# Petition — Garrett v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0792%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1978 - **Citation:** 436 U.S. 919 ## Text Supreme Court, U. & { FILED \ APR 27 1978 In THE MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1977 NO. . 771541 ARTHUR GARRETT, ANGELO MORINI, FIESTA FOODS, INC., Petitioners v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT JAMES E. MCLAUGHLIN 618 Frick Bldg. Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219 (412) 371-3250 Attorney for Petitioners Davip O’HANESIAN 525 William Penn Place Pittsburgh, Pa. Of Counsel SMITH BROS... LAW PRINTERS, 620 SECOND AVENUE, PITTSBURGH, PA. 15219 INDEX TO PETITION PAGE Citation To Opinions Below... ..... . . . . . . 1 r è ¾ SEES 1 ,, ...... 2 e T...... 2 e ... 3 Reasons for Granting the Writ 4 D a saietenidansosbioneobons 8 Appendix A Opinion of the Court Appeals BeloW,ẽ/ʒ;=R· la Appendix B , Ä 2... lll 12a TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), Cert. Denied 375 U.S. 986 (1964) 4,5,6 Sherwin v. United States, 320 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. c 7 United States v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1986) 6 United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244 (Sth Cir. — . 5 United States v. Diggs, 527 F. 2d 509 (8th Cir. 1975) 6 United States v. Helms, 340 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1964) 5, 6 United States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. ED ů——̃ — —„—-—⅛ 6 United States v. Wilkins, 385 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. . . —— 7 United States v. Woodring, 464 F.2d 1248 (10th . ̃ ̃ͤ 3 —1—— — 6 In THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1977 NO. Cee 22240 ARTHUR GARRETT, ANGELO MORINI, FIESTA FOODS, INC., Petitioners v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW Direct appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals and therefore, there was no opinion in the Dis- trict Court. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is not yet reported but a copy of the slip Opinion is reproduced in Appendix A hereto, infra. JURISDICTION The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on March 28, 1978. The jurisdiction of this court is in- voked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). Statutes Involved. QUESTION PRESENTED IS IT NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE DIS- TRICT COURT IN A CRIMINAL CASE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN SUCH FASHION AS TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE CRITICAL ELEMENT OF INTENT FROM THE PROSECUTION TO THE DE- FENDANTS. STATUTES INVOLVED The statutory provisions involved are set forth in Appendix B., infra. Statement of the Case. STATEMENT OF THE CASE In light of the fact that this petition is directed solely to a question of law, the facts of the case will be reviewed only briefly. Petitioners were tried jointly on indictments charging twenty counts of mail fraud and one count of conspiracy. The defendants were Arthur Garrett, food service director at Slippery Rock State College; Fiesta Foods, Inc., a food supply company; and Angelo Morini, the president of Fiesta Foods. They were charged with using the mails in connection with a scheme to falsify bids to the college in order to ensure that Fiesta would be awarded supply contracts for part of Slippery Rock’s food service. The government’s evidence as to the use of the mails was not disputed. The jury found each defend- ant guilty of eight counts of mail fraud. The individual defendants were sentenced to prison. Timely direct appeal was taken from the judgment of sentence and conviction and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on March 28, 1978. Reasons for Granting the Writ. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT Petitioners contend that a portion of the court’s in- structions to the jury impermissably shifted the burden of proof on intent from the government to the defendants. We further contend that this instruction and consequent burden shifting constituted reversible error. The portion of the charge to which petitioners took specific exception at the trial and to which they took ap- pellate exception was: “As a general rule it is resonable to infer that a per- son intends all the natural and probable conse- quences of an act knowingly done or knowingly omit- ted. So unless the evidence of a case leads you to a contrary conclusion you may draw the inference and find that the accused intended all the natural and probable consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have been expected to result from an act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the ac- cused.” This instruction is popularly known as the “Mann” instruction and derives its appellation from the fact that its use was condemned and found to be plain error in the case of Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 986 (1964). In the fifteen years since Mann came into being it has been revisited many times in a number of Circuits and such visits have created considerable confusion and a conflict in the Cir- cuits. The instant case is the first time that the Third Circuit has directly addressed itself to the Mann problem and its solution of the problem is what has prompted us to seek review in this Court. Reasons for Granting the Writ. In Mann, supra., the court gave the identical instruc- tion on intent as was given in this case. In spite of a lack of objection to the