# Petition — Fitzgerald v. Staats

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 1004

## Text

ene.

| Supreme Court, U. &

—- —————— . Ft ED

IN THE OCT S80 1978
Supreme Cart of thy United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978

MIGHAE! R@DAK, JR., CLERK

No. 7B -T15

A. ERNEST FITZGERALD.
Petitioner
VS.

ELMER B. STAATS, et al.

Re spond ts

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN BODNER, JR.
LAWRENCE R. VELVEL
1730 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneus for Petitioner
Of Counsel:

RALPH J. TEMPLE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
1345 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004

October, 1978

WILSON - EPES PRINTING COo., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C 20001

aR

i
;

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
NI LS SS PII se a 1
SR at AEN RES a NA Eee Re 1
NESS TIE BE ec er at Ree 2
a 2
ESS EIST Tis 8 OS ase 3
on ianueubuisiciancte 3
TT ceneaiaein 4
Reasons for Granting a Writ of Certiorari 0... 9

I. This Lawsuit Raises Issues Of Substantial Pub-
NES ES ES re Oe DOE LOT EL AD 9

Il. Sovereign Immunity Is Incompatible With Con-

stitutional Government Existing Under The Rule
SN isadcastnniinnen 12

A. The Decision Of This Court In United States
Nee so cieemmmbonnsiaueees 12

B. This Court Should Return To The Teachings
i oa, lactisaenaliennaonenaas 15

III. Sovereign Immunity Is Inconsistent With Deci-
sions Of This Court Involving Governmental
Immunities And The Awarding Of Remedies,
And, In Light Of Principles Regarding Ancillary
And Traditional Remedies, Is Particularly Inap-
plicable To Awards Of Interest’'On Back Pay.... 20

A. Sovereign Immunity Conflicts With Cases
Which Have Curtailed Governmental Im-
ey aR LR Ee ha A Rr ae OO 20

B. Sovereign Immunity Is In Conflict With De-
cisions Holding That Courts Must Fashion
Appropriate Remedies In Order To Protect
aa aa och a arcreeuandonniticicnbinasininas 22

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

C. Because of Principles Established by this
Court Regarding Ancillary and Traditional
Remedies, Sovereign Immunity Is Particu-
larly Inapplicable to Awards of Interest on
ea Ce aE Bi SS ee Cae a ee NI

REA RRURE STS OR 0g ce LER om PN
2. Interest Is A Traditional Remedy .............

III. This Case Illustrates Numerous Of The Reasons
Why Sovereign Immunity Should Be Overruled
Or At Least Should Be Ruled Inapplicable To
Recovery Of Interest On Back Pay ~.....-.........

Re en et pee ae ae

Page

24

27
29

Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page
Branzburg Vv. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 3
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) -........................... 22
Bivens Vv. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

ee Rie ee Roe 22, 23
Burnet Vv. Coronade Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393
RMS ns en cee re ale 19

Butz v. Economou, 46 L.W. 4952 (1978) . 20, 21, 22, 25, 24
Davis Vv. Jobs For Progress, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 479
rec: I ae 25
Dugan Vv. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) SS ES ties 16, 18
Edelman V. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)... 19, 20, 24, 25
Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (C.A. D.C.,

akc cece ee te ee 3,5
Fitzgerald v. Staats, 429 F.Supp. 933 (D.C. D.C.,

hh Sale cee A ERIN SN a PON y= eR 7 ORO 8
Fitzgerald v. Staats, 578 F.2d 485 (C.A. D.C.,

og RIESE TREN ELD. 1S cb CE CLO a 7 RC 8
Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-

sion, Civ. No. 74-686 (D.C. D.C., 1974) 3,6
Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commis-

sion, 554 F.2d 1186 (C.A. D.C., 1977) _....... 3,6
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) _........ 20
Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. 4817 (1978) _...20, 21, 24, 25, 26
Jones V. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)... 23
Larson V. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,

2 ae | _- eee eel ne 16,18

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the
City of New York, 46 L.W. 4569, decided June 8,

I OR 18, 19, 20, 21
NLRB v. American Express Warehouse, 374 F.2d

I 25
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)... 19
Pettway V. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 491 F.2d

Be OY SRO STN Pa 25
Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana RR. v. United

States, 264 US. 141 (1920) ................................ 26

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 329 U.S. 229

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
United States vy. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, et al.,
$41 US. 48 (7961) —........ eee 15
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) —.............. 15
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)..12, 13, 14, 15,
17, 18, 19
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) -......... 16
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)... 15
United States Vv. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1975) -....... 15
United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel, 329 U.S.
SOS (i967) 00 ee 9,15
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S.
166 (1972) eee 12
Willet v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F.Supp. 631
(W.D. Va., 1977), Aff’d, 529 F.2d 212 (CA 4,
Ste? Ste sos diheanencestclabeenasletceltnammiee OS eacgaa ene 25
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. Vv. Sawyer, 343
US. 679 (16)... eee 17
Statutes:
U.S. Code
28 U.S.C. See: 2966 20 1
Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5596 ......... 2, 8, 9, 10, 27
Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701.... 5, 8,9
31 U.S.C. See. SF ee 8,9
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 et seq. .... 25
Other:
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457
CORT). ok cae CRIP a EH 19

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No.

A. ERNEST FITZGERALD,
Petitioner
VS.
ELMER B. STAATS, et al.
Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioner A. Ernest Fitzgerald respectfully prays that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia entered June 2, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the District Court is reported at 429
F. Supp. 933, and appears in the Appendix at pp. 24-a—
29-a. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
578 F.2d 435, and appears in the Appendix at pp. l-a—
23-a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
June 2, 1978. Within ninety days of that date, on Au-
gust 9, 1978, the time in which to file a petition for cer-
tiorari was extended by order of Mr. Justice Brennan
until October 30, 1978. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254.

