# Petition — Mahroom v. Hook

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 436 U.S. 904

## Text

Supreme Court, U.S,
$+4-+ ~—
.
a MAR 6 1978
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED |STATES ,
|_MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

October Term, 1976

No. a 4 des 1240

ADIBA MAHROOM,
Petitioner,

vs.

COLONEL JOHN HOOK Commandant, Defense
Language Institute, West Coast Branch,
an agency of the U. S. Government;
HOWARD B,. CALLOWAY, Secretary of the
United States Army,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN DAVIS WALLACE

SAUL M,. WEINGARTEN, INC.
'Fremont Professional Center
Fremont Blvd. & Williams Ave,
Seaside, California 93955

Counsel for Petitioner

SUBJECT INDEX

Page
Opinion Below 1
Jurisdiction 2
Questions Presented for Review 2
Statutes & Regulations Involved 3
Statement of Facts 3
Argument 9
Conclusion , 15
Exhibits:
"A" - Opinion of November 4,
1977 17

"B" - Excerpts from 42 USC
g2000e-16 and
5 CFR 8§8713.215, 713.234 38
& 713.282

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases

Allen v. U. S. (3rd Cir. 1976)
542 F2d 176 9

Bell v. Brown (D.C. Cir. 1977)
557 F2d 849, 857 10

Clark v. Morgan's Austintown Foods
(D.C. Ohio 1975) 405 F Supp.
1008 10

ii Table of Authorities Cited
(Cases continued) Page

Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co.
(9th Cir. 1975) 509 F2d 1027 12

Coles v. Penney (D.C. Cir. 1976)
531 F2d 609 9

DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.
(2nd Cir. 1975) 511 F2d 306,

Mod. on reh. 520 F2d 409 10,12
Eastland v. T.V.A. (5th Cir.

1977) 553 F2d 364 4
Electrical Workers v. Robbins &

Myers, Inc. (1976) - U.S. -

50 LEd. 2d 427, 97 S Ct. - 13

Garner v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours
& Co. (4th Cir. 1976)
538 F2d 61l 10

Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District
Terminal {1959) 359 U.S. 231,
3 LEd. 2d 770, 79 S Ct. 760 11,13

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)
401 U.S. 424 at 430,
28 LEd. 2d 158,
91S Ct. 849 4, 14,15

Key v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc.
(D.C. Ala. 1977) 434 F Supp.
289 10

Lacy v. Chrysler Corp. (8th Cir.
1976) 533 F2d 353 10

Mahroom v. Hook (9th Cir. 1977)
563 F2d 1369 1, 9

iii Table of Authorities Cited

(Cases continued) Page

McGuire v. Aluminum Co. of America

(7th Cir. 1976) 542 F2d 43 10
McQueen v. EMC Plastic Co.

(D.C. Tex. 1969) 302 F Supp.

881 14
Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc,

(D.C. Tenn. 1975) 402 F. Supp.

1349 10
Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc.

(Sth Cir. 1977) 556 F2d 346 10
Tuft v. McDonnel Douglas Corp.

(8th Cir. 1975) 517 F2d 1301 10
Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co,

(1lOth Cir. 1976) 529 F2d 483 10
Wong v. The Bm Marche (9th Cir.

1975) 508 F2d 1249 12
Zambuto v. AT&T (5th Cir. 1977)

544 F2d 1333 12

Statutes

Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended 14

Sec. 717(c) 6, 7

Title VII 2, 3.
Equal Employment Opportunity

Act of 1972 5

Federal Employers' Liability
Act

13

iv Table of Authorities Cited
(Statutes continued)

5 CFR 8713.215
§713.234
8713 .282

28 USC 61254
61343

42 usc 62000(e) et seq.
82000e-5
$2000e-5 (c)
82000e-16
§2000e-16(c)

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976
No.

ADIBA MAHROOM,
Petitioner,

vs.

COLONEL JOHN HOOK Commandant, Defense
Language Institute, West Coast Branch,
an agency of the U. S. Government;
HOWARD B. CALLOWAY, Secretary of the
United States Army,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The above-named petitioner respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to
review a portion of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit entered in this proceedi
on November 4, 1977. ;

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals

is reported at 563 F2d 1369. Said opinion
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

2
JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit was made and entered
on November 4, 1977, in Case No. 75-2885.

A timely petition for rehearing was denied
on December 5, 1977, and petition for
certiorari was filed within 90 days of that
Gate. 28 USC 81254 confers on this Court
jurisdiction to review the judgment in
question by certiorari.

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari
to review that portion of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
part the decision of the District Court.
Said judgment affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part the judgment of the
U. S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, Honorable LLOYD H.
BURKE, Judge, in Case No, C-73-2295-LHB
which dismissed plaintiff's (petitioner
herein) complaint brought under the pro-
visions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 USC 882000(e)

st seq.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. When does the 30 day period to
file a federal action begin to run ina
Title VII suit against a federal agency
in which the complainant never receives
a “right to sue" letter?

2. Is the 30 day period embodied in
42 USC 82000e-16(c) absolute in the sense
that it would prohibit the application
of the doctrine of estoppel to extend the
period to file suit, regardless of failure
of notice?

3

3. Was the rule of administrative
res judicata properly applied to bar
consideration of petitioner's claim of sex
discrimination?

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The statute involved is Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 uSC 882000(e) et seq. The Civil
Service regulations involved are 5 CFR
§8713.215, 713.234, 713.282. The text of
these statutes and regulations is
appended hereto as Exhibit "B".

