# Opposition — Shannon v. Department of Housing & Urban Development

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1642%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 1002

## Text

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FILED’

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aoe). CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

MAURICE SHANNON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION

WapvE H. McCreE, JR.
Solicitor General

BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK
Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM KANTER

Mark H. GALLANT
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-369
MAURICE SHANNON, ET AL., PETITIONERS
2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-AS5) |
is reported at 577 F. 2d 854. The opinion of the district
court (Pet. App. BI-BS) is reported at 433 F. Supp. 249.

JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of ‘appeals was entered on
June 5, 1978. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
on September 1, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees against the
United States.

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Petitioners, who are residents, businessmen and
property owners in the East Poplar area of Philadelphia,

requested the district court to enjoin the Department of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) trom financing
a housing project in that area. They alleged that the
project would violate various civil rights acts.' The district
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction and failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (305 F.
Supp. 205), but the Third Circuit reversed. 436 F. 2d 809,
The court of appeals held that HUD must suspend
funding the project pending determination whether HUD
could lawfully provide financial assistance, On remand to
the agency, HUD found that federal financing of the
project was barred under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 387
F. Supp. 5, 6. The parties later agreed to the entry of a
consent judgment settling the litigation. 409 F. Supp.
1189, 1190.

In July 1975 petitioners unsuccessfully sought an award
of attorneys’ fees, relying on Section 812(c) of Title VIII,
42 U.S.C. 3612(c).2 After Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (“the Act”),
42 U.S.C. 1988, petitioners again moved for an award of

‘Petitioners alleged violations of Section 105(d) of the Housing Act
of 1949, 42 U.S.C. 1455(d): Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. 2000d et seqg.: and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 er seq.

*28 U.S.C. 2412 proscribes awards of attorneys’ fees against the
federal government “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by
statute.” The district court held that 42 U.S.C, 3612(c) is not such an

exception. 409 F. Supp. 1189. This ruling was not appealed and is not
in issue here.

3

attorneys’ fees.’ The district court rejected petitioners’
renewed motion because the new Act does not “expressly
providfe]” for an award of attorneys’ fees against the
federal sovereign, as required by 28 U.S.C. 2412 and this
Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Vv.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 267-268 (1975) (Pet.
App. BI-BS5). The court of appeals affirmed, stating that
“the legislative history of the Act convinces us that
Congress did not contemplate a waiver of sovereign
immunity in passing the Act, with the exception of the
clause dealing with Internal Revenue suits” (Pet. App.
A4).

ARGUMENT

Petitioners contend that the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorizes the award of at-
torneys’ fees against the federal government. The Act,
however, does not expressly waive sovereign immunity,
and its legislative history demonstrates that waiver was
not intended. There is no conflict among the courts of
appeals on this question and, consequently, review by this
Court is not warranted.

It is well established that waivers of federal sovereign
immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). This
policy against implied waivers of sovereign immunity is
particularly relevant to awards of attorneys’ fees because
Congress has explicitly declared that the United States ts
not liable for such awards “[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically provided by statute.” 28 U.S.C. 2412; see

‘Respondents opposed this motion on the merits but did not
contend that it was untimely or that the district court abused its
discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) in entertaining the motion,

4

Alveska Pipeline Service Co. \. Wilderness Society, supra,
421 U.S. at 267-268. The Act does not unequivocally or
specifically subject the federal government to awards of
attorneys’ fees, and the court of appeals therefore
correctly held that such awards are not available. Accord,
Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp.
891, 893 (D. Ore. 1977); contra, Andrulis v. United States,
No. 77-1936 (D. D.C. June 12, 1978), appeal docketed,
No. 78-2039 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1978).4

The portion of the Act on which petitioners rely
provides only that “[iJn any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of * * * Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party * * * a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.” 42° U.S.C. 1988. This language does not
mention awards against the United States, and it does not
authorize awards by necessary implication.’ It may be
compared with the statutes concerning attorneys’ fees that

‘Petitioners suggest (Pet. 11-12) that the Department of Justice has
taken a position contrary to the one espoused here in several recent
actions. This is incorrect. In both Women’s Equality Action League
v. Califano, Civ, No, 74-1720 (D. D.C, May 3, 1978), and Adams vy.
Califano, Civ. No, 3095-70 (D. D.C, May 3, 1978), the government
acquiesced in an award of attorneys’ fees that) was explicitly
authorized by 20 U.S.C, 1617, the cases did not require an
interpretation of the statute involved here. NAACP y, Bell, No, 78-
1639 (D.C, Cir, filed July 10, 1978), another case upon which
petitioners rely, is pending on the government's appeal, And, as the
text indicates, Andrulis \. United States, which held that the Act
authorizes the award of attorneys’ fees against the United States, is
similarly pending on the government's appeal.

‘A statute might authorize awards of attorneys’ fees against the
United States by necessary implication if the United States were the
only possible defendant in the suits mentioned in the fees statute,
That is one of the rationales on which the Act was held to authorize
awards of fees against the states. See Hutto v. Finney, No, 76-1660
(June 23, 1978). But the United States is not a necessary defendant,
und indeed may not even be a proper delendant, in a suit to entorce

5

were cited by this ‘Court in A/lveska as examples of
express congressional waivers of sovereign immunity;
these statutes explicitly state that awards against the
federal government are permissible. 421 U.S. at 268. For
example, Title Il of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000a-3(b), provides that “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person,” See also, ¢.g., Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C, 552a(g)(2)(B) (“The court may assess
against the United States reasonable attorney fees * * *");
Consumer Product Safety Act, IS U.S.C. 2059 (e)(4),
2060(c) (“attorneys’ fees may be awarded against the
United States * * *"); Title IIL of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000b-1 (“United States shall be liable for
costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee * * *"),

