# motion to dismiss — Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** motion to dismiss
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 809

## Text

ann oon. a4
D
ations JUL 10 1978
Supreme Court of the Unite States a
October Term, 1977 i me n
No. 77-1671
MODJESKA SIGN STUDIOS, INC.,
Appellant,
We
PETER A.A. BERLE,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Appellee
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Tel. No. (518) 474-8096

RUTH KESSLER TOCH
Solicitor General

STANLEY FISHMAN
MURRAY SUSSWEIN
Assistant Attorneys General
of Counsel

Daily Record Corporation 3948 Spauiding Law Printing
Rochester. New York ( ) Syracuse, New York

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NE Ss dio cu deernannsececescooune u
Opinion and Determinations Below ............... 2
ccc tthe vag ee Cee ea ee Nabe she aE EROS 2
ein ted de Neo RS ECKEE TR ORD oO 2
I ee re ee ee ee 4
EE Su eh ee bed Pha We hensicesenvde cesses 5

Argument

POINT I — The determination appealed from — having
remitted the case to a trial court for further proceeding
involving a constitutional issue — is not a final
judgment. Therefore, this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear thisappeal ....... asicuve as »

POINT II — No substantial federal questions are
presented on this appeal, since it is well-settled that a
statute, enacted pursuant to a state’s police power,
which: (A) merely regulates the place and manner of
commercial advertising, such as billboards, does not
infringe upon freedom of speech in violation of the
First Amendment; and (B) provides an amortization
period for phaseout of pre-existing uses to enable an
owner to substantially recoup his investment in such
property prior to discontinuance of the use thereof,
does not deprive the owner of property without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
Wa vad sc bee Nok Care buecceeec er eneene 10

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F. 2d 118
(10th Cir., 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S. 982 (1974) ...... 17
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26(1954) ............... ll
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) .... 8,9
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ............045. 13
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
RE ae a ee eee eed os aaa 16
Markham Advertising Co., Inc. v. Washington, 73 Wash
2d 405, 439 P. 2d 248 (1968), app. dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question 393 U.S. 316 (1969);
rehearing denied 393 U.S. 1112(1969) .......... 13, 16,17
National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 464 P.
2d 33 (Cal, 1970), cert, den. 398 U.S. 946(1970) ...... 17

People v. Adirondack Raiiway Co., 160 N.Y. 225 (1899),
affd sub nom Adirondack Railway Co. v. New York
ee, PE Eo cS bbeuceesieecee ds ll

Radvo Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) )
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62

DE gc cnen cheeks ates Keeaheanaeenade wees 9
Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 NY2d 483

ne eer ss Perr a er ee 2,6
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ......... 13
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council,

i eos wkcdawecuns cas Phnece 14, 16

Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) . . . 16

wi
Page

New York Constitutional Provisions:
BY a ne ee 15
N.Y. Const., Art. XIV (“Conservation”) ............. 3, 11
Statutes:
EY, icc cu tanweuewsudeunednscanaws 1, 2, 4, 8
N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 9-0305

EN iad EN ad wg passim
N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 9-0101 (1) and

i es ee oe ae 11
N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law, § 11-0529

i ee ea cid ewee 11
N.Y. Public Lands Law, § 17 (McKinney’s 1951) ....... ll
SEIUUML UE ‘Scnavaceduaanedcecccsues 11
ED dc ondncdcennenséueseces 11
EE vec keexsécedcbewene ces 10
oe eee bed enkeees 3, 10
UAE 64.606 606060050c00000005 3, 10

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1977

No. 77-1671

MODJESKA SIGN STUDIOS, INC.,
Appellant,

Vv.

PETER A.A. BERLE,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

Appellee, Peter A.A. Berle, Commissioner of Environmental
Conservation of the State of New York, by his attorney, Louis J.
Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State of New York, moves
this Court, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of this
Court, to dismiss the appeal herein on the following grounds:

I. This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal
since the determination appealed from is not a “final
determination” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2);

II. No substantial Federal questions are presented by this
appeal.

Opinion and Determinations Below

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, dated
December 21, 1977, is reported at 43 NY2d 468 and is set forth as
Appendix “A” to appellant's “Jurisdictional Statement”
(hereinafter “J.S.”), at pages la - 13a.

