# Petition — Abeles v. Elrod

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 440 U.S. 908

## Text

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No.78-640 |.

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In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1978

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. PETER O. ABELES,

Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD J. ELROD, SHERIFF OF

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

JEROLD S. SOLOVY
ROBERT L. GRAHAM
TERRY ROSE SAUNDERS
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 222-9350
Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:
JENNER & BLOCK

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581

f. cs

INDEX

PAGE
Nee ac aneutecbinisanscinane 1
SE EE 2
Is teenie 2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ........ 3
ELLE LEA 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ oo... eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 7

I. This Court’s Decision in Munsey v, Clough is In-
consistent with Present Constitutional Require-
ments for Notice and Hearing and Fails to Ac-
cord with the Realities of the Extradition Process 7

A. Under Present Constitutional Standards,
Notice and Hearing’ Prior to Extradition
are Required as a Matter of Right ............ 7

B. Under Present Extradition Practices, Prior
Notice and Hearing are Also Necessary .... 11

Il. Extradition Predicated Upon a Defective Indict-
ment Which is Later Amended Cannot Proceed,
Consistent with Constitutional and Statutory
Requirements, When No New Extradition Re-
quest is Made Based Upon the New, Amended

eel sa haeeas evan ssevvaastinuicmrensecenceees 14
ES SS LS SELES ART 16
Appendix :

A. Opinion of Court of Appeals. .........20000.... App. 1
B. Opinion of District Court. .........................c0c00000 App. 9

C. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions In-
ERT SIS ESET RS a App. 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

PAGE
Bell v, Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) oo... 10

Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
OT an 10

Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Hendrick, 430 Pa. 575,
ee nO TO i aria eae 14
Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1 (1909) we... 15
Edwards v, California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) 000 .. 8
| ee ce uNennEe 15
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) 0... eee 10
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) 10
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S, 254 (1970)... 10
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ...00... 8, 9, 10, 11, 14
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) ow. 9
Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929 (1st Cir, 1976) ........ 9
Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) on 14

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
Seni NE PIE: paiptedapiesbdliatbeneenhsicueidinsdilbiphicsastiecasetincbinndeoe 9
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S, (24 How.) 66 (1861) .. 11
Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ...... 9
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 000 8
Morrissey v, Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) .......... o, 10, 11,13

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950) . asthinapaieseahaainaiagahataaaiaiaahasendiiaiabuns si a

iii
PAGE
Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905) ............2, 6,7, 9,11
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)... 8
North Georgia Finishing, Inc, v. Di-Chem, Ine., 419
EE EINE sid iakicianiacpicptiidbinachotsedeckooinecsnns tices tibcintanias 9
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) .2................ mcsesesesceenees 7

People ex rel. Abeles v. Elrod, 27 Ill. App.3d 155, 326
N.E.2d 448 (1st Dist.), leave to appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court denied, 60 Ill. 2d 601 (1975), cert.

meta, GRR Te, FRG CT ccnp ccietccnicnncisteccsttsinenes E
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908) .......... eee 15
Reed v. Colpoys, 99 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

I TO OO a ac ll 13
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) .0..0.0........ 8
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337

SINUIID: :csechinecsaclovaniniaincabimieidheniestiehicinlatinniitninenphixsiisbasniienianisiadess 1¢
South Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal.3d 765, 144 Cal.Rptr.

758, 576 P.2d 473 (1978) (en bane) .......................... 12,13
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)... 8
State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., 81

Wis. 2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978) .....0000... 15
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S, 212 (1960) _ ........ 15
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) 00000... 8
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 483 (1971) ........ 8
Wolff v. MeDonnell, 418 U.S. 5389 (1974) 20... 8, 10

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
Roly CI, BG Bg Bike I oancccnccensncecensssneccnsevesereees 14
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1.0.0... eee passim
a a I» soit icich cece cea dapensicecnadicaadddachenierensicennateeus 14, 15

iv

PAGE
I. Rov, Stat. ch. Gh GE ccc lee 13
TR. Bow. Bhat. Gi. GE GED cescecceteskitiinteiccceaes 13
Wie, tet. SUMRGN scsi see

Other Authorities

Comment, Indigents’ Right to Appointed Counsel in
Interstate Extradition Proceedings, 28 Stan. L. Rev.
DODD (COTE) cccecessctsninncsenssiieersstniiiasttaenaiaiiaaialal cidade. 14

Comment, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices
and the Effects of Discretion, 66 Yale L.J. 97 (1956) 12

K. Davis, Administrative Law 443 (6th Ed. 1977) ........ 13

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroner Term, 1978

No.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. PETER O. ABELES,

Petitioner,

Vs.

RICHARD J. ELROD, SHERIFF OF
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
' SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Peter O. Abeles, respectfully prays that this
Court issue a writ of certiofari to review the judgment and
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit entered in this proceeding on August 8,
1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, which is unre-
ported, appears in Appendix A to this Petition. The opin-

D)

ion of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, also unreported, appears in Appendix
B to this Petition.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Cireuit was entered on August 8, 1978. A timely filed
petition fer rehearing and suggestions for rehearing en
bane was denied by the Court of Appeals on September
12, 1978. This petition for certiorari was filed within 90
days of that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This matter is worthy of certiorari. This case affects
the administration of interstate extradition throughout
the United States. In particular, this case squarely raises
the question of whether this Court’s seventy-year old de-
cision in Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905), holding
that prior notice and hearing are not constitutionally re-
quired in extradition proceedings, should be overruled in
light of evolving due process standards.

