# Appendix — Chambers v. United States

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1601%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 981

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

no. €87328

JOE HENRY CHAMBERS............... Petitioner

vs,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA....... Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX
DALE PRICE
211 Spring Street

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Attorney for Petitioner

Pres si De
AUG 25 1978

, f IR. , CLE

io

= Se SS St

/
\ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF APPENDIX

Appendix A:

Di. ccdehueatenesddeieens ees

Appendix B:
Opinion of Original Panel

fk TT eee

Appendix C:
Order denying Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc.............+000¢:

Appendix D:
Statements as introduced of
Appellants Chambers, Hansell and

DU tuviieuuealecendeakedbeeeeane ee

Appendix E:
Written Statement of Boggess

I 5 deus bu bb.eu bees beeee

Appendix F:
Statements of Chambers, Hansell and
Griffin as read by U.S. Attorney

in opening Statement.................

Appendix G:
Minutes of Lonoke Production

Credit Association. ..........ccceeees

Appendix H:
U.S. v. Bell, No. 77-1894

(8th Circuit. April 19, 1978)............

Appendix I:
U.S. v. Jones, No. 77-1490

(8th Cir. Feb. 16, 1978)............008.

Appendix J:
U.S. v. McClintic, Jr., No. 77-1174

(6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1078)... . cc cccccccccs

Appendix K:
Regulations of Lonoke Production

Credit Association (G) and (H).........

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

NO.
JOE HENRY CHAMBERS............... Petitioner
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA....... Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
(Filed Nov. 1, 1976)

United States of America )
) No. LR-76-CR-154
Vv. )
) Count I-18 U.S.C. §371
Charles Thomas Griffin ) (NMT $10,000; NMT 5 yrs., or
Joe Henry Chambers ) both) Counts II, III and IV -
Bill Hansell ) 18 U.S.C. §1006
) (NMT $10,000; NMT 5 yrs., or
) both) Count V - 18 U.S.C.
) §1014

) (NMT $5,000; 2 yrs., or both)

INDICTMENT
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
COUNT I
1. At all times material to this indictment:

a. The Lonoke Production Credit Association
(PCA) was a federally chartered instrumentality of the
United States with its central office located in Lonoke,
Arkansas, under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,
Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration (FCA),
also instrumenta'ities of the United States.

b. The East Lonoke Branch of the Lonoke PCA
was located in Lonoke, Arkansas; its Branch Office
Manager being BILL HANSELL, the defendant.

3

ec. CHARLES THOMAS GRIFFIN, the
defendant, was the President and a member of the
Executive Committee of the Lonoke PCA.

d. JOE HENRY CHAMBERS, the defendant,
was the Vice President of the Lonoke PCA.

e. O. M. Young was an attorney acting as
trustee for the defendants.

f. Irving Brauer owned a 2,880 acre farm in
Independence County, Arkansas.

g. Harold V. Huntsman was a borrower and
member of the Lonoke PCA.

II. That from on or about the 1st day of June,
1974, and continuously thereafter up to and including
the date of the return of this indictment, in the Eastern
District of Arkansas and elsewhere, CHARLES
THOMAS GRIFFIN, JOE HENRY CHAMBERS, and
BILL HANSELL the defendants, wilfully and
knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and
agree together with each other and with diverse other
persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury to
commit the following offense against the United States
of America, to-wit: to wilfully and unlawfully
participate, share in and directly and indirectly receive
monies, profits and benetits from a purported crop
loan, being officers and employees of the Lonoke
Production Credit Association, a federally chartered
body corporate and instrumentality of the United

d

States of America under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,
Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, with
intent to defraud said Association, in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1006.

III. It was a part of said conspiracy that the
defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman to make
a loan application to the Lonoke PCA in which false
statements concerning the purpose of the loan were
made.

IV. It was further part of said conspiracy that
the defendants would cause a specified 2,880 acre farm
in Independence County, Arkansas to be transferred
from Irving Brauer to O. M. Young, acting as trustee
for the defendants.

V. It was further part of said conspiracy that
the defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman’s loan
application to be approved by the Executive
Committee of the Lonoke PCA only after agreement
by Harold V. Huntsman to buy the said 2,880 acre farm
in Independence County, Arkansas.

VI. It was further part of said conspiracy that
the defendants would cause PCA loan proceeds to be
advanced to Harold V. Huntsman.

VII. It was further part of said conspiracy that
the defendants would cause Harold V. Huntsman to
use part of the PCA loan proceeds to purchase the said

—————ee

5

2,880 acre farm in Independence County, Arkansas,
from O. M. Young, trustee.

VIII. It was further part of said conspiracy that
the defendants would cause O. M. Young, trustee, to
issue checks to each defendant drawn on an escrow
account containing the PCA loan proceeds.

OVERT ACTS

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect
the object thereof, the defendants performed the
following overt acts:

1. On or abut the 18th day of July, 1974, in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL
HANSELL, in his capacity as Branch Manager of the
Lonoke Production Credit Association, took an
application from Harold V. Huntsman for a $513,800
crop loan.

2. On or about the 18th day of July, 1974, in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant
CHARLES THOMAS GRIFFIN, in his capacity as
President and voting member of the Lonoke
Production Credit Association Executive Committee,
approved the aforementioned crop loan.

3. On or about the 24th day of July, 1974, in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL
HANSELL, in his capacity as Branch Manager of the
Lonoke Production Credit Association, issued an

6

Association check in the amount of $386,600, payable
to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman.

4. On or about the 24th day of July, 1974, in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL
HANSELL accompanied Harold V. Huntsman to the
First National Bank in Little Rock, Little Rock,
Arkansas.

5. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974
to on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern
District of Arkansas, the defendant JOE HENRY
CHAMBERS accepted a $20,000 check dated the 26th
day of July, 1974, drawn on the escrow account of O. M.
Young, attorney.

6. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974 to
on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern
District of Arkansas, the defendant CHARLES
THOMAS GRIFFIN, accepted a $71,000 check dated
the 28th day of July, 1974, drawn on the escrow
account of O. M. Young, attorney.

7. From on or about the 28th day of July, 1974,
to on or about the 30th day of July, 1974, in the Eastern
District of Arkansas, the defendant BILL HANSELL
accepted a $71,000 check dated the 28th day of July,
1974, drawn on the escrow account of O. M. Young,
attorney.

Ali of the above in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 371.

7
COUNT II

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations
contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 28th day of July, 1974,
in the Eastern District of Arkansas, CHARLES
THOMAS GRIFFIN, being President of the Lonoke
Production Credit Association, a federally chartered
body corporate and instrumentality of the United
States of America, under the supervision of the
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) of St. Louis,
St. Louis, Missouri, and the Farm Credit
Administration, with intent to defraud said
Association, did participate, share in and directly and
indirectly receive monies, profits and benefits, that is
the sum of $71,000 by means of and through the
disbursement by the said Association of its check No.
60491, in the amount of $386,600, payable to Harold V.
Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, dated the 24th day
of July, 1974, and purportedly representing proceeds
of crop loan to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie
Huntsman, thereby violating the provisions of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1006.

COUNT III

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations
contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 26th day of July, 1974,
in the Eastern District of Arkansas, JOE HENRY

"

8

CHAMBERS, being Vice President of the Lonoke
Production Credit Association, a federally chartered
body corporate and instrumentality of the United
States of America under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) of St. Louis, St.
Louis, Missouri and the Farm Credit. Administration
with intent to defraud said Association did participate,
share in and directly and indirectly receive monies,
profits and benefits, that is the sum of $20,000 by
means of and through the disbursement by the said
Association of its check No. 60491, in the amount of
$386,600, payable to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie
Huntsman, dated the 24th day of July, 1974, and
purportedly representing proceeds of crop loan to
Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, thereby
violating the provisions of Title 18, United States
Code, Section, 1008.

COUNT IV

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations
contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 26th day of July, 1974,
in the Eastern District of Arkansas, BILL HANSELL,
being Branch Manager of the Lonoke Production
Credit Association, a federally chartered body
corporate and instrumentality of the United States of
America under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,
Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, with
intent to defraud said Association did participate,

9

share in and directly and indirectly receive monies,
profits and benefits, that is the sum of $71,000 by
means of and through the disbursement by the said
Association of its check No. 60491, in the amount of
$386,600, payable to Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie
Huntsman, dated the 24th day of July, 1974, and
purportedly representing proceeds of crop loan to
Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie Huntsman, thereby
violating the provision of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1006.

COUNT V

I. The Grand Jury realleges the allegations
contained in paragraph I of Count I.

II. That on or about the 16th day of July, 1974,
in the Eastern District of Arkansas, CHARLES
THOMAS GRIFFIN, JOE HENRY CHAMBERS and
BILL HANSELL knowingly and wilfully did cause to
be made a false statement in an application for a loan
submitted by Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie
Huntsman on said date to the Lonoke Production
Credit Association, a federally chartered body
corporate and instrumentality of the United States of
America under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,
Missouri and the Farm Credit Administration, for the
purpose of influencing the action of said Association to
approve said loan, in that the defendant caused to be
stated and represented in said application that request

10

was being made by Harold V. Huntsman and Maudie
Huntsman for a crop loan in the amount of $513,800,
whereas, in truth and fact, as the defendants -hen and
there well knew, $292,319.18 was to be used to
purchase 2,880 acres of real property in Independence
County, Arkansas, thereby violating the provisions of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014 and 2.

A TRUE BILL.

/s/ Tate Roberts

FOREMAN

/s) W. H. DILLAHUNTY

W.H. DILLAHUNTY
United States Attorney

/s) SAMUEL A. PERRONI

SAMUEL A. PERRONI
Assistant United States Attorney

11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

United States of America)
v. No. LR-76-CR-154
Joe Henry Chambers )

To' Any United States Marshal or other
authorized Officer

You are hereby commanded to arrest Joe
Henry Chambers and bring him forthwith before the
United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas in the city of Little Rock, Ark. to answer
to an indictment charging him with Wilfully &
unlawfully participated, share in and directly &
indirectly receive monies, profits & benefits from a
purported crop loan, being an officer & employee of the
Lonoke Production Credit Assn., better described in
the attached indictment.

1.

Insert designation of officer to whom the warrant is issued, e.g., “any
United States Marshal or any other authorized officer”; or “United States
Marshal for __ District of _"; or “any United States Marshal”; or
“any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”; or “any United
States Marshal or any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation”; or “any agent of the Alcohol Tax Unit.”

12

in violation of Sections 371 - 1006 - 1014 of 18 U.S.C.

Dated at Little Rock, Arkansas W.H. McClellan
on November 2nd, 1976 Clerk
By /s/ Paul D. Shuffield

Deputy Clerk

Bail fixed at $5,000
Address: Route #3, Box 33
Carlisle, Arkansas

RETURN
District of ss
Received the within warrant the day of
19 and executed same.
By

13

APPENDIX B

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 77-1597 and No. 77-1601

United States of America, *
°

Appellee, *

*

v. °

* Appeals from the United
Charles Thomas Griffin * States District Court for the
and Joe Henry Chambers,* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Appellants. *

Submitted: March 14, 1978
Filed: June 29, 1978

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge,

HENLEY, Circuit Judge and LARSON, Senior
*

District Judge.

*The Honorable ‘Earl R. Larson, Senior United States District
Judge, District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

14
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge.

On November 1, 1976, the federal grand jury
returned a five-count indictment against Charles
Thomas Griffin, Joe Henry Chambers and Bill Hansell.
Not guilty pleas were entered. Upon a joint trial to a
jury, commencing on June 20, 1977, defendant Griffin
was found guilty on Counts I, II and V. Defendant
Chambers was found guilty on Counts I and III and not
guilty on Count V.'

Griffin and Chambers have each filed a timely
appeal from their conviction. The defendants were
jointly tried below and their cases are consolidated
upon this appeal. Each defendant has filed separate
briefs. Hansell has not appealed from his conviction.

Count I alleges a conspiracy on the part of the
defendants to violate 18 U.S.C. §1006. Count II charges
Griffin with violation of 18 U.S.C. §1006. Count III
charges Chambers with violation of 18 U.S.C. §1006.
Count IV involves a charge against Hansell not here
material. Count V charges defendants with violation of
18 U.S.C. §§1014 and 2.

