# Petition — Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 1064

## Text

i “~ Supreme Court, U. a
) FILED
tt- 67 1 NOV 10 j977
K, JR., CLERK
ee . ae
In THE
_ Supreme Court of the United States
Es easieinbiiinss
Detta Ar Lives, Ino.,
Petitioner,
v.
Unrrep Srates or AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Grorce N. ToMpxKINs, JR.
Counsel for Petitioner

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

PAGE

NN I aa aesesinnianienanions 1
PRES ENGR SIPEG SRF CON RE RE ERO 2
I I a bteceecetnanniasiniameioh 2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... +
EERE Ee eT DOO NT TD 5
NY PIII isda csictaealacetla ieielaanceeas thaaidaninsithieatniiciiaiten 5

B. Dispositions in the Courts Below 2.000000... 6
Reasons for Granting the Writ 00.00.0000. 10

I. The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted and Mis-
applied the Clearly Erroneous Standard for
Appellate Review Set Forth in Federal Rule of
Ciwil Prece@ere GB(a) —~...ncccecececeoecees-- SE eh 11

A. Causation Is a Question of Ultimate Fact ...... 12

B. The District Court’s Clearly Erroneous Find-
ing of No Negligence Tainted the Ultimate
Finding of No Causation ...........................00-0-..-. 15

C. The District Court Did Not Apply the Cor-
rect Legal Standard for Determining Proxi-
SE ceil iclasiniabacisttetticclcicediiphinsistcibesciasniess 19

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Has Effectively
Denied Petitioner Due Process of Law ................ 24

il

PAGE

III. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is in Con-
flict With a Decision of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit —.00000000222... 28
or scandens videsaribteesteemnendtiiiaelaniaeidetteiadtiat st Ea 30
ey ar ee ~ ee seessselaiianenshiseiadaiacsumnass 31

TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Addison v. Green Cafe, Inc., 84 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1949)
23n.13

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) 000... 25, 26

Ashland Oi & Refining Co. v. Kenny Construction Co.,
BOG F’.Sd GBS (Gths Cir. 19GB) cence cccosenncceeseneee 14n.11

Baumgartner vy. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944)...... 12

Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955)

14n.11
Cordovan Associates, Inc, v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290

og 8 Lt RUNES esp eas econ 14

Crosby v. United States, 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974)
14n.11

Dickens v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 845 (S.D. Texas
ERNE LEA . Wee OVINE Ak CART ha as aA EE in 18
Ford vy. Flaherty, 305 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 1973) ............ 6n.5
Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962) 0000. peers 22

Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968),
reversing 249 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965) _...00...... 17n.12

ili
PAGE
Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) ......... a 18

Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974)....21, 27
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.

1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) ~............. 10, 28, 29
Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967) ............ 22, 27
Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001

Nl elas 23n.13

Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 360
F.2d 774 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966)
14n.11
McMaster v. United States, No. 76-1270 (1st Cir. 1977) 11
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (1st

ales ESE VR Oey Sa ee 23n.13
Morrison vy. Medaglia, 287 Mass. 46, i191 N.E. 133
fier AES Ge a0 SRY: RR 23n.13
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) _....22222... eee 11n.10
Official Creditors’ Committee of Fox Markets, Inc. v.
Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1964) 2.000002... 14n.11
Owen v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co. of New
York, 211 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1954) 20... 14n.11

Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d
736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 919 (1958) ...... 14n.11
Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
RIES AEA eee a ee one Fn 21, 27

Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970) ... 18

Todd v. United States, 384 F.Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla.
REESE Te Oe en cee ee 18

iv
PAGE

United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp.,
377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir, 1967), rev’d on other grounds,

Re ST), NL 14n.11
United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353
th SR) 5 OMIT 13, 21
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
CT) occesccsensinnssocesentnsisnenstnssmsaiiimmamaamans ae 14, 21
United States v. John J. Felin d Co., 334 U.S. 624
CRE) cceccevxesnsseicscoesiensszesnisencbesiannaaiaianan 13
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960)
13, 21
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S.
BEG (TRGB) a ecaccceccecscesecsnaseqsissiniesienspessunsnnniannninannnnn 13, 21
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.
BOT) necceccecesensoesesesessssusisasnscnensiananiinsaananiaiiantnn 14n.11
Whalen v. Shivek, 93 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1950) ........... 23n.13
White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) _...... 24
William G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829
(GER Che. BGT). cacccecccciesconcesonsctusnnsnseniannesnn 22, 27
Other Authorities:
Pap. B. Cov. BP. GB(G) eencesesecese passim
Mass. Gen. Laws, Chapter 231B §§1, 2 000000000... 2n.2, 7,19
Mass. Gen. Laws. Chapter 231B §$1, 2) 20000... 2n.2, 7,19
mis Co | EN 5
UB. Comae. Asem. VY oncccccecccesccsmsussesie 4
Federal Tort Claims Act,
IS Come) nna 2n.2
iP Coe | en 5
BB UBS. GRGBA(T) nececcecenesssserssnmenneseneeeene 2
BB UBD. GRIGG cccccccesssessscnsssisiieensviimsnnaanane 2,5

—_—_—_—

OTE CO TNs Lee ——

Iw THE

Supreme Court of the United States

a

Detra Are Lives, Ixc.,
Petitioner,

Vv.

Unirep States or AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Petitioner’ prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Cireuit entered in this case on August 12, 1977.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not reported,
either officially or unofficially; it is printed in the Appendix
to this Petition at pages la-33a.

The opinion of the District Court is reported at 412
F. Supp. 959 (D. Mass. 1976) and is printed in the Ap-
pendix at pages 34a-121a.

1 Hereinafter referred to either as Petitioner or Delta.

to

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
August 12, 1977. Appendix at p. 122a. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Questions Presented

Petitioner brought this action against the United States?
to recover contribution towards the damages paid by Delta
to the estates of passengers killed in an aircraft accident
which occurred in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973.
In numerous actions brought against Delta by the estates of
the deceased passengers, all of which were consolidated in
the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407,
Delta did not contest its liability for negligence. Pursuant
te the Massachusetts law on contribution among joint tort-
feasors, however, Delta pursued this action against the
United States claiming that the air traffic controllers em-
ployed by the United States were negligent in the handling
of the Delta aircraft and that this negligence contributed
to the accident.*

After a nonjury trial,‘ the District Court found that the
air traffic controllers were not negligent and that the sole
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the

* Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671,
et seq. and Mass. General Laws, Chapter 231 B §§ 1, 2.

>The Massachusetts contribution statute provides that the rela-
tive degrees of fault of joint tortfeasors shall not be considered in
determining the pro rata shares of the tortfeasors in the total lia-
bility. Mass. Gen. Laws Anno. §2. Since Delta did not contest its
liability to the estates of the passengers as a joint tortfeasor, the
only question before the District Court for resolution at the trial
was the alleged liability of the United States.

* As required by 28 U.S.C. §1346(b).

——— a

3

‘Delta pilot and co-pilot. Without articulating any legal

standard or applicable law for determining the question of
causation, the District Court also held that the allegedly
negligent acts of the air traffic controllers, even if they had
been proven, did not proximately cause or contribute to
the accident. Judgment, therefore, was entered for the
United States.

The Court of Appeals held that the finding of the District
Court that the air traffic controllers were not negligent
was “clearly erroneous” and further held that the United
States, through its air traffic controller employees, had
been substantially and unjustifiably negligent in failing to
render to Delta the air traffic control services mandated
by the Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual of the Federal
Aviation Administration. The Court of Appeals held,
however, that the ultimate finding of the District Court,
that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the Delta flight crew, was a question of fact
and was not “clearly erroneous”; the judgment for the
United States was affirmed accordingly.

The questions presented, therefore, are:

1. Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and
its clearly erroneous test may be applied in review-
ing the ultimate finding of causation where:

(a) the Court of Appeals determines that the Dis-
trict Court’s factual findings as to a prerequi-
site, interrelated and dispositive issue were
clearly erroneous; and

(b) the District Court did not apply the correct
standard of law to the issue of causation.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
“clearly erroneous” rule to an ultimate issue of fact

4

despite holdings of the Court and in other Circuit

Courts to the contrary.

3. Whether the petitioner was deprived of due process
of law where no trier of fact or reviewing court,
applying the correct legal standard for proximate
cause, made a finding as to whether the proven neg-
ligence of the United States caused or contributed to
the accident.

4. Whether the courts below erred in failing to apply
a federal rule of contribution and indemnity as among
joint tortfeasors to the claims of Delta against the
United States.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

FirtH AMENDMENT TO THE Unitep States ConstTITUTION

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.

U.S. Const. amend V.

FeperaL Rue or Crviz Procepure 52(a)
FINDINGS BY THE CouRT

(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly er-

5

roneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-
portunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses...

Fep. R. Crv. P. 52(a).

Statement of the Case
A. The Facts

On July 31, 1973 at approximately 11:08 a.m., a Delta
DC-9 aireraft crashed while making an instrument landing
system (ILS) approach to Runway 4R at Logan Inter-
national Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. The 83 pas-
sengers on the aircraft died in the crash, as did the 5 crew
members and a Delta cockpit observer.

Lawsuits were filed against Delta in various District
Courts by the estates of the passengers. Eventually, these
suits were transferred to the District of Massachusetts by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1407. 395 F. Supp. 1405. Delta did not contest
its liability for negligence to the estates of the passengers
and, eventually, all cases were disposed of by Delta by way
of settlement or trial on damages only. Delta sued the
United States for contribution and indemnity for these
amounts, as well as for the loss of the aircraft.

Prior to the commencement of the trial against the
United States, the District Court held that Delta was not
entitled to contribution or indemnity with respect to any
action brought against Delta by the estate of a passenger
pursuant to the Massachusetts death statute since that
statute was considered to be punitive in nature and the
United States is not liable, under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, for punitive damages. 28 U.S.C. §2674. The District
Court further dismissed all claims for indemnity in the
cases brought under the death statutes of other states

6

since the law of Massachusetts does not recognize a right
to indemnity in favor of a tort feasor who is guilty of ac-
tive negligence.® The only issues, therefore, that were the
subject of the nonjury trial before the District Court were
the claims of Delta for contribution pursuant to the Massa-
chusetts contribution statute and for the loss of the air-
craft. Delta contended at this trial that the air traffie con-
troller was negligent in failing to render required serv-
ices to the Delta flight crew and that this negligence was a
contributing cause of the accident for which the United
States should be held liable for contribution under Massa-

chusetts law.