2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, a government
employee who was unlawfully fired has a right to be made
whole for his losses. The employee cannot be made whole
unless he receives interest on back pay which was with-
held from him. Despite the statutory policy that the em-
ployee be made whole, the court below ruled that, pursuant
to decisions of this Court, the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity precludes an award of interest on back pay re-
covered by an illegally terminated employee. In these cir-
cumstances, the question presented is whether this Court
should permit awards of interest on back pay to be barred
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity even though that
doctrine is inconsistent with the statutory policy, is
inconsistent with fundamental precepts underlying a
constitutional republic operating under the rule of law,
is incompatible with decisions of this Court curtailing
governmental immunities and with decisions of the Court
holding that judicial tribunals must fashion remedies
to implement constitutional and statutory rights, and
is particularly inapplicable to an award of interest on
back pay because of principles regarding ancillary and
traditional remedies.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 5596, provides in perti-
nent part:

(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of
an administrative determination or a timely ap-
peal, is found by appropriate authority under
applicable law or regulation to have undergone
an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action
that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduc-
tions of all or a part of the pay, allowances, or
differentials of the employee—

(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel
action, to receive for the period for which

3

the personnel action was in effect an amount
equal to all or any part of the pay, allow-
ances, or differentials, as applicable, that
the employee normally would have earned
during that period if the personnel action
had not occurred, less any amounts earned
by him through other employment during
that period....

STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This petition for certiorari is filed by A. Ernest Fitz-
gerald, whose name has become synonymous with govern-
mental retaliation visited upon those who lawfully expose
serious inefficiency or wrongdoing in government pro-
grams. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 at 724
n. 12 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in the con-
solidated case of United States v. Caldwell) ; Fitzgerald
v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (CADC, 1972); Fitzgerald
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 554 F.2d 1186,
1190, 1188 n. 2 (CADC, 1977); Fitzgerald v. United
States Civil Service Commission, Civ. No. 74-686, de-
cided July 15, 1974, D.C.D.C. Fitzgerald was illegally
fired as one of the Air Force’s chief cost analysts almost
nine years ago, after accurately testifying before the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint
Economic Committee (JEC) that the C-5A transport
plane program could well incur approximately $2 billion
in cost overruns. Though in 1973 a Civil Service hearing
examiner ordered that he be reinstated with back pay to
a job with the same or similar qualifications, he has never
in fact been reinstated to a job requiring his expertise.
Instead, of being given a job working oa major weapons
systems—the work he did before he was illegally fired—
he has been placed in such positions as overseeing bowling
alleys in Thailand.

4

In the present petition Fitzgerald seeks to overturn an
order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia upholding the government’s refusal to
pay him interest on back pay which was withheld from
him. A large amount of the back pay on which interest
is sought was lengthily withheld from Fitzgerald even
after the government conceded that it was owed to him.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

Ernest Fitzgerald is a specialist in cost controls. He
began his career in private industry, where he worked
on cost controls for vital defense projects such as the
Minuteman missile program, and created a new cost con-
trol system now widely known in the military contracting
industry. The excellence of his work brought him to the
attention of high Air Force officials, who prevailed upon
him in 1965 to join the Air Force Secretariat as Deputy
for Management Systems. His work for the Air Force
received an “Outstanding Performance Rating” from his
superiors in 1966 and 1967.

In 1968 Congress became interested in the costs of de-
veloping the huge C-5A transport plane and -the Joint
Economic Committee (JEC) requested Fitzgerald’s testi-
mony on this subject. Fitzgerald testified to the JEC on
November 13, 1968 that there could be a $2 billion cost
overrun on the plane. The Secretary of Defense and Air
Force generals, including the Chief of Staff, subsequently
admitted that Fitzgerald’s figures were accurate.

After Fitzgerald’s testimony, he became ostracized
within the Air Force, had his tenured status taken away,
was subjected to public charges and secret investigations
by Air Force officials, and was fired on November 4, 1969.

5

Il.

On January 20, 1970, Fitzgerald instituted an appeal
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for reinstate-
ment, back pay and other relief, on the ground that his
firing was improper and contrary to law. The CSC Ap-
peals Examiner ruled that the hearings before him would
be closed ones, but, in a lawsuit thereupon instituted on
this question by Fitzgerald, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered that the
hearings be open. In rejecting the government’s plea for
secret hearings, the Court of Appeals, quoting Justice
Douglas, warned of the dangers which can flow from gov-
ernment actions which do not meet standards of fair
dealing. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 767-768
(1972).

After open hearings thereafter took place, the Appeals
Examiner ruled that Fitzgerald’s firing had been due to
improper reasons. The Examiner recommended that Fitz-
gerald be restored retroactively to the position from which
he had been separated or to one having the same or simi-
lar qualifications. The Examiner further recommended
an award of back pay and denied an award of attorneys
fees.

III.

Fitzgerald appealed the denial of attorneys fees to the
full Commission, which ruled against him on the ground
that payment of attorneys fees was not authorized by the
relevant statute, Section 14 of the Veterans Preference
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Fitzgerald then instituted a lawsuit
for the fees in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, which held in his favor but was
overruled by the Court of Appeals. Though the Court of
Appeals agreed with the lower court that a denial of
attorneys fees might work a miscarriage cf justice in

6

this case,’ it held that “attorneys fees are not awardable
under $14 because that section does not contain the
requisite explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.” Fitz-
gerald v. United States Civil Serv. Com’n, 554 F.2d 1186,
1188 (CADC, 1977).

IV.

The Air Force took no appeal to the full Commission
from the Examiner’s ruling that Fitzgerald had been
fired for improper reasons. The Examiner’s recommenda-
tion thus became the final order of the Commission on
October 3, 1973, and Fitzgerald thereupon obtained a
right to reinstatement to an appropriate postion and,
after appropriate deductions, to a considerable amount of
back pay. However, the Air Force refused to reinstate
Fitzgerald to an appropriate position and the CSC denied
Fitzgerald relief on this issue. Fitzgerald therefore
brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia asserting his right to reinstate-
ment.’ The district court vigorously upheld his right, but
to this day the Air Force still has not reinstated Fitz-
gerald to an appropriate position.