Be

Griffin was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment on each
count, to be served concurrently, and was fined $10,000 on Count I, $5,000
on Count I and $5,000 on Count V. Chambers was sentenced to fifteen
months imprisonment on each of Counts I and III, to be served
concurrently, and was fined $5,000 on Count I and $2,500 on Count IIL.

15

Griffin relies upon the following points for
reversal:

I. Prejudicial conduct of the Assistant United
States Attorney in reading in part of his
opening statement written statements
given to Government investigators.

II. Failure to dismiss Count II as defective.
III. Failure to Dismiss Count V.

IV. Error in admitting evidence of repurchase
of 2,880 acres.

V. Error in admitting evidence of other
transactions.

VI. Error in permitting Boggess to testify.

VII. Failure to produce Brady material and
denial of admission of certain minutes of
Lonoke PCA.

Chambers makes the same contention with
respect to Count III as Griffin does with respect to
Count II. He also relies upon points I, III, IV, V, VI and
VII asserted by Griffin. Such errors will be discussed
jointly with respect to both appeals.

16

Chambers urges the following additional points:
VIII. Refusal to grant a severance.
IX. Error in instructions.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reject
each of the contentions made and affirm the
convictions.

The trial was a long one. The record is very
extensive. A complete analysis of the facts and issues
would unduly extend this opinion without serving a
significant useful purpose. We shall summarize some
of the pertinent facts bearing upon the issues raised.
There is a dispute as to some of the material facts.
However, in light of the jury verdict in favor of the
Government, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government as the prevailing party,
and the facts are stated with this principle in mind.
The Lonoke Production Credit Association (PCA) is a
federally-chartered instrumentality of the United
States under the supervision of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis, Missouri, and
the Farm Credit Administration. Griffin was
president and Chambers was vice president of Lonoke
PCA. Hansell was manager of the East Lonoke branch.

In 1973 Huntsman, a large farm operator,
contacted Griffin in an effort to secure financing for his
farming operations. Huntsman was told by Griffin that
Hansell would take care of his needs. Huntsman was

17

unsuccessful in obtaining 1973 crops loans and had no
success with his 1974 application. He was told St. Louis
was fussing about Huntsman’s not having sufficient
farming operations in the Association's territory.

In July 1974 Hansell visited Huntsman and
suggested the purchase of a 2,880 acre tract of land
which Hansell said would make it easier for the PCA to
give him his desired line of credit. Hansell said Griffin
was waiting for a call to him of Huntsman’s decision on
the purchase and that PCA could finance 100% of the
purchase price. Huntsman, with some reluctance,
agreed to buy the land. A loan application for $513,800
was prepared and was signed by Huntsman. The
application states the loan is a crop loan. The loan
application was approved by the PCA loan committee
of which Griffin was an influential member.”

The involved 2,880 acre farm was purchased by
Griffin, Chambers and Hansell for $470,000 in late July
of 1974 with title taken in the name of O. M. Young,
Trustee.’ The Brauer land was encumbered by
existing encumbrances of $341,680 which were
assumed by the purchasers with a balance of $129,000
to be paid in cash at the time of closing. Huntsman’s

9

~~.

Real estate loans could be made by the PCA but the procedures for
such loans differed significantly from those with respect to crop loans.
Appraisals and title examinations were required for real estate loans,

3.

It is not clear from the record whether defendants committed
themselves to purchase the Brauer land prior to obtaining Huntsman's
purchase agreement,

18

purchase price was $634,000, or $164,000 more than
Brauer’s selling price. The beneficial ownership of the
land was not disclosed to Huntsman or to the
supervising Government agencies.

On July 24, 1974, the PCA disbursed the
proceeds of the crop loan, paying $121,433 for the
release of a bank crop lien and issuing a check to
Huntsman for $386,600.

Hansell refused to deliver the check for the loan
proceeds to Huntsman, and at Hansell’s insistence,
Hansell and Huntsman went to the First National
Bank in Little Rock where at Hansell’s direction
Huntsman endorsed and deposited the check for
$386,600 and received a cashier's check made out to
Young, Trustee, for $292,319.18, which was the amount
due on the purchase above the assumption of existing
encumbrances on the land. Hansell took possession of
such check and delivered it to Young. The check was
deposited to Young’s trust account. Shortly thereafter
Young issued a check on the trust account for $20,000
to Chambers and checks for $71,000 each to Griffin and
Hansell. The remaining $2,000 was retained by Young
as a fee. Telephone records were received in evidence
showing numerous phone calls between Griffin and
Young and others interested in the transaction on July
24 and that Young had a telephone conversation with
Chambers on that date. Huntsman, after the payments
hereinabove referred to, received a balance of about
$80,000 to be used for crop loan purposes and had
difficulty in meeting the expenses of his farming

19

operation. Huntsman in August 1974 received an
additional crop loan of $125,000, and repeated efforts
to obtain additional financing were unsuccessful.

On December 1, 1974, a payment on the
indebtedness assumed by Huntsman became due. At
the time of the purchase by Huntsman neither Brauer
nor Huntsman knew that a $164,000 profit had been
made on the sale, and Huntsman was not aware of the
fact that defendants were the equitable owners of the
real estate at such time. On March 7, 1975, Huntsman
learned of the true ownership of the land which he
purchased and the profit that had been made. The
following day Huntsman visited Hansell and
threatened to report the violation by the defendants of
the conflict of interest statute and regulation. Hansell
admitted that a profit had been made on the deal and
that it was unlawful for the PCA officers to do what
they had done, urged Huntsman not to go to the FBI,
and stated that he would comply with anything
Huntsman asked. Shortly thereafter a meeting was
held between Hansell, Huntsman and Boggess wherein
Boggess agreed to buy the farm for $662,000, which
was approximately Huntsman’s purchase _ price.
Boggess brought Huntsman an option agreement and a
$25,000 check drawn on the account of O. M. Young. On
March 25, 1975, the purchase of the farm was
completed with Boggess paying Huntsman and the
PCA $302,000, which was credited on Huntsman’s debt
to PCA. The balance of the repurchase was the
assumption of the existing mortgage indebtedness.

20

The Huntsman-Boggess closing took place in
Young's office with Chambers, Young, Boggess and
Huntsman and his attorney being present. It is
established that Griffin, Chambers and Hansell put up
the money for the Boggess purchase and induced
Boggess to give a false statement. to Government
investigators with respect to his involvement in the
purchase. The PCA loan was paid in full, and no money
was lost by PCA as a result of the Huntsman loan.
Additional facts to the extent necessary will be set out
in the course of the opinion.

We shall now consider the asserted errors in
the order hereinabove stated.

Defendants urge that the Assistant United
States Attorney engaged in improper conduct during
opening argument when he read portions of the signed
statement of each defendant to the jury upon the basis
that any conspiracy which might have existed was
terminated prior to the giving of the statements to the
Government investigator and that consequently the
statements were inadmissible to the extent that they
involved defendants other than the defendant making
the statement. At that point no motions had been made
to suppress the statements. The statements had been
furnished defendants as part of the discovery
procedure. No objection was made at the time the
statements were read nor was a motion for mistrial on

21

that ground made. Such failure precludes raising the
claimed error upon appeal. See United States v.
Lawson, 483 F.2d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1977).
Moreover, Griffin's attorney in opening statement
admitted nearly all of the facts referred to in Griffin's
statement concerning the purchase and sale of the
farm but denied criminal intent. The statement of each
defendant admitted the receipt of profits in the
substantial amounts shown in the Young
disbursements hereinabove.

Before defendants’ statements were admitted
in evidence all references to codefendants were
deleted, and the jury was advised that statements of
counsel did not constitute evidence. We are satisfied
that no prejudicial error was committed with respect
to the attorney’s opening statement. See United
States v. Powell, 564 F.2d 256, 259-60 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Killian, 524 F.2d 1268, 1273-75 (5th
Cir. 1975).

II.

The contention of defendants that the
allegations of Count II of the indictment as to Griffin
and Count III as to Chambers, charging violation of 18
U.S.C. §1006, are fatally defective lacks merit. Four
elements are required to be proved in order to
establish a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §1006. They are:
(1) that the defendant is an officer or employee of a
lending institution organized under the laws of the

22

United States; (2) that the defendant participated,
shared in or received, either directly or indirectly,
money, profit or benefit by and through any
transaction of such institution; (3) that the defendant
did such act or acts with intent to defraud the
association; and (4) that such act or acts were done
knowingly and wilfully. United States v. Hykel, 461
F.2d 721(3d Cir. 1972).

Counts II and III of the indictment tell the
appellants exactly what they were supposed to have
fraudulently received, and the exact transaction
involved, te, the disbursement of an Association
check in the amount of $386,600 payable to Harold and
Maudie Huntsman which purportedly represented the
proceeds of a Huntsman crop loan.

In United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 371
(8th Cir. 1976), we held:

An indictment must set forth in factual
terms the elements of the offense sought to be
charged. It must sufficiently apprise the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet,
and its generality must not endanger his
constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy. (Supporting citations omitted.)

The record in our present case clearly reflects
that the defendants were fully aware of the charges
against them and that their double jeopardy rights are
fully protected.

23
III.

Both Griffin and Chambers urge that the court
erred in denying their timely motions for acquittal on
Count V. This count alleges that the defendants
knowingly and wilfully violated 18 U.S.C. §§1014 and 2
in that they caused Huntsman to make a false
statement that the loan applied for was a crop loan
when in fact they knew that a major portion of the loan
was to be used to purchase the 2,880 acres, and that
they thereafter approved the loan, or that they aided
and abetted in such transaction. Our examination of
the record satisfies us that there is substantial
evidence to support the charge. Griffin was convicted
on Count V. Chambers was acquitted on Count V. The
case against Griffin, who was a member of the
committee that approved the loan, is stronger than
that against Chambers.

Chambers further contends that the refusal to
dismiss Couut V permitted the reception of evidence
that would have been excluded if the dismissal motion
had been granted.

We hold that the court committed no error in
submitting Count V to the jury.

IV.

The court committed no error in admitting buy-
back evidence relating to the 2,880 acres with respect

24

to Counts II and III. Admission of evidence is
committed to the broad discretion of the trial court and
the trial judge’s ruling should not be disturbed absent
a clear showing of abuse of discretion. United States v.
Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 1975). The
buy-back evidence was relevant and material on the
issue of knowledge and intent with respect to Counts
II and III. See Rules 401-402, Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court by proper instruction limited
consideration of the buy-back evidence to Counts II
and III. Accordingly, we need not reach the
Government's contention that the evidence was
admissible as to Count I.

V.

Defendants challenge the admission of evidence
concerning other similar transactions. Rule 404(b).
Federal Rules of Evidence, provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

This court in United States v. Maestas, 554
F.2d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 1977), held:

25

Our task is to assess the relevancy and the
probative value of the challenged evidence; if it
meets the requirements of Rule 404(b) we may
not reverse the ruling of the District Court
unless we also find that the prejudice from
admitting the evidence substantially out-
weighed its probative value. In making that
evaluation, we give great deference to the
district judge, who saw and heard the evidence.

The record reflects that the trial court held
three hearings on the admissibitity of the other
transactions evidence and was advised, as was defense
counsel, of the general facts surrounding each
transaction. The defense had several months to meet
the proposed evidence. The court limited the
prosecution to similar transactions which involved
land deals in which Griffin and Chambers were
involved, where loan proceeds were used in whole or in
part to buy land in which Griffin and Chambers had an
interest and where deception and concealment were
involved. Our examination of the record satisfies us
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the challenged evidence.

VI.

Boggess was a straw man used by the
defendants to re-purchase the 2,880 acres from
Huntsman. Boggess had refused to testify before the
grand jury on the basis of self-incrimination. He was
ultimately granted immunity by appropriate
proceedings. Defendants contend Boggess should not
be allowed to testify since he had attended several

26

meetings of defendants with their counsel. At such
time Boggess was represented by the same attorney
who represented Hansel] and he attended the
meetings at the attorney's request. The court, upon
the basis of substantial evidence at an in camera
evidentiary hearing, found Boggess was not a
Government informer or spy and that he did not
disclose any defense strategy to the Government. Both
Boggess and the Government specifically denied any
disclosure of defense strategy to the Government.