B. Dispositions in the Courts Below
1. The District Court. The District Court held:

The plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a fair
preponderance of the credible evidence that a duty of
eare to them existed on the part of ATC,’ that ATC
negligently breached that duty, and that such breach
was, in whole or in part, a proximate cause of the
erash.

On all the credible evidence I find that plaintiffs
have failed to sustain their burden. I rule that plain-
tiffs have not proven by a preponderance either that
ATC personnel were negligent or that the conduct of
ATC, however characterized, was a proximate cause of
the crash either in whole or in any part.

I find that the sole and exclusive cause of the ac-
cident was the negligence of the pilot and copilot of
D 723.

412 F.Supp. at 998, App. at pps. 115a-116a.

’ Ford v. Flaherty, 305 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 1973).
§ Air Traffic Control.
\

~~

7

In evaluating the evidence, the District Court failed
to articulate the legal standards that it was bound to
apply to the facts. As to the issue of causation, the Dis-
trict Court never articulated any test for causation what-
soever. Rather, throughout its opinion the District Court
appeared to be weighing the evidence in order to deter-
mine whether any individual action of the Government
was the proximate cause of the accident,’ as opposed to
whether any such action was a contributing cause to the
accident.

Under the Massachusetts contribution statute, Chapter
231 B, §$1, 2 Massachusetts General Laws, a court is
prohibited from considering the relative degrees of fault
of concurrent tortfeasors. The District Court, however, con-
tinually compared and contrasted the negligence of peti-
tioner to that of the United States air traffic controllers
(ATC). This resulted in the failure of the District Court to
determine whether the ATC negligence was a cause of the
accident for, as can be seen in the above cited conclusion,
the District Court determined that the negligence of peti-
tioner was the sole canse of the accident.

What the District Court did determine was: (1) that the
air traffic controllers had no duty to provide the information
and services in question to petitioner, 412 F.Supp. at 976,
App. at p. 64a; (2) that the information and services to
be provided were, at best, “third priority” services, Id. at
976, 989-991, App. at p. 64a; and (3) that the controller in-

7 On the precise issue of causation resulting from the cumulative
negligent failures of ATC, the crucial passage appears at 412
F.Supp. 983 where the District Court concludes:

I do not find . . . that the proximate cause of this crash was
the alleged negligence of ATC. (emphasis added).

Yet this was clearly not the correct standard for determining
the issue of whether the failure of ATC to render these services
contributed to the accident.

8

volved was entirely justified in failing to perform these
functions, Id. at 989-991, App. at pps. 97a-98a.

2. The Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
that the District Court’s finding that the United States
was not negligent was clearly erroneous. The Court of
Appeals found that: (1) the United States had a duty, set
forth in the Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual, to pro-
vide the services in question to petitioner; (2) the air traffic
controller failed to meet this duty because of “a substantial
and unjustified failure to follow procedures made manda-
tory by the Manual”; and (3) this failure was not justified
by the controller’s other duties inasmuch as he “admitted
that he had simply forgotten about D[elta Flight] 723.”
App. at p. 25a. In the section of the Court of Appeals’
opinion devoted to reviewing the District Court’s finding
of no negligence as to the United States, the Court of Ap-
peals also stated:

The fact that the procedures here in question are
made mandatory by the Government indicates not only
that they are not to be treated casually but that pilots
may rely on their being followed. Moreover, it is clear
from all the testimony that the three omissions by
Mr. Taylor contributed to an increased cockpit work-
load. We therefore cannot treat Mr. Taylor’s lapses
as trivial. Pilots and passengers alike are entitled to
expect better service from the air traffic control
system and, although pilots are undoubtedly respon-
sible for the safety of their aircraft, controllers are
concurrently responsible for adhering to procedures
which minimize the difficulties for the crew.

App. at p. 23a (emphasis added).

9

[NJone of the witnesses could recall an instance where
all of the services not given to D 723 were similarly
withheld from another flight.

App. at p. 19a.

The Court of Appeals then turned to the causation issue
and held that it must apply the “clearly erroneous” rule
to this finding of the District Court. For the first and only
time in this lawsuit, a court briefly addressed the legal
standard for proximate cause. The Court of Appeals held
that the legal standard to be applied was that embodied in
§431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Though the
Court of Appeals cited a Massachusetts case, no Massa-
chusetts court has ever adopted the Restatement test.®
More significantly, the District Court, in its opinion, never
used any of the terms which symbolize and inhere in the
Restatement test. The Court of Appeals not only did not
comment on the fact th. * the District Court had not artieu-
lated any standard, it failed entirely to explain or justify
why it, the Court of Appeals, was employing a different
standard.

Nonetheless, having articulated a test, the Court of
Appeals did not apply it to the facts of the case in order
to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence
established causation, Somewhat reluctantly,’ the Court
of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s finding of
no causation was not clearly erroneous.

*It is significant that the Massachusetts standard of proximate
eause had been fully and accurately set out in the briefs before
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. See infra n.13.

*The Court of Appeals stated, with regard to some of the Gov-
ernment’s negligence and its causative relationship to the accident,
that it found the matter “troublesome.” App. at p. 31a.

10

Reasons for Granting the Writ

wThis case presents a matter of utmost importance to
this Court in the proper interpretation and application of
the “clearly erroneous” standard for appellate review set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The mis-
interpretation and misapplication of the standard, in re-
viewing the findings and decision of the District Court, has
caused the Court of Appeals to reach an ultimate decision
which is, inherently and basically, wrong. This misappli-
eation of the “clearly erroneous” standard for appellate
review has deprived petitioner Delta of due process.

There is compelling need, in the national interest of
uniformity in the treatment and resolution of litigation
arising out of aviation disasters, for the adoption of a
federal rule of comparative negligence, such as the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted in Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975). This case presents a clear situation
where the Kohr rule should be applied in determining the
relative responsibility of the United States for an avia-
tion accident where the clear negligence of an air traffic
controller employed by the United States has been estab-
lished by the evidence.

11

I.

The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted and Misapplied
the Clearly Erroneous Standard for Appellate Review
Set Forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

The Court of Appeals applied the “clearly erroneous”
standard in affirming the ultimate decision of the District
Court that there was no causation established as to the
United States.’® This interpretation of Rule 52(a) and the
application of the “clearly erroneous” rule to the District
Court’s finding of no causation was fatally wrong because:
(A) the challenged finding was one of “ultimate fact” and,
therefore, the clearly erroneous standard was inapplicable;
(B) the District Court’s clearly erroneous factual findings
of no negligence tainted its “finding” of no causation; and
(C) the Court of Appeals apparently believed that the
District Court had applied the wrong legal test for deter-
mining causation.

In most cases, review by the Court can only be based
on the decision appealed from and the language contained
therein. The reasoning and bases for the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals are entitled to a favorable construc-
tion by the Court. However, after the appellate decision
in this case, individual plaintiff-appellants, in a companion
ease of McMaster v. United States, No. 76-1270 (1st Cir.
1977) filed a petition for rehearing. In a brief Memoran-
dum and Order Denying Rehearing (App. pps. 123a to

*® This Court’s informal “two-court” rule with regard to factual
findings is not applicable to the questions presented. Petitioner
is not challenging the findings of fact below per se, but, rather.
whether the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the “clearly
erroneous” rule to such findings. If this Court concludes that the
“elearly erroneous” standard was properly applied, petitioner
agrees that this Court’s “two-court” rule is applicable. Neil vy.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

12

125a), the Court of Appeals revealed, to an unusual extent,
the thought processes and the points in the District Court’s
opinion on which it relied in reaching the decision sought
to be reviewed herein. This second opinion provides the
Court with an insight into the original decision and deci-
sively points to the erroneous interpretation of Rule 52(a)
made by the Court of Appeals.

A. Causation Is a Question of Ultimate Fact.

In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944),
the Court provided its most detailed explanation of findings
of fact:

The phrase “finding of fact” may be a summary
characterization of complicated factors of varying
significance for judgment. Such a “finding of fact”
may be the ultimate judgment on a mass of details in-
volving not merely an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of witnesses but other appropriate inferences
that may be drawn from living testimony which elude
print. The conclusiveness of a “finding of fact” de-
pends on the nature of the materials on which the find-
ing is based. The finding even of a so-called “sub-
sidiary fact” may be a more or less difficult process
varying according to the simplicity or subtlety of the
type of “fact” in controversy. Finding so-called ul-
timate “facts” more clearly implies the application of
standards of law. And so the “finding of fact” even if
made by two courts may go beyond the determination
that should not be set aside here. Though labeled
“finding of fact,” it may involve the very basis on
which judgment of fallible evidence is to be made.
Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be drawn
from the whole mass of evidence is not always the

13

ascertainment of the kind of “fact” that precludes con-
sideration by this Court.

322 U.S. 670-671.

The Court repeatedly has adhered to this position. For
instance. in reviewing a decision of the Court of Claims,
the Court stated: ,

There are facts and facts, even in Court of Claims’
litigation. It is the function of the Court of Claims
to make findings. But when a judgment based on such
findings is here brought in question it is the function
of this Ceurt to ascertain the meaning of the findings
in order to determine their legal significance. ... Where
the conclusion is a “composite of fact and law,” Cedar
Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 US 655,
668, 56 L ed 594, 604, 32 S Ct 389, this Court may
certainly hold that as a matter of law the findings are
erroneous. ,

United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 at 639-40
(1948).

Other decisions of the Court have reached this conelusion
where it has been determined that the ultimate finding
reached may have been undermined by the application of
an improper legal standard. Under such circumstances,
the error is one of law and hence, freely reviewable. In
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174
(1963), the Court stated:

Insofar as that conclusion derived from the [district]
court’s application of an improper standard to the
facts, it may be corrected as a matter of law.

