# Petition — Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 946

## Text

AUG2 9 197¢

K, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1978

Ne 88-347

Oreck Corroration, Petitioner
v.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, |
and

Sears, Roencck & CoMPANY

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

—— |

llowarp ApLer, JR.
LIONEL KESTENBAUM
James W. OLSON

Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
Berason, BorKLAND, MARGOLIS & ADLER
11 Dupont Cirele N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
(202) 462-5930

August 29, 1978

Passs or Brron S. ApAms Paintinc, Inc., WASHINGTON, D. C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
EEE A ee i
Tasie or Cases AND AUTHORITIES .................3. Ul
EO 1
Nee LLG snes ccdeeescccee cece: 2
Nt don kesesesccsesecces 2
ees cack webpenccecescces 3
ee ad os cas cieeesccese sence 3
A. The Oreck-Whirlpool Arrangement .......... 3
B. The Sears-Whirlpool Relationship .......... 5
C. Evidence of a Conspiracy ................... 6
D. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals ........ 9
Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT .................5. 11
EE OT Tee ee 21
APPENDIX
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
IE ED ccc cccccscccccccscces la
Opinion of the Court of Appeals on Rehearing
I UID occ tscescccccccees 26a

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CasEs:

Ackerman, Chillingworth, Etc. v. Pacific Electrical
Contractors Ass’n, 405 F. Supp. 99 (D. Hawaii
1975), aff’d, No. 76-1264 (9th Cir. March 22,1978) 14

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Fed.

271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) ... 138

ii Table of Cases and Authorities Continued

All Label Record Service, Inc. v. Mr. Wiggs Dept.
Stores, 1978-1 Trade Cas. {62,073 (N.D. Ohio

SE: ons bana aln Roun 6 sino aeewakba eats wa «6 ll
Bernard v. Curtis Circulation, 1978-2 Trade Cas.
f & 9p 8k km | re oe ore eee 11

Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum 4
Chemical Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cas. { 62,064 (3d

NS kas dak kevin ote aa a ea 11
Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
CREE aes vee een wakes 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19

E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ........cccccccness 14
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United
OD, Te GPa, OD CREE nes voccncsdantodenes 12
Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11
a EE vc teat en anes ely cbacwneeweed + 21
FMC vy. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390
ee Se a bck ko 5 05 Ciba ae eae eA Kak 12
Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 447 F.
I Ge UMMM Es, BPE) 00s cncnaciicbseucess 11

Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 417 F.2d 621

ee EE ao Gara den Sab hs sas 00s co's4 eee eee 21
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211
SN a ths Ca vie Cannas d canwdvetnebetpeta tad 12
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 US.
OE eet Meee ty eer ee Tee 12, 13, 14, 21
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.),
cert. dented, 377 U.S. 933 (1964) .......cccceeees

ne, v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir.
NE Valice bute Pitas cakes ob al oP amtaieas 640s
McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 F.2d 877 (7th

Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947) ..... 20
Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.

FONE. rs chsedeircs eis ts cuienetanintieeins >< 21
Petroleum for Contractors, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No.

77 Civ. 3079 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 5, 1978) ...... 12
Poller vy. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 U.S. 464

to ) er re as Seah ta icts ok 21
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341

SED s:d akin wee eae ewe ds os sabe we kat nee 12, 13

Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C.
BRR Ga cs a ee eee 14, 17

Table of Cases and Authorities Continued iii
Page

Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National Bankamericard,
Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415

2 eer eer errr errr 14
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
ON aonb x skdaen ee anedhebss.0bb06 500.65 5a 5
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
es tik ie Ghd ee dancer hewsszedees 12,13
STATUTES:
Sherman Act, Section 1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970) ........ 3,5
i Pn Sen elie vabatedkese + bs ss 000 93 2

OrHEeR AUTHORITIES:
ABA Antitrust Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restric-

tions Limiting Intrabrand Competition .......... 15
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws,

Be i es I, ECD, cvcceccccisevecss: 13
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978) .............5. 13

Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Unprecedented Supreme Court—1977, 77 Columbia
Ei, SUITE A ovis p.c6Ny eee s cheeea nce ness 15

Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75

Columbia L. Rev. 282 (1975) ..........ceeeceees 15
ON IONE HUES a coca ctccccnccecccesaces 13, 15
Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Report, July, 1978 ....... 11

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
ee eae eet abana eeeReaeeke

Wright, Law of Federal Courts ..............00005: 20

ll

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBER TERM, 1978

No.

OrECK CorRPoRATION, Petitioner
a

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

\
and

SEARS, RoEBuCK & COMPANY

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Oreck Corporation petitions for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment and opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
tered on May 1, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals on Rehearing
en banc from which this petition is taken (including
the dissent of Judges Mansfield and Feinberg) is re-
ported at Trade Cas. 1978-1 162,026. The prior court
of appeals panel decision (including the dissent of

2

Judge Mansfield) is reported at 563 F.2d 54. Copies
of the opinions below are reprinted in the appendix.’

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on May 1,
1978. On July 17, 1978, Mr. Justice Marshall extended
the time to petition for certiorari to and including
August 29, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. See. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the rule that boycotts are illegal per se
is properly applied to a vertical agreement resulting
in a manufacturer’s refusal to sell, in a situation
where such agreement is not ancillary to an exclusive
distributorship or to any other valid marketing goal
suggested by this Court as possible justification for
vertical restrictions.

2. Whether the district court’s charge to the jury
was proper in the context of the issues and record evi-
dence in this case. More specifically, whether the court
of appeals erred in overturning a jury verdict, which
had found defendants Whirlpool and Sears liable for
conspiring to exclude Oreck from selling ‘‘ Whirlpool”
vacuum cleaners, because of a failure to charge the jury
regarding possible reasonableness, where

(a) no evidence had been presented purporting to
justify a Sears-Whirlpool agreement on the basis of a

* The appendix is cited as ‘‘Pet. App.’’. Proceedings below cited
in the Joint Appendix to the Second Cireuit are cited as ‘‘J.A.’’.
Trial transcript passages are cited as ‘‘Tr.’’; plaintiff’s trial ex-
hibits are identified as ‘‘PX’’ and are cited to their location in
the Book of sees as ‘‘E’’,

aint et ws Ant

3

legitimate business need to eliminate intrabrand com-
petition in Whirlpool vacuum cleaners ;

(b) no benefit to interbrand competition was
claimed ;

(ce) the only defense offered was that Whirlpool had
acted unilaterally to terminate Oreck without any pres-
sure or communication from Sears, or any agreement
with it; and

(d) no objection was made to the charge as given.

3. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that
defendants’ concerted exclusionary conduct could be
defensible on the ground that (a) plaintiff had failed
to show ‘‘an anti-competitive effect in the vacuum
cleaner industry as a whole’’, and (b) defendant
Whirlpool had exercised a contractual right to termi-
nate plaintiff.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $1, provides
in pertinent part:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade

or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, is declared to be illegal .. .

STATEMENT
A. The Oreck-Whirlpool Arrangement

Whirlpool Corporation (‘‘Whirlpool’’) manufac-
tures a variety of household products, including vac-
uum cleaners since its 1957 acquisition of the Birtman
Electric Company. Birtman had manufactured clean-
ers for Sears, Roebuck & Company (‘‘Sears’’), and

4

Whirlpool continued to do so under the Sears ‘‘Ken-
more’’ brand. It also sold under the Whirlpool label,
using its already-established distribution system. These
latter efforts proved unsuccessful and in 1961, Whirl-
pool discontinued sales under its own label.

During the 1958 to 1961 period, David Oreck, as
Executive Vice President of Bruno, New York, had
headed the sales operations of the most successful of
the Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaner distributors.
(J.A. 50-52, 55, 466-67). When Whirlpool decided to
reestablish the marketing of Whirlpool brand vacuum
cleaners, it determined to do so through a different
method of distribution, that of an exclusive national
distributor. It asked David Oreck to be that distribu-
tor, and the Oreck Corporation (‘‘Oreck’’) was ap-
pointed as the exclusive United States distributor for
Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaners in August, 1963.
(J.A. 56-68, 467-71; PX 3, E 1-9).

Oreck’s original contract with Whirlpool was for a
five year term with automatic one year extensions
thereafter, unless six months prior notice of termina-
tion was given. In 1967, Oreck switched its marketing
technique and began selling through direct mail solici-
tation, with a resultant increase in sales from 8,384
units in 1967, to 15,610 units in 1968, and to 78,203
units in 1971. (PX 106, E 102). The new sales tech-
nique initiated by Oreck displeased Sears, as is dis-
cussed below (pp. 6-7), and on June 17, 1968, Whirlpool
notified Oreck that it was terminating the contract.
After negotiations, including a threat to sue by Oreck,
a new contract was entered into on August 1, 1968,
extending Oreck’s distributorship until December 31,
1971, at which time Whirlpocl terminated Oreck, not-
withstanding the five-fold increase in Oreck’s sales
that occurred between 1968 and 1971.

ee

5

This action was filed by Oreck in September, 1972.
Count I, charging a conspiracy between Whirlpool and
Sears to exclude Oreck from the United States market,
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
$1, is the pertinent portion of the complaint for pur-
poses of this petition. The jury found for Oreck on
Counts I and II and on July 13, 1976, judgment was
entered in favor of Oreck in the amount of $2,250,000.*

B. The Sears-Whirlpool Relationship

The jury finding of a conspiracy between Whirlpool
and Sears was based on substantial evidence. An inti-
mate relationship has existed between Sears and
Whirlpool for over fifty years and Sears buys approxi-
mately two-thirds of Whirlpool’s annual production.
(J.A. 340-42). A series of Sears officers have sat on

2Count II charged a conspiracy to exclude Oreck from the
Canadian market. The jury allocated its damage award 90% to
Count I and 10% to Count II. The jury charge for Count IT was
in keeping with the then authoritative United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Because of the subsequent
overruling of Schwinn, this charge was incorrect and Oreck does
not seek review of the court of appeals’ order of a new trial on
Count IT.

Contrary to the view of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 31a n.
4), however, the error with respect to Count II does not affect the
validity of the 90% of the judgment relating to the domestic
market, The problem with the charge respecting the Canadian
market was that it allowed recovery for unilaterally-imposed re-
strictions; but no similar issue was raised as to the domestic claims,
and the reversal does not undermine the judgment on such claims
in any way. Insofar as the evidence regarding Canada showed a
combination of Whirlpool and Sears to injure Oreck, it was prop-
erly considered by the jury. As we will show, the defense was that
Whirlpool acted entirely on its own in terminating Oreck, without
any pressure, complaint, communication from, or agreement with,
Sears. Evidence contradicting that defense was material and rele-
vant and not improper prejudice. (See dissent, Pet. App. 48a n. 1).

6

Whirlpool’s board or become officers of Whirlpool and
Sears is a large Whirlpool shareholder. (J.A. 322-23,
333-36). In addition, officials of the two companies meet
to discuss marketing and sales plans. At one such 1971
meeting, future plans for vacuum cleaners, to be ef-
fected after Oreck’s termination, were discussed. (J.A.
971-74, 883-84).

Because of contacts such as these, Whirlpool knew
of Sears’ strong interest in how Whirlpool made its
non-Sears sales. A Whirlpool internal memorandum
written in 1961 states that ‘‘Sears becomes very un-
happy if RCA WHIRLPOOL product is retailed for
less than the Sears product manufactured by Whirl-
pool’’, facing Whirlpool with the challenge of selling
‘cleaners in volume at high retail prices.’’ (PX 160;
E 127, 141). Whirlpool made it clear to Oreck from
the outset that Oreck was not to offer low-priced mer-
chandise, (J.A. 73-75; PX 45, E 39-40).

Oreck found, however, that it could not compete with
Sears in the higher-priced line and in 1967 shifted its
method of distribution to sell a lower-priced cleaner,
primarily by direct mail. Oreck’s mail order campaign
proved successful; its sales increased dramatically, as
mentioned above; and, consequently, it was able to

provide more effective competition to Sears. (J.A.
200-12, 303-13).

C. Evidence of a Conspiracy

Sears’ reaction to Oreck’s burgeoning competition
was to attempt to suppress it. As early as 1967, John
Payne, the Whirlpool employee in most frequent direct
contact with Oreck (J.A. 105, 544, 577, 857-58) told
David Oreck not to ‘‘rock the boat’’ and to terminate
the mail order business because the “‘other customer”

LAuclltcis thnk clini te: DD a bghtidhbide se

4 ite lll 5 BB Rai hd ep ok &

Pa” Se .