Defendants further complain that th. y did not
learn of the grant of immunity until the fifth day of the
trial and that such information should have been
disclosed earlier in order to enable defendants to
propose questions on voir dire as to whether they
would consider the granting of immunity in
determining the credibility of a witness. We find such
contention lacks merit. Defendants knew for a
considerable time that Boggess had been subpoenaed
by the Government as a witness. Defendants had an
opportunity to argue to the jury the bearing of the
immunity on Boggess’ credibility. Boggess’ testimony
was very damaging to the defendants. He stated that
he had had several conferences with Griffin, Chambers
and Hansell and that he was their friend. He said that
he acted as purchaser at defendants’ request and that
all the money for the repurchase was provided by the
defendants. We disagree with defendants’ contention
that Boggess’ testimony, which was admitted only
with respect to Counts II and III, had no relevancy to
such charges. We also disagree with the claim that the

27

relevancy is substantially outweighed by danger of
unfair prejudice.

VI.

Defendants at several stages filed motions for
disclosure of material favorable to the defense. The
claimed favorable material is contained in the PCA
minute book and reads as follows:

Gentlemen, Mr. McGuire explained that an FCA
investigation team had _ discovered that
violations of FCA rules and regulations
apparently have been committed and that the
employment of Charles Griffin and Bill Hansell
had been terminated. He was direct, emphatic
and explicit that criminal violations were not
involved.

Mr. McGuire was the president of the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Louis. The record
reflects that neither the Government nor its
investigators had possession or knowledge of such
minutes and that they were discovered when the
minute books were produced on the fifth day of the
trial. The minutes disclose information unfavorable to
the defendants in that Griffin had been discharged for
violation of association rules. The favorable portion of
the minutes was that McGuire expressed the bald
assertion that criminal violation was not involved. The
tender of the quoted minutes was denied upon the
ground that it constituted an inadmissible conclusion

28

of the witness. It is doubtful whether the expression of
an expert opinion on guilt or innocence can be given by
a witness. Such issue is appropriately determined by
the jury under appropriate instructions by the court.

In any event, the statement was made some
three months before the indictment. McGuire was not
shown to be in possession of all the facts nor was he
shown to be an expert qualified to pass on the criminal
guilt issue. The court committed no error in
determining that there was no Brady violation and did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the
tendered extract from the minutes. The trial continued
for nine days after the defendants’ knowledge of the
minutes and a four-day recess intervened. The court
properly denied a continuance as ample time remained
for the defendants to make any desired investigation
as to the subject matter of the minutes.

VII.

Chambers complains of the court's denial of a
severance. Chambers participated in the same
transactions as his co-defendants. Joinder was proper
under Rule 8b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In United States v. King and United States v. Lewis,
567 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1977), we held no abuse of
discretion arose from the denial of Lewis’ motion for
severance. We stated:

Even if joinder is proper under Rule 8,
Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 authorizes the trial court to

29

grant relief from joinder “{iJf it appears that a
defendant or the government is prejudiced by
[the] joinder ....” The court “may order...
separate trials of courts, grant a severance of
defendants or provide whatever other relief
justice requires.” See United States v. Sanders,
563 F.2d 379, at 382 (8th Cir. 1977). A district
court in determining whether to grant relief
under Rule 14 has wide discretion and the
court's ruling is rarely disturbed on review.

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in denying Chambers’ motion for severance.

IX.

Chambers contends the court's instructions on
intent to defraud the association are inadequate and
erroneous. Chambers also contends the court erred in
refusing to instruct on his theory of defense. We have
reviewed the court's instructions on intent to defraud
as a whole and find no prejudicial error was
committed. As stated in United States v. Hykel, 461,
F.2d 721, 724 (3d Cir. 1972), quoting with approval from
Beaudine v. United States, 368-F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1966):

[T}his part of 18 U.S.C. §1006: “is intended to do
much more than forbid unsophisticated
embezzlement, larceny or theft. And that part of
the statute with which we are concerned is a
typical conflict of interests prohibition. As such
it is a congressional recognition of the principle
so well grounded in morality and equity that the
servant cannot serve two masters and that
when this is done without complete disclosure,

30

the law considers that the master-principal's
interests either will, or are apt to, suffer.”

Chambers complains of that part of the
instructions which states that the evidence need not
show that the PCA suffered any financial loss and that
a showing that the accused acted with intent to
defraud is sufficient. The Government suffered no
financial loss as the loan was repaid. As stated in
Hykel, supra at 725:

The fact that Havertown and the United
States may have suffered no loss through the
transaction does not preclude a finding of intent
to defraud.

The court's instructions in the present case
clearly place the burden on the Government to show an
intent to defraud beyond a _ reasonable doubt.
Defendants had signed statements that they were
familiar with the applicable regulations relating to
conflict of interest. The evidence here clearly shows a
conflict of interest and supports a finding of intent to
defraud a Government agency’ by _ not
revealing the conflicting interests to the supervising
agencies. Defendant's contention that the court erred
in failing to submit his theory of the case lacks merit.
The tendered defense that Chambers is a licensed real
estate agent and that the $20,000 received on the sale
was a commission finds no support in the evidence. The
evidence reflects that the sale was negotiated by
Hansell and that Chambers had nothing to do with the
selling except to acquiesce in the sale and accept his
share of the profits.

31

The extensive record developed at a lengthy
trial and the numerous errors asserted make it
impractical to discuss all facts and issues in greater
detail. No useful purpose would be accomplished by
a more detailed discussion of the facts and issues. We
have fully considered all of defendants’ contentions
including those not discussed and are convinced that
the defendants had a fair trial, that substantial
evidence supports the jury verdicts, and that no
prejudicial error was committed by the trial court nor
did it abuse its discretion upon issues lying within its
discretion.

The convictions are affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

32

APPENDIX C.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

77-1597 September Term, 1977

United States of America, )
Appellee, )

vs. )

Charles Thomas Griffin, )
Appellant. )

77-1601 Appeals from the United States
District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas

United States of America, )
Appellee,

)
Joe Henry Chambers, )
Appellant. )

The Court having considered petitions for
rehearing en banc filed by counsel for appellants and,
being fully advised in the premises, it is ordered that
the petitions for rehearing en banc be, and they are
hereby, denied.

33

Considering the petitions for rehearing en banc
as petitions for rehearing, it is ordered that the
petitions for rehearing also be, and they are hereby,
denied.

July 28, 1978

34

APPENDIX D.

“I, Charles Griffin, make the following
statement freely and voluntarily to John J. Hickey
who has identified himself to me as an examiner, Farm
Credit Administration, knowing that it may be used in
evidence.

“Tam 47 years old and live at 517 Northwest 3rd
Street, Lonoke, Arkansas. I was employed by the
Lonoke Production Credit Association, PCA, in 1952
and became its president in 1958. I discussed
purchasing a 2,880 acre farm in Independence County,
Arkansas, and decided I would be interested. It was
agreed that I would share in the venture. This was an
oral agreement. Contact was made with a local
insurance company to borrow enough money to
purchase the property. In the meantime Mr. Harold
Huntsman, a PCA borrower, had become interested in
purchasing the farm and he agreed to buy it for an
acceptable price.

“The contract for the sale and purchase of real
estate was drawn up whereby Irving Brauer sold the
2,880 acres to O. M. Young, trustee. This contract
shows that it was entered into on July 24th, 1974, by
Irving Brauer and QO. M. Young, trustee. Mr. Young
acted as our attorney. I don’t know who negotiated the
contract with Mr. Brauer. I was not familiar with the
terms of this contract except that I knew the purchase
price was $470,000.00.

35

“A contract was drawn up on July 25, 1974,
whereby O. M. Young, acting as trustee for Mr.
Boggess as well as the rest of our group, sold the farm
to Harold Huntsman for $634,000.00. Here again I was
not familiar with the terms of this contract.

“Since we had a buyer for the property soon
after. it was purchased from Mr. Brauer, we did not
have to put up any money on the purchase from Mr.
Brauer. There were debts on the property which our
group assumed from Mr. Brauer. Accordingly, Mr.
Huntsman assumed the same debts on the sale of the
property to him. Examiner Hickey has shown me
where Mr. Huntsman made a cash payment of
$292,319.18 which was turned over to Mr. Young for
disbursement. I don’t recall the exact amount Mr.
Huntsman paid in cash, but that figure looks about
right. Mr. Haley can furnish a complete breakdown of
the $128,319.18. However, the disbursements to me are
correct and represent the percentage of the profit
previously agreed upon. Mr. Boggess was entitled to
his share, but said he did not need the funds right then
and was willing to wait for his share until a later date.

“At this point we had no cash invested in the
property above debt assumption and had received the
above distribution of profits on the sale of the farm to
Mr. Huntsman.

“T have never had any direct dealings with Mr.
Huntsman until last Friday when he came to the PCA
office to discuss a new loan he needed. Under our

36

operating procedures, the branch office manager
servicing a particular area serves as the direct contact
with borrowers.

“IT had no discussion with Mr. Huntsman
concerning the purchase of the 2,880 acres in July
1974. In early 1975 I learned that Mr. Huntsman was
not satisfied with the purchase of the farm. It was
agreed to buy the property back from Mr. Huntsman
for $327,000.00 cash and assume debts, giving him a
profit. I talked to Franklin Collier about the property
and he agreed to provide interim financing of
$187,000.00 for six months or less. This amount was
insufficient to buy the property back. I, therefore,
provided $70,000.00, Boggess provided $40,000.00. Our
checks and the money obtained from Mr. Collier were
turned over to Mr. Haley for handling and
disbursement. Mr. Haley then issued his escrow check
to Mr. Huntsman and the PCA for $302,000.00 which
was applied against his loan. Mr. Huntsman had
previously been paid $25,000.00 by Mr. Boggess on an
option agreement entered into when it was decided to
buy the farm back from Mr. Huntsman. Mr. Haley has
the exact receipt and distribution of the funds
involved. Mr. Collier's loan was for only a short term. I
put up additional collateral to secure Mr. Collier.

“The 2,880 acres of land was later sold to Dr.
James Weber in the fall of 1975. I am not sure how this
sale was handled or how the funds received from Dr.
Weber were disbursed. Mr. Haley can furnish this

37

information. As I recall, the farm was sold to Dr.
Weber for about $680,000.00. I have not received any
distribution of any funds from this sale. $120,000.00 in
additional funds borrowed from Travelers Insurance
Company were required to close the sale and hae
sufficient funds to pay Collier. In connection with this
sale, Mr. Weber and I entered into a written
agreement whereby if the farm sold for more than Dr.
Weber paid for it, the profits would be divided as
shown in a memorandum of agreement dated
October—no specific date—'75. At this point, Mr.
Boggess was out of the picture with respect to any
ownership although I still owe him his portion of the
profits.

“IT am familiar with the $513,800.00 crop loan to
Mr. Huntsman applied for on July 16, 1974, as a
member of the Executive Committee. I have no
knowledge of how Mr. Huntsman used the funds
disbursed on this loan and assume he used them for the
purpose stated on the application.

“To my knowledge, Mr. Huntsman was not
coerced into purchasing the 2,880 acre farm but I don't
believe he was aware that we had an equity interest in
the farm.

“The only other land transaction I was involved
in was about five years ago when I purchased a tract of
land in Yell County, Arkansas, from a party who was
not at that time a PCA borrower. I do not recall his
name. I later sold the property to a non-PCA member

38

who later became one of our borrowers. I found out
about this farm being available through James
McCann, a PCA member.

“The only discussions I recall having with
Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, FIBC, personnel
concerning Mr. Huntsman pertained to his loans with
PCA. There was never any discussion concerning the
2,880 acre farm in Independence County or whether
any PCA personnel were involved in that property.

“I don’t know where Mr. Huntsman obtained
the funds to purchase the 2,880 acre farm and do not
feel I violated any rules or regulations by having
financial dealings with PCA members.

“I have read this statement consisting of four
typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have
been given the opportunity to make any corrections
and have signed or initialed each page.”

It contains the signature of Charles Griffin,
dated 7/23/76 with a handwritten addendum by Mr.
Griffin.

“To my knowledge, I received no down payment
on the property sold to Dr. Weber and no PCA funds
were involved.”