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner, ADIBA MAHROOM, is a female
naturalized citizen of Iragi descent, the
wife of an Arabic language instructor at
the Defense Language Institute, West
Coast Branch (DLI). She is an experienced
teacher having advanced degrees in educa-
tion and, during two temporary teaching
positions at the DLI, had established her
status as a competent instructor in the
esteem of her supervisor. Few women have
held permanent instructor's positions in
the DLI's Arabic Department. In 196l,
petitioner was informed that she could not
obtain a permanent teaching position due
to her marital status and the resulting
applicetion of the DLI's anti-nepotism
policy which prohibited the employment of
close family members on the teaching
staff (all of whom were men) if as quali-
fied non-related applicants could be found.

In 1971, the DLI announced that it
was seeking to employ permanent instructors

4

assigned to the Arabic Department and,
although Ms. Mahroom applied for one of
the positions, she was neither inter-
viewed nor selected.

On October 28, 1971 petitioner filed
a formai Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) complaint of discrimination based
upon sex and national origin with the
Department of Army. Petitioner was not
represented by legal counsel as the
attorneys she consulted refused to
undertake representation. After an
administrative hearing was held, the
Hearings Examiner concluded that petitioner
had not been a victim of discrimination.
The findings of the Hearing Examiner which
were accepted and adopted by the Department
of Army failed to consider whether the
anti-nepotism policy which purported to be
neutral on its face, operated “to ‘freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices", prohibited by
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U. S.
424 at 430, 28 LEd.2d 158, 91 S. Ct. 849.
Rather, the Hearing Examiner concluded
that “(t)he complainant's allegation that
she was not selected because she is the
wife of an instructor in the Arabic Depart-
ment does not strictly come within the
purview of this complaint procedure".
The Hearing Examiner went on to recite
the language of the anti-nepotism policy
but omitted to decide whether the policy
was discriminatory in application.

After appeal of the final decision of the
Department of Army to the Board of Appeals
and Review of the Civil Service Commission
(BAR) on March 22, 1973, the BAR notified
petitioner of the final agency action
affirming the Army's decisions. However,

5

the BAR did not sent petitioner a "Right
to Sue" letter informing her of her right
to initiate a civil action in federal
court within 30 days.

Following receipt of the BAR decision,
petitioner contacted several legal services
programs seeking help or advice on the
prosecution of her claim. One of the
agencies contacted informed her that she
had lost her opportunity to file a civil
suit by reason of the expiration of the
30 day period which began running upon
receipt of notice of final agency action.
Upon receiving this information, petitioner
wrote to the BAR and asked why she had not
been notified of her right to sue and
requested an extension of time to file
suit. On July 5, 1973, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) responded, stating that
under its interpretation, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 (amending
42 USC 82000e-16 to allow federal employees
to file court actions) was not retroactive,

did not apply to alleged acts of discrimina-

tion occurring prior to March 24, 1972,
and that she therefore had no right to
bring a civil suit. The letter stated in
part:

"It is our interpretation that
notification of the right to file a
Civil action under the provisions.

of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 arises only when the
alleged act or acts of discrimination
occurred on or after March 24, 1972,
the date the Act became effective.
Because your complaint was filed on
October 28, 1971, notice of a right

to file a civil action was not included

in the Board's decision in your case."

6

Exhibit 1, P. 87. This letter was signed
by William P. Berzak, Chairman, Board of
Appeals & Review for the Civil Service
Commission.

Petitioner, still unrepresented,
believed and accepted the representations
of the CSC that she did not have the right
to file suit and abandoned her efforts to
obtain review in federal court.

In 1973, another teaching position in
the Arabic Department at the DLI was avail-
able, petitioner applied for the position
and, again, was not selected. In response,
petitioner filed a-second complaint alleging
discrimination based on sex and national
origin on July 27, 1973.

On August 6, 143, by letter, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for
the DLI rejected the complaint on the
grounds that administrative res judicata
embodied in 5 CFR 8713.215 barred the suit
because it set forth identical matters
contained in the previous complaint. .
The letter also informed petitioner of her
right to file suit within 30 days or,
alternatively, to appeal to the BAR within
15 days. Petitioner chose to appeal to the
BAR, which affirmed the agency decision
and sent notice of final agency action and
notice of right to sue. In this letter,
the BAR stated in part:

"Civil Service Commission Regulations
provide that the Board's decision is
final and that there is no further
right of administrative appeal.
However, if the complainant is not
satisfied with this decision, she is
authorized by section 717 (c) of the

7

Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended
on March 24, 1972 to file a civil
action in an appropriate U. S.
District Court within thirty (30)
calendar days of her receipt of this
decision. (Emphasis added) Exhibit
l, pe 4.

This letter was signed by William P.
Berzak, Chairman, Board of Appeals &
Review for the Civil Service Commission.

Within this thirty day period after
receipt of the BAR's letter, petitioner
for the first time, obtained the services
of an attorney who timely filed suit on
her 1973 complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District
of California on December 20, 1973. Said
complaint invoked the jurisdiction of the
court pursuant to 28 USC 81343 and 42 USC
§82000e, et seq.

On April 24, 1975, respondents moved
to dismiss or for summary judgment. Because
Petitioner had substituted counsel on May
29, 1975, the hearing was postponed. On
June 23, 1975, in addition to a memorandum
in opposition to respondents' motion, petition
er filed a motion for leave to amend
the complaint to add a cause of action
based on the 1971 administrative proceed-
ings. Petitioner contended that she was
entitled to amend her complaint because
1) the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 should be applied retroactively
to the time of enactment; 2) the doctrine
of equitable estoppel extended the time
to file suit because the misrepresentations
of the CSC had precluded petitioner from
asserting her rights; and 3) since she
had never received a "right to sue" letter

8

on her 1971 EEO complaint, the 30 day
period to file suit had never begun
running and, thus, her request to amend
was timely. Additionally, petitioner
contended that her 1973 EEO complaint
raised new issues, that her claim of sex
discrimination vis-a-vis the DLI's anti-
nepotism policy had never been decided
and that the doctrine of administrative
res judicata was improperly applied.

