# Petition — WILSON v. DELLUMS (Nos. 77-1129, 77-955)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978

## Text

Oe Oe ee

7~ Supreme Court, U. §,
' FILED

FEB 10 i978

24

IN THE L_M'cHaeL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser Term 1977

No.7 = 1] 129

Jerry V. Wuson, Chief,
Metropolitan Police Department
and District or CoLUMBIA,
Petitioners,

Vv.

HonorasB_Le Ronatp V. Detivas, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Joun R. RisHer, JR.,
Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Ricuarp W. Barron,
Deputy Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Davmw Sutton,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Attorneys for Petitioners,
District Building,
Washington, D. C. 20004
Telephone: 629-3916

INDEX

Sussect Invex Pace
ee mi dunes 2
Jurisdiction ~_- SORE Sy Cane ae ee 2
CD TEE cccenenncintcineiblntinisiniiidnniiiiimntinkcmman 2
Statutes Involved — an 3
ID ~ecctccilenstisteicaleeiicliemnniitinrpennlitidiiaiitiiiais oan 5
ee ae Ge Te TD Secdiciniteneeemnenedenen 16
RITE I scl a ri te En ON 24

Cases CITED

Aldinger v. Howard (1976), 427 U. 8. 1 ~-----------------~-------

Bivens vy. Siz Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971), 408 U. 8S.
Ee ee ers — wis 2, 16, 17, 21

Bivens v. Siz Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc.
ee SS OE OF OS ee

Blain v. United States (9th Cir., 1977), 552 F. od I iii eccetiteniannien
City of Charlotte v. Firefighters (1976), 426 U. S. 283 __.....___-

Commonwealth of Pa. v. National Ass’n of Flood Ins. (3rd Cir.,
RR en ee ee

Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. (1932), 284 U. 8S. 306 ~----..-.--
District of Columbia vy. Carter (1973), 409 U. S. 418 _.....--_.-____
Farnsworth v. Orem City (D. Utah, 1976), 421 F. Supp. 830 —__---
Gentile v. Wallen (2nd Cir., 1977), 562 F. 2d 193 __--.-_-------__
Harrigan v. United States (E. D. Pa., 1974), 63 F. R. D. 402 .___-
Hill v. District of Columbia (D. C. App., 1975), 345 A. 2d 867 ___-
Jones v. McElroy (E. D. Pa., 1977), 429 F. Supp. 848 _____-__.----
Kostka v. Hogg (1st Cir., 1977), 560 F. 2d 37 -.... ------
Livingood v. Townsend (D. Minn., 1976), 422 F. Supp. 24 —_.._---

Lunsford v. United States, —— F. 2d —— (8th Cir., No. 76-1984,
December 31, 1977) caiiie

po AR ll OY Fe ee
Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle (1977), 429 U. S. 274 __--
Paton v. La Prade (3rd Cir., 1975), 524 F. 2d 862 _...._____...____
Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U. 8. 693 tiles
Perry v. Linke (N. D. Ohio, E. D., 1974), 394 F. Supp. 323 _____--
Pitrone v. Mercadante (E. D. Pa., 1976), 420 F. Supp. 1384 ______

ii.

INDEX—Continued Pace

Provancial v. United States (8th Cir., 1972), 454 F. 2d 72 ~.------ 19
Rafferty v. Prince George’s County (D. Md., 1976), 423 F.

I 17

Rizzo v. Goode (1076), 423 U. 8. 362 ....-------------------—----- 21

Sandoval v. Brown (D. N. M., 1977), 432 F. Supp. 1028 ~---—----- 17

United States v. Nicholson decided June 29, 1969, aff'd. (D. C.

App. 1096), 908 A. 34 9 .........--..-.............----.—----- 8, 12
Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U. S. 229 -.---------------~----- 20
Wood v. Strickland (1975), 420 U. S. 308 ------------------—----- 21
Zahn v. International Paper Company (1973), 414 U. 8. 291 -..---- 22

Unitep States Cope Crirep

Disks GR, GectRt TENNER) ccctncencsienensnnennnenensenennssen 2
Tithe GR, Gast GED nce ceeneetsccnntennnsnasennscenccamesces 22
i —————————— 23
Title 28, Section 2675(a) -~------------~—- ea ee ee ee 22
20

17, 18

. | | | _ |
OL 4... eee idbiiiainaaasiundens ‘

District or CotumBiA Cope, 1973, CiTep

ne SL 8
ae a ns ae 3, 6, 18, 21
Section 9-126a --.---------- _ _ 4, 19
Restle GOD dnecsnedstosnabennnen _... 2, 4-5, 16, 22, 23

Orner AvuTHOoRITIES CITED

P. L. 91-382, 84 Stat. 816, August 18, 1970, Section 101 ~...-.----- 4, 19, 23
S. Rept. No. 1709, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 12, 1946 ~-.--.----- 19

Inpex To APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit, dated August 4, 1977 -~- aiceinn la
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, dated August 4, 1977 ~~~ ali 3la

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of .

Columbia Circuit, dated November 14, 1977, denying the

petitions fer VORGRTIRG 2.cccccccceccennccccccencccecusecussuce= 32a
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, dated November 14, 1977, denying the

suggestion for rehearing en bane ~-~-.....---------------~----- 33a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser Term, 1977

No.

Jerry V. Witson, Chief,
Metropolitan Police Department
and District or CoLumBia,
Petitioners,

V.

Honoras.e Ronatp V. Detius, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioners, the District of Columbia and Jerry V. Wil-
son, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in this case.)