1 The appellate court said that the district court might have been
correct in fearing that a denial of attorneys fees “ ‘would make a
mockery and a sham of the mandate of Congress, and in cases like
the present one would make those rights meaningless.’” 554 F.2d
at 1190.

The Court of Appeals also noted that Fitzgerald “has, on more
than one occasion, been forced to seek judicial relief in order to
insure the integrity of the administrative hearing process.” 554
F.2d at 1188 n.2.

- In upholding Fitzgerald, the court said, per Judge Bryant:

This case, however presents an exceptional history of unseemly
delay and conduct by various agencies of government. This
conduct smacks of harassment and vindictiveness towards an
individual who dared expose the shortcomings of his superiors
and, whether deliberately or not, it will intimidate others who
might feel duty bound to take similar action. Fitzgerald v.
United States Civil Serv. Com'n., Civ. No. 74-686, decided
July 15, 1974, at p. 5.

7

Vv.

Just as the Air Force failed to reinstate Fitzgerald to
a proper position after the Appeals Examiner’s decision,
so too it refused to promptly pay him one dime of the
total amount of money owed to him: it would not even
promptly pay him portions which it conceded were owing
to him. Instead, it delayed payment by asking the Comp-
troller General to rule that large amounts should be de-
ducted from his back pay award, and, while the Comp-
troller’s decision was pending, flatly refusing to pay
Fitzgerald even the amounts conceded to be owing. After
almost eight months of this conduct, the Comptroller Gen-
eral ordered the Air Force to pay Fitzgerald the con-
ceded amounts, which then totalled $34,498.39. Thirteen
months later, on June 19, 1975, the Comptroller General
overruled the Air Force’s erroneous claim for deductions
from the back pay award. Thus 21 months after the
Examiner’s decision, Fitzgerald finally received the re-
maining money owed to him, which was $38,250.23.

VI.

Though the Comptroller General’s decisions resulted in
Fitzgerald finally receiving the amounts of back pay owed
to him, the Comptroller General also ruled on May 6, 1974
that interest was not recoverable on the back pay. Fitz-
gerald thus received no interest on monies which had been
wrongly withheld from him over a span of 514 years—
i.e. from the effective date of the wrongful firing which
denied him a salary, January 6, 1970, to the date of final
payment of back pay, June 19, 1975. He did not even
receive interest on the amounts of back pay which had
concededly been owing subsequent to the decision of the
Appeals Examiner.

After the Comptroller General’s decision denying inter-
est, Fitzgerald brought a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia to recover
interest on the monies which had been withheld. Fitz-

8

gerald claimed an entitlement to interest under the Back
Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. $§ 5596; under the Veterans Preference
Act, 5 U.S.C. $7701; and under 31 U.S.C. § 227, which
provides a method for dealing with final judgments
against the United States when the government claims an
offset on the ground that the judgment creditor is in-
debted to the United States.

The District Court held against Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald
v. Staats, 429 F. Supp. 933 (D.C.D.C., 1977). Citing
precedent from this Court, it ruled that, because the
Back Pay Act does not expressly provide for the payment
of interest, the Act does not contain an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity and therefore does not authorize the
recovery of interest. It also held that 31 USC § 227 does
not authorize interest in this case because Fitzgerald had
obtained no judgment against the United States.

Fitzgerald then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Court of Ap-
peals, per Judges Lumbard (sitting by designation),
McGowan and MacKinnon, was highly sympathetic to
Fitzgerald’s plight, pointing out that this was “‘his latest
skirmish in his struggle” and that “[p]art of the history
of Fitzgerald’s battle” could be found in prior opinions.
Fitzgerald v. Staats, 578 F.2d 435, 4386 n.2 (C.A.D.C.,
1978). The Court was also warmly disposed towards the
merits of Fitzgerald’s case, saying in this regard that he
“undoubtedly deserves to be ‘made whole’ by the govern-
ment, and that it had “sympathy for Fitzgerald’s posi-
tion.” 578 F.2d at 440, 436. Indeed, the court even indi-
cated clearly that its preference would have been to de-
cide the case in Fitzgerald’s favor: in assessing Fitzger-
ald’s argument that the “ ‘make whole’” policy of the
Back Pay Act and the “corrective action” policy of the
Veterans Preference Act show the payability of what the
court termed “so natural and common a remedy as inter-
est,”’ the court said “were we free to decide whether the
policies of these remedial statutes called for the recovery

9

of interest, we might well agree with” Fitzgerald. 578
F.2d at 438.

However, the Court of Appeals believed it was not free
to act in accordance with its view of the justice and
merits of the case. “Despite our sympathy for Fitzger-
ald’s position”, it said, “‘we believe ourselves constrained
to affirm.” 578 F.2d at 436. And though it “might well
agree with” Fitzgerald “[wlere we free to” do so, the
court believed “we are not so free.” 578 F.2d at 438.

In explaining why it felt forced to reject Fitzgerald’s
argument that the Back Pay Act and Veterans Preference
Act authorized the payment of interest, the Court of Ap-
peals relied heavily on decisions of this Court holding
that, unless it is expressly waived, the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity prevents suit against the United States.
The Court of Appeals relied in particular on this Court’s
ruling in United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel, 329
U.S. 585 (1947), that sovereign immunity bars the recov-
ery of interest against the United States unless a statute
provides for such recovery in express terms.

The Court of Appeals rejected Fitzgerald’s argument
under 31 U.S.C. § 227 on the ground that Fitzgerald was
not a judgment creditor and was not indebted to the
United States. 578 F.2d at 439.

