# Petition — County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0043%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1978 - **Citation:** 434 U.S. 1064 ## Text *~ Supreme Court, U. S, “TH FiLVED | NOV 14 1977 IN THE Supreme Court of the United SETURL RODAK, JR., CLERK OCTOBER TERM 1977 No.77- GRA COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MONTAUK, INC., Petitioners, We SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Respondent, NATIONAL OCEAN INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION and NEW YORK GAS GROUP, Intervenor-Respondents. PETITION OF COUNTY OF SUFFOLK AND CON. CERNED CITIZENS OF MONTAUK, INC. FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT IrvING LIKE 200 West Main Street Babylon, New York 11702 Telephone: 516—669-3000 Special Counsel for Petitioner County of Suffolk Wiiuiam F. Dupin, JR. Attorney for Petitioner Concerned Citizens of Montauk, Inc. 405 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 Telephone: 212—OX 7-7660 Dated: November 11, 1977 TABLE OF CONTENTS ES tg Fe ee Ne ck aweudh ch bibdekkes i sa sk seek be ones vekessea's Nee ea Veale ee sg. ace ececeeeeusctuece 1. 9 ane Second Circuit Errors Regarding Tanker/ EN EE rd shad Rae:k stock n sb ese 604s Second Cireuit Errors Regarding the Cost/ beso ised ya ANNS be wes bee sda Reasons for Granting the Writ ................... 1. 2. National Importance of the Case ........... Conflict with Supreme Court and other Ap- pellate Deesions regarding Standard of Re- Wee NEE BD BO) ois cc inasavacecesss Conflict with Decisions of the Supreme Court and other Circuits on the Requisites of an Adequate NEPA Administrative Record .... Certiorari Granted in Pendng Case involving Similar Questions Relating to Adequacy of Administrative Record and Scope of Judi- i ce. coc ccikvavenschbeeeerehaedes Conflict with Decisions in other Circuit Courts as to Environmental Divisibility of a Project Subject to NEPA Review ................. 19 21 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CN fo ak ae eee eee eka cuales ee 27 Appendix A—Second Cireuit’s Opinion, August Op a ea ee erarieer werterariers argc a ck: ae Appendix B—District Court’s Opinion, August Pebraary 17, 1077 « .occ cscs cccccesecceccnses Adi Appendix C—Second Circuit Judgment, August i REED .45y cbaseWee sn veRRaS UNS AGRO LOR Awan s A124 Appendix D—Excerpts of George Donkin Testi- IE 6 i ov cbc be ndes'ctucsnnte) coneeuneeesaes A126 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Allied General Nuclear Services, et al. v. NRDC, Docket No. 76-654; 76-762; 76-769; 76-744 ...... 27 Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 Oe RP (I. Cae. TTA) sci ch kak cnseseies’ 22 Chelsea Neighborhood Association v. United States Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975) .... 22 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. Oe CRITE 5a ckc wen wise eeee suns ceecceecen 3, 21, 22 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstetn, eit Be |) BAe re 20 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 Oe THO CURE. GO TURD hic cos ceckeseceesss 22 Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Ine. v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F. 2d 927 (2d Ge SES On rok ee eens laae ks 26 Ely v. Velde, 451 F. 2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1971) ........ 23 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii PAGE Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers (Tombigee Dam), 492 F. 2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974) 22 Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d ee ey ia occ eG oe ae anaee 22 Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Aw thority, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972) .......... 26 International Harvester Company v. Ruckelshaus, 478 B. Sn Wee Rae. ae Be eek Sivcevcedbees svar 22, 23 Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 337 Bee Sie TGs MPa edi eeiwekabeees 26 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) ......... 23 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 saan ee Ce Sk TEE ike oe a ccctentcnceees 22 National Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regu- latory Commission, 539 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1976) reer ee rere oh er er rey 26, 27 National Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Reg- ulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 9 E.R.C. 1149 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1976) (Cert. granted Feb. aa, 1977, 97 B. Ct. 10GB) 2... cc nvccevcvecs 22, 23, 24, 26 New York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1977) ....9, 21, 26 Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) ...... 26 Scientists’ Institute for Public Information v. AEC, Bl F.2a 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 2... ccc eccess 26, 27 Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ........ 