As, In the related case of Powell, et al. v. Dellums, et al., No. 77-955, a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on January 3, 1978, by the Solicitor

— on behalf of James M. Powell, the Chief of the United States Capitol
olice.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals has not yet been |

reported and is set forth in Appendix A, infra, at pages
1a-30a. The opinion of the court of appeals in the related
case of Powell, et al. v. Dellums, et al., is set forth in Ap-
pendix A, at pages la-104a, to the certiorari petition filed
in that case. The District Court rendered no opinion, but
its judgment is set forth in Appendix C, pages 107a-112a,
to the Powell petition.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Appendix B at
page 3la) was entered on August 4, 1977. The orders of
the court of appeais denying petitioners’ petition for re-
hearing and suggestion for rehearing en bane (Appendix
C at pages 32a-33a) were entered on November 14, 1977.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S. C.
§ 1254(a).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 306 (1971), justifies a constitu-
tional tort action against the District of Columbia Govern-
ment (on a respondeat superior theory) and its Metropoli-
tan Police Chief in favor of demonstrators arrested on the
Capitol grounds pursuant to a congressional enactment
delegating required peace keeping functions and related
arrest making decisions to federal officials.

2. Whether the notice to the District given on behalf of
65 named claimants, pursuant to D. C. Code 1973, § 12-309,
constitutes adequate notice on behalf of approximately
1200 individuals for whose benefit respondents’ class action
was brought.

3
STATUTES INVOLVED

D. C. Code, 1973, § 9-126:

§ 9-126. Policing of Capitol Buildings and
Grounds—Powers of Capitol Police—Arrests by
Metropolitan Police.

The Capitol Police shall police the United States
Capitol Buildings and Grounds under the direction
of the Capitol Police Board, consisting of the Ser-
geant at Arms of the United States Senate, the
Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives,
and the Architect of the Capitol, and shall have
the power to enforce the provisions of sections 9-
118, 9-119 to 9-126, 9-17 to 9-132 and regulations
promulgated under section 9-131 and to make ar-
rests within the United States Capitol Buildings
and Grounds for any violations of any law of the
United States or of any State, or any regulation
promulgated pursuant thereto: Provided, That
the Metropolitan Police force of the District of
Columbia are hereby authorized to make arrests
within the United States Capitol Buildings and
Grounds for any violations of any such laws or
regulations, but such authority shall not be con-
strued as authorizing the Metropolitan Police
force, except with the consent or upon the request
of the Capitol Police Board, to enter such build-
ings to make arrests in response to complaints or
to serve warrants or to patrol the United States
Capitol Buildings and Grounds, with the excep-
tion of the streets and roadways shown on the map
referred to in section 9-118 as being under the
jurisdiction and control [of] the Commissioner of
the District of Columbia. For the purpose of this

4

section, the word ‘‘grounds’’ shall include the
House Office Building parking area. (July 31,
1946, 60 Stat. 719, ch. 707, § 9.)

P. L. 91-382, 4 101, 84 Stat. 816, August 18, 1970 (D. C.
Code, 1973, § 9-126a) :

To enable the Capitol Police Board to provide
additional protection for the Capitol Buildings and
Grounds, including the Senate and House Office
Buildings and the Capitol Power Plant, $880.000.
Such sum shall be expanded only for payment of
salaries and other expenses of personnel detailed
from the Metropolitan Police of the District of
Columbia, and the Commissioner of the District
of Columbia is authorized and directed to make
such details upon the request of the Board. Per-
sonnel so detailed shall, during the period of such
detail, serve under the direction and instructions
of the Board and are authorized to exercise the
same authority as members of such Metropolitan
Police and members of the Capitol Police and to
perform such other duties as may be assigned by
the Board. Reimbursement for salaries and other
expenses of such detail personnel shall be made to
the government of the District of Columbia, and
any sums so reimbursed shall be credited to the
appropriation or appropriations from which such
salaries and expenses are payable and shall be
available for all purposes thereof * * *.

D. C. Code, 1973, § 12-309:

§ 12-309. Actions against the District of Co-
lumbia for unliquidated damages; time for notice.
An action may not be maintained against the
District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to

5

person or property unless, within six months after
the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant,
his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing
to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia of
the approximate time, place, cause, and circum-
stances of the injury or damage. A report in
writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in
regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under
this section. (Dec. 23, 1963, 77 Stat. 511, Pub. L.
88-241, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1964; July 29, 1970, Pub.
L. 91-358, title I, § 141(2), 84 Stat. 551.)

STATEMENT

In a civil action filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia on November 11, 1971, ap-
proximately 1200 members of # class represented by ten
named plaintiffs-respondents sought damages against the
District of Columbia, Jerry V. Wilson, then Chief of the
Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia, and James
M. Powell, the Chief of the United States Capitol Police,
for false arrest, malicious prosecution and violation of
First and Eighth Amendment rights. The action stemmed
from arrests occurring in the course of a ‘‘Mayweek”’
related demonstration at the Capitol on May 5, 1971.
(J. App. 26-38.)

In answering respondents’ complaint allegations, Chief
Powell and the District of Columbia petitioners denied the
unconstitutional conduct attributed to them (J. App. 39-
53), and additionally asserted that the arrests made on the
Capitol steps were: lawfully undertaken in the course of
official governmental duties of Chief Powell (J. App. 39,
49). The District also claimed that it was protected by
the doctrine of governmental immunity and that respond-
ents failed to give advance notice of their claims for dam-
ages as required by D. C. Code, 1973, § 12-309 (J. App. 48-
49). Respondents purported to comply with § 12-309 by

6

a letter written to the then Commissioner of the District
of Columbia on November 4, 1971, by Monroe H. Freed-
man, Special Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union
- Fund (J. App. 75-81). The letter recited in general terms
that about 1200 claimants were unlawfully arrested on
the Capitol steps on the occasion in question and were
subjected to excessive force and other abusive conduct. It
went on to specifically name 65 claimants who allegedly
sustained injuries of various kinds and degrees and repre-
sented that such injuries were ‘‘typical of those sustained
by the group of claimants as a whole’’ (J. App. 75-81).
Over the objection of petitioners (J. App. 54-83, 89-92),
the case proceeded to trial as a class action, the court
defining the class as ‘‘all persons who were arrested while
assembled on the Capitol steps on May 5, 1971.’’ (J. App.
85-87.)

