# Petition — Cantwell v. Hudnut

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1979
- **Citation:** 439 U.S. 1114

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED \

MAY 12 1978
\

IN THE MICHAEL RODA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES——— ae: #
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City of Phoenix v.
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reenburgh, 436 F.2d
on 6 SS ear i. 2 Swann v. Adams, 385
| Se Se ccc uvieeews we 8, 14,
Hadley v. Junior 19
~ Colle e Districe.
397 U.S. 50, (1970)......... 10, 12, | Town of Lockport etc.
13, 14, | v. Citizens for
17, 18, | Community Action etc.,
19, 20, | OP OB Fae 17
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Holt Civic Club etc. | Statutes - Federal
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Page
Statutes - Indiana

IC 18-4-3-6 (1974 Burns),

C1976) .ccccscectuuevacueuen 7
IC 18-4-1-2 (1976)........44.- 5
IC 18-4-1-2(1) (1976)......... 6
IC 18-4-1-2(m) (1976)......... ; e°
IC 18-4-3-8 (1976)............ 11, 18
IC 18-4-3-13 (1976)........... 6
IC 18-4-4-5 (1976)........44.. f 6,
IC 18-4-5-8 (1976)............ 6
IC 18-4-12-6(b) (1976)........ 5
IC 18-4-12-34(b) (1976)....... 5

iv

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1977

NO.

Paul Cantwell, Glen Howard
and Rozelle Boyd,

Petitioners,
vs.

William H. Hudnut III, Mayor

of Indianapolis, Joyce Brinkman,
George Tintera, Alan Kimbell and
Paula Hart, Members of the Indianap-
olis-Marion County City-County
Council,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners request that a Writ
of Certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals entered in
the above cause on December 2, 1977.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals
reversing the District Court by a vote
of 2-1 is reported at 566 F.2d 30
(7th Cir. 1977). A copy is appended
as Appendix I. The District Court's

opinion is reported at 419 F. Supp. 1301
(S.D. Ind. 1976). A copy is appended as
Appendix II.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals was dated and entered December 2,
1977. A petition for rehearing timely
filed by petitioners was denied on
February 15, 1978 with Chief Judge
Fairchild and Judge Swygert voting to
rehear the matter in banc. The juris-
diction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1) and 2101(c).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Is Equal Protection denied by a franchise

in governmental units having general
governmental powers which is diluted
nearly 40% through the votes of non-
residents who are neither taxed nor
served by the units?

Is Equal Protection denied where the
legislature of a municipal corporation
with general governmental powers is
controlled in large measure by another
legislature containing members elected
at-large from a county-wide district
having only 60% of its residents lo-
cated within the limits of the munici-
pal corporation?

Can relief mandated by a denial of Equal
Protection be refused because granting
it may result in exacerbating another
such denial?

STATUTES INVOLVED

Indiana Code (IC) 18-4-1-2(m)
(1976) provides:

(m) A "Special Service Dis-
trict Council” shall be compose of
all the members of the city-county
council elected from an electoral
district consisting of the entire
county, provided sixty per cent
[60%] or more of the population in
the county is encompassed within
the territorial limits of said
district. Such council shall also
consist of 1 member of the city-
county council elected from a
single electoral district under IC
1971, 18-4-3-6 with fifty per cent
[50%] or more of its gree
within the territorial limits of
said special service district.

Where the population of a
special service district is less
t sixty per cent [60%] of the
entire county at any time, the
members elected from the electoral
district consisting of the entire
county shall cease to be members of
the special service district
council. Where the population of
a portion of a special service
district within a single electoral
district falls below, or rises
above, such | per cent [50%],
the members shall cease to be, or
shall become, tn peat & a men-
ber of the special service district
council. Such special service
district council shall also include
members who are appointed to fill
vacancies in any district from
which any special district council
member was elected.

afte

IC 18-4-4-5 (1976) provides:

18-4-4-5. Special Service
District Council. The Special
Service District Council of any
Special Service District shall,
with respect to such district have
exclusive power by ordinance to
approve its budget and make appro-
priations and tax levies required
to be made under the provisions of
this article. No Special Service
District Council shall have au-
thority to originate or separately
to adopt any other ordinance.
However any ordinance adopted by
the City-County Council relating
solely or — to a Special
Service District shall be suspended
and of no effect until separately
approved and concurred in by a
majority of a Special District
Council when, but only when, the
Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution of the state of
Indiana prohibits such ordinance

taking effect without such approval.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
INCLUDING BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4) since
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment were at issue. The
petitioners are each residents in and
registered voters of the Marion County
(Indiana) Police and Fire Special Serv-
ice Districts. Respondent William Hud-
nut III is the Mayor of the consoli-
dated government of Indianapolis and
Marion County, Indiana. The remaining

o4-

respondents are the four members of the
Indianapolis-Marion County Council who
are elected from the County at large.
(App. II, pp. A 58-59.)

Prior to 1969 Indianapolis was a
"First Class" city located wholly within
Marion County, Indiana and containing
slightly more than 60% of the avy s
residents. In 1969 a form of consolidated
government called "Uni-Gov" was begun.
Indianapolis was abolished as a separate
entity and merged into the Consolidated
City of Indianapolis which consists of
the then city together with much of the
rest of Marion County. The city of
Beech Grove and the towns of Lawrence
and Speedway are located in the same
county but were excluded from Uni-Gov.
(IC 18-4-1-2 (1976)) (App. I, p. A 3 and
App. yrs A 47.) Under the Uni-Gov
law a combined legislative body called
the City-County Council was created. It
has 25 members chosen from single-member
districts plus four elected from the
County at large. Some of the legislative
powers of the city and county were
combined in the City-County Council.
Other significant functions were not
consolidated.

Under Uni-Gov, police and fire
services within the county were not
merged. The residents from outside the
old city continued, as before, to be
served a the Sheriff and various fire
departments. The residents of the
former city were served by the same
police and fire departments that had
served the former city. The latter were
organized within the boundaries of the
former city under the name of Police and
Fire Special Service Districts. IC 18-
4-12-6(b) and IC 18-4-12-34(b) (1976).

These districts are separate bodies
corporate and while they do not enjoy

the power to issue general obligation
bonds, the activities of the two special
districts are broad. IC 18-4-1-2(1)
(1976). (App. II, pp. A 49-50.) Their
combined 1976 budget including pensions
exceeded $50 million of which $3i million
came from local tax levies. (Ibid at

A 59.)[1] These funds are expended
solely on services within the districts

(IC 18-4-3-13 (1976)). Similarly the
districts levy no taxes beyond their
boundaries. (IC 18-4-5-8 (1976)).
App. II, pp. A 62-64.)