On August 1, 1975, the motions of
petitioner and respondents were heard. The
respondents motion for summary judgment
was granted and petitioner's motion to
amend was denied.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and raised
the same issues argued in the lower court.
On November 4, 1977, the Court of Appeals
issued its decision holding that the issue
of retroactivity of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 had been resolved
by this Court in petitioner's favor. The
Court of Appeals found that the 30 day
period to file suit on petitioner's 1971
EEO complaint commenced running at the
time that petitioner received the "right
to sue" letter from the BAR on her second,
1973 complaint. The Court held that since
this 30 day period expired on December 21,
1973, petitioner's request to amend was
untimely and jurisdictionally barred. The
Court of Appeals failed to discuss the
issues of estoppel and administrative res
judicata but remanded the case to the
District Court for further consideration
of petitioner's 1973 EEO complaint.
Thereafter, petitioner petitioned the Court
for rehearing which was denied on December
5, 1977.

ARGUMENT

1. THE TYPE OF NOTICE SUFFICIENT TO
START TIME RUNNING ON CIVIL ACTIONS
UNDER TITLE ViI SHOULD BE UNIFORM.

Federal courts have been faced with
the recurring problem of when the 90 or
30 day period to file a civil suit under
42 USC 82000e-5 or 42 USC 82000e-16,
respectively, begins to run and have
arrived at conflicting decisions on this
issue. In suits against federal agencies,
the Ninth, Third and District of Columbia
Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that
the “right to sue" letter initiates the
30 day period.1/ But the Fifth Circuit
has departed from this line of cases and
has held that the 30 day period begins to

run upon receipt of notice of final agency
action.

In suits against private employees,
the federal courts in the various circuits
also have taken divergent positions.

Some state that the 90 day period to file
Suit begins to run from receipt of the

1/ Mahroom v. Hook (9th Cir. 1977) 563
F2d 1369; Coles v. Penney (D.C. Cir.
1976) 531 F2d 609; Allen v. U. S. (3rd
Cir. 1976) 542 F2d 176.

2/ Eastland v. T.V.A. (5th Cir. 1977)
553 F2d 364.

10

“right to sue" letter3/; others hold
that the 90 day period commences upon
notice of final agency action4/; while
still others find that the notice of
failure of concilliation activates the
periods/.

In the present case, the Ninth Circuit
determined that a type of constructive
notice will initiate the 30 day period,
which is incompatible with the spirit of

the law9/,

3/ Garner v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co. (4th Cir. 1976) 538 F2d 611; McGuire
v. Aluminum Co. of America (7th Cir. 1976)
542 F2d 43; Williams v. Southern Union
Gas Co. (10th Cir. 1976) 529 F2d 483;

4/ Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc. (5th
Cir. 1977) 556 F2d 346; Key v. Lumberjack
Meats, Inc. (D.C. Ala. 1977) 434 F. Supp.
289; Dematteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.

(2nd Cir. 1975) 511 F2d 306; Lacy v.

Chrysler Corp. (8th Cir. 1976) 533 F2d 353.

5/ Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc. (D.C. Tenn.
1975) 402 F Supp. 1349; Clark v. Morgan's
Austintown Foods (D.C. Ohio 1975) 405 F
Supp. 1008; Contra: Tuft v. McDonnel

Douglas Corp. (8th Cir. 1975) 517 F2d 1301.

6/ Bell v. Brown (D.C. Cir. 1977) 557 F2d
849, 857 stated "We cannot believe that
Congress willed the subversion of Sec.
717(c) (42 USC 82000e-5(c)) by an incompat-
ible invocation of imputed notice”.

+

ll

It is manifestly unjust to expect that a
"right to sue" letter which by its

terms is solely directed to a 1973 EEO
complaint, will notify a layperson
complainant of her rights in regards to

a 1971 EEO complaint. This is especially
true when the complainant has been told
previously by the CSC that she had no
right to bring a civil suit on her 1971
complaint.

This Court has never squarely faced
the issues presented by this Writ. Thus,
this proceeding presents the Court with
the opportunity to settle the issue and
bring uniformity to this area of the law.

2. THE COURT OF APPEAL'S IMPLICIT
RULING VJPON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL
IS CONTRARY TO GLUS V, BROOKLYN

EASTERN DISTRICT TERMINAL AND
OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in the
instant case did not rule on petitioner's
argument that equitable principles should
be applied to extend the period to file
Suit on her 1971 EEO complaint. Thus,
it must be inferred that the Court found
petitioner's contentions to be without
merit. This supposition finds strong
Support from a prior decision of the

Ninth Circuit, Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft

12

Co. (9th Cir. 1975) 509 F2d 1027. 7/
Other Courts of Appeals are not in
sympathy with this position and have
refused to visit the sins of the EEOC
upon the layman initiating the complaint.
8/ The Ninth Circuit has stated that the
30 day period to file suit is "jurisdic-
tional" 9/ and while the meaning of this
term is not entirely clear, it suggests
that the 30 day period is more than a
statute of limitations. If so, is the

30 day period an integral part of a civil
suit under Title VII which occasions the
extinction of the cause of action upon
the expiration of the statutory period?
If the answer is yes, this interpretation
excludes the operation of the doctrine

of estoppel.

This Court has never decided this

7/ In Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
Supra,the plaintiff dismissed a civil

suit timely initiated after receipt of

a “right to sue" letter at the suggestion
of the EEOC and upon EEOC's assurances
that a dismissal would not prejudice his
right to re-file at a later time.
Plaintiff's second civil suit was held
untimely and the Court stated that the
plaintiff's reliance upon the representa-
tions of the EEOC was unjustified.

8/ See: Zambuto v. AT&T (5th Cir. 1977)
544 F2d 1333; De Matteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co. (2nd Cir. 1975) 520 F2d 409.

9/ Wong v. The Bon Marche (9th Cir. 1975)
508 F2d 1249.