Under congressional enactment (D. C. Code, 1973, § 9-
126), the preservation of peace and the maintenance of
order at the Capitol buildings and grounds is the responsi-
bility of a Capitol Police Board consisting of the Sergeants-
at-Arms of the respective Houses of Congress and the Ar-
chitect of the Capitol. The Board is the immediate supervi-
sor of the Capitol Police Chief. Each Sergeant-at-Arms is
responsible for the preservation of peace in, and the order-
ly functioning of, his respective wing of the Capitol and the
Capitol Police Chief is charged with the duty of imple-
menting the discharge of these responsibilities (J. App.
1108-110, 1326, 1524). The Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment has no authority to perform general peace keeping
functions at the Capitol or to assume custody of persons
on the Capitol grounds, except when specifically called
upon to do so by the Capitol Police Board or the Capitol
Police Chief as its representative. When such authority
is given, any arrests are considered to be those of the
Capitol Police, with Metropolitan Police officers ‘‘merely
assisting.’’ Although the Metropolitan Police Department

7

sometimes provides personnel to assist the Capitol Police
Chief in the preservation of peace at the Capitol, the Capi-
tol Police Chief is ‘‘in charge of all police activities within
the Capitol grounds’’ and was in charge on May 5, 1971
(J. App. 1108, 1151-1152, 1430, 1601, 1631-1632, 1703).

Well in advance of the expected demonstration, Chief
Powell and other government officials had read in a tacti-
cal manual published and distributed by the ‘‘Mayday Coa-
lition’’ (J. App. 1140) that:

* * * On May 5th Algonquin Peace City will
shift its camping grounds from Rock Creek Park
to the U. S. Capitol Building. There, it is expected
that we will Jay a nonviolent seige of the Congress,
forcing it to remain in session until it ratifies the
People’s Peace Treaty or until we are all arrested.

On the morning of May 5, 1971, in anticipation of the
demonstration, Chief Powell met with the Sergeants-at-
Arms of the respective Houses, the Administrative Assist-
ant to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief
Wilson, and Eric Marcy, an Assistant United States Attor-
ney assigned to provide advice as to the legal aspects of
dealing with the then expected demonstration. All in at-
tendance at that meeting understood that Chief Wilson and
the Metropolitan Police would have no authority to take
any demonstrators into custody without advance authori-
zation from Chief Powell. But because of the unavailabili-
ty of sufficient Capitol police to deal with the expected
demonstration, Metropolitan Police officers were dispatched
to the Capitol at the request of the Capitol Police Board.
(J. App. 1146-1150, 1403, 1631-1632.)

That same morning, representatives of the ‘‘People’s
Coalition’? made arrangements to meet at 2:45 p.m., with
several members of Congress on the House steps of the
east wing of the Capitol building to present a peoples’

8

peace treaty and to register a protest against the war
in Southeast Asia (J. App. 293, 317, 649-650, 780, 2071).

Around 1:00 p.m., Chief Powell and Mr. Marcy proceeded
to the west front of the Capitol grounds and subsequently
met with Chief Wilson who stated that there were suffici-
ent Metropolitan Police officers available to provide sup-
port in any emergency that might arise. Gilbert Zimmer-
man, another Assistant United States Attorney, also ar-
rived on the scene (J. App. 1146-1147, 1150-1152, 1975).
As the District Court observed ( J. App. 2067), ‘‘it is con-
ceded by everybody that * * * [Mr. Zimmerman] is the
U. S. Attorney’s expert in * * * [the] field’’ of First
Amendment rights. He was sent to advise Chief Powell
as to the applicability to the expected demonstration of the
Capitol grounds statute, D. C. Code, 1973, § 9-124, as con-
strued in June 1969, by Chief Judge Greene of the then
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions in United
States v. Nicholson (J. App. 2480-2497), aff’d., 263 A. 2d
56 (D. C. App., 1970) (J. App. 1124-1127, 1152-1153). A
third Assistant United States Attorney was sent to the
general scene of the demonstration for observatory and in-
formation gathering purposes in anticipation of criminal
prosecutions by the United States (J. App. 532, 537-538,
544-545, 559).

As the demonstration group was assembling in the mall
area around 2:00 p.m., Chief Powell received intelligence
information that the group had estabilshed alternative
plans calling for acts of civil disobedience and violations
of law at the Capitol (J. App. 546-550). At about 2:30
p.m., the group, consisting of about 1200 demonstrators
carrying placards, banners, and bullhorns, proceeded from
the mail area enroute to the Capitol in an easterly di-
rection on Independence Avenue, completely blocking
its eastbound lanes (J. App. 1171, 1369-1371, 1381,
1385, 1482, 1935A, 1989). At about 2:45 p.m., the group
was stopped at the intersection of Independence Avenue

9

and New Jersey Avenue by Inspector Xander of the Capi-
tol Police. Congressmen Dellums and Mitchell, and Con-
gresswoman Abzug, who had by then joined the group, in-
formed the Inspector that the group had been invited to
meet with them on the House steps of the Capitol. The
group was permitted to proceed to the House steps where
most of its members were later arrested in the course of
speeches given by members of Congress (J. App. 297, 321-
322, 388, 568, 570, 573, 653-654, 1172, 1486-1487, 1500, 1560).
The basis of these arrests was the behavior of the group
during the approximately 20 minute interval which pre-
ceded those speeches.