7

did not like it. (J.A. 207). Two other Whirlpool offi-
cials also told Oreck that selling by mail order was a
‘‘mistake.”? (J.A. 501, 505). When Oreck’s original
contract was terminated the following year, Payne told

David Oreck:
Dave, I hesitate to tell you this because it could

cost me my job, but I think our other customer got
to the head of the company. (J.A. 175)

Sears’ dislike of Oreck’s mail order business is also
shown by a complaint about Oreck’s mail order solici-
tation from J. M. Barker, ‘‘an Honorary Director of
Sears”’ (J.A. 330), which was forwarded to Whirlpool
by Sid Boyar, who was both a Sears vice president and
director and a Whirlpool director. (J.A. 335, 828-31).
Boyar’s communication was sent on by Don Ranum, of
Whirlpool, to Whirlpool president, John Platts. (PX
60, E 53, 54). Another indication that Whirlpool sought
to prevent Oreck from competing with Sears in the
mail order business is Whirlpool’s refusal to create a
mailing package satisfying parcel post and UPS Te-
quirements. (J.A. 601-02, 610). J ohn Payne had origi-
nally told Oreck that there would be no problem doing
this, (J.A. 604) but ’xter advised Marshall Oreck that

[Corporate said] they are not interested in pro-
viding you with a carton and it’s in your best
interest leaving this matter alone. It’s sensitive
with Corporate and do not make any changes
leave this matter alone. (J.A. 609)

Two other incidents also demonstrate the existence
of a Sears-Whirlpool conspiracy to restrain competi-
tion from Oreck. When Oreck desired to distribute
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners in Canada, Whirlpool de-
clined to obtain Canadian Standard Association

8

(CSA) approval for the Oreck unit or to make minor
design changes necessary to meet CSA standards.
(J.A. 130-33, 151, 353, 387). John Payne, who had
encouraged Oreck in its interest in marketing in
Canada, admitted that his superior at Whirlpool told
him not to make the changes necessary for CSA ap-
proval. (J.A. 354, 362-63). In an April 15, 1970 tele-
gram to David Oreck, Payne expressed regret that
‘“‘T am unable to obtain a waiver to the current fran-
chise to permit Canadian marketing.”’ (J.A. 356-57,
PX 34, E 22). Whirlpool sold vacuum cleaners in
Canada to Simpson-Sears Ltd., an affiliate of Sears
which marketed cleaners competitive to that sold by
Oreck, and for which Whirlpool had obtained CSA
approval. (J.A. 134-35, 538-39, 562-63).

Oreck also several times asked Payne to make
vacuum cleaners for private label customers (J.A.
257-58, 264, 634-35; PX 78-79, 81, E 84-49) and Payne
initially was enthusiastic about the idea. (J.A. 626).
However, Payne later advised Marshall Oreck that
‘“‘Corporate had decided . . . not to make a private
label for us’? (J.A. 629) and in response to a later
request from David Oreck to make a private label
vacuum cleaner, Payne responded,

Dave, I want to tell you as a friend, don’t rock
the boat. We have objections here from our cus-
tomer about giving you private label and if you
persist on asking this, it’s only going to cause you
trouble. (J.A. 263)

Oreck persisted in its attempts to have private label
vacuum cleaners made by Whirlpool until September
1971, when Payne told Marshall Oreck that ‘‘another
vacuum cleaner customer’’ told Whirlpool ‘‘they are
not interested in having another competitor in the

9

vacuum cleaner business.’’ (J.A. 637-38). Despite the
close involvement of John Payne with Oreck, defend-
ants did not call him as a witness, although Payne
was present in the court room. (Tr. 1648).

Additional evidence from which the jury could
have inferred a conspiracy was Whirlpool’s eco-
nomically irrational termination of Oreck in 1971,
Oreck’s most successful year, and the admission of
Whirlpool officials that Oreck was ‘‘doing a nice job,
no question about that’’ (J.A. 552) and ‘‘we had no
quarrel with the amounts he was selling”. (J.A. 488).
This seemingly irrational behavior continued even
after Oreck’s termination, when in 1972, Whirlpool
refused to sell Oreck 30,000 units in inventory on a
eash basis at a full unit price of $30. (J.A. 298-99,
491-92, 495-96, 518, 521-22, 544-46). Instead, it sold
them to third parties at only $15.00 per unit (J.A. 546,
555-56), or a total of approximately $450,000 less than
Whirlpool could have realized from a sale to Oreck.

D. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The judgment entered for Oreck in the district
court was overturned, two to one, by a three-judge
panel in the court of appeals for the Second Circuit,
563 F.2d 54, and the case remanded for a new trial.
On rehearing en banc, the panel majority’s decision
was affirmed, six to two. Trade Cas. 1978-1 1 62,026.

The majority held that the trial judge’s charge to
the jury invoked a per se standard under which ‘‘the
jury could simply have found an agreement by Sears
and Whirlpool to exclude Oreck from the sale of
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners and on that basis have
found them guilty ... of a per se violation of §1
of the Sherman Act’’ (Pet. App. 30a-3la, court’s

10

emphasis). The issue, as framed by the majority, was
‘“‘whether the per se standard . . . was appropriate in
light of the nature of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears
agreement’’ (Pet. App. 32a). Relying on this court’s
decision in Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), the majority held that vertical
boycott agreements, unlike horizontal restraints, must
be ‘‘examined under the rule of reason standard,”’
since they ‘promote interbrand competition by allow-
ing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in
the distribution of its products” (Pet. App. 35a). In
addition, finding that ‘‘Whirlpool’s decision not to
renew Oreck’s distributorship was an exercise of its
contractual rights’? (Pet. App. 39a), the majority
further held that ‘“‘[a]ny alleged inducements by
Sears to Whirlpool to allow the contract with Oreck
to expire” would not violate the antitrust laws “‘with-
out some further showing that . . . there was an anti-
competitive effect in the vacuum cleaner industry as
a whole...’ (Pet. App. 39a-40a).

Judges Mansfield and Feinberg, in dissent, accepted
“the legal issue as framed by the majority’”’ (Pet.
App. 49a), but would have affirmed under decisions
of this Court holding that an “agreement to boy-
cott is sufficiently pernicious in its purpose and ef-
fect to be unreasonable per se...” (Id.). In so hold-
ing, the dissent noted that ‘‘the existence of a con-
tract right to terminate Oreck does not create a
mantle of protection against an anticompetitive agree-
ment’’ (Pet. App. 52a); and it held the majority’s
“heavy reliance on Continental T.V.”’ to be mis-
placed both because this ease “‘involves a boycott,
not a vertical restriction’’ and because there had been
no showing here that elimination of Oreck’s intra-

Po

|
:

11

iti i : tervail-
brand competition had resulted in any ‘coun
ing stimulation of interbrand competition, the usual
saving grace of a vertical restraint.” (Pet. App. 54a-

50a ).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This ease presents questions of fundamental im-
portance under the antitrust laws. Most sharply raised
is the issue that divided the court of appeals: whether
a vertical boycott agreement is illegal per se or must
be tested by the rule of reason under this Court’s 1977
Continental T.V. decision, in a situation where the
agreement was not ancillary to an exclusive distribu-
torship or other valid marketing goal, and no benefit
to interbrand competition was even claimed. Review
by this Court is called for both to correct the error
below and to make clear that, in these circumstances,
a boyeott agreement is subject to the per se rule estab-
lished by this Court’s group boycott decisions, whether
vertical or horizontal. The need for such review 1s
particularly urgent because of the influence an en
bane decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Cireuit will inevitably have both within and outside

that Circuit.’

. eadin ntator has noted that the ‘‘Oreck case has
onal = Bigecamel and discussion at each level of am
tion.’”? Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Report, July 1978, at - piece
finding the dissent’s argument ‘‘most persuasive, Von Ka gw
observed that ‘‘ultimately the Supreme Court must reso
issue . . .”’ raised by the majority and dissenting opinions “a
(Id.). The panel or en banc decision in Oreck has og -
cited in at least five antitrust cases: Columbia Metal re “a
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 1978-1 Tra a “es
7 62,064 (3rd Cir. 1978); Bernard v. Curtis Circulation, 8-
Trade Cas. 962,141 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Al Label Record Servic,
Inc. v. Mr. Wiggs Dept. Stores, 1978-1 Trade Cas. {| 62,07 ( a
Ohio 1978); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp.,

12

The decision below set aside a jury verdict in favor
of Oreck on the ground that the charge to the jury pre-
sented an improper per se theory of liability—a conten-
tion not urged by the defense at trial.‘ In so holding
the majority misconceived the applicable law on group
boycotts and vertical restraints and erroneously read
Continental T.V. as countenancing a rule of reason de-
fense for vertical boycott agreements that eliminate
intrabrand competition without even an iota of coun-
tervailing benefit to interbrand competition. The ma-
jority further erred in relying on the existence of a
Supposed contractual right to terminate, irrelevant
when antitrust violation is involved, and an ostensible
requirement of general market effect, or ‘public in-
Jury,’’ which this court rejected in Klor’s, Inc. v
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).

1. Boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, ‘have long
been held to be in the forbidden category” of per se
illegal restraints under the Sherman Act. Klor’s, Inc
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959) ; United States v. General Motors Corp. 384
U.S. 127, 146 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Ez-
change, 373 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1963).° The majority

F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and Petrolewm for Contractors,

Inc. v. Mobil Vil Corp., No. 77 Ci
one, p., No Civ. 3079 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 5,

*To the contrary, in a colloquy quoted in Ju ’
dissent (Pet. App. 21a), defense counsel Becton ane
correct statement of the law’’ to instruct the jury that if it ‘‘finds
that we had a conspiracy for the purpose of getting rid of Oreck
that is an unreasonable restraint of trade.’’ (Tr. 1660).

5Cf. FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S.
~ ey ~~ oid tage Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S
, ; Eastern States Retail Lu ; ~ V.
United States, 234 U.S, 600 (1914). ii i a i

13

below found the present case distinguishable on the
ground that it involved a vertical combination. (Pet.
App. 34a-35a). But the per se prohibition of boycotts is
not limited to horizontal arrangements. A leading com-
mentator on boycotts has declared that ‘‘the essential
combination may be horizontal or vertical,’’*® and Pro-
fessor Bork has analyzed the proper dichotomy as
being between ‘‘naked boycotts,”’ which are per se il-
legal, and ‘‘ancillary boycotts”’ which are lawful when
reasonably related to a cooperative endeavor that en-
hances efficiency. This dichotomy applies without re-
gard to whether the combinations at issue are vertical
or horizontal.’

Indeed, one of the leading cases in this Court ex-

pounding the per se boycott rule, Klor’s, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc., involved vertical agreements, be-

® Barber, ‘‘Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws’’, 103
U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 875 (1955), cited with approval by this court
in United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, at 146-47 ; see
also, Sullivan, Antitrust, 231 n. 1 (1977) [‘‘But it is conceivable
that only a single firm at the blockaded level may succeed in
coercing or inducing suppliers or customers (or, for that matter,
one important supplier or customer) from dealing with one or
more would-be competitor of the perpetrator. Such an arrange-
ment would display all essential elements of a boycott.’’].

t As Professor Bork notes, the naked-ancillary dichotomy was
first enunciated in the leading decision of Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899). Bork, The Antitrust Paradoz, at 26-30 (1978).
See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 348-49
(1963), which held that the action there challenged would be a
boycott illegal per se, ‘‘absent any justification derived from the
policy of another statute or otherwise. . . .”’ Continental T.V.
propounded a possible justification for a manufacturer’s restriction
of intrabrand competition among his dealers, ancillary to organi-
zation of a distribution system and aimed at enhancing interbrand
competition. Absent such justification, the per se rule applies.

14

tween a major department store and a number of manu-
facturers and distributors, pursuant to which the latter
agreed not to supply a competing store. Subsequent
court cases have recognized that Klor’s was essen-
tially a vertical case,” and in Tysons Corner Regional
Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970, 1010-11 (1975), the
Federal Trade Commission rejected an attempt to dis-
tinguish Klor’s on the ground that veto of a new en-
trant pursuant to a shopping center approval clause
would ‘‘amount to a concerted refusal to deal only on
the part of one competitor (the tenant) and one sup-
plier (the lessor).’’ Noting that the ‘‘ presence of more
than one party at the same distributional level’’ is not
essential to the per se rule fashioned by this Court in
Klor’s and other cases, the Commission held that ex-
clusion of an entrant through ‘‘joint activity’’ of one
tenant and one lessor violates ‘‘the policy of the anti-
trust laws which render group boycotts illegal per se.”’

