# Petition — Shannon v. Department of Housing & Urban Development

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 1002

## Text

IN THE SEP : 1978
Supreme Court of the United Statestoorx. te. cree |

October Term, 1978

No. 78-369

MAURICE SHANNON , et al.,
Petitioners

U.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

~ SAYRE
ROBERT W. 8*#e4&R
3800 Centre Square West
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
(215) 972-7709

MICHAEL CHURCHILL
THOMAS K. GILHOOL
Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia
1315 Walnut Street, Suite 1600
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
(215) 735-7200
Attorneys for Petitioners

THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 66 NORTH JUNIPER STREET, PHILA., PA. 19107 (215) 561-4050

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I i ee he Sa oes 1
a daa Po ke Kas Sk aoe cub kd cae abbr OREN 1
EN cS ape ce CAs cane hcemwabels bee 2
ce ST REIT PES ARR EE FR 2
SE Gr ED NO oe ald bw so finned. vine whannweeles 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................... 4
ME ewireca., . oc. ok sinces ws na wena ne a 14

Appendix:

A. Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, June 5, 1978 . Al

B. Opinion and Order of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
ee ee UE oc lo Ata Gass cack Bl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Adams v. Califano, Civ. A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C.,
Se PD ccs k Sunde ndecedeesae ace 11
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
eR 9S CGR OCR em SESE MIT U | ema ER 7
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
ee te SP COUN wn ccm dc tcp sivcuaewosncaeec 7,8
Andrulis, et al. v. United States of America, et al.,
Civ. A. No. 77-1936 (D.D.C. 1978) ........... 5
Hilis v. Gautreaux, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (April
RA RPM GG oh i ban wearer eee et re ok 7
Hutto v. Finney, — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 2565 (June 23,
SSE se apa Ui: ioe rents reenter ee 5, 6, 7, 8, 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES~—(Continued )
Cases: Page

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) ........ 13
NAACP v. Bell, Civ. A. No. 75-1317 (D.D.C. 1978) 12

Women’s Equity Action League v. Califano, Civ. A.

No. 74-1720 (D.D.C., May 3, 1978) .......... 11
Statutes and Rules:
eS visi chs oe haledee ewes oie «i 13
Ee ci cay ib cee se yew ODA me on's 0.69 7
EE ES Was vy 5 rake cls e bans'e see oepinat 1
og A ETS a nn ae 2, 4, 6, 13
NO Noa Sonne by Geass as ache de benas 2,12
ae SID sock os cco nreeetevestevnetes 6, 7
i on kip onde ose eke ree 6, 7
ree 2
eT Ss Fakes ccd avsusseeuns 6,7
i EE OE RS i he ccen be astancecdncee 3
Ova y heap ee dsdtaveneecewe vee 6
eR SO nd Loe bh Ran Gwe hha och b i's ee 9008 6
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, P.L. 95-95,

Net ae” Se 4 SE a a 6

Legislative Materials:

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
EN ile ETS ae RRS RS Re ee 7,13

H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.(1977) 7
S. Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) 7
122 Cong. Rec. H 12159 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) . 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)
122 Cong. Rec. H 12163-4 (daily ec Oct. 1, 1976) 10

“Awarding of Attorney’s Fees’’, Hearings before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administrative of Justice,
ae A et PAE ee ee 1]

ili

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1978

No.

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.,
Petitioners

Uv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners, plaintiffs below, respectfully pray that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A,
infra) is reported at 577 F.2d 854. The opinion and order
of the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-

sylvania (Appendix B, infra) are reported at 433
F.Supp. 249.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) to review the order of the Court cf
Appeals entered on June 5, 1978.

1

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act of 1976, P.L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (42 U.S.C.A.
§1988) authorizes fees to be awarded to a plaintiff pre-
vailing against the United States in a suit under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d et

seq.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C.A. §1988 (Supp. 1974-1977) provides as
follows:

“$1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
... Inany action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil
action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United
States of America, to enforce, or charging a viola-
tion of, a provision of the United States Internal
Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. As
amended Pub. L. 94-559, §2, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat.
2641.”