The Court of Appeals in its “Remittitur”, also dated December
21, 1977 (J.S., App. “D”, pp. 3la - 32a), “remitted the case to
Supreme Court, Albany County, for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion herein” .' (Emphasis ours.)

Jurisdiction

Appellant seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

It is appellee's position (as discussed in Point I of “Argument”,
infra, pp. 8-10) that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal.

Statutes Involved
I. Federal Statute

Appellant claims that the determination by the New York
State Court of Appeals is a final judgment and, therefore, it may
appeal to this Court therefrom pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2),
which, in relevant part, provides:

“§ 1257. State courts, appeal; certiorari. Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court as follows:

IThereafter, the Court of Appeals, by order dated February 22, 1978 (JS.,
App. “E”, p. 39a) denied a motion by appellant herein (and by the appellant
in a related case, entitled Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse [which
case is being simultaneously appealed to this Court)), “for reargument of the

eer
.

appeals ° * * or, in the alternative to amend the remittiturs herein

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity
of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”

Il. New York State Statute

The statute challenged on this appeal is § 9-0305 of the En-
vironmental Conservation Law of the State of New York
(hereinafter ECL, § 9-0305). This statute bars the erection or
maintenance of any off-premises outdoor advertising signs,
device or structure within the boundaries of the Adirondack and
Catskill Parks’ without a permit issued by the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation. This statute was
made applicable to the Catskill Park by Laws of 1969, Chapter
1052, effective May 26, 1969, which provided that all signs in the
Catskill Park not eligible for a permit were to be amortized over
a period of time to be individually determined for each sign, and
then removed.

By Laws of 1970, Chapter 392, effective May 1, 1970, the
statute was further amended to provide a general amortization
period of 6-1/2 years for signs in the Catskill Park, in place of the
individually determined amortization periods.

The relevant portions of the statute, as currently in effect,
provide:

“§ 90305. Signs and advertising in Adirondack and
Catskill parks.

“1. In order to conserve the natural beauty of the
Adirondack and Catskill parks, to preserve and regulate
the said parks for public uses for the resort of the public
for recreation, pleasure, air, light and enjoyment, to keep
them open, safe, clean, and in good order for the welfare

2]t should be noted that the state-owned lands, consisting of a substantial
portion of said parks, are constitutionally protected and required to “be
forever kept as wild forest lands.” (N.Y.S. Cons., Art. XIV, Section 1.)

of society, and to protect and conserve the investment of
the state in forest lands, campsites and other interests in
real property in said parks, no person shall erect or
maintain within the boundaries thereof any advertising
sign, advertising structure or device of any kind, except
under written permit from the department. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to signs erected
or maintained upon a parcel or real property in con-
nection with the principal business or principal
businesses conducted thereon and which advertise such
business or businesses only, or to signs within the limits
of an incorporated village.

“As to signs, structures or devices existing within the
Catskill park on May 26, 1969, and which require a
permit pursuant to this section, the same may continue to
be maintained without permit until January 1, 1976
provided that the property owner or owner of such sign,
structure or device registers the same with the depart-
ment on or before January 1, 1972.

. oe *,

Questions Presented

I. Is the opinion and order of remittitur of the New York
State Court of Appeals — which reversed the order of the Ap
pellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
and remitted the case “for further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion herein” — a final judgment within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), thus giving this Court jurisdiction to hear
this appeal?

II. Since it is well settled that a state statute regulating the
place and manner of outdoor advertising signs for aesthetic
purposes, and which contains an amortization period for
phaseout of existing non-conforming signs, constitutes a valid
exercise of the police power, and that such a statute neither
violates the freedom of speech provisions of the First Amend-
ment nor constitutes a deprivation of property without due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, do claims
that ECL, § 9-0305 violate the aforesaid provisions of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments present substantial Federal
questions warranting plenary review by this Court?