23 Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975) 25 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) 20 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. Se I 6 hse bade daducueeades cuss etic 20 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Statutes: PAGE eC TID in bv nxcis do diths Be knsaadee sees esees 24 Se TS SCENES war s-e ccadwaseaunaeeeaseaes 4, 22 Gateway National Recreational Area (16 U.S.C. See. NS ine sak os pan koe unwkik Geena eaaeke nen 11,12 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), ey an WO is OO OUR, bg ns kneed specu desns passim Regulations and Other Authorities: 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Pro- gee RE kL ere err eee 20 CEQ Guidelines, See. 1500.8(a)(4) and (8) ........ 5, 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a) ...... 3, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 21 La Rue, Moore & Schafer, “Calculation of New Oil Costs, United States, years 1959 through 1974.” Dallas, Texas: Petroleum Consultants (May 1, rr rer re es Sey ems 17 In THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM 1977 No. 77- - . County oF SUFFOLK AND CONCERNED CITIZENS OF Montauk, Inc., Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Respondent, NaTionaL Ocean Insivsrries ASSOCIATION AND New York Gas Grovp, Intervenor-Respondents. -% aa PETITION OF COUNTY OF SUFFOLK AND CON- CERNED CITIZENS OF MONTAUK, INC. FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT This petition for certiorari arises out of the Second Cir- cuit’s reversal on August 25, 1977 of a decision by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York rendered February 17, 1977 voiding certain off- shore oil leases sold by the Secretary of the Interior in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and enjoining further activities on the leases until the environmental impacts thereof are properly evalu- ated under NEPA by the Secretary. The leases are for 2 exploration and production of oil and gas on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Sale 40 area in the Baltimore Canyon area off New Jersey and below Long Island. Sale 40 is the first in the Mid-Atlantic OCS area. It involves 154 tracts, comprising an area of 867,750 acres, a potential of 50 oil producing platforms, more than 1,000 wells and 450 miles of offshore pipelines, increased oil tanker traffic as well as massive onshore petro-chemical and other support facilities. Thus, the Second Circuit’s reversal clears the way for profound and irrevocable alteration of the Mid-Atlantic seascape and landscape de- spite the admittedly unresolved major risk of oil pollution to the Atlantic fishing grounds, and the risk of oil fouling of ocean beaches and parks and other grievous environ- mental impacts in America’s most densely populated coastal area. Opinions Below The Second Circuit’s opinion of August 25, 1977 is set forth in Appendix A to the Petition (unofficially reported 10 Environment Reporter Cases (E.R.C.) 1513.* *The judgment of the Second Circuit is set forth in Appen- dix C. Prior opinions forming the historical background of this liti- gation are: 1. The District Court’s decision dated August 13, 1976, preliminarily enjoining Sale 40, scheduled for August 17, 1976. (9 E.R.C. 1769) 2. The Second Cireuit’s opinion dated August 16, 1976 (9 E.R.C. 1793), staying enforcement of District Court’s pre- liminary injunction. 3. The Supreme Court’s opinion dated August 19, 1976 (by Cireuit Justice Marshall) (50 L. Ed.2d 38) declining to vacate the Second Cireuit’s stay of enforcement of the District Court’s preliminary injunction. 4. The Second Circuit's opinion on October 14, 1976 (9 E.R.C. 1794) reversing the District Court’s preliminary in- junction order. 3 The District Court’s opinion of February 17, 1977 is set forth in Appendix B. (9 E.R.C. 1798) Jurisdiction Petitioner’s motion dated September 12, 1977 to stay issuance of the mandate of the Second Cireuit pending application to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, was denied by Order of the Second Circuit dated October 4, 1977. This Petition for certiorari is being filed within the prescribed ninety days after August 25, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1). Questions Presented 1. Whether the Second Circuit erroneously substituted the “rule of reason” for the “clearly erroneous” rule (Rule d2a, F.R. Civ. Proc.) to justify its de novo review and re- versal of the District Court’s evidentiary findings on the inadequacy of the Secretary’s environmental evaluation. 2. Whether the Second Circuit misapplied Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), in denying the power of the District Court to review and find arbitrary, the Secretary’s decision, which is based on an incomplete and defective administrative record, contain- ing grossly erroneous cost-benefit data relied on by the Secretary in authorizing Sale 40, which data was unsup- ported and unexplained and was not even circulated to the public as required by NEPA. 3. Whether the Second Circuit erred in validating the Sale 40 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) despite its recognition of the EIS’s “apparent failure to deal as thor- oughly with some environmental consequences of trans- 4 portation (of Sale 40 oil) as might be hoped” on the assumptions (unsupported by the