# Appendix — Weiner v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 981

## Text

IN THE venanins
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978
No.

JULIAN S.H. WEINER, and
SOLOMON BLOCK,

Petitioners,
vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

APPENDICES FOR

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD A. ABELES

315 South Beverly Drive
Suite 300

Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885

Attorney for Petitioner
JULIAN S.H. WEINER

NATHAN MARKOWITZ
315 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885

Attorney for Petitioner
SOLOMON BLOCK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1978

No.

JULIAN S.H. WEINER, and

SOLOMON BLOCK,

vs.
UNITED STATES

Petitioners,

OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

APPENDICES FOR
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAROLD A. ABELES

315 South Beverly Drive
Suite 300

Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885

Attorney for Petitioner
JULIAN S.H. WEINER

NATHAN MARKOWITZ
315 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(213) 553-0885

Attorney for Petitioner
SOLOMON BLOCK

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Opinion of United States
Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed

May 15, 1978

Order of the Ninth Circuit
denying the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, filed
July 21, 1978

Allen Instruction given
by the District Judge

Affidavit of Juror

Mary Krueger, handwritten
ballot and transcription
thereof

Affidavit of Juror
Amando Carrillo

Affidavit of Juror
Charles Flores

APPENDIX A

\

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH DISTRICT

FILED

MAY 15, 1978

EMIL E. MELFI, UR.
CLERK, U.S. COURT

OF APPEALS
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
NO.
Appellee, 959933
| Vv. )
JULIAN S. H. WEINER, MARVIN } 14.

AL LICHTIG; AND SOLOMON BLOCK, )
Appellants. )
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Central District
of California

Before: CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit
Judges, and THOMPSON,* District Judge.

PER CURIAM: **

«The Honorable Bruce R. Thompson, United
States District Judge for the District
of Nevada, sitting by designation

'
.
:

**2A11 three members of the panel shared
equally in the writing of this decision.

Julian Weiner, Marvin Lichtig, and
Solomon Block appeal their respective
convictions for securities fraud aris-
ing out of their employment as auditors
of Equity Funding Corporation of America
(Equity Funding) during the time cover-
ed by the indictment.

Equity Funding was incorporated in
1960 to sell life insurance, mutual
funds, and "equity funding" programs.+
The company operated legitimately and
profitably until 1964, when, the govern-
ment proved, it began to publish in-
accurate and false financial statements.
Equity Funding was accused of massive
fraud in overstating its income and °
seit: nonexistent assets in order to
increase the market value of its stock.

Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff, and Lapin
were the independent public accountants
for Equity Funding from 1961 until 1971.
In early 1972, the Los Angeles branch
of the Wolfson, Weiner firm joined with
the accounting firm of Seidman & Seid-
man. The combined firm served as Equity
Funding's independent public accountant

}

i

until the exposure of the fraud in 1973.

Julian Weiner was the Wolfson, Wein-~
er partner in charge of the audits of
Equity Funding from 1961 to 1973. He
was convicted of six counts of secur-
ities fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77q(a),
for accounting practices which fraud-
ulently overstated the income and assets
of Equity Funding and of four counts of
willfully making untrue statements to
the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the New York or Pacific Coast
Stock Exchanges, in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77£, 78ff, 78m.

Marvin Lichtig, as an employee and
later as a junior partner of Wolfson,
Weiner, supervised the audit field work
of Equity Funding for the audits between
1963 and 1968. He reported directly to
Julian Weiner. From 1968 until 1973,
Lichtig served as an officer of Equity
Funding and signed registration state~-
ments as the principal accounting
officer of the company. Lichtig was
convicted of the same six counts of
securities fraud as Weiner.

3.

Lichtig was also convicted of seven
counts of filing false statements with
the SEC and the New York or Pacific
Coast Stock Exchange in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77f£, 78ff, 781,78m.

Solomon Block was employed by Wolf-
son, Weiner in 1968 and replaced Lich-
tig as the supervisor of field audits.
Block served as supervisor for the 1969
through 1972 audits. Block was charged
with the same six counts of securities
fraud as Weiner and Lichtig, but Block
was convicted of only five of the
counts. Block was convicted of two
counts of making false statements to
the SEC and the New York or Pacific
Coast Stock Exchanges in violation of
15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77£, 78ff, 78m.

A. UNANIMOUS VERDICT

Defendants argue that the convic-
tions must be reversed because the jury
verdict was not unanimous. This chal-
lenge is based on juror affidavits.

The jury returned a verdict of
guilty, and each member of the panel
was polled. The judge asked "please

4.

indicate by answering if the verdicts
just read are your verdicts," and each
juror responded individually in the
affirmative. The verdicts were receiv-
ed and the jury was discharged. Half
an hour later, a juror went to the
judge's chambers and said that she had
never voted "guilty", but rather had
voted "guilty with reservation" during
the jury's deliberations. She further
stated that she understood that the
jury's verdict was eleven "guilty" and
one "guilty with reservation", and was
confused by the events in the courtroom
when she responded affirmatively that
the verdict rendered was her verdict.
Two other jurors made affidavits to
support this juror's statement that she
had always qualified her "guilty" vote
"with reservation".

The defendants moved for a new trial,
based on the affidavits of the three
jurors. The district judge denied the
motion, holding that the affidavits
were not admissible to impeach the
verdicts.

The district court followed estab-
lished law. Jurors may not impeach
their own verdict. McDonald v. Pless,
238 U.S. 264 (1915). This rule, with

narrow exceptions, is codified in Fed.
R. Evid. 606(b).

Defendants argue that they are not
seeking to impeach the verdict. They
contend that the verdict rendered in
court was not the true verdict of the
jury and the affidavits should be ad-
missible to prove this fact. They cite
Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84 (5th
Cir. 1969). In that case, a juror re-
mained silent when polled, and other
jurors by affidavit said they thought a
verdict by a majority was sufficient.
The court held that there was no legal
verdict. But here there was a verdict,
and upon a poll of each juror in open
court it was unanimous. Even if the
defendants were able to prove that one
juror had consistently voted "guilty
with reservation", the only purpose of
such testimony would be to impeach the
verdict. The meaning of "with reser-
vation" would thus be left to the in-

genuity of counsel and the vagaries of
social behavior in every case.

The juror answered in the affirma-
tive when asked if "guilty" was her ver-
dict. Many jurors have some second
thoughts about their verdicts. "Beyond
a reasonable doubt" need not exclude
all doubt. To permit this juror to
contradict this verdict by an explana-
tion that her vote was “guilty with
reservation" would sanction the im-
peachment of any verdict in which a jur-
or could be found who was willing to
repudiate the answer he gave when pol-
led.” Opportunities for harassment of
jurors and jury tampering would abound.
Such a burden on the jury system could
not long be tolerated.

B. THE “ALLEN CHARGE"

The defendants also argue that the
jury was coerced by the giving of the
Allen charge.> After 5 days of delib-
erations the foreman of the jury not-
ified the judge that “one of the mem-
bers of our jury feels unable to par~
ticipate in deliberations with the rest

7

of us." After ascertaining that the
juror was not suffering from a physical
Or mental disability, the judge gave a
modified Allen instruction substantially
as set out in E. Devitt & C. Blackmar,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions

§ 18.14 2d ed., (1970). (This instruc-
tion is §18.14 in the Third Edition,
1977.)

This court has consistently upheld
this form of the Allen charge. Sulli-
van_v. United States 414 F.2d 714 (9th
Cir. 1969). The cases which discuss
the assumed effect of the Allen charge
are all appealed by defendants who were
convicted. Defendants who have been
acquitted after the giving of the charge
have not complained. ' Upon review of all
the circumstances of the case, we hold
that the supplemental instruction was
not coercive.

C. PREJUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS

During the trial, the prosecutor
learned that two jurors had been on an
elevator during a conversation between
a government attorney and a government

witness. The prosecutor notified the
trial judge, who called a conference in
chambers with all parties to the con-
versation plus defense counsel. The
judge determined that nothing prejud-
icial had been said. There was no mo~
tion for a mistrial. Defense counsel
now assert that there was something
sinister about the event. The record,
however, reveals no reason for disturb-
ing the trial court's descretion in
handling the matter.