Between 2:45 and 3:00 p.m., the group ascended the
House steps and when Chief Powell, who had a bullhorn,
and the two Assistant United States Attorneys assigned
to advise him, arrived at the foot of the steps at 2:56 p.m.,
the steps were almost filled (J. App. 1174-1175, 1223, 1372).
The House was then in session, its Ways and Means Com-
mittee, located behind the windows at the top of the steps,
was conducting a meeting (J. App. 1345-1346, 1543-1544),
and the Speaker’s staff members, whose office windows al-
so front the steps, were attempting to perform their as-
signed work (J. App. 1520-1521). In the course of the 20
minute period which followed their arrival, various of
the demonstrators pounded on windows, wrote on walls,
climbed on poles and balustrades, and constantly engaged
in loud chanting, singing, and shouting (J. App. 1174-
1175, 1298, 1300, 1334, 1345-1348, 1354, 1374, 1404, 1410-
1413, 1462-1463, 1485, 1492, 1521, 1525,, 1543-1544, 1569
1810-1812, 1935B, 1950-1953, 1988, 2501).

Numerous individuals, testifying on respondents’ behalf,
noted that the assembled group was singing, chanting, and
making noise prior to the commencement of the speeches
(J. App. 294-295, 296, 351, 366, 410-411, 449, 494, 513-514,
527, 539, 568, 632, 639, 643, 646-648, 653, 657-658, 686 698).
A television reporter (J. App. 510-511) heard the crowd

10

repeatedly chant in ‘‘loud tones.’’ Although the reporter
was standing ‘‘quite close’’ to Chief Powell when the Chief
made his first bullhorn annoucement, he was unable to
hear it because of the competing noise of the crowd (J.
App. 513-514, 527). Various other individuals assembled
at dfferent locations in the crowd observed the bullhorn,
but were unable to hear the announcements that it trans-
mitted (J. App. 496, 556, 643, 660, 668, 675-676, 698-699,
736-737, 742-745, 786-787, 793; ef. J. App. 1301). Nancy
Hornick, one of the demonstrators (J. App. 673-674), ob-
served that the group chanted various things before the
speeches began, including ‘‘one, two, three, four, we don’t
want your fucking war’’ (J. App. 686). As she put it,
‘«* * * Tt is fair to say it [the noise] was loud’’ (J. App.
698). A newspaper reporter called by respondents (J.
App. 640-641), testified that there was an ‘‘awful lot of
noise’’ (J. App. 643), that he heard the noise from both
inside and outside the building and that, while inside the
building, he was informed ‘‘that the Speaker [of the
House] was very upset because he felt the noise was inter-
ferring with work’’ (J. App. 646-648).

The Legislative Assistant to the Speaker of the House
(J. App. 1517) testified that the work of his office was dis-
rupted by what transpired on the nearby steps after the
arrival of the demonstrators (J. App. 1522, 1537, 1539-
1540). Explaining the impact of the outside activity upon
such work, he stated (J. App. 1521) that:

* * * [T)his group came up to the stairs, and
there was a lot of activity immediately outside our
windows. The windows sit back at the back of
this porch, and we can only see the porch area and
not down the stairs, but there were a lot of
people—activity back and forth of the crowd mil-
ling around. One or two hundred people actually
up within our line of sight in the windows were

11

yelling and chanting. Some of them were pound-
ing on our windows, trying to distract and disturb
us.

He went on to state (J. App. 1525) that:

We were trying to conduct our work. There
was a great deal of disturbance on the outside.
As I indicated earlier, people were banging on our
windows, shouting at us through the windows, try-
ing to engage us in debate or conversation. * * *

In a simiiar context, the Chief Counsel of the House
Ways and Means Committee (J. App. 1543), which, at the
time of the outside activity, was working ‘‘on some com-
plex, important matters’’ (J. App. 1547) testified (J. App.
1544-1546) that:

_ They were walking around up on those ledges at
the top of the steps, and on occasion were rapping
very loudly on our Committe windows, and mak-
ing a great deal of noise * * *.

* * * [T]hee noise was quite disruptive of the
Committee and quite disturbing. As I say, we
pulled the blinds on the windows in order to try
to insulate ourselves somewhat. The noise and
the chanting, I would say, from the outside was
quite loud and totally disruptive, almost, of the
Committee meeting.

Complaints regarding the disruptive behavior of the group
were made to a Capitol Police Lieutenant by staff members
of both the Committee and the Speaker (J. App. 1950-
1962).

After Chief Powell had observed the behavior of the as-
sembled group for about five minutes, he requested the

12

advice of Assistant United States Attorney Zimmerman as
to whether the group was in violation of the Capitol
Grounds statute as contrued in Nicholson and was prompt-
ly advised that a very flagrant violation was taking place.
The Chief then attempted to issue his first series of bull-
horn announcements from the bettom of the steps and to
inform the group tha it was in violation of law and must
disperse (J. App. 1174-1177, 1342-1343, 1391, 1984). As he
tried to convey such a message, the crowd increased the
volume of its noise (J. App. 1176, 1291, 1377, 1985). De-
scribing the reaction of the crowd, Chief Powell stated on
cross-examination (J. App. 1921) that:

I only got so far as stating that I was Chief of
Police when this terrific roar went up and several
pointed to me and called me a § of a B, and other
things that I don’t like to repeat here in front of
the jury. But they were four-letter words.

It was my impression from that reaction that
this group did not intend for me to remind them
that they were noisy. I thought they certainly
already knew it. And I did then continue on and
attempt to get them to listen as I announced three
or four times over the bullhorn that I was Chief
of the Capitol Police, and they were a noisy, loud,
disruptive group. And I asked them to remove
themselves from the steps immediately, at which
time they reacted with loud chants and clinched
fists as an indication to me that they didn’t intend
to pay much attention to what I had to say.

Chief Powell repeated the message after further discus-
sion with Assistant United States Attorney Zimmerman,
who described the crowd’s resulting response as follows
(J. App. 1985) :

As he did that [i.e., repeated the announcement],
there was a din that seemed to increase as though

13

the group wanted to drown out the Chief and his
announcement. In other words, the sound—the
loudness of the group increased in volume.