>

39

APPENDIX D-2

“I, Bill Hansell, make the following statement
freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman and John J.
Hickey who have identified themselves to me as
examiners, Farm Credit Administration, knowing that
it may be used in evidence.

“IT am 39 years old and reside at 303 Southeast
9th Street, England, Arkansas. I was employed by the
Lonoke Production Credit Association—PCA_ in
brackets—as fieldman in June 1973 and later became
branch office manager stationed in the Lonoke office.

“Jimmie Boggess, a PCA borrower, told me he
knew of a farm that could be purchased in
Independence County, Arkansas, and wanted to know
if I was interested in going in on the deal with him. Mr.
Boggess did not say who he was buying the farm from
and I didn't know who the seller was until quite some
time later. I don’t recall how I learned who the seller
was. I have known Mr. Boggess for a long time and
respect his judgment, so when he recommends
something like this I go along with him.

“Tam not familiar with the contract for sale and
purchase of real estate dated July 24, 1974, in which
Irving Brauer sold 2,880 acres of land in Independence
County to O. M. Young, trustee. I assume Mr. Young
was acting as trustee for Mr. Boggess. I never
discussed this with Mr. Boggess.

40

“This was the land that the four of us entered
into as a joint venture. Mr. Boggess interested Mr.
Huntsman in the purchase of the property and the two
of them agreed on a price. I had no contact whatsoever
with Mr. Huntsman to purchase the 2,880 acres that
Mr. Boggess had acquired. The only knowledge I had of
the contract between O. M. Young, trustee, as seller,
and Harold V. Huntsman, as buyer, was that I
notarized the form. This contract is dated either July
24th or July 25, 1974.

“All I knew about the selling price to Mr.
Huntsman was from information shown on the
contract. Mr. Young was acting as trustee for Mr.
Boggess on the sale to Mr. Huntsman and he, Mr.
Young, handled the receipt and disbursement of funds.
Mr. Huntsman was never told that I had an equity in
the property that he purchased. As far as Mr.
Huntsman was concerned Mr. Boggess was in the deal
alone.

“I took Mr. Huntsman’s loan application dated
July 16, 1974 and the entries made thereon are in my
handwriting. This application is for $513,800.00 for a
crop loan. I disbursed two checks to Mr. Huntsman on
July 24, 1974. One was for $121,433.33 issued jointly to
Mr. Huntsman and the Bank of McCrory. The other
check was issued to Harold and Maudie Huntsman for
$386,600.00. I handed the checks to Mr. Huntsman and
do not know how the proceeds were used. Approval of
this loan was subject to assignment of the contract on
the 2,880 acres. Such an assignment was subsequently

41

received from Mr. Huntsman. Although an assignment
was obtained, I don’t recal] getting it. I have never
heard of no trouble in getting the assignment.

“I have been in the First National Bank, Little
Rock, a couple of times with Mr. Huntsman, but do not
recall the circumstances. I have no recollection of
accompanying Mr. Huntsman to the First National
Bank so he could obtain a cashier's check from his loan
proceeds so he could make a payment on the 2,880
acres he had acquired. I don’t know what funds Mr.
Huntsman used to purchase the property.

“Because Mr. Boggess had found a buyer so
soon, I had no money invested in it. I did receive a
check for $71,000.00 on July 26, 1974, which
represented my share of the profits on the sale of the
farm to Mr. Huntsman. I don't know how the other
shares were divided. My check came from Mr. Young.
Frankly, I was surprised to receive so much.

“In the winter of 1974 or early spring 1975, Mr.
Huntsman called me and said he had a buyer for the
farm in Independence County who was willing to pay
about $800,000.00 and wanted to know if the PCA
would finance the buyer. Mr. Huntsman offered to co-
sign the note along with the buyer if a loan was made. I
told Mr. Huntsman that there was no way the PCA
could make the loan because his endorsement of the
note would jeopardize his line of credit. Mr.
Huntsman was angry. The reported buyer, whose
name I do not recall, then called me and asked about

—s

42

financing. I told him that the farm was out of our
territory, but he could bring his papers over to the
office and I would discuss the loan with the executive
committee. The man never showed up and did not
make application for a loan with the PCA.

“After this incident, or about the spring of 1975,
Mr. Huntsman called me and told me to get in touch
with that boy in Coy, Arkansas—who was Mr.
Boggess —to see if he would buy the 2,880 acre farm
back. Mr. Huntsman told me all he wanted was his
money back, but that I should not tell Mr. Boggess
that. I called Mr. Boggess and told him that Mr.
Huntsman wanted to sell it back but did not state what
Mr. Huntsman wanted. I had no other contact with Mr.
Huntsman concerning the sale of the farm until a
meeting was set up in a restaurant in Beebe, Arkansas.
I don’t recall the date of this meeting, but it was in the
spring of 1975.

“Present at the restaurant besides myself were:
Messrs. Boggess and Huntsman, Mrs. Huntsman and
their son, and another party whom I do not know. At
this meeting Boggess and Huntsman’ excused
themselves and went out to the car. I believe Mr.
Huntsman’s son also went to the car. I joined them
p briefly i in their discussions in the car. Messrs. Boggess
and Huntsman entered into an option agreement for
Mr. Boggess to repurchase the farm. Mr. Boggess later
paid Mr. Huntsman $25,000.00 in connection with the
option. Mr. Huntsman still wanted to sell the farm
because he needed the money.

43

“I told Mr. Boggess a few days after the
meeting that we had done wrong in dealing with a PCA
member and we had better buy the farm back and give
Mr. Huntsman a profit. As far as I know, Mr. Boggess
borrowed the necessary funds to repurchase the farm
from Franklin Collier, but I do not know what
arrangements were made with Mr. Collier or how
much was borrowed from him.

“Mr. Huntsman was given a _ check for
$302,000.00 through John Haley, an attorney, who was
handling the paper work for Mr. Boggess. Mr.
Huntsman brought the check to the PCA and wanted
me to release the funds to him. The check had been
issued jointly to Mr. Huntsman and the PCA. I told Mr.
Huntsman I could not release the funds because the
PCA had a mortgage on the place. The proceeds were
applied on Mr. Huntsman’s loan.

“After the property was purchased from Mr.
Huntsman, I backed out of the joint venture and was
no longer involved. I understood the property was
subsequently sold by Mr. Boggess to Dr. James
Weber. Although I had not returned any of the
$71,000.00 I had received on the sale of the property to
Mr. Huntsman, I considered that I had returned it
because I did not share in any further profits from the
sale of the land te Dr. Weber. I know that it was wrong
in having financial dealings with borrowers and have
learned a valuable lesson. I would not want to disgrace
the PCA.

44

“T have read this statement consisting of four
typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have
been given the opportunity to make any additions or
corrections and have signed and initialed each page.

“Signed: Bill Hansell, July 22, 1976.”
APPENDIX D-3

“I, Henry Chambers, make the following
statement freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman and
John J. Hickey who have identified themselves to me
as examiners, Farm Credit Administration, knowing
that it may be used in evidence.

“Tam 39 years old, married, and live on Route 3,
Box 33, Carlisle, Arkansas 72024. I was employed in
June 1961 by the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank,
FICB, St. Louis, Missouri, as a fieldman under an
apprenticeship program and served in four production
credit associations, PCA, before being assigned
permanently to the Lonoke PCA. I was a credit man at
the PCA and my title was later changed from assistant
secretary-treasurer to vice president in charge of
credit. My employment with the PCA was recently
terminated. I farm approximately 1,000 acres of land.

| “I became involved in the purchase of a 2,880
acre farm in Independence County, Arkansas, in 1974.
It was my understanding that Jimmie Boggess had
found some land for sale and asked if I wanted to go in

45

with him on the purchase. In my opinion the land was a
bargain as far as land values go. About 60 to 70 days
elapsed between the time the land was available and
the date we purchased it. The land was purchased on a
contract for sale and purchase of real estate dated July
24, 1974, with Irv ine | rauer the seller and O. M. Young
acting as truste. . the buyer. Mr. Brauer does not
have a PCA loan and I did not know him personally.
My interest in the property at the time it was
purchased from Mr. Brauer was about twelve and-a-
half percent.

“The 2,880 acres was purchased from Mr.
Brauer for $470,000.00 and we were to assume the
outstanding debts on the property of $341,680.82. This
left about $129,000.00 that had to be paid to Mr.
Brauer. We did not have to come up with any money at
the time because somebody found a buyer for the farm
in Mr. Huntsman. The property was sold to Mr.
Huntsman for $634,000.00 on a contract for sale and
purchase of real estate dated July 25, 1974. Mr. Young
acted as trustee for our group on the sale of the
property to Mr. Huntsman. I am sure Mr. Huntsman
did not know that PCA employees had an interest in
the property he purchased. Mr. Huntsman assumed
the same debts that were on the property we had
assumed from Mr. Brauer. The proceeds collected from
Mr. Huntsman were used to pay the balance due Mr.
Brauer and I received $20,000.00 for my approximately
twelve and-a-half percent interest. I did not see a
c! sing statement and do not know how much each of
the others received.

46

“Later on Mr. Huntsman became displeased
with his purchase and called and expressed his
displeasure, and it was decided that Mr. Boggess
should offer to repurchase the 2,880 acres from Mr.
Huntsman. This was done at the agreed price of
$662,000.00 with our group to again assume the
outstanding debts on the property at the time of
repurchase. I don’t recall the exact amount our group
had to put up to repurchase the property, but it was
around $327,000.00. It was my understanding that Mr.
Boggess initially entered into an option agreement
with Mr. Huntsman whereby Mr. Boggess paid Mr.
Huntsman $25,000.00 for the option. I saw a copy of the
option agreement. In order to repurchase the
property, I put up $30,000.00 which I borrowed from
the Citizens Bank of Carlisle and the balance from the
funds I had on hand. These checks were turned over to
Mr. Haley for distribution from his escrow account.
Mr. Haley paid the interest due on the debts we had
assumed and issued a check jointly to Mr. Huntsman
and the PCA for $302,000.00.

“Mr. Huntsman had obtained a crop loan from
the PCA in July of 1974 and had obtained other
advances and had assigned his purchase contract as
partial security. He had nothing to do—I had nothing
to do with this loan and do not know how Mr.
Huntsman used the funds. When we repurchased the
property from Mr. Huntsman in March of 1975, Mr.
Haley called and asked me to bring PCA'S RELEASE
OF ASSIGNMENT TO HIS OFFICE. I then took the
release to Mr. Young's office. I don’t remember if I

47

picked up the check for $302,000.00, but it was applied
to his PCA loan. To my knowledge I visited with Mr.
Huntsman only twice. One time I inspected his farm on
one of his loans and the other time was when I saw him
at the closing in Mr. Young’s office. I had no discussion
with Mr. Huntsman on the purchase or sale of the 2,880
acres.

“Dr. James Weber is active in farming and is
always looking for farm land as an investment. He was
interested in purchasing the 2,880 acres from us. Dr.
Weber agreed to pay about $700,000.00 for land, less
closing costs. Dr. Weber was also to assume the
remaining debts on the property. At the time
negotiations were being made to sell the farm to Dr.
Weber, I visited with him. We had an oral agreement
at this time that should Dr. Weber sell the property at
more than his purchase price, he, Dr. Weber, would get
one-third of the profits, I would get one-third of the
remaining two-thirds of the profits. Should the farm
sell at a loss, we would share the loss in like
proportions. However, in my opinion the property is
worth about a million dollars and that someday Dr.
Weber will be able to sell the property at this figure.
No one in the area can afford to pay that much for the
farm, but outside investors are always looking for farm
land to buy. I have no doubt that we will make a nice
profit on the subsequent sale of this property.

“There were no profits distributed on the sale
of the property to Dr. Weber. Additional interest had
accrued on debts on the property which had to be paid

48

and Mr. Collier was repaid for his loan. I borrowed
$40,000.00 from the Travelers Life Insurance Company
at the time Dr. Weber purchased the property. This
money was paid into Mr. Haley’s escrow account as a
further investment.

“I have read this statement consisting of three
typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have
been given the opportunity to make any additions or
corrections and have signed or initialed each page.”

49

APPENDIX E

I, Jimmie H. Boggess, make the following
statement freely and voluntarily to R. H. Whitman,
who has identified himself to me as an Examiner, Farm
Credit Administration, knowing that it may be used in
evidence.