Thus, whether horizontal or vertical, the issue is
whether a concerted refusal to deal may be justified as
ancillary to a lawful transaction or relationship. If not,
a boycott is properly condemned per se because, as the
court below noted with regard to horizontal restraints,
it is a ‘‘naked restraint of trade with no purpose except
stifling competition’’ (Pet. App. 35a). The teaching of
Continental T.V. is that vertical non-price restrictions,

* While the Klor’s complaint also charged conspiracy among
the suppliers, comment on the decision has recognized its essen-
tially vertical nature. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Bankamericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973, cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974)); B.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Con
solidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Ackerman, Chilling-
worth, Etc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass’n, 405 F. Supp.
99 (D.Hawaii 1975), aff’d, No. 76-1264 (9th Cir. March 22, 1978).

a yea a ees

a

15

including exclusive distributorships, which reduce in-
trabrand competition may nonetheless be justified be-
eause they serve to enhance interbrand competition.
The majority below, erroneously relying on Contt-
nental T.V., held that the Sears-Whirlpool boycott
agreement had to be ‘‘examined under the rule of
reason standard’’ because ‘‘vertical restrictions .. .
promote interbrand competition by allowing a manu-
facturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribu-
tion of its products.’’ (Pet. App. 35a).

The Continental T.V. rationale, however, presup-
poses that the case involves a manufacturer seeking to
achieve efficiencies in the distribution of his branded
product, and thereby enhance interbrand competition.
The court of appeals erred in failing to consider
whether the promotion of ‘‘efficiencies in the distribu-
tion of its products’’ was either the motive or result of
the agreement to terminate Oreck. Such consideration
immediately discloses that the Sears-Whirlpool agree-
ment cannot be justified under any of the grounds dis-
cussed by this Court as possible justifications for ver-
tical restrictions.’ As the dissent aptly observed, ‘‘No

* Among the justifications discussed in Continental T.V. are: to
allow the manufacturer to achieve distribution efficiencies in dis-
tribution of his branded product; to obtain retailer investment in
promotion or in service and repair facilities; to avoid the ‘‘free
rider’’ effect which would discourage such retailer investment and
effort. 433 U.S. at 55. See also, Sullivan, Antitrust, pp. 411-21
(1977) ; Handler, ‘‘Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Unprecedented Supreme Court—1977,’’ 77 Columbia L. Rev. 979,
986 n.39 (1977); Posner ,‘‘Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,’’ 75 Columbia L.
Rev. 282, 283-99 (1975). For a discussion of possible procompeti-
tive benefits and justifications of vertical restrictions, see ABA
Antitrust Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intra-
brand Competition, 67-71 (1977).

16

redeeming virtue has been asserted to justify the con-
spiracy between Whirlpool and Sears to terminate
Oreck, as found by the jury; nor has it ever been sug-
gested that benefits to the market-place will result from
this conspiratorial termination’? (Pet. App. 55a).

The court’s error is vividly demonstrated by its char-
acterization of this case as ‘‘in essence, an exclusive
distributorship controversy” and its heavy reliance on
dealer substitution cases. (Pet. App. 32a, 35a). In fact,
it was no such thing. There was never any issue or de-
fense presented that Whirlpool had selected Sears as
its exclusive distributor, or that the termination of
Oreck was related to any such decision. Thus, there
was no evidence or argument by defendants that Sears’
marketing, service and promotion of ‘‘Kenmore’’ was
affected by Oreck’s development of the market for
‘Whirlpool’? machines. The district court explicitly
held that the two brands were different in appearance,
quality and performance ;” and the panel majority ob-
served that the Whirlpool and Kenmore brands were
not in an intrabrand competitive relationship, stating
that Oreck’s sale ‘‘of vacuum cleaners under the
‘Whirlpool’ label would not, from the point of view of
the public consumer, have any particular effect on com-
petition with machines sold by Sears’’ under the ‘‘Ken-
more’’ brand.”

There was, in sum, no claim that a Sears-Whirlpool
combination aimed at Oreck could be justified as ancil-

*° Tr. 1371-73, in rejecting Oreck’s Robinson-Patman claims on
the ground that the products were not of like grade and quality.

™ Pet. App. Ila. See also Whirlpool counsel’s reference to the
testimony of defendants’ expert ‘‘that Sears and Oreck were in
different businesses’’. (Tr. 1746).

oe -

siti
bot os RE

17

lary to the legitimate needs of Whirlpool’s distribution
system. Cf. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center,
at 1011. To the contrary, the sole defense through-
out was that there was simply no agreement to elimi-

~ nate Oreck as a seller of Whirlpool cleaners. Accord-

ingly, the defendants’ closing arguments to the jury
will be searched in vain for any contention that
Sears and Whirlpool had an exclusive distributorship,
that termination of Oreck was justified to protect any
such Sears-Whirlpool arrangement, to enhance sales of
Sears’ Kenmore brand, to avoid ‘‘free rider’’ effects,
or, indeed, for any of the reasons recognized in Conti-
nental T.V. as justifications for restricting intrabrand
competition. Instead, the only arguments made, and
repeated again and again, were that Whirlpool had
acted unilaterally and independently of Sears for its
own reasons; that Sears had no interest in the relations
between Whirlpool and Oreck; and that there had
never even been any communication between Sears and
Whirlpool regarding Oreck or his termination, much
less any pressure by Sears.’* The absence of any in-
volvement or communication by Sears was the crux of
the defense presented at trial, and it was rejected by
the jury.

12 For example, in his closing statement Whirlpool’s counsel re-
peatedly stressed the testimony of Sears and Whirlpool officials
denying any communication regarding Oreck: ‘‘And every single
one of them denied receiving complaints or making complaints.
They denied having anything to do with the termination insofar as
Sears is concerned’’ (Tr. 1718-19; see also Tr. 1745-46). The Whirl-
pool official who terminated Oreck was cited as saying ‘that Sears
played no part in his decision—he didn’t consult with Sears, they
hadn’t any complaints from Sears’’ (Tr. 1711). Further, ‘‘there
isn’t one single shred of evidence to tie Sears into the termination’’
(Tr. 1712, see also Tr. 1722).

Whirlpool’s defense may be summed up in this statement:

18

In these circumstances, the case did not present any
possible ground of justification applicable to intra-
brand restrictions, and Continental T.V.’s rule of rea-
son criteria were not applicable. The Sears-Whirlpool
agreement to refuse to supply Oreck was a non-ancil-
lary, ‘‘naked,”’ restraint of trade, a boycott unlawful
per se. Review by this Court is needed to correct the
error below and to dispel promptly the erroneous con-
cept that naked trade restraints, if vertical, are defen-
sible under the rule of reason.

2. In the context of the issues presented by the par-
ties and the record evidence, the district judge prop-

erly presented the case to the jury, and reversal was
erroneous.

This case involved the claim that Whirlpool cut off
plaintiff Oreck, its exclusive distributor of vacuum
cleaners under the tradename ‘‘ Whirlpool,’’ pursuant
to agreement with its major vacuum cleaner customer
Sears, which sold under the brand ‘‘Kenmore’’. As we
have shown, the sole defense was that Whirlpool had
acted entirely unilaterally, because of alleged dissatis-
faction with Oreck’s marketing methods, and that there
had been no pressure, communication, or agreement
with Sears. As the dissent below pointed out, the jury
reasonably rejected this defense in light of Oreck’s
success in selling the Whirlpool product, the evidence

‘‘And I say to you again that unless you find that Sears is
involved in all of this, if this is a decision that Whir]pool

makes on its own, you cannot find for the plaintiff in thi ”
(Tr. 1717). r the plaintiff in this case.

Similarly, Sears’ counsel stated as its essential defense :

‘Sears was not involved in this entire Oreck-Whir!lpool con-

troversy and on that basis you must render a verdict i
of Sears and Whirlpool.’’ (Tr. 1754). verdict in favor

Cheksie ke w

epapeegeistens

a a a or ae

19

of Sears’ pressure on Whirlpool, the defendants’ fail-
ure to call a Whirlpool official to explain or deny his
damaging deposition statements and documents which
attested to Sears’ blatant pressure on Whirlpool first
to limit Oreck’s activities, and then to terminate
Oreck. (Pet. App. 44a-49a).

It is crucial that at trial defendants made no argu-
ment that Whirlpool cut off Oreck in order to obtain
efficiencies of exclusive distribution, avoid ‘‘free rider”’
problems or the other reasons given in Continental T.V.
as possible justification for reducing intrabrand com-
petition in order to promote interbrand competition.

Consequently, the issue presented by the parties and
the evidence was not the justification and reasonable-
ness of a vertical agreement in restraint of trade; the
issue presented was only whether there had been a
Sears-Whirlpool agreement to terminate Oreck. It is
for this reason, quite clearly, that defendants’ counsel
did not object to the parts of the charge which the
court of appeals has found defective and why counsel
for Whirlpool in fact explicitly embraced language
that the majority below held to be grounds for reversal
(see note 4, supra). In the unambiguous circumstances;
of this case, the district court’s charge was unexcep-
tionable.”

18 With respect to the defense of unilateral conduct actually
asserted by defendants, the district judge charged as follows
(J.A, 2922) :

‘‘T charge you that a manufacturer has the right to deal with
whom he pleases and to select his customers at will as long as
there is no resultant effect which is violative of the anti-
trust laws. The manufacturer may discontinue an exclusive
distributorship or may refuse to renew an exclusive distri-
butorship for business reasons which are sufficient to the
manufacturer alone and any adverse effect such a decision

20

3. The majority below also erred in holding that a
rule of reason instruction was required because
‘*Whirlpool’s decision not to renew Oreck’s distribu-
torship was an exercise of its contractual rights’’ and
therefore, non-renewal, even in response to ‘‘induce-
ments by Sears to Whirlpool to allow the contract with
Oreck to expire’’ would not violate the Sherman Act
‘‘without some further showing that ... there was an
anticompetitive effect in the vacuum cleaner industry
as a whole...’’ (Pet. App. 40a). This is clear error in
two respects. First, the cases are legion which have
condemned terminations and non-renewals pursuant to
contract terms, when additional circumstances demon-

may have upon the business of the distributor is immaterial
in the absence of any arrangement or conspiracy restraining
trade or competition. ’’

Indeed, in the absence of argument or evidence as to the justifi-
cation for and reasonableness of a Sears-Whirlpool boycott agree-
ment, it might well have been prejudicial error for the trial court
to have charged the jury with respect to those matters. Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2556 (‘‘Nor should a
charge be given on a matter, whether or not raised in the plead-
ings, if it is not supported by the evidence’’) ; McCarthy v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 156 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 812 (1947).

* The court of appeals also took the trial judge to task because
he ‘‘failed to marshal any of the evidence presented by Whirlpool
to show that its refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship was moti-
vated and that its actions were consistent with the terms of the
1968 contract.’’ (Pet. App. 36a). This statement is unwarranted.
The district judge explicitly told the jury that he was not going
to marshal the evidence on each side, and that the parties’ counsel
had done so. (J.A. 931). There is no requirement that a trial
judge marshal or comment upon the evidence. See Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2557; see also Wright, Law of
Federal Courts, 416-17.

— "7 a an eee
FN Gane easel Fe

bid Bae,

21

strate antitrust violations, including illegal boycotts.”
Second, by requiring proof of ‘‘anticompetitive effect
in the industry as a whole,’ the majority has resur-
rected a general market effect or ‘‘ public injury”’ re-
quirement in direct conflict with this Court’s decision
in Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra.”
The court has thus erected an almost insuperable bar-
rier to recovery in group boycott cases by small busi-
nesses like Oreck—a barrier that becomes greater as
the victim becomes smaller. Review by this Court is re-
quired in order to make clear to businessmen and the
courts that the discredited ‘‘public injury’’ require-
ment has not been reintroduced into the law in the guise
of a rule of reason test.

CONCLUSION

The decision below erroneously overturned a jury
verdict in this antitrust case on the ground of a sup-
posed defect in the charge not raised by defendants.

18 See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 US. 464
(1962) ; Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964) ; Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454
F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) ; Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
394 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.,
295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 417 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1969).

16 In Klor’s, the court of appeals had upheld dismissal of the
complaint for lack of the ‘‘required public injury,’’ since “ ‘there
was no charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price,
quantity, or quality offered the public was affected .. .’’’ (359
U.S. at 210). This Court reversed on the ground that a group
boyeott ‘‘is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just
one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes
little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by
the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can
by driving them out in large groups.’’ Jd. at 213.

22

Under the holding of the court of appeals, a naked boy-
cott agreement, if vertical, must be tested under the
rule of reason, even where there is not an iota of busi-
ness justification or of stimulation to interbrand com-
petition, and it will be upheld unless anticompetitive
effect in the overall industry can be shown. The court
of appeals decision is in direct conflict with the deci-
sions of this Court dealing with boycotts and vertical
restrictions, and with a leading Federal Trade Commis-
sion decision. Certiorari should be granted to correct
the errors below and to clarify an important area of
antitrust law.”