374 U.S. at 194n.9. To the same extent see United States vy.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598 n.28
(1957); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,

14

43-44 (1960); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S, 127, 142 n.16 (1966).

A clear statement of this principle is in Cordovan Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Dayton Rubber Co., 290 F.2d 858 (6th Cir.

1961) :

Where a finding designated as a finding of fact is not
in reality a finding of fact, but is a conclusion of law
or a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law, it is
not binding on the appellate court. [citations omitted]
Where a finding is of an ultimate fact in the making of
which is involved the application of legal principles,
it is subject to review.

290 F.2d at 860."

In its Memorandum and Order Denying Rehearing
(hereinafter “second opimion”) the Court of Appeals
states:

We add that we were of course not unaware that the
legal standards applicable to issues of negligence and
proximate cause may present issues of law; still, the
basic issue here remains the court’s factual evaluation
of the connection, or lack thereof, between controller’s
conduct and the crash.

App. at p. 125a.

11 See, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460-61 (6th
Cir. 1973); United Artists Television, Inc. vy. Fortnightly Corp.,
377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 392 U.S. 390
(1968) ; Mamiye Bros. v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 360 F.2d
774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966 ) : Perfectform Corp.
v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d 736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 919 (1958); Owen v. Commercial Union Fire Insurance Co.
of New York, 211 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Crosby v. United
States, 496 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Ashland Oil & Refining Co.
v. Kenny Construction Co., 395 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1966) : Chandler
v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Official Creditors’
Committee of Fox Markets, Inc. v. Ely, 337 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.
1964).

15

Thus, the Court of Appealr concedes that the issue of
causation may involve questions of law and fact, some
of which may properly be freely reviewable. Concededly,
causation normally presents a question of fact where it is
clear that, in the first instance, the correct legal standard
was applied in determining negligence. However, this is
never correct where the District Court entirely fails to
articulate or, in any way, evidence the legal standard of
proximate causation upon which this ultimate factual find-
ing must rest. Thus, in this case, it was plainly wrong for
the Court of Appeals to treat the finding of no causation
as a simple question of fact protected by the clearly erro-
neous rule. Only where the appellate court is convinced
that the correct legal standard of proximate cause has been
applied does the question of causation become one of fact
alone.

B. The District Court’s Clearly Erroneous Finding of No
Negligence Tainted the Ultimate Finding of No Causation.

In this case, the issues of negligence and causation were
closely intertwined. As a matter of common sense, it is
highly questionable whether a trier of fact who has con-
cluded that certain acts are unimportant, non-negligent,
excusable and even compelled by events, can then conclude
that those acts were responsible for a tragic result. Yet,
the Court of Appeals has concluded that the District Court
was not affected in any way by his clearly erroneous con-
clusions as to negligence even though, clearly, the District
Court believed ATC to be acting properly in ignoring what
it believed to be unimportant services,

Specifically, the District Court held: (1) that ATC had
no duty to provide certain services and information to peti-
tioner; (2) that the services and information were, at best,
of a third priority; and (3) that the air traffic controller
involved was excused from performing these third priority

16

services in any case because he had a first priority emer-
gency to deal with.

As to all three of these points, crucial testimony was
provided by witnesses Ball (for petitioner), Roseborough
and Burke (for the United States), as well as many others.
The District Court rejected Ball's testimony, as well as
that of the rest of the witnesses for petitioner, and found
that, on the basis of testimony of witnesses for the United
States, the United States was not negligent for the reasons
given above. The District Court was wrong in its evalua-
tion of the testimony and the Court of Appeals so held. Yet
these three witnesses also testified as to causation, and the
District Court again believed only the witnesses for the
United States. The United States witnesses’ opinions were
that none of the controller’s failures caused or contributed
to the accident. The District Court found this testimony to
be “factual” and correct. 412 F.Supp. at 993. App. at p.
102a.

The Court of Appeals, in examining the question of
negligence, found: (1) “it is clear from all of the testimony
that the ... omissions . . . contributed to an increased cock-
pit workload,” (App. at p. 23a); (2) that “none of the wit-
nesses could recall” so many simultaneous negligent acts
being committed by ATC (App. at p. 19a); and (3) that
the Government’s failure was “substantial and... un-
justified.” App. at p. 17a It is difficult to rationalize the
Court of Appeals’ acquiescence in the District Court’s find-
ing that the no causation conclusion was “factual” where
the Court of Appeals had already determined that this con-
clusion was based on a combination of facts that had never
occurred before. The Court of Appeals second opinion
only makes this more illogical. Compare the lower
Court's conclusion in its first opinion, that it should not
disturb the District Court’s finding “that the sole cause of

17

the crash was the negligence of the Delta crew”, with its
characterization of this tragedy in its second opinion, as
“this largely still unexplained accident.” App. at p. 123a.

In its second opinion, the Court of Appeals cites, as an
example of the District Court’s correct treatment of the
causation issue, the District Court’s handling of the causa-
tion cases cited by the petitioner to the District Court
(App. at p. 123a). If the Court of Appeals did, as it so
states, rely on this section of the District Court’s opinion
(App. at pps. 106a-115a), its decision should be reversed,
simply because the taint of the District Court’s clearly
erroneous finding of no negligence invalidated its con-
sideration of the causation issue.

In Section VI of the District Court’s opinion (App.
106a-115a), it distinguishes all of the cases cited on the
basis of the difference between its negligence findings and
those contained in those cases. The District Court starts
by distinguishing, as “inapposite”, seven cases on the
ground that those cases did not involve holdings of pilot
negligence. Yet, each of these cases stand for the proposi-
tion that, despite the pilot’s sole responsibility for the
safety of his aircraft, ATC breaches of their concurrent
duties have been held to be proximate or contributing
causes of the accident. Several of these cases find ATC
failures, very similar to but of a lesser degree than those
herein, to have been proximate causes of accidents. Finally,
some of these cases held the Government liable despite
findings of pilot negligence.** Thus, the District Court
eschewed consideration of these cases because they did not

** A clear example of how the District Court erroneously distin-
guished this almost unanimous authority can be seen by reading
Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), reversing
249 F.Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965). In fact, these two opinions
reveal a case factually indistinguishable from this one, but with a
completely different legal result.

18

appear to be consistent with its finding of no negligence
in this case.

The remaining four cases which the District Court did
not find “inapposite” contain even more telling examples
of how the District Court’s clearly erroneous finding of
no negligence infected its determination of the causation is-
sue. Despite its extraordinarily similar factual circum-
stances in ATC failure to warn and act promptly, the
District Court distinguished Stork v. United States, 430
F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970) because of the type of negligence
found in that case. With regard to Todd v. United States,
384 F.Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975), the District Court

stated:

In this respect Todd is distinguishable from the case
at bar. In the instant case the ATC handling of D 723
to the point of DH was not negligent.

412 F.Supp. at 996, App. at p. 110a.

As to Dickens v. United States, 378 F.Supp. 845 (S.D.
Texas 1974), the District Court stated:

The Dickens case is distinguishable from the case at
bar in that the basis of ATC negligence there was a
failure to warn of a hazard known to the controller
but unknown to and unknowable by the pilot. In the
case at bar, the possible hazard to landing caused by
sea fog was a condition known to the pilot and the
erew of D 723.

412 F.Supp. at 996. App. at p. 1lla. The same error in-
fects the District Court’s lengthy handling of Ingham v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967), a case whose holding as to causation
is indistinguishable from the case at bar.

19

It must be remembered that the right to contribution,
if governed by the law of Massachusetts as the District
Court held, provides that the relative degrees of fault
shall not be considered in determining the pro rata shares
of tortfeasors in the total liability. Chapter 231B 4§1, 2,
Massachusetts General Law. It is clear that the District
Court did consider the relative degrees of fault, and, in
fact, was overwhelmingly concerned with issues of relative
negligence in this case. The District Court’s conclusions
and findings with regard to negligence were dispositive,
not only of the case before it, but also of the District Court’s
consideration of the causation issue. The irony is that,
although the Court of Appeals held that the District Court
was clearly erroneous as to its finding of no negligence,
the Court of Appeals, by affirming, upheld the District
Court’s other negligence finding which stated that peti-
tioner’s sole negligence caused this accident.

The Court of Appeals in its second opinion summarily
cited the District Court’s handling of the above authorities
on the causation issue as evidencing the District Court’s
proper handling of that isste. This is absolute proof of
why the “clearly erroneous” standard should not have
been applied in reviewing the finding of no causation.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals found itself so shackled by
the rvle that it could not even review the District Court’s
hand! .g of the law on the causation issue in order to see
the tainted effect caused by the District Court’s clearly
erroneous finding of no negligence,

C. The District Court Did Not Apply the Correct Legal
Standard for Determining Proximate Cause.

The District Court, in its opinion, never articulated any
legal standard for proximate cause. The Court of Appeals
took no cognizance of this in its opinion. The Court of
Appeals did, however, articulate a proximate cause stan-

20

dard. It did not, however, apply that standard to the
facts of this case, because, constrained by its application
of the “clearly erroneous” rule, the Court of Appeals de-
termined only that the District Court’s factual finding of
no causation was not clearly erroneous. The crucial ques-
tion which the Court of Appeals failed to explicitly address
was whether or not the District Court applied the correct
legal standard in determining causation.

In articulating a legal standard for proximate cause, the
Court of Appeals chose that of the Restatement (Second)
Torts $431. That standard emplovs the “substantial fac-
tor” test. It is impossible to discuss that test or to apply
it to facts without using the words “substantial” or “fac-
tor” as is evidenced by the Court of Appeals repeated use
of those terms throughout its discussion of causation.
These words are not merely symbolic, but inhere in and
capture the essence of the test itself. It is, therefore, sig-
nificant that the District Court never used this language
anywhere in its opinion.