Statement

In its “Statement” (J.S., pp. 4-10), appellant sets forth an
argumentative version of the “facts”, liberally supplemented by
statements of opinion and “facts” not contained in, nor sup
ported by, the Record on Appeal before the New York State
Court of Appeals. Appellant, by the paucity of its references to
that Record, implicitly acknowledges that the bulk of its “facts”
were not before the Court below.

We therefore set forth what we submit is the essential! factual
background of the case.

Appellant is the owner of approximately 96 outdoor ad-
vertising signs located in the Catskill Park (R. 92)’, all of which
were erected prior to May 26, 1969, when the provisions now
contained in ECL, § 9-0305 became applicable to the Catskill
Park.

ECL, § 9-0305 prohibits the erection of off-premise advertising
signs or structures within the Catskill or Adirondack Parks,
except under written permit from the Department of En-
vironmental Conservation. The ststute expressly exempts from
its scope all “signs withir the limics of an incorporated village.”
It also provides that signs within the Catskill Park existing prior
to May 26, 1969, may continue to be maintained without a
permit until January 1, 1976. As stated at page 8 of Appellant’s
Jurisdictional Statement, appellant’s signs are not eligible for
permits under rules promulgated by the Department of En-
vironmental Conservation and, hence, as of January 1, 1976, the
signs were subject to removal.

Appellant commenced this action in the New York State
Supreme Court, Albany County, for a declaratory judgment on
December 30, 1975, by service of the summons (R. 23) and

3Unless otherwise noted, parenthetical references (R. _) are to the Record
on Appeal before the New York State Court of Appeals.

verified complaint (R. 24-41), together with an order to show
cause (R. 18-20), seeking a preliminary injunction. Appellant's
complaint contained allegations, inter alia, that ECL, § 9-0305
was unconstitutional on its face in that (a) it effects a
deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (b) it effects an im-
permissible abridgment of speech, in violation of the First
Amendment.

Appellee cross-moved (R. 42-48) to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action and requested that such motion
be treated as one for summary judgment, on the grounds that no
materia! question of fact existed and the complaint raised solely
questions of law which must, on the basis of settled decisional
law of the State of New York, be decided in appellee’s favor.

New York Supreme Court, Special Term, denied appellant's
motion for a preliminary injunction and granted appellee’s cross-
motion for summary judgment declaring the subject statute to
be constitutional (R. 917). The New York Appellate Division
affirmed (R. 88-97).

The New York Court of Appeals (the State’s highest Court)
reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the
case to Supreme Court, Albany County “to provide plaintiff with
an opportunity to establish, if it can, that the statutory
amortization period of six and one-half years is unreasonable, as
applied” (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a).

The Court of Appeals did, however, uphold the con-
stitutionality of ECL, § 9-0305 on its face, stating, “we cannot
agree with plaintiff's contention that BCL 9-0305 unreasonably
deprives it of property without due process of law” (43 NY2d at
p. 477 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 7a). The Court of Appeals, instead, held
ECL, § 9-0305 to be a reasonable exercise of the police power,
reaffirming its “prior decisions holding aesthetics to be a valid
basis for the exercise of the police power (see Suffolk Outdoor

Adv. Co. v. Hulse, 43 NY2d 483 [decided herewith])” 43 NY2d at
p. 473 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 2a]). The Court further stated that the
statute did not constitute a “taking” of property without due
process, since “it cannot be said that the prohibition of billboards
deprives landowners or their lessees of all reasonable use of their
property” (43 N Y2d at p. 477 [J.S., App. “A”, pp. 6a-7a)).

The Court did go on to differentiate the regulation of
billboards premised on highway safety from that based solely on
aesthetics, holding that “it would have been unreasonable to
require, solely for aesthe:ic purposes, the immediate removal of
the billboards prohibited in the present case” (43 NY2d at p. 478
{J.S., App. “A”, p. 8a]. Thus, the Court remanded the case for
determination of the reasonableness of the 6’ year statutory
amortization period, as applied to appellant’s signs, holding that
it could not decide this issue on the basis of the record before it.

The New York Court of Appeals also rejected appellant's
contention that ECL, § 9-0305 violates the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech, citing its discussion of that issue in the
Suffolk case (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a), supra. In
that case, the Court held that the prohibition of non-accessory
billboards to promote aesthetics constituted a permissible
regulation of the place and manner of speech to effectuate a
significant government interest (43 NY 2d 483, 489).