After Chief Powell made the initial series of bullhorn
announcements, he was approached by Inspector Xander
who informed him that the Speaker of the House had
stated that the group should be permitted to meet with
members of Congress on the Capitol steps if its behavior
remained orderly (J. App. 1220-1224, 1519-1520). Con-
vinced that such a criterion had not been met, the Chief
and federal counsel, at about 3:05 p.m., went underneath
the steps at the foot of the Capitol to confer with the House
Sergeant-at-Arms (J. App. 1177-1180, 1224, 1414-1415,
1987-1988). The Chief advised the Sergeant-at-Arms that
he was confronted with a noisy and unruly crowd that
should be dispersed and the Sergeant-at-Arms in turn con-
versed with the Speaker of the House. The Speaker ap-
proved the Chief’s recommendation that the group be re-
moved from the House steps and upon returning from his
meeting with the Speaker, the Sergeant-at-Arms told
Chief Powell to do whatever was necessary to effect such

removal, including the making of any required arrests (J.
App. 1179-1180, 1414-1417, 1514-1516, 1522-1523, 1987-1988).

At about 3:14 p.m., the Chief, accompanied by federal
counsel, went outside and at 3:15 p.m., after proceeding
up the steps about 10 feet into the crowd, issued a second
series of bullhorn announcements and dispersal orders (J.
App. 1237, 1343, 1374-1377, 1469, 1484-1435, 1988-1989).
At that point, the group was more stationary and organ-
ized, most of its members having seated themselves, but
the noise level had not significantly changed (J. App. 1241-
1242, 1374, 1485, 1502; ef. J. App. 1225-1227). Describing
the behavior of the crowd at that time, Captain Abernathy
of the Capitol Police stated (J. App. 1374) that:

14

* * * [T]hey were extremely loud, and some-
chanting in unison, and on other occasions that
would die off, and they would be shouting their
individual slogans and profanities.

There were some still pounding on the windows.
You could see them separated enough to observe
that. I observed one man that did disrobe. That
brought a loud response.

As the second series of announcements were made, the
crowd again made competing noise and one of its members
turned up a portable amplification system that had been
brought to the House steps (J. App. 1183, 1377, 1469, 1989).
In the iterval that followed the second series of announce-
ments, numerous demonstrators left the area (J. App. 1376-
1377, 1487, 1883, 1989-1990). Thereafter all remaining dem-
onstrators were placed under arrest by Chief Powell (J.
App. 1185, 1884-1885). Arrest teams of the Special Opera-
tions Division of the Metropolitan Police Department then
removed these individuals from the steps and took them
into physical custody (J. App. 1813, 1818-1821). A field
arrest form, with a contemporaneous photograph, was pre-
pared on each individual taken into custody (J. App. 382,
1636-1637, 1991).

Asked on cross-examination to state the justification
for his dispersal orders and his related state of mind (J.
App. 1298-1301, 1340), Chief Powell explained that, from
his vantage point at the bottom of the steps, he had been
informed of the disruptive activity around the windows at
the top of the steps (J. App. 1298, 1340, 1334-1335), that
he saw persons climb on balustrades and lamp posts, and
others that appeared to be writing on walls (J. App. 1298-
1300). In addition, he was quite concerned about the dis-
ruptive impact of the noise volume on those inside the
Capitol building and in that regard stated on cross-
examination (J. App. 1301) that:

15

* * * They were making so much noise, as has
been said, they couldn’t—if they say they couldn’t
hear my bull horn, and I attempted to get through
to them, and I had thought that they had heard,
but they were making so much noise that they were
sufficiently loud so that there could be some ques-
tion as to whether each and every person did in
fact hear it. The very fact they were making that
much noise and the fact that I knew the House
was in session, and I knew that there was a Com-
mittee Room inside which had a hearing going on,
I was concerned that they certainly were disturb-
ing the orderliness of the Congress.

After the arrests were completed, a second group of
about 100 demonstrators, which had been unable to join
the initial assemblage, ran to the steps, shouted obsceni-
ties and demanded to be arrested. This group was ordered
to disperse and upon its failure to do so also was taken
into custody. In light of what had previously taken place,
Chief Powell, who had been instructed by the Chairman of
the Capitol Police Board to clear the grounds, did so by
arresting this second group (J. App. 1191-1192, 1311-1312,
1886-1887, 1931-1932).

Following their arrests, the demonstrators were taken to
the District of Columbia Coliseum where attempts were
made to process them. Those who submitted to processing
were subsequently taken to the District of Columbia Su-
perior Court and those who did not were transported to
the cellblock of the United States Courthouse (App. A at
16-18). The demonstrators were charged by the United
States with violating the Capitol Grounds statute and with
unlawful entry, following discussions involving Chief
Powell and various Assistant United States Attorneys,
and ultimate personal approval by the United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia. Eight specific cases

16

were selected for prosecution in the Superior Court, and
following the acquittal of the demonstrators involved in
those cases, the United States Attorney elected not to pro-
ceed in the remaining cases (J. App. 2003-2005, 2100-2103,
2111-2117, 2129-2130, 2135, 2140-2141).

The jury awarded damages against the District of Co-
lumbia, Chief Wilson and Chief Powell for malicious prose-
eution and violation of First and Fourth Amendment
rights. It returned a verdict against the District only
based on Eighth Amendment liability (J. App. 129-132).
It awarded total damages exceeding $12,000,000. Follow-
ing the entry of judgment on the verdicts and the denial
of post-judgment motions, the District, Chief Wilson and
Chief Powell appealed (J. App. 129-136).