28 U.S.C. §2412 (1976) provides as follows:

“Except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in
section 1920 of this title but not including the fees
and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the
prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official
of the United States acting in his official capacity,
in any court having jurisdiction of such action ....
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 973; July 18,
1966, Pub. L. 89-507, §1, 80 Stat. 308.)”

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition for certiorari from the denial of an
attorney’s fee to the prevailing plaintiffs in an action
brought, inter alia, under Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act against the Department of Housing and
Urban Development and several of its officials.

Plaintiffs’ action to enjoin approval by the De-
partment of financing for a subsidized housing project
known as Fairmount Manor in Philadelphia was origi-
nally dismissed by the District Court in an opinion re-
ported at 305 F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In the ab-
sence of a stay, construction of the project was com-
pleted pending the appeal. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the Department had vio-
lated certain civil rights laws, including Title VI and
the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq.), by failing to consider
racial impact in approving the location of subsidized
housing, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970), and remanded
for further proceedings.

Extended negotiations and hearings ensued. The
District Court, at the urging of Plaintiffs, ordered the
Department to retain experts to prepare an analysis of
the impact of the illegally approved project and a re-
medial program. Defendants contested the right of the
Plaintiffs to any remedy and a hearing on the scope of
relief was held prior to a settlement being agreed upon
and the entry of a judgment for Plaintiffs in May 1975.

As a consequence of Plaintiffs’ action the Depart-
ment promulgated Site Selection Criteria regulations,
found at 24 CFR 200.700 et seq.; contributed $500,000
to subsidize construction and sale of 42 new units of
homeownership housing in the affected community
and approved mortgage insurance for such houses;
contributed $150,000 for physical improvements to
Fairmount Manor; and approved subsidized financing
and mortgage insurance for 150 additional units of
senior citizen housing in the affected community.

3

Plaintiffs, pursuant to the settlement, moved for
an award of attorney’s fees under Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which was denied on March 1, 1976
on the grounds that the attorney’s fee provision of 42
U.S.C. §3612 did not apply to Section 3608(d) on which,
inter alia, relief had been predicated. 409 F.Supp. 1189.
No appeal was taken.

Plaintiffs’ bill of costs, filed on November 13, 1975,
was still pending before the District Court on appeal
from the Clerk’s ruling at the time of the enactment of
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 on
October 19, 1976. Plaintiffs thereafter timely renewed
their petition for attorney’s fees on the ground that fees
were permitted as part of the costs under the Act, that
it governed pending matters, and that as parties prevail-
ing under Title VI Plaintiffs met all the criteria of the
Act.

In an opinion dated June 16, 1977 (Appendix B,
infra) the District Court held the issue was properly
before it, but denied any award solely on the ground
that 28 U.S.C. §2412 “stands as an explicit assertion of
sovereign immunity” barring awards of fees against
the United States in the absence of ‘‘unequivocal”
statutory authorization and that the Fees Awards Act
did not constitute such statutory authorization. It en-
tered an order denying fees and awarding other costs.

The Circuit Court, in an opinion filed June 5, 1978
(Appendix A, infra), affirmed the District Court’s de-
nial of attorney’s fees, holding that the Fees Awards
Act did not contain ‘‘clear statutory authority” for
waiver of sovereign immunity and imposition of attor-
ney’s fees against the United States in connection with
the civil rights actions included in the Act.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should review and reverse the Court of
Appeals decision in this case because it decides an im-

4

portant question of federal law with wide applicability
in a manner inconsistent with a recent interpretation
of the same statute by this Court in Hutto v. Finney,
__. U.S. ___., 98 S.Ct. 2565 (June 23, 1978), and con-
trary to the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act
and to the intended effect of the same language em-
ployed by Congress in another recent statute autho-
rizing attorney’s fees to be awarded against the United
States. The decision is also in conflict with administra-
tive interpretations of the Fees Awards Act adopted by
the Department of Justice both before and after enact-

ment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be

reviewed has been rejected by the District Court for the
District of Columbia (Gesell, J.) which ordered the
United States to pay $19,874.03 in attorney’s fees and
out-of-pocket expenses under the Fees Awards Act
after the Government submitted the same brief as it
filed with the Third Circuit in this case and had drawn
the Third Circuit’s opinion to the attention of the Dis-
trict Court. Andrulis, et al. v. United States of
America, et al., Civil Action 77-1936 (Mem. Opinion of
June 12, 1978, clarified, July 13, 1978).