The questions which this Court should decide are:

(1) Whether due process requires that an individual,
whose interstate extradition has been demanded, receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard by the governor of
the asylum state prior to extradition to the demanding
state.

(2) Whether interstate extradition may be predicated
upon a defective indictment which is later amended, when
no new extradition request is made based upon the new,
amended indictment.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 2

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 1

18 U.S.C. $3182

Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §21
Ill, Rev. Stat., ch. 60, §24
Wis. Stat. §133.01(1)
Wis. Stat, §133.01(3)

The constitutional and statutory provisions involved are
set forth in Appendix C to this Petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois on May 12, 1976. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of his proposed extradition pursuant to
an extradition warrant issued by the Governor of Illinois
at the request of the Governor of Wisconsin.

The Wisconsin Proceedings

The Governor of Wisconsin based his extradition request
upon an indictment returned by the grand jury of Dane
County, Wisconsin on February 28, 1973. That indictment
charged petitioner, his employer, Waste Management of
Wisconsin, Inc. (‘‘Waste Management’’), and a second
employee, with a conspiracy ‘‘to restrain competition in
the supply or price of an article or commodity”’ in violation
of Section 133.01 of the Wisconsin statutes. It is undis-

4

puted, however, that Waste Management’s business, the
handling and disposing of solid waste matter, is a service,
which is not covered by the indictment’s reference to an
‘‘article or commodity’’.

Petitioner’s co-defendants in Wisconsin moved to dis-
miss the February, 1973 indictment, arguing that the in-
dictment charged and the Wisconsin statute prohibited a
restraint of trade in the supply or price of an article or
commodity, whereas they were engaged in the business of
providing a service. In an order and decision dated June
4, 1973, Judge Jackman, the Wisconsin judge before whom
the case was then pending, agreed that waste removal is a
service and not ‘‘an article or commodity”’’ as stated in the
indictment. However, Judge Jackman chose to disregard
the words ‘‘article or commodity’’ in the indictment and
denied the motion to dismiss. The trial before Judge Jack-
man resulted in a mistrial.

The Wisconsin case was then reassigned to Judge Ma-
loney, who granted a motion of the Wisconsin prosecutor to
amend the indictment to eliminate its reference to articles
and commodities. The indictment was thus judicially
amended by striking the words ‘‘competition in the supply
or price of an article or commodity which is the subject of’’
from paragraph 16 of the indictment.

Wisconsin’s extradition request predated the amendment
of the indictment. Wisconsin never made a request for the
extradition of petitioner predicated on this new, amended
indictment. The only request for extradition was that
predicated upon the outdated indictment, which, as even the
Wisconsin prosecutor recognized, needed to be amended
in order to charge a crime.

1 As Judge Jackman recognized :
The draftsman of the indictment was in error in describing
the conspiracy as one to restrain competition in the supply
or price of an article or commodity.

The Illinois Proceedings

At the time the grand jury returned the indictment, peti-
tioner was no longer an employee of Waste Management or
a resident of Wisconsin. On April 4, 1973, the Governor of
Wisconsin sent his extradition request, based on the Febru-
ary 28, 1973 indictment, to the Governor of Illinois. On
April 13, 1973, the Governor of Illinois summarily issued
an extradition warrant ordering petitioner’s arrest and
immediate return to Wisconsin. Petitioner received neither
notice from nor a hearing before the Governor of Illinois
prior to the issuance of the extradition warrant.

On April 30, 1973, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Cook County, IlIli-
nois. This petition was denied and that denial was subse-
quently affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. People
ex rel, Abeles v. Elrod, 27 Ill.App.3d 155, 326 N.E.2d 443
(1st Dist. 1975). The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave
to appeal, 60 Ill. 2d 601 (1975), and this Court denied
certiorari. 424 U.S. 914 (1976).

The Federal Court Proceedings

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court on May 12, 1976. As set forth in his
habeas corpus petition, petitioner challenged his extradi-
tion on the grounds that (1) the Governor of Illinois failed
to afford petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to issuing the extradition warrant; and (2) the only
predicate for the extradition warrant was an outdated in-
dictment which failed to charge a crime.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
failure to state a claim for relief. On November 30, 1976,
the District Court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss.

6

The District Court held that petitioner had no right to
notice and a hearing before the Governor of Illinois prior
to the issuance of an extradition warrant. Relying on
Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905), the District Court
ruled that a hearing before the governor is not constitu-
tionally required. (App. i3.) The District Court also held
that the February 28, 1973 indictment was sufficient to
charge a crime, finding the defect in the indictment to be
a technical one which did not affect the validity of the in-
dictment as a whole. (App. 12.)

On August 8, 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. The
Court of Appeals held that, under this Court’s opinion in
Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905), notice and a hear-
ing before the Governor of Illinois prior to issuance of an
extradition warrant is not ‘‘constitutionally mandated’”’.
The Court of Appeals declined ‘‘to break tradition with
the time honored precedent established by the decision in
Munsey.’’? (App. 8.) The Court also concluded that the
indictment serving as the predicate for the Governor’s
extradition warrant met minimum standards to charge a
crime and that ‘‘the extradition order was therefore con-
stitutionally proper.’’ (App. 7.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

THIS COURT’S DECISION IN MUNSEY v. CLOUGH
IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRESENT CONSTITUTION.
AL REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE AND HEARING
AND FAILS TO ACCORD WITH THE REALITIES OF
THE EXTRADITION PROCESS.