- I live in England, Arkansas, and raise cotton,
soybeans, and rice. I have been a member of the
Lonoke Production Credit Association, Lonoke,
Arkansas (PCA) for many years.

In 1974 I learned that a Mr. Irvin Brauer was
asking $470,000 for a 2880 acre farm located in
Independence County, Arkansas. Although I had not
been on the farm, I thought from its location it was
worth a great deal more that he was asking. I knew
that Mr. Harold V. Huntsman of Bald Knob, Arkansas,
was always looking for land to purchase, so I called
him. I told him I knew of a farm in Independence
County that could be purchased for $650,000 and asked
him if he was interested. After looking at it, he called
me back and said he thought it was worth no more than
$634,000. After talking it over, we agreed on a price of
$634,000. I then had my attorney, Mr. O. M. Young
draw up a trust agreement whereby I authorized him
to act for me as trustee in connection with the
purchase of the farm from Brauer for $470,000, and the
sale the following day to Mr. Huntsman for $634,000
for a net profit before expenses of $164,000. I did not
have to pay down any money in connection with the

50

purchase because I was reselling it at a profit. To the
best of knowledge I did not give or receive a warranty
deed to the property. Both transactions were handled
by sales contracts. I do not remember how much
money I received from Mr. Young, the escrow agent,
but his records would show the disposition of the
funds, and I would have to ask him about it.

In 1975 I learned that Mr. Huntsman was not
satisfied with the farm. I do not remember if he called
me and told me or if I learned from Bill Hansell of. the
PCA. Anyway, Mr. Hansell and I drove to Beebe,
Arkansas, one evening, and met Mr. and Mrs.
Huntsman at a restaurant. After talking about the
matter, I told Mr. Huntsman that I would repurchase
the 2880 acres for $662,000, if he would give me a
$25,000 purchase option. I then drew up a handwritten
option to this effect, and gave him a $25,000 check
drawn payable to Harold V. Huntsman by Mr. O. M.
Young, my attorney. I felt the farm was worth much
more than I was paying for it, and would be able to
again sell it at a profit. I called it my “million dollar
farm”.

In connection with the repurchase of the farm
from Huntsman, I borrowed $302,000 from Mr.
Franklin Collier, of Augusta, Arkansas. I believe he
took a second mortgage on the place to secure the
debt. I later on sold the place in the fall of 1975 to Dr.
James R. Weber, M.D. of Jacksonville, Ar. for
$700,000. Attorney John Haley handled the details of
the sale to Weber, and I do not know how he financed
it.

51

No PCA employees’ were involved in
connection with the above transactions, and had no
interest in the property.

I never offered to lend Mr. Huntsman any
money on his 17,000 acre farm for 90 days in return for
a deed to his property. I am not in the lending business.
I have to borrow money to run my farming business. I
applied for a $200,000 PCA loan on February 26, 1975,
to purchase a farm in Lonoke County, Arkansas, that
Roy and Orlan Roper were farming. However, they
later exercised their option to purchase the property,
and I did not get the PCA loan.

I have read this statement consisting of two
typewritten pages and it is true and correct. I have
been given the opportunity to make and additions or
corrections and have initialed or signed each page.

Witness: /s/ Jimmie H. Boggess
/s/ RR. H. Whitman, Examiner Box 9
Farm Credit Administration Coy, Arkansas 72051
St. Louis, Mo. 63141

52

APPENDIX F
(Opening Statements)
(T. 23-30)

Hansell then called the investigators later on
that day and told them he couldn't make it, but an
appointment was set up for July 21, 1976. Thereafter,
Hansell signed a statement which stated, among other
things, these things: Hansell stated that he, Boggess
and Griffin and Chambers decided to take shares in the
purchase of this farm in Independence County,
Arkansas; that Boggess, Griffin and Hansell were to
take about 29 percent interest and that Chambers was
to take about a four percent interest, and that these
percentages were based upon the risk they were going
to take. They had some risks involved, and these
percentages were based upon the risks.

He was not familiar with the contract of sale
between Brauer and Young and he
assumed — assumed — that Young was acting as trustee
for Boggess. He then stated that Boggess interested
Huntsman in the purchase of the property and the two
of them—that is, Boggess and Huntsman—agreed
upon a price. He stated that he had no contact
whatsoever with Mr. Huntsman to purchase this land
and that the only knowledge that he had on the
contract between O. M. Young and Harold Huntsman
was that he had notarized that contract.

a

53

He also stated that Huntsman was never told
that he, Griffin, and Chambers had an equity in the
property that Huntsman purchased. Hansell stated
that he took care of Huntsman’s loan applications and
disbursed the checks which made up the $513,800.00.

Hansell stated he did not know how the
proceeds were used. Hansell stated he had no
recollection of accompanying Huntsman to the First
National Bank so he could obtain a cashier’s check from
the Huntsman PCA loan proceeds in order to make the
down payment on the property.

Hansell added again that he did not know what
funds Huntsman used to purchase the property.
Hansell stated that because Boggess found a buyer for
the property so soon, that he, Hansell, had no money
invested in the land whatsoever but that he did receive
a check for $71,000.00, which represented his share of
the profits on the sale of the farm to Huntsman.

Hansell stated he did not know how the other
shares were divided. Hansell further stated that in the
spring of 1975 Huntsman called and told him to get in
touch with Boggess to see if Boggess would buy back
the land. Hansell stated that Huntsman told him all he
wanted was his money back. Hansell called Boggess,
told him that Huntsman wanted to sell the farm back
to him but did not state what Huntsman wanted for the
farm. Hansell then stated he had no other contact with
Huntsman concerning the sale of the farm until a
meeting was set up between Huntsman and Boggess.

54

It was during this meeting that Huntsman and
Boggess entered into the option agreement. Hansell
stated later that Boggess paid Huntsman $25,000.00 in
connection with this option. Thereafter Hansell told
Boggess that, “We had done wrong in dealing with a
PCA member and that we had better buy the farm
back and give Mr. Huntsman a profit.”

Hansell stated that as far as he knew, Boggess
borrowed the funds to repurchase the farm from
Huntsman. After the property was purchased back
from Huntsman, Hansell stated that he backed out of
the venture and was no longer involved.

Finally, Hansell ended his statement by saying
he knew it was wrong to have financial dealings with
PCA borrowers and that he had learned a valuable
lesson.

After being advised of his constitutional rights,
Chambers stated in his statement, which was signed
on July 23, 1974 (sic.) among other things these things:
that he became involved in the purchase of the
Independence County farm when Griffin and
Hansell invited him to join in the purchase.
It was his understanding in talking to Griffin and
Hansell that Boggess had found some land for sale and
asked if they wanted to go in with him, Boggess, on the
purchase.

The land was purchased on a contract of sale
dated July 24, 1974, with Irving Brauer selling and O.

55

M. Young acting as trustee for all of the buyers. His
interest in the profit at that time it was purchased
from Brauer was about 12 and a half percent. The
other three buyers held equal shares.

They had only an oral agreement with regard to
the sharing of the profit, and his interest was less than
the others because, and I quote, “He could not stand a:
greater financial exposure at the time.”

He said further they didn't have to put any
money into the property because somebody found a
buyer in Harold Huntsman. The property was then
sold to Huntsman for $634,000.00 on July 25, 1974.

He again stated that Huntsman (sic.) acted as
trustee for all of them on the sale of the property to
Huntsman. Proceeds, he stated, were collected for
Huntsman and used to pay the balance to Mr. Brauer,
and he received $20,000.00 for his approximate 12 and
a half percent interest. He didn't know, he stated, what
the other people received.

Chambers then stated Huntsman became
displeased with his purchase and called one of the
three individuals to express his displeasure. The group
decided Huntsman —excuse me, Boggess should offer
to repurchase the 2,880 acres of land from Huntsman.

He stated that the repurchase’ was
accomplished and the group had to put approximately
$337,000.00 and assume the outstanding debts on the

56

property. Chambers stated it was his understanding
that Boggess initially entered into an _ option
agreement for the $25,000.00.

Chambers also stated that he put up $30,000.00
for the repurchase and Griffin put up $70,000.00.
Chambers also stated that Griffin and Boggess made
arrangements with a man by the name of Franklin
Collier to borrow the balance making up _ the
repurchase of $187,000.00. Chambers states further
that Huntsman obtained a crop loan from the PCA in
July of '74 and he didn’t know how Huntsman used the
funds.

Chambers had no discussions with Huntsman
regarding the purchase or the sale of the 2,880 acres.
After the purchase by the group, the land was
transferred to Dr. James Weber at a price of
$700,000.00 and at the time of the negotiations he and
Griffin and Weber entered into an agreement whereby
Chambers—the defendant Chambers and_ the
defendant Griffin would receive one-third of the profit
if the farm was sold for an amount exceeding what Dr.
Weber paid for it and would also share in one-third of
the losses if the property was sold for an amount less
than what Dr. Weber paid for it.

Now with regard to the defendant Charles
Griffin. he gave a signed statement and also gave oral
information to the investigators, and that signed
statement is dated July 23, 1976. His statement

a

57

reflects, among other things, that he, Chambers,

Hansell, and Boggess discussed purchasing a farm in
Independence County and that it was agreed that
Boggess, Hansell and Griffin would share the venture
and that Chambers would have about a 15 percent
interest. This was all done orally; nothing in writing.

While they were attempting to borrow enough
money to purchase the property, Mr. Harold
Huntsman became interested in purchasing the farm
and agreed to purchase it for a “acceptable price”. The
contract of sale was drawn up whereby Brauer sold the
farm to Young as trustee on July 24, 1974, and Young
was acting as their attorney.

Griffin stated that he did not know who
negotiated the contract with Irving Brauer.
Thereafter, Griffin stated that a contract was drawn
up on July 25, '74, whereby Young, acting as trustee
for he, Boggess, Chambers and Hansell, sold the farm
to Harold Huntsman for $634,000.00.

Griffin stated he was not familiar with the
terms of the contract. Griffin stated that the
disbursements from Young's account were correct and
represented the percentage of profits they had
previously agreed upon.

Griffin further stated that Boggess was entitled
to his share — was entitled to his share, but that he did
not need the funds right then and was willing to wait
for his share until a later date.

58

Griffin further stated that he talked to Franklin
Collier about a $187,000.00 ioan and believed that
Boggess and Chambers obtained the loan from Collier.
In addition, Griffin provided $70,000.00. he stated
Boggess provided $40,000.00, and the balance of
$30,000.00 came from Chambers to repurchase this
farm.

Griffin stated further that Boggess paid
Huntsman $25,000.00 for an option agreement entered
into when it was decided to buy the farm back from
Huntsman, and then he stated later that the land was
later sold to Weber and the same agreement was in
effect when Mr. Chambers stated in effect about the
sharing of profits and the sharing of losses.

Griffin then stated he had no knowledge of how
Huntsman used the funds disbursed on the loan and
assumed he used them for the purpose stated on the
application. |

He then added this—which was in a signed
statement that he prepared. You will hear testimony
that he prepared the statement. —that the only other
land transaction that he was involved in was about five
years before the time of the interview when he
purchased a tract of land in Yell County from a party
who was not a PCA borrower. Griffin stated that he
found out about the Yell County farm from James
McCann who was a PCA member.

i. St ae

_ ai Rene ee ee

ns i a ie Re Dt

—_——o
SE Ee a Sa

—

59

Finally, Griffin stated that he did not know
where Huntsman obtained the funds to purchase the
Independence County farm and did not feel he violated
any rules or regulations by having financial dealings
with PCA members.

60
APPENDIX G

MINUTES OF THE LONOKE PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION DATED JULY 26, 1976
(DEFENDANTS’ EXHIBIT aa)

“Gentlemen, Mr. McGuire explained that an
FCA investigation team had discovered that violations
of FCA rules and regulations apparently have been
committed and that the employment of Charles Griffin
and Bill Hansell had been terminated. He was direct,
emphatic and explicit that criminal violations were not
involved.” (Vvi, T. 127)

61

APPENDIX H

UNITED STATES v. BELL No. 1894
(8th Cir. April 19, 1978)
Submitted: February 13, 1978
Filed: April 19, 1978

Before MATTHES, Senior Circuit Judge, LAY,
Circuit Judge, and HANSON, * District Judge.