Tiie opinion of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent
with this Court’s subsequent interpretation of the Fees
Awards Act in Hutto v. Finney, supra, at 2575:

“The Act itself could not be broader. It applies to
‘any’ action brought to enforce certain civil
rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception
for States defending injunction actions: ...”

Similarly, there is no “hint of any exception” for
the federal government. Indeed, one clause of the Act,
referring to awards to any party (except the United
States) prevailing in enforcement proceedings under
the Internal Revenue Code can only apply to awards
against the United States.

In Hutto v. Finney the Court held that such “plain
indication of legislative intent” (bolstered by “equally
plain” legislative history) was sufficient to set aside

5

sovereign immunity of the States, and rejected a claim
that ‘‘Congress must enact express statutory lan-
guage.” Id. at 2576.

By contrast, in this case, the Third Circuit adopted
the District Court’s view that the 1976 Act was not
sufficiently clear statutory authority because it did not
contain the same express language found in Titles II,
III and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000a-3(b), 2000b-1, 2000e-5(k).'

Not only does this view conflict with the principle
expressed in Hutto v. Finney, but Congress in the
legislative history of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, Aug. 7, 1977, P.L. 95-95, Sec. 305(f), 91 Stat.
777, explicitly stated that the general authorization of
attorney’s fees contained in the amendment enacted to
Section 307(f), 42 U.S.C.A. §7607 (Supp. 1977),? which
does not contain any express reference to the United
States was intended to waive sovereign immunity and
constitute authorization under 28 U.S.C. Section 2412:

“In adopting this provision concerning fees,
the committee intended to meet the require-
ment for specific authorization imposed by 28
U.S.C. sec. 2412 and by the Supreme Court’s

1. Title II provides, for example:

“In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter,
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C. Section
2000a-3(b).

2. 42 U.S.C.A. §7607(f) provides:

“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) whenever it determines that such
award is appropriate.”

This language is identical to the attorney's fee provision included
in the citizen suit provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
$7604 and is similar to the broad lanugage of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act.

6

ruling in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240(1975).” H.R.
Rep. No. 95-294, at p.337; 8 U.S. Code Congres-
sional and Administrative News, 1977, p.2546.

The very same portion of legislative history of the
Fees Awards Act in the House Report which is cited in
Hutto v. Finney, supra, at 2575-6 to show sufficient
legislative intention to award fees against state gov-
ernments explicitly refers in the same paragraph to a
suit against tederal officials, Hills v. Gautreaux as one
of three examples of cases to which the Act would ap-
ply.’ Reference is also made to that case, sub nom,
Hills v. Gautreaux, __. U.S. ___., 96 S.Ct. 1538 (April
20, 1976) and to another case against federal officials,
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
in the House Report at page 5 when identifying the
scope of the civil rights cases encompassed by the bill.

The Third Circuit’s decision ignores the repeated
statements throughout House Report 94-1558 and
Senate Report 94-1011 that the purpose of the legisla-
tion was to promote enforcement of the civil rights
laws by “private attorneys general,” ‘to achieve uni-
formity in the remedies provided by Federal laws
guaranteeing civil and constitutional rights’ and to
“remedy anomalous gaps” in the civil rights laws.
Every other civil rights act which might apply to the
United States and which permits the award of fees
against any party waives sovereign immunity to permit
fee awards against the United States.‘ No other attor-

3. “... it should further be noted that government officials are
frequently the defendants in cases brought under the statutes
covered by H.R. 15460 [the bill which was enacted]. See, e.g... .
Hills v. Gautreaux, supra. ... The greater resources available to
governments provide an ample base from which fees can be
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against governmental
officials or entities.’"” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p.7 (1976).