Nor did the District Court ever cite any case law or other
authority which might indicate what legal standard for
proximate cause, if any, it was applying. While it is true
that the District Court does mention the terms “a proxl-
mate cause”, “a contributing cause” and languag® indicat-
ing such concepts, it never addresses the issue of what
standard underlies the use of such language or terms. While
the Court of Appeals does not explicitly address the issue
of what standard the District Court applied, by selecting
a standard which is clearly not present in the District
Court’s opinion, it would appear that the Court of Appeals
perceived both the lack of an explicit standard in the lower
court, as well as the necessity of employing a different
standard. Thus, the Court of Appeals at least impliedly
held that the District Court’s legal basis was wrong.

21

In Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders
of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
(1968), the Court stated that:

In this there was error, and it was an error which in-
fected the conclusions of the trial court .... Evalua-
tions of evidence reached by the accurate application
of erroneous legal standards are erroneous evalua-
tions.

390 U.S. at 444-45. This principle merely reflects the
Court’s long-standing rule that erroneous applications of
legal standards are not subject to the “clearly erroneous”
test; rather, they are freely reviewable. United States v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours € Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) ; United
States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) ;
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

The most recent decision holding that the trier of fact
must reexamine the record on remand because it initially
applied an erroneous legal standard is Kelley v. Southern
Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974). Kelley sued the defendant
railroad under the F.E.L.A. for injuries sustained while
unloading automobiles from a railroad car. Kelley was
employed by a wholly owned subsidiary of the railroad, and
thus the question was whether he was an “employee” of
the railroad so-ms to be covered by the F.E.L.A. The Dis-
trict Court found that Kelley was so covered on grounds
that the subsidiary’s employees were agents of the railroad
and because work which Kelley performed fulfilled a non-
delegable duty of the railroad.

The Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment for
the railroad, holding that “employment” had to be based
on a master-servant and not an agency relationship.

22
The Court vacated and remanded for the District Court
to determine whether the facts could support a verdict
under the appropriate legal standard of master-servant:

[While the Court of Appeals may have meant to sug-
gest that in its view the record could not support a
finding of employment, that suggestion is not de-
veloped in its opinion, and we think the best course
at this point is to require the trier of fact to re-ex-
amine the record in light of the proper legal standard.

419 U.S. at 332.

In Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962), the Court
outlined what it would have done had it found itself in
the position the Court of Appeals apparently was in when
reviewing the District Court’s decision:

If we were convinced . . . that the trial court’s action
was colored by a misunderstanding of such legal prin-
ciples, we would have to remand .. . for further find-
ings by the trial court [on the issue there involved].
E.g. Kweskin v. Finkelstein, 223 F2d 677, 679 (CA
7th Cir 1955).

369 U.S. at 701. See also Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119
(Sth Cir. 1967), where the Court of Appeals remanded for
a new determination of proximate causation after finding
that one of the two district court findings of contributory
negligence was clearly erroneous and William G. Roe &
Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1967), which
remanded the case for a new finding of causation applying
the correct standard.

Thus, it is clear that the Court of Appeals should not
have reviewed the District Court’s finding of causation to
determine if it was clearly erroneous where they felt that
a different standard should be applied. What renders the
judgment of the Court of Appeals inherently wrong is that

23

neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court used
the correct legal standard of proximate cause applicable
in this case.

18 The applicable Massachusetts standards for proximate causa-
tion where there is more than one cause or for determining whether
an act is a contributing cause are quite different from the “sub-
stantial factor test.”

Under Massachusetts law, the intervening negligence of a third
party does not, generally, exonerate the earlier wrongdoer. The
Court in Morrison v. Medaglie, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133, 134
(1934), set forth the applicable legal standards under which the
question of proximate causation of prior negligence should be
considered :

[T]he intervening negligence of a third person, which con-
tributed to an injury, does not necessarily break the causal
connection between the conduct of an earlier wrongdoer, and
the injury. A causal connection may nevertheless be found,
either on the theory of Burke v. Hodge, 217 Mass. 182, 104
N.E. 450, that the negligence of the earlier wrongdoer
remained a dangerous force until the negligence of the later
wrongdoer concurred and combined with it to cause injury.
or on the theory of Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136,
restated in Horan v. Inhabitants of Watertown, 217 Mass.
185, 104 N.E. 464, that the earlier wrongdoer ought to have
foreseen that his negligence would be followed by negligence
of another resulting in injury, and consequently that in law
the act of that other is the act of the original wrongdoer be-
cause it is the natural and probable consequence of his
wrongdoing.

See also, Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.

1959) ; Whalen v. Shivek, 93 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1950) : Addison v.

Green Cafe, Inc., 84 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1949); and Malloy v. New-
man, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001, 1005-6 (1941).

24

Il.

The Court of Appeals Decision Has Effectively Denied
Petitioner Due Process of Law.

No court in this case has determined, based upon a cor-
rect legal standard for proximate cause, whether petitioner
has or has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that ATC negligence caused or contributed to the accident.
The District Court did not because it found no ATC neg-
ligence and did not apply a correct legal standard to its
determination. The Court of Appeals did not because it
never determined the correct legal standard. Even if it
had, the Court of Appeals’ adherence to the clearly errone-
ous rule would have prevented an application of such stan-
dard to the facts of this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals
would never have applied the correct legal standard in
order to determine whether a preponderance of the evi-
dence supported a finding of causation. Thus, petitioner’s
claim has ‘fallen between the cracks’ in a constitutionally
impermissible way.

In White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), the
court stated:

The requirements of due process include a determina-
tion of the issues according to articulated standards.
The lack of such standards in this case deprives any
hearing, whether before an agency or a court, of its
meaning and value as an opportunity for the plaintiffs
to prove [their claim].

530 F.2d at 754. Since the District Court never applied any
articulated standard for proximate cause, it clearly failed
to meet this requirement of due process. Petitioner has
shown, in addition, that the District Court’s clearly errone-
ous finding of no ATC negligence fundamentally under-

25

mined the District Court’s evaluation of the authorities
cited by petitioner as supporting a finding of causation.
These two factors combine to render the District Court’s
determination of the merits, on the basis of a preponder-
ance of the evidence, meaningless. Thus, petitioner was
denied due process in the District Court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals failed to remedy
this denial. In effect, petitioner was placed in the position
of proving causation in light of a new test (still not the
correct one, but certainly different from the one used by
the District Court), beyond a reasonable doubt, in order
to overcome the clearly erroneous standard. The Court
has condemned, as violative of due process, similar pro-
cedures which require a party to prove its claim with a
different or higher burden of proof than that to which his
claim would ordinarily be subjected. Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965). In that case, the Court held invalid
a situation wherein one party, because of lack of notice,
was forced to seek to overturn a pre-existing judgment.
He was placed in a position of having the burden of proof
in this subsequent proceeding where he would not have had
the burden in the original action. Thus, the Court held the
subsequent proceeding did not result in the adjudication
of his claim in a way that comported with due process.
The Court stated:

A fundamental requirement of due process is “the
opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US
385, 394, 58 L ed 1363, 1369, 34 S Ct 779. It is an
opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. The trial court
could have fully accorded this right to the petitioner
only by granting his motion to set aside the decree
and consider the case anew. Only that would have
wiped the slate clean. Only that would have restored

26

the petitioner to the position he would have occupied
had due process of law been accorded to him in the
first place.

380 U.S. at 552-3.

Similarly, in the case at bar, after the Court of Appeals
determined that the District Court had erred in its fact
finding of no ATC negligence and that the District Court
had not applied the correct legal standard for determining
proximate cause, the Court of Appeals should have re-
manded for a new trial. Instead, the Court imposed upon
petitioner the extraordinary burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.* It is no less debilitating to
change the burden of proof from “preponderance” to “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” than it is to place the burden
of proof of “preponderance” on the wrong party. Cer-
tainly, as the Court stated in Armstrong, supra at 551:

The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner were
real, not purely theoretical. For “it is plain that
where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the
outcome.”

Petitioner would add that the weight of the burden of
proof may be more decisive than its placement.

The Court of Appeals decision, therefore, worked as a
final denial of petitioner’s due process right to a full and
fair determination of its claims against the United States.
Yet, the Court of Appeals could easily have resolved this
case without denying petitioner due process in either of
two ways. Firstly, after finding ATC negligence and ascer-
taining the correct legal standard for proximate cause,

** Petitioner submits this as the closest articulated burden to
proving that there is no “substantial” evidence whatsoever to
support the District Court's finding.

27

the Court of Appeals could have remanded for a new trial
or application of the proper standard of proximate cause
to the proven ATC negligence. In its second opinion, the
Court of Appeals derided this alternative, noting: “a re-
trial of the proximate cause issue would in essence be one
more bite at the same apple.” Yet other courts have not
balked at allowing “one more bite” where justice so dic-
tates. Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974);
William G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 370 F.2d 829 (Sth
Cir. 1967); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967).

Secondly, the Court of Appeals might have held that the
finding of proximate cause was an ultimate issue of fact
comprised of mixed questions of law and fact. By doing
so, the Court of Appeals could then have reviewed the
District Court’s finding freely. It could have established
the applicable legal standard and applied it to the factual
findings of ATC negligence. The Court of Appeals, in its
second opinion, held that it could not do so because of the
application of its Local Rule 15. Yet courts have repeatedly
held that mixed questions of law and fact are freely re-
viewable,’* and such review is required where an erroneous
legal standard has been applied. Protecttve Committee
for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.
v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (196_).

In conclusion, it is clear that petitioner never has had an
opportunity to fully and fairly have its claims adjudicated.
No court has ever determined whether petitioner proved
by a preponderance of ihe evidence that the proven ATC
negligence caused or contributed to the crash. No court
has ever applied the correct legal standard for proximate
cause to this proven negligence. No court, in short, has
decided petitioner’s claims properly. Given this, it is diffi-
cult for petitioner to accept that the Court can, consonant

18 See cases cited supra at p. 15 n.11.

28

with fundamental principles of due process and its role as
ultimate protector of the fair administration of justice,
accept the decisions below and allow these essentially in-
correct adjudications to stand.

Il.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is in Conflict
With a Decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.