The instant petition for certiorari seeks review of the
Court of Appeals decision. More specifically, review is
sought of the court’s ruling that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity bars the payment of interest under the Back
Pay Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I. THIS LAWSUIT RAISES ISSUES OF SUBSTAN-
TIAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

The Back Pay Act states that a government employee
who has “undergone an unjustified or unwarranted per-
sonnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or re-

10

ductions of all or part of the pay, allowances or differen-
tials of the employee—(1) is entitled, on correction of the
personnel action, to receive for the period for which the
personnel action was im effect an amount equal to all or
any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials, as ap-
plicable, that the employee normally would have earned
during that period if the personnel action had not oc-
curred. ...” In providing that a wronged employee should
receive what he otherwise would have earned, the Act
evinces a clear congressional policy that an unlawfully
terminated employee should be made whole for any losses
he has suffered because of the wrongful termination.

In the courts below, Fitzg:rald argued that this make
whole policy of the Back Pay Act entitled him to receive
interest on the back pay which had been withheld from
him heeause he was wrongfully fired by the Air Force.
This legal argument is premised on the simple proposition
that, having lost the use of the monies over a span of
years, Fitzgerald cannot truly receive what he otherwise
would have earned and cannot be made whole unless he is
compensated by interest. The proposition that interest is
necessary to compensate for the lost use of monies and to
make a party whole is universally accepted in the Ameri-
can economy. It is obviously followed by the United States
Government itself, which demands that interest be paid to
it by persons who have withheld monies from it, such as
persons who have not paid the appropriate amount of
taxes or have paid them late. The validity of Fitzgerald’s
argument, and its plain basis, was not denied by the dis-
trict court, was not denied by the Court of Appeals—
which called interest “so natural and common a remedy”
—and was not even denied by the government. Rather,
Fitzgerald lost his argument for one reason only: the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. As previously indicated,
both lower courts held that, pursuant to precedents of this
Court, sovereign immunity blocks an award of interest
against the United States unless a statute provides in
express terms for the payment of interest.

A A een ne

11

The question which therefore arises is whether this
Court should continue to permit the judicially-created doc-
trine of sovereign immunity to prevent an award of in-
terest against the United States in cases where a statute
does not provide in express terms for the payment of
interest. It is Fitzgerald’s contention that the answer to
this question must necessarily be in the negative for three
reasons which are of such fundamental importance to
this nation that they inherently demonstrate that this
case raises issues of enormous consequence for the law
and the country.

The first reason is that, because it destroys the possi-
bility of recovery by citizens who have been grievously
and wrongfully injured by the government, sovereign
immunity is wholly incompatible with the most basic
concepts of a constitutional government operating under
the rule of law. In view of its inconsistency with basic
concepts underlying our structure of government, sov-
ereign immunity should no longer be allowed to bar such
recoveries.

Second, sovereign immunity is highly inconsistent with
decisions of this Court curtailing governmental immuni-
ties and decisions of the Court holding that courts must
fashion remedies to implement constitutional and statu-
tory rights. For this reason, also, sovereign immunity
should not be allowed to bar recoveries.

Third, even if the doctrine of sovereign immunity were
not to be wholly disposed of by this Court, the doctrine
is particularly inapplicable to the payment of interest on
statutory awards of back pay which has been wrongfully
withheld by government. This pronounced inapplicability
exists due to principles established by this Court regard-
ing ancijlary and traditional remedies. Thus sovereign
immunity should not bar the recovery of interest on back
pay even if the doctrine were to continue to bar recoveries
in other contexts.

12

II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT EXIST-
ING UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

A. The Decision of This Court in United States v. Lee

Almost 100 years ago, in its “classic opinion” * in
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), this Court
recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
wholly inconsistent with fundamental concepts of Ameri-
can government. Sovereign immunity, said the Court,
was derived from England, where it had existed at
least from the time of King Edward I. 106 U.S. at 205.
Although it had been asserted in America, it “has never
been discussed or the reasons for it given.” 106 U.S. at
207. In analyzing the reasons for it, the Court pointed
out that the grounds which justified the doctrine in
England were entirely inapplicable to the United States
because of the “vast difference in the essential character
of the two governments as regards the source and the
depositories of power.” 106 U.S. at 208. England, said
the Court, is a “king-loving nation”, where “|t}he
crown remains the fountain of honor,” and “the monarch
is looked upon with too much reverence to be subjected
to the demands of law, as ordinary persons are.” But the
United States (which fought a revolution against rule by
a king) is entirely different:

Under our system the people, who are there called
subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether
collective or individual, are not bound to give way to
a sentiment of loyalty to the person of a monarch.
The citizen here knows no person, however near to
those in power, or however pewerful himself, to
whom he need yield the rights which the law secures
to him when it is well administered. When he, in

* Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 165 at 178.
(Dissent of Rehnquist, J., discussing the opinion of Justice Miller
in the Slaughter House Cases.)

13

one of the courts of competent jurisdiction, has
established his right to property, there is no reason
why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not
even the United States, should prevent him from us-
ing the means which the law gives him for the pro-
tection and enforcement of that right. 106 U.S. at
208.

In England, where the courts are the king’s courts,
a suit against the government would involve “the ab-
surdity of the king’s sending a writ to himself to com-
mand the king to appear in the king’s court.” But, said
the Court, “[N]jo such reason exists in our government.”
106 U.S. at 206. “Nor can it be said the government is
degraded by appearing as a defendant.” Jd. And if it be
argued that suit against the government “would be in-
consistent with the very idea of supreme executive power,
and would endanger the performance of the publie duties
of the sovereign,” id., the clear answer is that “fa]s ne
person in this government exercises supreme executive
power, or performs the public duties of a sovereign, it is
difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the
exemption from liability to suit rests.” 106 U.S. at 206.

Just as the Court believed the differences between Eng-
land and the United States militated heavily against’ the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, so too the Court believed
that sovereign immunity cannot be justified by any argu-
ment that evils will befall the nation if the government
is subject to suit. The history of the country was against
any such argument. Though the United States govern-
ment had existed “for now nearly a century under the
present constitution,” with the “principle and practice”
of judicial action against unlawful conduct by the United
States government being “well established,” “no injury
from it has come to that government.” 106 U.S. at 221.
Indeed, no harm from the judicial check against unlawful
conduct had befallen the government even though the
principle and practice of a such a check had existed over

14

a lengthy period during which the nation had been in-
volved in “at least two wars, so serious as to call into
exercise ali the powers a‘ all the resources of the gov-
ernment ... One of them was a great civil war, such
as the world has seldom known ....” Ibid. at 221-222.