Argument

POINT I

The determination appealed from — having remitted the
case to a trial court for further proceedings involving a
constitutional issue — is not a final judgment. Therefore, this
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Appellant baldly asserts (J.S., p. 3) that this Court has
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C., § 1257 (2),
which provision, of course, is applicable only where there has
been a final judgment. However, appellant attempts to gloss over
the actual determination made, by relegating to a footnote (Fn.
“2” JS., p. 3) the indisputable fact that the New York Court of
Appeals remanded the matter for further proceedings involving
a constitutiona! issue (whether the statute, as applied to ap
pellant’s billboards, effects a deprivation of property without
due process). Appellant conclusorily asserts in this footnote that
“there is no question as to the finality of the judgment”, and in
support of this blanket statement refers to Cor Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). It is submitted that there is,
indeed, much question as to the finality of the judgment and, in
claiming the contrary, appellant has misread or misinterpreted
the Cox Broadcasting case.

In Cox, supra, this Court discussed in detail four exceptions
which have developed to the traditional rule precluding review
by this Court where anything further remains to be determined
by a state court, upon remand or otherwise. However, none of
the four exceptions would appear to apply to the case at bar.
Each concerns a situation where all the federal question(s) in-
volved have been finally determined and the further proceedings
to be completed concerned only non-federal issues. These ex-
ceptions are further limited to cases in which the additional
state proceedings will not conceivably involve other federal
issues that could require Supreme Court review at a later date.

In the case at bar, the two federal issues involved are freedom
of speech and deprivation of property without due process.‘
While the New York Court of Appeals has made a final
determination on the freedom of speech issue, there has not been
any such final determination on the “taking” issue, since the
remand is for the very purpose of providing “plaintiff with an
opportunity to establish, if it can, that the statutory amor-
tization period of six and one-half vears is unreasonable, as
applied” (43 NY2d at p. 481 [J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a]. Surely, if
appellant feels itself aggrieved by the determinations which
remain to be made in the state courts as to the constitutionality
of the amortization period as applied to its various billboards, it
will, at such time in the future, still be able to claim that its
proper .y has been “taken” without due process — a federal issue
which may be brought to this Court for review.

Thus, entertaining appellant’s appeal at this time would not
necessarily terminate the action, nor even preclude a later
review by this Court of a federal question but, instead, might
well result in the type “piecemeal” review which has always
been eschewed by this Court. Republic Natural Gas Co. v.
Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).

Moreover, it would seem that the case at bar is analogous to
the eminent domain proceedings referred to by this Court in
Footnote “6” of its opinion in the Cox Broadcasting case, supra
(420 U.S. at pp. 477-478). In such cases, this Court has held that
the state court judgment will not be considered as final unless it
was dispositive of the entire case and adjudicated all issues
including the issue of just compensation (see, also, Radio Station
WOW, Ine. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 [1945). Accordingly, even
though the First Amendment freedom of speech issue has been
finally decided by the New York Court of Appeals, the Four-

4in any event, it is appellee's position that neither of these issues raise any
substantia! federal questions. See Point II, infra, pages 10-18.

10

teenth Amendment question of whether appellant has been
deprived of property without due process has not been finally
determined by the New York Court of Appeals and, therefore, it
is submitted that this Court should not sever the First Amend-
ment issue while another federal question remains open.

POINT II

No substantial federal questions are presented of this
appeal, since it is well-settled that a statute, enacted pur-
suant to a state’s police power, which: (A) merely regulates
the place and manner of commercial advertising, such as
billboards, does not infringe upon freedom of speech in
violation of the First Amendment; and (B) provides an
amortization period for phase-out of pre-existing uses to
enable an owner to substantially recoup his investment in
such property prior to discontinuance of the use thereof, does
not deprive the owner of property without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The predecessor to ECL, § 9-0305 first became a law in 1924 (L.
of New York 1924, c. 512) and, from its very inception, it is clear
that it was a regulatory statute enacted pursuant to the State’s
police power. As stated in its original form:

“In order to conserve the natural beauty of the
Adirondack park by preserving and regulating it for
public uses * * * and to abate the public nuisance which
has arisen through the unrestricted use of signs and
billboards therein, no person shall erect or maintain
within the boundaries thereof any advertising sign or
billboard, except under written permit from the com-
mission. * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

After various amendments (not relevant herein), in 1969 (L.
1969, c. 1052), the statute was made applicable to the Catskill
Park, and in 1970 (L. 1970, c. 392) the statute was further
amended to provide for an amortization period of some six and

1]

one-half years for non-complying signs in the Catskill Park (in
place of individually determined amortization periods).

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that both the Adirondack
and Catskill Parks (the boundaries of which are defined,
respectively, in ECL, § 9-0101 [1] and [2]), are uniquely beautiful
areas within the State of New York which have long been given
special protection.’ They consist of an inter-mixture of private
and State-owned lands, with the State-owned lands — known as
the “forest preserve” — being protected by Article XIV
(“Conservation”) of the New York State Constitution. Suffice it
to say, as found by the Appe'late Division of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York in its opinion in this case (55 AD2d 340
[1977] at page 343 (J.S., App. “B”, p. 18a):

“The Adirondack and Catskill State Parks are con-
stitutionally protected preserves (N.Y. Const., art. XIV)
wherein special material and cultural values exist which
are deserving of preservation for future generations.
Thus, objects, such as outdoor advertising structures, that
offend the eye and detract from the natural beauty of the
setting are legitimate targets of legislation requiring
their removal providing the totality of the means em-
ployed is reasonable * * * ”

That a State, as a proper exercise of its police power, may
enact laws designed to conserve and protect the beauty and
appearance of an area — particularly areas of inestimable value
to the public such as the Adirondack and Catskill Parks — is now
beyond any shadow of doubt. Almost twenty-five years ago, in
the landmark and frequently cited case of Berman v. Parker, 348

SThe Adirondack Park was created in 1892 (L. 1892, c. 707) and the Catskill
Park was created in 1904 (L. 1904, c. 233). As to the “special protection”
given these areas, see, e.g., People v. Adirondack Railway Co., 160 N.Y. 225
(1899), aff'd sub nom Adirondack Railway Co. v. New York State, 176 US.
335 (1900); Environmental Conservation Law, § 11-0529 and Public Lands
Law, § 17.

12

US. 26 (1954), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous
Court, observed (p. 32):

“We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has
been known as the police power. An attempt to define its
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case
must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially
the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor
historically capable of complete definition. Subject to
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the mublic interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be
served by social legislation, whether it be Congress
legislating concerning the District of Columbia (see Block
v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135) or the States legislating con-
cerning local affairs. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236;
Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525;
California State Association v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 1065.

*eer

Mr. Justice Douglas then declared (p. 33):

“The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,
424. The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as

clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. ;

Thus, it is unquestionable that the interests sought to be
protected by ECL, § 9-0305 — aesthetic enhancement of uniquely
beautiful regions of the State of New York through regulation of
billboards and outdoor advertising signs — are constitutionally
legitimate and proper objects of attainment by the State under
its police power.

13

A.

With regard to the instant appeal, the appellee submits that it
is not necessary for this Court to again review whether a statute
which regulates the place and manner — not the content — of
commercial speech, in order to serve an important government
interest that is totally unrelated to suppression of free speech, is
an impermissible abridgement of freedom of speech, since this
Court has firmly and definitively determined that such type of
regulation is not unconstitutional.

In Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405,
439 P. 2d 248 (1968), the Supreme Court of Washington, in
reviewing a statute strikingly similar to the statute now being
challenged, rejected the advertising company’s claim that the
statute unconstitutionally abridged freedom of speech, and held
that the minimal free speech interest affected by the statute was
outweighed by the public’s right to enjoy highways free of
dangerous, obtrusive and unsolicited presence of advertising
signs. Moreover, the Court specifically stated (439 P. 2d, at p.
259) “we hold that the maintenance of the natural beauty of
areas along interstate highways is to be taken into account in
determining whether the police power is properly exercised.”
This Court then dismissed, for want of a substantial federal
question, the appeal taken by the advertising company (393 U.S.
316 [1969]), and also denied its petition for a rehearing (393 U.S.
1112 [1969).