The same juror who had expressed her
reservations in the jury room and later
in a posttrial affidavit also stated in
her affidavit that during the deliber-
ations she had initiated a conversation
with the bailiff by asking whether the
judge expected a verdict. She said the
bailiff told her that he didn't know,
but he assumed that the judge would
"like" a verdict. The bailiff, by
affidavit, denied the conversation. In
any event, the defendants fail to show
how such a conversation, if it occurred,
could have prejudiced anyone. Since
the alleged conversation occurred, if

9.

it occurred at all, nearly a week after
the judge had given the Allen charge
earlier complained of, it should have
been apparent to even the most obtuse
juror that a verdict would be a wel-
comed development, We find no basis for
charging the trial judge with an abuse
of discretion for refusing to grant a
new trial upon this sort of clutching
at straws, It was a long trial, and
such trials frequently produce a number
of imperfections. It is to the credit
of the experienced trial judge that this
is the sort of assignment of error to
which the appellants apparently must

look in their search for reversible
error,

D. ALLEGED MISCONDUCT BY
PROSECUTOR

Appellant Lichtig claims that the
prosecutor made an impermissible ref-
erence in final argument to his and
Block's failure to take the stand.
Block's attorney, in his part of the
summation, had made a reference to cer-
tain evidence thought to be exculpatory
of Block. The prosecutor in his final

LO.

argument referred to "Julian Weiner's
exculpatory testimony" and the absence
of other testimony on the point. None
of these comments trespassed upon the
rule against calling attention to fail-
ure to testify. The jury knew very well
that neither Block nor Lichtig had
testified, and, if this failure left
some unanswered questions in the minds
of jurors, that was a risk that had
been assumed long before final argument.
The government took no unfair advantage
of the situation, and there was no er~-
ror in refusing a new trial on this
score. The trial court carefully in-
structed the jury about the presumption
of innocence, the burden of proof, and
the right of the defendant to refrain

from testifying.

Lichtig and Block also complain
about the exploitation by the prosecutor
of the term "reciprocal income"> during
the course of the trial. The point is
frivolous. "Reciprocal income" and
"reciprocals" were terms commonly used
in the reporting of inflated or non-
existing assets. The trial court

ll.

carefully instructed the jury that there
was nothing illegal about reciprocal
income. The illegal conduct consisted
of making false or exaggerated reports

about "reciprocal" and other kinds of
income.

E. ALLEGED IMPERMISSIBLE
RESTRICTION OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
LOWELL

The interrogation of Samuel Lowell,
one of the government's principal wit-
nesses, commenced in the afternoon of
Friday, February 21, 1975. At the close
of that session the trial was continued
to 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, February 25,
1975. The direct examination continued
through Tuesday and for a very short
time Wednesday morning, when the case
was continued to Thursday on motion of
defense counsel. Cross-examination by
Mr. Abeles for defendant Weiner lasted
all day Thursday and all day Friday.

Mr. DeSantis, representing defendant
Lichtig, commenced cross~examination
late Friday afternoon. On adjournment,
the trial was continued to Tuesday,
March 1l. Mr. DeSantis cross-examined

12.

- ——

eet ee

Lowell all day Tuesday, and half of
Wednesday morning. Mr. Markowitz, rep-~
resenting defendant Block, then took
over and completed his questioning in
the middle of the afternoon.

In addition, during the government's
case, the court permitted defense coun-
sel to recall Mr. Lowell for further
cross-interrogation on March 20, 1975.

During cross-examination there were
numerous and repetitive attacks upon the
credibility of the witness. Counsel
probed Lowell on extramarital relation-
ships and participation in fraudulent
conduct not charged in the indictment.
It will serve no useful purpose to de-
tail the specific instances in which
defendants claim that cross-examination
was improperly curtailed or restricted.
With respect to each such assignment of
error, the impeaching information came
to the attention of the jury. The
attack is only upon the court's refusal
to permit counsel unrestricted license
to exhaust the details of the particular
circumstance or transaction. There was

13.

no error.

The scope and extent of cross-exam-
ination is within the discretion of the
trial court, and the court's limitation
of cross-examination will not result in
reversal unless it is clear that a def-
endant was thereby denied his consti-
tutional right to confrontation, Smith
v. Illinois, 390 U.D. 129, 132 (1968);
United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295,
1299 (9th Cir. 1971); Enciso v. United
States, 370 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1967),

The court in its discretion may
limit cross-examination in order to pre-
clude repetitive questioning, upon det-
ermining that a particular subject has
been exhausted, or to avoid extensive
and time-wasting exploration of col-
lateral matters. See e.g. United States

Vv. Zane, 495 F.2d 683, 695 (2d Cir.
1973); United States y. Miller, 473 F.2d
600 (lst Cir. 1972).

The trial court has a duty to con-
trol cross-examination to prevent it
from unduly burdening the record with
cumulative or irrelevant matter. Alford

14,

v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694
(1931); United States v. Carrion, 463
F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1972). This
duty includes a specific duty to pre-
vent counsel from confusing the jury
with a proliferation of details on col-
lateral matters. United States v.
Carrion, 463 F.2d at 707. See also Fed.
R. Evid. 403 and 608(b).

F. ACCESS TO AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Apparently two pages of notes made
by prosecutor Rathje of an interview
with Fred Levin, a government witness,
were supplied to the defense and used
by the defense in cross-examination.

The government then offered the notes as
evidence. Defendants objected. They
wanted the notes to be censored before
submission to the jury. Later the
government withdrew the offer. The ex-
hibit was never reoffered by defense
counsel. The alleged error was not pre-
served for appellate review. This is
certainly not a situation, as suggested
by defense counsel, where the govern-
ment has withheld or suppressed ex-

15.

culpatory material as was the case in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88
(1963). See United States v. Agurs, 421
U.S. 97, 107-14 (1976).

Appellant Lichtig says his consti-
tutional rights were infringed by the
government's failure to disclose a pre-
trial agreement (in a companion civil
action) between the trustee in reorgan-
ization and the previously mentioned
Lowell which allegedly absolved Lowell
of civil liability in the Equity Funding
litigation. Here, the verdict of the
jury was returned on May 20, 1975, def-
endants were sentenced on July 14, 1975,
and appeals were taken on July 25, 1975.
Lichtig's present claim of error is
based on an application for a continu-
ance made on May 7, 1976, in the civil
litigation, for the purpose of consum-
mating a settlement with respect to
Lowell. Obviously, none of this is part
of the record on appeal. Since the
agreement Lichtig would have had the
government disclose was not made until
a year after trial, it was hardly sus-
ceptible of nondisclosure during the

16.

iad -

trial. There was no infringement of a
right to exculpatory material.

Lichtig also complains of the den-
ial of his oral motion during the trial
for an order requiring the government
to lodge all SEC transcripts and state-
ments and interviews with witnesses by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the postal service, or anyone else that
were in possession of the United States
Attorney, for the court's examination
to ferret out possible Brady material.
As the Supreme Court noted in United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, a re-
quest "for ‘all Brady meterial' or for
‘anything exculpatory'" is equivalent
to no cequest at all. The trial judge
need not accord the slightest heed to
such a shotgun approach. This attempt
to create error has as little merit as

the one preceding it.

G. DISQUALIFICATION OF U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Appellant Block asserts error in the
refusal of the trial judge to disqualify
the United States Attorney's office from
prosecuting the case. An attorney em-

17.

ployed by the law firm of Nelson, Liker
& Merrifield while that firm represented
Weiner and Block in connection with
matters arising out of the Equity Fund-

ing fraud ieft the firm and went to work
for the SEC.