13

important question of federal lawLO/ ana
this case presents the situation in which
the petitioner has been prevented from
asserting her rights because of the
misrepresentations of the CSC. The
government should not be allowed to gain
an advantage by reason of its own errors
and thereby deprive petitioner of her “day
in court". Furthermore, the decision of
the Ninth Circuit cannot be reconciled
with Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District
Terminal (1959) 359 U. S.-231, 3 LEd. 2d
770, 79 S Ct. 760. LI/

10/ In Electrical Workers v, Robbins &
Myers, Inc. (1976) U. S. , 50 LEd,
° BS ce. , the complainant
contended that equitable principles could

toll the statutory periods embodied in
Title VII but this Court found the argu-
ment inconsistent with the facts.

ll/ In Glus, the employer contended
that estoppel could not be employed to
toll the 3 year period to file suit
under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act because "the time limitation is

an integral part of a new cause of
action and that cause is irretrievably
lost at the end of the statutory ;
period". 359 U. S. at 232. This Cour
dismissed the employer's contentions
and found nothing in the Act or in its
legislative history "to indicate that
this principle of law (estoppel), older
than the country itself, was not to
apply in suits arising under the statute".

359 U. S. at 234.

14

The rationale of Glus, supra, must
apply with equal force to the case
presented herein. The language of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
indicates a Congressional desire for
speedy resolution of employment discrim-
ination claims but not to the exclusion
of equitable principles. Since Title
VII actions are ladened with heavy over-
tones of public interest and such actions
are equitable in nature, such actions
must be governed by equitable considera-
tions.12/

3. THE EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE.RES JUDICATA AS IT
APPLIES TO ANTI-NEPOTISM REGULATIONS
IS OF SUCH PERVASIVE IMPORTANCE THAT
IT SHOULD BE EXAMINED AND CLARIFIED
BY THIS COURT.

This Court has held in various
decisions that where regulations, neutral
and fair on their face, nonetheless have
the effect of perpetuating prohibited
discrimination such regulations cannot
stand.13/ The legally supported anti-
nepotism policy, having a legitimate
object and purpose, has run head on with
the policy that women shall have job
opportunities equal to men. Because of
the vastly greater number of male incum-
bents in the prestigious and highly .
remunerative employment positions, the

12/ See: McQueen v. EMC Plastic Co.
(D.C. Tex. 1969) 302 F Supp. 881.

13/ See: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
(1971) 401 U. S. 424.

15

chances of women obtaining such positions
are diminished. For example, assuming
that there are 50 married couples and
that the husband in each case is a quali-
fied instructor on the staff of the DLI,
the anti-nepotism policy would prohibit
the employmert of 50 women who might be
as well or better qualified than their
spouses. While it might be true that an
anti-nepotism policy would be fair if
there were 25 men and 25 women incumbents,
in practice it is highly discriminatory
where all incumbents are male, as here.

It can be expected that this question
will be raised repeatedly in a variety
of situations and since the aplication
given in this case is directly counter to
the essense of the law stated in Griggs,
a clear affirmation of the right of equal
opportunity is of vital and urgent
necessity.

CONC LUSION

Depending upon the circuit in which
the Title VII complainant is located, the
30 or 90 day period to file a civil suit
will begin upon receipt of notice of:

l. failure of concilliation; or

2. final agency action; or

3. right to sue.

Further, the availability of estoppel to
toll this period is contingent upon the
particular federal circuit in which the
complaint is filed. Immediate clarifica-

tion of the law is compelled by its present

state of disarray. It is especially
appropriate that this case become the

16

vehicle for Supreme Court resolution of
these issues since the Court of Appeals
has determined that further proceedings
are required on petitioner's action in
any event.

Respectfully submitted,

SSce Miia) etlac
SUSAN DAVIS WALLACE
SAUL M. WEINGARTEN, INC.
Fremont Professional Center
Fremont Blvd. & Williams Ave.
Seaside, California 93955

Counsel for Petitioner

17

EXHIBIT “A"

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADIBA MAHROOM,
Appellant,

— No. 75-2885
COLONEL JOHN HOOK Com-
mandant, Defense Language
Institute, West Coast
Branch, an agency of the
U. S. Government; HOWARD
B. CALLOWAY, Secretary

of the United States Army

OPINION

Appellees.

mee ee ee eee ee ee ee ee

[November 4, 1977]
Appeal from the United States District

Court for the
Northern District of California

Before: CARTER, WATERMAN,* and
ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

*The Honorable Sterry R. Waterman,
Senior Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, sit-
ting by designation.

18

Appellant, Adiba Mahroom, an appli-
cant for federal employment, brought
suit against the commandant of the
Defense Language Institute (DLI) at
Monterey, California, and the Secretary
of the Army, principally under Title
VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(C)],
for employment discrimination upo pthe
basis of sex and national origin.=—

In her complaint, she demanded a declara-
tory judgment, injunctive relief con-
cerning such alleged discrimination,
damages (including lost wages), costs

of suit, and attorneys' fees. After
providing counsel an opportunity to be
heard, the district court denied
appellant's motion for leave to amend
her complaint and granted appellees'
motion for summary judgment, dismissing
the action. We affirm the denial of the
motion for leave to amend, but we
reverse and remand the grant of summary
judgment.

BACKGROUND

The 1971 Complaint

Mahroom, a female naturalized
citizen of Iraqi descent, has twice been
employed at the DLI in temporary
positions as a training instructor in
Arabic. She has received advanced
degrees in education and was con-
sidered to be a good teacher by her
supervisor at DLI.

In 1971, the DLI announced
that teaching positions were open in
the Arabic Department, and instructors
were to be selected from highly-quali-
fied applicants with Egyptian, Syrian

19

, 2/
or Iragi background, in that order.
Mahroom applied for one of the positions;
however, she did not obtain an inter-
view or a position. As she failed

to obtain employment, she filed a formal
complaint on October 28, 1971, alleging
discrimination based upon sex and
national origin.