Respectfully submitted,

Howarp ADLER, JR.
LIONEL KESTENBAUM
JAMES W. OLSON

Attorneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:

Berason, BorKLAND, Maracouis & ADLER
11 Dupont Circle N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 462-5930

August 29, 1978

17 The errors below require reinstatement of the jury verdict and
the judgment based thereon, with the exception of the 10% of that
judgment representing an award of damages caused by Oreck’s
exclusion from the Canadian market. Oreck accepts the necessity
of a new trial on that minor aspect of the case; however, contrary
to the holding of the court of appeals, the introduction of evidence
regarding Canada does not necessitate a new trial on the principal
part of the case. See n. 2 supra and the dissent of Judges Mansfield
and Feinberg. (Pet. App. 43a, n. 1).

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
SECOND CIRCUIT.

Oreck CoRPORATION,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,

WHIRLPOOL CoRPORATION and
Sears, Roepuck anp Co.,

Defendants-A ppellants.

No. 1173, Docket 76-7631.

Argued June 3, 1977.
Decided Sept. 21, 1977.

Rehearing En Banc Granted Dec. 15, 1977.

Before Anderson and Mansfield, Circuit Judges, and
Brient, District Judge.*

* Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

2a

Rosert P. Anprerson, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on July 13,
1976 in favor of Oreck Corporation (Oreck) against de-
fendants Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool) and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. (Sears) on two counts of a seven count
complaint charging violations of §1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §1. Oreck was awarded $2,250,000 (after
trebling) in monetary damages. For the reasons set forth
below, we reverse.

The factual basis of this controversy is fairly straight-
forward. Whirlpool is a manufacturer of vacuum cleaners
(as well as other household appliances not relevant here)
and has been in that business since 1957, when it acquired
the Birtman Electric Co. Birtman had previously manu-
factured vacuum cleaners for Sears, under the Kenmore
label. Whirlpool continued this business, and also sought
to sell vacuum cleaners under its own ‘‘RCA-Whirlpool’”’
label. It discontinued the line of sales under this label
for approximately two years after which it re-entered
the field through a designated exclusive distributor,
Oreck, which was appointed in 1963 for an initial term
of five years, with automatic extensions for one year pe-
riods thereafter, absent six months prior notice of termi-
nation by either party. Whirlpool gave Oreck formal
notice of termination of the agreement on June 27, 1968,
but instead, a new agreement, dated August 1, 1968, was
drawn up extending Oreck’s distributorship until Decem-
ber 31, 1971, with no provision for extension. At the ex-
piration of this extension, however, Oreck’s relationship
with Whirlpool, as its exclusive distributor, was not re-
newed or extended, and it terminated completely. The
instant action followed in September of 1972.

This lawsuit and the underlying controversy, are based
on the claimed reasons why Oreck was not afforded an
additional term as Whirlpool’s exclusive distributor of
vacuum cleaners. Oreck’s successful contention below
was that its agreement was not renewed by Whirlpool at
the behest and insistence of Sears, a much larger pur-

3a

chaser of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners than Oreck. Sears’
association with Whirlpool extended back to 1925, when
Sears acquired 750 shares of Whirlpool’s forerunner cor-
poration, the Upton Machine Co.’ By January of 1960,
Sears owned approximately 4% of Whirlpool’s outstand-
ing stock. Oreck also contended that Sears did not want
Oreck to compete with its own line of Kenmore vacuum
cleaners, also manufactured by Whirlpool, and that it
used its influence with Whirlpool to have Oreck’s ex-
elusive distributorship terminated.

Accordingly, Oreck’s complaint charged both Whirl-
pool and Sears with engaging in a contract, combination
or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade to ex-
clude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner market in the
United States and Canada (counts one and two of the
complaint) and with forcing or persuading potential cus-
tomers of Oreck from refusing to deal with Oreck (count
three). Additionally, count four of the complaint charged
Whirlpool with selling vacuum cleaners, attachments and
parts to Sears at unlawfully discriminatory prices, con-
trary to 15 U.S.C. §$13(a) and count five with Sears’
knowing inducement or receipt of those same discrimina-
tory prices, prohibited by 15 U.S.C. §13(f). Finally,
count six alleged irreparable damage to Oreck as a result
of Sears’ and Whirlpool’s violations of the antitrust
laws and Oreck’s absence of an adequate remedy at law,
and count seven pleaded damage to Oreck in the amount
of $6,500,000 as a result of Sears’ alleged status as a ‘‘con-
trol person’’ over Whirlpool (because of Sears’ stockhold-
ings in Whirlpool) and the close relationship between the

* According to Sears’ answer to one of plaintiff’s interrogatories,
after Sears’ purchase of 750 shares of Upton Machine Co. in 1925,
‘*the Upton Machine Company underwent major corporate changes,
including merger with the Seeger Refrigeration Company in 1955,
and The Birtman Electric Company in 1957. The name of the re-
sulting corporation was changed to Whirlpool Corporation in
1957.’’

4a

two defendants over a period of 50 years. Counts three,
four and seven were voluntarily dismissed on Oreck’s mo-
tion; and the court directed a verdict for defendants on
counts three and four, the alleged Robinson-Patman Act
violations.

The trial testimony therefore centered on counts one
and two, the alleged Sherman Act violations. Plaintiff’s
ease for liability rests largely upon the testimony of Mar-
shall Oreck, its General Manager, and upon the testimony
of its President and founder, David Oreck, who told of his
relationship with Whirlpool over the years and of his be-
lief, derived primarily from communications with one John
Payne, a salesman for Whirlpool, that the reason for the
cancellation was Sears’ desire to end competition from
Oreck. Plaintiff also presented the deposition of Payne,
who did not appear at the trial. Hyman B. Ritchin, an
economic consultant, and Ernest L. Sommer, a certified
public accountant, gave testimony for the plaintiff on the
issue of damages.

By way of defense and explanation of Oreck’s cancella-
tion, Whirlpool presented the testimony of its officers who
dealt with Oreck, showing that the reason for the cancella-
tion was Oreck’s failure to follow an assigned marketing
strategy. Jack D. Sparks, a Vice President and Director of
Whirlpool, who made the decision to terminate Oreck, testi-
fied that the exclusive distributor had failed to market
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners through “major accounts” (de-
partment store chains and the like) and had instead re-
sorted to “commercial-type distribution” (janitorial sup-
ply houses and mail order sales), a strategy which did not
agree with Whirlpool’s desires. Sparks explained that he
accepted a subordinate’s recommendation to terminate
Oreck “because Oreck corporation had failed to reach the
original objective when we first conceived the program in
1963 which was to set up a one-step distribution system
nationally to major accounts on vacuum cleaners with the
hopes that ultimately we would have a system that other

da

specialty-type products could go through.” Sparks denied
being concerned with competing against Sears, pointing out
that “the system we... talked about [distribution to “major
accounts” such as department stores] would be in direct
competition with Sears.” ?

Significantly, however, plaintiff presented no evidence or
testimony that the net economic effect of Oreck’s cancella-
tion was unreasonably to restrain trade in the vacuum
cleaner industry in the United States and/or Canada. In
fact, as to this critical inquiry, David Oreck testified on
direct examination that “[t]he vacuum cleaner industry is,
indeed, a very large one” and that during 1971, when Oreck
sold 78,203 vacuum cleaners, “the vacuum cleaner industry
in 1971 was about 7.8 million purchases.” Basic arithmetic
reveals, therefore, that Oreck had a 1% market share at the
time of the completion of his exclusive distributorship for
Whirlpool. Moreover, David Oreck admitted on cross-exami-
nation that, following this event, the plaintiff obtained an
alternative source of supply and was, at the time of trial,
the world’s largest supplier of “top fill upright vacuum
cleaners.”

The above testimony and the other evidence adduced at
the trial by the plaintiff show nothing more than the refusal
by Whirlpool to renew Oreck’s exclusive distributorship of
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners under the “Whirlpool” label
and the replacement of Oreck, in effect, by Sears, the other
existing distributor, who sold the same manufacturer’s
vacuum cleaner but under the label, “Kenmore.” It is well-
settled that

“[w]hen an exclusive dealership ‘is no part and parcel
of a scheme to monopolize and effective competition
exists at both the seller and buyer levels, the arrange-

2 It is thus difficult to understand the dissent’s view that there
was ‘‘[n]o substantial evidence . . . offered to show that Oreck was
terminated for some possible lawful reason. . .’’ (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

6a

ment has invariably been upheld as a reasonable re-
straint of trade. In short, the rule was virtually one of
per se legality’ until the District Court decided the
present case [which was reversed].” (Cases cited in
footnote omitted.) Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 163, 243 F.2d
418, 420, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.
2d 38 (1957).°

The Supreme Court expressed much the same rationale in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87

° The holdings of Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 355 U.S.
822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), and a similar case, Schwing
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 188 F.Supp. 899 (D.Md.), aff’d,
239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823, 78 S.Ct.
30, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), were succinctly summarized in a case
relied on by the dissent, Quality Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976), as follows: ‘‘Both courts [Packard
and Schwing] held that a manufacturer has a right to select his
customers and may agree with one to exclude another, if: (1) the
agreement is not a horizontal one between competitors; (2) the
manufacturer is not using it to establish market dominance; or (3)
the manufacturer is not using it to promote a monopoly.’’ 542 F.2d
at 470. As is made clear in the remainder of this opinion, Whirl-
pool, as the manufacturer of vacuum cleaners, did not engage in a
horizontal agreement between competitors, while Oreck submitted
no substantial proof that Whirlpool’s motive in cancelling Oreck
was to establish market dominance or to promote a monopoly in
the vacuum cleaner business.

The dissent also relies on Quality Mercury, supra, for the prop-
osition that a per se rule under § 1 of the Sherman Act becomes
applicable when ‘‘a horizontal, intrabrand competitor exercises a
veto power over plaintiff’s access to the manufacturer’s goods or
trademark .. ..’’ The result in Quality Mercury, however, involv-
ing the refusal of Ford to grant a Lincoln dealership in the Min-
neapolis area allegedly because a preexisting dealership had veto
power over such a decision, was to remand for trial in order to
allow the plaintiff ‘‘an opportunity to prove the unreasonableness
of the restraint,’’ 542 F.2d at 472, decidedly not a per se approach
to the alleged Sherman Act violation.

7a

S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967), overruled on other
grounds, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
— US. —, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977), where
it held that a manufacturer may choose his own customers
and franchise certain exclusive dealers:

“Tf the restraint stops at that point—if nothing more
is involved than vertical ‘confinement’ of the manufac-
turer’s own sales of the merchandise to selected deal-
ers, and if competitive products are readily available
to others, the restriction, on these facts alone, would
not violate the Sherman Act.” 388 U.S. at 376, 87 S.Ct.
at 1864.

See also, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
é Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1970) (“it is
well settled that it is not a per se violation of the antitrust
laws for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with a distrib-
utor to give him an exclusive franchise, even if this means
cutting off another distributor [citing cases].”) ; * Bay City-
Abrahams Bros. Inc. v. Estee Lauder Inc., 375 F.Supp.
1206, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Top-All Varieties, Ine. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 703, 704-5 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).

Under these standards, given additional weight by the
Supreme Court’s recent over-ruling of the per se approach

‘United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 938, 35 L.Ed.2d 256
(1973), cited in the dissent as limiting the Hawaiian Oke holding,
was a case where hotels, restaurants and companies supplying those
businesses in Portland, Oregon, organized an association to attract
conventions to their city. The association was financed by contri-
butions from its members. ‘‘To aid collection, hotel members . .
agreed to give preferential treatment to suppliers who paid their
assessments, and to curtail purchases from those who did not.’’
467 F.2d at 1002. (Emphasis supplied.) Hilton Hotels thus in-
volved a horizontal agreement between compeiitors at the same
level, not the situation in Hawatian Oke or the present case.

8a

to vertical location restrictions of United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., supra, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., supra, Oreck was required to show not only
conspiratorial conduct by Sears and Whirlpool in order to
recover under §1 of the Sherman Act, but also credible
proof that the net result and effect of the allegedly con-
spiratorial conduct of the defendants was anticompetitive
in the vacuum cleaner industry as a whole or that the con-
spiracy was designed to drive Oreck out of the vacuum
cleaner business.

In instructing the jury, the trial court quoted the lan-
guage of §1 of the Sherman Act and then further defined
the meaning of the terms within that statute as follows:

“As to the meaning of the term ‘restraint of trade,’ you
are instructed that this general term applies only to
unreasonable restraints and not to all possible re-
straints of trade. Not all restraints of trade are reason-
able. All business affects trade in some way.

The violations alleged by plaintiff are, if you credit
them, unreasonable restraints of trade. If you do not
credit them, Whirlpool’s conduct was not an unreason-
able restraint of trade.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The trial court further instructed the jury with regard to
count one that “[i]f you find there was such an agreement
[between Whirlpool & Sears ‘to exclude Oreck from a mar-
ket in vacuum cleaners or Whirlpool vacuum cleaners any-
where’], then you should go on to consider damages, if any,
flowing from it.” An almost identical charge was given as
regards count two, dealing with Oreck’s alleged exclusion
from the Canadian market. We hold that the above-quoted
portions of the jury instructions constitute plain error
which make necessary a reversal of this judgment. Under
these instructions, the jury could have gone no further than
to find a conspiracy followed by an assessment of damages.