4. 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title II], 42 U.S.C. §2000a-3(b); 1964
Civil Rights Act, Title III, 42 U.S.C. §2000b-1; 1964 Civil Rights
Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k); Education School Aid Act of
1972, 20 U.S.C. $1617.

7

ney’s fee provision in a civil rights act distinguishes
between private and state defendants on the one hand
and federal defendants on the other. Instead of creat-
ing “uniformity” and “consistency” the Third Circuit’s
decision merely creates a different anomaly, between
the civil rights acts covered by the Fees Awards Act
and all other civil rights acts with attorney’s fee provi-
sions. Furthermore, it fails to apply the rule of con-
struction which this Court utilized in Alyeska, supra,
421 U.S. at 267:

“If, as respondents argue, one of the main
functions of a private attorney general is to call
public officials to account and to insist that they
enforce the law, it would follow in such cases
that attorney’s fees should be awarded against
the Government of the officials themselves.”

The Third Circuit’s ruling thus vitiates the only ar-
ticulated purposes of the Congressional action.”
Although the legislative debates were complex, the
Court of Appeals erred when it stated at footnote 2 that
“Congressman Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill,
noted that the Allen Amendment [inserting the clause
concerning tax enforcement proceedings] was the only
provision in the bill which would involve expenditures
by the United States.” A careful reading of the passage
referred to indicates the Congressman was comment-
ing on the effects of the Allen Amendment and was
stating that the costs to the government under it would

5. The frequently made statements in the legislative reports
and debates that a purpose was to reverse Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company v. Wilderness Society, et ai., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), is not
contrary, for Alyeska clearly stated, although in dictum, that fees
could not be awarded against the United States as well as against
private parties. 42] U.S. at 267-268. There is no statement by any
member of Congress that they intended to preserve part of Alyeska
and the decision in Hutto v. Finney, supra, establishes that the
1976 Act did more than merely reverse the “American Rule” for
private parties.

be “‘negligible’’ because it would award fees “only in
special circumstances,”’ i.e. if the United States
brought a tax suit to harass a taxpayer or if such suit
was frivolous and vexatious. 122 Cong. Rec. H 12159
(daily ed., Oct. 1, 1976).

Much more to the point, and also ignored by the
Court of Appeals, was the statement made three times
by Congressman Railsback, ranking minority member
of the Subcommittee which reported the bill, in re-
sponse to questions by Rep. Quie, that the United
States would be potentially liable for fees not only to
prevailing defendants in tax cases under the Allen
Amendment, but to defendants prevailing in civil
rights cases.

“MR QUIE. First I would like to ask if the
U.S. Government is the plaintiff in a civil rights
case against an individual or corporation, can
that individual or corporation as the prevailing
party be awarded attorney’s fees against the
U.S. Government?

* * * *

MR. RAILSBACK. Mr. Speaker, as I read
the bill before us, my answer would be yes. What
we dois limit the United States from recovering
but we do not limit the rights of other prevailing
parties to recover in the event the United States
would be the plaintiff in an action such as
described in the bill.

MR. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman
will yield, would the gentleman from Mas-
sachusetts agree with that answer? Does the
gentleman agree with that answer?

MR. DRINAN. I am not entirely certain be-
cause the statutes covered by this bill are not

9

ordinarily used by the United States to initiate
civil rights cases.

*x * x *

MR. RAILSBACK. What my answer is, as I
read the bill before us, we limit the right of
the U.S. Government to recover, we do not limit
itin acase where the United States would be the
plaintiff suing a defendant, we do not limit the
defendant’s right to recover. Where the judge
might decide that a prevailing defendant should
recover, we do not limit the defendant from re-
covering from the United States in civil rights
cases.

* * * *

MR. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman
will yield further, the next question I have on the
IRS is if the United States is the plaintiff and
loses a civil rights case against a school district
or college, can that school district or college as
the prevailing party be awarded attorneys fees
against the U.S. Government?

MR. RAILSBACK. Mr. Speaker, if the gen-
tleman will yield further, again it would bein the
discretion of the court and nowhere in the bill do
we prevent a school district or college from re-
covering reasonable attorneys fees, even in a
case where the United States is a party plain-
tiff.”’