(See

Each of these districts serving the
old city is
tive body called a Special Service
District Council, and not m the City-
County Council. IC 18-4-1-2(m). The
Special District Councils are given the
exclusive power to approve the district
budgets, appropriations and tax levies.
Ic 18-4-4-5. They may not adopt or
originate any other ordinance unless the
federal or state constitution requires
such approval. All remaining legis-
lative power for these districts lies
with the City-County Council elected
from the entire county. Ibid.

las the district court found,
the districts control property, purchase
supplies, regulate the members of the
police and fire forces and fix compen-
sation for employees. (App. II, p. A 60.)
The police force has full police powers.
Police and fire officers are provided
educational, insurance and pension
benefits. Ibid.

overned by a separate legisla-

a ee ween et eee eee — + >

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Ae hoe ee om me

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Pursuant to IC 18-4-1-2(m) the
Special Service District Councils are
made up of those single-district council-
men whose districts are at least 50%
within the Special Service Districts
plus the four councilmen elected from
the county at-large if the Special
Service Districts contain at least 60%
of the county population. Based on the
applicable census and districting data
the Special District Councils consist of
16 of the 25 single-district councilmen
who serve on the City-County Council
plus the four councilmen elected from
the county at-large. The latter repre-
sent both residents (60%) and non-
residents (40%)[2].

Certain cities in Marion County
were not included in the scheme of
consolidation. Like non-residents of
the districts who are located within the
consolidated city, residents of the
"excluded cities" are represented on the
Special District Councils by the four
councilmen elected from the county at-
large. IC 18-4-3-6 (1974 Burns) and 18-
4-3-6 (1976). Residents of the special
districts have no vote for members of
legislative bodies controlling the

2since the lines of the single

member districts are not consistent with
those of the Special Service Districts
there are residents of the Special
Service Districts whose single-district
councilman does not sit on the Special
District Councils. Conversely some non-
residents of these districts are repre-
sented on the councils both by the four
at-large councilmen and their single-
member district councilman. (App. I,
pp. A 5-8.)

police or fire affairs of such excluded
areas.

The amended complaint raised two
central issues. These were (1) the
denial of equal protection through
dilution resulting from the seating of
the councilmen elected from the county
at-large on the Special District Councils
although 39.2% of their constituents do
not reside in the districts, are not
subject to tax by the districts at their
place of residence and are not served by
these districts, and (2) the denial of
equal protection resulting from the
exercise of legislative control over the
Special District Councils by the overall
City-County Council which includes the
same at-large councilmen.

The District Court granted relief
as to both statutes attacked. It found
as to IC 18-4-1-2(m) that the special
districts enjoyed general governmental
powers (App. II, pp. A 59-61, 77-79) and
that the plaintiffs' franchise was
diluted to the extent of 39.2% in the
selection of the at-large councilmen.
(App. II, p. A 84-85.) It found the
extent of this dilution beyond constitu-
tionally oe limits under Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973) and
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
This dilution was found not to effect
any rational state policy. Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). (App. II,
pp. A 84-89.) The trial court concluded
that the statute limiting the powers of
the special service district councils
(IC 18-4-4-5) also provided an improper
role in distric= affairs for the at-
large councilmen. (Ibid at A 89-91.)

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In reversing on the issues pre-
sented here by a 2-1 vote (Chief Judge
Fairchild dissenting) the Court of
Appeals relied on several theories. [3]
As a basis for the first theory it
granted arguendo that "a state law
allowing strangers to participate in the
vote for representatives to a local
legislative body having general govern-
mental powers over a particular terri-
tory would offend the equal protection
rights of the resident voters." (App.
I, p. A 23-4.) It further agreed with
the District Court's conclusion that
police and fire protection are general
governmental functions. (Ibid)

However, the Court of Appeals
concluded that “at most it can be said
that only part of the power to exercise”
such general governmental functions was
delegated to the Special Service Dis-
tricts while a "substantial part” of
this power was delegated to the
county-wide government. (Ibid) In fact
the Court of Appeals concluded that
under the scheme at issue the police and
fire powers “7 with the county-wide
government. e legislature was held to
have granted the Special Service Dis-
trict voters “added weight" as to fiscal
aspects of the districts without any
requirement to do so. (Ibid at 24-25.)
There was found to be no need to grant
the districts autonomy.

3Petitioners do not raise here a
third issue dealing with the confirma-
tion of the Public Safety Director. The
district court's denial of relief on
this issue was affirmed unanimously.

In reaching these conclusions the
Court of Appeals held that "the fran-
chise apportionment cases wit with
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
are .. . inapplicable here. . [since
petitioners] complain not that other
voters uave greater participation or
that districts are unequally appor-
tioned, see Hadley v. Junior College
District, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970), fot
that other persons are also allowed some
participation.” (App. I, p. A 28.)

Aside from its refusal to apply
Reynolds the Court of Appeals found
against petitioners on their dilution
theory. It held that non-residents of
the districts shared a "community of
interests" that justified giving them a
franchise. It also concluded that the
franchise structure at issue was ra-
tionally related to the "need for simpli-
fication and unification of metropoli-
tan" government, citing Avery v. Mid-
land County, 390 U.S. L7% CLOBy
(App. I, pp. A 32-34.) While accepting
this rationale, the Court of Appeals did
not overturn the District Court's
finding of a 40% dilution. It ques-
tioned whether the District Court's
finding of peo | 40% was "realistic"
but concluded only that non-residents of
the district have a "relatively minor
voice in the election of members of the
district councils." (App. I, pp. A 3l-

32 n. 13.) This "voice" was not quanti-
fied.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals noted
that if the councilmen elected from the
county at-large were excluded from
district affairs some district residents
who had no single member representative
on the Special Service District Councils

-10-

would be without representation. This
effect, which is a product of districting
not of statute, was apparently felt to
justify a denial of relief. [4]

Chief Judge Fairchild in dissent
found the same system "fraught with
unjustified classification of residents
of the districts and inequality of
representation." (App. I, p. A 41.)
Judge Fairchild would have held that the
granting of the franchise to an elec-
torate containing 40% non-residents
results in a "substantial dilution of
the voting power of the residents of the
special service districts." (App. I,
pp. A 38-39.) As proof of this he noted
that in 1975 this expanded electorate
seated four councilmen elected from the
county at large on the Special Service
District Councils who had received only
42% of the vote in the districts. The
candidates receiving 58% of the resi-
dents' votes were not seated. (Ibid at
A 39.)