Even aside from the history of the nation, the Court
was unwilling to countenance any argument positing that
calamities would arise if sovereign immunity were struck
down. For such arguments would destroy the system
of law.

Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested
by a particularly fruitful imagination in regard to
almost every law upon which depend the rights of
the individual or of the government, and if the ex-
istence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to
withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law
must fail.

To the Court in Lee, the evils to be feared were not
those imagined from an absence of sovereign immunity,
but the destruction of rights which accompanies sovereign
immunity.

Looking at the question upon principle, and apart
from the authority of adjudged cases, we think it
still clearer that this branch of the defence cannot
be maintained. It seems to be opposed to all the prin-
ciples upon which the rights of the citizen, when
brought in collision with the acts of the government,
must be determined. In such cases there is no safety
for the citizen, except in the protection of the
judicia] tribunals, for rights which have been in-
vaded by the officers of the government, professing
to act in its name... 106 U.S. at 219.

These provisions for the security of the rights of
the citizen stand in the Constitution in the same con-
nection and upon the same ground, as they regard
his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that
both were intended to be enforced by the judiciary

15

as one of the departments of the government estab-
lished by that Constitution .... 106 U.S. at 220.

Courts of justice are established, not only to decide
upon the controverted rights of the citizens against
each other, but also upon rights in controversy be-
tween them and the government; and the docket of
this court is crowded with controversies of the latter
class.

Shall it be said, in the face of all this, and of the
acknowledged right of the judiciary to decide in
proper cases, statutes which have been passed by
both branches of Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent to be unconstitutional, that the courts cannot
give a remedy when the citizen has been deprived of
his property by force, his estate seized and converted
to the use of the government without lawful author-
ity, without process of law, and without compensa-
tion, because the President has ordered it and his
officers are in possession?

If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a
tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies
of Europe, nor in any other government which has a
just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protec-
tion of personal rights. 106 U.S. at 220-221.

B. This Court Should Return To the Teachings of Lee

The opinion in Lee was clearly correct, but in subse-
quent years, its teachings largely fell into desuetude. Sov-
ereign immunity was repeatedly invoked by the govern-
ment and upheld by this Court. E.g. United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) ; United States v. Thayer-
West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947); United
States v. Alcea Band of Tiilamooks, et al., 341 U.S. 48
(1951); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969);
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1975). Rarely
were any reasons given for upholding it: rather, it usually
Was sustained as an ipsi dixit. It became, to borrow a
memorable phrase used by Justice Warren, a “talismanic

16

incantation [used] to support any exercise of . + + power
which can be brought within its ambit.” * United States
v. Robel, 389 US 258, 263 (1967).

Only on relatively infrequent occasions did the Court
depart from the doctrine. The Court did once acknowl-
edge that there could be substance In the argument that
sovereign immunity is an archaic hangover which should
be limited wherever possible in connection with suits for
damages, that Congress itself had increasingly permitted
damage suits, and that the Court should be hospitable to
this trend. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703-704 (1949). And Justice Frank-
furter did point out on various occasions that justice and
democratic notions of moral responsibility require that
the sovereign not be free of ordinary legal responsibility.
E.g. Larson Vv. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,
ibid., at 708-709, 723-724, 723 n.13 (dissenting opinion
of Justice Frankfurter). But for the most part, though
sovereign immunity is a judge-made doctrine which could
be curbed by judges, the Court left it entirely to the Con-
gress to make inroads upon the doctrine. Perhaps the
only broad inroad made by this Court itself was its hold-
ing in Dugan v. Rank, 372 US 609 (1963), that sov-
ereign immunity will not apply when an official’s action
is in excess of his statutory powers or, though within his
statutory powers, the powers themselves, or the manner
of their exercise, are constitutionally void. However,
while this inroad has the estimable virtue of at least re-
moving the bar of sovereign immunity where an official
has no power or the Constitution is violated, it does not
touch the host of cases in which government wrongly in-
jures citizens by actions which are within statutory
powers and not constitutionally void. The present litiga-

‘ The invocation and upholding of the doctrine became so routine
that, as is known to any lawyer having much experience with the
doctrine, the go. ernment long has used virtual “canned briefs” when
invoking it.

17

tion, in which government has denied interest to Fitz-
gerald, is one example of such cases.

Fitzgerald submits that the time has come when this
Court should no longer permit the invocation of sovereign
immunity, but should instead return to the wisdom of
United States v. Lee, and extend the inroad of Dugan Vv.
Rank, by ruling that sovereign immunity cannot bar suit
against unlawful governmental action regardless of
whether or not the illegal action happens to fit the cate-
gory of being in excess of statutory powers or constitu-
tionally void. The desirability of returning to Lee and
extending Dugan is made manifest by the kinds of his-
torical experiences which led to efforts to create a consti-
tutional government under the rule of law, and which
have never ceased to occur in this nation or in the world
at large. Historical experience has shown, time and time
again, and no less in the last fifteen years than at other
times, that the preservation of liberty and democracy
depends upon the existence of checks against the illegal
use of governmental power. History has shown the con-
tinuing soundness, in Justice Frankfurter’s words, of the
views of the “long-headed statesmen” who framed the
Constitution with “no illusion that our people enjoyed
biological or psychological or sociologica! immunities from
the hazards” of illegal power. Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. Vv. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1950) (Justice Frank-
furter concurring). History has shown and continues
to show the wisdom of the Lee case in ruling that “there
is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the
judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded by

officers of the government, professing to act in its name.”
106 U.S. 219.

This Court is, of course, free to implement the wisdom
of Lee. Precedents upholding sovereign immunity do not
bar the Court from doing so. As the Court recently said
in overruling the mistaken doctrine of municipal im-
munity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C.