Oreck’s argument that it did show an unreasonable re-
straint of trade because the net effect of its termination

9a

was to provide Sears with a “monopoly position” in the
market for Whirlpool vacuum cleaners is plainly unper-
suasive. Oreck did not demonstrate anything unique about
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners sufficient to establish them as
a separate market apart from all other brands, United
States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593, 77 S.Ct. 872, 1 L.Ed2d 1057 (1957) ; George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Prddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 550-
52 (1st Cir. 1974). Oreck’s further attempt to characterize
its cancellation as a “group boycott” under the rule of
Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959), and United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.
2d 415 (1966), which treats such behavior as a per se viola-
tion of §1 of the Sherman Act, is similarly incorrect. In
Klor’s, the Supreme Court specifically noted that “[t]his is
not a case of ... a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to
an exclusive distributorship,” 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. at
709-10. The present case is, in essence, a case involving an
exclusive distributorship controversy, and the “group boy-
eott” doctrine is, therefore, not applicable. Had Sears joined
with other retailers of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners to drive
Oreck out of the vacuum cleaner market, this court would
have been presented with a totally different situation, but
Sears did not do so, and, therefore, Klor’s is not applicable.
Because Sears is a large company presumably selling a
large number of vacuum cleaners does not, ipso facto, con-
vert this case into a horizontal conspiracy warranting per
se treatment.°

’ The dissent attempts to get around these facts by claiming that
‘Sears was the equivalent of many Whirlpool vacuum cleaner
distributors,’’ a novel theory which simply transforms Sears into
something it is not. The implications of applying such a concept
in future cases require the trial court to make legislative determi-
nations. When is a single company ‘‘big’’ enough to be considered
trantamount to a series of ‘‘little’’ companies? The dissent pre-
sumably leaves the determination of what is a ‘‘big’’ company for
this purpose of one case but not ‘‘big’’ for the purpose of another

10a

Any effect on price competition for the sale of Whirl-
pool vacuum cleaners, brought about by the cancellation
of Oreck’s exclusive distributorship, cannot have any legal
or economic significance in the present case. Economically,
the view that the net effect of Oreck’s cancellation will be
to raise the price of Whirlpool vacuums has no significance
absent a showing that consumers cannot substitute for
Whirlpool another type of vacuum cleaner that is as effec-
tive and equally attractive as Oreck’s was in price. In addi-
tion, Oreck has neither charged nor proven a conspiracy to
fix prices for Whirlpool vacuum cleaners. Nowhere in the
complaint does Oreck allege that Whirlpool’s refusal to
deal was aimed at eliminating intrabrand price competition.
The inappropriateness of any claim of price-fixing is made

case, to the wisdom of the trial judge, in the complete absence of
any criteria or standards which the court can apply.

The dissent also charges the majority with looking not to sub-
stance but to form. Perhaps the best rejoinder to such a character-
ization of our opinion is contained in Judge Medina’s fine opinion
in United States v. Morgan, 118 F.Supp. 621 (D.C.1953), an action
under §§ 1, and 2 of the Sherman Act against seventeen investment
banking firms charging a combination, conspiracy and agreement
to restrain and monopolize the securities business in the United
States, in which the court wrote:

‘‘Much of the confusion, especially in the field of antitrust
law, is due to the fact that the breadth and scope of the Sher-
man Act are so general and beneficent that lawyers and even
judges often fail to heed repeated admonitions that each case
must necessarily stand on its own legs, and that the conclu-
sions reached in each depend largely upon the peculiar char-
acteristics of the particular industry involved.’’ 118 F.Supp.
at 688,

In short, the facts and circumstances of this controversy do not call
for the application of the per se rule against price fixing and/or
group boycotts, so that the per se approach must not be dogmatic-
ally followed because it was used in other cases in which those
factors were present. Indeed, the dissent’s attempt to convert this
case into one involving a horizontal price fixing conspiracy itself
might be characterized as looking to form rather than substance.

lla

even more clear by the fact that Sears markets its vacuum
cleaners under the “Kenmore” label. Oreck’s exclusive dis-
tributorship of vacuum cleaners under the “Whirlpool”
label would not, from the point of view of the public con-
sumer, have any particular effect on competition with ma-
chines sold by Sears.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would place intolerable re-
straints on the ability of a manufacturer to award and can-
cel an exclusive distributorship where no public harm has
been shown. Whirlpool would be thereby compelled to con-
tinue Oreck’s exclusive distributorship indefinitely, despite
the manufacturer’s clear intent and desire not to renew it
and in derogation of its express contractual right and power
not to renew it. Blindly protecting Oreck without regard to
the cancellation’s effects on the affected market thus dis-
regards the well-established rule that “[t]he antitrust laws

. were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not
competitors....’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697, 50 L.Ed.2d 701
(1977) (emphasis in original).

The judgment of the district court, based as it is on a
finding of liability on the part of the defendants, is re-
versed and the case is remanded for a new trial. In doing
s0, we express no opinion as to the correctness of those
portions of the trial court’s jury instruction dealing with
the formulation of damages.

MansFIELD, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

With due respect, I must dissent. This case is governed
by well-settled antitrust law principles governing combina-
tions and conspiracies designed to restrain competition on
the part of a specific competitor—in this case Oreck—
which the majority chooses to disregard.

The evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff-appellee
Oreck, as it must be after the jury’s verdict, Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 696, 82 S.Ct. 1404,

l2a

8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962), reveals a classic per se restraint of
competition of the type condemned by the Supreme Court
in United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct.
1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966). Whirlpool, a large manufac-
turer of appliances, including vacuum cleaners, combined
with Sears, Roebuck, a merchandising giant which for 40
odd years had distributed the lion’s share of Whirlpool’s
entire output, to stop plaintiff-appellee Oreck, the only
other distributor of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners, from com-
peting against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made ma-
chines. The motive was clear—to prevent Oreck’s price-
cutting and other competitive practices from interfering
with Sears’ higher prices and its sales of Whirlpool-made
vacuum cleaners. When Oreck refused to knuckle under as
requested, the combination agreed to have Whirlpool cut it
off as a distributor of Whirlpool machines, which was done
even though Oreck had dramatically increased its sales of
Whirlpool vacuum cleaners from 8,384 units to 78,203 units
over the preceding four years. As a result, the public lost
the benefit of Oreck’s competition and particularly of its
lower prices in the sale of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners.
Thereafter, if customers wanted Whirlpool machines they
would have to buy them from Sears and pay Sears’ higher
prices. The principles governing such a case were summar-
ized by the Supreme Court in United States v. General
Motors, 384 U.S. at 146-47, 86 S.Ct. at 1331 (1966) as fol-
lows:

‘‘The principle of these cases is that where business-
men concert their actions in order to deprive others of
access to merchandise which the latter wish to sell to
the public, we need not inquire into the economic moti-
vation underlying their conduct. See Barber, Refusals
to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U.Pa.L.Rev. 847, 872-885 (1955). Exclusion of traders
from the market by means of combination or conspir-
acy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles
embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved

13a

by reference to the need for preserving the collabo-
rators’ profit margins or their system for distributing
automobiles, any more than by reference to the alleg-
edly tortious conduct against which a combination or
conspiracy may be directed—as in Fashion Origina-
tors’ Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n,
supra [312 U.S. 457] at 468 [61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed.
949].

We note, moreover, that inherent in the success of
the combination in this case was a substantial restraint
upon price competition—a goal unlawful per se when
sought to be effected by combination or conspiracy.
E. g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 US.
29, 47 [80 S.Ct. 503, 513, 4 L.Ed.2d 505] ; United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 [60 S.Ct.
811, 844, 84 L.Ed. 1129]. And the per se rule applies
even when the effect upon prices is indirect. Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 18, 16-22 [84 S.Ct. 1051, 1057,
12 L.Ed.2d 98]; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra.’’

The background of the conspiracy is instructive. Since
1925 Sears has been the principal distributor of Whirlpool
products, currently purchasing more than two-thirds of
Whirlpool’s total appliance production and, at the time of
the events here involved, more than 90% of Whirlpool’s
vacuum cleaner output for resale under Sears’ ‘‘ Kenmore’”’
label. In addition Sears, beginning in 1925, purchased a sub-
stantial block of Whirlpool’s common stock and by 1960
became its largest single shareholder, owning 251,192 shares
and usually electing one or more of its executives to Whirl-
pool’s board of directors. Sears, therefore, has been in a
position to exercise considerable leverage power over
Whirlpool’s sales and distribution policies and decisions.

Prior to the formation of Oreck in 1963, Whirlpool had
periodically attempted to broaden the sales of its vacuum
cleaners by marketing them under its own brand name, but
had found that its existing distribution network was inade-

l4a

quate and that Sears’ sales of Whirlpool-manufactured
vacuum cleaners at higher retail prices posed a barrier to
Whirlpool’s entry into price competition against other
brands as long as it was restrained by its arrangement with
Sears from competing price-wide against Sears in the sale
of Whirlpool-made machines. As a result Whirlpool in 1961
discontinued efforts to sell its product independently under
its own name and H. Thomas Stroop, a Whirlpool execu-
tive, prepared a report entitled ‘‘Appraisal of Vacuum
Cleaner Business—RCA Whirlpool’’. He concluded that

‘*Unlike other appliances, Sears sells their [vacuum]
cleaners for as high or higher prices than major brand
competition.

‘‘Sears becomes very unhappy if RCA WHIRLPOOL
product [sic] is retailed for less than the Sears product
manufactured by Whirlpool. For this reason, we under-
stand that it has been decided that the RCA WHIRL-
POOL brand should have retail prices comparable to
Sears.

“Our challenge then ... ‘Can we sell cleaners in
volume at high retail prices ... and if so how?’ ”’ (PI.
Ex. 160)

Thereafter, until the events giving rise to this case, Whirl-
pool-made vacuum cleaners were sold to the public only by
Sears.

In April, 1963, Whirlpool’s interest in selling its vacuum
cleaners under its own brand name was revived. Jack
Sparks, Vice President of Whirlpool, approached David
Oreck, who had prior to 1961 been in charge of Whirlpool
vacuum cleaners sales for Bruno, New York and had been
the most successful distributor of Whirlpool vacuum clean-
ers under its own brand name before Whirlpool discontin-
ued such sales. The result was an agreement to the effect
that the newly-formed Oreck Corporation, plaintiff-appel-
lee, would function as the exclusive United States distrib-

l5a

utor of Whirlpool brand vacuum cleaners. Sparks advised
Oreck that he was ‘‘not to conflict with Sears, Roebuck on
price’’ and that an internal Whirlpool letter confirmed that
Oreck’s prices would ‘‘emphasize specialty [i. e., high-
priced] selling’’.

Oreck soon found that it could not compete with Sears in
selling Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners at Sears’ prices
and decided that it could distribute them profitably only by
selling at lower prices and through direct mail or institu-
tional supply houses, which would, by reducing or eliminat-
ing the middleman’s mark-up, enable Oreck to sell com-
petitively and profitably at the lower price levels. Accord-
ingly, in 1967 Oreck began a large-scale mail solicitation
campaign which, dramatically increased its sales of Whirl-
pool machines from a low in 1967 of 8,384 units to an all-
time high of 78,203 units in 1971, the year Whirlpool termi-
nated its distributorship. The mail order campaign offered
the vacuum cleaners to carefully selected group of consum-
ers at very low prices. Oreck planned to realize its profit
from the sale of dust bags and accessories over the 10-15
year life of the product. Despite the prospects for increased
sales, three Whirlpool executives, Jack Sparks, Sol Sweet
and Jchn Payne, Whirlpool’s primary contact with Oreck,
all expressed disapproval of the mail order campaign,
Payne advising Oreck that Whirlpool’s unhappiness was
attributable to the company’s ‘‘other customer’’ (Sears),
which did not like the mail solicitation. Payne also told
Oreck that the ‘‘other customer got to the head of the
company [Whirlpool]’’.*

* Payne’s statements were never objected to by defendants as not
within the scope of his employment by Whirlpool and are therefore
admissible under Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Judge Owen also instructed the jury, without objection by defend-
ants, that defendants’ failure to call Payne to the stand to explain
or refute these statements, given his clear availability, may be taken
to indicate that if called his testimony would have been unfavor-
able to defendants.

l6a

That a Whirlpool-Sears combination had been formed to
stop Oreck’s competition against Sears is further evidenced
by events during the preceding year, 1966, when David
Oreck sought to obtain Whirlpool’s approval of Oreck’s
plan to market in Canada ,where Sears operated under the
name of Simpson-Sears Ltd. Whirlpool refused to make
the minor changes in the vacuum cleaner necessary to con-
form to Canadian Standards Association requirements, as
they had done for Sears, and Payne later wired Oreck that
it could not market in Canada because Whirlpool could not
‘‘obtain a waiver to the current franchise,’’ meaning ap-
proval by Sears. A concurrent Whirlpool internal memo-
randum criticized Oreck’s emphasis on low-priced sales,
concluding that, ‘‘ Needless to say, we should not consider
for a moment authorizing Oreck to operate in Canada.”’