Judge Fairchild did not find this
system permissible under the rubric of a
"valid response to the need for flexi-
bility in local government" (Ibid at p.
A 43) but rather concluded that:

4 Under the statutory scheme here
the district boundaries are set by the
City-County Council. The districts are
to be "compact" and to be wholly within
or wholly without the special service
district lines "where practicable”. IC
18-4-3-8 (1976). The district lines
at issue were drawn by the City-County
Council after the passage of Uni-Gov.
(Ibid. )

itn

"We do not have before us a
simple mechanism which could be
claimed to afford representation to
the overall government in recogni-
tion of some relationship it has to
the problems and decisions of the
special service districts, whatever
might be the proper result if that
were the case." (Ibid at p. A 41.)

Petitioners sought a rehearing in
banc. This was denied on February 15,
I978 with Judges Fairchild and Swygert
dissenting.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Ba The Decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Conflicts with Controlling Deci-
sions of This Court.

Under the decisions of Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 and

ey v. Junior College District, 397
U.S. a0 (1970) this Court concluded that
where units of elected local government
having "general governmental powers" are
at issue (Avery at 484-5) apportionment
Must not “deprive any voter of his right
to have his own vote given as much
weight, as far as is practicable, as
that of any other voter in the...
district." Hadley at 52. Any failur
to meet the norm of "one man, one vote"
must be “based on legitimate considera-
tions incident to the effectuation of a
rational state policy" (Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 at 579 TI 3855) and
given such a policy must be within

constitutionally allowable limits.
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328
(1973).

siGe

The Court of Appeals specifically
rejected the applicability of Reynolds
and its progeny on the apparent ground
that dilution of the voting franchise is
only a relevant inquiry in cases where
there is malapportionment or where one
class of voters is alleged to have too
much participation (App. I, p. A 28.)
It concluded that the principles of
Reynolds do not apply to the device of
aitucion through extension of the
franchise to voters with no significant
interest on the affairs of a political
unit enjoying general governmental
powers. Thus Reynolds was held in-
applicable to cases of overinclusivity.

The rule of Reynolds as applied to
local governmental units with general

governmental powers in Hadley requires
that each vote of a person in the dis-
trict be given as much weight as that of
any other voter to the extent practica-
ble. Hadley supra at 52. The rule, as
stated, is not qualified by allowing
dilution through the device of allowing
non-residents to vote. The Court of
Appeals creates such an exception to the
rule. If the rules of Hadley and Mahan
are applied to the instant Facts without
this new exception, the structure at
issue fails to pass constitutional
muster.

The Court of Appeals placed primary
reliance on the case of Clark v. Town of
Greenburgh, 436 F.2d 770 (ind Cir.
1971). But as was noted by the trial
court (App. II, pp. A 82-83) Clark does
not support the position of the Court of

Appeals. In Clark a claim of overinclu-
sivity failed where the challenged

x)

franchise extended to voters who paid
sore taxes and got some services. Here
the challenged Seonchiae is given not to
taxpayers, residents or recipients of
services. No interest rising to the
level of that seen in Clark has been
shown that would support the exten-

sion of the franchise beyond special
district boundaries.

If Reynolds applies[5], the com-
plained of statutes must fail. The
dilution of nearly 40% found here is 50%
greater than that disallowed in Swann
v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). Aside
from the scope of this dilution the
District Court and Chief Judge Fairchild
in dissent found no rational basis for
its existence. The District Court
specifically rejected the only two
rationales for dilution presented to it.
(App. II, pp. A 85-89.) The trial court

The Court of Appeals apparently
would diminish the efficacy of the Equal
Protection Clause on the basis that the
Indiana Te ger granted residents of
the Special Service Districts more voting
power than necessary. Petitioners' con-
tention, however, is that once the fran-
chise is granted, it must comply with
the mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause. As this Court said in Hadley,

supra at 56:

[W]henever a state . . government
decides to select persons by pop-
ular election to perform govern-
mental functions, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each quali-
fied voter must be given an equal

7 to participate in that
electiom. . .

obs

held that the franchise attacked did not
contribute to 7 “flexibility” in
solving the problems of local govern-
ment. Nor was the granting of the
franchise to all residents of the county
seen to fit with any protection of the
interests in the Special Service Dis-
tricts of those county residents from
outside the Special Service Distr. :ts
who owned property in the districts.
(Ibid)

The trial court's conclusion as to
"flexibility" was based on the fact that
the complained of wrongs were created
after Uni-Gov's formation. See Bryant
v. Whitcomb, 419 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D.

nd. and (APP - a pp. A 8-13.)[6]
The violations of Equal Protection at
issue here could not have contributed to
the formation of Uni-Gov as a solution
to local government problems. In fact
the local government at issue abrogated
the complained of role of the at-large
councilmen in the course of settling
Bryant, an earlier suit attacking Uni-
Gov. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeals
ignored, but did not overturn, the

The Court of Appeals also pointed
to the fact that debt for capital ex-
penditures in the special services dis-
tricts are supported by a county-wide
tax base. (App. I, pp. A 20-21.) The
decision fails to note that since this
power does not lie with the Special Dis-
tricts the interests of non-district
residents need no protection there. In
fact the bond issues alluded to are
voted on by the whole City-County Council
in which the interests of non-residents
of the Special Service Districts are
fully protected.

-15-

District Court's conclusion on flexi-
bility. Nor did it disagree with the
trial court's rejection of the second
suggested rationale--the interests of
non-residents owning district property.

Ir. seeking a rationale for a denial
of Equal Protection the Court of Appeals
justified the 40% dilution largely on
the basis of recognition of a “community
of interests" in the way of social,
political aud economic ties between the
‘districts and the rest of the Uni-Gov
territory." (App. I, p. A 23.) This
conclusion is in direct conflict with
the conclusion of the District Court
based upon the record that:

"In sum, persons inside Marion
County, but outside the districts
hold no relationship to the dis-
tricts any different from the
relationship of persons living
outside Marion County altogether in
other parts of Indiana . =

(App. II, p. A 69.)

The District Court's conclusion which
was not overturned by the Court of
Appeals was based directly on a stipu-
lation signed by counsel for the re-
spondents which conceded that the common
social and economic interests pointed to
by the Court of Appeals extended —
the county boundaries i.e. beyond the
Uni-Gov territory. APP II, pp. A 68-
69 and R. following p. 73 at Stipulation
para. 21.) There is, therefore, no more
‘community of interest" basis for ex-
tending the Special Service District
franchise to Marion County residents
than there is to residents in the eight
counties surrounding Marion County or,
indeed, to residents ®™f the entire
state.