Appellant suggests, but the record
does not confirm, close cooperation be-
tween the SEC and the Department of

Justice in the management of this pro-
secution,

In order to disqualify the U.S.
Attorney's office, the court would first
have to impute to the former private
apa knowledge of the Equity Fund-
ing litigation possessed by other mem-
bers of his former law firm. Second
the court would have to impute this
The statement came up during a conver-
sation about notes receivable. The
notes did not exist as a true receiv-
able, but supposedly represented a col-
lection of "recip" that Equity Funding
did not want to reveal. Block asked
for confirmation, and a confirmation
was arranged through someone in Italy.
Weiner directed Lowell to get confir-
mation for Block, despite Lowell's pro-
tests. This was only one of several

76.

times that Lowell had confirmations
manufactured at Weiner's request. Block
indicated knowledge of the questionable
nature of some of these false confir-
mations when he pointed out to Lowell
that envelopes bearing the confirmations
had unlikely postmarks.

Lowell testified that Block had
questioned some of the procedures dur-
ing the first part of the audit. Lowell
with concurrence of other participants
in the scheme, offered Block a trip to
Rome if he would cooperate. After this
conversation, the reconciliation to ex-
plain the $10 million gap in the funded
loans asset was given to Block, and he
was told to handle it himself. No
further questions were raised by him
about the asset, and, as stated, appar-
ently no inquiry into backup was made.
Block's suspicions were aroused in 1969.
The jury chose not to convict him for
his activities then. Their finding
that by 1971, during the audit for 1970,
Block had the requisite willfulness and
knowledge is supported by the record,
Although he may not have known the mag-

77.

—-

nitude of the fraud or many of its de-
tails, his awareness of the manipula-
tions used and his willingness to co-
operate and not fully investigate sus-
picious areas suffice to sustain his
conviction on Count 80.

During the 1970 audit Weiner knew
that two confirmations, one for an ac~-
count at Banco Union and another for
Banque Jordan, were prepared at Lowell's
direction. Weiner received one by mail
and one from Lowell personally. At the
least, he knew that the explanation for
the accounts was that they concealed
"recip" income, and he nonetheless co-
operated in falsifying the confirmations.
The confirmations showed the accounts to
be cash deposits subject to withdrawal
by check with no interest shown as pay~-
able. This was never questioned even
though the accounts were listed as in-
vestment accounts in the financial
statements. Weiner also knew that cer-
tain notes receivable were not what they
purported to be. During the 1970 audit
he participated in developing a cover-
up of a mistake made in the 1969 record-

78.

ing of an investment. The account was
reclassified with Weiner's knowledge,
and a note was attached to the journal
entries dealing with the reclassifica-
tion which stated: "all transactions
verified by JW - WWR & L == no adjust-
ments necessary." Lowell prepared the
schedule and note and sent a copy to
Weiner and Block. Weiner's continuing
involvement with various misleading
practices was sufficiently proved to
sustain his conviction on Count 80,

Lichtig participated in the dis-
cussions of how to cover up the $10
million plug discovered by West. His
continued role as an officer of Equity
Funding involved in its financial af-
fairs, combined with his previous know-
ledge of the falsification in the ac-
count, supplied sufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction on Count 79,

Counts 81 and 93, charging Lichtig,
and 84, charging Block and Weiner, are
the same counts for the 1971 audit based
on SEC registration statements filed on
September 8,1972, and April 5, 1972,

79.

which contained audited financial
statements for the year 1971. The in-
volvement of each defendant was contin-
uing. They each held the same position
as in the years before, Block's furth-
er knowledge of the falsity of the fin-
ancial statements was demonstrated by

events such as a conversation with
Lowell in the summer of 1971 wherein he
described, hypothetically, a transaction
exactly like that which had been set up
for the purported sale of the Investors
Planning Client Contractual receivable.
He also made requests to Lowell and
Goldblum for a job with Equity Funding,
thus bringing his independence sharply

into question. Sultan testified that
the earnings~per-share figure released
in a press release turned out to be a
penny off, and that he had discussed
the problem with Block. Sultan changed
the figures showing the number of out-
standing shares, and Block was aware
that the change to an erroneous figure
was made.

In general, inflations of accounts
continued in 1971, and earlier incorrect

80.

figures were carried froward even though
in some instances there was a prima
facie indication that something was
wrong with the accounts. In one in-
stance an account that would not nor-
mally have been static had the same be-
ginning and ending balance, and there
was no investigation to determine the
reason for such an unusual situation.
Also, no payment was received on var-
ious notes receivable; yet the notes
were not discounted or written off but
were carried at full value. Thus, suf-
ficient evidence existed to support
defendants' convictions on each of the
applicable counts for the audits for
the years 1970 and 1971.

In view of the sufficiency of the
evidence on the foregoing counts, the
concurrent sentence doctrine makes it
unnecessary to review in detail the
evidence on Counts 6 and 10 through 14.

Summation,

Defendants have contended that they
were victims of the fraud perpetrated
by the officers of Equity Funding, and

81,

that, although they might have been to
some degree negligent or they might have
erred in their judgment as auditors,
their criminal participation was not
proved. More accurate is the following
comment of the trial judge made during
the proceedings relating to defendant's
motion for new trial:

"The evidence, I think, does
not show that the defendants were
aware of the fraud in its early
stages. I think they were the
victims of the fraud for some
period of time. * * * Even
though the evidence is not al-
together direct, it is largely
circumstantial, it is overwhelm-
ing to the point where I cannot
escape the conclusion that the
defendants must have known and
must have come to a point where
they knew of the fraud, and that

they thereafter did acts in
furtherance of the fraud."

The Equity Funding account was a
large part of the business of Wolfson,
Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin. Weiner and
Block had worked with Equity Funding
almost from its inception. Weiner's
participation in financial decision-
making at critical stages was establish-

82.

ed. Lichtig moved into an executive
position. By 1971, Block was also at-
tempting to gain employment with Equity
Funding. There is no question that a
purposeful fraud was perpetrated by the
officers of Equity Funding. The over-
whelming scope of the fraud, its often
complex but sometimes very simple mech-
anisms, and the failure of the auditors
to find in any of the suspicious pro-
cedures cause to dig further into Equity
Funding's financial records system all
lead to the inescapable conclusion that
defendants were involved. Even if they
did not initially know or indeed learn
the step-by-step fictitious entries and
improper manipulations, their consistent
failure to apply GAAS and GAAP after
they knew some kind of a major fraud was
afoot provided a basis from which the
jury could reasonably infer defendants'
knowing and willful participation in the
fraud.
"* * *Generally accepted
accounting principles instruct
an accountant what to do in the

usual case where he has no reason
to doubt that the affairs of the

83.

corporation are being honestly
conducted. Once he has reason
to believe that this basic as-
sumption is false, an entirely
different situation confronts
him.* * *," United States v.
Simon, 425 F.2d at 806.

P, JURY INSTRUCTIONS DEALING
WITH INTENT

We next dispose of defendants' con-
tentions regarding certain jury instruc~
tions: those related to the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence.

a. Compliance with GAAS and GAAP

Defendants first challenge the
court's instruction on the rule of
generally accepted auditing standards
and generally accepted accounting
principles in the jury's deliberations.
The instruction is reproduced in the

—
margin.

We have not previously ruled on the
propriety of instructions which state
that compliance or noncompliance with
GAAS or GAAP is relevant to the deter-
mination of a defendant's intent. The
Second Circuit has dealt with similar
instructions in United States v. Simon,

84.

25 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), and United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 318-24
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976). In Simon three accountants
appealed from their convictions on three

counts arising out of their drawing up
and certifying a misleading and false
financial statement. The jury was in-
structed that the primary determination
was whether the financial statements
accurately reflected the company's con-
dition, and, if not, whether the def-
endants acted in good faith. Proof of
complaince with GAAS was deemed "ev-
idence which may be very persuasive but
not necessarily conclusive that he act-
ed in good faith." 425 F.2d at 805

See United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d
at 318-24; United States v. Colasurdo,
453 F.2d at 594,

The prosecution introduced into ev-
idence the Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards (1973) issued by the Committee on
Auditing Procedure, American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants. The
Statement outlines the general purpose
of the independent audit,’ and

85.