The lower courts in this case, citing Munsey v. Clough,
196 U.S. 364 (1905), declined to consider the merits of
petitioner’s due process claims. In Munsey, this Court
held that there was no constitutional right to a hearing
before the governor prior to extradition. However, at the
time Munsey was decided, this Court had not held due
process applicable to the range of governmental functions
it now encompasses. Moreover, Munsey did nct consider
the due process safeguards necessary to ensure that the
discretion available to the governor to grant or refuse ex-
tradition is exercised rationally and fairly in accordance
with the facts, circumstances and equities of each case.

Munsey should be overruled. Prior notice and hearing
are constitutionally required under evolving standards of
due process. Furthermore, prior notice and hearing are
particularly necessary in light of the realities of present-
day extradition practice.

A. Under Present Constitutional Standards, Notice and
Hearing Prior To Extradition Are Required As A Mat-
ter of Right.

In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), this Court recently
re-examined the traditional concepts of liberty and prop-

8

erty interests which come within the protection of the due
process clause. As this Court commented with respect to
these interests, ‘‘we have repeatedly ruled that the pro-
cedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter
that protected status.’’ 424 U.S. at 710-711. See also,
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution
is the right of freedom of movement, including the right
to travel freely between states or to stay at home. See,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-631 (1969) ; United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-758 (1966); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941). Also encompassed
within that protected legal status are associational rights,
NAACP vy. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and the right to
one’s home life. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) ;
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).—Individuals
also have a recognized liberty interest in protecting their
integrity, reputation, and standing in the community from
being damaged because of governmental action. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-575 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, supra, at 437.

Interstate extradition results in the deprivation of all
of these basic rights. Extradition means that an individual
loses his right to remain where he chooses and to associate
with his family and friends of his choice. At the same time,
extradition taints the good name and standing of an indi-
vidual in his community. The significant loss of liberty
which extradition entails has been aptly described as fol-
lows:

At best extradition means an extended period of
detention, involving custody pending administrative
arrangements in two states as well as forced travel in
between. At worst it means separation from a familiar

9

jurisdiction and effective denial of the support of
family, friends and familiar advisors. Jerardi v. Gun-
ter, 528 F.2d 929, 930 (1st Cir. 1976).

See also Kirkland vy. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

Termination of such essential liberty and property inter-
ests constitutes a grievous loss and must be preceded by
due process guarantees. Basic among these guarantees is
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, for ‘‘the right to
be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of
any kind ... isa principle basic to our society.’’ Joint Antt-
Fascist Refugee Committee v, McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

Notice and hearing must be afforded at a meaning-
ful time, or before the deprivation takes place. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972). In the ease of extradition, notice and hearing
must accordingly be afforded before the governor issues
his extradition warrant. Nevertheless, in this case, peti-
tioner was afforded none of those procedural safeguards,
as the extradition warrant was issued without notice or
an opportunity to be heard. The courts below, citing Mun-
sey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905), upheld this procedure,
declining to overturn the traditional rule deeming extradi-
tion proceedings to be summary in nature.

This Court, however, has increasingly required due pro-
cess in ‘‘summary proceedings’’ involving serious depriva-
tions of liberty or property. The expanding concept of due
process was aptly noted by Mr. Justice Powell in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring), where this Court struck

10

down a Georgia statute permitting prejudgment attach-
ment:

... [T|he Court in the past unanimously approved
prejudgment attachment liens similar to those at issue
in this case. [Citations omitted.] But the recent ex-
pansion vf concepts of procedural due process requires
a more careful assessment of the nature of the govern-
mental function served by the challenged procedure
and of the costs the procedure exacts of private inter-
ests. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-
266 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).

Thus, the fact that a proceeding has traditionally been
summary in nature no longer immunizes it from basie due
process requirements. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Cor-
poration, 395 U.S. 337 (1969), this Court accordingly held
unconstitutional prejudgment garnishment proceedings
which did not provide for notice and hearing prior to sei-
zure of an individual’s wages. Similarly, fuentes v. Shevin,
407 J.S. 67 (1972), declared unconstitutional summary
seizure of personal property under the long honored writ
of replevin. Indeed, the recent expansion of due process
by this Court has recognized a broad spectrum of interests
not previously considered to require protection. See, e.g.,
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of unin-
sured motorist’s driver’s license unless security posted) ;
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of
welfare benefits) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973) (probation revocation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (loss of prison inmate’s good time) ; Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of school student
for short time period).

Applying the expanded concept of due process to the
extradition proceedings at issue here, petitioner’s interest

11

in prior notice and hearing clearly outweighs the state’s
interest in summary proceedings. Petitioner’s interest is
in avoiding improper or unfair displacement and _ being
compelled to defend against extraterritorial claims in a
foreign forum. Petitioner should be allowed to ‘‘tell his
side of the story in order to make sure that an injustice is
not done.’’ Goss v. Lopez, supra, at 580. Moreover, the state
has no interest in depriving petitioner of his liberty with-
out assuring that his extradition is not based on an
erroneous evaluation of the facts and circumstances in his
ease. See, Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 483-484.

In short, under the evolving standards of due process
recognized by this Court, prior notice and hearing must
be afforded in the extradition process. This Court should
accordingly grant certiorari and overrule Munsey v.
Clough.