-16-

ee See a cles tadliites

If such vague interests can justify
the extension of the franchise beyond
the Special District boundaries then the
franchise of the residents of any local
government unit can be eroded by ex-
panding the franchise to "interested"
residents of nearby communities. The
line could be drawn to fit the pvlitical
convenience of the draftsman. Thus the
purpose of Avery and Hadley would be
defeated. ere the “community of
interests" rationale has been applied by
the legislature in one-direction only.
The Special Service District residents
are given no say over affairs of the
police departments of "excluded" areas
within the county. This only makes the
effect of dilution greater and belies
the claim that community of interests is
anything but an after-the-fact rationale
for control by "strangers."[7]

As another possible rationale for
dilution the Court of Appeals pagpess
that the device of seating councilmen
elected from the county at naan "“af-
ford[s] representation to nearly 200,000
of the districts’ residents who would

Petitioners recognize the possible

propriety of "stranger" voting in the
context of adjacent governmental units
operating in tandem and sharing some
veto power over each other. Cf. Town
of Lockport etc. v. Citizens for Com-
munity Action etc., 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
Here there is no such mutuality - the
residents of the special service dis-
tricts enjoy no control over police and
fire service in "excluded cities" out-
side their districts while residents of
those “excluded cities" are given con-
trol over special district affairs.

x\*

have no representation whatsoever on the
special service district councils if ;
only councilmanic districts wholly
within the special service districts sat
on these councils." (App. I, pp. A 30-
31.) There is no support in the statu-
tory scheme for this hypothetical
rationale. The district lines at issue
were drawn, not by statute, but by the
City-County Council after Uni-Gov was
effective. IC 13-4-3-8. No one has sought
to exclude these 200,000 voters from any
franchise. Rather the goal is to main-
tain the fullness of their franchise to-
ng with that of other district resi-
ents.

in _— =

ee ee ee a a

The Court of Appeals, while re-
jecting both Reynolds and the limits
imposed by Mahan and Swann, did note the
significance of certain of this Court's
earlier opinions. It noted (App. I, pp.
A 29-30) that petitioners argument is in
effect that the rules of Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake etc., 410 U.S. 7195

(1973) and Associated Enterprises v.
Toltec Watershed etc., 410 i 743
(1973) and Hadley hold in the converse
i.e. that onl ae benefited and/or
burdened by the operations of a govern-
ment unit having general governmental
porate should have the franchise. To
old otherwise is to run the risk of
control by non-residents. Under the
facts of the present case as was rec-
ognized by Chief Judge Fairchild in
dissent, the non-residents did not merely
et "some voice" they got a voice suf-
iciently great to control the outcome
of the election for members elected by
the county at-large who sit on the
Special Service District Councils.

Thus one-fifth of the governing bodies
represents a point of view cortrary to

-18-

that of a majority of the voters of the
special service districts." (App. lI, p.
A 39, Fairchild J. dissenting.)

The Court of Appeals despite Mahan
and Swann has decided that Equal Pro-
tection in the granting of a franchise
can be diluted to the extent of 39.2% in
favor of non-residents. This decision
has no adequate rationale under Reynolds.
The decision of the Court of Appeals on
the important federal Equal Protection
question presented is thus in conflict
with the applicable decisions of this
Court and should be reversed.

2. This Case Presents the Ques-
tion of the Propriety of Dilution
of the Franchise in the Context of
Overinclusivity, an Issue Not
Directly Resolved by this Court and
of Such Importance as to Require
Solution by this Court.

On March 6, 1978, this Court granted
review of Holt Civic Club etc. et al. v.
City of Tuscaloosa etc. et al. No. 77-

postponing its consideration of the
question of jurisdiction to the hearing
of the case on the merits. 46 U.S.L.W.
3555 (1978). Holt deals with an under-
inclusive franchise in a local govern-
mental system under which the City of
Tuscaloosa exerts extraterritorial
powers over adjacent non-residents who
are not enfranchised in Tuscaloosa
elections. It also raises the question
of whether the en
8. Thus as of the date of the

judgment entry in Bryant (March 6, 1970)
this Court found no constitutional
problems remaining in the structure

or functioning of the special service
districts and entered judgment for the
defendants. As of that moment in

time Uni-Gov was a functioning reality
with the scope and membership of the
Special Service District Councils

set by statute and an interpretative
ordinance. In the interim since

March 6, 1970 this structure was
changed by Acts 1971 P.L. 258 as set
forth above and by the repeal of
Ordinance 2-84 In sum, P.L. 258 did

Fe Ordinance No. 48 also responded
to the Court's guidance as to the

proper method for selection of a Public
Safety Director.

A57

the following: (1) it restored the
at-large councilmen to the special
service district councils. (P.L. 258
§ 1 quoted supra at para. 5) and
(2) it restricted the functions of
these councils, (P.L. 258 § 6, (quoted
supra at para. 6). The repeal of
Ordinance 2-84 in 1976 only served to
confirm these effects and constituted
an approval of P.L. 258 by the defend-
ants herein. The same repeal leaves
the special district councils with
only fiscal powers and no effective
device to police the use of this
power. Neither P.L. 258 nor the
repeal of Ordinance 2-84 were shown
to be a response to any change in the
structure, functioning or area served
by the two special service districts
at issue. Neither P.L. 258 nor the
repeal of Ordinance 2-84 was mam Se
contribute in any way to the creation
or continuation of Uni-Gov. Thus,
any Constitutional defects found
therein will not be able to be jus-
tified by any progress towards

A58

metropolitan consolidation. The ser-
vices at issue were not consolidated
in 1969 nor since.

Il. The Parties

9. Plaintiffs Cantwell, Howard
and Boyd are all citizens of the
United States, registered voters in
Marion County, Indiana, and residents
of the Police and Fire Special Service
Districts which are defined in
IC 18-4-1-2(1) and IC 18-4-15.5-1(p),
and as established by IC 18-4-12-6(b)
and IC 18-4-12-34(b). Defendant
William H. Hudnut, III, is and has
been the Mayor of the City of Indianap-
Olis and the Chief Executive Officer
of the consolidated government for

Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana

since January 1, 1976. He was
elected at the general election held
on November 4, 1975, and is the
successor to Richard G. Lugar in this
action pursuant to F.R.C.P. 25(d).
Defendants Tintera, Kimbell, Hart and
Brinkman are the four "at-large"

A59

members of the Indianapolis-Marion
County City-Council elected at the
general election held on November 4,
1975, each of whom represents a dis-
trict consisting of the entire area of
Marion County, pursuant to IC 18-4-3-6.
Defendants Hart and Brinkman are
successors in this action to former

councilmen Roger Brown and John Ruckelshaus

pursuant to F.R.C.P. 25(d).