instruction, the Fifth Circuit held it to be plain error and reversed, stating: “If the charge had ended when the jury was told that a person is presumed to intend the consequences of his own acts, when considered in the light of the charge as a whole, there would have been no error. When the words, “So unless the contrary appears from the evidence“ were introduced, the burden of proof was thereupon shifted from the prosecution to the defendant to prove lack of intent. If an inference from a fact or set of facts must be overcome with op- posing evidence, the inference becomes a presump- tion and places a burden on the accused to overcome that presumption. Such a burden is especially harm- ful when a person is required to overcome a presump- tion as to anything subjective, such as intent or wil- fulness, and a barrier almost impossible to hurdle results.” 319 F.2d 404 at 409. In the instant case the matter of petitioners intent was purely subjective and the jury was permitted to infer evil intent from the use of the mails alone. The advent of the Mann decision has given rise to a plethora of appellant problems. A detailed analysis of the recurring appearances of the Mann problem in the Fifth Circuit is to be found in the recent case of United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977). Chiantese, supra., discloses that Mann over the years has caused the Fifth Circuit more than a modicum of judicial labor and frustration. Since the decision came down in 1963 the original teaching of Mann has been distinguished as often as it has been followed by the Fifth Circuit. In United Reasons for Granting the Writ. States v. Helms, 340 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1964), it was held that where there was objective evidence of intent, the 1963 holding Mann did not obtain. In this case there was no objective evidence of intent. In 1971 the Fifth Circuit held that where curative instructions were given immedi- ately after the Mann instruction, the harm indigenous to Mann was vitiated. United States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1971). Finally, in 1977 the Fifth Circuit at- tempted to put Mann in what it thought to be proper per- spective. In Chiantese, supra., the Fifth Circuit ruled prospectively en banc, that the Mann charge was no longer to be given and that curative instructions would not be considered in determining whether its use was re- versible error. In this case the Third Circuit while recognizing the vice of the Mann instruction found that the vice was cured by the virtue of the charge as a whole and then goes on to rule that the use of such instructions ninety days hence will be considered reversible error. While this holding may be considered a just solution by the Third Circuit, it can hardly be embraced with much enthusiasm by the petitioners who have been left in the unfortunate posture of legal pioneers on their way to the penitentiary. Since the weight of authority finds this type of instruc- tion offensive it would have been far more equitable to call a spade a spade and treat reversible error as rever- sible error whenever it appeared. The Mann instruction and similar instructions have been weighed and found wanting in the Second Circuit in United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) and have been criticized in the Eighth and Tenth Cir- cuits. United States v. Diggs, 527 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Woodring, 464 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. Reasons for Granting the Writ. 1972). On the other hand a Mann type instruction has been approved by the Ninth Circuit in Sherwin v. United States, 320 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1963) and found harmless by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wilkins, 385 F. 2d 465 (4th Cir. 1967). Thus it can be seen that there is a conflict in the Circuits which can be resolved only by a grant of certiorari to this Court. That the question is important enough to warrant review can be judged from the amount of appellant litigation the use of the in- struction has engendered. Mann has returned to the Fifth Circuit a minimum of seventeen times in the last fifteen years and has been the subject of appellant consideration in six other Circuits. The instruction has resulted in the reversal of numerous convictions and the puzzling af- firmance of a number of others. It is important to the petitioners because they stand convicted on a charge that has been judicially labelled poison in the future but harmless in the past. Conclusion. CONCLUSION It is our contention that any shift of the burden of proof of intent from the government to the defendant is reversible error of a Constitutional dimension. At present the Mann instruction is proper in the Ninth Circuit and probably proper in the Fourth. It is improper in the Second Circuit and questionable in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. It is now error in the Fifth Circuit but not per se reversible. In a few months it will constitute reversible error in the Third Circuit. The status of the instruction in the remaining Circuits is unresolved. It is submitted that this conflict and confusion in the Circuits calls for a final solution and that solution can only be supplied by a grant of review in this case. Respectfully submitted, JAMES E. MCLAUGHLIN 618 Frick Bldg. Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219 (412) 471-3250 Attorney for Petitioners Davip O’HANESIAN 525 William Penn Place Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219 Of Counsel la Appendiz 4. APPENDIX A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Nos. 77-1780/1/2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. ARTHUR GARRETT, ANGELO MORINI, FIESTA FOODS, INC., Appellants. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA D.C. Crim Nos. 77-18-1, 77-18-2, 77-18-3 Argued January 13, 1978 Before ALDISERT and HUNTER, Circuit Judges and CaHN,* District Judge Blair A. Griffith Alexander H. Lindsay Bruce A. Antkowiak Attorneys for Appellee David O’Hanesian Attorney for Appellants OPINION (Filed March 28, 1978) *Honorable Edward N. Cahn, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 2a Appendiæ A. HUNTER, Circuit Judge: In this case, appellants challenge the trial judge’s jury instruction on intent in their joint trial for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1870). They contend that part of the charge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on intent from the government to the defendants. Our review of the trial judge’s charge convinces us that no reversible error was committed. We affirm. I. The facts will be outlined only briefly. The defend- ants are Arthur Garrett, food service director at Slip- pery Rock State College; Fiesta Foods, Inc., a food sup- ply company; and Angelo Morini, the president of Fiesta Foods. They were charged with using the mails in furtherance of a scheme to falsify bids to the college in order to ensure that Fiesta would be awarded supply contracts for part of Slippery Rock’s food service. At trial, the government introduced evidence-that Garrett had obtained a financial interest in Fiesta Foods. The college’s purchasing agent testified that pur- he: chases of perishable foods were to be made after com- peting bids were solicited, if the product sought was available from more than one source. The evidence indi- cated that Garrett had instructed food services em- ployees to solicit the required multiple bids for pizzas from defendant Morini, with the result that Fiesta Foods was awarded the pizza contracts. Representatives of other food companies, which had been listed on college purchase orders as participating in the bidding, testi- fied that the bids made on behalf of their companies for the pizza contract were not authorized. 3a Appendiæ A. Evidence of the use of the mails for submitting contracts and receiving payments for supplies was intro- duced by the government and not disputed by defendants. In its closing, the government contended that the evi- dence presented demonstrated that defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud the college and used the mails to perpetrate the scheme, The jury found each defendant guilty of eight counts of mail fraud. II. The defendants’ contentions in this appeal are di- rected solely at the following portion of the trial judge’s charge to the jury: As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that. a person intends all the natural and probable conse- quences of an act knowingly done or knowingly omitted. So unless the evidence of a case leads you to a contrary conclusion you may draw the infer- ence and find that the accused intended all the natural and probable consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have been expected to result from an act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the accused. Counsel for defendants objected to this portion of the charge but were overruled by the trial judge. The thrust of defendants’ argument is that by in- structing the members of the jury that they may infer the specific intent to defraud element of the crime of mail fraud from acts by the accused “unless the evi- dence leads [the jury] to a contrary conclusion,” the trial judge shifted the burden onto defendants to intro- duce evidence of their lack of intent to defraud. Further, 4a Appendiz A. defendants argue that the instruction is inconsistent with other elements of the charge placing the burden of proving all elements of the crime on the government. The Fifth Circuit has reviewed the instruction under consideration here numerous times over the last fifteen years. In Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404 (Sth Cir. 1963) cert. denied 375 U.S. 986 (1964), the court held that the trial judge’s use of the instruction in a prosecution for wilful evasion of income tax payments constituted plain error. In Mann, the court stated: When the words “So unless the contrary appears from the evidence” were introduced [after the first sentence of the instruction], the burden of proof was thereupon shifted from the prosecution to the defendant to prove lack of intent. If an inference from a fact or set of facts must be overcome with opposing evidence, then the inference becomes a presumption, and places a burden on the accused to overcome that presumption. Such a burden is es- pecially harmful when a person is required to over- come a presumption as to anything subjective, such as intent or wilfulness, and a barrier almost im- possible to hurdle results. 