The court of appeals affirmed the judgment to the extent
that it related to the liability of the District of Columbia
and Chief Wilson under the First and Fourth Amend-
ments. The court also held that all respondents had satis-
fied the statutory notice requirement contained in D. C.
Code, 1973, § 12-309. However, the court concluded that
the amount of damages awarded for violation of First
Amendment rights was so excessive as to require a new
trial and additionally vacated the Eighth Amendment
based award of damages against the District in its entirety.
On November 14, 1977, the court of appeals denied a peti-
tion for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc
filed by the District and Chief Wilson, and this petition
for a writ of certiorari followed,

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The holding of the court of appeals that the District, as
a governmental entity, may be compelled to respond in
damages for constitutional torts on a respondeat superior
theory raises a question of substantial importance under
the Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). This Court plainly

17

recognized in Bivens that the appropriateness of constitu-
tionally based damages remedies logically requires a con-
sideration of any ‘‘special factors counselling nesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’’ 403 U. S.
at 390. In particular, this Court noted (403 U. S. at 397)
that:

* * * Finally, we cannot accept respondents’
formulation of the question as whether the availa-
bility of money damages.is necessary to enforce
the Fourth Amendment. For we have here no ex-
plicit congressional declaration that persons in-
jured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not recover money damages
from the agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the view of
Congress. * * * (Emphasis added.)

Various federal courts, in refusing to extend the Bivens
doctrine to municipalities, have concluded that the crea-
tion of a constitutional tort action against these govern-
mental entities would circumvent their explicit congres-
sional exclusion from liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F. 2d 37 (1st Cir., 1977) ; Sandoval
v. Brown, 432 F. Supp. 1028, 1029-1030 and n. 3 (D. N. M.,
1977) ; Farnsworth v. Orem City, 421 F. Supp. 830, 831 (D.
Utah, 1976); Rafferty v. Prince George’s County, 423 F.
Supp. 1045, 1057-1058 (D. Md., 1976); Livingood v. Town-
send, 422 F. Supp. 24 (D. Minn., 1976); Pitrone v. Merca-
dante, 420 F. Supp. 1384 (E. D. Pa., 1976); Perry v. Linke,
394 F. Supp. 323 (N. D. Ohio E. D. 1974). However, the
matter has given rise to a rapidly expanding decisional
split in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Gentile v. Wal-
len, 562 F. 2d 193, 195-197 (2nd Cir., 1977); Jones v. Mc-
Elroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 856 (E. D. Pa., 1977).

In Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274,
278 (1977), this Court recently recognized the extreme im-

18

portance of the question whether, by analogy to Bivens, it
shouid imply a remedy from the Constitution against a
governmental entity not otherwise subject to liability under
42 U. S. C. § 1983. But, because the question was not
properly presented in that case, the Court declined to re-
solve it (429 U. S. at 278). See also City of Charlotte v.
Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283, 284, n. 1 (1976); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3 (1976). It is, however, squarely
presented here. The District’s exclusion from liability
under § 1983 is, of course, based on a different rationale
than that generally governing the non-liability of other
municipalities under that enactment. Compare District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418 (1973) with Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). But its status as a congres-
sionally created municipal corporation can hardly single
it out in a manner which distinguishes it from all other
municipalities in terms of its amenability to respondeat
superior based constitutional tort liability in ‘‘a Bivens-
type cause of action [which] is the federal counterpart to
claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 * * *.’? See Paton v. La
Prade, 524 F. 2d 862, 871 (3rd Cir., 1975); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 456 F. 2d

1339, 1346 (2nd Cir., 1972).

In addition, there are other explicit congressional decla-
rations which cast serious doubt on the extension of Bivens
to municipal liability like that endorsed by the court of ap-
peals.

First, the Capitol Grounds statute plainly negates that
kind of liability. D. C. Code, 1973 § 9126, and its legisla-
tive history, make it abundantly clear that when, as here,
Metropolitan Police officers ‘‘patrol’’ and perform general
peace keeping functions at the Capitol at the request of the
Capitol Police Board, they function in a federal capacity
as agents of the United States. As such, unlike the Capitol
Police Chief and his federal subordinates, they have no in-
dependent decision-making power concerning the arrest

19

function. In the language of the Senate Report on § 9-126,
any other construction of that enactment would have the
unmistakable effect of ‘‘nullifying the prime jurisdiction
of the Capitol Police over the Capitol Buildings and
Grounds.’’ See S. Rept. No. 1709, 79th Cong.,-2nd Sess.,
July 12, 1946, at 5.

Consistent with that legislative policy, the record incon-
trovertibly establishes that (1) Metropolitan Police Officers
were dispatched to the Capitol grounds on May 5, 1971,
‘fat the request of the Capitol Police Board,’’ (2) such a
request was necessary because of the unavailability of
sufficient Capitol Police officers to perform necessary peace
keeping functions in connection with the expected mass
demonstration (J. App. 1146-1148), (3) Chief Powell, not

“Chief Wilson, was in charge of ‘‘all police activities,’’ in-

cluding the making of necessary demonstration-related ar-
rests, and (4) Chief Wilson and his police subordinates
were totally powerless to assume custody of any demon-
strator without Chief Powell’s specific advance authoriza-
tion, which followed the advice of federal counsel (J. App.
1152, 1185, 1616-1617, 1631, 1703, 1714, 1985). In Denton v.
Yazoo &€ M. V. R. Co., 284 JU. S. 305, 308-309 (1932), this
Court held that when, as here, individuals perform work
for the benefit of the United States under an enactment
which places key elements of control in a federal officer,
they become borowed federal servants. This Court also
made plain that there is simply no basis for imposing lia-
bility on the lending employer under such circumstances.
See also Provancial v. United States, 454 F. 2d 72 (8th Cir.,
1972). The decision of the court of appeals appears to be
in direct conflict with that rationale.

