# Petition — United States Navigation, Inc. v. Esposito > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0611%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1978 - **Citation:** 435 U.S. 972 ## Text Supreme Court, U. $i ' FILED | MAR 16 1978 | a JR. al In THE Supreme Court of the United States Octoser Term, 1977 No. a & Sn 1 2 Y 6 Unitep Srates Navication Inc., and Scrinpia Steam Nayieation Co., Lop., Petitioners, —against— Joun Esposito, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Wim M. Kiwpari Counsel for Petitioners 1 Battery Park Plaza New York, N.Y. 10004 IN THE Supreme Count of the United States Octroser Term, 1977 Unrtep Srates Navication Inc., and Scinpia Steam Navication Co., Lap., Petitioners, —against— Joun Esposito, Respondent. > PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered herein on October 17, 1977. Opinion Below There is no opinion by the Court of Appeals, which summarily affirmed on the unreported District Court opinion, printed in app’x A. Jurisdiction The judgment of the Court of Appeals dated and entered October 17, 1977, is printed in app’x B. The orders of the Court of Appeals dated January 4, 1978, denying timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in bane, are printed in app’xes C and D. This Court’s juris- diction is invoked under 28’ U.S.C. 1254(1). Questions Presented 1. Whether a demise charterer is liable without negli- gence for personal injury caused by a latent defect existing before the demise? 2. If the answer to 1 is affirmative, whether the de- misee’s undisclosed principal is liable on ground of respon- deat superior? 3. Regardless of the answers to 1 and 2, whether the Court of Appeals’ summary affirmance warrants an exer- cise of this Court’s power of supervision? Statement Invoking 28 U.S.C. 1333(1) admiralty jurisdiction, re- spondent Esposito, a longshoreman, sued petitioners U.S. Navigation, a steamship agency, and Scindia, a shipowner, in the United States District Court for Eastern New York to recover damages for personal injury caused by a “defect in the beams supporting the deck [of a barge, which] could not be discovered by a reasonable inspection * * * a latent defect” (app’x A, pp. 5a-6a). The defect 3 existed before U.S. Navigation hired the barge, and was unknown to U.S. Navigation before Esposito’s injury. The barge was used to receive cargo discharged from Scindia’s ship. While Esposito was stowing some of that cargo, a portion of the barge’s deck on which he had walked more than 30 times, and which “appeared to be safe and able to support the weight of the longshoremen and cargo” (app’x A, p. 3a), unexpectedly gave way be- cause of the latent defect in the supporting beams. After bifureated trial of the liability issues, Chief Judge Mishler found that U.S. “Navigation acted independently in the hiring” of the barge (app’x A, p. 4a) as “agent of an undisclosed principal” (app’x A, p. 5a), and held U.S. Navigation liable as “demise charterer of the barge” (app’x A, p. 4a) and Scindia liable “on the traditional con- cept of respondeat superior [that] * * * [t]he undisclosed principal is liable for the acts of its agent performed within the scope of the agency” (app’x A, pp. 4a, 5a). He dis- missed petitioners’ indemnity claim against Esposito’s em- ployer because the latent defect was not reasonably dis- eoverable, and subsequently awarded Esposito 100% of his recoverable damages, thereby implicitly finding that Espo- sito was not contributorily negligent. Petitioners appealed solely the question of their liability to Esposito. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed “on the opinion of Chief Judge Mishler below” (app’x B) and denied petitioners’ timely petition for rehearing (app’x C) and suggestion for rehearing in banc (app’x D). Reasons for Granting the Writ I The holding that a demisee is liable without negligence for personal injury caused by a latent, unknown, not rea- sonably discoverable defect existing before the demise is unprecedented, and raises an important question which should be settled by this Court because of its “responsi- bility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.” Fitegerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 US. 397, 409 (1975). The question is commercially important because steam- ship agents constantly hire barges and other harbor craft for use by their principals and, until the opinion below, neither did, nor considered it necessary to, obtain costly insurance against liability for non-negligent injuries, dam- ages, or losses occurring during the hire period, and because demisees customarily rely on demisors’ express or implied seaworthiness warranties at the time the demise commences and do not deem it either requisite or desirable to otherwise protect themselves against non-negligent lia- bility for pre-demise unseaworthiness. The question is legally important because the holding below is contrary to the rationale of the personal obliga- tion relationship to unseaworthiness liability which the Court has twice granted certiorari to consider, and then left undecided because of other considerations. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 699, 700 (1962); Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 411, 412 (1963); cf., the dissents in Guzman, p. 704, and Reed, p. 419 n.2. It seems reasonably 5 settled in light of decisions such as Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F. 2d 794, 795-797 (2 Cir. 1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 859 (1949), that, although a demised ship can be sued in rem for both pre-demise and post-demise unseaworthiness, a non-negligent demisor is personally liable only for pre-demise unseaworthiness, and a non- negligent demisee is personally liable for post-demise unseaworthiness. What is not, but should *e, settled, con- sistent with those rules of admiralty law and with the personal obligation relationship to unseaworthiness lia- bility persuasively substantiated in Ruiz Pichirilo v. Maysonet Gueman, 290 F. 2d 812, 814-815 (1 Cir. 1961), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962), and reaffirmed in Ramos v. Beauregard, Inc., 423 F. 2d 916, 917-918 (1 Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 865 (1970), is whether a non-negligent demisee can be held personally liable for pre-demise unseaworthiness. The holding that a demisee’s undisclosed principal is liable for unseaworthiness on the respondeat suwpertor “concept” that “[t]he undisclosed principal is liable for the acts of its agent performed within the scope of the agency” (app’x A, p. 5a) is “such a significant departure from longstanding principles of [admiralty and agency] law that the petition for certiorari should be granted.” Cf., Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1005 n.2, 1009 (1976), dissent by Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, where the “Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in a short, uncritical, per curiam opinion * * * a significant departure from long- standing principles of patent law”. 6 Liability for unseaworthiness “is peculiarly and exclu- sively the obligation of the owner”, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 100 (1946), or owner pro hac vice, Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412-413 (1963), and is “a species of liability without fault * * * a form of absolute duty”. Seas Shipping Co., pp. 94-95; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). Non-negligent U.S. Navigation committed no “acts” for which its principal can properly be held secondarily liable on the ground of respon- deat superior. If U.S. Navigation is liable as demisee- owner pro hac vice for the barge’s latent unseaworthiness, that liability is “exclusive”. Ill The Court of Appeals’ summary affirmance, and re- affirmance, of an opinion which either vitiates or trans- forms fundamental law, and is either plainly wrong or so obscurely right as to mystify entire law firms, “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court’s power of supervision.” Sup. Ct. Rule 19.1(b). “Traditionally, then, the function of the appellate court has been to expound what the law should be. As chief oracle, by virtue of authority and prestige, it has furnished a pattern of thought by which lower courts, lawyers, and laymen might guide themselves— a refining process by which judicial dross has been separated from the gold. A serious undermining of that function has come about through the practice, common in several appellate courts, of affirming de- cisions without opinion.” Mareus, Affirmance Without Opinion, 6 Fordham L.Rev. 212, 213 (1937). 7 “A most important function is the writing of opin- ions. Opinions are to serve a number of purposes at least two of which are highly significant. One is that an articulated discussion of the factors, legal, factual or both, which lead the Court to one rather than to another result, gives strength to the system, and reduces, if not eliminates, the easy temptation or tendency to ill-considered or even arbitrary action by those having the awesome power of almost final review. The second, of course, is that the very dis- cursive statement of these articulated reasons is the thing out of which law—and particularly Judge-made law—grows. It is an essential part of the process of the creation of principles on which predictions can fairly be forecast as a basis for conduct, accountabil- ity, or the like. All Judges know that in some cases this latter factor may almost completely transcend the importance of the case which is the vehicle bring- ing the questions forward.” NURB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F. 2d 966, 972 (5 Cir. 1970). “The most dramatic evidence of the importance which attorneys attach to a written record of the reason for a decision can be found in the view expressed by more than two-thirds of the attorneys surveyed [in the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits] that the due process clause of the Constitution should be held to require courts of appeals to write at least a brief statement of the reasons for their decisions.” Commission for Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure & Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change 69 (1975). “TWje recommend that in every case there be some record, however brief, and whatever the form, of 8 reasoning which impelled the decision. * * * Opinions can be signed or unsigned, published or unpublished, but in each case the litigants and their attorneys would be apprised of the reasoning which underlies the con- clusion of the court.” Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure & Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change 73 (1975). While “courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions * * * especially * * * with respect to summary affirmances”, Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972), that discretion is not absolute and resort to affirmances without opinions “is certainly not to be encouraged in other than clearly deserving cases.” Haworth, Screening & Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 Wash. Univ. L.Q. 257, 272. There are “factors which would make application of the Rule [permitting affirmance with- out opinion] wrong or unwise or inappropriate”, NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, supra, 430 F. 2d, p. 973, and there are “cases in which an opinion by the Court seems * * * necessary, not merely to resolve an issue con- cededly present, but to denominate for the benefit of the parties and the District Court what issues the Court conceives to be resolved by its summary affirmance.” Buchanan vy. Evans, 423 U.S. 963, 975 (1975), dissent by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined in relevant part by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Powell. The Court has granted certiorari and remanded for elucidation when it was not clear that a court of appeals’ summary disposition cor- rectly applied the proper determinative standards. £.g., Taylor v. McKeithen, supra, 407 U.S., p. 194; Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104, 107 (1967); Northcross 9 v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 428-429 (1973). Vindicating the Fifth Cirecuit’s summary disposition Rule 21, printed in app’x E, which, unlike the Second Cireuit’s Rule § 0.23, also printed in app’x E, has more specific safeguards and is limited to affirmances, Chief Judge Brown avowed that Rule 21 “must be carefully and selectively employed. * * * This means that * * * it must be sparingly used.” NLRB vy. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, supra, 430 F. 2d, p. 972. The Second Circuit’s Rule § 0.23 has not been sparingly used. During the past 10 years the ratio between its Rule $0.23 dispositions and total decisions has risen from 11.5% to an alarming 54%, United States Courts, Second Circuit Report 1977, p. 20, Table 1, and, like a scythe, has been used to sum- marily affirm, dismiss, grant or deny enforcement, modify, remand, reverse, or vacate. 556 F. 2d 554-563; 559 F. 2d 1202-1206; 562 F. 2d 37-40. A brief explication by the Court of Appeals of its affirm- ance that petitioners were properly held liable would not be supererogatory; would not have unreasonably added to that Court’s burden; and would have lessened this Court’s burden. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, this petition should be granted. Respectfully submitted, Wiuuiam M. Kimsau Counsel for Petitioners New York, N.Y. March ‘6, 1978 Appendices APPENDIX A District Court Opinion on Liability (Filed February 16, 1977) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Eastern District or New York 73 Civil 655 —~—— Joun Esposito, Plaintiff, —against— Unitep States Navigation Ino. —and— Scrnpia Steam Navication Co. Lrp., Defendants. Scrnpia Steam Navication Co. Lrp., Third-Party Plaintiff, —against— INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL OperatinG Co. Inc., Third-Party Defendant. MisHueErR, Cu. J. This is an action for personal injuries by a longshore- man employed by International Terminal Operating Co. Inc. (“ITO”), against Scindia Steam Navigation Company, 2a Ltd. (“Seindia”), the owner of carge vessel M/V “Jala- dhanya” and United States Navigation, Inc. (“Naviga- tion”), Scindia’s agent. Esposito was injured aboard a barge on March 18, 1969, while engaged in stowing bales of hemp discharged from the #5 hatch of the Jaladhanya onto the deck of the barge. Defendant—third-party plain- tiff—seeks indemity from ITO. The trial on the issue of liability was conducted by the court without a jury. The court finds as follows: The M/V Jaladhanya, owned by Scindia, arrived at Pier 12 in Brooklyn, New York, on March 13, 1969, with a cargo of hemp and similar merchandise. Its ultimate destination was Boston. Because of a strike of longshore- men in Boston Harbor, defendants decided to transfer the cargo to a sister cargo vessel, the M/V “Jalagopal”, which was berthed at Pier 9. Navigation had a barge, “P-98”,, for an indefinite term since February 29, 1969, which was owned by Petterson Lighterage and Towing Corp.’ The barge was without motor power. The oral charter was on a day-to-day basis at $80 per day, and included the services of Hubert E. Reel, who was described as the “captain” of the barge. During this period, the barge and its “captain” were under the direct control of Navigation. Reel’s duties with relation to the barge consisted of securing the lines and acting as a watchman over its cargo. When directed by the ship’s personnel, he made a check of the cargo and reported it back. 1 Plaintiff commenced an action against Petterson in this court on March 25, 1970 (70 C 362). Petterson filed a petition in bank- ruptey on May 11, 1970, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff thereupon abandoned the claim against Petterso-. The case was dismissed for failure to appear on December 11, 1973. The complaint in the case at bar was filed on May 10, 1973. oo 3a On the morning of March 18, 1969, Navigation assigned barge “P-98” to the service of the Jaladhanya. The barge was towed by tug to the stern of the Jaladhanya. Reel was aboard the barge during the towing operation. The deck of the barge was a patchwork, consisting of boards of various sizes and dimensions placed over supporting beams. The shell leaked and required bilge pumps to keep it afloat. ITO commenced discharging the cargo from the Jala- dhanya at about 8:00 A. M., soon after the barge was secured. The ship’s winch removed the bales of hemp from the #5 hatch and placed them on the pier. A crane then moved the cargo from the pier onto the barge. Plaintiff and another longshoreman aboard the barge removed the bridle from the draft, and a hilo operator then stowed the bales of hemp. At about 8:00 P. M. on March 18, 1969, plaintiff walked toward a draft that had landed on the deck of the barge for the purpose of removing the bridle. Boards had been substituted for the original planking of the deck in and about the area where the draft had landed. The deck in that area appeared to be safe and able to support the weight of the longshoremen and cargo. As plaintiff stepped toward the draft, the board beneath him yielded and his right foot was thrust through the deck to his groin. Defendant Navigation answers that the barge charter was not a demise; if indeed it was, then “the sublet to Secindia was not a demise” (Trial brief, p. 5), and a bare- boat charterer is not liable for personal injuries arising from unseaworthiness due to a latent defect existing be- fore the demise (Trial brief, p. 5). “To create a demise the owner of the vessel must com- pletely and exclusively relinquish possession, command and 4a navigation thereof to the demisee,” Gueman v. Pichirdlo, 369 U.S. 698, 699, 82 S.Ct. 1095, 1096 (1962). Petterson relinquished possession and control of the barge and placed Reel under Navigation’s command. Charters of barges with “captains” in the employ of the owner are generally held to be demises.? Navigation’s argument that the “sublet” was not a de- mise rests on the relationship between Navigation and Scindia with reference to the barge. The original hiring of the barge was not for Scindia’s account. Navigation acted independently in the hiring. It was the demise char- terer of the barge. On March 18, when it assigned the barge to the service of the Jaladhanya it acted as agent for Scindia. Navigation did not surrender control of the barge. The services were performed pursuant to Navi- gation’s direction and under its control. The claim against Scindia is based on the traditional concept of respondeat superior. A general agency agreement is not a maritime contract. P. D. Marchessini & Co. v. Pacific Marine Corp., 227 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936). As a general rule, federal law governs admiralty claims. Nevertheless, an accommodation is proper where local law 2In Hastorf v. F.R. Long-W.G. Broadhurst Co., 239 Fed. 852 (2d Cir. 1917), an oral charter for a dumper-scow including a man to take care of her at $20 per day was held to be a demise. In The Willie, 231 Fed. 865, 867 (2d Cir. 1916), the court held: “Charterers of scows in this harbor, without motive power of their own and subject to orders and control of charterers, are treated as demises, even though the owner keeps a man aboard, called captain by courtesy,” citing Monk v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 198 Fed. 472, 117 C.C.A. 232. In Aird v. Weyerhaeuser SS. Co., 169 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959, 69 S. Ct. 1521 (1949), where a barge was brought to defend ats dock and left in defendants possession for the purpose of luading it with pipe, the court held defendants to be ihe demisee of the barge. RE A ON a ls ei 5a expands the rights flowing from a breach of a maritime duty, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739, 81 S.Ct. 886, 892 (1961). The agent of an undisclosed princi- pal is liable for its own acts, Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 215 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1954), The Falkefjell v. Arnold Bernstein Shipping Co. Inc., 223 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1955). The undisclosed principal is liable for the acts of its agent performed within the scope of the agency. Defendant’s final argument is that it is not liable*for latent defects existing before the demise. The demise char- terer is the owner of the barge pro hac vice and is liable for personal injuries to seaman, Aird v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., supra at 610; Cromwell v. Slaney, 65 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir. 1933). The warranty of seaworthiness running from the owner to the charterer gives the charterer a right of indemnity for any loss the charterer sustains by reason of a latent defect existing at the time of the charter. Connecticut Adamant Plaster Co. v. James McWilliams Blue Line Inc., 149 F. Supp. 122, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1958). The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939), cited by defendants (Trial brief p. 5) is not to the contrary.