By 1968 the Whirlpool-Sears combination was continuing
to put the screws on Oreck in an effort to force it to adhere
to Sears’ prices, sales methods, and markets. In that year
Whirlpool refused to manufacture private label vacuum
cleaners for certain of Oreck’s large customers, and Payne
attributed the refusal to ‘‘objections from our other cus-
tomer... .’’ In 1969 and 1970, Whirlpool refused to make
minor changes in Oreck’s shipping carton to meet parcel
post requirements and thereby avoid a penalty charge,
even though Whirlpool had provided Sears with an accept-
able box for its mail orders. Payne, who handled the matter,
attributed the refusal not to engineering difficulties but to a
‘*corporate’’ decision.

On December 31, 1971, despite Oreck’s highest sales level
since it had begun selling Whirlpool vacuum cleaners,
Whirlpool terminated the Oreck distributorship.

The foregoing, together with other evidence and wit-
nesses viewed by the jury, supported the jury’s inference
that Whirlpool terminated Oreck as the result of the com-
bined efforts of Sears and Whirlpool to put an end to
Oreck’s competition against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool

l7a

machines, including mail-order solicitation and low prices,
to which Sears objected because of the possible adverse ef-
fect on its sale of Whirlpool vacuum cleaners under its own
label at higher prices and without any Canadian Whirl-
pool competition. No substantial evidence was offered to
show that Oreck was terminated for some possibly lawful
reason, such as failure to increase Whirlpool sales or Whirl-
pool’s desire to protect its trade name, other than testi-
mony of Jack D. Sparks and John Payne that Oreck had
failed to market to ‘‘major accounts,’’ which was under-
standably rejected by the jury in view of Oreck’s tremen-
dous increase in sale of Whirlpool cleaners from 1967 to
1971.

The law governing the case is clear and well-settled. A
manufacturer may unilaterally choose his customers,
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465,
63 L.Ed. 992 (1919), and unilaterally substitute one exclu-
sive distributor for another, Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack
Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 452 (9th Cir. 1972). How-
ever, it is elementary that a combination between a manu-
facturer and one or more of its customers which has as its
sole object the restraint of another customer’s competition
through purchase and resale of the manufacturer’s product
is per se illegal. United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S.
127, 146-47, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); United
States v. Parke-Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47, 80 S.Ct. 503,
4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960); Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S.Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959) ;
E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Man-
ual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-7 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den.,
409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 912, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973) ; Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under The Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U.Pa.L.Rev. 847, 875 (1955).

In United States v. General Motors, supra, the manufac-
turer and a group of its Los Angeles area dealers agreed to
discontinue selling Chevrolets through discount houses ad-
vertising discount prices and lower financing costs. The

18a

Court characterized the arrangement as a ‘‘classic conspir-
acy in restraint of trade,’’ explaining the application of the
per se rule as follows:

‘‘'T]nherent in the success of the combination . .. was
a substantial restraint upon price competition—a goal
illegal per se when sought to be effected by combination
and conspiracy... . And the per se rule applies even
when the effect upon prices is indirect.’’ 384 U.S. at
147, 86 S.Ct. at 1331.

General Motors represented one more application of the
basic principle established long ago in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24, 60 S.Ct. 811,
844-45, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940) to the effect that

‘‘Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for
the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity
in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se... .
Where the means for price-fixing are purchases or sales
of the commodity in a market operation or, as here,
purchases of a part of the supply of the commodity for
the purpose of keeping it from having a depressive
effect on the markets, such power may be found to
exist though the combination does not control a sub-
stantial part of the commodity. . .. Price-fixing agree-
ments may have utility to members of the group
though the power possessed or exerted falls far short
of domination and control. Monopoly power (United
States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 [33 S.Ct. 141, 57 L.Ed.
333]) is not the only power which the Act strikes down,
as we have said. Proof that a combination was formed
for the purpose of fixing prices and that it caused them
to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the
completion of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the
Act.”’

19a

Moreover, such a combination by agreement to restrain
price competition or through refusal to deal with a custo-
mer is per se illegal whether it is horizontal, vertical or
embraces participants from both levels. See, e. g., United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn € Co., 388 U.S. at 375-76, 87 S.Ct.
1856, where the Supreme Court observed that a conspiracy
embracing both levels is illegal per se, when it is ‘‘ancillary
to price fixing’’ or ‘‘price fixing is ‘an integral part of the
whole distribution system’,’’ 388 U.S. at 375, 87 S.Ct. at
1864, even if the effect on prices is ‘‘indirect,’’ United
States v. General Motors, supra, 384 U.S at 147, 86 S.Ct.
1321.

The majority further errs in stating that Oreck’s com-
plaint fails to allege that ‘‘Whirlpool’s refusal to deal was
aimed at eliminating intrabrand price competition.’’ The
complaint alleges clearly an agreement between Sears and
Whirlpool to restrain Oreck’s competition against Sears in
the sale and distribution of Whirlpool-made vacuum clean-
ers. Plaintiff Oreck alleged, at {] 14-15 of the First Claim
of its complaint, that when Oreck began ‘‘to compete seri-
ously with Sears’’ in the sale and distribution of Whirlpool
products—specifically ‘‘sales of ‘Kenmore’ vacuum clean-
ers’’ made by Whirlpool—Whirlpool terminated its distrib-
utorship to ‘‘eliminate any serious competition to Sears,
Roebuck from Oreck.’’ These allegations were clearly broad
enough to embrace restraint of price competition by Oreck
against Sears in the sale of Whirlpool-made vacuum clean-
ers, an issue that was actually tried without objection. Par.
21 of the complaint, moreover, alleges that improvements in
Whirlpool’s vacuum cleaner were withheld ‘‘with the intent
and effect of ... reducing Oreck’s competition with Sears,
Roebuck.’’ Although the complaint also alleged that the
purpose and effect of the combination was to exclude Oreck
generally from the vacuum cleaner market—a type of alle-
gation not unusual in civil antitrust cases—the record, in-
cluding the examinations of witnesses, summations of coun-
sel and the court’s instructions, show that the case was tried

20a

and submitted to the jury on the claim that Whirlpool and
Sears combined to restrain Oreck from competing against
Sears, particularly on prices, in the sale of Whirlpool-made
machines, as a result of which Oreck was ultimately cut off
as a distributor of such machines. At trial and prior to the
jury’s verdict, the court and counsel had no disagreement
as to the applicable legal principles, as the following collo-
quy with respect to the Court’s proposed charge shows:

‘‘The Court: I understand that, but it seems to me
that if the jury were to conclude that Sears and Whirl-
pool had conspired to terminate Oreck to rid Sears of
a competitor, they have gone all the farther that they

need to go.

‘‘Mr. Turoff [Whirlpool’s counsel]: I see now your
Honor’s argument. I think what you are saying is that
if the jury finds that we had a conspiracy for the pur-
pose of getting rid of Oreck, that is an unreasonable
restraint of trade. That is, I think, a correct statement

of the law.”’

Thus the evidence presented at trial to the effect that the
termination culminated a Sears-Whirlpool conspiracy to
eliminate Oreck’s competition against Sears, and particu-
larly its price competition, established a per se violation of

§ 1 of the Sherman Act.’

2The proof of a conspiracy between Whirlpool and Sears was
more than sufficient. Indeed, a manufacturer may be held to violate
§ 1 of the Sherman Act ‘‘irrespective of monopoly or conspiracy,”’
when he refuses to deal with a distributor and thereby creates an
‘‘arrangement’’ in restraint of trade. Osborn v. Sinclair Co., 324
F.2d 566, 573 (4th Cir. 1963). The existence of a conspiracy
and Sears’ membership and participation could also be inferred
from the totality of the course and conduct engaged in by the
defendants, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
80 S.Ct. 503, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960) ; United States v. A. Schrader’s
Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 40 S.Ct. 251, 64 L.Ed. 471 (1920). The
jury was entitled to rely, among other things, upon (1) Sears’
purchase of 90 per cent of Whirlpool’s annual production of
vacuum cleaners and two-thirds of its production of all appliances,

2la

: Since a refusal to deal for the purpose of eliminating
intrabrand price competition is thus per se unlawful, the
majority errs in holding that plaintiff Oreck was required
also to prove a restraint of trade in the relevant market
In General Motors, where the Supreme Court found per me
unlawful a similar combination to restrain intrabrand price
competition by refusing to deal with ‘‘discounters”’ of
Chevrolet cars, the Court deemed it unnecessary to consider
the effect of the intrabrand competition on the relevant
market or the availability of alternative sources of supply
to the discounters. Indeed, as early at FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 8.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 307 (1922)

the court condemned the boycott of price cutters, without
regard to the availability of alternative products. See also
Ford Motor Co. v. Webster’s Auto Sales Inc., 361 F.2d 874
( Ist Cir. 1966) (per se rule applied without regard to alter-
native sources of supply available to plaintiff).

The dealer-termination cases relied upon by the majority,
see, e. ., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1972), Alpha
Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniels Distillery, 454 F.2d 442,
452 (9th Cir. 1972), and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822, 78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), are
all clearly distinguishable and do not govern the facts of
this case. They stand simply for the proposition that a

(2) Sears’ position on the Whirlpool board, (3) its use of its own
brand name (which decreased its reliance on Whirlpool as a source)
and (4) Sears’ traditional high price structure. This evidence of a
motive to maintain high prices and leverage over Whirlpool coin-
cided with Whirlpool’s irrational termination of an increasingly
successful distributor, Oreck’s entry into Sears’ mai] order domain
at discount prices, the fact that ‘‘an honorary director of Sears’’
placed Oreck’s mail order solicitation before the Whirlpool board,
and Payne ’s statemerts to David Oreck admitting that Sears had
applied pressure on Whirlpool. Viewed as a whole the evidence
clearly supported the jury’s finding of conspiracy.

22a

manufacturer may unilaterally terminate or replace an
exclusive distributor for legitimate business purposes with-
out violating §1 of the Sherman Act. The critical distinc-
tion is that in the cases relied upon by appellants, unlike
the present case or General Motors, there was no evidence
that the cutoff or substitution was pursuant to a combina-
tion to restrain competition by the victim against the con-
spirators in the sale of the product. Indeed, each of the
dealer termination cases finding no violation of § 1, includ-
ing the carefully reasoned opinion in Hawatan Oke, recog:
nize that a per se rule would apply to a dealer termination
where the manufacturer had the ‘‘anticompetitive objec-
tive’’ of excluding ‘‘one or more so-called ‘discounters’ or
‘price cutters’ ’’. 416 F.2d at 76. In Hawaiian Oke no such
evidence of anticompetitive reason or effect was offered by
the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals understandably
found reversible error in the district court’s instruction
that a per se violation is made out by any agreement which
‘ig hound to reduce another businessman’s opportunity to

compete in the same market.’’ 416 F.2d at 75. However, the ©

court was careful to distinguish the case from those, like the
present case, where an objective was to restrain competi-

tion, stating: ;

‘‘In other cases, there was concerted action by one
group to put one or more of their competitors out of
business, or to impair their ability to compete with the
conspirators. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
1963, 373 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 ;
Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
1960, 364 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 365, 5 L.Ed.2d 358 ; Asso-
ciated Press. v. United States, supra [326 U.S. 1, 65
S.Ct. 1416, 89 L.Ed. 2013]... . In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 1951, 340 U.S. 211, 71
S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219, there was an agreement be-
tween sellers to refuse to sell to wholesalers who would
not agree to abide by maximum resale prices fixed by
the sellers. Thus the boycott of the plaintiff to that case
was part of a price-fixing scheme. .. .

23a

“Here, plaintiff presented no evidence whatever that
either Seagram or Barton had any antitcompetitive
motive for terminating plaintiff as their distributor.
There were no price fixing or other similar motives or
demands or activities.’ Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d at 77-78.