§ 110.05 explains the responsibilities ness.
of the individual auditor who finds
fraud in the entity whose records are

being examined:

Sufficient evidence was introduced
to raise the issue of conformity with
GAAS and GAAP. During the trial sev-

"In making the ordinary
examination, the independent
auditor is aware of the poss-~
ibility that fraud may exist
* * *. However, the ordinary
examination directed to the
expression of an opinion on
financial statements is not
primarily or specifically de-
signed and cannot be relied
upon, to disclose defalcation
and other similar irregularities,
although their discovery may
result * * *, The responsibility
of the independent auditor for
failure to detect fraud (which
responsibility differs as to
clients and others) arises only
when such failure clearly results
from failure to comply with
generally accepted auditing
standards."

Under these standards the auditor is not
"responsible" for fraud that has gone
undetected despite his utilization of
generally accepted auditing standards.
In our case, failure to apply generally
accepted auditing standards is relevant
to the issue of knowledge and willful-

86.

eral witnesses testified that many of
the practices under consideration were
not in conformance with GAAS and GAAP.
Generally, no audit manual was prepared
for each year's audit, no checks on in-
ternal controls were made, and basic
standards for confirming accounts were
not followed. The witnesses included
Norman Grosman, a partner in Touche,
Ross & Co.; Frank West, who worked on
the audits from 1969 through 1972; and
William Simpson and Benjamin Karchin,
SEC employees who reviewed Equity Fund-

ing's books. The jury had evidence from

which it could determine whether GAAS
and GAAP were properly utilized and
whether the failure to utilize them was
such as to lead to a reasonable infer-
ence of criminal intent.

The judge's instruction, which
stated that evidence regarding com-
pliance with GAAS and GAAP was not con-

87.

clusive but was relevant, was a proper
statement. The weight to be given the
evidence was for the jury's determin-
ation.

b. "“Willfulness"

Defendants also assert that the
court erred in instructing the jury on
the issue of knowledge. The jury was
instructed that proof of negligence was
insufficient to support a conviction,
and that proof of good faith constitu-
ted a complete defense to the charges.
The court went on to instruct the jury
that, in determining intent, the jury
could consider whether defendants acted
in "reckless, deliberate indifference
to or disregard for truth or falsity"
and could infer from proof of such acts
that defendants acted willfully and

knowingly. 2°

The instruction was given before

our decision in United States v. Jewell,

532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (i976),
where we held:

"* * * To act ‘knowingly, '

88.

therefore, is not necessarily

to act only with positive

knowledge, but also to act with

an awareness of the high prob-

ability of the existence of

the fact in question. When

such awareness is present,

"positive" knowledge is not

required." 532 F.2d at 700
United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d
911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977). The trial
court's instruction in the present case
followed closely the instruction app-
roved by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d at 322-23.
There the trial court had instructed the
jury that, on proof of "reckless de-
liberate indifference to or disregard
for truth or falsity," the jury could
infer the defendants' willful and
knowing participation in the filing of
false financial information with the
SEC. The defendants contended that the

instruction erroneously failed to state

also that there must be a concurrent,
"conscious purpose to avoid learning
the truth." 527 F.2d at 323. The
court approved the instruction and
stated:

89.

"* * *The dual instruction
is not necessarily required, how-
ever, when the defendant is under
a specific duty to discover the
true facts, the facts tendered
are suspect, and he does nothing
to correct them." 527 F.2d
at 323

The court properly instructed the
jury on the need to find both deliber-
ate avoidance and an awareness of im-
propriety. Defendants here, as audit-
ors, had a duty carefully to investi-
gate and review the information pre-
sented. Because the instruction stated
that good faith constituted a complete
defense, it was implicit in the instruc-
tion that, coupled with a finding of
deliberate avoidance of knowledge, the
jury also had to find bad faith.

As the Second Circuit stated in
United States v. Simon:

"# @ * ‘While there is no
allowable inference of knowledge
from the mere fact of falsity,
there are many cases where from
the actor's special situation
and continuity of conduct an
inference that he did know the
untruth of what he said or wrote
may legitimately be drawn.'* * *
Evidence that defendants knowingly

90 .

suppressed one fact permitted,
although it surely did not
compel, an inference that their
suppression of another was like-
wise knowing and willful."
425 F.2d at 809, quoting from
Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d
’ ir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 713 (1926.

In view of the defendants' duty because
of their roles as auditors and financial
officer of the company, the jury in-
struction was proper.
Q. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
UNANIMITY

Lichtig, joined by Block and Weiner,
contends that the court failed to in-
struct the jury properly on the unanim-
ity requirements for a finding of guilt
on Count 6 and Gounts 10 through 14.4
These counts charged mail-fraud viol-
ations, and incorporated Count 2 and a
portion of Count 1 which detailed
specific wrongful acts. Lichtig argues
that Counts 1 and 2 alleged acts oc-
curring both while he was an auditor
and while he was an executive of Equity
Funding, that two distinct time periods |
were thus established, and that the jury

91.

should have been instructed that is had
to be unanimous as to at least one time
period. 7° Appellants also argue that
there was a failure to instruct on the
need for unanimity as to individual
“acts or specifications” in a single

count.

A reading of the jury instructions
shows that the court separated out the
six mail-fraud counts and instructed
the jury that it had to find three
elements in order to convict. The first
two elements were the participation of
the particular defendant in the offer-
ing or sale of securities where use was
made of some manner of transportation
in interstate commerce or of the mails.
The third element contained three al-
ternative subparts. As to this element
the jury was instructed it also had to
find that the defendant (1) willfully
and knowingly employed any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2)
willfully obtained money or property
by utilizing untrue statements of mat-
erial fact or by omitting statements of
material fact which were necessary to

92.

make the statement accurate, or (3) will-

fully and knowingly engaged in a trans-
action, practice, or course of business
which operated as a fraud or deceit

upon a purchaser. Immediately following

this instruction, the court continued:

"Although it is necessary

to prove only one of the three

different subparts I have just

mentioned, if you find one or

more of such subparts has been

proved, you must agree unanimously

upon at least one of such subparts
before you can convict for such
offense."

The instruction outlined the ele-
ments, and, for the one portion where
alternate findings were possible, clear-
ly emphasized the necessity of unanim-
ity. Unlike United States v. Natelli,
527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 394 (1976); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 547 (1969); and
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298

(1957), the jury here was properly in-

structed on unanimity and the various
alternate bases were supported by the
evidence. (See discussion on suffic-
iency of the evidence, Part O, supra.)

93.

As to the necessity of instructing
the jury that it had to agree unanimous-
ly in its verdicts on the individual
acts specified in a given charge:

"xe * *[T)he defendants
confuse the scheme to defraud,
which is the gist of the offense,
with the means adopted to effect-
uate that scheme.* * *" Simons v.
United States, 119 F.2d 539, 549
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
616 (1941).

See United States v. Amrep Corp., 560
F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977). The charges
against the defendants involved schemes

to defraud, and the particular acts al-
leged were the means for carrying the
general schemes into effect. The court
sufficiently instructed the jury on the
need for unanimity.
R. FAILURE TO HAVE CERTAIN
PROCEEDINGS RECORDED

Defendants contend that the trial
court erred in failing to have three
portions of the trial reported pursuant
to the mandate of the Court Reporter
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), that "all
proceedings in criminal cases had in

94.

open court" be recorded verbatim. The
proceedings that went unreported were:
(1) the judge's action in ascertaining
that the presence of two jurors on an
elevator during a conversation between
a government attorney and witness was
harmless; (2) part of the discussion
regarding the proposed jury instruc-
tions; and (3) a portion of the jury
voir dire.

The first event has been dealt with

in our discussion of alleged prejudic-
ial communications, Part C, supra, where
we find no significant basis for over-
ruling the trial court. We further

note that no explicit request for a
court reporter was made by defendants

at the time of the incident. See
United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545,
550 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

U.S. (1978). There was no error

in the court's handling of the situation.