III. The Nature of Special
Service Districts
10. There can be no doubt that

this case arises in the context of
significant governmental units.
Defendants have not argued differently.
Among the most fundamental and ancient
governmental services are police and

fire protection.
ll. The 1976 budget reveals that

the Police and Fire Special Service
District budgets including pensions
exceeds $50 million of which about $31
million comes from local tax levies.
No single item in the combined

A60

county-wide budget equals this total.
Only the Health and Hospital budget
($47 million) approaches it. Even
Welfare ($35 million) and the combined
budget for Roads and Transportation
($29.5 million) are smaller. The
activities of the special districts
are broad. By statute the Police and
Fire Special Service Districts through
the Director of Public Safety control
property, purchase supplies, regulate
the members of the police and fire
forces, ana fix compensation for
employees. IC 18-4-12-5. The police
force enjoys the fullness of the
police powers. IC 18-4-12-16. A
community relations office is a
functional part of the police force.
IC 18-4-12-28. Police and fire
officers are provided with insurance
and/or educational benefits. IC
18-4-12-30 and 31 and 18-4-12-50.
Pension funds are provided. IC

18-4-12-33. In sum, the constitutional
questions raised by the structuring
of elections for and powers of the

A6l

special service districts arise in the
context of municipal corporations
which are large in size and pervasive
in activity. These constitutional
problems are not temporary. Despite
the statutory provisions for the
expansion of the special districts and
their absorption by the consolidated
government there has been no substan-
tial change in the boundaries of the
districts.
as, The Act as amended ties the
special service districts into the
county-wide administrative structure.
Thus, (1) the Police and Fire Special
Service Districts are under the
authority of the Department of Public
Safety, IC 18-4-12-1 et seq. (2) The
same department is responsible for
weights and measures, civil defense
and the dog pound. IC 18-4-12-2.
(3) The mayor appoints a Director of
Public Safety subject to approval by
a majority of the entire City-County
Council. IC 18-4-3-4. (4) The
budgets for the districts are prepared

A62

by the Director. IC 18-4-12-11 and
18-4-12-37. (5) upon the approval or
modification thereof by the special
councils, the budget is subject to a
veto by the mayor of the consolidated
city-county (IC 18-4-5-2(c)) who is
elected by the voters of the entire
county, not just the special: service
districts (IC 18-4-3-1). (6) Beyond
the limited legislative powers of the
districts, their legislative affairs
are controlled by the entire City-
County Council including both the
at-large councilmen as well as single-
district councilmen from outside the
districts.

13. Within Marion County there
are 49 tax rates applied to 83 differ-
ent geographical areas. No property
taxes are (or could lawfully be)
collected by the special service

districts on property located outside
these districts.

A63

IV. The Department of Public Safety
and Its Relation to the Special
Service Districts
14. One of Uni-Gov's several

executive departments is known as the
"Department of Public Safety." The
present Director of Public Safety is
Murrill E. Lowry who has occupied

that office since May 20, 1974. Lowry
was appointed by Mayor William H.
Hudnut, III for a one year term in
January, 1976. The appointment was ap-
proved by the City-County Council.

The at-large members have consistently
participated in the voting on the
subject of confirmation of the Public
Safety Director by the Special Service
District Councils since 1969. Certain
minimal activities of the Department
of Public Safety extend beyond the
area of the Special Service Districts.
That is to be expected since the Uni-
Gov Act gives that Department, as Op-
posed to the Special Districts, certain
limited county-wide powers. See

IC 18-4-12-2. The Districts however

A64

have no right to serve non-residents
unless statutorily allowed. IC 18-4-
3-13. There was no showing of the
existence or use of any such authority
(if there be such) with the possible
exception of the reference to contracts
to provide fire service to non-resident
properties. (Exhibit X at pp. 5-7).
This is specifically permitted by

IC 18-4-2-9 and 10. With this minor
"exception" of no legal significance
the record establishes only that (a)
the Department of Public Safety has
certain county-wide functions paid on
that basis, (b) that the Department
administers the geographically-limited
Police and Fire Districts which have

separate financial structures and

(c) that the Department of Public
Safety and the Indianapolis Police and
Fire Districts cooperate with other

police and fire agencies. This cooper-
ation does not constitute anything
unusual and is typical of ordinary
governmental interaction. Such cooper-
ation does not approach a merger of

A65

district and county services. Since
1971 the districts have expanded only
through marginal annexations of indi-
vidual commercial sites, presumably

due to quirks in the Indiana liquor
laws. There has been no annexation
through the broad population growth
allowed by IC 18-4-12-8 and 18-4-12-36.
The Special Service Districts, as
opposed to the Department, have acted
only within their districts. They
tax only property located therein.

1S. In Indiana voting rights are
conferred according to the residence
of the voter regardless of place of
employment, property ownership or
other factors. See Indiana Constitu-
tion Article 2, Section 2 and IC 3-l-
16-9, 3-1-7-26 and 18-4-3-6. The pro-
visions plaintiffs attack are those
permitting all residents cf Marion
County to vote on the seating of
at-large councilmen on the Special
Service District Councils.

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A68

Thus while receiving only about 41% of
the vote in the Special Service Dis-
tricts, the four at-large councilmen
defendants are given representation in
their legislative bodies. The at-
large candidates who received over 58%
of the vote in the special service
districts do not sit by virtue of hav-
ing lost the other areas of the county
by a larger ->rgin than they carried
the special service districts.

18. No precise figures were made
available, but it was stipulated and
the Court finds that the ownership of
commercial and industrial businesses,
located within the Police and Fire
Special Service Districts rests with
individuals residing both within and
outside of such districts, and within
Marion County as well as outside of the
county. Also, residents residing both
within and outside of the Police and
Fire Special Service Districts and
within and outside of Marion County
hold substantial interests in the form
of stock in corporations which have

A69

major investments in some of the many
businesses located within such dis-
tricts. In addition, there are many
national corporations active in the
districts and owning real property
therein which have shareholders re-
siding both within and outside of the
districts and both within and also out-
side of Marion County. These corpora-
tions own substantial taxable property
within the districts. Such business
enterprises have employees who live

in Marion County, both within and with-
out such Special Service Districts, as
well as outside of Marion County. How-
ever, stock in such corporations is
also held by persons residing outside
of Marion County. In sum, persons in-
side Marion County, but outside the
districts hold no relationship to

the districts any different from the
relationship of persons living out-
side Marion County altogether in other
parts of Indiana, or even outside

Indiana.