The limitations of the Hawaiian Oke decision were fur-
ther made clear by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 938, 35 L.Ed.2d 256
(1973), where the court held that a refusal to deal in order
to coerce competitors or to exclude them from competition
(which is the case here) is illegal per se. Hawaiian Oke
was distinguished as a case in which the manufacturer’s
“primary purpose” and “direct effect” was to achieve a
“legitimate business objective.” * A similar line of cases has
held that, although a manufacturer may unilaterally termi-
nate a distributorship or for his own legitimate business
reasons refuse to grant an exclusive distributorship, when
a horizontal, intrabrand competitor exercises a veto power
over plaintiff’s access to the manufacturer’s goods or trade-
mark, as Sears did here, an inference of anticompetitive
motive and effect is available and the per se rule becomes
applicable. Quality Mercury Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542

* See also Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir.
1972) (per se rule applies to refusals to deal to eliminate price
cutters) ; Bay-City Abrahams Bros. Inc. v. Estee Lauder Inc., 375
F.Supp. 1206, 1216 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (refusal to deal is per se
illegal if the result is price fixing or the elimination of competi-
tion) ; Ace Beer Distributors Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283, 286
(6th Cir.), cert. den., 375 U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 267, 11 L.Ed.2d 166
(1963) (same); E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air
Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-7 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
den., 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 912, 34 L.Ed.2d 690 (1973) (combi-
nations among traders at different marketing levels to exclude a
competitor of some member of the combination is illegal per se) ;
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U.Pa.L. Rev, 847, 875 (1955).

24a

F.2d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 1976) ; American Motor Inns v. Holi-
day Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1975).

Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 100
U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822,
78 S.Ct. 29, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957), relied upon by the major-
ity, is the typical dealer termination case in which evidence
was presented to show that the survival of Packard’s larg-
est area franchise depended, in the business judgment of
the company, upon its being given an exclusive franchise.
No evidence was presented, as in General Motors and the
present case, to show that the dealer was terminated be-
cause he was a price cutter or in order to maintain high in-
trabrand prices.

Similarly, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., —— U.S. ——, 97
S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977), relied on by the majority,
has no application to this case. Although the Court over-
ruled a portion of United States v. Arnold Schwinn €& Co.,
not involved here, it did not change any of the foregoing
principles regarding price restraints. On the contrary, it
reaffirmed them, restricting its application of the “rule
of reason” to exclude vertically-imposed price restraints,
US. , 97 S.Ct. 2549 n.18, and General Motors-type
conspiracies, —— U.S. ——, 97 S.Ct. 2549 n.28.

The majority vainly seeks to get around General Motors
and other Supreme Court decisions holding similar combi-
nations to restrain competition illegal per se by pointing
to the fact that more than one competing dealer was in-
volved in the General Motors conspiracy and by suggesting
that, if Sears had joined with another distributor rather
than with Whirlpool to restrain Oreck’s price competition,
perhaps General Motors might apply. The attempted dis-
tinction has no legal significance and ignores the substan-
tive fact that Sears was not only the sole other distributor
of Whirlpool machines but handled some 90% of the vacuum
cleaners made by Whirlpool. Sears was the equivalent of
many Whirlpool vacuum cleaner distributors. The effect

25a

of its combining with Whirlpool to stop Oreck’s price com-
petition was just as harmful to Oreck and to the public as
would be a combination between two small distributors to
eliminate a discounter, which under the majority’s dis-
tinction would be per se illegal under General Motors. A
combination to restrain intrabrand price competition can-
not be condoned simply because it consists solely of the
manufacturer of the product and its only distributor, a
huge merchandising chain, without participation by a sec-
ond distributor. The law looks to substance, not form, and
condemns as per se illegal any combination or conspiracy
of 2 or more persons to restrain price competition or to
eliminate a competitor.

For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment
of the district court.‘ The majority has in my view seriously
erred in its concept of the antitrust principles that govern
this case. The decision departs from basic principles estab-
lished in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. It will
have mischievous results, since it will be seized upon by
those who would otherwise be bound by established prece-
dent to demand similar treatment. It weakens the private
enforcement of the antitrust laws, upon which the Execu-
tive Branch heavily depends. I therefore dissent.

*I would also find that Oreck’s proof of damages was sufficient
to meet its burden of proof and to support the jury’s verdict since
‘damage issues in these cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of
concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other con-
texts,’’ Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123,
89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969), and that in the absense
of precise damage calculations ‘‘the wrongdoer should bear the risk
of uncertainty that his own conduct has created.’’ Autowest, Inc.
v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 565 (2d Cir 1970). Here plaintiff’s
evidence of profit structure and sales performance over the years
prior to termination and its projections by an expert witness as to
future performance, clearly afforded the jury ‘‘a reasonable basis
of computation.’’ Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379, 47 S.Ct. 400, 71 L.Ed, 684 (1929).

26a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 76-7631

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1977

Oreck Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

WuirLpooL CoRPORATION AND
Sears, Roesuck anv Co., Defendants-Appellants.

Before: ANpEeRSON, Frrnperc, MANSFIELD, MuLuican, TiM-
BERS, GuRFEIN, VAN GRAAFEILAND, Meskiu, Circuit
Judges.

Fitep May 1, 1978

On Renearinc En Banco

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27a

[Opinion ]

AnpersoN, Cir. J.: The appellants, Whirlpool Corpora-
tion (Whirlpool) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears), ap-
pealed from a judgment entered on July 13, 1976, on a jury
verdict against them and in favor of Oreck Corporation
(Oreck), on two counts of a seven count complaint charging
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. On ap-
peal, a divided panel of this court reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.
[1977-2 Trape Caszs {| 61,641], 563 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir. 1977).
Appellee’s petition for a rehearing en banc was granted on
December 15, 1977. The hearing of the appeal en banc was
submitted on briefs by all of the parties and without fur-
ther oral argument. On reconsideration we concur in the
judgment of the panel majority, reverse the judgment of
district court, and remand the case for a new trial.

[Termination of Distributor]

The material facts of this dispute have been set forth in
the opinion of the panel majority and will be reviewed here
only briefly. Whirlpool has been in the vacuum cleaner
business since 1957 when it acquired the Birtman Electric
Co. and began manufacturing vacuum cleaners for Sears,
te be sold under the ‘‘Kenmore’’ label. Whirlpool also
sought to sell vacuum cleaners under its own tradename.
In August, 1963, Whirlpool entered into an agreement with
Oreck, by which the latter was appointed the exclusive dis-
tributor of vacuum cleaners under the name of ‘‘ Whirlpool”’
for an initial term of five years, with automatic extensions

28a

for one-year periods thereafter, absent six months prior
notice of termination of the agreement by either party.

Whirlpool gave Oreck formal notice of termination of the-

agreement on June 27, 1968; but after further negotiations,
Whirlpool and Oreck entered into a substituted contract,
dated August 1, 1968, which extended Oreck’s distributor-
ship through December 31, 1971; it did not, however, con-
tain any provision for an extension. On May 14, 1971, Whirl-
pool informed Oreck that it intended to allow the sales
agreement to expire according to its terms and, on Decem-
ber 31, 1971, Oreck’s exclusive distributorship of “Whirl-
pool” products ended. The instant action followed in Sep-
tember of 1972.

This lawsuit is based on Oreck’s claim that it was not
afforded the opportunity for an additional period of time
as Whirlpool’s exclusive distributor at the behest and in-
sistence of Sears, a much larger purchaser of Whirlpool
products. Accordingly, Oreck’s complaint charged both
Whirlpool and Sears with engaging in a contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade
to exclude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner market in the
United States and Canada.’

At trial, Oreck’s case for liability rested principally upon
the testimony of Marshall Oreck, its General Manager, and
of David Oreck, its President. It was their contention that
the reason for Whirlpool’s failure to renew the contract
was Sears’ desire to end competition from Oreck. By way of
defense and explanation of its action, Whirlpool presented
the testimony of its officers who dealt with Oreck to show
that, among other reasons, the contract was not renewed

* At no time in the course of this litigation has Oreck alleged
that either its 1963 or its 1968 contract with Whirlpool in and of
itself violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Neither was alleged to be
an agreement which attempted to fix prices or eliminate resale price
competition, nor did it attempt to impose unreasonable geographi-
eal or customer restraints on Oreck’s ability to compete.

29a

after December, 1971, because of Oreck’s failure to follow
the original marketing strategy contemplated by Whirlpool.’

[Economic Effects]

Oreck presented no evidence that the net economic effect
of the non-renewal of its contract was to restrain trade un-
reasonably in the vacuum cleaner industry in the United
States and/or Canada.‘ Nor did it show that alternative
sources of supply were unavailable and that it was, there-
fore, excluded from competition in the vacuum cleaner busi-
ness. David Oreck admitted that Oreck had been able to
obtain vacuum cleaners from another manufacturer and
was, at the time of trial, the world’s largest supplier of
“top fill upright vacuum cleaners.”

Despite the lack of mention or reference to any evidence
of an anticompetitive purpose or effect in connection with
the alleged Whirlpool/Sears agreement, the trial court in-
structed the jury that,

The violations alleged by plaintiff are, if you credit
them, unreasonable restraints of trade ... If you find

* According to their testimony, it was Whirlpool’s intention that
Oreck’s distributorship would serve as an avenue to the sale of
‘*Whirlpool’’ vacuum cleaners to department stores and other spe-
cial retail accounts. There was further testimony that by 1965,
Oreck had abandoned this marketing strategy and had resorted to
sales to janitorial supply houses, and that Oreck further departed
from Whirlpool’s original plan by adopting, in 1967, a technique
for making sales of ‘‘Whirlpool’’ machines through direct mail
orders It was undisputed that by 1970, mail order sales comprised
over 90% of Oreck’s business.

* David Oreck testified that the vacuum cleaner industry is a
large one and that during 1971, when Oreck sold 78,203 vacuum
cleaners, consumers purchased about 7.8 million cleaners. Oreck,
therefore, had no more than a 1% market share at the time of the
completion of its exclusive distributorship for Whirlpool. More-
over, there was, at all relevant times, an abundance of vacuum
eleaners available in the marketplace which were reasonably inter-
changeable with those manufactured by Whirlpool.

30a

there was such an agreement [between Whirlpool and
Sears “to exclude Oreck from a market in vacuum
cleaners or Whirlpool vacuum cleaners anywhere”),
then you should go on to consider damages. (Emphasis
added.)

[Per Se Violation]

An almost identical charge was given with respect to
count two, dealing with Oreck’s alleged exclusion from the
Canadian market.‘ Under such instructions, the jury could

‘Count 2 of the complaint charged that Whirlpool and Sears
unlawfully conspired to exclude Oreck from the vacuum cleaner
market in Canada. (Counts 3 through 7 were dismissed.) At trial,
Oreck contended that Whirlpool’s refusal to grant its request that
Whirlpool procure Canadian Standards Association approval for
the ‘‘Whirlpool’’ vacuum cleaners it desired to sell in Canada,
provided substantial evidence of the unlawful conspiracy to remove
Oreck’s competition against Sears, selling its ‘‘Kenmore’’ ma-
chinery through its subsidiary, Simpson-Sears Ltd., the sole dis-
tributor of Whirlpool-made products in Canada.

The 1963 and 1968 agreements between Whirlpool and Oreck
both specifically stated that Whirlpool was appointing Oreck its
exclusive distributor of certain ‘‘Whirlpool’’ products ‘‘for the
United States of America and its possessions.’’ The parties agree
that this provision placed no restriction on the territory in which
Oreck might sell goods purchased from Whirlpool. Whirlpool con-
cedes that it refused to obtain Canadian Standards Association
approval for the cleaners that Oreck was seeking to market in
Canada, but argues that such approval was not a prerequisite to
selling in Canada and that, in any event, Oreck sold vacuum
cleaners in Canada during the period of its distributorship.

On this count, the trial judge instructed the jury that,

‘* Arrangements . . . restricting the territory in which a product
may be resold are unreasonable restraints of trade in and of them-
selves .. . You need not determine whether such arrangements are
reasonable, or whether they have an impact upon the market place,
nor need you be concerned with the business or supposed economic
justification for such arrangements... .”’

In light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 TrapE Cases

3la

simply have found an agreement by Sears and Whirlpool
to exclude Oreck from the sale of Whirlpool vacuum clean-
ers and, on that basis, have found them guilty (as it in fact
did) of a per se violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. Yet
the very same conduct can constitute the granting of a
perfectly legal exclusive distributorship or one, at least,
whose legality must be judged under the rule of reason

f 61,488], 433 U. S. 36 (1977), this instruction was incorrect.
Efforts by a manufacturer to restrict the territory in which a
distributor of its products operates are to be examined under
the rule of reason standard. See Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild
Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc. [1978-1 Trape Cases 61,926], ——
F. 2d ——, 46 U.S. L. W. 2492 (1st Cir. March 17, 1978).