MATTHES, Senior Circuit Judge.

Michael Bell, appellant, and Mario Burkhalter,
apparently a friend or at least an acquaintance of
appellant, were jointly indicted for transferring two
sawed-off shotguns without paying the transfer tax
required by 26 U.S.C. §5811,' in violation of 26 U.S.C.

*The Honorable William C. Hanson, Senior District Judge for the
Southern District of lowa, sitting by designation.

3.
27 U.S.C. §5811 provides in pertinent part:

There shall be levied, collected, and paid on firearms
transferred a tax at the rate of $200 for each firearm
transferred ... . The tax imposed .. . shall be paid by the
transferor.

62

§5861° and 18 U.S.C. §2.° Bell was tried alone, found

guilty by a jury, and committed to custody under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §5010(b),
until discharged by the United States Parole
Commission, as provided by 18 U.S.C. §5017(c). On
appeal, Bell contends that the district court erred in
declining to propound requested voir dire questions;
admitting certain testimony; commenting on the
evidence; and omitting requested instructions. We
affirm.

A brief resume of the background facts will
serve to place the contentions of appellant in proper
perspective. On February 22, 1977, two federal
undercover agents were taken by Mario Burkhalter to
appellant's apartment for the purpose of purchasing
illegal firearms. Appellant testified that before the
agents and Burkhalter arrived, Burkhalter had the

2
26 U.S.C. §5861 provides in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for any person —

(e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of
this chapter... .

3.
18 U.S.C. §2(a) provides:

Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal.

63

same day “dropped the rifles off in a multi-colored
blanket all wrapped,” and that appellant “threw” them
into his closet. However, appellant informed the
agents that he did not have the guns there, but that
they would probably “be here later on tonight.” He
also testified that he had “sort of whispered” in
Burkhalter’s ear to come back alone.

Later that evening, Burkhalter, accompanied
by the agents, returned to appellant's apartment.
According to the agents, appellant removed two
sawed-off shotguns from a closet and displayed them
on a bed. After satisfying themselves that the guns
were in working order, the agents paid appellant a
total of $110 for them. Appellant denied receiving any
money from the agents. Burkhalter was paid $40 as a
“finder’s fee” by the agents.

Appellant attempted to persuade the jury by
his testimony to find, in effect, that Burkhalter induced
him to participate in the sale of the guns as a
precondition to Burkhalter’s payment of a debt of $45
owed to appellant. Thus, it is apparent that because of
the differing versions of what transpired, the jury, of
necessity, was required to pass upon the credibility of
the testimony of the agents vis-a-vis the credibility of
appellant as delineated in his testimony.

It is undisputed that appellant did not pay a
transfer tax on the weapons. he claimed that he had no
knowledge about the $200 transfer tax, and that he
was willing to pay the tax “at the present time.”

64
I

Appellant is a black man. The jury before which
he was tried was white. On voir dire, the district court
asked the prospective jurors the following questions:

Do any of you have any prejudices about giving
a fair trial to a person of a minority race?

Have any of you had any untold experiences
with black people, any experiences that would
be unusual of any kind that might shade your
thinking in a situation of this kind?

Do any of you think that you might give more
credibility to the testimony of a witness who
was white than toa witness who was black?

Appellant requested that the voir dire include
nineteen additional questions, all but one of which
concerned race. The district court denied appellant's
request. Appellant contends that the district court's
refusal to ask the requested voir dire questions was
reversible error. We disagree.

Voir dire questions concerning race are not
constitutionally required unless the circumstances in
the case “suggest a significant likelihood that racial
prejudice might infect [the defendant's] trial.” Ristaino
v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976). Ristaino involved the
trial of a black man for violent crimes against a white
security guard. Because race was not an issue at trial,
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to

c

~< oT» Ge Sate ae e

65

voir dire potential jury members concerning their
racial attitudes.

In the present case, as in Ristaino, the issue of
race was not “inextricably bound up with the conduct
of the trial.” Jd. at 597. Consequently, the district court
was under no constitutional obligation to probe
prospective jurors for signs of racism.

Of course, a federal court does have a non-
constitutional duty to inquire as to possible racial bias
on the jury panel when the defendant is a member of a
racial minority group. Aldridge v. United States, 283
U.S. 308 (1931); United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941,
944 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied 415 U.S. 923 (1974). That
duty was fulfilled in the case at bar, however. The
questions concerning race which the district court
propounded demonstrated a proper exercise of
discretion. See United States v. Hamling, 418 U.S. 87,
140 (1974); United States v. Thompson, 490 F.2d 1218,
1222 (8th Cir. 1974).

II

A. Coconspirator’s Statements.

At trial, the undercover agents, over
appellant’s objection, related the substance of
telephone conversations with Mario Burkhalter during
which the sale of the shotguns was arranged.
Appellant contends that the agents’ testimony was
hearsay and therefore improperly admitted. The

66

government urges that the statements were
admissible as declarations of a coconspirator under
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (EF).

It is well-established that an out-of-court
declaration of a coconspirator is admissible against a
defendant if the government demonstrates (1) that a
conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and the
declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) that
the declaration was made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Lambros, 564 F.2d 26, 30 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086, 1088 (8th Cir. 1972);
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E). The new Federal Rules of
Evidence have caused subtle but significant changes in
the way that rule is applied, however. See United
States v. Petroziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1977).
In particular, the admissibility of an alleged
coconspirator’s statement is now a_ preliminary
question for the judge, not the jury, to decide. FED. R.
EVID. 104; United States v. Petroziello, supra; but

4.
FED. R. EVID. 104 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of sub-
division (b), In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy
of evidence depends on the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition,

‘ Rimi nat el at

67

see Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of
Fact in Conspiracy Litigation: Putting the Conspiracy
Back Into the Coconspirator Rule, 5 Hofstra Law
Review 77 (1976). This shift in the relative functions of
the judge and jury has occasioned a reevaluation of the
level and type of proof necessary to demonstrate a
defendant's involvement in a conspiracy sufficiently to
admit a coconspirator’s statement. See 1
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 4104 [05] at 104-39-44
(1977); Bergman, The Coconspirator’s Exception:
Defining the Standard of the Independent Evidence
Test Under the New Rules of Evidence, 5 Hofstra Law
Review 99 (1976).

Previous cases in this circuit required that the
conspiracy be proved by “substantial independent
evidence... .” United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109,
1117 (8th Cir. 1977); See United States v. Frol, supra at
1136. Other decisions spoke in terms of a “prima facie
case of conspiracy... .” United States v. Anthony, 565
F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lambros,
supra at 30 n. 4. These formulations were appropriate
“when the jury ha{d] the last word... .” United States
v. Petroziello, supra at 23. But because the district
court’s determination of the admissibility of a
coconspirator’s statement is final under FED. R.EVID.
104, we have concluded that a different standard of
proof is now required. See id. at 22-23; see generally
United States v. Lambros, supra. It is not necessary,
however, that a defendant's complicity ina conspiracy
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt for a statement

68

to be admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (E).
United States v. Petroziello, supra at 23. The ordinary
civil standard of preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient since the district court is ruling on
admissibility rather than ultimate guilt. /d.

It has been suggested that the new Federal
Rules of Evidence have altered the requirement that
the admissibility of a coconspirator's statement be
determined on evidence exclusive of the statement
itself. See, e.g., United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1,
11-12 (1st Cir.), rehearing denied, 561 F.2d 406, 408-09
(1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. March 21,
1978) (No. 77-603); Bergman, supra at 105. We believe
that the requirement of independent evidence is an
important safeguard, however, and therefore adhere
to our traditional rule. See Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942); United States v. Lambros,
supra. Accordingly, we hold that an out-of-court
statement is not hearsay and is admissible if on the
independent evidence the district court is satisfied
that it is more likely than not that the statement was
made during the course and in furtherance of an illegal
association to which the declarant and the defendant
were parties.

For the purpose of providing guidance to the
district courts in future trials, we submit that the
following procedural steps should be utilized when the
admissibility of a coconspirator's statement is at issue,
regardless of the nature of the charge or charges:

69

(1) If the prosecutor propounds a question which
obvious!y requires a witness to recount an out-of-court
declaration of an alleged coconspirator, the court, upon
a timely and appropriate objection by the defendant,
may conditionally admit the statement. At the same
time, the court should, on the record, caution the
parties (a) that the statement is being admitted subject
to defendant's objection; (b) that the government will
be required to prove by a preponderance of the
independent evidence that the statement was made by
a coconspirator during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy; (c) that at the conclusion of all the
evidence the court will make an explicit determination
for the record regarding the admissibility of the
statement; and (d) that if the court determines that the
government has failed to carry the burden delineated
in (b) above, the court will, upon appropriate motion,
declare a mistrial, unless a cautionary instruction to
the jury to disregard the statement would suffice to
cure any prejudice. See United States v. Stanchich,
550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977). The foregoing
procedural steps should transpire out of the hearing of
the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 104(e),

(2) After a ruling on the record that the out-of.
court declaration is admissible under Rule
801(d) (2) (E), the court may submit the case to the jury.
The court should not charge the jury on the
admissibility of the coconspirator’s statement, but
should, of course, instruct that the government is
required to prove the ultimate guilt of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. An appropriate instruction

70

on credibility should be given, and the jury should be
cautioned with regard to the weight and credibility to
be accorded a coconspirator’s statement.

In the present case, appellant complains that
the district court never made _ the _ requisite
determination on the record that Burkhalter's
statements were admissible under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E). An explicit, on-the-record finding of
admissibility has never previously been required in
this circuit, however. See United States v. Kelley, 526
F.2d 615, 619 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S,
914 (1976). Moreover, appellant failed to request the
finding he now contends was necessary. Given the
dearth of appellate guidance on point, the absence of a
formal finding of admissibility was not plain error. See
United States v. Martorano, supra, 557 F.2d at 11;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). There was compelling
independent evidence that appellant and Burkhalter
conspired to sell firearms without payment of the
required transfer tax. The agents testified that
Burkhalter, for a fee, introduced them to appellant and
arranged for appellant to sell them the shotguns, They
further testified that both appellant and Burkhalter
were present when the purchase price and a portion of
the “finder's fee" were paid. In addition, the
statements admitted against appellant were clearly
made during the course and in furtherance of the

71

conspiracy.” In short, the government unquestionably
met its burden of demonstrating the admissibility of
Burkhalter’s statements. Consequently, the lack of an
on-the-record determination of admissibility did not
affect any substantial rights of appellant. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(b).

B. Testimony on the Purpose of the Gun
Control Act.

On redirect examination by the prosecutor, one
of the undercover agents testified concerning the
statutory purpose of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C, §921 et seg. Over repeated defense objections,
the following was elicited:

5.
One agent testified as follows:

[Burkhalter] inquired as to whether I would be interested
in purchasing two sawed off shotguns and discussed the fee that
he would receive for lining up the sale,

It was agreed that he would receive twenty dollars for
each firearm if | were allowed—or if I were introduced to the
party that had them for sale,

[Burkhalter] said that when he had finally lined the sale up he
would contact me again or contact us, my partner and myself,

The other agent testified concerning a second phone conversation:
[Burkhalter] indicated to me that he was in contact with the

person that had two sawed off shotguns for sale and wished] to
sell them to us,

72

[Sawed-off shotguns] are considered
gangster type weapons, sir, because of their
concealability and their use in impact upon
persons.

[T]hey are readily concealable, but at the same
time they afford the person carrying the firearm
a great amount of fire power, and as they are
five shot weapons, and they do fire shotgun shell
which is a very good antipersonnel type
projectile.

[Blecause of the shortened barrel, the shot
pattern, when the shot is fired, and the shotgun
shell pellets go down the barrel they tend to
spread out at a very fast rate so they can cover a
very large area and strike a great many objects
in a wide area at short range.

This testimony had little or no probative value
on any issue at trial. See United States v. Williams,
545 F.2d 47, 50-51 (8th Cir. 1976). Since the prejudicial
impact of the testimony substantially outweighed its
probativeness, the district court erred in admitting it.
FED. R. EVID. 403; see United States v. Mejia, 529
F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In view of the
strength of the case against appellant, however, we
hold that the district court’s error was harmless. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. EVID. 103(a); see
generally Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
764-65 (1946).