As to the second incident, at the
commencement of the discussion on the
jury instructions the court stated,
"It seems to me that we should let the

95.

reporter go, because I don't plan on
making any rulings." No objection was
made and the reporter was dismissed.
Thereafter, Markowitz, attorney for
Block, requested the presence of the
reporter. A discussion on the record
ensued and the judge informed counsel
that he was willing to keep the report-
er there, but that the "free discussion"
they had been having would have to
cease and each attorney would have to
speak from the podium. The court as-
sured counsel that they would be given
an opportunity to make timely object-
ions on the record. Markowitz agreed
that if the making of a timely objec-
tion was shown on the record, there was
no need for the reporter. The reporter
was again excused. No objection was
made by any counsel.

Defendants now contend that they
are prejudiced because all of their
arguments regarding the instructions
are not available for review. As
promised by the judge, their objections
were reported in detail after a deter-

96.

mination had been made as to what in-
structions were to be given. Defendants
point to no objection that went unre-
ported; they point only to unreported
arguments in support of their objec-
tions. The objections were adequately
preserved for our review, and no counsel
has been bound merely to restating the
arguments made below; they have in fact
expanded on their arguments on appeal.
Trial courts frequently discuss in-
structions in chambers before a record
is made.

In addition, although this court
has held that compliance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 753(b) is mandatory, we have also
held that a waiver without personal
consent of the defendant is permissible.
United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d at
549-50. Counsel here withdrew the ob-
jection to the reporter's absence and
cannot now reassert it.

The last disputed incident involved
the trial court's preliminary "admin-
istrative" voir dire of the prospective
jurors. Before the case was formally

97.

called, the judge informed the array

of jurors that those who wished to be
excused should approach the bench in-
dividually, and he would then rule on
the sufficiency of each excuse present-
ed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c). The in-
dividual excuses were not reported.
When the case was called, defendants ob-
jected to the array and requested a
new array in its stead. The objection
was overruled, and regular voir dire

was conducted.

Although we believe that the better
procedure is to report everything said
in the courtroom, a reversal is not
necessary. Defendants allege no pre-
judice. The court's administrative
transactions with jurors who had per-
sonal excuses preceded the calling of
the case and the formal commencement
of the proceedings. The preliminary
screening of the array here, prior to
the calling of the case for trial, pre-
sents no different situation than if
the jurors had telephoned or written
their requests. If something prejudi-
cial to the case occurred, counsel

98.

could be depended upon to tell us what
it was. There has been no hint of any
irregularity. In United States v.
Piascik, decided after the trial in
this case, we stated:

"* * *In the exercise of

Our supervisory powers, we
Suggest that court reporters

e required to record (but not
transcribe unless requested for
appellate purposes) the voir dire
examination of jurors* * * when
requested by the court or counsel.
* * *" 559 F.2d at 550 (Emphasis
added).

S. CONCLUSION

While it was not necessary to not-
ice and discuss every point made by the
appellants in their lengthy briefs, we
have considered them all. Lichtig makes
several other charges of improper tac-
tics by government counsel which, when
examined in the context of the trial,
evaporate into harmless error, if in-
deed there was error at all. We do
notice, however, Lichtig's point about
the alleged failure of the government
to comply with 18 U.S.C. §3504, This
section requires the government in

99.

certain situations to admit or deny
certain types of surveillance. The
standards for such disclaimers are ad-
equately covered in United States v.
See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975);
United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d
1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1027
(9th Cir. 1973). We are satisfied, as
was the trial court, that the affida-
vits of the prosecutor sufficiently an-
swered all of Lichtig's checklist as-

sertions of improper surveillance. The
charges of misconduct leveled against
the prosecutor, not unlike some of the
other assignments of error, have been
magnified in the hope that some pellet
from the shotgun might fall upon a vul-
nerable spot. It is to the consider-
able credit of the judge who tried this
complex case that the record is not
only free from reversible error, but is
remarkably clean in terms of the minor
imperfections that creep into a long
and involved trial.

Affirmed.

100.

UNITED STATES v. WEINER
No. 75-2973

FOOTNOTES:
1

In “equity funding" or "life fund-
ing" programs, a participant purchases
mutual funds for cash; at the same time,
the participant purchases life insur-
ance with funds borrowed from the com-
pany by pledging the mutual funds as
security.

In United States v. Lustig, 555
F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1977), we said:
"Lustig would have a valid objection if
one or more jury members expressed some
uncertainty as to the verdict." But we
were speaking of the expression of the
uncertainty at the time of the poll,
not after the jurors had been excused

and subjected to out-of-court cultiva-
tion.

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492 (1896).

4We have recently held that giving
the instruction a second time is er-
roneous per se, United States v. Sea-
well, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir, 1977).

"Reciptocal income" was a term
used to describe a practice by brokers,
until it was discontinued, of sharing
commissions on market transactions with

the insurance producers.

The trial took place prior to the
effective date of Pub.L. 93-595, § l,
88 Stat. 1932 (1975), which created the
codified Federal Rules of Evidence,
Prior law is therefore applicable.

Cf. United States v. Dunn, 564
F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977) (dis-
cussing the slight evidence rule in the
context of sufficiency of the evidence).

Investors Planning sold contract-
ual plans for the purchase of mutual
funds. These plans did not involve an
actual contractual agreement, but

-b-

merely denoted programs where commiss-
ions on the sale of mutual funds were
collected in such a manner that up to

50 percent of the commissions were col-
lected in the first year and the balance
of the commissions were spread out over
the remainder of the period of acquisi-
tions, an average of 12-1/2 years. The
actual amount of commissions collected
On a completed program was approximately
equivalent to that collected under
other kinds of payment plans. Purchas-
ers of mutual funds were under no ob-
ligation to complete the plan and could
withdraw at any time, thus relieving
themselves of any future commission
obligation as well.

Trail commissions represent com-

missions not yet collected but expected
as future sales under the programs are

made.

10 Detail is the term for the in-

dividual components of an account.

-Cc@-

11 Coconspirator hearsay admissib-

ility does not depend upon the declar-
ant's unavailability. 4 J. Weinstein

& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence

qq 800 [04], 804(a) [01]; Fed. R. Evid.
804.

12 The defendants' contention that

the government was obliged to grant
immunity to Goldblum so that he might
testify on their behalf is also merit-
less. The Sixth Amendment contains no
such requirement. United States v.
Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).

United States v. Baxter, 492
F.2d 150, 177 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).

14

See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204, 213 (1972), where the Court
reemphasizes the significance of the
reliability of the offered evidence.

1s This statutory grant of "use

plus derivative use" immunity is co-
extensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
462 (1971). See Goldberg v. Weiner,
480 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1972).

16 In Part K we discuss an aspect

of the proceeding before the SEC,
Block testified before the SEC on May
21, 22, and 30, 1973, and on September
24, 1973. He first testified in his
bankruptcy case on December 11, 1973.

17

The trial judge was careful to
summarize the charges in the six counts
for the jury, including the portions

of Counts 1 and 2 which were incorpor-
ated by reference, and to admonish the
jury to consider only the counts sub-
mitted to it and not the counts which
had been dismissed.

46 The accounting firm of which all

three defendants were a part was orig-
inally called Wolfson and Weiner. It
expanded to Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and
Lapin, and then merged with Seidman and
Seidman in 1971.

19 The relevant portion of the text

which appears in each of these counts
is as follows:

"* * * [T]he firm of Wolfson,
Weiner, Ratoff and Lapin (Seid-
man and Seidman), certified
public accountants, had examined
the consolidated statements of
financial condition of EFCA and
its subsidiaries as of December
31, 1968 (1969-1971), and the
related consolidated statements
of earnings and retained earn-
ings and the consolidated state-
ments of additional paid-in
capital for the five years then
ended, in accordance with general-
ly accepted auditing standards,
and that, in the opinion of
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff and
Lapin (Seidman and Seidman), the
aforesaid financial statements
presented fairly the consolidated
financial position of EFCA and
its subsidiaries as of December
31, 1968 (1969-1971), and the
consolidated results of operations

ofa

for the five years then ended,
in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles
applied on a consistent basis."