The internal structure of the Act further demonstrates
Congress’ intent. The Act was amended at the eleventh
hour to allow awards of attorneys’ fees out of the federal
treasury in tax cases brought by the United States in bad
faith. See Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F. 2d 552
(Ct, Cl. 1978); 122 Cong. Rec. S17049 (daily ed. Sept. 29,
1976) (remarks of Sen. Allen); 122 Cong. Rec. $17050
(daily ed. Sept 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney); 122
Cong. Rec, $17050-S17051 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Congress must have recogniz-
ed that the bill did not generally authorize awards of fees
against the United States, or it would not have felt the
need to insert such an explicit authorization with regard
to tax cases. The portion of the Act explicitly authorizing
fees against the United States in certain tax cases

litle VI. See Mr, Justice Stevens’ opinion in Regents of the
University of California \, Bakke, No. 76-811 (June 28, 1978), slip op.
12 n.26,

6

demonstrates that such awards are not authorized in the
other categories of cases mentioned by the Act. Cf. Ford
v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611 (1927).

The legislative history of the Act also demonstrates that
Congress did not intend to subject the federal fise to
awards of attorneys’ fees under this provision. Both the
House and Senate Reports accompanying the Act
specifically stated that the government would incur no
additional costs as a result of this legislation. S. Rep. No.
94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1976).° Similarly, the
relevant legislative debates are replete with indications
that Congress affirmatively elected not to create a
“startling new remedy” against the federal sovereign. E.g.,
122 Cong. Rec. S16431 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks
of Sen. Hathaway); 122 Cong. Rec. S17052 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk); 122 Cong.
Rec. $1625! (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); 122 Cong. Rec. S$16490 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
1976) (letter from Rep. Rodino to Sen. Kennedy). The
Senate rejected an amendment, offered by Senator Helms
of North Carolina, that would have imposed the cost of
attorneys’ fees on the federal government. See 122 Cong.
Rec. $16257-S16259 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (exchange
of Sen. Helms and Sen. Mathias); 122 Cong. Rec. $17053
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Morgan); 122
Cong. Rec. S$16260 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (letter from
Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann read by Sen.
Mathias). Finally, on still another occasion the Senate

6Because the amendment authorizing fees in tax cases was added as
a last-minute compromise, the legislative reports and early debates
not reflect the amendment’s potential costs to the federal government.
Rep. Drinan, the floor manager of the bill in the House, commented
that, in contrast to the original bill, “the [tax] amendment might

involve an expense to the United States. However, since awards of

counsel fees under that amendment will occur only in the special

a

7

rejected a second Helms’ amendment that would have
“afford[ed] protection to financially pressed State and
local governments by including them within the bill’s
exemption from liability granted to the Government of
the United States.” 122 Cong. Rec. $16431 (daily ed.

Sept. 22, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms); see also id. at
S$ 16432.’

Petitioners’ further contention (Pet. 5-7) that the court
of appeals’ decision here conflicts with Hutto v. Finney,
No. 76-1660 (June 23, 1978), is also incorrect. Hutto
relied on unequivocal legislative history, and the civil
rights acts’ primary focus on state action, in holding that
the Act authorized attorneys’ fees awards against the
States. Slip op. 13-15. The legislative history is equally
explicit that Congress did not intend to authorize awards
of fees against the United States. See pages 6-7, supra.
The decisions thus are quite consistent.*

circumstances | have described, it is fair to say that the total costs to
the Government for fiscal year 1977 would be negligible.” 122 Cong.
Rec. H12159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). .

’Petitioners rely (Pet. 9-10) on some interchanges between members -
of the House immediately preceding the House vote on the amended
bill. 122 Cong. Rec. H12163-H12164 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). But the
comments of Rep. Railsback, who was confused by the effect of the
tax amendment, do not support petitioners’ position. Even Rep.
Railsback thought only that attorneys’ fees could be awarded against
the United States as plaintiff; here, of course, the United States was
a defendant. In any event, Rep. Drinan corrected Rep. Railsback’s
misunderstanding of the tax amendment. 122 Cong. Rec. H12164
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). Petitioners’ invocation (Pet. 6-7) of the
legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 777, is simply irrelevant.

‘Petitioners also contend (Pet. 12-14) pet Congress impliedly
waived the prohibition against attorneys’ fées found in 28 U.S.C.
2412 by amending the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702,
shortly after enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's fees Awards Act of
1976. See Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721. This contention was

8

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

WapeE H. McCrer, Jr.
Solicitor General

BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK
Assistant Attorney General

WILLIAM KANTER
MARK H. GALLANT
Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1978

not made be'ow and cannot be raised in this Court for the first time.
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977); Adickes
V. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970). In any event, there
is NO support for petitioners’ position in either the legislative history
or the language of the amendment. In conjunction with a parallel
amendment of 28 U.S.C. 1331(a), the Administrative Procedure Act
was amended for the narrow purpose of “withdrawing the defense of
sovereign immunity in actions [against federal agencies] seeking relief
other than money damages * * *.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976¥% emphasis added) The amendment itself
provides that “(nJothing “herein (1) affe¢ts other limitations on
** * the power or duty of the court to * * * deny relief on any other
appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” Pub. L. No. 94-574,
Section 702, 90 Stat. 2721. Accordingly, petitioners’ argument that
this legislation repealed the express provisions of Section 2412 to
allow an award of money (attorney's fees) is wrong.

DOJ-1978-11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1642%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