It is undisputed that Whirlpool was not required to obtain Ca-
nadian Standards Association approval for its vacuum cleaners as
requested by Oreck. That its refusal to do so may have been
based on an agreement with its existing Canadian distributor does
not, of itself, create a violation of the antitrust laws. It must fur-
ther be found that this agreement was anticompetitive in purpose
or effect. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra;
Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. [1976-2 TrapE CasEs
7] 61,086], 542 F. 2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom.
Prestige Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Quality Mercury, Inc., 433 U. S.
914 (1977); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.
[1957 Trape Cases { 68,682], 243 F. 2d 418 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U. S. 822 (1957) ; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales
Corp. [1956 Trape Csazs { 68,292], 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.),
aff’d [1956 Trape Cases { 68,564], 239 F. 2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 823 (1957).

The trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury on this point was
plain error. Moreover, it inevitably prejudiced the jury’s consid-
eration of the first count even though the matter of sales in the
Canadian market was set out in the second count. In the evidence,
in the arguments, and in the district court’s charge, this incident
was used as an example of the claimed unlawful activity by Whirl-
pool and Sears to keep Oreck from selling more vacuum cleaners
and to destroy Oreck’s competitive activities. Throughout the trial,
Whirlpoo!’s refusal to procure Canadian Standards Association ap-
proval for the vacuum cleaners Oreck desired to sell in Canada
was characterized as a major part of the alleged Whirlpool/Sears
conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.

32a

standard. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co. [1957 Trape Cases § 68,682], 243 F. 2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); see also, United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. [1967 Trape Cases { 72,126], 388
U.S. 365 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. [1977-1 Trapve Cases
7 61,488], 433 U.S. 36 (1977) ; Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co. [1976-2 Trape Cases { 61,086], 542 F. 2d 466
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Prestige Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Quality Mercury, Inc., 433 U.S. 914 (1977) ;
Joseph E. Seagram € Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd. [1969 Trape Cases § 72,914], 416 F. 2d 71 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Bay City-Abra-
ham Bros., Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc. [1974-1 Trapr Cases
7 75,095], 375 F. Supp. 1206 (S. D .N. Y. 1974). On the in-
stant reconsideration en banc, the issue is whether the per
se standard, under which the trial judge charged the jury,
was appropriate in light of the nature of the alleged Whirl-
pool/Sears agreement.

[Price Competition; Boycott]

Oreck’s argument that the district court was correct in
instructing the jury to apply the per se standard in this
case, rests principally on two assertions: first, that Whirl-
pool’s decision not to renew Oreck’s distributorship was
motivated by a desire to eliminate the price competition
which Oreck was offering to Sears; and second, that this
effort by Sears and Whirlpool to restrain competition con-
stituted a group boycott expressly forbidden by the ho.d-
ings of the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. General Motors Corp. [1966 Trapg Cases { 71,750], 384
U.S. 127 (1966); and Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc. [1959 Trapr Cases { 69,316], 359 U.S. 207 (1959).

With regard tc the first of these points, it is undisputed
that, at all times relevant, Sears was selling its “Kenmore”
vacuum cleaners at prices below those charged by Oreck
for comparable “Whirlpool” models. The complaint did not

33a

allege, the evidence at the trial did not show, and counsel in
summation did not argue, that Whirlpool was attempting
to maintain high resale prices for its products by conspir-
ing with its distributors or that its actions toward Oreck
were an effort to chastise a dealer for refusing to cooperate
in a scheme to fix or maintain prices. Cf. United States v.
Parke, Davis € Co. [1960 Trape Cases { 69,611], 362 U.S.
29 (1960). The contracts entered into by Oreck and Whirl-
pool in 1963 and 1968 clearly stated that Oreck had the
sole right to determine its selling prices.

[Edge Effect]

Oreck concedes that there was no Sears/Whirlpool agree-
ment to fix prices, but argues that the elimination of its
distributorship amounted to tampering with the price
structure for vacuum cleaners, equally a per se violation.'
See, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. [1940-1943
Trade Cases { 56,031], 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). In its brief
on rehearing en banc, Oreck refers to a so-called “edge
effect,” that is, that by continuing to lower its prices and
thereby come closer to those of Sears, Oreck’s price oper-
ated as a ceiling against any increases by Sears. Cf. United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company [1964 Trapve Cases
| 71,147], 378 U.S. 158 at 173-74 (1964) ; Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division [II], 75 Yale L. J. 373, 405-410 (1966). This claim

* Oreck introduced no evidence at trial to show that the purpose
of Whirlpool’s refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship was to give
Sears the power to maintain the prices of its ‘‘Kenmore’’ machines
at an artificially high level. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. [1940-19438 Trape Cases { 56,031], 310 U. S. 150, 224-26
n. 59 (1940). Neither did Oreck submit evidence to show that
Whirlpool machines had a sufficient share of the vacuum cleaner
market to permit any of its dealers to exploit a dealer monopoly
without feeling the pinch of interbrand competition. See the Su-
preme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 237 n. 57 (1977).
It appears from the record that there was effective competition in
the vacuum cleaner business at the manufacturer level. When in-

34a

is unavailing in the present posture of this case. Because
of the trial judge’s incorrect instructions to the jury, it can-
not be said that the issue of whether Oreck’s distributor-
ship was allowed to lapse in order to protect Sears from
price competition was fairly submitted to the jury or de-
cided by its verdict. Rather, because the trial judge failed
to instruct the jury that it must find that the purpose or the
effect of these agreements was to enable Sears to raise or
to maintain its prices for “Kenmore” vacuum cleaners, the
jury’s verdict that Sears and Whirlpool violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act is of no effect.

[Boycott]

Oreck alleged that its cancellation, by agreement of
Whirlpool and Sears, was a “group boycott” under the rule
of Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra, and
of United States v. General Motors Corp., supra, which
treat such behavior as a per se violation of § 1 of the Sher-
man Act. This case, however, cannot be fitted into the
category of group boycott cases. “While the boycott con-
cept is infinitely expandable, the per se doctrine ought not
to be.” Sullivan, Antitrust 256 (1977), quoted in Drayer v.
Krasner, — F. 2d — (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1978), slip op. at

terbrand competition exists, it provides a significant check on the
exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of
consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product. See
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 52 n. 19.
In order to prove a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act, Oreck
would have had to show that Whirlpool’s agreement with Sears to
eliminate Oreck’s competition either promoted a Whirlpool mo-
nopoly in the vacuum cleaner industry, see Quality Mercury, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 470; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Distillers Co. Ltd. [1975-1 Trape Cases { 60,337], 395 F. Supp.
221 (S. D. N. Y. 1975); or gave Sears a market position from
which it could raise retail prices even in the face of interbrand
competition. See, ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Ver-
tical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition (1977), at 93
n. 380. The Whirlpool/ Sears agreement should, therefore, have
been examined under the rule of reason standard.

35a

1253, 1265. It is important to distinguish between “horizon-
tal” restraints, t.e. agreements between competitors at the
same level of market structure, and “vertical” restraints,
1.e. combinations of persons at different levels of the mar-
ket structure, such as manufacturers and distributors. See
United States v. Topco Associates [1972 Trapge Cases
| 73,904], 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Horizontal restraints
alone have been characterized as “naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except stifling competition,” White Motor
Co. v. United States [1963 Trapr Cases J 70,679], 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963); and, therefore, per se violations of the
Sherman Act. On the other hand, while vertical restric-
tions may reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the
number of sellers of a particular product, competing for
a given group of buyers, they also promote interbrand com-
petition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain effi-
ciencies in the distribution of its products, see Continental
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 54. They are
therefore, to be examined under the rule of reason stand-
ard. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines:
An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term—1977, 77 Colum.
L. Rev. 979 at 985-87 (1977).

In Klor’s, the Supreme Court specifically noted that “this
is not a case of ... a manufacturer and... [its] dealer
agreeing to an exclusive distributorship,” 359 U.S. at 212.
The present case, involving as it does an alleged agreement
between a single manufacturer and a single dealer, is, in
essence, an exclusive distributorship controversy, and the
“group boycott” doctrine, is, therefore, not applicable. Be-
cause Sears is a large company presumably selling a large
number of vacuum cleaners does not, ipso facto, convert
this case into a horizontal conspiracy warranting per se
treatment.’ Cf. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., supra, at 58 n. 28.

* Oreck seeks to distinguish the line of cases upholding the le-
gality of agreements by which a manufacturer substitutes one ex-
clusive distributor for another or terminates a distributor in order

36a

[Legitimate Business Concerns]

Moreover, in his instructions to the jury, the trial judge
failed to marshal any of the evidence presented by Whirl-
pool to show that its refusal to renew Oreck’s distributor-

to afford another exclusive selling rights, see, e.g., Quality Mercury,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Fed-
erated Dept. Stores, Inc. [1972 Trape Cases {| 73,918], 459 F. 2d
138 (6th Cir. 1972); Alpha Distributing Co. of Calif. v. Jack
Daniel Distillery [1972 Trape Cases { 73,798], 454 F. 2d 442 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974) ; Packard Motor Car
Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., supra; on the ground that Sears
did not replace Oreck as the distributor of ‘‘Whirlpool’’ vacuum
cleaners; and, therefore, competition of both an interbrand and
intrabrand nature was eliminated.

While it is true that, because of its unique facts, this case does
not fit exactly into the dealer substitution line of cases, appellee’s
argument does not persuade us that it therefore comes within the
rule of per se illegality. It may be argued that there were alterna-
tive sources of supply available to Oreck and that the net effect
of Whirlpool’s decision to allow Oreck’s distributorship to lapse
was to add an interbrand competitor to Whirlpool-made machines
in the upright vacuum cleaner market. Moreover, it appears from
the record that, while Sears sold several models of Whirlpool-made
vacuum cleaners under its ‘‘Kenmore’’ label, Oreck was allowed to
market only one model under the terms of the 1968 agreement,
thereby reducing the potential for intrabrand competition in Whirl-
pool-made machines In the absence of a showing of an anticom-
petitive purpose or effect, the fact that Sears may have asked to
be made the sole distributor of a certain line of products (in this
case, Whirlpool-made vacuum cleaners), does not render Whirl-
pool’s subsequent action in refusing to renew Oreck’s distributor-
ship illegal. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-
Clark Co., 263 U. S. 565 (1924) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
Motor Car Co., supra.

The rule of reason provides a more discriminating way of dif-
ferentiating true exclusive dealerships from two-firm vertical com-
binations to exclude a distributor from supply. Although Oreck
asserts that Whirlpool’s refusal to renew its distributorship was
against Whirlpool’s own economic interests, the trial court’s in-
structions to the jury, under the per se rule, did not require the
jury to balance the anticompetitive evils and pro-competitive vir-

37a

ship was motivated by legitimate business concerns’ and
that its actions were consistent with the terms of the 1968
contract. It is the contractual nature of the dealings between
Oreck and Whirlpool which distinguish this case from the
holding of United States v. General Motors Corp., supra,
relied upon by Oreck. In General Motors, the Court focused
on the eztra-contractual and price-fixing aspects of Gen-
eral Motors’ activities in eliciting from dealers in the Los
Angeles area agreements, substantially interrelated and in-
terdependent, that none of them would do business with
price discounters. 384 U.S. at 144. The Court pointed out
that what resulted from the activities of General Motors
was “a fabric interwoven by many strands of joint action
to eliminate the discounters from participation in the mar-
ket, to inhibit the free choice of franchised dealers to select
their own methods of trade and to provide multilateral sur-
veillance and enforcement,” id. at 144; and that these activi-
ties could hsrdly be described as “unilateral” or merely
“parallel.” Jd. at 145. It was this same concerted action by

tues of the alleged vertical Sears/Whirlpool agreement, as would
have been done under the rule of reason. See Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTZ Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 57 n. 27; Handler Changing
Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court
Term—1977, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 979 at 983 (1977). ‘‘Per se rules
of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that
is manifestly anticompetitive,’’ Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., supra, at 49-50; and where the conduct involved is
an agreement between a single manufacturer and a single dis-
tributor whicn results in a sole distributorship for the manufac-
turer’s products, a careful inquiry into the business justifications
for the agreement is required.

* The evidence presented at trial by both parties revealed several
instances of Oreck’s alleged disregard for the terms of its contract,
e.g., refusal to modify advertising campaigns in accordance with
Whirlpool’s wishes, sales to private label customers, and failure to
abide by the original marketing strategy of distribution to major
retail accounts; anyone of which could have justified Whirlpool’s
refusal to renew Oreck’s distributorship. In addition, the 1968
contract itself contained no provision for renewal.

38a

businessmen to boycott other traders and thereby deprive
them of access to all sources of merchandise which they
wished to sell to the public, which led to the results
reached in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra; and
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra. Cf. Beck-
man v. Walter Kidde & Company [1970 Trape Cases
1 73,347], 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (E. D. N. Y. 1970), aff'd
[1971 Trape Cases { 73,768], 451 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).

[Contractual Rights]

What is crucial here is to consider those actions which
General Motors could have taken, but did

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1620%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