20

21 "Reciprocal commissions' is the

term used for the portion of commiss-
ions earned by various brokerage houses
on securities transactions involving
Equity Funding that was returned to
Equity Funding.

22 The revised portion of the note,

with the addition underlined, reads:

"Under the Company's
method of operations, this
represents, in the aggregate,
the amount that clients owe as
a result of the various "Equity
Funding Programs' offered by
the Company, and net contracts
receivable together with loan
and/or receivables where ‘Equity
Funding Programs' have terminated."

23

Referring to our earlier dis-

aa

cussion of the transaction, we note

that the valuation placed on the Clients

Contractual Accounts and the creation
of the account were concurred in by
Weiner, who participated in developing
the accounting treatment.

24 He made an error that Goldblum

feared would invite close scrutiny of
the financial statements, and was then
replaced in this role by Lowell,

25 Because covering up the receipt

of "recip" was one of the reasons
given for many questionable recording
practices, the jury could logically
infer that Block's statement showed
knowledge of at least some of these
practices.

26 The instruction reads, in per-

tinent part:

"One circumstance you are en-
titled to consider and weigh in
determining whether the defen-
dants Weiner, Lichtig, and Block
acted willfully and knowingly

=@h=

while in their capacities as
independent accountants in
relation to Equity Funding is
whether they followed or deviated
from generally accepted auditing
Standards or accounting principles
in effect at the times here
pertinent,

"For example, in this case,
you may recall evidence of cer-
tain accounting principles or
auditing standards which were
talked about.

"The government points to
evidence which they say estab-
lishes that, at various times
each of the defendants deviated
from sound accounting principles
and auditing standards,

"Evidence on this issue is
not conclusive, however, on the
overriding issue of the defen-
dant's [sic] knowledge and intent.
The weight and credibility to be
extended by you to such proof
must depend among other things,
on the weight you give to the
opinion evidence offered by the
Governments' [sic] witnesses,

"Generally, when a certified
public accountant is engaged to
perform an independent audit for
a corporation such as Equity

Funding, he represents and warrants

that he will perform the audit
and other accounting work in

-i-

accordance with generally accept-
ed auditing standards and general-
ly accepted accounting principles
and that he will render an opinion
as to whether the financial state-
ment of the company fairly rep-
resents its financial position

and the results of its business
operation.

"Proof, if any, that any of
these defendants departed from
such standards of auditing and
accounting as were then applicable
or participated in the preparation
or approval of an audited finan-
cial statement that did not
fairly present Equity Funding's
financial position is evidence,
though not necessarily conclusive
evidence, that the individual
defendant involved did not act
honestly or in good faith, and
that the financial statement
prepared contrary to such stan-
dards may have been materially
false or misleading."

a7 "The objective of the ordinary
examination of financial state-
ments by the independent auditor
is the expression of an opinion

on the fairness with which they
present financial position in
conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. The audit-
or's report is the medium through
which he expresses his opinion or,
if circumstances require, dis-

-j-

claims an opinion. In either case,

he states whether his examina-
tion has been made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing
standards." Committee on Auditing
Procedure, American Institute of
ee Public Accountants,
atement on Auditi
§ 110.01 (1973). i ei aaa

The instruction reads, in per-

tinent part:

"It is not enough, of c
merely to establish chat a re fon
defendant acted negligently or
through error or mistake. Under
our system of laws men are not
punished criminally for mere mis-
takes in judgment, mismanagement
carelessness, negligence, or
errors of judgment. They are
punished only for intentional
wrongdoing. The defendants are
not on trial here for errors of
judgment or mistakes or mismanage-
ment or negligence, but are on
trial for a criminal offense, and
an essential element of that
offense is an evil or criminal
intent, which it is incumbent
upon the government to prove to
your satisfaction and beyond a
reasonable doubt before you will
be warranted in returning a
verdict of guilty.

"The defendants argue that

oka

they acted in good faith in

their activities relating to
Equity Funding. Good faith,

that is to say, an honest belief
in the truth of the statement
made, would constitute a complete
defense here.

"Tf the evidence in the case
leaves you with a reasonable
doubt as to whether the accused
in good faith believed the finan-
cial statements, auditors'
certificates, and other written
statements to be true at the
time they were made, then you
should acquit the accused.

"While I have stated that
negligence or mistake does not
constitute guilty knowledge or
intent, nevertheless, ladies and
gentlemen, you are entitled to
consider in determining whether
a defendant acted with such
intent if he deliberately closed
his eyes to the obvious or to the
facts that certainly would be
observed or ascertained in the
course of his portion of the
accounting works, or whether he
recklessly states as facts
matters of which he knew he was
ignorant.

"If you find such a reckless,
deliberate indifference to or dis-
regard for truth or falsity on the
part of a given defendant when
considered in the light of all
other evidence relating to inte..t,

=-j=

ee se SESS.

me

wre

you may, but you need not
necessarily, infer therefrom that
such defendant acted willfully
re knowingly. Such an

inference, of course, depends upon
the weight and credibility ex- '
tended to the evidence of

reckless and indifferent conduct
if any."

29
Block and Weiner also raise this

issue in regard to Counts 80 and 84.

30
Block's and Weiner's incorpora-

tion of this argument is clearly merit-
less since Lichtig's argument is pre-

mised on his change in position.

-m-

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FILED
JUL 21 1978

EMIL E. MELFI, JR.
CLERK, U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

Appellee,

Vv.

JULIAN S. H. WEINER;
MARVIN AL LICHTIG:
and SOLOMON BLOCK,

Appellants.

No. 75-2973

)
)
)
) ORDER
)
)
)

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of
California

Before: CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges,
and THOMPSON*, District Judge.

On May 26, 1978, appellants Weiner and
Block filed a petition for rehearing with
a suggestion for rehearing en banc.

On May 30, 1978, appellant Lichtig
filed a petition for rehearing.

® The Honorable Bruce R. Thompson,
United States District Judge for the

District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

B-l.

—

has
May

The panel as constituted in this case

voted to amend the opinion filed

15, 1978, in the following particulars:
At page 10, line 5, of the

typewritten opinion (page 1587 of

the printed slip opinion, top of

right-hand column), starting with

"Lichtig's present claim", delete

the remainder of the paragraph and

substitute the following language:

Lichtig claims he discovered
the existence of the agree-
ment on May 7, 1976, almost
a year after the conclusion
of the trial. However, the
record on appeal does not
contain any evidence of the
agreement or of the govern-
ment's knowledge that such
an agreement existed. The
issue is therefore not pro-
perly before us.

At page 35, line 20, of the type-
written opinion (page 1601 of the
printed slip opinion, line 10,
right-hand column), delete the
period after the word “statement”
and insert before "The untrue”
the following language:

which stated that an indepen-
dent audit of the financial

B-2.

statement using GAAS had
found it to reflect truth-
fully the financial condi-
tion of the company and its
operations and to have been
prepared according to GAAP.

Count 76 charges that

Lichtig and another defen-

dant “wilfully made and

caused to be made untrue
statements of material fact"
or “wilfully omitted and
caused to be omitted state-
ments of material fact" in
the December registration
statement.

At page 36, lines 15-18, of
the typewritten opinion (page
1602 of the printed slip opinion,
lines 12-16, left hand column),
delete the two sentences begin-
ning "The SEC had previously
ruled” and ending “to receive
such money.”

At page 48, line 1l, of the
typewritten opinion (page 1608
of the printed slip opinion,
line 4, right-hand column),
substitute "Lichtig” for

"Block".

With the opinion so amended, the
panel has voted to deny the petitions
B-3.

for rehearing and to reject the sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc. The full
court has been advised of the proposed
amendments, and of the suggestion for
rehearing en banc, and no judge has
requested a vote on the suggestion for
rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App. P.
35(b).

It is ordered that the opinion in

this case is amended as set forth above;

the petition for rehearing filed by
appellant Lichtig is denied; and the
petition for rehearing filed by appel-
lants Weiner and Block is denied and
their suggestion for rehearing en banc
is rejected.