The District Court, in this case, applied Massachusetts
law in dismissing all claims by petitioner seeking indem-
nification for sums paid in settlement of claims by the
estates of passengers who died in the crash of petitioner’s
aircraft. The application of Massachusetts law also re-
sulted in the dismissal of claims for contribution brought
by petitioner for claims arising under the Massachusetts
death statute which is considered punitive in nature. The
District Court did not dismiss petitioner’s claims for con-
tribution based upon the death statutes of other states.
Thus, the application of state law to petitioner’s claims
for contribution and indemnity resulted in inconsistent
treatment of claims arising out of one accident.

Petitioner argued in the Court below that the applica-
tion of state law was in conflict with the federal rule
of contribution and indemnity in aviation tort cases
adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Cireuit in Kohr y. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504
F.2d 400 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). In
affirming the District Court, the First Cireuit placed itself
in direet conflict with Kohr.

The Seventh Circuit, in Kohr, relied primarily on the
“predominant, indeed, almost exclusive interest of the fed-

29

!
eral government in regulating the affairs of the nation’s

airways” in its decision to apply a federal rule of con-
tribution and indemnity in aviation tort cases. 504 F.2d
at 403. The Court there also found other important fac-
tors in the case mandating the adoption of such a rule,
stating:

When the notion of federal preemption over aviation
is viewed in combination with the fact that this litiga-
tion ensues from a mid-air collision occurring in na-
tional airspace, that the Government is a party to the
action pursuant to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.
§$1346(b) et seq.), and that this litigation has since its
inception been subject to the supervision of the Judi-
cial Panel created by the Multidistrict Litigation Act
(28 U.S.C. § 1407 et seq.), there is no perceptible rea-
son why federal law should not be applied to deter-
mine the rights and liabilities of the parties involved.

504 F.2d at 404.

All of these factors were present in the case at bar.
Further, as already stated, there also existed the problem
of great concern in Kohr for “inconsistency of result in
similar collision occurrences as well as within the same
occurrence due to the application of differing state laws
on contribution and indemnity.” 504 F.2d 403,

In affirming the decision of the District Court, except as
to its findings on ATC negligence, the Court below has
adopted the application of state law with regard to con-
tribution and indemnity in disregard of the Kohr decision,
thereby creating a conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

This conflict, whether to apply federal or state law, can
be resolved only by the Court.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in this case, as prayed herein.

Georce N. Tompkins, Jr.
Counsel for Petitioner

Delta Air Lines, Inc.

1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

Of Counsel:

Connon & ForsytH
NATHANIEL F. Kwappen
Streruen J. Fearon
Ropert Fviton

November 10, 1977

31

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I have, this 10th day of November,
1977, served the foregoing petition for a writ of certiorari
upon respondents by depositing same in a United States
mail box at One Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York
10020, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to
Michael J. Pangia, Esq., counsel of record for respondent,
at his post office address, Aviation Unit, Civil Division
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530 and James
N. Gabriel, United States Attorney, at his post office
address, at Office of the U.S. Attorney, 1525 John W.
McCormack Building, Boston, Massachusetts 02108.

November 10, 1977

Grorce N. Tompkins, Jr.
Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

OS a aN ee he

Opinion of Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe First Circuit

No. 76-1269
Detta Air Livzs, Inc.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.

Unitrep States or AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.

No. 76-1270
Karen Harensic McMaster, Erc. Er au,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
Unirep States oF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

{Hon. Anprew A. Carrrey, U.S. District Judge]

Before:

Corrin, Chief Judge, CaMpBELL, Circuit Judge,
Gicnoux, District Judge.*

* Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
la

2a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Grorce N. Tompkins, Jr., with whom Robert
Fulton and Condon & Forsyth were on brief,
for appellant.

Micuaet B. Lartr and Auan R. Horrmay, with
whom Kaplan, Latti and Flannery was
on brief, Karen Haelsig McMaster, ete.,
et al.

Micuakt J. Panota, Attorney, United States De-
partment of Justice, with whom James N.
Gabriel, United States Attorney, was on
brief, for appellee.

August 12, 1977

CaMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

On July 31, 1973, a Delta Air Line DC-9 aircraft crashed
during an approach in fog to Logan International Airport
in Boston, Massachusetts. Eighty-three passengers, the
erew of five and a Delta cockpit observer died in the acci-
dent.

The various lawsuits arising out of the accident were
transferred for pretrial proceedings in the District of
Massachusetts. See, e.g., In re Delta Airlines Crash at
Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973, 395 F.Supp. 1405
(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1975); In re Delta Airlines Crash at
Boston, Massachusetts, on July 31, 1973, 373 F. Supp. 1406
(Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1974). All claims were consolidated
for a non-jury trial on the issue of liability.

Delta did not contest its own liability to the estates of
deceased passengers but sought contribution and indemnifi-

3a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

cation from the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), based on the alleged negli-
gence of an air traffic controller who handled the flight.
The airline also sought recovery for the loss of the air-
craft and other consequential damages. Individual suits
against the United States were brought as well by the
families of crewmembers barred under workmen’s compen-
sation statutes from bringing suit against Delta.

Delta conceded at the eleven-day trial that crew negli-
gence contributed to the accident, but argued that negli-
gence on the part of air traffic control was also a
contributing factor. The individual plaintiffs sought to
prove that the controller was negligent and that this
negligence was a proximate cause of the crash. The Gov-
ernment took the position that the crew’s negligence was
the sole cause of the accident.

On February 19, 1976, the court filed a lengthy opinion
which concluded “that the sole and exclusive cause of the
accident was the negligence of the pilot and co-pilot of
D 723”. In re Aircrash Disaster, 412 F. Supp. 959, 998
(D. Mass. 1976). Judgment for the United States was en-
tered and notice of appeal was subsequently filed by Delta
and by the individual plaintiffs. We affirm.

I

On July 31, 1973, at approximately eight minutes after
eleven in the morning (1508:05 Greenwich Mean Time,
hereinafter GMT), Delta flight 723 (D 723), a regularly
scheduled passenger flight from Burlington, Vermont to
Boston, Massachusetts, crashed into a seawall at the pe-
rimeter of Logan International Airport while making an
instrument landing system (ILS) approach in fog to
runway four right (4R).

4a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

D 723 had made an unscheduled stop at Manchester,
New Hampshire to pick up some passengers whose flight
had been cancelled due to the weather. At 10:14 a.m.
(1414 GMT), D 723 was informed that its departure from
Manchester would be delayed because of traffic delays at
Logan caused by adverse weather conditions. The flight
eventually left Manchester at approximately ten minutes
before eleven (1450 GMT) for the 18 minute flight to
Logan.

Shortly after takeoff, D 723 contacted Boston Approach
Control Arrival Radar #1 (Approach) which was being
manned by Mr. Taylor. Approach told the flight to plan
on receiving radar vectors for an instrument landing ap-
proach to runway 4R. A radar vector is “a [magnetic
compass] heading issued to an aircraft to provide navi-
gational guidance by radar.” See 412 F. Supp. at 965
n.6. Approach also gave D 723 its only enroute weather
advisory: “Weather is partial obscuration, estimated four
hundred overcast, mile an’ a half and fog.” The flight
climbed to 4,000 feet and at 10:52 a.m. (1452 GMT), D 723
was identified by Approach on the radar scope. Four
minutes after the plane left Manchester, Approach in-
structed it to “fly heading now one eight zero [180°],
radar vectors ILS four right.” This meant that the plane
was to fly south and would be given further headings which
would feed it into the instrument landing system (ILS)
for runway 4R at Logan.

Because of the low ceiling and limited visibility at Logan
Airport, D 723, and the other aircraft flying into Logan
on July 31, were required to make an instrument landing
system approach. The two major components of the in-
strument landing system are the localizer and the glide
slope, see 412 F. Supp. at 965 nn. 7 & 9. The localizer is

5a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

an electronic beam which, in combination with radio equip-
ment in the plane, allows a pilot to align his aircraft so
that it is headed straight for the centerline of the intended
runway for landing. The localizer course for runway 4R
is 035°. If the plane deviates to the right or the
left of this course, the aircraft’s instrumentation tells the
pilot which way to turn to reintercept the localizer, i.e.,
to get back on course. The glide slope, also an electronic
beam which operates in combination with a receiver in the
plane, aids the pilot in making the descent. A plane which
stays on the glide slope will eventually touch down at the
intended point on the runway, the ILS touchdown zone.
FAA regulations and Delta procedures require that when,
during the descent, an altitude known as the decision
height (DH) is reached—216 feet above sea level for
runway 4R at Logan—the Captain must determine if the
landing environment is in sight and whether a safe landing
can be made.’ If not, he must execute a missed approach
by applying power and climbing back up to altitude. Other-
wise, the landing approach continues, although the Cap-
tain is free to discontinue the approach should he deem
it necessary. There was testimony at trial that a missed
approach may be executed in a DC-9 at any time up to
and including touchdown.

All flights approaching Boston on the morning of July
31, 1973, were under the control of air traffic controllers
who handle the air traffic from a darkened room where

* Delta’s procedures require the pilot who is not actually flying
the plane to call out the altitude when the aircraft is 200 feet and
100 feet above decision height. At decision height, he must say
either “Decision height, contact” or “Decision height, no contact”
indicating whether or not visual contact has been made with the
runway environment. If there is no contact, a missed approach
must be executed.

6a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

each airplane is tracked on a radar scope. See 412 F.
Supp. at 972 n.18. The function of approach control is to
promote the “safe, orderly and expeditious” flow of
traffic arriving and departing from a terminal area, See
id. at 978 n.22 (definition of approach contro] service).
Approach controllers operating in these terminal areas,
including Boston, do so according to procedures set out
in the Federal Aviation Administration’s handbook, Ter-
minal Air Traffic Control (the Manual). The Manual pro-
vides that action verbs in the imperative mean that a pro-
cedure is mandatory. The Manual also prescribes duty
priorities, the first being to separate aircraft, the second
to tend to “second priority services” that do not involve
air traffic separation and the third to give “additional
services to the extent possible”. See 412 F. Supp. at 964
n.6 quoting Manual 28. Iscluded in the last category is
the dissemination of weather information. See Manual
7361.