After an unsuccessful attempt
at an informal resolution of her
grievance, the complaint was forwarded
to the U. S. Army Civilian Appellate
Review Office. An investigator was
assigned to undertake a detailed in-
vestigation of the facts. After care-
fully exploring the matter, the in-
spector reported that student demand
justified establishment of selection
preferences for persons proficient in
the Egyptian and Syrian dialects, and
recommended, therefore, a finding of no
discrimination. On December 29, 1971,
the recommendation was approved by the
Civilian Personnel Office.

Subsequently, Mahroom requested
a hearing before an Appeals Examiner
assigned to the agency by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), and a hearing
was conducted on March 14-15, 1972. On
June 7, 1972, the Appeals Examiner
issued his report, concluding that
appellant had not been the victim of
discrimination.

On October 27, 1972, the Army's
Director of Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) accepted the finding of no dis-
crimination. This, the final decision,
was appealed to CSC's Board of Appeals
and Review (BAR). On March 22, 1973, the

20

BAR affirmed the agency decision. How-
ever, the BAR did not ggnd Mahroom a
"Right-to-Sue" letter.=

Appellant thereafter sought
help from the ACLU and from the San
Pranciscg ,Lawyer's Committee for Urban
Affairs.— The ACLU advised her that
she had 90 days after the BAR's decision
was issued in which to bring a civil
suit, while the Lawyer's Committee in-
formed her that the time for court
action expired 30 days after the final
decision. Upon receiving this informa-
tion, appellant wrote to the BAR, asking
why she was not advised of her right to
sue. On July 5, 1973, the CSC wrote
back to her, stating that under its
interpretation the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (which in-
cluded 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) was not
retroactive and that, therefore, she had
no right to notification.=

Appellant went on to request
reconsideg¢gtion of the final agency
decision. — Reasoning that she had not
established a proper basis on which to
reopen the prior decision, the BAR
rejected the request on November 7, 1973.

The 1973 Complaint

Another teaching position in
the Arabic Department at DLI op ned up
in early 1973. Again, appellant applied
for the position and was not selected.
As a result, a second complaint, alleging
discrimination based on sex and national
origin, was filed on July 27, 1973.

21

On August 6, 1973, the EEO
officer for DLI rejected the complaint ,
in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 713.215-—
for the reason that it set forth identi-
cal matters contained in the previous
complaint. This decision was appealed,
and on November 19, 1973, the BAR
affirmed.

This time appellant was given
her "Right-to-Sue" letter. In this
letter of final action the BAR stated:

"Civil Service Com-
mission Regulations
provide that the
Board's decision is
final and that there
is no further right

of administrative
appeal. However, if
the complainant is

not satisfied with the
decision, she is
authorized by section
717(c) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as
amended on March 24,
1972 to file a civil
action in an appro-
priate U. S. District
Court within thirty (30)
calendar days of her
receipt of this
decision." (Exhibit l,
p. 4)

Mahroom received notice of
this final action on November 21,
1973. Within the requisite thirty days,
she instituted this action in the

22

district court, filing her complaint

on December 20, 1973. On April 24,
1975, the appellees moved to dismiss or,
alternatively, for summary judgment. As
she substituted counsel on May 29, 1975,
the scheduled hearing on the motion was
postponed. On June 23, 1975, she filed
a memorandum in opposition to appellees'
motion and a motion for leave to amend
the complaint by adding a cause of action
based on the 1971 administrative
complaint.

On August 1, 1975, both
motions were heard. The motion to amend
was denied, and the motion for summary
judgment was granted. It is from these
decisions that this appeal follows.

I. The Motion for Leave to Amend

As discussed above, when the
Civil Service Commission's Board of
Appeals and Review finally denied
Mahroom's claim of discrimination, they
did not provide her with her statutory
notice of right to sue or what is
commonly referred to as the "Right-to-
Sue" letter.

Mahroom's claim began in 1971.
The effective date of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000Qe,
et segq.] is March 24, 1972. Her claim
was therefore pending administratively
on the effective date of the Act.

Because the Commission
interpreted the Act as not retroactive
to her 1971 claim, they held that she
had no right to notification of her
right to bring suit in federal court.

23

Our first inquiry is to decide
whether the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act is retroactive to cases which are
pending administratively at the time of
the effective date of the Act. Or, in
other words, was Mahroom entitled to
notice of her right to sue once the
administrative agency's decision to deny
her complaint was final?

In Koger v. Ball, 497 F. 2d
702 (4th Cir. 1974), that court held:

"We conclude that
Congress, being fully
aware of the general rule
favoring retrospective
application of pro-
cedural statutes, in-
tended by enacting § 717
(c) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(c)] to grant employees
consent to sue for redress
of pending cases of pre-
Act discrimination."

(497 F. 2d at 709-709)

And, in Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.
2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (which adopted
the reasoning of the Koger opinion,
Supra), the court held:

"Section 717(c) is

merely a procedural
statute that affects

the remedies avail-

able to federal employees
suffering from employ-
ment discrimination.

Their right to be free

of such discrimination

has been assured for years.

24

We hold that this
remedial statute
applies retroactive-
ly to proceedings
already pending at the
time of its effective
date, March 4, 1972."
(504 F. 2d at 269)
(emphasis in original).

Womack was followed in Grubbs v. Butz,
514 F. 2a 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

Other cases which follow this reasoning
are: Weahkee v. Powell, 532 F. 2d 727
(10th Cir. 1976); Huntley v. Dept. of
H.E.W., 550 F. 2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977);
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
553 F. 2d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1977); and
Brown v. General Services Administration,
507 F. 2d 1300 (2nd Cir. 1974), aff'd.
425 U.S. 820, 824 n. 4 (The Supreme
Court observing that it had "no occasion
to disturb" the Second Circuit's
decision on retroactivity). See also
Bunch v. United States, 548 F. 2d 336
(9th Cir. 1977) and Davis v. Valley
Dist. Co., 522 F. 2d 827 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. den., 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).