73

ITI

Appellant next contends that the district court
erroneously instructed the jury on aiding and abetting
a violation of 26 U.S.C. §5861(e) by omitting any
reference to specific intent. We find no merit in
appellant’s argument.

Specific intent is not required for a violation of
26 U.S.C. §5861(e). United States v. Thomas, 531 F.2d
419, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1976; United States v. DeBartolo,
482 F.2d 312, 314-17 (1st Cir. 1973); see United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971). It would be anomalous
to hold that specific intent was a necessary element of
aiding and abetting a crime, but not of the crime itself.
In the present case, it was enough that appellant
knowingly participate in the sale of the shotguns, and
the district court so instructed the jury.’ See Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949); ef.
United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 670 (8th Cir.
1971) (similar instructions).

The district court instructed the jury as follows:

[T]he law is in order to find a person guilty of a crime you need
not find that he did every single thing about the crime. If he
aided or assisted in some knowing way and participated in it as
something he wanted to do, then he, too, is involved in the crime.
If you are in on the act vou are in on the crime, and I think that's
the government's second bow there that even if you didn't
believe that the actual transfer was made by this defendant to
the two agents, he was still acting as an aider and abettor in the
crime.

74

Finally, appeliant complains of prejudicial
comments by the district court in the charge to the
jury. Specifically, appellant contends that the district
court improperly mentioned the reasons for
Burkhalter’s absence from the trial. Appellant also
asserts that the district court’s comments on the
evidence of appellant's failure to pay a transfer tax
effectively directed the verdict on that issue. We have
carefully reviewed the district court’s comments and
find no error affecting the substantial rights of
appellant.

Appellant's conviction is affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

75
APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES v. JONES No. 1490
(8th Cir. Feb. 16, 1978)
Submitted: October 10, 1977
Filed: February 16, 1978

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge; BRIGHT, Circuit Judge;
and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.*

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Augustin Jones, a physician practicing in St.
Louis, Missouri, appeals a conviction for intentionally
distributing Quaalude, a Schedule II controlled
substance,! in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a) (1) (1970).”

*TALBOT SMITH, United States Senior District Judge, Eastern
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

a.

A drug or other substance listed in Schedule II has “a high
potential for abuse,” has “a currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe
restrictions,” and is a drug or substance the abuse of which “may lead to
severe psychological or physical dependence.” 21 U.S.C. §812 (b) (2) (1970).
21 C.F.R. §1308.12(e) (1977) provides that drugs containing specified
depressant substances are listed under Schedule II. No dispute exists
that Quaalude is a depressant-type drug listed under Schedule II.

21 U.S.C. §841 (a) (1) 1970) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally —

(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense * * * a
controlled substancef.|

76

Dr. Jones was charged with two counts of prescribing
Quaalude without a legitimate medical purpose and
outside the usual course of professional practice: count
I related to a prescription written by Dr. Jones on
January 10, 1977, and count II related to a second
prescription written on February 9, 1977. The jury
acquitted Dr. Jones on count I but convicted him on
count II. We reverse the conviction.

On this appeal, Dr. Jones contends that the
district court erred in admitting evidence of alleged
similar acts in prescribing Quaalude, and, in addition,
Tuinal, Preludin, Desoxyn, and Dilaudid, other
Schedule II drugs. Dr. Jones also contends that the
prosecution did not produce sufficient expert medical
evidence on which to base a conviction.

We hold that the district court erred in
permitting the Government to introduce evidence
concerning 478 prescriptions for Schedule II drugs,
allegedly issued by Dr. Jones to his patients, as
evidence of other crimes bearing upon Dr. Jones’
knowledge and unlawful intent in prescribing drugs as
charged in the indictment.

I. The Evidence at Trial.

In order to place the admission of the contested
evidence in appropriate context, we summarize the
evidence introduced at the two-day trial. The
indictment stemmed from the efforts of St. Louis
policemen who, posing as patients, visited Dr. Jones

77

in order to obtain prescriptions of Schedule II drugs,
specifically Quaalude, a depressant, or Preludin, an
amphetamine sometimes used for the purpose of
facilitating weight loss. In late November or the early
part of December 1976, officer Antone Wagner of the
St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, who
worked as an undercover agent in the Narcotics
Division, went to Dr. Jones’ office. In the waiting room
of the office he observed five other persons between
the ages of twenty and thirty-five. Officer Wagner
asked Dr. Jones for a prescription for Preludin, which
Wagner indicated he needed for weight control. Dr.
Jones asked Wagner for his reference, and Wagner
responded with the name of Linda Couch. Stating that
he did not recail Linda Couch, Dr. Jones declined to
prescribe Preludin for Wagner.

On January 10, 1977, the St. Louis Police
Department made a further effort to obtain Schedule
II drugs from Dr. Jones. On that date, Larry Wells, a
police officer on assignment to the Drug Enforcement
Administration, went to Dr. Jones’ office under the
assumed name of Tony Ventimiglia and told the
physician that one Ricky Feldman had said that he
(Wells) could obtain a prescription for Quaalude from
Dr. Jones. Officer Wells testified that Dr. Jones took
some information from him and then gave him a
prescription for thirty Quaalude tablets. Wells paid
ten dollars for this medical service and was told by Dr.
Jones to try Gross Drugs in St. Louis if he had any
trouble getting the prescription filled. In fact, Gross

78

Drugs would not fill the prescription, but Wells
obtained the medication from another pharmacy in St.
Louis. Dr. Jones’ version of the session, while
substantially in accord with the testimony of officer
Wells, added that Wells had stated that he worked on
the production line at the Chrysler plant, that the
work was tiring, and that he needed something for
sleep. Count I of the indictment rests upon this
January 10th incident. As we have already noted, the
jury returned a not guilty verdict on this count.

Officer Wells returned to Dr. Jones’ office on
February 9, 1977.2 He identified himself by his
assumed name and was escorted by Dr. Jones into the
latter’s office. In the conversation that ensued, Dr.
Jones commented on Wells’ apparant Italian heritage.
Wells mentioned that he had obtained the new job that
he had mentioned during his previous office visit on
January 10th. Dr. Jones wrote a prescription for thirty
Quaalude tablets and gave the prescription to Wells;
Wells again paid Dr. Jones ten dollars. Wells testified
that he had not requested the prescription and that Dr.
Jones did not make any inquiry into his medical history
or make any kind of physical examination. Wells also
told Dr. Jones that his wife had taken and benefited
from some of the Quaalude tablets. Wells requested a
prescription for his wife, but Dr. Jones refused, stating

3.
On this occasion, officer Wells carried a concealed microphone that
transmitted his conversation with Dr. Jones to a receiver-recorder
operated by officer Wagner, who was stationed in an automobile outside.
The Government introduced the taped record of the conversation into
evidence. The recording was of poor quality and partly inaudible.

=) alieS =

79

that she would have to come to the office for a
prescription. Wells filled his prescription at King
Pharmacy in St. Louis. These events formed the basis
for count II of the indictment, on which the jury
returned its guilty verdict.

In order to buttress its case against Dr. Jones,
the prosecution introduced 478 prescriptions issued by
Dr. Jones to patients over an approximate twenty-
month period between August 9, 1975, and April 26,
1977. These prescriptions had been filled by Gross
Drugs in St. Louis. An agent of the Drug Enforcement
Agency also testified about prescriptions issued by Dr.
Jones that had been filled at other St. Louis
pharmacies. The agent indicated that in a three-month
period from November 1976, through January 1977,
Dr. Jones’ prescriptions for Schedule II drugs
accounted for forty-seven percent of Gross Drugs’ total
volume of Schedule II drug prescriptions.

An investigator for the Missouri Division of
Health, Bureau of Narcotics, testified that he visited
Dr. Jones in January of 1976 and warned Dr. Jones
about prescribing large quantities of Schedule II drugs
to certain types of people. The investigator declared
that after their conversation Dr. Jones cancelled the
rest of his appointments scheduled for that cay.

The Government then called police officers
associated with the Drug Enforcement Division of the
St. Louis Police Department, who identified thirteen
individuals named as patients on some of the 478

80

prescriptions written by Dr. Jones and filled at Gross
Drugs. The police officers testified that all of these
individuals have recognizable “track marks,” which
are scars or discolorations indicative of drug addiction,
on their arms or hands, and that some were “slender.”
A pharmacist testified that in February of 1977 he had
filled about a dozen prescriptions for Quaalude issued
by Dr. Jones; he described the recipients as young
people around twenty years of age.

The introduction of this evidence, over
objection by the defendant Dr. Jones, placed Dr. Jones
in a posture of having to explain not only a proper
medical purpose for prescribing Quaalude for pseudo-
patient officer Wells, but also his medical treatment
for the thirteen individuals identified as probable drug
addicts by police officers. In addition, Dr. Jones was
required to attempt to rebut the suggestion of
wrongful conduct in prescribing Schedule II narcotics
for the scores of persons listed as patients in the 478
prescriptions seized by the prosecution and introduced
in evidence. Indeed, the transcript of the trial
establishes that most of the trial time, including
examination and cross-examination of Dr. Jones, dwelt
not on matters covered by the indictment but on Dr.
Jones’ conduct in issuing the 478 other prescriptions.

II. Other Crimes Evidence.
Appellant argues that the trial court committed

prejudicial error in admitting into evidence testimony
relating to the 478 other prescriptions issued by Dr.

81

Jones for Schedule II drugs and in permitting St. Louis
police officers to identify several of the patients named
in these prescriptions as known or recognizable drug
addicts. The Government, citing United States v.
Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 911 (1976), and Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),‘
argues that evidence of other crimes or similar acts is
admissible to show intent, knowledge, plan, or absence
of mistake when those matters are at issue in the trial.

That Dr. Jones issued a great number of
prescriptions for Schedule II drugs demonstrates
familiarity, i.e, knowledge, concerning the usages of
Quaalude. But the Government clearly did not
introduce that evidence for such limited and proper
purpose. By obtaining testimony from various police
officers that some of the patients named _ in
prescriptions for Schedule II drugs were narcotics
addicts, the prosecution sought to imply that some, if
not all, of these 478 prescriptions had been issued by
Dr. Jones outside the legitimate and proper scope of
medical practice. The prosecution did not introduce
any evidence concerning the doctor-patient
relationship existing with respect to these
prescriptions, nor did it present other proof that the

4.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) reads:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith, It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

82

prescriptions had not been issued for a proper medical
purpose,

In United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486, 489
(8th Cir. 1974), we said that evidence of alleged other
crimes must be “clear and convincing.” That case arose
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which became effective on July 1, 1975. Subsequent to
the adoption of the Federal Rules, in United States v.
Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977), we
commented that “evidence [of other crimes] which is
vague and speculative is not competent proof and
should not be admitted into evidence.”

The other prescriptions of Schedule II drugs by
Dr. Jones to his patients constituted crimes or
unlawful acts similar to the crimes charged in the
indictment only if Dr. Jones issued those prescriptions
outside the bounds of professional medical practice.
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124, 142 (1975).
Absent any evidence bearing upon Dr. Jones’
treatment of the patients in question, issuance of the
prescriptions without more does not show that Dr.
Jones acted unprofessionally in issuing these
prescriptions. Therefore, the district court erred in
admitting these prescriptions as evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or similar acts under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b).

Moreover, the evidence, even though relevant
for some purpose, should have been excluded under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which reads as follows:

83

Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time

Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

The evidence in question was relevant in part to
establish the nature of Dr. Jones’ practice and his
knowledge of restrictions on prescribing Quaalude as a
sleeping tablet. However, the Government sought to
imply wrongdoing on the physician's part from the
quantity of the prescriptions and the “quality” of some
patients. The evidence lacked substantial probative
force upon the issue of improper medical practice in
the transactions charged, yet it could have led the jury
to speculate that the quantity of prescriptions alone
established wrongful conduct by Dr. Jones.

The trial transcript indicates that the
Government spent more time in its case-in-chief
dealing with alleged wrongful conduct not covered by
the indictment than it spent dealing with the incidents
for which Dr. Jones was charged. When Dr. Jones took
the witness stand to present his defense, he was
required to respond to some 478 instances of allegedly
improper practice in issuing medical prescriptions,
matters not set forth in the indictment, and was
subject to vigorous cross-examination relating to these

84

other claims of wrong-doing. This case calls for the
application of the exclusionary principle of Rule 403,
for the probative value of the evidence in question was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading of
the jury.