B. Under Present Extradition Practices, Prior Notice and
Hearing Are Also Necessary.

Under present practices, the governor of an asylum state
exercises broad discretion in granting or denying extradi-
tion in individual eases. The governor’s decision in this
regard involves a factual determination. Notice and hear-
ing should be mandatory to ensure that each individual
has an opportunity to present the facts, equities and cir-
cumstances of his case for the governor’s consideration
before extradition takes place.

In Kentucky vy. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861),
this Court concluded that the duty of the governor to turn
over a fugitive when the papers are in order, although
ministerial, was not mandatory, but rather ‘‘declaratory of
the moral duty’’ of the governor. Jd. at 106-107. The fram-
ers left final extradition decisions to the discretion of

12

the state executive. Governors have conducted prior hear-
ings in extradition cases and have refused extradition for
failure to satisfy constitutional requirements. Even where
constitutional requirements are satisfied, governors have
also refused extradition based upon the facts and cireum-
stances of a particular case. Thus, extradition has been
refused on the basis of equitable factors, substantive de-
fenses to a crime, and due process violations in the de-
manding state. See, Comment, /nterstate Rendition: Exec-
utive Practices and the Effects of Discretion, 66 Yale L.J.
97, 106-109 (1956).

In South Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765, 144 Cal.Rptr.
758, 576 P.2d 473 (1978) (en banc), the Supreme Court of
California expressly recognized and sanctioned the discre-
tion involved in the governor’s extradition function. As
that court emphasized, the exercise of such discretion is
both necessary and valid to avoid mechanical application
of absolute rules and to ensure that justice is achieved in
a particular case. Describing the types of factors that only
the governor eculd consider and which would justify re-
fusing extraaition, the court concluded:

It would be a harsh rule that stripped the Gover-
nor of all power to deny extradition in a ease in which,
for example, the Governor is satisfied that a fugitive,
since residing in California, has established himself as
a worthy law-abiding citizen, or in which his physical
safety or right to a fair trial cannot be assured in the
demanding state, or the offense charged does not con-
stitute a crime in California. In a given case, various
unanticipated equitable considerations may be para-
mount. IJd. at 482.

South Dakota v. Brown is a recognition of the
practice in effect today throughout the country. Since
1930, all of the states have adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act. That Act confers discre-

ill

13

tion upon the governor in the exercise of his extradi-
tion power. Section 7 provides that ‘‘[i]f the Governor
decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall
sign a warrant of arrest.’’ See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 60,
§24. Section 4 authorizes the Governor to ‘‘call upon the
Attorney General or any prosecuting officer . . . to investi-
gate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report
to him the situation and circumstances of the person so
demanded, and whether he ought to be surrendered.’’ See,
é.g., Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 60, $21. These provisions make sense
only if construed to confer discretion upon the governor to
consider the facts and circumstances in each case.”

The governor’s ultimate decision in extradition cases
depends on factual considerations. The governor must
evaluate the infirmity of a charge, good character, long resi-
dence in the asylum state, contribution to the asylum state,
or the extreme and unusual hardship that would result
from extradition. Proper exercise of the governor’s dis-
cretion on these matters requires that the governor have
the facts in each case so that he can decide rationally
whether the standards for denying extradition are appli-
cable. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484
(1972); K. Davis, Administrative Law 443 (6th Ed. 1977).*

2 The California Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Brown, supra,
acknowledged that five governors in a row had refused to honor extra-
dition requests which had been in proper form. The court also noted
that in 84 cases from 1959 to 1976, California’s extradition requests to
other states had been declined. 576 P.2d at 481, 482.

3 Without a hearing before the governor, the accused is limited
to challenging his extradition by means of a writ of habeas corpus.
However, courts at habeas corpus hearings have refused to con-
sider the facts, circumstances, and equities in individual cases.
Reed v. Colpoys, 99 F.2d 396, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied

(footnote continued)

14

Due process requires that the individual have prior notice
of the charges and an opportunity to present his side of
the story to the governor. The Due Process Clause mandates
the minimum safeguards of notice and hearing to prevent
arbitrary decision-making, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581
(1975); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 363 (1956) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Accord, Comment, Indigents’ Right to Ap-
pointed Counsel in Interstate Extradition Proceedings, 28
Stan. L.Rev. 1039, 1058-59 (1976) (concluding that ‘‘due
process applies in the extradition process’’.) The decision of
the Court of Appeals, upholding the summary issuance of a
warrant for petitioner’s arrest and extradition, deprived
petitioner of due process of law and should be reversed.

IT.

EXTRADITION PREDICATED UPON A DEFECTIVE
INDICTMENT WHICH IS LATER AMENDED CANNOT
PROCEED, CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, WHEN NO NEW
EXTRADITION REQUEST IS MADE BASED UPON
THE NEW, AMENDED INDICTMENT.

Under Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and the
federal statute enacted to implement the Constitutional
provision, 18 U.S.C. §3182, extradition may proceed only
if the individual whose return is sought is charged with a
crime by the demanding state. A fundamental prerequi-
site is that the indictment or information on its face con-

(footnote continued )

305 U.S. 598 (1938); Commonwealth ex rel. Banks v. Hendrick,
430 Pa. 575, 243 A.2d 438 (1968). A hearing before the governor
is therefore necessary if the accused is to have the opportunity
to plead the facts and equities of his case in order to avoid extra-
dition. No other forum is available to him.

15

tain and describe each element of the crime charged. Pierce
v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908).

The Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether the in-
dictment returned against petitioner in this case charged
a crime. In fact, the February 28, 1973 indictment against
petitioner and his co-defendants charged a conspiracy ‘‘to
restrain competition in the supply or price of an article or
commodity’’. It is undisputed that this indictment did not
validly charge a crime, since the business activities of
Waste Management did not involve articles or commodi-
ties. In the Wisconsin proceedings involving petitioner’s
co-defendants, but not petitioner, the defect in the indict-
ment was recognized, and the indictment was amended in
an effort to eliminate it, However, Wisconsin never made
a new extradition request based on the amended indictment.
In these circumstances, this failure of the original indict-
ment to describe any possible offense against petitioner
renders the indictment an invalid basis for extradition.‘

Wisconsin never supported its extradition request with
an amended indictment certified as authentic by the gov-
ernor. This is required under the federal statute regulat-
ing extradition. 18 U.S.C. $3182. Strict compliance with
the statute’s terms is mandatory. Compton v. Alabama,
214 U.S. 1 (1909). The decision of the Court of Appeals

* Recognizing that the grand jury indictment did not charge a
crime, the Wisconsin prosecutor chose not to return to the grand
jury but rather sought and obtained a judicial amendment of the
indictment. The amended indictment has been held sufficient by
the Wisconsin courts. State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin,
Inc., 81 Wis.2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978). However, ex-
tradition here is based on the original and not the amended in-
dictment. To extradite petitioner on this basis would violate con-
stitutional precepts. See Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887);
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).

16

would permit petitioner’s extradition to proceed on an in-
dictment which fails to charge a crime. This result is in-
consistent with the constitutional and statutory require-
ments of extradition and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, petitioner respect-
fully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Jerotp S. SoLovy
Rosert L. Granam
Terry Rose Saunpers
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 222-9350

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:
JENNER & BLock

Dated: October 16, 1978

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 15, 1978

August 8, 1978

Before

lion. Lurner M. Swycert, Circuit Judge
Hon. Wauter J. Cummings, Circuit Judge
Hon. Ropert A. Sprecuer, Circuit Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
PETER O. ABELES,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
No. 77-1031 Vs.

RICHARD J. ELROD, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,
Respondent-A ppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Kastern
Division.

No. 76-C-1772
John F. Grady, Judge.

ORDER

This case requires us to determine whether the inter-
state extradition of Peter O. Abeles, a fugitive from justice
and the petitioner-appellant herein, by reason of an April
13, 1973, executive order of the Governor of Illinois (the
asylum state) returning petitioner to Wisconsin (the de-
manding state) to face charges of conspiracy to restrain

App. 2

trade and bid-rigging in violation of that State’s anti-trust
laws, would violate Article 4, Section 2, Clause 2 and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

We conclude that it does not, and for the reasons more
fully explained below, affirm the district court’s' denial of
habeas corpus relief, pursuant to Rule 2, FedR.App.P.?

Jurisdiction on appeal is by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Also, since this appeal is taken as of right no certificate of
probable cause is required. Furthermore, we note that
this Court previously ordered that the execution of the ex-
tradition order by the respondent, Richard J. Elrod, Sheriff
of Cook County, Illinois, be stayed pending our review
of this matter. Therefore, in light of our affirmance, we
vacate that order forthwith.

I.

It should be noted at the outset that this Circuit is not
without precedent in this area of the law. Thus in United
States v, O’Brien, 138 F.2d 217, 218 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied 321 U.S. 766 (1944), we summarized the federal
nature of interstate extradition proceedings along with the
relevant scope of our inquiry on review, as follows:

Unquestionably, the source of all authority for the ex-
tradition of an alleged fugitive from justice from one
state to another is found in Art. IV, See. 2, clause 2 of
the Constitution of the United States, which is not self-
executing, but is made effective by [18 U.S.C. § 3182]

1 United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Hon. John F. Grady, Judge Presiding.

? Accordingly, we deny appellee’s motion for summary affirmance
under Circuit Rule 15.

App. 3

construction of which has frequently been before the
Supreme Court and construed as placing the burden
upon the governor of the asylum state to determine,
before complying with the demand, (a) whether the
person demanded is substantially charged with a crime
and (b) whether he is a fugitive from justice. The
first is a question of law and the second is a question
of fact, which the governor, upon whom the demand
is made, must decide, upon such evidence as is satisfac-
tory to him. Strict common-law evidence is not neces-
sary, and the statute does not prescribe the character
of such proof, nor how it shall be authenticated.
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544;
Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 5 S.Ct. 1148, 29 L.Ed.
250; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 S.Ct. 282, 49
L.Ed. 515; United States ex rel. Darcy v. Superinten-
dent of County Prisons of Philadelphia, 3 Cir., 111 F.2d
409. The requisition, with its accompanying affidavit,
together with the Governor’s rendition warrant, are
all to be considered as evidence and made a prima
facie case against the accused, and upon him lies the
burden of overcoming it. Munsey v. Clough, supra,
196 U.S. 373, 25 S.Ct. at page 284, 49 L.Ed. 515.”’

However, on appeal petitioner has challenged only the
sufficiency of the indictment, and may be deemed to have
waived the latter issue concerning his fugitive status. In
addition, absent any argument to the contrary, we have
assumed that the Governor of Illinois complied fully with
that state’s statutes governing extradition and that all
papers before him (excepting, of course, the challenged in-
dictment) were proper as to both form and substance. See
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Chapter 60, §§ 18-49,
Illinois Revised Statutes (1975).