319 F.2d at 409. See also Uniied States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Driscoll, 454 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. United States, 425 F. 2d 134 (5th Cir. 1970); South v. United States, 412 F. 2d 697 (5th Cir. 1969). Although Mann seemed to indicate that use of the charge in subsequent criminal cases would constitute re- versible error per se, later Fifth Circuit cases recognized factual situations in which a conviction would not be re- 5a Appendiæ A. versed even though the “Mann instruction” was given. First, in United States v. Helms, 340 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 382 U.S. 814 (1965), another tax eva- sion case, the court refused to reverse a conviction after a jury trial in which the Mann instruction was given. In that case, the government introduced two sets of rec- ords, one of which was false and from which defendant’s tax returns were prepared. The appeals court noted that the jury’s determination of whether the defendant had prepared the two sets of books—a matter of objective conduct—was dispositive of his criminal intent. The Mann decision was distinguished on the ground that the jury in that case, in which intent could not be deter- mined from objective conduct alone, could have been misled far more easily by the offensive language in the charge. See also United States v. Durham, 512 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 423 U.S. 871 (1975). Another factual situation in which use of the Mann charge was determined not to constitute reversible error is found in United States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1971). Although the same language was used in Jenkins as in Mann, the court found that curative in- structions immediately following the Mann language vitiated any harmful effect that the challenged instruc- tion might have on the jury.! See also United States v. 1. The sa elements of the charge included di- rectives 1) that the jury was entitled to consider any statements made and acts done or omitted by the ac- cused, and all facts and circumstances in evidence which may aid in determination of state of mind; and 2) that the law never im on a defendant in a criminal case the burden of witnesses or ow i evidence. ora States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429, (5th Cir. 6a Appendiz A. Roberts, 546 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 431 U.S. 968 (1977); United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 952 (1976) ; United States v. DeSimone, 452 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 959 (1972). In United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit attempted to rid itself of the recurrent appeals arising from use of the charge. Although the court refrained from mandating a rule of per se reversal whenever the Mann charge is given, the court en banc held prospectively that curative instruc- tions will not be considered in determining whether a trial judge’s use of the Mann charge is reversible. ‘ Other circuits have criticized the language of the instruction.? This circuit, however, has not had occasion to pass on the challenged instruction until now. In United States v. Restaino, 405 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1968), the district court had instructed the jury on intent in language similar to that used in this case. Defense coun- sel timely objected to the instruction, and the district judge corrected and supplemented the charge on intent. Thus, on appeal, this court did not review the instruc- tion. 2. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Diggs, 517 F.2d (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Robinson, 464 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wilkens, 385 F. 2d 465 (4th Cir. 1967); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Releford, 352 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1965). — ee ee ee 7a Appendiæ 4. III. An appellant court’s role in reviewing jury instruc- tions is to examine the entire charge in order to deter- mine whether the district judge properly performed his function. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973). The district judge is responsible for giving the jury the guidance by which it can make appropriate conclusions from the testimony. This duty is performed by clearly stating the relevant legal criteria. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946). We thus must determine, in light of the entire jury charge, whether the trial judge’s use of the Mann in- struction misled the jury by effectively imposing on de- fendants the burden of proving lack of intent to defraud. As to the first sentence of the challenged instruc- tion As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done or knowingly omitted“ de- fendants do not contend and we do not hold that this portion is in any way improper. Rather, defendants point to the second sentence of the charge— “.. unless the evidence of a case leads you to a contrary conclus- ion, you may draw... [the inference outlined in the first sentence] as containing what they assert to be the im- permissible, “burden-shifting instruction.” Although it has been suggested that the instruction does not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the de- fendant, 3 it is possible that a jury might construe the second sentence of the instructiou as an invitation to 3. See United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244, 1256 & 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) (Hill, J., concurring) (Ains- worth, J., dissenting). 