122 Cong. Rec. H 12163-4 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 1976).
Finally, it is important to note that when the
spokesman for the Department of Justice, Assistant At-
torney General of the Civil Division, Rex E. Lee, tes-
tified “in principle” in support of the bill as then
drafted before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, he
interpreted it as applying to the federal government.

10

“H.R. 8220 would authorize the awarding of
attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiffin actions
brought under certain civil rights statutes. Ac-
tions under the statutes involved have been
brought against both Federal officers and
private individuals.’”®

H.R. 8220 was identical to H.R. 9552 except award
of fees was mandatory under the former and discre-
tionary under the latter. The Department of Justice fa-
vored discretionary fees, supporting H.R. 9552. Ac-
cording to footnote 4 of the House Report:

“Apart from the addition of Title IX of Public
Law 92-318, the only difference between H.R.
9552 and the clean bill (H.R. 15460) [the bill as
enacted, except for the addition of the tax en-
forcement clause by the Allen Amendment] are
technical, not affecting the substance, made on
advice of the House Parliamentarian and staff
and legislative counsel.”

This contemporaneous interpretation of the Act as
applying to federal officials is consistent with the ac-
tions of the two divisions of the Department of Justice
through their respective Assistant Attorneys General
consenting to substantial awards being entered
against the United States by district court judges for
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act. Or-
ders issued in Adams v. Califano, Civil Action No.
3095-70 (D.D.C., May 3 and 5, 1978) and Women’s
Equity Action League v. Califano, Civil Action No.
74-1720 (D.D.C., May 3, 1978) awarded plaintiffs ap-
proximately $310,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to a
December 29, 1977 decree signed by Judge Pratt and
consented to by the Civil Division of the Department of

6. “Awarding of Attorneys’ Fees,” Hearings before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-
ministration of Justice, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 176.

11

Justice through its Assistant Attorney General which
settled litigation brought under Title VI and Title IX
(both covered by Section 1988) against the Secretaries
of HEW and Labor. Part V of that order provided that
the

“{pjlaintiffs and intervenors are also entitled
under... 42 U.S.C. 1988 to the award of rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees.”

On October 25, 1977, a separate order relating to set-
tlement of another aspect of the Adams case resulted in
an award of $107,914.95, again consented to by the
Justice Department and approved by Judge Pratt pur-
suant to Section 1988.

In a wholly separate matter, NAACP v. Bell, Civil
Action No. 75-1317 (D.D.C.), the Civil Rights Division
conceded in an October 14, 1977 brief signed by its
Assistant Attorney General that Section 1988 applied
to the federal government by failing to counter the
NAACP’s lengthy arguments to that effect. Judge
Parker therefore concluded in an April 3, 1978 decision
that the ‘“[djefendants do not contest the validity of ap-
plying this act ... to obtain an award from the gov-
ernment,” slip op. at 2, and awarded $26,300.00 against
the Department of Justice. (Appeal filed June 2, 1978,
No. 78-1639.)

These interpretations by the Assistant Attorneys
General charged with advising the Congress of the
Department’s views on the impact of proposed legisla-
tion and with the actual implementation of the Act are
entitled to significant weight in assessing legislative
intent.

Finally, the decision below to narrowly construe
the Fees Awards Act in order to protect sovereign im-
munity in an ancillary matter such as fees and costs is
utterly inconsistent with the nearly simultaneous
enactment of P.L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 amending the
Administrative Procedure Act, which was approved by

12

the House the same day as the Fees Awards Act and
which was signed into law two days later. Section 1 of
that act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (1976) eliminates the defense of
sovereign immunity as to any action in federal court
seeking relief other than money damages and stating a
claim, like the claim in this case, based on the asser-
tion of unlawful official action.’ The House Report on
the Fees Awards Act emphasized that fees awarded
under Section 1988 are not damages and stressed that
counsel fees are ‘‘particularly important” in cases
where damages are barred by immunity doctrines.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558 at 8-9. In Hutto v. Finney,
supra, at 2576, n.24 this Court reaffirmed the long-
standing principle that attorney’s fees are very differ-
ent from damages:

“Unlike ordinary ‘retroactive’ relief such as
damages or restitution, an award of costs does
not compensate the plaintiff for the injury that
first brought him into court. Instead, the award
reimburses him for a portion of the expenses he
incurred in seeking prospective relief.”