Section 1360 of the Manual in use on July 31, 1973, re-
quired an approach controller to issue certain information
and instructions to an aircraft before it reached the so-
called approach gate. This would constitute a second
priority duty. The approach gate for runway 4R at Logan
is a point 6.3 miles from the runway landing threshold
and 1 mile outside the outer marker, the final approach
fix. Id. at 965 n.8. The following information should have
been given: 1) D 723’s position relative to the outer
marker (the final approach fix); 2) a vector to intercept
the final approach course; 3) a clearance for the aircraft
to make the instrument approach; and 4) an instruction
to go ahead and monitor Boston Local Control (the Tower)
then contact it upon reaching the final approach fix or,
alternatively, an instruction to switch over to the Tower

—_—_—<——~

7a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

immediately. The handbook gives this example: “Three
miles from outer marker, turn left heading zero one zero,
cleared for I-L-S runway three six approach. Monitor
one one eight point three; report to tower when over the
outer marker.” Furthermore, $1351 of the Manual states
as a guideline that the maximum localizer interception
angle to be given when a plane is 2 miles or more outside
the approach gate is 30° Paragraph 1352 requires, by its
use of verbs in the imperative, that the controller “vector
aireraft to intercept the localizer course at least 2 miles
from the approach gate and at an altitude not above the
glide slope.” [Emphasis original] As will be seen, D 723
was never given its position relative to the approach fix
and was not turned over to the Tower until well after
passing the approach gate. Further, it was given an in-
terception angle larger than 30° and was not instructed
to descend to an altitude “not above the guide slope.”
With this background, we return to D 723. About 6
minutes after it took off from Manchester, the flight, which
had leveled off at 4,000 feet, was told to descend to 3,000
feet. Approach never assigned a lower altitude. Between
10:57 a.m. and 11:04 a.m., Approach issued various com-
pass heading changes to D 723 which brought it west of
Boston and around to the south of Logan Airport in prepa-
ration for the instrument approach to runway 4R. Just
past 11:04 a.m. (1504:27 GMT), less than 4 minutes before
the crash, Approach said: “. .. and Delta seven two three
fly heading of, zero eight zero [080°] and intercept. the
localizer course and fly it inbound over.” [D 723 replied,
“Okay zero eight zero for interception.” The transmis-
sion from Approach constituted “a vector to intercept the
final approach course” and was given more than 2 miles
and approximately 14% minutes prior to D 723’s reaching

8a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

the approach gate. Therefore, the second of the required
four pre-approach instructions was given before the flight
reached the approach gate. The angle of intercept, how-
ever, was 15° greater than that suggested by the Manual.
The intercept heading of 080° necessitated a heading
change, or intercept angle, of 45° as the airplane made
its left turn on to the localizer course of 035°. Of more
significance, however, no clearance to descend to an alti-
tude “not above glide slope” was given; this was contrary
to mandatory Manual prucedures. Thus, the flight re-
mained at 3,000 feet at a point when planes making the
approach would, according to testimony, customarily have
been descended to 2,900 feet.

Some thirty seconds prior to arriving at the approach
gate, D 723 asked if it were “cleared for ILS”. Ap-
proach responded, “Yes, seven two three is cleared for
ILS, yes.” The flight profile indicates that this transmis-
sion from Approach occurred before D 723 reached the
approach gate. Thus, the third of the four mandatory
instructions was timely given to D 723, albeit at the insti-
gation of the aircraft. However, at no time was the flight
given the first mandatory instruction, its position relative
to the final approach fix; furthermore, at the point that
D 723 had passed the approach gate and reached the final
approach fix, it had not received the fourth mandatory
instruction, to monitor the Tower frequency or, alterna-
tively, to report to the Tower.

The plaintiffs claim that the fact D 723 was not turned
over to the Tower was critical because a significant
weather change had taken place at Logan subsequent to
the weather report relayed to the aircraft after its take
off from Manchester. At almost 6 minutes past 11 (1505 :42
GMT), the Tower informed Eastern 572, the plane im-

9a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

mediately preceding D 723 on the approach to 4R, “...
the fog’s movin’ back in from the south across the airport
now it’s just approaching runway four right”. D 723 was
less than a mile from the approach gate, had not been
told to monitor the Tower and did not hear this transmis-
sion. Had D 723 contacted the Tower at the outer marker,
testimony suggests that it would have received the fog
warning. This would have occurred shortly after 11:06:14
a.m., almost 2 minutes prior to the accident. At 7 minutes
past 11 (1507:03 GMT), about 1 minute before the crash
when D 723 was well inside the outer marker, but before
it had been switched to Tower, there was an internal com-
munication from the Tower to the radar room that the
fog was “coming right back across again so you can get
ready for some [missed approaches], its real thick again.”
Mr. Taylor, the approach controller handling D 723, testi-
fied that he did not hear anything about the fog bank.
Meanwhile, D 723’s approach continued with the co-
pilot flying the aircraft and the Captain handling the radio
communications and other chores, D 723 crossed the outer
marker 1 minute and 51 seconds before impact at a speed
of 207 knots which was, according to the testimony, over
40 knots too fast. The flight profile shows, and various
witnesses testified, that D 723 did not execute a good
approach; it was off course to the left of the localizer
until the final momenis and was never established on the
glide slope. See id. at 999. Nevertheless, there was testi-
mony by Delta’s expert that the approach would have
been acceptable had the ceiling been at 400 feet as initially
reported to D 723. Plaintiffs argued that the excessive
intercept angle and the fact that D 723 was forced to begin
its approach 1,000 feet too high contributed to the devia-
tions. While there was testimony tending to confirm this

10a
Optnion of Court of Appeals

view, there was other testimony, and the district court
found, that the deviations were caused by the crew’s neglli-
gent reliance on the flight director, a sophisticated instru-
ment that had been set in the wrong mode.

Fifty-one seconds before the accident and only at the
request of the local control coordinator whose job it was
to coordinate approaches, Approach cleared D 723 to land
and told it, finally, to go to the Tower frequency. This
clearance was received 2 minutes and some 4 miles after
the plane had crossed the approach gate and at a point
in the approach where the cockpit voice recorder reveals
the crew was concerned with problems in flying the plane.’

* Following is an excerpt from the cockpit voice recorder.
“CAM-1” refers to the Captain and “CAM-2” to the First Officer
who was flying the airplane. “Approach” is Mr. Taylor and “D
723” someone, probably the Captain, handling the radio work in
the plane.

1506 :47.5 GMT

CAM-2: Gettin down (ah) thousand feet a minute

1506 :50.5 GMT

CAM-1: Leave it below one [unintelligible]
eeee

1507 :05.0 GMT

CAM-2: This ... command bar shows [unintelligible]
eeee

CAM-1: Yeah that doesn’t show much

1507 :14.0 GMT

Approach: Seven two three is cleared to land. Tower one
nineteen one

1507 :17.0 GMT

D 723: Seven two three

1507 :19.0 GMT

CAM-1: Going like a....

According to testimony, the reference to the command bar con-
cerned the vertical bar on the flight director which, when operating
properly, gives a pilot information about his position relative to
the localizer course. At the time the comment was made the flight
profile shows that D 723 was at its largest deviation left of the

lla
Opinion of Court of Appeals

The aircraft was 3% to 4 miles from the touchdown zone
and was at 700 feet having just descended below the glide
slope on its approach.

D 723 did not contact the Tower immediately. In the
seconds after the transmission from Approach, the Cap-
tain made a remark which indicated that the plane was
going too fast, see 412 F. Supp. at 982; 25 seconds before
impact, apparently perceiving a malfunction in the flight
director, the Captain ordered a switch to “raw data” or
primary instrumentation. Only then, 22 seconds before
the crash, did D 723 contact the Tower which responded,
2 seconds later as the plane was descending through 325
feet, “Cleared to land four right, traffie’s clearin’ at the
end, the RVR shows more than six thousand, a fog bank
is movin’ in, its pretty heavy across the approach end.”
D 723 acknowledged the Tower’s clearance and weather
advisory 13 seconds before the accident by saying simply,
“seven two three”. This was the last transmission from
the aircraft and it was made fractions of a second before
the plane descended through decision height. Insofar as
the cockpit recorder shows, the crew did not make manda-
tory altitude call-outs nor did anyone refer to altitude
throughout the approach.’ Discussion in the cockpit fol-
lowing receipt of the fog warning indicates no vocalized
reaction whatever to the reported fog bank; instead, both

localizer. Thereafter, the flight path shows a continuing correction
to the right toward the localizer.

At 1507 :19, the aircraft was, according to the flight profile, going
143 knots. Its target speed was 124 knots.

* Just before 11 a.m. (1459 GMT), the crew apparently set the
radio altimeters so that a light would flash when the plane was
at decision height. This is good procedure and Delta’s expert
testified that it did not indicate that the crew in any way thought

- @ missed approach was likely.

12a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

the co-pilot who was flying the plane, and the pilot voiced
concern only with getting the airplane on course. Despite
the focussed efforts, the aircraft was never successfully
established on the localizer. Moreover, inexplicably, it
descended in the last 11 seconds at a rate of descent of
1200 feet per minute, almost twice the normal rate of
650-700 feet per minute which D 723 had, during the latter
phases of the approach, maintained. D 723 crashed 4153
feet short of the touchdown zone on runway 4R and about
165 feet to the right of the runway centerline. See 412
F. Supp. at 963.

Three planes which immediately followed D 723 on the
ILS approach were successively cleared to land. (The
Tower was unable to see the crash site because of fog
and for some reason did not realize that D 723 was not
accounted for.) Two of them executed missed approaches
because they were unable to see the runway environment
due to fog. The third was told by the Tower to make a
missed approach, apparently as a result of first reports
of a plane down on runway 4R. Upon confirmation of the
crash, the airport was closed.

In order to complete the factual picture as it pertains
to the issues in this case, it is necessary to backtrack in
time a bit and focus on Approach’s difficulties with an-
other aircraft during D 723’s approach.