III. Motion for Acquittal.

Appellant urges as error the district court's
failure to sustain a motion for acquittal. We do not
know the grounds on which the motion was based, for
the motion is not included in the record on appeal. We
have only these two statements from appellant's brief
to guide us:

The Court committed prejudicial error in
failing to sustain Defendant's Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal at the Close of All the
Evidence for the Government and at the Close
of All the Evidence in the case for the reason
that there was no expert witness testimony that
the prescriptions [sic] issued by defendant were
not for a legitimate medical purpose and not
issued in the usual course of professional
practice.

Lastly, it needs to be said that the
evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant
because Dr. Burton merely testified, and
remember he was an associate professor of
Pharmacology at Washington University
Medical School only, that, “. . . we teach our

85

medical students that they must take a proper
history and complete history, and they must do
a physical examination and then prescribe the
appropriate drug for the diagnosis they arrive.”
And in answer to the question, “Do you feel in
any prescribing situation a proper history and
physical should be taken?” He answered, “Yes,
sir,

Appellant appears to be arguing either that the
Government failed to establish a medical standard for
prescribing Quaalude or that the Government, though
establishing a medical standard, failed to prove by the
testimony of medical experts that Dr. Jones did not
comply with the standard.

We reject both of these arguments. The
testimony of Dr. Robert Burton, called by the
prosecution, as well as that of Dr. Charles Jost, called
by appellant, substantially agreed that a physician
should inquire as to a patient's general condition
before prescribing Quaalude or other Schedule II
drugs. Dr. Burton testified that before prescribing any
drug, a physician must take a medical history and
make some physical examination. Witness Burton
possesses a Ph.D. in pharmacology. Although not an
M.D., his twenty years of teaching at the Washington
University Medical School qualifies him as an expert
entitled to express an opinion as to medical
procedures in prescribing drugs such as those listed
under Schedule II. Thus, the Government adequately
proved a medical standard. The question of whether
Dr. Jones’ procedures met that standard was for the

86

jury to determine, not expert witnesses. See United
States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1073 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).

Thus, the trial judge did not err in denying the
motion for acquittal on the narrow grounds asserted on
appeal. Although our decision on appeal does not
require a dismissal of the conviction on count II against
Dr. Jones, from our review of the record, we believe
that this court’s comment in United States v. Garvin,
565 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1977), apropos:

We view the evidence of record in this
case as extremely marginal. However, * * * we
find nothing to preclude a re-trial if the
Government chooses that course * * *.

Reversed and remanded.
A true copy.
Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

87
APPENDIX J

UNITED States v. McClintie, Jr.
No. 77-1174
(8th Cir. Jan. 18, 1978)

Before HEANEY jand BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and
TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

The defendant appeals from a jury verdict of
guilty on five counts of a six-count indictment. We
affirm.

Count I charged the defendant, Scott Voeltz,
and Robert Braumann with violating 18 U.S.C. §371 by
conspiring to commit wire and mail fraud, and
interstate transportation and receiving of stolen
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 2314,
and 2315. Counts II, III, and V charged the defendant
with receiving stolen property transported in
interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
2315. Count IV charged the defendant with interstate
transportation of stolen property in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314. The jury acquitted the defendant
of the sixth count, which charged an extortionate

*TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge, Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.

88

extension of credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. §892. The
defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment
on count I and ten years on count II, to run
concurrently. He was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment on count III, to run consecutively to the
terms on counts I and II. He received prison terms of
ten years on each of counts IV and V, to run
concurrently with counts I, II, and III.

After filing notice of appeal, defendant filed a
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. This Court remanded to the
District Court! for disposition and defendant's motion
was subsequently denied. On appeal, the defendant
challenges the adequacy of the indictment, the trial
court's refusal to sever counts I, II, and III from counts
IV and V, several evidentiary rulings, and the denial of
his new trial motion based on newly discovered
evidence.

Counts I, II and III arise out of the defendant's
involvement in the so-called Mount Vernon scheme.
Pursuant to this scheme the defendant initially loaned
money to Susan Dvorak. She in turn transferred part
of the money to Scott Voeltz and Robert Braumann to
operate a food concession in Florida. Unable to collect
the loan from Ms. Dvorak, the defendant attempted to
collect directly from Voeltz and Braumann, without
success. Agreeing that they could pay in merchandise,

l.
The Honorable Edward J. McManus, Chief United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

89

Voeltz and Braumann, with defendant's knowledge,
operated two business fronts, Star Sales and Mount
Vernon Sales, on premises in Mount Vernon, Iowa.
Using false financial statements and alternating their
“companies” as credit references, they placed orders
by mail and telephone with a variety of wholesale
suppliers. When the suppliers checked the
“references” by telephone, the false information was
confirmed. Quick Products, a local sales company
owned by the defendant and his brother, was also used
as a credit reference; false credit reference
confirmations were provided through the cooperation
of the defendant and Timothy Morrissey, a Quick
Products employee.

When Voeltz and Braumann received
merchandise in late May, 1975, the defendant took
items valued at about $14,000 in repayment of the loan
and sold them in his own name. Morrissey helped
transfer the goods to the defendant’s residence. When
the initial sales of the merchandise did not satisfy the
defendant, he returned to Voeltz, who furnished him
with more merchandise later in June, 1975.

Counts IV and V arise out of the defendant's
involvement in the so-called “Paper Place” scheme in
Denver, Colorado. In August or early September, 1975,
Morrissey approached the defendant with an outline
for a novel which Morrissey had entitled “Paper
Place.” The outline detailed a check-kiting scheme in
which persons would set up a bogus company and open

90

bank * accounts using false documents’ and
identification. Payroll checks written on the accounts
would be cashed in supermarkets and retail stores on a
weekend, while the banks were closed; the rest of the
scheme would be closed up by the end of the weekend.
After discussion of the scheme, the defendant loaned
money to Morrissey to try the plan out in Minnesota.
This attempt, and another, executed in Salt Lake City
and similarly financed by a loan from defendant, were
economically unsuccessful.

Anxious to pay back his loans, Morrissey met
with defendant later in September and discussed a trip
to execute the Paper Place scheme in Denver.
Defendant again loaned money to Morrissey to finance
the trip. The operation of the Denver scheme was
successful, netting several thousand dollars worth of
merchandise, which Morrissey and an accomplice
brought back to Iowa for resale.

Morrissey and his accomplice removed some of
the serial numbers from the goods and shortly
thereafter, the defendant and Morrissey began to sell
the merchandise locally, for cash. They were
unsuccessful in recouping the amount of the loans
outstanding to Morrissey, so a few weeks later, the
Paper Place scheme was attempted in Rockford,
Illinois, at defendant's suggestion. After two or three
days in Rockford, the sham was detected, and
Morrissey and his accomplice were arrested.
Defendant McClintic was apprehended later.

91

Defendant contends that the trial court erred
by refusing to dismiss counts II, III, and V of the
indictment as fatally defective for failing to charge a
violation of 18 U.S.C. §2315.” Defendant complains that
by charging him with receipt of stolen merchandise
which he knew “to have been stolen, unlawfully
converted and taken by fraud,” (emphasis supplied),
counts II, III, and V added an element not contained in
the statute. The defendant argues that the addition of
this descriptive element had the effect of charging acts
which are not proscribed by 18 U.S.C § 2315.

The defendant’s argument is defective in three
particulars. First, the addition of the descriptive
element did not mislead the accused; rather it merely
described in greater detail “the elements of the offense
charged and fairly inform{ed] [him] of the charge

2.
18 U.S.C. §2315 provides in relevant part:

Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or
disposes of any goods, wares or merchandise, securities, or
money of the value of $5,000 or more, or pledges or accepts as
security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or
securities, of the value of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a
part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or
taken;

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)

92

against which he must defend.” Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).

Second, the accepted construction of the term
“stolen,” as used in the present codification of the
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and
2315, as well as the “Dyer Act,”” includes “all felonious
takings ... with intent to deprive the owner of the
rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of
whether or not the theft constitutes common-law
larceny.” United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417
(1957). See also United States v. Frakes, 563 F.2d 803,
805 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d
988, 995 (1977); Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461,
464 (5th Cir. 1960); Bergman v. United States, 253 F.2d
933, 935 (6th Cir. 1958). A taking “by fraud,” fits
accurately within the expansive definition of “stolen”
above.

Third, the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. §2315
shows that the type of taking referred to in the
scienter clause was a taking by fraud. Section 4 of the
National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 795
(1934), the precursor to 18 U.S.C. §2315, provided
originally as follows:

Whoever shall receive, conceal, store,
barter, sell, or dispose of any goods, wares, or
merchandise, securities, or money, of the value

3.
The Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §2312, prohibits the interstate

transportation of “stolen” vehicles.

93

of $5,000 or more, or whoever shall pledge or
accept as security for a loan any goods, wares,
or merchandise, or securities of the value of
$500 or more which, while moving in or
constituting a part of interstate or foreign
commerce, has been stolen or taken feloniously
by fraud or with intent to steal or purloin,
knowing the same to have been stolen or taken,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or by imprisonment of not more than ten
years, or both. (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequent simplifying amendments of this language
in later codifications reveal no hint that Congress
thereby intended to restrict the statute's reach. We
agree with the Fifth Circuit in Lyda v. United Stats,
supra, that the class of deprivations of property which
Congress sought to prohibit in the National Stolen
Property Act includes “a forcible taking or a taking
without ... permission, by false pretense, by fraud, by
swindling, or by a conversion by one rightfully in
possession.” 279 F.2d at 464. The _ indictment
accurately spelled out the elements of the offense
charged.

II.

The defendant claims that the trial court erred
by refusing to sever counts I, II, and III, relating to the
Mount Vernon scheme, from counts IV and V, relating
to the Paper Place scheme. He argues that the Mount
Vernon and Paper Place schemes were dissimilar in
character and that the jury was prejudicially swayed
by the accumulated evidence against him.

94

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) permits joinder of offenses
if “the offenses charged ... are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction
or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.” Rule 14 permits severance to avoid undue
prejudice. Where the offenses are similar in character
and occurred over a relatively short period of time and
the evidence overlaps, joinder is ordinarily
appropriate. United States v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767, 770
(8th Cir. 1976), United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 49
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975). The
trial court has a wide range of discretion in matters of
severance, and we reverse only upon a finding of clear
prejudice and abuse of discretion. United States v.
Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1111 (1977). United States v. Riley, supra;
United States v. Chrisco, 493 F.2d 232, 239 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974); United States v.
Simon, 453 F.2d 111, 114 (8th Cir. 1971). Here, the
defendant participated in each scheme in a nearly
identical manner: - that is, by receipt and sale of
fraudulently obtained merchandise as payment on a
previous loan. While Voeltz and Braumann did not
participate in the second scheme, McClintic’s
involvement in both smoothly shifted from sales of the
Mount Vernon goods to financing the Paper Place
operations. No abuse of discretion has been shown.
Defendant's contention that joinder allowed the jury
to impermissably pool incriminating evidence against
him is belied by his acquittal of count VI.

95
ITI.

Timothy Morrissey was’ the _ principal
government witness concerning the Paper Place
scheme. He testified that although he and McClintic
had discussed the scheme prior to his Denver trip, he
did not explain to the defendant after the trip how the
goods had been obtained. The government then
elicited over the defendant’s objection Morrissey’'s
opinion that McClintic knew that the Denver
merchandise had _ been fraudulently obtained.
Defendant now claims that this testimony went
beyond the proper bonds for a lay witness’ opinion and
could not have been rationally based on _ the
perceptions of the witness.

Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence limits
the opinions of a lay witness to “those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue.” Defendant does not contest that the
opinion of the person closest to McClintie during the
planning of the Denver scheme and its aftermath
would be helpful in determining whether or not the
defendant knew that the goods were obtained by
fraud. Rather, defendant disputes the basis for the
witness’ opinion.

Here the basis seems ample. In the first place
there had been a full discussion between defendant
and Morrissey of the details of operation of the Paper

Place scheme, which was employed in

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1601%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