EIS) that Sale 40 is environmentally divisible and that the Secretary has the power to and will at some undetermined future date deal thoroughly with the oil transportation problem. Statutes Involved The statutes involved are: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 706 (2) ; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 4332. Statement of the Case The Sale 40 Draft EIS was published on December 10, 1975. The Sale 40 Final EIS was released on May 25, 1976. Neither contained a cost/benefit analysis; the Final EIS noted that a cost/benefit analysis would be provided in a separate Sale 40 Program Decision Option Document (PDOD) prepared for the Secretary. A separate Sale 40 PDOD was drafted and received by the Secretary on June 22, 1976. It was not circulated for public comment. In three pages of tables it estimated: a) the low and high case timetable of oil and gas development ; b) the acreage, facilities and equipment expected to develop the Sale 40 resources; and c) the investment costs for low and high cases. The PDOD did not explain, docu- ment or support the estimates and the assumptions under- lying the estimates and simply attributed the sources of its information to the United States Geological Survey, and the Atlantic Offshore Operator’s Committee (a petroleum industry organization). The cost-benefit data was not attached to the Environ- mental Impact Statement for Sale 40 (or otherwise 5 circulated) as recommended by the Guidelines of the Council of Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. See. 1500.8 (a)(8), although the Seeond Cireuit Court mistakenly as- sumed it was attached. (Appendix A, A30) The PDOD did not set forth responsible opposing views as to Sale 40 costs and benefits held by the relevant technical community. On June 30, 1976, the Secretary announced his decision to hold Sale 40 on August 17, 1976. County of Suffolk, and others challenged this decision by moving for & pre- liminary injunction. Discovery was expedited and the ease was set for hearing on the earliest possible date the, parties could be ready. Subsequently, Respondent National Ocean Industries Associates together with eleven of its members, and the New York Gas Group, intervened as defendants. Evidentiary hearings consumed three weeks. Many distinguished experts testified for both sides. The attorneys worked days, nights and weekends to speed the trial because of the need for a prompt decision compelled by the August 17, 1976 sale date. On August 13, 1976 the District Court issued its decision preliminarily enjoining Sale 40. Its opinion concluded that the Secretary's decision violated NEPA and insufficiently analyzed environmental dangers because the Final EIS and PDOD inadequately assessed the impact of state and local decisions on a) whether pipelines or tankers would be used to bring the oil ashore, and b) where onshore facilities could be located. Respondents then moved in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for a stay of enforcement of the District Court’s preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit, forced to act on August 16, 1976, the eve of the sale, granted the motion, ruling that the sale in and of itself would not cause the petitioners any irreparable injury. On the following day, August 17, 1976, the petitioners applied to Cireuit Justice Marshall to vacate the stay. He declined to dissolve the stay. In his opinion of August 19, 6 1976 he noted that he only had a few hours to review the District Court’s opinion, the briefs of the parties and the four-volume EIS, and that he did not have nor could he meaningfully have considered the voluminous record com- piled in the District Court. Mr. Justice Marshall found plaintiffs would not be irreparably injured if the Secretary were permitted to open bids, but if the government were to make an irreversible commitment of resources without preparing an adequate impact statement, this would con- stitute irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief. He made clear that invalidation of any resultant leases was a very real possibility should plaintiffs prevail on the merits, In a brief opinion on October 14, 1976, the Second Cir- cuit reversed the District Court’s preliminary injunction order, holding that petitioners had not demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm between the date of the preliminary hearing and the trial, and that on its re- view of the record concerning the NEPA violation found by the District Court, there was some doubt whether peti- tioners would succeed on the merits at the trial. Respond- ents were advised that by proceeding with leasing prior to a final determination, they assumed the risk of an ultimate adverse decision. After further pre-trial hearing and discovery, a trial on the merits was held before District Judge Jack B. Wein- stein, at which all parties introduced extensive additional proof. Twelve hundred pages of new testimony were taken and numerous additional documents were received in evi- dence. In all, a total of 4,043 pages of testimony were taken, 32 witnesses were heard, 273 documents were re- ceived and the