A70

{2} 19. The calculation of the
extent of the dilution involved in the
selection of at-large councilmen (if
allowed to serve on the special district
councils) is relatively simple. at
least 39.2% of the county's population
lives outside the special service dis-
trict (Stipulation 7), thus since the
franchise is based on residence (Ic 18-
4-3-6) ome concludes that the vote of
the average resident, including plain-
tiffs, suffers a substantial dilution
through the votes of non-residents.
Plaintiffs contend this is a 39% dilu-
tion and clearly impermissible. at
oral argument the defendants suggested
for the first time that the apprc ximately
40% dilution in the election of the at-
large councilmen must be reduced by
multiplying it by 20% since the at-
large make up only 20% (4 of 20) of
the membership of the special service
district councils. Since 40% X 20% «=
Si the dilution thus becomes 8%. This
argument has a surface appeal but
misses the point. The denial of equal
protection here is determined by the

A71

dilution of plaintiffs* vote for the
at-large councilmen through the voie
of non-residents of the district. The
extent of the dilution cannot depend
upon the size of the legislative body
where the at-large sit. A 50: dilu-
tion in a Congressional race would not
be discounted because the elected Con-
gressman is only one of 435 represen-
tatives chosen to serve all the pecple
of this Country. Im any event, the
practical impact of the dilution is
the ultimate test and it is clear that
the very sizable vote cast by persons
outside the district had the effect of
reversing the selections of the resi-
dents of the district for their
councils.

20. The conclusions expressed in
Paragraph 6, supra as to the ability
of the City-County Council to control
the Special Service District Councils
is buttressed by a review of the
statutory and ordinance provisions
relating to the City-County Council
Committees. Each department of the
county-wide government has a standing
committee with powers as follows:

A72

18-4-3-1l1. Committees of the
council--Internal auditor.--The
city-county council shall set up
standing committees of not less
than three [3] council members for
each department, with full power
to investigate the policies and
jitures of the

phasis added.)

21. By ordinance the Department
of Public Safety has a Standing Con-
mittee (Indianapolis Code § 2-76(9))
but since March 1976 the Police and
Fire Special Service District Councils
have not enjoyed the powers of such a
committee which they had enjoyed prior
to the repeal of Indianapolis Code
§ 2-84. The provision of standing

A73

committee powers to the Special Service
District Councils had been incorporated
in the judgment in Bryant v_ Whitcomb
but was repealed by action of the City-
County Council as 4 whole taken during
the pendency of this case. This repeal
when taken together with IC 18-4-4-5
leaves the Special Service District
Councils with little if any power to
supervise the Police and Fire Depart-
ment for which they sedly serve
as legislative bodies.

22. This legislative structure
of the Act includes obvious grants of
power to non-residents of the district
since they can control the district
through their single-district council-
men as well as through their influence
on the at-large councilmen. However,
the property outside the district is
not subject to taxation by the dis-
trict. Taxation_is limited to property
solely within the districts. IC 18-4-
5-8. Similarly, unless specially pro-
wided, the special service districts

6. The Ordinances referred to here-
in are included in Appendix A hereto.

A74&

cannot provide service to non-residents.

IC 18-4-3-13. (See also Para. 12
supré.)

V. The Constitutional Issues
Raised by the Special Service
District as Implemented by
P.L. 258

23. This Court has subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(3) and (4) and has jurisdiction
and venue of this suit since violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the 14th Amendment
are established. The Court has power
to order relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202 on which this action
was brought.

24. At the time of the implemen-
tation of Uni-Gov, substantial liti-
gation was directed towards questioning
the constitutionality of the Act. See

ar (1971) 255 Ind. 545,

A75

266 N.E.2d 25 and Bryant v. Whitcomb,
supra.’ Virtually all of the provisions
of the Act withstood judicial scrutiny.
However, in Bryant the Court noted sev-
eral constitutional problems raised by
the structure of the special service
districts. These related to (1) the
membership of the special service dis-
trict councils, (2) the legislative
powers of these councils and (3) the
method of appointment of the public
safety director. The same issues

were raised by the plaintiffs herein.
In light of the changed factual cir-
cumstances discussed herein the Court
has decided these issues anew rather
than relying on the principle of col-
lateral estoppel.

d@ be noted that in Dortch
a aed eme Court did not rule
on the issue of “unequal protection
in the context of the special service
districts finding such issue to have
been waived by appellant there. 255
Ind. at 575-6, 265 N.E.2d at 44.

A76

[3} 25. This Court has recog-
mized the need for “flexibility” or
“experimentation” in local government.
See e.g., Dusch v. Davis (1967) 387
U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2¢
65€; Sailors v. Board of Education
(1966) 387 U.s. 105. 110-111, 87 S.cr.
1549, 18 L.Ed.24 650 ang Avery v. Mid-

land County (1968) 390 U.S. 474, 485.
88 S.Cr. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45. Such a
need can justify a dilution of voting
power otherwise impermissible under
the Equal Protection Clause.” But
there is no showing that the legisla-
tion at issue here “may reasonably be
Saic to advance the rational state
policy” of providing flexibility in
local government. See Mahan v. Howell
(1973) 410 U.s. 315, 328, 93 S.Ct.
979, 987, 35 L.Ed.2¢ 320.

9. There is reason to doubt whether
this rationale could ever justify the
nearly 40% dilution found here. How-
ever, in light of the evidence that

issue need not be faced at this time.

A77

26. This Court is compelled by

Avery v. Midland County (1967) 390
U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d

45 and Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict (1970) 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.ct. 791,
25 L.Ed.2d 45 to conclude that the
units of elected local government at
issue here have such “general govern-
mental powers” (Avery at 484-5, 88
$.Ct. 1114) to require an apportion-
ment that “does not deprive any voter
of his right to have his own vote
given as much weight, as far as is
practicable, as that of any other
voter in the... district.” Hadley
10
at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 793. This
result should obtain a fortiori when
the dilution is in favor of a non-
resident.

“The. ing of Hadley is not
solialt =) a Vv. are Lake

3 : : : Ge.
ea asta} a8 659 which deals with

an exception to the rule of Hadley.