Following this line of authori-
ty we hold that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act is retroactive to em-
brace claims administratively pending on
its effective date and is therefore
applicable to Mahroom's 1971 action.
Under the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12
gives the Commission the authority to
issue suitable procedural regulations to
carry out the provisions of the Act. In
exercise of this authority, the Commis-
sion promulgated, among others, 5 C.F.R.
§ 713.234 and § 713.282.

25

F.R. § 713.234, at the time
provided in pertinent part:

5 G7

in question,—

"The Board of Appeals and
Review shall review the
complaint file and all
relevant written representa-
tions made to the board. . .
The board shall issue a
written decision setting
forth its reasons for the
decision and shall send
copies thereof to the
complainant, his designated
representative, and the
agency. ... . The decision
of the board is final, but
shall contain a notice of
the right to file a civil
action in accordance with

§ 713.282." (emphasis

added)

5 C.F.R. § 713.282 in pertinent
part provides:

"The Commission shall
notify an employee or
applicant of his right to
file a civil action, and
of the 30-day time limit
for filing, in any
decision under § 713.234."

The thirty-day time limit referred to in
these regulations is set out by Congress
in section 717(c) of the Act [42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-16(c)] which provides that "[w]
ithin thirty days of receipt of notice

of final action. . . . an employee or
applicant for employment, if aggrieved

by the final disposition of his complaint,

26

- « « May file a civil action as provided
in section 706" [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5].

Therefore, under this statute,
as interprted by the agency designated to
interpret and enforce it, notice must be
given to the employee or applicant that
he has the right to bring an action in
federal court and that he has thirty
days in which to act.

This thirty-day time period is
jurisdictional. If an aggrieved party
does not file his suit within that time
limit, the federal courts have no power
to entertain the suit. Cleveland v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F. 2d 1027,
1029 (9th Cir. 1975), Wong v. Bon Marche,
508 F. 2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
Brown v. General Services Administration,
425 U.S. 820 (1976).

The question which arises once
it has been determined that notice is
required is when does the thirty-day
period begin to run. In Gates v.
Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 492 F. 2d
292, 295 (9th Cir. 1974), we held that
"the 30 day period within which the civil
action may be brought commenced when the
January 23, 1969, formal notice was
received." (emphasis added) We limited
Gates to its facts and left open the
specific question of what form of notice
would trigger the thirty-day period in
other circumstances.

The appellee contends that the
thirty-day period began to run as soon
as Mahroom received notice of the BAR's
final decision, regardless of whether or
not she received any “Right-to-Sue”"

27

letter. We disagree and hold that the
thirty-day time limit does not begin to
run until the aggrieved party has
received actual formal notification of
his statutory right to sue in federal
court. By this we mean receipt of the
so-called "Right-to-Sue”" letter.

In holding this way, we
follow such authority as Coles v. Penny,
531 F. 2d 609 (4th Cir. 1976), where
the Fourth Circuit held that:

", . . the thirty-day
period within which

a civil action may be
filed did not begin

to run until July 18,
1973 - - the first
time at which appellant was
notified [by way of a
"Right-to-Sue" letter]
that he had a right to
bring a civil action
within thirty days."
(531 F. 2d at 617)

And, in Garner v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours

& Co., 538 F. 20 611 (4th Cir. 1976),
that court also stated:

"In conclusion, we hold
that, for reasons sub-
stantially similar to
those given by Judge
McGowan in Coles, it was
within the regulatory
power of the EEOC in
interpreting § 706 (f) (1)
of Title VII to treat only
a formal “right to sue"
letter from the EEOC as

28

constituting the requisite
statutory ‘notice’ which
started the permissible period
for initiating a federal court
case under Title VII." (538 F.
2d at 615)

Other cases which support this result are:
Lacy v. Chrysler Corp., 533 F. 2d 353,

en banc, (8th Cir. 1976), cert. den.,

429 U.S. 959; Tuft v. McDonnel Douglas,
517 F. 2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. den.,
423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Williams v. Southern
U. Gas Co., 529 F. 2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. den., 429 U.S. 959, and Page v. U. S.
Industries, 556 F. 2d 346 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also, Alexander v. Gardner~Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974), and McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973)
(where the Supreme Court noted that one of
the jurisdictional prerequisites to Title
VII suits was that the claimant receive and
act upon Commissioner's statutory notice of
the right to sue).

As we mentioned above, Mahroom
did not receive any "Right-to-Sue” letter.
What she did receive was a letter from the
BAR which deniei her claim of employment
discrimination and stated that "Civil Ser-
vice Regulations provide that the decision
of the Board is final and that there is
no further right of administrative appeal."
(Exhibit 1 at 104)

The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act is a remedial statute to be liberally
construed in favor of the victims of dis-
crimination. Davis v. Valley Dist. Co.,
522 F. 2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1974), EEOC
v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F. 2d 187,
189 (9th Cir. 1974). Accordingly, "courts

29

confronted with procedural ambiguities

ia the statutory framework have, with
virtual unanimity resolved them in favor
of the complaining party.” Davis v.
Valley Dist. Co., supra, quoting Sanchez
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F. 2d 455,
461 (5th Cir. 1970). The broad structure
and purpose of Title VII, as established
by Congress, relies upon laymen, operating
without legal assistance, to initiate both
administrative complaints and lawsuits.
Congress did not intend that such laymen,
not schooled in the finer points of legal
procedure, be presumed to know exactly
what procedural step they must next take
in order to perfect their claims, especially
when they have been conclusively told that
they have no further rights or remedies.
By holding that Mahroom must be specifi-
cally informed in the "Right to Sue" letter
that she has a right to sue and how much
time she has in which to bring the suit,
we give effect to the intent and purpose
of Congress in enacting Title VII.