affidavits and proffers of proof for a sub- stantial number of other persons considered, The following disputed factual questions were decided by the District Court: | a) whether sufficient meaningful information was available to the Secretary at the EIS Sale 40 stage 7 with which to project likely and feasible pipeline routes to shore; b) whether such information could be used to assess the impact of state and local regulatory powers on the environmental and economic consequences of the Sale 40 ; ¢) was such information essential to the Secretary’s cost-benefit analysis of Sale 40; d) was Sale 40 a unitary «project without separate controlled arrangement for pipeline /tanker transpor- tation problems via a Development Plan EIS and the Secretary’s retained regulatory powers; e) whether despite meaningful information readily available to him, the Secretary’s cost/benefit analysis was so grossly inaccurate and defective as to preclude him, as the trustee and fiduciary of the public interest OCS resources, from making an informed evaluation of Sale 40 in comparison with the possible alternatives; f) whether the Secretary failed to meaningfully con- sider alternatives such as the separation of explora- tion and production; g) whether the pre-Sale 40 historical evidence of the Secretary’s ‘‘firm’’ commitment to proceed with Mid- Atlantie OCS leasing considered in conjunction with the Secretary’s failure to adequately assess the vitally linked tanker/pipeline, cost/benefit alternatives and other critical NEPA issues—justified a finding that the NEPA review was a charade. The District Court’s second opinion (Appendix B) ren- dered February 17, 1977, on the evidence, found all of the subsequent questions of fact in the affirmative, and ac- cordingly, enjoined further activities pursuant to the leases sold in August 1976, and declared the leases null and void. . a 8 | 9 The opinion, (which included Appendices totalling 36 While there was substantial evidence that the Sec- pages® listing the witnesses and exhibits considered by the retary’s decision was not based upon a good faith con- Court), concluded that the massive new evidentiary record sideration of relevant NEPA documents, but on served to confirm and expand the bases of the Court’s decisions made privately and in advance of public earlier tentative conclusion in its decision of August 13, hearings, we find it unnecessary to make any such 1976 that NEPA had been violated. The Court sum- finding. It is enough for purposes of this proceeding marized the factual findings for its conclusion that NEPA to detail the abstract and misleading aspects of the had been violated in a number of respects, as follows: operative NEPA documents that prevented any realis- tic appraisal of either environmental dangers or the effects of local governmental licensing, permitting, and practical advantages and disadvantages that would result from the specific Sale 40 leases. Each of the review powers in the NEPA documents; (2) failed to . ; consider the environmental impact of specific probable inadequacies, considered below in detail, constitutes a violation of both the letter and spirit of NEPA and pipeline routes from the outer continental shelf, in Hay , . os spite of the fact that projection of such routes is rou- requires rescission of the Secretary's leasing decision. We find that the Secretary (1) ignored the practical tinely made by industry ? , caggeeno vee the ear, ab ee ap can air have ori —_ re! On August 25, 1977, the Second Circuit handed down its sail. oil and vas iad ag a an apna opinion (Appendix A) reversing the District Court’s in- and gas p on for Sale and signifi- junction decision. cantly understated the cost of such production, inelud- ing pipeline construction; this resulted in a serious lack of consideration of the likelihood and attendant dan- gers of increased tanker traffic and an overestimate of the net value of the entire project; (4) failed to con- sider the possible impact of particular tract-selection choices on the feasibility and sites of pipelines; there was no consideration of the alternatives of either ex- cluding industry-preferred tracts, or including less highly desired tracts in the final sale offer because of In an unusual usurpation of the District Court’s fact finding functions, as applied to a massive fact intensive evidentiary record containing much sharply disputed live and expert testimony from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the Second Circuit proceeded ad seriatim to burrow into the record,’ review the evidence and to ap- praise and set aside each of the District Court’s factual findings. In doing so, it violated Rule 52(a) that District Court findings (particularly as to disputed issues of evi- related onshore impacts and developments; and (5) = Oo Before: MansFIELD, Circuit Judge, Smitu, Chief Judge,° and Paumiert, District Judge.