18

$1983, even when “Congress can correct our mistakes
through legislation . . . we have never applied stare
decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling an earlier de-
cision. . . Nor is this a case where we should place on
the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court’s own
error’. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the
City of New York, 46 L.W. 4569, decided June 8, 1978,
O.T. 1977, at p. 4579. This teaching is as applicable here
as it was in Monell, as is shown by the many parallels
between the two cases on matters which were controlling
in Monell on the question whether prior precedent should
be overruled. Those parallels on controlling matters in-
clude the following:

Here, as in Monell, the doctrine at issue is judge-made
and therefore can properly be overruled by judges. In
both cases, the doctrine was a departure from precedent
‘i.e., from Lee in the present case). In both cases, Con-
gress refused to extend the doctrine and in fact enacted
legislation to diminish it. Indeed, in the present case,
Congressional inroads are broader than in Monell, since
here the federal tort claims act waives sovereign im-
munity and permits recovery for a variety of actions,
whereas in Monell Congress had merely legislated to
provide for recovery of attorneys fees.

Here, as in Monell, the government can claim no
absolute immunity and cannot arrange its affairs on the
assumption that it can violate rights at will, since not
only has Congress made inroads on sovereign immunity,
but this Court itself has made an important departure
from it in Dugan v. Rank. Here, as in Monell, Con-
gressional history clearly indicates that Congress does
not favor the doctrine at issue, as illustrated by Con-
gressional inroads, and as was effectively acknowledged
by the Court in Larson when it pointed out that Con-
gress had increasingly allowed damage suits against the
United States. And here, as was true in Monell, the
doctrine at issue conflicts with other important lines of

19

precedent established by this Court, as will be showa
below.

Finally, not only is this Court free to return to the
wisdom of Lee, but principles of sound decision-making
clearly indicate that it should do so. In a concurring
opinion in Monell, Justice Powell said, quoting in part
from a famous comment made by Justice Holmes, that
“the law has recognized the necessity of change, lest
rules ‘simply persist from blind imitation of the past.’ ”
46 L.W. 4583 n.6. Holmes’ full comment, of course, was
that “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past. Holmes’ The Path of The Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev.
457, 459 (1897). The doctrine of sovereign immunity
continues to exist only because “so it was laid down in
the time of” King Edward I, and only because of “imita-
tion of the past.” Its original grounds “have vanished
long since” and it cannot be justified on any ground that
will withstand analysis. To the contrary, it is condemned
by the lessons of history and the fundamental precepts of
our government. Thus, because the Court’s decisions are
open to discussion when . . . supposed to have been founded
in error, and... its judicial authority should hereafter
depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by
which it is supported,” Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 470 (1849) (per Taney, C.J.), and because
“(t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning,’ ” Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 671 n.14, quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil and
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis), the Court should consign sovereign
immunity to the discard heap of history, where it belongs.

20

III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT INVOLVING GOV-
ERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES AND THE AWARDING
OF REMEDIES, AND, IN LIGHT OF PRINCIPLES
REGARDING ANCILLARY AND TRADITIONAL
REMEDIES, IS PARTICULARLY INAPPLICABLE
TO AWARDS OF INTEREST ON BACK PAY

A. Sovereign Immunity Conflicts with Cases Which
Have Curtailed Governmental Immunities

In a series of cases decided in recent years, this Court
has repeatedly struck down or greatly restricted im-
munities which protected governments and governmental
officials from suits alleging violations of statutory and
constitutional rights. Butz v. Economou, 46 U.W. 4952,
decided June 29, 1978, O.T. 1977; Hutto v. Finney, 46
L.W. 4817. decided June 23, 1978, O.T. 1977; Monell v.
Department of Social Services, supra; Fitzpatrick Vv.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman V. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974). The continued existence of sovereign
immunity for the federal government is inconsistent with
this line of decisions.

Three of the cases actually involved sovereign im-
munity: they dealt with the sovereign immunity of
states. Hutto v. Finney, supra; Fitzpatrick. v. Bitzer,
supra, Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The states’ sovereign
immunity, unlike that of the federal government, is
possessed by virtue of a specific constitutional clause, the
Eleventh Amendment, rather than by virtue of mere ju-
dicial creation. But though the Court was dealing with
sovereign immunity existing under an express provision
of the Constitution, in all three cases it ruled that the
immunity could not bar recovery. In Edelman vy. Jordan
the Court held that the claimed sovereign immunity did
not preclude the recovery of prospective damages from
state government for a violation of rights existing under
a federal statute and regulations. In Fitzpatrick v.

21

Bitzer, where Congress had enforced the Fourteenth
Amendment by enacting a statute granting substantive
rights, providing for suit, and providing for attorneys
fees, the Court held that the claimed sovereign immunity
did not bar the recovery of prospective damages and
attorneys fees for a violation of the rights existing under
the statute. And in Hutto v. Finney the Court held that
the alleged sovereign immunity could not bar the recovery
of attorneys fees from state government for district
court litigation in which state officials had in bad faith
failed to follow court orders enforcing constitutional
rights, and for appellate court litigation as to which the
attorneys fees were authorized by Congress.

: A fourth case, Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, struck down a claim of municipal immunity from
damages for violations of federal statutory rights. The
fifth case, Butz v. Economou, curtailed the absolute im-
munity of federal officials, when not acting in a judicial
or prosecutorial capacity, for knowing and deliberate
violations of constitutional rights.

These cases, in which governmental immunities were
abolished or restricted, demonstrate that the continued
existence of sovereign immunity for the federal govern-
ment is in conflict with the clear trend of authority in
this Court. Moreover, it is difficult to grasp why federal
sovereign immunity should continue to stand when state
sovereign immunity repeatedly falls. Principles appli-
cable to the governmental immunities of states are ap-
plicable as well to the governmenta! immunities of the
federal government, as was made explicitly clear by
numerous statements of the Court in Butz v. Economou.’

s In Butz v. Economou, the Court said that decisions on state im-
munities are “instructive” on federal! immunities, and relied heavily
on such decisions in determining federal immunities. 49 L. W. at
4957. It said that it could “see no sense” in holding state officials
liable, but immunizing their exact federal counterparts. 46 L. W. at
4958, 4958-59. It pointed out that any relevant problems facing state

22

Thus it is evident that, since state sovereign immunity
has had to fall in order to insure “ ‘the very essence of
civil liberty, [which] consists in the right of every in-
dividual to claim the protection of the laws,’” so too
federal sovereign immunity must also fall. Butz v. Econo-
mou, supra, at 4954.