° Turning to the defendant third-party complaint for in- demnity against ITO, I find that the defect in the beams supporting the deck could not be discovered by a reason- able inspection. The stevedore’s warranty to perform the 8 The district court’s decision is not reported. Nor is it explained in the Court of Appeals’ reversal. It is clear, however, that the Court of Appeals recognized the right of duPont (the shipper of the lost cargo) to recover against Sheridan, the charterer of the Lighter Doyle. This court interprets the order of the Court of Appeals relating to impleading, as permitting a claim over for the loss suffered by the charterer against Cox, the owner of the lighter. 6a stevedoring services in a workmanlike manner does not obligate him to uncover defects not readily discoverable through a cursory examination. The defect in the support of the deck at the site of the injury was a latent defect. ‘Third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint is granted, Vaccaro v. Alcoa Steamship Com- pany, 405 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1968).* The court finds for the plaintiff and against Navigation and Scindia. The court directs a trial on the issue of damages on February 22, 1977, at 10:00 A. M., and it is So ORDERED. /s/ Jacop MIsSHLER U.S.D.J. * Entry of judgment is stayed until the time of entry of judg- ment in favor of plaintiff. 7a APPENDIX B Judgment of the Court of Appeals (Entered October 17, 1977) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For tHE Seconp Circuit At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court- house in the City of New York, on the 17th day of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven. Present: HonoraBie Paut R. Hays, HonoraBLeE Murray I. Gurrein, HonoraBLeE T'Homas J. MESKILL, Circwt Judges. 77-7213 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 8a This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is Arrmmep on the opinion of Chief Judge Mishler below. Pau. R. Hays Murray I. Gurrein Tomas J. MESKILL Circuit Judges Ones oo ee ee 9a APPENDIX C Order of the Court of Appeals Denying Rehearing (Filed January 4, 1978) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Seconp Circuit At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court House, in the City of New York, on the fourth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight. Present: HonoraB_e Pavur R. Hays, HonoraBLeE Murray I. Gurren, HonoraBte THomas J. MESKILL, Circwit Judges. 77-7213 —~ Joun Esposito, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vv. Unitep States Navieation Inc., and Scrnpia Steam Navigation Company, Ltp., Defendants-A ppellants. —— Joun Esposito, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Unitep Stares Navigation Inc., and Scinpia Sream Navication Company, Ltp., Defendants-Appellants. > A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by counsel for the appellants, and no active judge or judge who was a member of the panel having requested that a vote be taken on said suggestion, Upon consideration thereof, it is Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is Deniep. Irvine R. KaurmMan Chief Judge A ee A CORRE a AN CCI i CO Te ee ee ee lla APPENDIX E Second Circuit Rule § 0.23 § 0.23. Dispositions in Open Court or by Summary Order The demands of an expanding caseload require the court to be ever conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accordingly, in those cases in which decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion, disposition will be made in open court or by sum- mary order. Where a decision is rendered from the bench, the court may deliver a brief oral statement, the record of which is available to counsel upon request and payment of tran- scription charges. Where disposition is by summary order, the court may append a brief written statement to that order. Since these statements do not constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other court. Fifth Circuit Rule 21 Rule 21. Affirmance Without Opinion When the court determines that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the court for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported by 12a substantial evidence on the record as a whole; (4) that no error of law appears; and the court also determines that an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion. In such case, the court may in its discretion enter either of the following orders: “Arrmmep. See Local Rule 21,” or “Enrorcep. See Local Rule 21.” ee ee ee ee --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0611%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.