B-4.

APPENDIX C

ALLEN INSTRUCTION GIVEN
BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE

"This is an important case. The
trial has been expensive in time and
effort and money to both the defense and
the prosecution. If you should fail to
agree on a verdict the case is left open
and undecided. Like all cases, it must
be disposed of some time.

"There appears no reason to believe
that another trial would not be as costly
to both sides, nor does there appear any
reason to believe that the case can be
tried again by either side better or more
exhaustively than it has been tried
before you.

"Any future jury would be selected
in the same manner from the same sgurce
as you have been chosen, so there appears
to be no reason to believe that the case
would ever be submitted to twelve men
and women more conscientious, more im-
partial or more competent to decide, or
that more or clearer evidence could be
produced on behalf of either side.

"Of course, these things suggest
themselves upon a brief reflection to

C-l,

all of us who have sat through this

trial. The only reason they are mentioned
now is because some of them may have
escaped your attention which must have
been fully occupied up to this time in
reviewing the evidence in the case.

"They are matters which, along with
others, and perhaps more obvious ones,
remind us how desirable it is that you
unanimously agree on a verdict.

"As stated in the instructions given
at the time the case was submitted to you
for decision, you should not surrender
your honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of evidence solely because of
the opinion of the other jurors, or for
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
However, it is your duty as jurors to
consult with one another and to delib-

rate with a view to reaching an agree-
ment if you can do so without violence
to your individual judgment.

"Bach of you must decide the case for
yourself, but you should do so only after
a consideration of the evidence in the
case with your fellow jurors. And in the
course ot your deliberations you should
not hesitate to re-examine your own views

C-2.

and change your opinion if convinced that
it is erroneous.
"In order to bring twelve minds to
a unanimous result you must examine the
questions submitted to you with candor
and frankness and with proper deference
to and regard for the opinions of each
other. That is to say, in conferring
together each of you should pay due
attention and respect to the views of
the others and listen to each other's
arguments with a disposition to re-
examine your own views.
"If much the greater number of you
are for a conviction, each dissenting
juror ought to consider whether a doubt
in his or her mind is a reasonable one
since it makes no effective impression
upon the minds of so many equally honest,
equally conscientious fellow jurors who
bear the same responsibility, serve under
the same oath and have heard the same
evidence with, and we may assume, the
same attention and an equal desire to
arrive at the truth.
"On the other hand, if a majority
or even a lesser number of you are for
acquittal, other jurors ought seriously
c-3. |
|

to ask themselves most thoughtfully
whether they do not have reason to doubt
the correctness of a judgment which is
not concurred in by many of their fellow
jurors and whether they should not dis-
trust the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence which fails to convince the
minds of several other fellows beyond a
reasonable doubt.

"You are not partisians, you are
judges, judges of the facts. Your sole
interest here is to seek the truth from
the evidence in the case.

"You are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of all witnesses and the
weight and effect of all evidence. In
the performance of this high duty you
are at liberty to disregard all comments
of both the Court and counsel, including,
of course, the remards which I am now
making.

"Remember at all times that no juror
is expect [sic] to yield a conscientious
conviction he or she may have as to the
weight or effect of evidence. But,

remember, also, that after full delibera-

tion and consideration of all the
C-4.

evidence in the case it is your duty to
agree upon 4 verdict if you can do so
without violating your own individual
judgment and your conscience."

APPENDIX D

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY KRUEGER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I, MARY KRUEGER, being duly sworn,
say:

I was a juror in the above-entitled
matter. That at no time did I vote
"Guilty" for the defendants, but rather
voted "Guilty with reservation", and my
ballot was so marked and I so informed the
jury. By so informing the jury, I meant
that I had a reasonable doubt. I made
this statement repeatedly to the jury,
particularly on May 20, 1975 in the jury
room before the final vote in the matter.
I read the statement which is marked Ex-
hibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference and which reflects my
attitude at the time and qualification of
my "Guilty" vote as being one subject to
reasonable doubt or reservation.

The form of the question, as asked by
the Clerk, as to whether or not that was
my verdict, threw me off because obviously
that was the verdict of the jury if you in-
cluded my conditional "Guilty" vote which

D-l.

was not truly a “Guilty” vote, but a
"Guilty" with an inordinate doubt as to
guilt. If I had been asked the question
in the form I expected it, I would have
answered that I felt that any vote of
"Guilty" by me was subject to at least a
reasonable doubt as defined by the Court
and was in fact a “Not Guilty” vote. How-
ever, following my surprise at the ques-
tion coming in a different form than I had
anticipated, I became so upset that I
could not speak further in order to ex-
plain my position. For that reason, I re-
quested to see Judge Curtis, and met with
the Judge for the purpose of explaining
my opposition and showing him Exhibit "A",
which is attached hereto. I did this as
soon as I could after Court recessed fol-
lowing the verdict. The Judge told me
there is no use in flaying myself and “to
go home and forget it.”

I felt during the trial that I was sub-
ject to a great deal of pressure from the
Judge to reach a verdict, as I have stated
in the statement which I read to the jury
before my vote. I also felt pressure from
my fellow jurymen in that I felt that they

were anxious to terminate the deliberation,
D-2.

and I felt I was holding them up and keep-
ing them from going about their busines-
ses. They said that they were getting
butterflies in their stomachs, that they
were afraid the Judge was going to scold
them, and unless I capitulated that they
would never get to leave because the Judge
would keep us there until we reached a
unanimous verdict based on the last in-
struction of record on May 14, 1975, given
by the Judge. These were the reasons

that I even gave the qualified vote of
"Guilty with reservations" on Tuesday,

May 20, 1975, which had nothing to do with
the merits of the case or any belief in
the guilt of the defendants on my part. I
did not then think that the defendants
were guilty at the time of the vote, in-
cluding the final vote. I did not think
that we reached a unanimous verdict of
Guilty. I have not ever thought they were
Guilty, and I do not now believe them to
be Guilty. I wish to reiterate that I
never voted "Guilty". I voted "Guilty with
reservation" which to me was the equivalent
of meaning I had inordinate doubt as to
their Guilt, which in the eyes of the law I

thought would be equivalent to innocent, and
D-3

APPENDIX TO AFFIDAVIT OF MARY KREUGER

eege' he pat ome Pesan pee see =
would be the equivalent of a "Not Guilty” és —

vote. Serbs BOs ae y_pnlcpedd”

I expected the foreman to report a eres, i Ot thd al ‘te’. Ez lose SS
vote of eleven "Guilty" votes and one : alt f
: , Z Setersls of. Ce Lows, “cere ,
vote “Guilty with Mary's explanation" (I > anil hyp

understood this to mean my "“reservation") an Legfe Seale Segased by h, hen “ff

which I expected to explain meant "Guilty f, WA
Lo 7 oe reel lia foo!

with an inordinate doubt" ("Not Guilty") fA eg tie

if, Ad a Luaews auteade,

had I been given the opportunity (and

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which opportunity anticipated having). er Z
This was a way I knew to try to get across ey, hg ale howe! ade i to Ceutag
to the Judge that my convictions and con- r Cat - We ft Lif the 2 Bent
science were being violated by his last peed el oe CE ff a.

aft fi x4

instruction of Wednesday, May 14, 1975. y: y 3 , eg Aa
4g Ze ‘oiliss
One part of that instruction contradicted ae A * abe?

another part of it. I felt that this last A Va ihe acter ine! . |
instruction pressured my vote. pat “7° J wee ee aay es
woe Yon = me

I declare under penalty of perjury ip Bs
that the foregoing is true and correct. A va ae ” Ue, fou ey Oe onal, Afr
uaa i os S

Ae g s yf" Mivigs oe Pe

Executed at Los Angeles, California, 2 wo LAté
this 27th day of May, 1975. ve lee aihy 4 7

as Mehl of tel,
(Xerox of Mary Krueger's letter ar . Lip . fai yes

attached hereto)

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Transliteration of Appendix of