Just past 11:02 a.m., while D 723 was in the process of
being vectored by Approach and was still almost 3 min-
utes away from the approach gate, Allegheny 666 (AL
666) reported in the Millis holding pattern 20 miles south-
west of Boston at 8,000 feet. AL 666, however, had been
assigned 9,000 feet and another aircraft, Eastern 1020 (EA
1020), was already at 8,000 feet in the holding pattern.
Approach reacted to this potential conflict immediately by

13a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

directing EA 1020 to make a left turn to the northeast
that would take it toward Logan and out of the holding
pattern and by instructing AL 666 to maintain its south-
westerly heading which would take it out of the holding
pattern in a direction away from Logan. Approach then
gave D 723 a vector of 150° and instructed another air-
eraft at Millis to descend out of 7,000 feet to 6,000 feet.
Next approach verified EA 1020's left turn and, satisfied
that it was now safe to do so, directed AL 666 to reverse
its course, return to Millis and hold.

At 11:04 a.m. (1504:27), D 723 was given its final vector
for intercepting the localizer, but no position report, no
clearance for the approach and no instruction to monitor
the Tower. Fifty-two seconds later, Approach attempted
to verify AL 666’s altitude. AL 666 did not reply and
Approach repeated it radio call to the flight four more
times. It was after the fourth of these five attempts to
raise AL 666 that D 723 asked if it were cleared for the
approach. Approach replied simply “yes, seven two three
cleared ILS, yes” then made a fifth call to AL 666, this
time receiving a response culminating in a confirmation at
11:06 a.m., that AL 666 was still at 8,000 feet. Eleven
seconds later, D 723 crossed the outer marker inbound.
Approach continued to handle the numerous other traffic
in its jurisdiction including setting up EA 1020 and an-
other aircraft for their approaches to runway 4R. There
were, however, no communications to D723 between the
time it was cleared for the ILS approach at 11:05:41 a.m.,
when the plane was roughly 1 mile outside the approach
gate and almost 2 miles from the outer marker, and
11:07:14 a.m., when the aireraft, then 51 seconds and
slightly less than 2 miles from the site of impact, was, at
the request of the local control coordinator, cleared by
Approach to land and to switch to the Tower.

l4a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Delta premised its theory of Government liability on
the contention that had Manual procedures been followed,
D 723 would have been aware that the fog bank was in the
vicinity of runway 4R prior to beginning its approach
and would not have encountered the heavy fog unex-
pectedly in the last critical stages of flight, become dis-
oriented, lost control of the aircraft and crashed. An
essential part of this theory is that at some point the
crew had ground contact then lost it in the fog. Delta
further contended that the cumulative effects of the non-
standard service led to an unstabilized condition which made
it impossible for the erew to react quickly enough when
it flew into the fog bank. The individual plaintiffs argued
that failure of Approach to turn D 723 over to the Tower
prevented D 723 from receiving timely warning of the
thickening fog and also produced a number of last minute
controller-cockpit communications which seriously dis-
tracted the crew from attention to essential landing pro-
cedures. The Government countered that the controller
was, during the entire approach of D 723, properly con-
centrating his attention on maintaining separation of
another aircraft, AL 666, and that, in any event, the safe
completion of D 723’s flight was entirely in the hands of
the crew.

The district court found that the controller’s attention
was

“appropriately focussed on concentrated communication

efforts with [Allegheny 666] and other aircraft, co-
ordination efforts with other controllers concerning
intended routes for other approaching aircraft, the
sequence of aircraft being vectored to their approach
courses, and the avoidance of potential conflicts with
departing aircraft.”

lda
Opinion of Court of Appeals

412 F. Supp. at 991. In particular the conrt found that
corcern over Allegheny 666 caused the controller to delay
ordering Delta to switch to the Tower frequency. /d. at
900.
Although Delta had conceded its negligence from the
onset of the trial, the court also made specific findings in
support of its conclusion that the crew had been grossly
negligent. There was negligence, the court found, in the
crew’s reliance on the flight director’s faulty indications,
its failure to control the aircraft’s speed, or to stabilize
on the localizer and glide slope, its permitting the aircraft
to dive in the last moments of the flight and its failure
to make a decision at decision height regarding whether
to continue the approach. /d. at 966. The court ruled
ultimately that the plaintiffs had not proven “by a pre-
ponderance [of the evidence] either that ATC [air traffic
control] personnel were negligent or that the conduct of
ATC, however characterized, was a proximate cause of
the crash either in whole or in part.” Jd. at 988.

II

Once the Government undertakes to provide services
otherwise not required of it, those services must be per-
formed in the exercise of due care and the Government
will be liable for injuries shown to have been proximately
caused by the lack of such care. Ingham v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 931 (1967). See Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878,
884 (10th Cir. 1974).‘ In determining whether or not the

‘This principle applies fully to the federal air traffic control
system which has been developed at the command of Congress, see
49 U.S.C. §§ 1347(a), 1348(b) (4), and which has as its purpose

16a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Government should be held concurrently liable for the
erash of D 723, the appropriate inquiry is whether in the
circumstances the approach controller was under a duty
to provide the flight with those services which were omit-
ted, end, if so, whether his failure to give the information
and instructions had a “reasonably close causal connec-
tion” with the accident. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts
§30 at 143 (4th ed. 1971). For the reasons set forth
below we believe that the approach controller, Mr. Taylor,
did have a duty to both the crew and the passengers to
comply more fully than he did with the mandatory ap-
proach procedures outlined in the Manual; and we do not
accept the district court’s finding that concern about AL
666 was a satisfactory excuse for what was tantamount,
on occasion, to forgetting D 723. The district court’s
finding, however, that the controller’s omissions did not
proximately cause the accident is not clearly erroneous
and we therefore affirm.

A. Duty Imposed by Manual Procedures

Other courts have said that, as a basic premise, the
Government’s duty of care in the maintenance and promo-
tion of a safe and efficient air traffic control system is
defined in part by the provisions in the procedure manuals.

the promotion of the “safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air
traffic”, 412 F. Supp. at 978 n.22; 49 U.S.C. § 1303(c). See Yates
v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 1974); Ingham v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 931 (1967). Both pilots and passengers are entitled to
rely on the services provided by Government controllers. See In
Re Air Crash at New Orleans (Moisant Field), 544 F.2d 270, 273
(6th Cir. 1976); Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra, 373
F.2d at 235-36. See also Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626,
629 (6th Cir. 1975) (controller's duty extends to parachutists).

—E

17a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th
Cir. 1972); Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1970). See generally Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., supra, 373 F.2d at 233-36. This duty extends to both
flight crews and their passengers. See, e.g., In Re Air
Crash at New Orleans (Moisant Field), 544 F.2d 270,
273 (6th Cir. 1976). While failure to conform to every
mandatory Manual procedure, however trivial the devia-
tion, would not necessarily constitute negligence, and while
it might not be negligent to deviate from established pro-
cedures in the face of a higher priority concern, nonethe-
less a substantial and unjustified failure to follow proce-
dures made mandatory by the Manual is persuasive as an
indication of a lack of due care.

Appellants complain that Mr. Taylor failed in four
respects to give standard service to D 723: he gave a
final vector to the localizer which required too great an
intercept angle; he omitted the position report; he kept
the aircraft at 3,000 feet when it should have been at
2,000 feet to intercept the glide slope from below; and he
failed to turn the flight over to local tower control at or
before the aircraft reached the outer marker. The first
of these was contrary to recommended but not mandatory
procedures. The other three lapses represented non-
standard service in violation of specific mandatory Manual
provisions. We discuss each of the four factors in turn.

5 These cases also held that a controller’s duty may flow from
customary pilot reliance upon a nonspecified procedure. At times
there may be a duty on the part of controllers to warn pilots of
potential dangers including changes in the weather. See Spaulding
v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Gill v. United
States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); Ingham v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.d 227, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967).

18a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

The Manual prescribes, as a guideline, that the maxi-
mum localizer intercept angle for a plane two miles or
more outside the approach gate be 30°. Manual at { 1351.
Within two miles, the angle is reduced to 20°. Id. D 723
intercepted the localizer approximately two miles from
the approach gate. Delta’s expert testified that the greater
the intercept angle the more difficult it is to get stabilized
quickly on the localizer course. The farther away from
the outer marker the turn is made, however, the less sig-
nificant the amount of turning the aircraft must do be-
comes simply because there is more time to stabilize the
heading before the final approach begins at the outer
marker. Thus, the reason for the suggested maximum
heading change is not related to the pilot’s ability suc-
cessfully to execute the turn required by a larger intercept
angle, but rather to the need to minimize the maneuvering
required to get set up for the final approach. A very large
intercept angle quite close to the outer marker will in-
crease the crew workload and diminish, to some degree,
the chances that the aircraft will be stabilized on the
localizer heading as early in the final approach phase as
desirable.

The district court found that Approach was not negli-
gent in giving to D 723 a 45° intercept, 15° greater than
that recommended. The finding rested in part on the fact
that the 45° intercept, as well as greater ones, had been
used successfully with other aircraft that day. 412 F.
Supp. at 988.6 There was also evidence that intercept

6 The court also found it significant that a nonradar approach
procedure for aircraft established by the Government contemplated
a 50° intercept angle relative to the final approach course. This
procedure, however, is for planes approaching the airport from
the holding pattern at the Millis intersection twenty miles from

19a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

angles in excess of 30° were not unusual. This, combined
with the fact that the angles suggested in the Manual are
guides and not absolute values, and that pilots are free
to refuse approaches which they find difficult to handle,
leads us to accept the district court’s finding that the vec-
tor to the final approach course which required a turn of
more than 30° was not, by itself, indicative of a lack of
due care.

The three deviations from mandatory procedures seem
to us more serious; they cannot be explained as acceptable
customary procedures. While experts testified that on
oceasion individual services are not provided in compli-
ance with the Manual, this is the exception and not the
rule. Mr. Taylor himself testified that he normally gave
arriving aircraft the services required by the Manual and
none of the witnesses could recall an instance where all of
the services not given to D 723 were similarly withheld
from another flight.

We start with Approach’s failure to give D 723 its
position relative to the outer marker, information which
must be given to the crew before it is 3 miles from that
point. Delta’s expert testified that the aircraft’s distance
from the outer marker cannot be determined from aircraft
instrumentation, and that the knowledge assists the crew
in planning speed reduction in preparation for the ap-
proach. While it is no doubt true that the crew knew or
should have known by a mental time-distance-speed cal-
culation its general position south of Boston, the radar
controller was better able to know more exactly the air-
eraft’s position. D 723 had not been responsible for its

Logan Airport. The greater intercept angle required by that proce-
dure is in no way inconsistent with the smaller ones recommended
for planes intercepting the localizer course closer in to the airport.