In this case, Mahroom was a lay-
man and operated without legal assistance
for her 1971 claim. Because the BAR wrote
and told her that their decision was final,
it is not reasonable or within the policy
of Title VII to hold that she should have
known that she had only thirty days to
institute suit from that time. The rea-
soning for this was persuasively stated in
Coles v. Penny, supra, in a factual situa-
tion strikingly similar to the facts of
this case. In Coles the court reasoned:

30

statutory right to sue.

Consider the situation in

which the appellant found
himself in this case. After

two years of administrative
consideration, his claim

was denied by the Board of
Appeals and Review. The notice
he received--that ‘Civil Service
Regulations provide that a deci-
sion of the Board is final and
that there is no further right
to administrative appeal'-- had
a definite right of finality to
it. A trained lawyer might
realize that judicial review
commences when administrative
appeals end, but we do not
believe that such a realization
is likely to spring forth full
blown in the mind of a layman;
the notice actually received may
rather have stifled any inclina-
tion appellant might have had to
pursue the matter any further.
It may be more than coincidental
that appellant filed a timely
action regarding his 1972 com-
plaint, as to which he received
notice of his right to sue,
whereas his failure to bring

an action regarding his 1970
complaint followed a less informa-
tive and possibly misleading
notice. '

(531 F. 2d at 615) (emphasis in
original)

Since Mahroom has never received

"Thirty days is not a long a "Right ‘to Sue" letter on her 1971 action,
period in which to expect . our next inguiry is whether her right to

a pro se complainant to become bring suit can continue indefinitely until
aware of and exercise his

31

the "“Right-to-Sue”" letter is received.
More specifically, the question is whether
Mahroom should have been able in 1975, to
amend her complaint (filed on her 1973 dis-
crimination action) to include her 1971
action. The situation is this. In 197l
she complained of discrimination. Her
claim was denied. She was told the deci-
sion was final, but was not told she could
sue. She did not sue. In 1973 she again
complained of discrimination. Her claim
was again denied. She was told the deci-
sion was final. However, this time she
was told that under the statutes she did
have a right to sue within thirty days.

Under the facts of this case,
we find that the thirty-day time limit
to file a federal suit on both her 1971
and 1973 claims began to run when she
in fact received the "Right-to-Sue"
letter on November 21, 1973, in regard
to her 1973 action.

We find that if Mahroom would
have brought suit on her 1971 action
(or alternatively, amended her 1973
complaint to include her 1971 action),
within the thirty days following receipt
of her “Right-to-Sue" letter on Noven-
ber 21, 1973, the action would have been
timely. This is the precise result that
the Fourth Circuit arrived at in Coles
v. Penny, supra, under that nearly
identical factual situation. In that
case, the appellant Melvin Coles had
filed a 1970 discrimination claim. It
was denied and "finalized" much the
same as Mahroom's claim was. He also
was given no notice of right to sue.
In 1972 he filed another discrimination
claim. This claim was also denied, but

32

he was given the statutory notice of his
right to sue. Within thirty days of
this “Right-to-Sue" letter he filed a
suit on his 1970 claim, as well as a new
1972 claim. The district court found
the 1970 claim untimely and granted
summary judgment against Coles. The
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding (as quoted, supra) that the
thirty-day time limit did not begin to
run on the 1970 claim until receipt of
the "Right-to-Sue" letter, which involved
his later 1972 claim.

——

Because of our holding that Mah-
room's right to sue on the 1971 claim was
only timely within thirty days of receipt
of the November 21, 1973, "“Right-to-Sue"
letter, her motion to amend the complaint
over one year and seven months later, was
untimely. The district court properly
denied that motion as it was without
jurisdiction at that time to hear the 1971
claim. Cleveland v. Dougias Aircraft,
Wong v. Bon Marche, and Brown v. General
Services Administration, supra.

II. The Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Chandler v. Roudebush,
425 U.S. 840 (1976), applicants for
federal employment bringing suit under
42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c) have the same
right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed
by applicants for employment in the
private sector under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5.

In their memorandum for support
of the motion for summary judgment,
appellees contended that no trial de novo
was required for suits brought under
§2000e-16. This position, of course, was

33

directly rejected in Chandler. However,
Chandler doesnot require a de novo hearing

in every instance; if a complaint brought
under 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 would be properly
disposed of by summary judgment, then it
is appropriate for a district court to
handle similarly a complaint brought under
42 U.S.C. §2000e-16.

Summary judgment is appropriate
only when the movant has proven that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. See

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
Since the motion for leave to amend was
properly denied, the only controversy
before the district court concerned the
1973 discrimination action. The 1973
action is allegedly barred under 5 C.F.R.
§713.215 for setting forth "identical
allegations" as in the 1971 action. It
is true that the 1971 and 1973 complaints
do set forth the same claims of discrim-
ination, i.e., discrimination on the basis
of sex and her Iraqi national origin.
Appellees countered these claims by
responding each time that priority was
given to applicants proficient in the
Arabic-Egyptian dialect and that Mahroom
was not the victim of any discrimination.

While the complaints do state
Similar actions, we feel that the 1973
complaint did state a cause of action new
and separate from the 1971 complaint
because in 1973 she was competing against
a different set of applicants with poten-
tially different qualifications than she
competed against in 1971. Other facts
may also be different. Her not being
selected from the 1973 applicants has not
yet been considered in the administrative
process. We feel that it is totally

34

inappropriate to forever bar an applicant
for federal employment from either adminis-
trative or judicial consideration of a
discrimination charge simply because that
individual had claimed similar acts of
discrimination at an earlier time and had
not prevailed. Mahroom's 1973 action was
not “identical” to her 1971 action. We

do not believe that 5 C.F.R. §713.215 was
intended to prevent che hearing of discrim-
ination complaints on new causes of action.