Affidavit
The last five days have not been a rest
for me; it has been a prolonged agony.
Last Wednesday I tried to wash my hands
of this decision. I anticipated that I
would be released from duty to the jury
and that an alternate would replace me
inasmuch that they also heard all the
testimony and evidence. I felt that my
purposes in declining to participate in
the jury was both misunderstood and im-
pugned. I had no intention of "hangin”
the jury when I refused to be party to
the jury. I intended to “unhang" the
jury and get all of us, including myself,
off of the hook judicially. As you know
my good intentions were not realized, in-
stead it appeard as if I intended to hang
the jury. I am sorry to have discomfited
you. As you are aware, instead of being
released from the jury; the Judge required
that we reach a unanimous verdict. The
Judge gave additional instructions to the
jury and in doing so he impaled me on the
horns of a dilemma I may not evade. In
effect he has forced a confrontation with

contradictions in his instructions. As
D-12.

an example, look at our four day vacation.
Although I suspect that the suggestion
emanated from the brain of Mr. Ablese,
the Judge concurred and gave us 2 extra
days off not only for the stated reason
of taking a rest, but also to expedite
the decision, to speed the juridical
process, and to return from the four
free days with a verdict one way or the
other. In those same instructions, he
said that we should take as much time as
necessary and be at our leisure.

A contradiction of greater impact was
the Judge's statement that the dissenting
juror should consider the majority deci-
sion, give weight to the opinion of other
jurors, and reconsider the evidence. To
the contrary, the Judge said the dissent-
ing juror should not do violence to one's
conscience. If I concur with the Majority
opinion, I've done violence to my con-
science. If I do not do violence to my
conscience, I have not made verdict unani-
mous. By virtue of the instructions the
Judge gave us, I'm in the wrong by the
criterion of one instruction or the other
no matter which decision I make. The

fact that I have tried my best to wash my
D-13.

hands of this conviction, that I do not
make this decision willingly, but un-
willingly, that the Judge has ordained
the decision instead of my acting on my
own volition, does not deprive me of
guilt inculcated by my decision, but
shares it with the Judge who demands

the decision.

These facts throw a sop to my sore con-
science and salves my suffering. Thus I
cast my vote with your verdict and throw
in my lot with yours with my many reser-
vations and qualifications you will know
because I insist on it, altho the court
probably will not.

To my mind, you have presented positive,
but evidence insufficient for myself
which does not adequately convince me of
conviction. There has been a claim I
have based my decision on pure feeling.
This is false inasmuch that it is not
entirely true. I, too, have made a case
which I have not made clear as you do
not understand or acknowledge as a case
because of its poor presentation. As I
stated several times before I do not
doubt that the defendants did what they
D-14.

did such as sign registration statements,
but I do not think that what they did
constitutes criminal intent, that they
were altogether willing and knowing par-
ticipants in the fraud, that these were
holes in the government's case. You
based your case on the evidence you im-
puted to the charges; I based mine on
negative proof, on the insufficiency of
your case to my mind, to the overreaching
doubt in my mind. I do not have a reason-
able doubt, but more than a reasonable
doubt; an inordinate doubt. I believe
they are only guilty of negligence, mal-
feasance, and general slobbery which are
subject to civil suit. You have won the
case not ee on merits but by default of
my memory to prove the contrary, by my
inability to argue my case adequately,
all of which goes to show I would make a
lousy lawyer.

Hence I capitulate to your conviction,
commit myself to culpability, and curtsey
to my conscience. I am an unwilling par-
ty to verdict of guilty and I stand com-
mitted to stricken conscience.

D-15.

APPENDIX E

AFFIDAVIT OF ARMANDO CARRILLO

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I, ARMANDO CARRILLO, being duly sworn,
say:

I was a juror in the above-entitled
matter. At no time did Mary Krueger vote
"Guilty" for the Defendants, but rather,
at all times after Wednesday, May 14,
1975, voted "Guilty with Reservation."
When the foreman Charles Flores read and
tallied the votes on the final vote and
on numerous votes preceding the final
vote where Mary Krueger had voted "Guilty
with Reservation," the foreman always
read "Eleven Guilty, one Guilt with
Reservation" or "Twelve Guilty with
Mary Krueger's Reservation." Mary Krueger
informed us, the jury, that her vote of
"Guilty with Reservation" meant that she
had at least reasonable doubt concerning
the guilt of the Defendants. She made
this statement repeatedly to us, and read
a rather lengthy statement to us on May
20, 1975, in the jury room before the
final vote was taken. The final vote was

E-l.

el
ees

read by the foreman as "Eleven Guilty,
one Guilty with Reservation." I ques-
tioned that this was not a unanimous
decision and a debate ensued thereon.
The jury never voted on whether the
final vote of “Eleven Guilty, one Guilty
with Reservation" should be reported to
the Court «as a unanimous guilty verdict.
I always understood Mary Krueger's vote
to be, in fact, a "Not Guilty" vote.

I also remember the jury discussing
how Mary Krueger would respond if polled
in the courtroom, It was clear in my
mind that if asked "Guilty or Not Guilty?"
Mary Krueger wovld have stated "Guilty
with Reservation" and would have explained
her vote to the Court in a manner similar
to the statement read in the jury room on
May 20, 1975. I also understood that if,
on polling, she were asked if the verdict
were of her own volition or made by her
freely and willingly, Mary Krueger would
have answered "No" and explained her
reasons. However, when the polling ques-
tion was asked it was not phrased in a
manner anticipated by the members of the
jury, nonetheless from the discussions

E-2.

in the jury room, I understood Mary

Krueger's vote to,

in fact, be "Not

Guilty" and that, if given the oppor-

tunity, she intended to explain her vote

to the Court.

E-3.

APPENDIX F

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES FLORES

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
>: os
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I, CHARLES FLORES, being duly sworn,
say:

I was a juror in the above entitled
matter. During our deliberations we had
in the jury room with us the following
portions of the indictment: Count l, a
short portion of Count 2, Count 6, Counts
10-14 and Counts 75-84, Count 1 was read
by several jurors and I read it out loud
to the entire jury on at least one occa-
sion. I had the impression that the co-
conspirator portions of Count 1 were
still incorporated into the latter counts
which were submitted to us for our delib-
erations. There was, however, a hand-
written note at the top of Count 1, but
I do not recall what that note said or
know who wrote it.

It is my understanding from its de-
liberations and discussions that the jury
as a whole came to a Guilty verdict based
upon the mandates in the instruction that
dealt with reckless disregard and that

Fel,

the defendants could be found guilty of
the crimes charged if any of them signed
documents containing information of which
that defendant knew he was ignorant.
(Government's Proposed Instruction No.
35, as Modified). We, as a jury, had a
lot of problems reconciling this instruc-
tion with the negligence instruction also
read to us by the Judge,

Mary Krueger, the juror who had re-
fused to deliberate further on May 14,
1975, tried her best to follow the man-
dates of the instruction read to us by
the Judge the afternoon of May 14, 1975,
in order to reach some sort of a verdict
howsoever we (the jury) could; it was
not until then that she made a conces-
sion to our language
voting "Guilty with Reservation."

At no time did she vote straight
"Guilty" for the defendants, but rather,
at all times on Wednesday, May 14, 1975,
voted "Guilty with Reservation." When I,
as foreman, read and tallied the votes,
on the final vote and on numerous votes
preceding the final vote where Mary
Krueger had voted "Guilty with

F=2

Reservation", I read it as "Eleven
Guilty with one reservation," or ". ..
with Mary's reservation," or "with

Mary's explanation.” Mary Krueger read

a statement to the jury on May 20, 1975,
after we returned from lunch. I ques-
tioned each member of the jury as to
whether they would stand with her vote of
"Guilty with Reservation". Before re-
turning the verdict, Ms. Krueger an-
nounced her intention to explain her
"reservations" to the Court upon delivery
of the verdict.

Subscribed to and sworn to before a
Notary Public on the 6th day of June,
1975.

F-3, . ;

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1556%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