A7&

27. That these districts have
general governmental powers is obvious
when one compares the facts here with
those in Hadley. Here the powers of
the special service district are fully
as broad as those in Radley. Police
and fire services are normally the
very heart of those local governments
having "general responsibility". The
members of the Special Service Dis-
trict Councils do not have duties "far
removed from normal governmental
activities" or disproportionately
affecting only some citizens. Ibid.
at 56, 90 S.Ct. at 795. As with edu-
cation police and fire services have
traditionally been governmental func-
tions. Cf. Salyer 410 U.S. at 728-
729, 93 S.Ct. 1224. See also Baker v.
Regional School District No. 5 (2nd
Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 799, cert. den.
423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 422, 46 L.Ed.2d
369, where a district far more limited
than that in Hadley was found to be
within the rule of that case. The
question of whether participation in

A79

voting by non-residents constitutes an
impermissible "dilution" in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause has
rarely arisen. There is no reported
case other than this one where such
unique "representation without taxa-
tion" has in fact occurred.

(4, 5] 28. The defendants argue in
effect that the allowance of the at-
large councilmen on the special dis-
trict councils can be justified on a
property-based franchise theory. This
ignores the fact that the Constitution
of the State of Indiana, Article 2,
Section 2, specifically ties the right
to vote to residence only, not property
ownership or use of services. The
qualifications for voting in municipal
elections are limited to those set up
by the Constitution and the general
election laws. IC 3-1-16-9. These
latter are similarly limited to resi-
dence. IC 3-1-7-26. Under the Uni-
Gov Act it is this system of election
which is provided. IC 18-4-3-6. At
least in Indiana, defendants’

A80

discussion of other factors is irrele-
vant. The statute makes residence,
not property or other interests, the
test; the issue is whether residence
in Marion County outside the district
‘is a permissible selection.

29. Defendants assert that
Glisson v. Mayor and Councilmen of the
Town of Savannah Beach, (5th Cir. 1965)
346 F.2d 135 is "in point". That case
legitimized the use of a complicated
franchise based under the statute on
residence and/or property ownership.
The Fifth Circuit approved this fran-
chise in the context of a resort
community which allows the vote to
permanent residents of that city and
to residents of the county where the
city is located if they own property
in the city. There is no such two-
tiered franchise here. Voting for

ll. The rights of property owners who
lived outside the county were not ad-
judicated because of a standing

problem. Oliver v. Mayor et al., (5th
Cir. 1965) 246 F.2d 3s

A81

at-large councilmen here is based
solely on residence anywhere in the
county. IC 18-4-3-6. This franchise
does not require that any voter live
in the special service districts, work
therein or own property therein. It
does not deal with these questions at
all. Thus, many of the voters in
question here would not meet either of

the tests approved in Glisson. In
Glisson there was a "fit" between the
franchise granted by the statute and
the interests sought to be repre-
sented.‘ Here there is no such fit
as to the theory defendants assert.

hown

; he extent of the fit was st

oy nn in that case indicating

that 64% of the value of the real ;

estate in the city was owned by —

residents of the Sify O06 Soa-resisents
tial majority o -

ates 8 at Savannah ~o - ss

onths a year. ere

nny nor does it appear ing

thane is much of a useful analogy -

tween a beach resort and an urbanize

state capital.

A82

[6] 30. Defendants' aiso rely
on Clark v. Town of Greenburgh (2d
Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 770. The "“out-
siders'' there both paid some taxes and
received some services from the govern-
mental body at issue. 436 F.2d at
772. Here by statute the property of
non-residents of the special service
districts located outside the district
cannot be taxed by the districts (IC
18-4-5-8) and the districts cannot
provide services outside the districts
except as provided by statute. IC 18-
4-3-13. Even if services are provided
to "outside" parts of Marion County by
contract, they cannot be a basis for
granting votes to broad numbers of
other non-residents of the district.
Moreover, to permit contracts to
require the Courts to hold otherwise
would be to induce a nation-wide
rejection of inter-government coopera-
tion for fear that it would permit, or
require, a change in the franchise.

It is this Indiana statutory arrange-
ment that is before the Court, as it

A83

was in Bryant. The New York structure
is so different as to be irrelevant.

31. Rutledge v. State of
Louisiana (W.D. La. 1971) 330 F. Supp.
336 is simlarly distinguished on the
issues of services and taxes. There
students from the city could attend
city or parish schools. Here, police
and fire services are geographically
limited. There, the chief source of
local revenue was local sales taxes
apparently collected from the whole
area of the parish. Here the main
local revenue comes from property
solely within the district. None
comes from property without the
district, and none comes from Marion
County outside the district as such,
i.e., as distinguished from any other
part of the state outside the dis-
trict. The other major sources of
revenue are federal revenue sharing
and Criminal Justice Revenues. Stip.
Ex. I.(2), H.(2). The case is not
controlling in any way.

a8.

[7} 32. The defendants made
much of the non-local source of some
Gistrict funds. This Court cannot
conclude that because federal revenu
sharing comes from all over the United
States certain residents of Marion
County get a vote for members of the
Special Service District Councils.
There is again no logical relationship
between the franchise granted and the
asserted justification.

{8} 33. It is the Court's
Gecision that in light of the nature
of the electorate which selects the
at-large city-county councilmen there
is a dilution of at least 39.2% of the
wote of the plaintiffs in the selec-
tion of these officials if they are
allowed to serve on the special ser-

vice district councils. This is an
obvious violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and therefore IC
i8-4-1-2(m) as amended must be
¢eclared unconstitutional pursuant to
that Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since
it allows this result unless the

a&s5

defendants have shown that this
dilution is “based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effec-
tuation of a rational state policy.”
slds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533
at 579, 84 S.Ct. 1362 at 1391, 12
L.Ed.2¢ 506 and that given such 4
policy the dilution is within con-
nergy 23 tolerable limits. See,
han v. Howell (1973) 416 U.S. 315,
328, — S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320.
Defendants have wholly failed to meet
this test.)>
34. The only two justifications
for the dilution suggested by defend-
ants were the need for flexibility to
achieve and maintain consolidation and
the desire to give non-resident

that this
13. Im light of the fact ct
Act permits the unique phenomer

— voting”, this Court is
)

Sec. 2-78. President of the city-county
council to be an ex officio
member of the standing con-
mittees.

The president of the city-county
council shall be an ex officio member

of each standing committee of the city-

county council and may participate in

Alol

its deliberations. The president shall
not vote unless his vote would break 4
tie, and then only if he chooses to do
so. (G.0. 293, 1971. § 2 (Rule 3, § 7))

Sec. 2-79. Functions of standing com-
mittees.