Second, under P. L. 91-382, § 101, 84 Stat. 816 (August
18, 1970) (see also D. C. Code, 1973 § 9-126a), Metropoli-
tan Police officers assigned to a ‘‘detail’’ at the Capitol
are totally subject to federal authority and simply do not
act for the District’s benefit (J. App. 1639-1640). It is

20

equally clear that, when Metropolitan Police officers were
dispatched to the Capitol on May 5, 1971, at the special
request of the Capitol Police Board (J. App. 1146), such a
‘*detail’’ existed, notwithstanding its brief duration.
While such a temporary assignment may not have called
for the reimbursement which occurs in cases involving as-
signments of longer duration, that circumstances does not
defeat the conclusion that under any reasonable construc-
tion of P. L. 91-382, § 101, what occurred on May 5, 1971,
was the equivalent of a ‘‘detail.’’

~*

Third, under 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), as it existed at the
time of the mass demonstration involved, the United States
was incontrovertibly exempt from the kind of liability im-
posed here.* Yet, in spite of the undisputed need to call
upon the District Government in order to insuie the Fed-
eral Government’s capability of maintaining the security
of its own grounds, the court of appeals (App. A at 10-13)
perfunctorily allows the liability of one government entity
to be substituted for that of another. But, since the Dis-
trict, in acting for the benefit of the United States under
Federal direction and on federal grounds, was engaged in
the precise type of activities at which § 2680(h) government
liability exemptions are aimed, this case surely presents a
substantial question as to whether that enactment serves

2 As an integral component of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. 8S. C.
§ 2680(h), then conferred federal immunity in connection with “la]ny claim
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,* * ** abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepreseniation, deceit, or interference with con-
tract rights” (emphasis added). The ruling of the court of appeals (App. A
at 15-16) that recent amendments to § 2680(h), altering the federal govern-
ment’s liability, provides a special factor justifying a Bivens-type action
against the District plainly discounts the circumstance that those amend-
ments were enacted after the occurrence of the mass demonstration involved.
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238 n. 10 (1976).

21

as an explicit congressional declaration foreclosing ~
Bivens type action against it.®

The holding of the court of appeals that a constitutional-
ly based award of damages was justified against Chief Wil-
son likewise raises a question of extreme importance under
Bivens. It must be remembered that the allegations in that
case were that federal agents entered Bivens’ apartment in
the early morning without either probable cause for a search
or an arrest warrant. Turned out of bed, he was arrested,
manacled, and searched ‘‘from stem to stern.’’ He was then
taken to the station house, strip searched, and released
without charges ever being filed. Given such a direct and
outrageous intrusion by police officers, the considerations
which influence judicial discretion in the creation of a con-
stitutionally implied damages remedy are quite compelling.
Here, in contrast, Chief Wilson has engaged in no direct
invasion of a constitutionally protected interest. The con-
clusion that he must still respond in damages on a constitu-
tional tort theory is necessarily based on the premise that
he was constantly required to remain at Chief Powell’s
side and monitor his every action between the arrival and
the mass arrests of the demonstrators. However, his fail-
ure to do so amounts to nothing more than a deferral to
the judgment of the federal official, admittedly ‘‘in charge
of all police activities within the Capitol Grounds’’ on May
5, 1971 (J. App. 1152). Chief Wilson’s inaction in such a
context hardly equates with the direct and conscious
wrongdoing on which constitutional tort actions must be
predicated. Ct. Paul v. Davis, 424 U. 8S. 693, 701 (1976) ;
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308, 319 (1975). Moreover, not a single demon-

3 Aside from any considerations pertaining to the unwarranted extension of
the Bivens doctrine by the court of appeals, it. is submitted that the court’s
construction of the Capitol Grounds statute, i.e. D. C. Code, 1973, § 9-126,
supra, vis a vis the matter of municipal liability at the federal enclave in-
volved, in and of itself raises a question of sufficient importance to justify
this Court’s review.

22

strator could be removed from the Capitol grounds with-
out the advance authorization of Chief Powell, that is, after
he (Chief Powell) made the arrests (J. App. 1152, 1185,
1631, 1703). The thesis that Bivens nonetheless justifies
Chief Wilson’s liability simply because the actual removal
was effected by local officers as the final link in a federally-
structured chain of command stretches the Bivens rationale
beyond its breaking point and is sufficiently substantial to
warrant this Court’s scrutiny.‘

Likewise substantial is the question presented by the
holding of the court of apeals that notice of a claim tend-
ered in behalf of a small number of persons is sufficient to
satisfy the statutory notice requirement as to all unnamed
members of an immense class which later files suit. In
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291 (1973), this
Court held that each member of a class, not merely the
named plaintiffs, must satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1332 as a prerequisite to in-
vocation of jurisdiction. Since the notice requirement of
§ 12-309 is a mandatory threshold requirement and a neces-
sary condition precedent to the institution of suit—/Hill v.
District of Columbia, 345 A. 2d 867, 869 (D. C. App.,
1975)—it would appear that the court of appeals’ construc-
tion of that enactment is conceptually inconsistent with
Zahn. Moreover, the importance of this aspect of the case
from a certiorari standpoint is underscored by recent de-
cisions of three other circuits which reached a different
result in construing a similar notice requirement contained
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S. C. § 2675(a).

4 Chief Powell asserts in his certiorari petition that substantial questions
exist as to whether his liability is foreclosed by the doctrine of official im-
munity and whether this Court’s holding in Bivens extends to First Amend-
ment based actions for damages. We agree with this submission, adopt the
position of Chief Powell in these respects, and hasten to add that if the
liaL.!ity of Chief Powell, who performed the key decisional role, is foreclosed
under this Court's teachings, it would indeed be anomalous to impose liability
on either the District or Chief Wilson.

23

In Commonwealth of Pa. v. National Ass’n of Flood Ins.,
520 F. 2d 11 (3rd Cir., 1975), the Court held that written
notice tendered by a State on behalf of numerous unnamed
property owners who sustained flood damage was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the FTCA notice requirement. The Court
relied heavily on the plain terms of § 2675 in holding that
such terms required separate and individual notice on the
part of each claimant (520 F. 2d at 23-24). And in con-
struing an implementing regulation which, like § 12-309,
permitted a claim to be presented by an authorized agent
of the claimant, the Court held that, without proof of agen-
cy, the notice was invalid (id. at 23).