App. 4

More specifically, the following issues have been ad-
vanced with respect to the indictment. Firstly, whether the
January 1973 grand jury indictment returned in Dane
County, Wisconsin, naming petitioner as a co-conspirator,
failed to state a crime under the anti-trust laws of Wiscon-
sin, Section 133.01(1) and (3), Wis. Stats. (1971); and
secondly, whether a Wisconsin trial court judge illegally
amended the indictment by striking certain words therein
rendering it a nullity. In addition, petitioner claims that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires the Governor of an
asylum state to give notice and a hearing to a fugitive from
justice before ordering his extradition.

II

The facts in this case, as well as the pertinent state
court history, are reported below in People ex rel. Abeles v.
Elrod, 27 Ill. App. 3d 155, 326 N.E. 2d 443 (First District
1975), reh. denied, leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court denied, 60 Ill. 2d 601, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976).
We therefore take judicial notice of the same and need
not repeat them here.

But before addressing the issues, it is necessary to re-
port a late happening in the Wisconsin Supreme Court
made known to us by the respondent-appellee pursuant to
Circuit Rule 11, and which in our opinion lends new and
controlling authority as to the legal sufficiency of the Dane
County indictment. Thus in State of Wisconsin v. Waste
Management of Wisconsin, Inc., d/b/a City Disposal Co.,
No. 75-412-CR (Wis., filed January 3, 1978) rehearing de-
nied, Justice Hansen reviewed on direct appeal the con-
viction of one of petitioner’s co-defendants, Waste Manage-
ment, and discussed at length the identical challenges to
the common indictment advanced here. At issue in Waste

App. 5

Management, supra, was whether the indictment failed to
state a crime under Section 133.01(1) and (3), Wis. Stats.
(1971), and whether a Wisconsin trial court judge illegally
amended the indictment by striking the words ‘‘article or
commodity’’ therefrom. After careful consideration of
the charging portion of the indictment, Justice Hansen
concluded that the judicial amendment of the indictment
amounted to ‘‘a formal deletion of words, and not a sub-
stitution of one charge for another.’’ Slip Op. at 4.

Citing Section 971.26, Wis. Stats. (1971), which provides
that an indictment in Wisconsin will not be deemed invalid
per se because of a defect or imperfection so long as it may
be amended without prejudicing the defendant, the Court
continued:

The test in this state is whether the defendant was
prejudiced by this change. As with any information,
an indictment must inform the accused of what particu-
lar acts he is alleged to have committed. Notice to the
accused, not perfection in draftsmanship is the key.
...I1n the ease before us, the defendant was informed
long before trial that the state was required to pro-
ceed solely on the theory that the defendant violated
the first and not the second sentence of See. 133.01(1).
This amendment in the indictment is no foundation
for a claim of prejudice.’’

Slip Op. 4-5 (emphasis added).

Also, as for the argument that the indictment did not
charge a crime under Wisconsin law because solid waste re-
moval was a ‘‘service’’ and not an ‘‘article or commodity’’,
Justice Hansen clarified the Court’s previous holding in
State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.
2d (1966), explaining that restraint of services was also

App. 6

within the statutory prohibition and that the second sen-
tence of Section 133.01(1) merely recited ‘‘non-exclusion-
ary’’ examples of conduct which was prohibited therein.
Ibid at 6-7.

ITI.

It is apparent, therefore, that under the present inter-
pretation of Wisconsin law, not only was the judicial
amendment of the common indictment permissible, but did
not result in any prejudice. Also, it is clear that the
amended indictment without question states an offense
under Wisconsin law. Waste Management, supra. This, of
course, is all with the benefit of hindsight and is quite
unlike the usual situation where the habeas corpus peti-
tioner seeks to test the sufficiency of the demanding state’s
indictment prior to its construction by that state’s courts.

However, be that as it may, the petitioner nonetheless
calls our attention to our ‘‘broad powers in habeas corpus
proceedings’’ and asks us to ‘‘consider fully the merits of
federal constitutional claims without being bound by prior
state adjudications’’ citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
and United States ex rel. McCline v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716
(7th Cir. 1934).

Yet even if we were to assume for purposes of argument
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not addressed these
issues, the scope of our inquiry is limited by a long line
of extradition cases holding that attacks upon the demand-
ing state’s indictment are cognizable on habeas corpus
review only if the objection destroys its sufficiency to charge
acrime. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 402 (1908).

Thus in Pierce, supra at 402, Justice Moody formulated
the following benchmark rule:

The only safe rule is to abandon entirely the standard
to which the indictment must conform, judged as a

App. 7

criminal pleading, and consider only whether it shows
satisfactorily that the fugitive has been in fact, how-
ever inartifically, charged with crime in the State
from which he has fled. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80,
95; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 313; Hyatt v. Cork-
ran, 188 U.S. 691, 709; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364,
372; Davise’s Case, 122 Massachusetts, 324; State v.
O’Connor, 38 Minnesota, 243; State v. Goss, 66 Minne-
sota, 291; Matter of Voorhees, 32 N.J.L. 141; Ex parte
Pearce, 32 Tex. Crim. 301; In re Van Sciever, 42
Nebraska, 772; State v. Clough, 71 N.H. 594.