Therefore, the stated grounds
for dismissal of her complaint by the
CSC were erroneous. The district court,
in turn, was in error when it granted
summary judgment. The factual allegations
raised by appellant had never been heard
and such a hearing is required by Chandler
v. Roudebush, supra.

Therefore, we reverse and remand
for a trial de novo in accordance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Chandler.
We, of course, do not preclude further
summary judgment motions, if appropriate.
We express no opinion regarding the merits
of Mahroom's allegations.

The reply brief of appellant
has not been considered. No good cause
has been shown for the late filing and
the motion to strike the reply brief is
GRANTED.

AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART.

35
FOOTNOTES

Appellant also brought suit under

28 U.S.C. §1343. However, the
Supreme Court has made clear that

42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 provides the
exclusive judicial remedy for claims
of discrimination in federal employ-
ment. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820
(1976). See also, Eastland v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 553 F.
2d 364, 371 (5th Cir. 1977).

The Arabic language contains
numerous different dialects. In
each Arabic language class at DLI,
a specialization in one of these
dialects is taught. Appellant is
trained solely in the Arabic-Iraqi
dialect; however, preference in
the selection process was to go to
those trained in the Arabid-
Egyptian dialect. The stated
reasons for this preference were
simply that there were more students
interested in that dialect.and that
there was a sufficient supply of
instructors trained in the Iraqi
dialect to handle the demand.

A "Right-to-Sue" letter informs
an employee or applicant of his
right to file a civil action and
of the 30-day time limit for
filing.

It should be noted that appellant
was not represented by counsel
during the course of this first
administrative appeal.

36

5/ In its letter to appellant the BAR
stated:

: "It is our interpretation
that notification of the right
to file a civil action
under the provisions of the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 arises only when
the alleged act or acts of
discrimination occurred on
or after March 24, 1972, the
date the Act became effective.
Because your complaint was filed
on October 28, 1971 notice of
a right to file a civil action
was not included in the Board's
decision in your case."
(Exhibit 1 at 87)

6/ Letters to this effect were sent to
the BAR on July 25, 1973, October 19,
: 1973, and October 30, 1973.

7/ 5 C.F.R. 713.215 provides, in part:

"The head of an agency or his
designee may reject a complaint
which was not timely filed and
shall reject those allegations
in a complaint which are not
within the purview of §713.212
or which set forth identical
matters as contained in a
previous complaint filed by
the same complainant which is
pending in the agency or has
been decided by the agency.”
(emphasis added)

8/ 5 C.F.R. §713.234 was amended
slightly on September 9, 1974, and

37

changed the name of the Board of
Appeals and Review to the Appeals
Review Board. In other respects
the regulation is identical to the
1972 version.

38

EXHIBIT "B"

42 USC 82000e-16(c) provides:

"“(c) Within thirty days of receipt

of notice of final action taken by

a department, agency, or unit
referred to in subsection (a) of
this section, or by the Civil
Service Commission upon an appeal
from a decision or order of such
department, agency, or unit ona
complaint of discrimination based

on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, brought pursuant

to subsection (a) of this section,
Executive Order 11478 or any
succeeding Executive orders, or
after one hundred and eighty days
from the filing of the initial
charge with the department, agency,
or unit or with the Civil Service
Commission on appeal from a decision
or order of such department, agency,
or unit until such time as final
action may be taken by a department,
agency, or unit, an employee or
applicant for employment, if aggrieved
by the final disposition of his
complaint, or by the failure to take
final action on his complaint, may
file a civil action as provided in
section 2000e-5 of this title, in
which civil action the head of the
department, agency, or unit, as
appropriate, shall be the defendant."

39

~ § C.F.R. 8713.215

"The head of the agency or his
designee may reject a complaint
which was not timely filed and

shall reject those allegations

in a complaint which are not within
the purview of 8713.212 or which set
forth identical matters as contained
in a previous complaint filed by the
same complainant which is pending in
the agency or has been decided by

the agency. He may cancel a complaint

because of failure of the complainant
to prosecute the complaint. He shall
transmit the decision to reject or
cancel by letter to the complainant
and his representative. The decision
letter shall inform the complainant
of his right to appeal the decision
of the agency to the Commission and
of the time limit within which the
appeal may be submitted and of his
right to file a civil action as des-
cribed in 8713.281."

5 C.F.R. 8713.234

"The Board of Appeals and Review shall
review the complaint file and all
relevant written representations made
to the board. The board may remand

a complaint to the agency for further
investigation or a rehearing if it
considers that action necessary or
have additional investigation con-
ducted by Commission personnel. This

subpart applies to any further investi-

gation or rehearing resulting from a
remand from the board. There is no
right to a hearing before the board.

40

The board shall issue a written
decision setting forth its reasons
for the decision and shall send
copies thereof to the complainant,
his designated representative, and
the agency. When corrective action
is ordered, the agency shall report
promptly to the board that the cor-
rective action has been taken. The
decision of the board is final, but
shall contain a notice of the right
to file a civil action in accordance
with 8713.282."

5 C.F.R. §8713.282

"An agency shall notify an employee
or applicant of his right to file

a Civil action, and of the 30-day
time limit for filing, in any finai
action on a complaint under 88713.215,
713.217, 713.220, or 8713.221. The
Commission shall notify an employee
or applicant of his right to file a
civil action, and of the 30-day time
limit for filing, in any decision
under 8§713.234."

‘¢

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day
of March, 1978, three copies each of the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari were air-
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Solicitor General

Room 5614

Dept. of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Secretary of the Army

General Counsel

Department of Army, 2nd Headquarters
Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

/
/

% - WV G2. , A CHL CE

j* qe

SUSAN DAVIS WALLACE

X

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0562%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.