It has long been observed that related statutes must be
read in conjunction with each other. See, e.g.
Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).

In light of that sweeping policy waiving sovereign
immunity there exists no support for a policy re-
quiring extraordinarily express language above and
beyond that normally needed to establish legisla-
tive intent in order to comply with the requirement of
28 U.S.C. §2412. The House Report’s position in con-
nection with the adequacy of the language of Section
305(f) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
supra, is consistent with such a revised policy. Simi-
larly, the 1976 Fees Awards Act is a statutory provision

7. “An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other
than money damages .. . shall not be dismissed nor relief therein
be denied on the ground that it is against the United States... .”

13

authorizing fees in “all” proceedings covered thereby,
and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which has
been waived except in damage cases, should not create
any bar to effectuating the Congressional purpose of
promoting private attorneys general and creating uni-
form remedies in our civil rights laws.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.

ROBERT W. SAYRE

3800 Centre Square West
Philadelphia, Pennsylvnaia 19102

MICHAEL CHURCHILL
THOMAS K. GILHOOL
Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia
1315 Walnut Street, Suite 1600
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Attorneys for Petitioners

14

Al
APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 77-2255

MAURICE SHANNON, CAROLYN BECK, BASIL H.

LOSTEN, IRENE SISK, THOMASENE MACK,
MILDRED BATES, LUCILLE WEEKS, TYRONE
BEAL, BRENDA PARKER, FRANCES
McCARTHY, CATHERINE M. P. TAYLOR,
JAMES W. WILLIAMS, JUANITA WILLIAMS,
CHARLES JOHNSON, SAMUEL D. BROG,
LIBERYPLACE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, FRIENDS
NEIGHBORHOOD GUILD, FRIENDS HOUSING
COOPERATIVE, THE GERMAN SOCIETY OF ~-
PENNSYLVANIA, for themselves and all others
similarly situated,

Appellants,

v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING

AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE
ROMNEY, Secretary of Department of Housing
and Urban Development; WARREN P. PHELAN,
Regional Administrator, Region II, Department of
Housing and Urban Development; a:.4 THOMAS
J. GALLAGHER, Regional Administrator; Federal
Housing Administration, Department of Housing
and Urban Development,

Appellees.

A2

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

D.C. No. 69-197.

Before HUNTER, WEIS, Circuit Judges, and
LAYTON, District Judge.*

OPINION

(Filed June 5, 1978)

PER CURIAM

This appeal raises the question whether the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-599, 90 Stat. 2641, permits an award of fees against
the United States in a suit under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. Since we
agree with the district court that the Attorney’s Fees
Act does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity
in this context, we affirm.

Plaintiffs filed suit in 1969 challenging approval by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development of
a rent supplement program known as Fairmount
Manor in the East Poplar neighborhood of
Philadelphia. The district court originally dismissed the
complaint, 305 F.Supp. 205 (E.D. Pa. 1969), but was
reversed by this court, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). We
held that the Department had violated certain civil
rights laws including Title VI, and remanded for
further proceedings. During the pendency of the

* Honorable Caleb Rodney Layton, 3rd, United States District
Judge for the District of Delaware, sitting by designation.

A3

remand, the parties agreed upon a settlement, and the
district court entered judgment for plaintiffs in May,
1975. Plaintiffs then moved for an award of attorneys
fees, which the district court denied. 409 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D. Pa. 1976).