It shall be the duty of all
standing committees of the city-county
council to consider all proposals re-
ferred to it as provided in these rules.
A standing committee may consider any
other matter properly concerning de-
partments or subject matter indicated
by the name of the standing committee.
Meetings of the standing committees
shall be open to the public. A
standing committee may hear such testi-
mony or public comment 4s the committee
deems proper. In lieu of separate
hearings, standing committees may meet
with the boards of corresponding city
departments. (G.0. 293, 1971. § 2
(Rule 3. § 9))

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Sec. 2-80. Attendance at meetings of
standing committees by city-
county council members who
are mot on the committee.

Any member of the city-county
coumcil shall be entitled to attend
anc participate in the discussions be-
fore any standing committee. The
councilman introducing any proposal
referred to a standing committee shell
be a member of that committee while it
is considering that proposal, but

he shall not be entitled to vote.

(G.0. 293, 1971, § 2 (Rule 3, § 9))

Sec. 2-81. Action and reports on pro-
posals.

Any permanent or standing committee

of the city-county council to which a
proposal has been referred shall report
to the city-county council upon each
such proposal within forty-five (45)
days of its referral, either with or
without a recommendation, unless the
president of the city-county council
shall withdraw the proposal or reas-
Sign it. After any hearing by the

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committee upon a proposal, the chairman
of the committee shall submit a formal
report of the committee's action, in
writing, to the clerk. The report

shall include any recommendations sup-
ported by a majority of the committee
and may, upon request of any member of
the city-county council, include a
minority position. Any member of a
committee may file a minority report.
Such reports shall be filed in sufficient
time to permit the clerk to circulate
copies to all members of the city-county
council prior to the next scheduled
meeting of the city-county council.
Copies of all committee reports shall
remain on file in the clerk's office
readily available to the press and
public. (G.0. 293, 1971, § 2 (Rule 3,
§ 10); G.O. 70, 1972, § 1)

Sec. 2-82. Meetings of standing con-
mittees.

Standing committees of the city-
county council shall establish at least
one (1) regular meeting time and date
each month. Other meetings of standing

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committees shall be held at the call of
the committee chairman upon not less
than twenty-four (24) hours’ actual
motice to each member of the committee.
All proposals referred to the committees
shall be a proper ites of business at
each regular meeting, unless the pro-
posal has been reported back to the
city-county council. at any regular
meeting of a committee. three (3) men-
bers present shall constitute a quorum
for purposes of acting and reporting

om any proposal assigned to the con-
mittee. (C.0. 293, 1971, § 2 (Rule 3,

§ 11); G.0. 31, 1975, ¢§ 1)

Sec. 2-83. Special committees.
Special committees of the city-
county council may be formed by the
president of the city-county council
or by a2 vote of the majority of the
members of the city-county council for
any specific purpose proper for city-
county council consideration. Special
committees shall corsist of an odd
mumber of members aad shall have at

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least ome (1) minority member. (G.O.
293. 1971. § 2 (Rule 3, § 12))

Sec. 2-84. Police special service dis-
trict committee and fire
special service district com-
mittee.

(a) There is hereby created a com-
mittee of the city-county council to be
known as the "fire special service dis-
trict committee" and a committee of the
cit+-counmty council to be known as the
“police special service district com-
mttee.”

>) Each member of the fire spe-
cial service district council, as es-
tebliished pursuant to section 310 of
chapter 173 of the Acts of 1969, or as
shall be established pursuant to sec-
tion 102(m) of chapter 173 of the Acts
of 1969, shall be a member of the fire
special service district committee of
the city-county council.

(c) Each member of the police
special service district council, us
established pursuant to section 310 of
chapter 173 of the Acts of 1969, or

A106

as shall be established pursuant to
section 102(m) of chapter 173 of the
Acts of 1969, shall be a member of the
police special service district com-
mittee of the city-county council.

(d) Each committee established
by this section shall elect a chairman
by majority vote of the committee and
shall provide for its organization,
procedures and meetings by rules to be
adopted by the majority vote of the
committee.

(e) Each committee established
by this section shall have the au-
thority and power of a standing com-
mittee of the city-county council as
specified in section 31l of chapter 173
of the Acts of 1969, with regard to
matters pertaining solely to their
special service districts.

(f) Each committee established
pursuant to this section, or a member
thereof, shall further have the au-
thority to propose ordinances on all
legislative matters relating solely
to their respective special service
districts. Any ordinance pertaining

A107

solely to a special service district
shall be acted upon by the city-county
council in accordance with its rules,
provided that the members of the city-
county council who are not members of
the committee for the district af-
fected by the ordinance shall not be
eligible to debate or vote thereon,
and any such ordinance receiving a
majority vote of those eligible to
vote shall be deemed to be duly passed
and adopted.

(g) The appointment of a director
of the department of public safety pro-
vided for in section 1203 of chapter 173
of the Acts of 1969 shall become ef-
fective, and shall be approved by the
city-county council, only upon approval
of the nominee by a majority vote of
the members of the fire and police
special service district committees
established in this section. (G.O.

48, 1970, §§ 1-7)

a ne ee

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Sec. 2-85. Investigating committees.
Investigating committees of the
city-county council may be formed by
resolution of the city-county council
for any lawful purpose. The resolu-
tion establishing the committee shall
specify the membership of the con-
mittee, the general nature of its in-
vestigation and the power to subpoena
witnesses, if the power is granted.
(G.O. 293, 1971, § 2 (Rule 3, § 13))

Secs. 2-86--2-90. Reserved.
RULE 4. PETITIONS, MEMORIALS,
SPECIAL RESOLUTIONS AND
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS*
Sec. 2-91. Petitions.

Any petition directed to the city-
county council, whether specifically
authorized by law or not, shall be
filed with the clerk and called to
the attention of the city-county council
by the clerk under the proper order

*State law reference--Ordinances
and resolutions of the city-county
council, IC 1971, 18-4-5-2.

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of business. If the petition is one
specifically authorized by law, the
president shall refer it to a proper
committee. As to all other petitions,
any motion for referral or other ap-
propriate action shall be in order un-
less the motion requires action which
is proper only by a general resolution
or ordinance. In calling the petition
to the attention of the city-county
council, the clerk need not read the
petition in full but shall report,
fairly describing its contents. (G.O.
293, 1971, § 2 (Rule 4, § 1))

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_1005%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.