B. Sovereign Immunity Is In Confiict With Decisions
Holding That Courts Must Fashion Appropriate
Remedies In Order To Protect Rights

In addition to being incompatible with the line of au-
thority curtailing governmental immunities, sovereign
immunity conflicts with a line of decisions holding that
courts must fashion remedies necessary to protect citizens’
rights. These decisions establish that

where federally protected rights have been invaded,
it has been the rule from the beginning that courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-
edy to make good the wrong done. Bell v. Hood, 327
US 678 at 684 (1946), quoted in Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 329 US 229 at 239 (1969).

The line of cases enunciating this rule include well known
decisions implementing constitutional rights, Bell V.
Hood, supra, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics

officials “are little if at all different from those affecting federal offi-
cials”. 46 L. W. at 4958. It said that in the absence of contrary direc-
tions from Congress, it was “untenable to draw a distinction for
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state
officials under $ 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials.” 46 L. W. at 4959. And it ruled that
“To create a system in which the Bill of Rights more closely moni-
tors the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials
is to stand the constitutional design on its head.” 46 L. W. at 4959.

23

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and other well known de-
cisions implementing rights granted by statute, Jones
v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n. 13 (1968); Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, supra. In these decisions, this
Court has not shied away from allowing monetary re-
covery since “|hJistorically damages have been regarded
as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal in-
terests in liberty.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, supra, 403 U.S. at 395. See also
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra. And the Court
has been cognizant that remedies must be provided for
violations of law because “[a]n agent acting—albeit
unconstitutionally—in the name of the United States
possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an in-
dividual trespasser exercising no authority other than
his own. Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 392.

It is clear that sovereign immunity runs athwart of
the foregoing line of cases, since the cases are intended
to protect rights by awarding a remedy, whereas sover-
eign immunity denies protection of rights by denying a
remedy. The existence of precisely this type of confli :
was addressed by the Court in Butz v. Economou, when
it pointed out that “the cause of action recognized in
Bivens . . . would similarly be ‘drained of meaning’ if
federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for
their constitutional transgressions,’ 46 L.W. at 4959,
and consequently refused to uphold absolute - immunity
lest a lawsuit “provide no redress to the injured citizen,
nor... in any degree deter federal officials from com-
mitting constitutional wrongs.” 46 L.W. at 4959-60. As
in Butz v. Economou, the Court in the present case should
address the conflict between a line of authority holding
that courts should fashion remedies to uphold rights,
and a doctrine of immunity which nullifies rights by
denying remedies. And, as it also did in Butz v. Econo-

24

moi, the Court should strike down the immunity in order
to provide redress and deter wrongdoing.*

C. Because of Principles Established by this Court
Regarding Ancillary and Traditional Remedies,
Sovereign Immunity Is Particularly Inapplicable to
Awards of Interest on Back Pay

1. Interest On Back Pay Is An Ancillary Remedy

Sovereign immunity is not only inconsistent with the
cases discussed above, but, under principles of this Court
regarding ancillary and traditional remedies, is particn-
larly inapplicable to awards of interest on back pay. In
curtailing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the
Edelman and Hutto cases, supra, this Court held that sov-
ereign immunity will not bar a particular remedy which
is ancillary to another remedy whose grant is within the
power of a court. Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. at 4820-21;
Edeiman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667-669. Moreover, while
the consequences to the governmental fise have been of

6 There are. of course, numerous rights whose vindication is still
barred by sovereign immunity even though Congress has made in-
roads upon the doctrine and the Court itself made an inroad in
Duganv. Rank. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 46 L. W. 4959 n. 31.
Statutory rights as to which Congress has not expressly waived
sovereign immunity are a major category of rights which receive
no vindication against governmental invasion. Indeed this major
category is exemplified by this very case, since here government has
refused, on the basis of sovereign immunity, to pay Fitzgerald the
interest necessary to fulfill his statutory right to be made whole.
It is also possible that even some constitutional rights may be
jeopardized by sovereign immunity, since the specific reach and
application of Dugan v. Rank has not been sufficiently if at all
delineated in litigation.

It should be noted that lawsuits against government officials
themselves do not provide redress for the rights jeopardized by
sovereign immunity. For even when federal officials have no per-
sonal immunity, they will lack the personal means necessary to pay
damage awards. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673; opinion of
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part in
Butz v. Economou, 46 L. W. at 4963.

25

concern to the Court in determining whether a remedy is
permissible despite sovereign immunity, Hutto v. Fin-
ney, 46 L.W. at 4821 n. 11; Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. at 665-667; the Court specifically noted in Hutto
that permissible “‘[a]ncillary costs may be very large
indeed,” having exceeded $6 million in one case decided
by the Court. Hutto v. Finney, 46 L.W. at 4820, n.17.
The Court also stressed in Hutto that an ancillary remedy
is appropriate, despite sovereign immunity, when the
government has acted in bad faith. For in such a case,
the ancillary award is necessary to insure compliance
with law and to compensate for bad faith non compliance.