Plaintiffs renewed their request for counsel fees,
based on the newly enacted Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act, in their appeal of the Clerk’s taxation
of costs. The district court agreed to reopen the matter,
but held that the award of fees, despite the new Act,
was still barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The court reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 2412' was an
express assertion of sovereign immunity prohibiting
the award of counsel fees against the United States
absent statutory authority. Noting that a waiver of
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the
court ruled that the new Act did not authorize an
award of attorneys fees against the United States in a
suit under Title VI. The court contrasted the explicit
waivers of immunity found in Titles II, III, and VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2200a-3(b),
2000b-1, 2000e-5(k).

We agree with the analysis of the district court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, attorneys fees may not be
awarded against the United States absent clear
Statutory authority. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392, 399 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975);
Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service
Commission, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf.
Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir. 1977)
(denying award of interest on claim against United
States). The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act

amends 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to provide:

1. 28 U.S.C. §2412(a) provides:

The United States shall be liable for fees and costs only
when such liability is expressed provided for by Act of
Congress.

A4

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provi-
sion of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and
1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1982, 1985, 1986], title IX of Public Law
92-318, orin any civil action or proceeding, by or
on behalf of the United States of America, to en-
force, or charging a violation of, a provision of
the United States Internal Revenue Code, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, areasonable attor-
ney’s fee as part of the costs.

With the exception of certain suits under the Internal
Revenue code, see Aparacor, Inc. v. United States,
No. 139-73 (Ct. Cl. Feb. 22, 1978), the Act does not
explicitly waive the sovereign immunity of the United
States. It contains none of the language usually used to
indicate a waiver of immunity. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (Freedom of Information Act) (‘‘The
court may assess against the United States reasonable
attorney fees... .’’); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (‘‘. . . the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.”’);
15 U.S.C. §§ 2059 (e)(4), 2060(c) (Consumer Product
Safety Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (Title III of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); id. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964). Further, our reading of the
legislative history of the Act convinces us that
Congress did not contemplate a waiver of sovereign
immunity in passing the Act, with the exception of the
clause dealing with Internal Revenue suits.? See

2. The Allen Amendment, dealing with tax suits, was added late
in the consideration of the bill from the floor of the Senate. See 122
Cong. Rec. S$17049-51 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976). Congressman
Drinan, a House sponsor of the bill, noted that the Allen
Amendment was the onlv provision in the bill which would involve
expenditures by the United States. 122 Cong. Rec. H12159-60 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1976).

AS

Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F.
Supp. 891, 893 (D. Ore. 1977). Accordingly, we hold
that the Attorney’s Fees Act does not permit an award
of counsel fees against the United States in a suit
brought under Title VI.

The order of the district court denying counsel fees
will be affirmed.

The legislative history also clarifies an ambiguity in the statute
caused by the Allen Amendment. The phrase “by or on behalf of the
United States of America” was meant to modify only the phrase “to
enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code,” and not the phrase “or Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.” See 122 Cong. Rec. $17049-53 (daily ed., Sept.
29, 1976); id. H12151-52, 12161 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976).

Bl

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Civil Action No. 69-197.

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.

Vv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, et al.

June 16, 1977.
OPINION

JOSEPH S. Lorp, III, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs from the Clerk’s
taxation of costs. We have previously considered and
denied plaintiffs’ motion for counsel fees under Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et
seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). See
Shannon v. U. S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development, 409 F.Supp. 1189 (£.D.Pa.1976).
Plaintiffs now ask that we award counsel fees
pursuant to “The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act of 1976”, (“Fees Awards Act’’), an amendment to
42 U.S.C. §1988, adopted on October 19, 1976. The
amendment provides, inter alia, for the award of
counsel fees as part of the costs in an action, as this
suit is, to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.

B2

[1] We must first consider whether the finality of
our previous decision and plaintiffs’ failure to appeal
prevents us from considering the present petition. We
think not. In our last opinion, we considered only the
recoverability of attorneys’ fees under Title VIII, which
did allow them in certain actions under that Title. We
held that this was not one of those actions. Here, on the
other hand, we are faced with a question of whether
attorneys’ fees are recoverable as part of costs in an
action to enforce Title VI. Since we still have before us
plaintiffs’ exceptions to the Clerk’s ruling on other
costs, and since the Fees Awards Act was promulgated
after we originally considered attorneys’ fees, we
believe there is ‘treason justifying relief from the
operation” of the order denying attorneys’ fees. See
F.R. Civ.P. 60(b)(6).