Similarly, in Blain v. United States, 552 F. 2d 289 (9th
Cir., 1977), the Court considered the sufficiency of a class
type notice as to unnamed individuals whose property was
damaged by a forest fire. In concluding that, under FTCA
standards, the notice was fatally defective as to the unspeci-
fied plaintiffs, the Court emphasized that there was no evi-
dence of any kind to establish an agency relationship be-
tween those filing the notice and these plaintiffs.

More recently, in Lunsford v. United States, —— F. 2d
—— (8th Cir., No. 76-1984, December 31, 1977), a small
number of persons brought an action on behalf of all indi-
viduals who lost their lives and piv »erty as a result of a
flood causing substantial property damage as well as 283
deaths. The Court held that absent individual notice by
identifiiable injured parties or specifie proof that the named
parties acted as their agents, the aplicable FTCA notice
requirement could not be met. See also Harrigan v. United
States, 63 F. R. D. 402 (E. D. Pa., (1974).

The unprecedented class-based notice holding of the
court of appeals is difficult to reconcile with these recent
decisions and plainly rises to a level of importance suffi-
cient to warrant this Court’s review.

24

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the
petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Joun R. RisHer, JR.,
Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Ricuarp W. Barton,
Deputy Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Davi Sutton,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C.

Attorneys for Petitioners,
District Building,
Washington, D! C. 2004
Telephone: 629-3916

APPENDIX A

la

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested
to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Comt of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 75-1975
HONORABLE RONALD V. DELLUMS et al.
Vv.

JAMES M. POWELL, Chief,
United States Capitol Police, et al.

JERRY V. WILSON, Chief, Metropolitan Police Department,
and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLANTS

[DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPEAL]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2271-71)

Argued January 14,1977 | ac,

Decided August 4, 1977 | Had prejudice arisen from failure to disclose the names of
claimants, a result different from that here might be required.
But see note 57 infra.

%In Brown v. District of Columbia, 304 A.2d 292 (D.C.
App. 1973), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that an arrest report was defective as § 309 notice because
it did not disclose any claim of injury. See 304 A.2d at 293.

5? In Hurd v. District of Columbia, 106 A.2d 702 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1954), Mrs. Hurd sued the District for personal injuries
arising from a fall on a sidewalk. Her letter of notice gave an
inaccurate location for the place of the fall. Later, however,
Mrs. Hurd’s attorney recognized the mistake and sent a
letter to.the District’s Inspector of Claims correcting the lo-
cation of the fall. The court held that the second letter, al-
though not sent to the Commissioner of the District as
required by § 309, was nonetheless sufficient to correct inac-
curate information given in the proper notice. See 106 A.2d
at 704-705. Here, proper notice was given to the District of
the claims of 1,200 putative class members, see note 45 supra,
except that the names were left out. We see no reason why,
under Hurd, the arrest reports which the District had had in
its possession since May 5, 1971 could not supplement the
notice filed with the District, even assuming arguendo that
names were required to be disclosed by § 309. Surely the filed
arrest forms are “report[s] in writing by the Metropolitan
Police Department, in regular course of duty” as described
in § 309. Brown v. District of Columbia, supra note 56, is not
to the contrary since the court held there that an arrest
record was defective solely because it did not give notice that

29a

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, wé vacate the judg-
ment entered ager net the District of Columbia defend-
ants for malicious prosecution and for violation of Eighth
Amendment rights. In accord with our mandate in Del-
lums I, we also vacate the damages awarded for viola-
tion of First Amendment rights and remand this facet
of the case for a new trial. In all other respects the
judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

a claim for false arrest was being asserted. Here, the letter
from ACLU Special Counsel filled that void.

Because we conclude that 12 D.C. Code § 309 can be read
consistently with Rule 23, Fep. R. Crv. P., we have no need
to consider the separate argument that § 309 was never in-
tended to apply to constitutional actions. We note, however,
that the District Court has concluded that § 309 is no bar to
a constitutional action, see Order of April 8, 1976 in Lively
v. Cullinane, D. D.C. Civil Action No. 75-0815. This decision
rests heavily on Judge Leventhal’s holding in Sullivan v.
Murphy, supra note 31, 478 F.2d at 971-973, that a District
of Columbia Code provision, 4 D.C. Code § 187 (1973), did
not bar equitable relief of constitutional violations where
there was no indication that Congress intended to reach such
a result.

30a

TAMM, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully dis-
sent for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in
Dellums v. Powell, No. 75-1974 (D.C. Cir. August 4,
1977).

APPENDIX | £

3la
{[Firep Aveust 4, 1977]

JUDGMENT

These causes came on to be heard on the record on ap-
peal from the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia, and were argued by counsel. On considera-
tion thereof, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the
3ZAgment of the District Court appealed from in these
causes is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, in

accordance with the opinion of this Court filed herein this
date.

Peh Curiam
For the Court:

George A. Fisher,
Clerk

“BEST GOPY AVAILABLE i

APPENDIX C

32a
[Fitep Novemser 14, 1977]

ORDER

The suggestion for rehearing en banc filed by appellants
District of Columbia, et al, having been transmitted to the
full Court and no Judge having requested a vote with re-
spect thereto, it is

ORDERED by the Court en banc that appellants’ afore-
said suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.
Per Curiam
For the Court:

George A. Fisher,
Clerk

33a
[Pitep NovemsBer 14, 1977]

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petitions for rehearing filed by
appellees Ronald V. Dellums, et al, and appellants District
of Columbia, et al, it is

ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid petitions for
rehearing are denied.

Per Curiam
For the Court:

George A. Fisher,
Clerk

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0460%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.