We are satisfied here that the common indictment pre-
sented to the Governor of Illinois met this minimum stan-
dard and that the extradition order was therefore consti-
tutionally proper. We need only be reminded that ex-
tradition is sw? generis and a summary proceeding ad-
dressed to the discretion of the state’s chief executive.
Furthermore, we note with a degree of pragmatism that
‘*fe)]xtradition is not a means of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused... [rjather, it is a means of as-
certaining whether the evidence is sufficient to detain and
deliver the accused for trial in another state.’’ Smith v.
State of Idaho; 373 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1967), citing
Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 132-133
(1917).

Finally, as for petitioner’s argument that he was entitled
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to notice and a hearing before the Governor of Illinois is-
sued his extradition warrant, we agree with the district
court that Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 372 (1905)
is dispositive of this claim and that such a hearing is not
constitutionally mandated. Therefore, we remain unper-
suaded by petitioner’s reference to the Supreme Court’s

App. 8

recently expanded concept of due process in such diverse
cases as Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), among others, as compelling us to presently
break tradition with the time honored preeedent estab-
lished by the decision in Munsey, supra. Although we
note that some states including Illinois,* have adopted
informal procedures, whereby an individual may request a
hearing before the state’s executive officer prior to or even
after the issuance of an extradition warrant, the record in
this case shows no attempt whatsoever on petitioner’s part
to apply for such a discretionary hearing. Therefore, the
failure to have such a discretionary hearing is at least
partially of petitioner’s own making.

Accordingly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to enter
an appropriate order affirming the district court’s denial
of habeas corpus relief.

AFFIRMED.

8 See Interstate Rendition; Executive Practices and the Effects
of Discretion, 66 Yale L.J. 97, 101 n.25 (1956).

App. 9

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KASERN DIVISION

PETER O. ABELES,
Petitioner,
vs.

RCHARD J. ELROD, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,
| Respondent.

NO. 76 C 1772

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court believes that the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The reasons for this conclusion are stated below.

THE AMENDMENT OF THE INDICTMENT

On May 27, 1975, Judge Maloney of the Dane County
Circuit Court purported to amend the indictment by strik-
ing from Paragraph 16 the words ‘‘. . . competition in the
supply or price of an article or commodity which is the
subject of. ...’’ Petitioner argues that this purported
amendment by the court renders the indictment invalid,
since it is no longer the product of the grand jury. Respon-
dent does not address himself to this question. (The opinion
of the Illinois Appellate Court considered the argument
that the interpretation of the indictment by Judge Jackman

App. 10

in his order of June 4, 1973, was, in effect, an amendment of
the indictment, but the opinion was rendered prior to the
actual purported amendment by Judge Maloney on May
27, 1975. People ex rel. Abeles v. Elrod, 27 Ili.App.3d 155,
526 N.E.2d 443, 448 [1st Dist. 1975]).

It appears to this court that the amendment by Judge
Maloney was either proper or it was harmless. If the
language he struck was a mere formal defect or surplusage,
it was proper to strike it and the integrity of the indict-
ment is unaffected. If the language was an essential part of
the indictment, then Judge Maloney lacked the power to
strike it and his action was simply void. If that is the case,
the indictment remains the way it was before Judge Ma-
loney purported to amend it.

Whether the language in question was properly stricken
is not a matter to be determined in an extradition pro-
ceeding. It is a question to be determined by the courts
of the State of Wisconsin. As indicated below, this court
does not believe the defendant will be prejudiced by a ruling
either way on the matter.

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT

The question on this petition for habeas corpus is whether
the indictment substantially charges a crime. The ques-
tion is not whether the indictment is perfect or immune
to motion. If extradition required an indictment whose
sufficiency was entirely free from doubt, the statute requir-
ing extradition would have little meaning.

In determining the sufficiency of the indictment, we as-
sume that the attempted amendment by Judge Maloney
was void, so that the indictment stands as originally re-
turned by the grand jury. The question, then, is whether

App. 11

the indictment substantially charges an offense when, in
Paragraph 16, it alleges something which is not a crime
under the law of Wisconsin. To answer this question, we
must consider the indictment as a whole.

Anyone reading Paragraphs 13 through 15 and 17
through 20 of this indictment knows that the defendant
is charged with a conspiracy to restrain price competition
in the removal of solid waste in Dane County. The con-
spiracy is described clearly and there is no uncertainty or
ambiguity as to its alleged objective. These paragraphs
are suificient to charge an offense under the first sentence
of Section 133.01(1) of the Wisconsin statutes, the section
cited in the indictment.

This first sentence of the section broadly declares all
combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade to be
illegal. The second sentence of the section goes on to
declare that a specific type of restraint, namely, the re-
straint of competition in the supply or price of an article
or commodity, ‘‘is hereby declared an illegal restraint of
trade.’’ The activity specified in the second sentence of
this section, therefore, is simply one form of the generic
crime described in the first sentence. Anyone guilty of
violating the second sentence is necessarily guilty of violat-
ing the first, although one may violate the first without vio-
lating the second if no article or commodity is involved.

Returning to Paragraph 16 of the indictment, it alleges
that the defendants conspired to restrain competition in the
supply of an article or commodity. Paragraphs 13 through
15 and 17 through 20 make it clear that the alleged re-
straint was directed at the price for removal of solid
waste. Whether solid waste be regarded as a commodity
or not, the charge is the same. The indictment is sufficient-
ly clear te enable the petitioner to prepare his defense

App. 12

and it is sufficiently specific to allow a plea of double
jeopardy in the event of a later prosecution for the same
conduct. Thus, this indictment passes the traditional con-
stitutional tests of sufficiency. Petitioner’s argument that
the grand jury might not have returned this indictment had
they known that solid waste was not considered an article
or commodity cannot be taken seriously.