The law, therefore, is clear that a state legislature need not
subordinate all other legitimate public interests to the
protection of free speech, nor is it required to totally ignore such
other legitimate public interests in order to preserve absolute
freedom of speech (see, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 {1949}.
In this regard, it is noted that, in United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), this Court declared (p. 377):

“* * * we think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

14

power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that inverest. * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

Nonetheless, the appellant, in attempting to cloak itself in the
mantle of vindicator of First Amendment freedom of speech
rights, contends that recent decisions by this Court — which
decisions, admittedly, have blurred the distinction between
commercial and ordinary speech — require this Court to give
plenary consideration to the question of whether the regulation
of the place and manner of appellant’s billboards accomplished
by the subject statute effects an unconstitutional abridgment of
appellant’s freedom of speech. In support of its request for
plenary review, appellant cites Viryinia Pharmacy Bad. v.
Virginia Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and urges
that the tests set forth in that case for a statute to pass con-
stitutional muster have not been satisfied in the case at bar.

In the Virginia Pharmacy Bd. case, supra, this Court held (425
US., at p. 771) that for a statute to permissibly infringe upon
freedom of speech, it could not be directed to the content of the
regulated speech; it must serve a significant governmental
interest; and must leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of information.

That the statute in question fully satisfies these tests is easily
demonstrated. Initially, it is important to again note that ECL,
§ 9-0305 does not constitute a prohibition of outdoor advertising
signs since it expressly exempts from regulation signs “erected
or maintained upon a parcel of real property in connection with
the principal business or principal businesses conducted
thereon” and any signs located “within the limits of an in-
corporated village.” That the subject statute is not in any way
directed to the content of signs or billboards and is self-evident
from the words of the statute itself and from the fact that ap

15

pellant’s claim of unconstitutionality is limited to the two
contentions that no significant governmental interest is served
by the statute and that the available alternative channels of
communication are inadequate.

As to the interest served, there can be no doubt whatsoever —
as previously discussed — that the subject statute is a proper
exercise of the police power enacted to attain a significantly
important governmental interest, which interest clearly out-
weighs the minimal infringement of speech occasioned by the
statute. Thus, appellant’s challenge reduces itself solely to the
claim that alternative channels of communication are not

adequate.

However, the speciousness of this claim — notwithstanding
appellant’s imaginative attempts to “prove” the “uniqueness” of
its billboards as a means of communication — is established by
the factual finding of the New York Supreme Court in this case
(87 Misc 2d 600, 606 [J.S., App. “C”, p. 29a} that “there are ample
other channels of communication available in the affected area
such as radio, television and newspapers”, and the concurrence
with this factual finding by the Appellate Division (55 AD2d 340,
345 [J.S., App. “B”, at 20a]) when it noted that “[t}he same in-
formation [conveyed by appellant’s billboards] can be conveyed to
the public by newspaper, radio or television advertising.” This
factual finding, which was not, and could not be, questioned by
the New York Court of Appeals‘ conclusively refutes appellant’s
arguments that alternative channels of communication for the
supposedly “unique” medium of billboards are inadequate.

Moreover, there are at least two very recent decisions by this
Court which further substantiate that the challenged statute
does not effect an impermissible abridgment of speech, and these

6In cases such as the one at bar, the Constitution of the State of New York,
Article VI, § 3 (a), provides that the jurisdiction of the New York Court of
Appeals “shall be limited to the review of questions of law.”

16

eases (Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 [1976] and
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 [1977]
inexorably point to the conclusion that the question herein is not
a substantial federal question.

In the Young case, supra, this Court, although emphasizing its
prior holding in Virginia Pharmacy Bad. v. Virginia Commercial
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), supra, that commercial speech
is entitled to some protection under the First Amendment,
nonetheless explicitly stated (427 U.S., at p. 68) that “[a] state
statute may permit highway billboards to advertise businesses
located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere” and, in support
of this statement, cited (see fn. 30, 427 U.S., at p. 68), the case of
Markham Adveriising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439
P. 2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 393 U.S. 316 (1969), supra.