{2} Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ petition, we
have concluded that the award of attorneys’ fees is
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Before
1966, the United States was liable for fees and costs
only when such liability was expressly provided for by
an act of Congress, 28 U.S.C. §2412. That section was
amended in 1966, to permit the recovery of costs unless
specifically forbidden by statute. However, Congress
explicitly excluded ‘‘the fees and expenses of
attorneys” from the costs recoverable under §2412.
Thus, Section 2412 stands as an explicit assertion of
sovereign immunity as respects the fees and expenses
of attorneys. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v.
Wilderness Society et al., 421 U.S. 240, 268 n. 42, 95
S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 512 F.2d 1351 (1975).

In Alyeska, speaking of the allowance of attorneys’
fees against the government, the Court said, 421 U.S. at
pages 267-268, 95 S.Ct. at page 1626:

“. . . But §2412 on its face, and in light of its
legislative history, generally bars such awards,

B3

which, if allowable at all, must be expressly
provided for by statute, as, for example, under
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§2000a—3(b).”’

Title II to which the Court referred provides:

“(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs, and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.” 42 U.S.C.
§2000a—3. (Emphasis added).

There are other instances of Congress’ awareness
of the necessity of clear language to waive sovereign
immunity. Title 42 U.S.C. §2000b—1 provides:

“In any action or proceeding under this sub-
chapter the United States shall be liable for
costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, the
same as a private person.”

Title 42 U.S.C. §2000e—5(k) states:

“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter
the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of
the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.” (Emphasis added).

The unequivocal language to which the Court
adverted in Alyeska and that contained in the statutes
quoted above is in stark contrast to the silence of the
Fees Awards Act. It may be that the lack of specificity
was a Congressional oversight or it may have been
deliberate. If the former, the correction must be made
by Congress. It cannot be made by the court. If the
latter. we are bound by it.

B4

Plaintiffs’ claim the following expenses:

Venturi & Rauch-report and testimony $3,051.00
Postage, phone, attorneys’
travel & miscellaneous 277.23
Copies of documents 790.00
Copies of briefs & appendix 710.00
Allowed by Clerk 35.75
Total $4,863.98

[3, 4] The only expenses which may be allowed are
those for which sovereign immunity has been waived.
Any waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed
strictly within its terms. The softening 1966
amendment to 28 U.S.C. §2412 limits the costs and
expenses made recoverable from the United States to
those allowed by 28 U.S.C. §1920. That Section
provides:

“A judge or clerk of any court of the United States
may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part
of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained
for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of
papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title.

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon
allowance, included in the judgment or decree.”

[5] The Clerk found that the $790.00 claimed for
copies of documents were for copies given to plaintiffs
and therefore are not recoverable under §1920(4).
However, we believe the $710.00 ciaimed for briefs
and appendix submitted to the Court of Appeals is
allowable either under §1920(3) or (4). The remaining
claims are clearly without §1920.

BS

[6] We recognize that in exceptional private party
cases, the courts may exercise their equitable powers
to allow costs not covered by § 1920. However, the cases
in which this power was invoked did not involve the
bar of sovereign immunity. And in §2412, the waiver of
sovereign immunity was firmly bounded by the
limitations of §1920. Furthermore, to make it even
more explicit, the “fees and expenses of attorneys”
were specifically excluded.

Nor is the Fees Awards Act of any avail to
plaintiffs. Its only reference to costs is the allowance of
attorneys’ fees as costs against a losing private party.
Plaintiffs’ recovery of costs and expenses, therefore,
remain confined by the boundaries of §1920.

B6

IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action

No. 69-197

MAURICE SHANNON, et al.
v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, et al.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 1977, it is
ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ request for counsel fees is DENIED.

2. The plaintiffs’ exception to the Clerk’s denial of
the amount of $710.00 for costs of printing is
SUSTAINED; in all other respects the plaintiffs’
exceptions are overruled.

By the Court

JOSEPH S. Lorp, III, Chief Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1642%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