** ~~ = Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jack B. Weinstein, Judge, voiding leases made by the Secretary of the Interior of an area of the Atlantic Continental Shelf known as Sale 40 for failure to comply with the require- ments of §102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). Reversed. tenia i or Irvine Lrxg, Special Counsel for County of Suf- folk, Babylon, N.Y. (Patricia A. Dempsey, Attorney, Richard C. Hand, Esq., Babylon, N.Y., of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee County of Suffolk. WiuiaM GiteLMan, County Attorney of Nassau County, Mineola, N.Y. (John F. Picciano, Deputy County Attorney, Mineola, N.Y., of a Of the United States District Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. ee Of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 5522 | -A3- Appendiz A. counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee County of Nassau. Wau F. Duping, Jr., Esq., New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellee Concerned Citizens of Montauk, Inc. J. CHRISTOPHER JENSEN, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y., Joun J. Z1mMeER- MAN, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (David G. Trager, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Bernard J. Fried, Cyril Hyman, Assistant United States Attorneys, Brook- lyn, N.Y., Lawrence R. Hoese, Attorney, De- partment of Interior, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Federal Defendants-Appel- lants, Jon M. Kaurman, Esq., New York, N.Y. (Kom- mel, Rogers, Kaufman, Lorber & Shenk- ‘ man, Sarah Chasis, Attorney, Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Plaintiff-A ppellée Na- tural Resources Defense Council, Inc. E. Epwarp Bruce, Esq., Washington, D.C. (Mark D. Nozette, Esq., Covington & Burl- ing, Washington, D.C., Gene W. Lafitte, Esq., J. Berry St. John, Jr., Esq., Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, La., George A. Bur- rell, Esq., New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants National Ocean Industries Association, et al. Sugarman & Sterno, New York, N.Y. (Robert L. Clare, Jr., Esq., W. Foster Wollen, Esq., Joseph T. McLaughlin, Esq., Kenneth M: 5523 -A4- Appendtx A. Kramer, Esq., New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Amici Curiae Exxon Corp., Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil, Shell Oil; Robert M. Perry, Esq., Houston, Texas, of counsel for Exxon Corp.; James A. Boone, Esq., A. Paul Brandimarte, Jr., Esq., New Orleans, La., of counsel for Gulf Oil Corp.; E. M. Sutter, Esq., R. B. Shaw, Esq., New Orleans, La., of counsel for Shell Oil Corp.; Arthur Ait- kens, Esq., New York, N.Y., of counsel for Mobil Oil Corp. Baxer & Borts, Washington, D.C. (Gordon Gooch, Esq., John P. Mathis, Esq., Thomas B. Hudson, Esq., Washington, D.C.; Gray Castle, General Counsel, John T. Rafferty, Esq., NL Industries, Inc., New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Amicus Curiae NL Indus- tries, Inc. Davip J. Mucnow, General Counsel, American Gas Association, Arlington, Va. (Kevin B. Belford, Assistant General Counsel, Arling- ton, Va., of counsel), for Amicus Curiae American Gas Assoctation. Wiuticox, Prrozzoto & McCarrxy, Boston, Mass. (Jack R. Pirozzolo, Esq., Richard F. Mce- Carthy, Esq., Boston, Mass., of counsel), for Amicus Curiae New England Council. RoseNMAN Cotin FrReuND Lewis & Conen, New York, N.Y. (Samuel H. Lindenbaum, Eszq., Martin S. Baker, Esq., Thomas J. DeZure, Esq., New York, N.Y., of counsel), for Amicus Curiae Association For A Better New York, Inc. 5524 — Appendiz A. Vinson & Exins, Washington, D.C. (Rush Moody, Jr., Esq., Michael J. Henke, Esq., Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Amicus Curtae The Business Roundtable. Stantey C. Van Ness, Public Advocate of the State of New Jersey, Trenton, N.J. (Robert P. Corman, Assistant Deputy Public Ad- voeate, Division of Public Interest o . . e * (1166) * * * Q. What’s the basis for that assumption? Exploratory wells are included as an investment capital cost and you’ve admitted and agreed, I believe, that ex- ploration (1167) overhead costs are not capital costs in an economic— A. The FTC treats them as investments (1169) A. The development of my exhibit assumes a certain production-to-reserves ratio by year of production. Q. Yes, that’s what I mean. It does assume a—your exhibit does. A. Yes, and that’s shown here. Now, I’m aware that in the Gulf of Mexico there are reservoirs that will produce 15 percent of their reserves in a given year. Then you have a much faster rate of decline thereafter, and believe me, I did it several ways. You can change the assumption any way you want to, but the results are going to be the same. A129 Appendiz D. You will not be able to reach peak production in 1989 as long as you are bringing them on in 1981. (1174) * * * A. Yes, sir, but the results will remain the same. If you increase the per year of production to 12 percent and keep it constant for three years and then drop it down, you're still going to come up with the same results. You can’t make, in the high case—there is no way you can increase 3,000—3,080,000 mef per day— Mr. Lafitte: I’m sorry. A. —in 1989, if you are going to produce a billion cubic feet a day in 1985 and 240,000 mef per day in ’83, ete. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0043%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.