It is common for a conspiracy to have multiple objec-
tives, and, if this indictment be regarded as charging a
conspiracy to restrain trade in a commodity as well as
a service, that would not render it defective. Nor would
the prosecution fail by reason of the fact that the Wis-
consin court has held solid waste not to be an article or
commodity. Failure to prove one object of the conspiracy
would not ordinarily be a fatal variance, and a conviction
would be warranted if the proof shows that the conspiracy
contemplated at least one of the alleged objects.

In short, it seems clear that this indictment, even as
originally returned by the grand jury, substantially charges
the crime of conspiracy under Section 133.01(1) of the
Wisconsin statutes. The error of the draftsman in ref-
erring to an article or commodity in Paragraph 16 is a
technical defect which does not affect the substance of the
charge. There is nothing unfair about requiring petitioner
to answer to the indictment in Wisconsin, where he will
have ample opportunity to make what he can of the defect
he sees in Paragraph 16.

THE RIGHT TO A HEARING

Petitioner argues that the Governor should conduct a
hearing before ordering extradition. It appears that peti-
tioner has in mind something more than a determination
by the Governor that the indictment does substantially

App. 13

charge a crime and that petitioner is the person named in
the indictment. However, petitioner has not enlightened
this court as to what additional issues he believes should
be presented. At page 29 of his memorandum, he states
that the law requires that he be afforded ‘‘some meaning-
ful opportunity to present his case. ...’’ He does not
explain what he means by ‘‘his case.’’ Apparently peti-
tioner does not seriously contend that the Governor should
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the charge,
and, short of that, we can think of no kind of hearing
which would benefit the petitioner. The kind of hearing
required by due process varies with the type of inquiry
before the tribunal. It is not feasible for a Governor of a
state to inquire into the merits of a criminal charge pending
in another state, nor has it ever been thought that due
process requires him to do so. A hearing is not even re-
quired on the narrow issues which are before the Gov-
ernor. Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905); Marbles
v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909). Petitioner’s reliance on re-
cent due process cases involving such matters as garnish-
ment and replevin is entirely misplaced. That subject mat-
ter is simply not analogous to an extradition proceeding,
and we note that petitioner has merely cited these cases
without attempting to relate them in a practical way to the
case before us.

The petition of a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
DATED: November 30, 1976.
ENTER: /s/ John F. Grady

United States District Judge

App. 14 App. 15

Territory from whence the person so charged has
fled, the executive authority of the State, District or
Territory to which such person has fled shall cause
him to be arrested and secured, and notify the execu-
tive authority making such demand, or the agent of
such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and
shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent
found in another State, shall on Demand of the execu- when he shall appear. If no such agent appears with-
tive Authority of the State from which he fled, be in thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Juris- may be discharged.

diction of the Crime.

APPENDIX C

United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,
or other crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be

, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 60, Section 21. Governor may investi-
United States Constitation, Fourteenth Amendment, Sec- gate case.
tion 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.

When a demand shall be made upon the Governor of
this State by the Executive Authority of another state
for the surrender of a person so charged with crime,
the Governor may call upon the Attorney General
or any prosecuting officer in this State to investi-
gate or assist in investigating the demand, and to re-
port to him the situation and circumstances of the
person so demanded, and whether he ought to be sur-
rendered.

Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 60, Section 24. Issue of Governor’s

18 U.S.C., Section 3182. Fugitives from State or Territory warrant of arrest; Its recitals.

to State, District or Territory.

Whenever the executive authority of any State or
Territory demands any person as a fugitive from jus-
tice, of the executive authority of any State, District
or Territory to which such person has fled, and pro-
duces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit
made before a magistrate of any State or Territory,
charging the person demanded with having committed
treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic
by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or

If the Governor decides that the demand should be
complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which
shall be sealed with the state seal, and be directed
to any peace officer or other person whom he may
think fit to entrust with the execution thereof. The
warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary
to the validity of its issuance.

App. 16
Wis.Stat., 1971, Section 133.01(1) and (3)

(1) Every contract or combination in the nature of
a trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce is hereby declared illegal. Every combination,
conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement or contract intend-
ed to restrain or prevent competition in the supply or
price of any article or commodity in general use in
this state, to be produced or sold therein or consti-
tuting a subject of trade, or commerce therein, or
which combination, conspiracy, trust, pool, agreement
or contract shall in any manner ccntrol the price of
any such article or commodity, fix the price thereof,
limit or fix the amount or quantity thereof to be man-
ufactured, mined, produced or sold in this state, or
fix any standard or figure in which its price to the
public shall be in any manner controlled or estab-
lished, is hereby declared an illegal restraint of trade.
Every person, corporation, copartnership, trustee or
association who shall either as principal or agent be-
come a party to any contract, combination, cconspir-
acy, trust, pool or agreement herein declared unlawful
or declared to be in restraint of trade, or who shall
combine or conspire with any other person, corpora-
tion, copartnership, association or trustee to monop-
olize or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce in this state shall forfeit for each such
offense not less than $100 nor more than $5,000.

(3) Whoever violates sub. (1) may be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or
both.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1905%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.