Similarly, in the Linmark Associates case, supra, while this
Court struck down the township’s ordinance prohibiting the
posting of real estate “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on lawns
because the challenged ordinance was found to be directed at the
content of the signs — not merely the time, place and manner of
speech — this Court suggested (431 U.S., at p. 93) that had
Willingboro’s ordinance been genuinely concerned with the place
or manner of speech, or even “prohibited all lawn signs — or all
lawn signs of a particular size or shape — in order to promote
aesthetic values” (emphasis ours), the ordinance could have
survived constitutional scrutiny. Further, in making this ob-
servation, this Court, in a footnote (see fn. 7, 431 U.S., at p. 94),
cited, with apparent approval, the Markham Advertising Co.
case, supra.

Clearly, the freedom of speech issue in the case at bar is so fore-
closed by recent decisions of this Court as to leave no room for
real controversy and, therefore, cannot be deemed to present a
substantial federal question warranting plenary consideration
by this Court.

ee

17

Appellant’s claim that the subject statute effects a deprivation
of property (i.e., a “taking”) without due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is also without merit.
This claim is bottomed on the argument that an amortization
period — no matter how lengthy the period may be — can never
be a constitutionally adequate equivalent for compensation.
Surely, in the face of existing precedents, such argument is
patently frivolous.

As with the freedom of speech issue, the case of Markham
Advertising Co. v. State of Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.
2d 248 (1968), supra, points to the conclusion that the “taking”
issued does not present a substantial federal question
warranting plenary review by this Court. In Markham, the
challenged statute provided for a maximum amortization period
of some four years, and the Washington Supreme Court held
that both the concept of amortization in lieu of compensation
and the length of the amortization period provided were con-
stitutional. As previously noted, this Court dismissed the appeal
taken by Markham for want of a substantial federal question
(393 U.S. 316 [1969], and also denied the petition for a rehearing
(393 U.S. 1112 [1969).

Similarly, in Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488
F. 2d 118 (10th Cir., 1973), the Tenth Circuit upheld the con-
stitutionality of amortization periods of two to five years for the
termination of signs made non-conforming by the subject or-
dinance, and this Court then denied a petition for certiorari. 417
U.S. 932 (1974).

Finally, in National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey,
464 P. 2d 33 (1970), the ordinance provided that billboards in “U”
(unclassified) districts were to be removed within one year after
the property on which a sign was located was reclassified into
some other district. The Supreme Court of California declared
that this one-year amortization period was constitutional with

18

respect to signs which had already been fully amortized, and
that other signs should be removed after the “expiration of a
reasonable amortization period in order to permit plaintiff to
recover their original cost” (464 P.2d, at p. 36). Certiorari was
thereafter denied by this Court. 398 U.S. 946 (1970).

As to the case at bar, it is important to note that ECL, § >
0305, on its face, provides for an amortization period of some 6-
1/2 years — significantly longer than the periods in the above-
discussed cases. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, in construing
this statute, not only upheld the 6-1/2 year amortization period
as being a constitutionally adequate and permissible alternative
to compensation but, additionally, directed (43 NY2d at p. 481
[J.S., App. “A”, p. 12a) that the case be remanded for a hearing
“to provide plaintiff with an opportunity to establish, if it can,
that the statutory amortization period of six and one-half years
is unreasonable, as applied.” Cf. National Advertising Co. v.
County of Monterey, supra.

Surely, under the circumstances herein, appellant’s claim of
deprivation of property without due process of law does not
present a substantial federal question and, indeed, is specious.

es ee Me

19

CONCLUSION

This Court should dismiss, the appeal on the ground that
there has not been a final judgment or, in the alternative,
that no substantial federal questions are presented.

Dated: July 6, 1978

Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Appellee
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Tel. No. (518) 474-8096

RUTH KESSLER TOCH

Solicitor Genera!

STANLEY FISHMAN
MURRAY SUSSWEIN

Assistant Attorneys General
of Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1056%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