8a Appendiæ A. resume the requisite intent in the absence of rebuttal evidence introduced by defendant. The instruction’s pro- lixity serves only to confuse the jurors and adds little to their understanding of the legal criteria they must ap- ply, “since insofar as the statement has logical validity the jury would know it anyhow.” United States v. Ba- rash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966). In this case, however, the instructions as a whole fully informed the jury of the government’s burden of proof on the question of intent. The jury was instructed on the following: 1) the law presumes the defendants ‘o be innocent of a crime; 2) the presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reason- able doubt of a defendant’s guilt; 3) the burden is always on the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 4) this burden never shifts to a defendant; 5) a defendant is never under a burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence; 6) the burden is on the government to establish the guilt of a corporate defendant, just as in the case of an individual defendant; 7) the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly did an act forbidden by law purposely intending to violate the law; and 8) that such jatent may be determined from all the facts and circums surrounding the case. ee ree ee wr eee oe ee — — 94 Appendiæ 4. We hold, in light of these instructions, that the trial judge properly informed the jury of the government's burden of proof on the issue of intent and that the po- tentially harmful effect of the Mann instruction was vitiated. Thus we find no reversible error in this case arising from the use of the Mann instruction. IV. Notwithstanding our holding in this case, the con- fusing nature of the instruction’s language and the ex- tent of judicial time spent reviewing charges containing the Mann instruction convinces us to prohibit its use in criminal trials commenced ninety days after the filing of this opinion. Hereafter, district courts in this circuit shall not use language in instructions that reasonably can be in- terpreted as shifting the burden to the accused to pro- duce proof of innocence. This includes charges indi- cating that the law presumes a person to intend the nat- ural and probable consequences of his knowing acts, as well as charges substantially similiar to that given in this case. Use of this instruction will be deemed error, and convictions obtained in trials in which the instruc- tion is given will be reversed, except in those “very extraordinary circumstances [in which] the error may be found so inconsequential as to avoid the necessity of reversal on appeal.” United States v. Fioravanti, 414 F. 2d 407, 420 (3d Cir. 1969). Certainly, the use of particular language in charging the jury is left to the sound discretion of the 4. See United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977). * 10a Appendiæ 4. trial judge. See United States v. Bailey, 451 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1971); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rivera, 439 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1971). Further, a trial judge should tailor his instructions to a particular case and not rely too heavily on form instructions. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971). Never- theless, the charges outlined in Devitt & Blackmar, Fed- eral Jury Practice and Instructions 514.13 (1977 ed.) 5 and in United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1972) ,6 may be of some help to trial judges in avoid- 5. The instruction prepared by Devitt & Blackmar is as follows: Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly, because there is no way of fathoming or scruti- nizing the operations of the human mind. But you may infer the defendant’s intent from the surround- ing circumstances. You may consider any statement made and done or omitted by the defendant, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence which indicate his state of mind. You may consider it reasonable to draw the in- ference and find that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. As I have said, it is entirely 22 you to decide what facts to find from the evidence. 1 Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instruc- tions 514.13 (1977 ed.) 6. The Wilkinson court suggested the following lan- It is reasonable to infer that a person ordinar- 4 —— the natural and probable consequences of knowing acts. The jury may draw the inference that the accused intended all of the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and poss- like knowledge should reasonably have ex- pected to result from an intentional act or conscious —ͤ—— — TO lla Appendiz 4. ing the use of instructions on intent that might be con- strued by a jury to shift the burden of proof to the de- fendant in a criminal case. We repeat and emphasize that this decision with respect to the Mann instruction shall have only pros- pective application in those jury trials which shall commence ninety days after this opinion is filed. The judgments of conviction will be affirmed. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. omission. Any such inference drawn is entitled to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the government has proved beyond a reason- able doubt that the defendant possessed the re- quired criminal intent. United States v. Wilkinson, 460 F.2d 725, 733. Appendiz B. APPENDIX B $1341. Frauds and swindles Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of execu- ting such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be de- livered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. As amended May 24, 1949, c. 139 §34, 63 Stat. 94; Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, §6(j) (11), 84 Stat. 778. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0792%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.