Under these principles, the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity cannot bar the recovery of interest on back pay
which has been wrongfully withheld.’ The recovery of in-
terest is merely ancillary to the award of back pay itself,
whose grant is within the power of the appropriate tri-
bunals because Congress has created a statutory right to
it. The recovery of interest, moreover, will not injure
the federal fise because, in the usual case, by far the
preponderant portion of the overall award will consist of
the back pay expressly authorized by Congress, with the
interest being only a smal! part of the award.” And even
if an improbable case were to arise in which interest
were to have mounted to the point where it overshadowed

7 It may be noted that, because of the make whole policy of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 72 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq.—-the same policy implemented by the Back
Pay Act—inteerst is granted as a matter of course on awards
of back pay under Title VII. Willett v. Emory and Henry College,
427 F.Supp. 631 (1977) (W.D. Va.), aff’d 529 F.2d 212 (C.A. 4,
1978); Davis v. Jobs For Progress, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 479 (1976);
Tidweli.v. American Oil Co., 332 F.Supp. 424 (1971); see Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 491 F.2d 211 (1974) (C.A. 5);
peso American Express Warehouse, 274 F.2d 573 (1967)

te This is true in the present case even though the government
withheld back pay from Fitzgerald for many years.

26

the amount of back pay itself, this would likely be due
to a very lengthy course of bad faith conduct by which
officials long refused to pay an employee the monies due
him.”

2. Interest Is A Traditional Remedy

In Hutto v. Finney this Court, speaking of an award
of costs of suit, pointed out that state sovereign im-
munity granted by the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
a form of recovery which has “traditionally been
awarded.” 46 L.W. at 4821. Like costs of suit, interest
is a form of recovery which has “traditionally been
awarded.” It was indeed called “so natural and common
a remedy” by the Court of Appeals. The government it-
self demands interest on monies owed to it, and can
hardly complain if it must in turn pay interest on money
which it owes to citizens,'’ especially citizens who have
been denied a living by the wrongful withholding of their
pay. If the government can refuse with impunity to pay
interest to citizens whose pay has been wrongly with-
held, then in practical effect it has received an interest
free loan from these citizens by illegally denying them
the monies necessary to support themselves and their

* During the course of this bad faith conduct, moreover, as well as
where there was no bad faith, the government would have had the
use of the money at statutory rates of interest which are normally
much less than the rate of interest the government would have had
to pay in the open market.

0In a famous comment quoted by the Court of Appeals in this
case, this Court, per Justice Holmes, said that citizens ‘“‘must turn
square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island,
Arkansas & Louisiana RR v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
Since in this nation the government was instituted and exists for
the benefit of the citizens, instead of the other way ‘round, it is hard
to understand why the government should not equally have to turn
square corners when dealing with citizens. If citizens must pay
interest to government on monies they owe to it, but government
need not pay interest to citizens on money it owes to them, then it is
obvious the government is not turning square corners when dealing
with the citizens.

dm eee me

27

families. For the government, as a practical matter, to
secure an interest free loan in this way is wholly repre-
hensible if not worse, and it can hardly be thought that
Congress intended to authorize such conduct when it
passed the Back Pay Act. Rather, the more logical (not
to say moral) reading of the act is that it represents a
Congressional waiver of any sovereign immunity which
might otherwise bar the payment of interest."

Ill. THIS CASE ILLUSTRATES NUMEROUS OF THE
REASONS WHY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHOULD
BE OVERRULED OR AT LEAST SHOULD BE
RULED INAPPLICABLE TO RECOVERY OF IN-
TEREST ON BACK PAY

The foregoing discussion makes clear that there are
numerous reasons why this Court should grant this pe-
tition for certiorari and either overrule the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in its entirety or at least rule it
inapplicable to the recovery of interest on back pay. The
appropriateness of granting this petition is further en-
hanced because the facts of this case provide a paradigm
illustration of so many of the reasons for ruling that
sovereign immunity can no longer bar recoveries or at
least cannot bar recovery of interest on awards of back
pay.

First, this case presents an unfortunately classic ex-
ample of governmental efforts to lawlessly destroy the
rights of a citizen. Fitzgerald, an outstanding employee
who was performing exemplary publie service, was sub-
jected to governmental ostracism and was fired for rea-
sons which were illegal. After he was unlawfully fired,

This reading of Congress’ intent is also supported by the fact
that Congress’ ability to carry out its constitutional functious will
be hampered if the government can visit illegal retribution upon em-
ployees who lawfully give Congress information it needs to carry
out its functions, and can then invoke sovereign immunity to bar
recoveries by these employees.

28

a government agency sought to suppress information
about his case by holding closed hearings in violation of
due process. After judicially ordered open hearings were
held and a decision was rendered, the government re-
fused to follow a lawful order to reinstate Fitzgerald to
an appropriate position, and also refused for a long
period to pay him money which was owed to him, even
money which concededly was owed to him. The govern-
ment also refused to pay him attorneys fees or interest,
and has forced him to fight a legal battle which is al-
ready over eight years old in order to obtain justice.
The government has been rebuked on several occasions
by federal district courts and federal courts of appeal,
but this has not dissuaded it from its course of resist-
ance to law—a course of action during which it has in-
voked sovereign immunity to bar various forms of
recovery.

Second, the claim of immunity being made here not
only conflicts with the teaching of recent cases on gov-
ernmental immunities, but is being used to deny a remedy
necessary to enforce the Congressionally granted right
of an unlawfully fired employee to be made whole for
his losses.

Third, the remedy of interest being sought here is
ancillary to the main remedy of back pay, is a traditional
remedy, is a remedy obtained by the government itself,
and will work no harm to the fise. Indeed, it will aid the
fisc because it will be a step towards insuring that gov-
ernment employees will be able to lawfully inform Con-
gress of enormous wastes of money * without fearing dev-
astating retaliation that will jeopardize their livelihood.

12 Fitzgerald warned Congress of a $2 billion cost overrun. Since
it is often pointed out that the work of the federal judiciary would
be greatly facilitated if the courts were allotted an extra amount of
money equal to the cost of a single destroyer, the mind staggers at
the beneficial results which could arise if the government were to
save $2 billion by avoiding an unnecessary cost overrun.

29
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for certiorari
should be granted.

JOHN BODNER, JR.
LAWRENCE R. VELVEL
1730 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:

RALPH J. TEMPLE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
1345 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004

October, 1978

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1977%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