20a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

own navigating but had been following headings given to
it by Approach. In light of the mandatory Manual pro-
cedure and the fact that the information is customarily
given to all incoming flights, the crew and, more especially,
the passengers, were entitled to rely on Approach to give
the position report.

A further troublesome factor in the handling of D 723
is that the flight was kept at 3,000 feet, and, as a result,
was required to intercept the glideslope from above. While
all agreed that occasionally pilots do this in making instru-
ment approaches, there was also expert testimony that
pilots are trained to intercept the glide slope from below.’
Further, the sophisticated instrumentation in airliners is
designed with such an intercept in mind. Having to inter-
cept from above greatly increases crew responsibilities
and workload. It is, for example, difficult for a jet aircraft
to descend rapidly and still keep the speed down to that
desired during the approach. It is the purpose of the pro-
cedure to achieve the minimum crew workload by making

7 Aircraft making the ILS approach to runway 4R are generally
cleared down to 2,000 feet at a point three or more miles outside
the outer marker. Once cleared for the approach,—this is also done
three miles or more outside the marker—they maintain 2,000 feet
until intercepting the glideslope from below roughly half a mile
before actually reaching the outer marker. According to testimony,
when flying a DC-9 like D 723, the crew will put down 15° of
flaps and slow to 160 knots before reaching this point. As the air-
eraft instruments show that interception is imminent, the crew
lowers the gear and the flaps to 50° in order to increase drag
and slow the plane. The aircraft rotates to a slightly nosedown
attitude. It is then relatively easy for the pilot to stabilize both
airspeed and the rate of descent on the glide slope without any
large power adjustments. An added benefit is that when the plane
is properly on the glide slope prior to reaching the outer marker,
the crew can check the altimeters as the plane passes over the
marker. The point at which the glide slope and the marker beacon
intersect is known to be at 1819 feet above sea level for the ap-
proach to runway 4R.

2la
Opinion of Court of Appeals

this very exacting phase of flight as uncomplicated and
routine as possible. That pilots should be capable of han-
dling the additional problems caused by the intercept does
not relieve the controller of his duty to the crew and
passengers to adhere to procedures established to make
the pilots’ tasks simpler and to enhance safety.

Finally, Mr. Taylor did not turn D 723 over to the
Tower at or before the outer marker as he was required
to do by §1360d of the Manual.

“The principal purpose of this paragraph is to
ensure that frequency changes are made prior to pass-
ing the final approach fix. However, at times it will
be desirable to retain an aircraft on the approach
control frequency to provide a single-frequency ap-
proach or other radar services. When this occurs, it
will be necessary to relay tower clearances or instrue-
tions to preclude changing frequencies prior to land-
ing or approach termination.”

Manual § 1360 d. Note. Mr. Taylor had no reason to keep
D 723 on the Approach frequency. Once he discovered the
flight was still with him, he turned it over to the Tower
instead of undertaking to relay all communications him-
self. As a result, the erew was required to switch frequen-
cies and to engage in last minute communications with the
Tower at a time when concentration should have been
focussed on the instrument approach and, more particu-
larly, on the mandatory altitude callouts as the aircraft
reached decision height. This is the type of distraction
that the procedure seeks to prevent.

* At 1507:43 GMT, D 723, then at roughly 370 to 380 feet, re-
ported to the Tower. The Tower, at 1507:45.5 GMT responded
with a clearance to land and the report of a fog bank across the

22a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

Another consequence of the failure to turn D 723 over
to the Tower at or before the outer marker was that D 723
did not learn of the fog bank in the vicinity of runway 4R
until twenty seconds before the crash. While appellants do
not argue that radar controllers must warn pilots about
airport weather conditions’ this is the kind of information
crews can reasonably expect to receive from the local
Tower controller who is in a position to observe and relay
last minute weather changes that cannot be observed from
the cockpit or the radar room. The duty to turn the air-
craft over to the Tower at the appropriate time and place
arises in part from the desirability of landing aircraft
receiving information of a distinctly local character.

The established Manual procedures for setting up air-
craft for the instrument approach and for turning them
over to local control are important to the safe and efficient

approach end of the runway. At the beginning of the Tower's
transmission, D 723 was at 350 feet and by the end it was at 260
feet. The mandatory ecallouts should have been made when the
plane was at 419 feet and 319 feet. See note 1 supra.

® It has been held that the Government’s duty to provide services
with due care to pilots includes communicating current weather
information, Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir.
1970), as well as giving appropriate warnings when controllers
are in a better position to make observations than pilots, Spaulding
v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 226 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1972). Here,
the Tower personnel were in the best situation to observe the ap-
proaching fog bank and, even without a mandatory Manual pro-
vision, were under a duty to pass on this warning to inbound
pilots, which the Tower in fact did. As we have already found
that it was a breach of the duty of due care not to turn D 723
over to the Tower at or before the outer marker there is no need
to consider if Mr. Taylor himself should have been informed of
the fog bank so he could pass it on to all incoming flights. The
critical issue, discussed in Part III infra, is whether D 723’s learn-
ing of the fog 1% to 2 minutes earlier would have significantly
changed the course of events.

23a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

termination of flights conducted in instrument flight condi-
tions. The fact that the procedures here in question are
made mandatory by the Government indicates not only
that they are not to be treated casually but that pilots may
rely on their being followed. Morevor, it is clear from
all the testimony that the three omissions by Mr. Taylor
contributed to an increased cockpit workload. We there-
fore cannot treat Mr. Taylor’s lapses as trivial. Pilots and
passengers alike are entitled to expect better service from
the air traffic control system and, although pilots are un-
doubtedly responsible for the safety of their aircraft,
controllers are concurrently responsible for adhering to
procedures which minimize the difficulties for the crew.
Accord Moisant Field, supra, 544 F.2d at 273. Unless there
were circumstances which would reasonably have caused
a controller to act as Mr. Taylor did, the handling of D 723
was negligent. We turn, then, to the problems caused by
Allegheny 666 to determine if they provided sufficient
excuse for the lapse in service to D 723.

B. The Separation Problem

After reviewing the record, we are left with a strong
conviction that the separation problem created by Alle-
gheny 666 did not justify the controller’s failure to give
D 723 standard service. Neither the transcripts of radio
communications between Approach and the numerous air-
craft it was handling, nor the testimony of Mr. Taylor
supports the district court’s finding that Mr. Taylor was
involved in an emergency situation over a seven minute
period.

At approximately two and one half minutes after eleven
(1502:25 GMT), AL 666 reported in the Millis holding

24a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

pattern at 8,000 feet, the same altitude already occupied
by EA 1020. (D 723 was at the time on a radar vector
flying a heading of 220°.) Approach responded quickly to
the potentially serious conflict by directing both aircraft
to leave the holding pattern, EA 1020 to the northeast
toward Logan Airport and AL 666 to the southwest. It
was soon determined that the two aircraft had followed
instructions and the immediate problem was resolved. Ap-
proach continued to control other aircraft including D 723
to which new vectors were issued. At 11:03 a.m. (1503:28
GMT), Approach told AL 666 to reverse its course and to
return to Millis and hold. Mr. Taylor testified that at the
time he gave this instruction he was satisfied that, from a
separation point of view, it was safe to send AL 666 back
to Millis. Almost a full minute later, at 11:04:27 a.m.,
Approach gave D 723 a final vector to intercept the local-
izer, but no instruction to descend and to go to Tower
frequency, no clearance for the approach and no position
report. Not only does it appear from the transcript that
there was no reason for Mr. Taylor to withhold a complete
standard clearance at that time, but Mr. Taylor himself
testified that he had intended to give the full clearance
and he didn’t know why he had not. Nevertheless, Ap-
proach continued to handle the various aircraft in its
jurisdiction, vectoring some in readiness for approaches
and descending others within the holding pattern. During
the early part of minute 11:05 a.m., five attempts to raise
AL 666 and to reconfirm its altitude as 8,000 feet were
unsuccessful. At 11:05 a.m. (1505:40 GMT), D 723 asked
if it were cleared for the ILS approach and the response
was “Yes, seven two three is cleared for ILS yes.”
Shortly thereafter, AL 666 reported that it was still at

25a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

8,000 feet’? and Approach took the time to discuss with
the flight AL 666’s expected approach clearance time.
D 723 crossed the outer marker at 11:06:14, after dis-
cussion between Approach and AL 666 had, for the mo-
ment, ceased, yet Approach still did not turn D 723 over
to the Tower and only did so when reminded by the local
control coordinator. Mr. Taylor, in his testimony, as
much as admitted that he had simply forgotten about D 723.

A econtroller’s job is a busy one requiring the juggling
of many aircraft at once and the skillful handling of a
constantly changing situation. Too much attention to any
one aircraft or problem, however, may mean that others
in the system do not get the service to which they are
entitled. Mr. Taylor may have been preoccupied with
AL 666; he had not in twenty years of experience had
two airplanes report in a holding pattern at the same
altitude. Certainly immediate, concentrated attention to
the problem was necessary. Once the potential crisis was
defused, however, there was no longer a legal excuse for

1° Approach’s problems with AL 666 were not yet over, however.
At 11:09 am., Approach had to ask the flight to return to the
Millis holding pattern hecause it had strayed seven miles to the
north. During his testimony Mr. Taylor stated that during the
period he was trying to raise AL 666 to reconfirm its altitude
(minute 1504 GMT), he observed that the flight was overshooting
the holding pattern. However, under redirect by the Government’s
attorney, Mr. Taylor conceded that, at the time he was making
the calls, AL 666 must have still been in the holding pattern. The
reason for this is because at holding pattern speed it would have
taken AL 666 only 2 to 2.1 minutes to get to a point 7 miles north
of Millis and so the overshoot by the aircraft most likely would
not have been noticed until sometime after 11:07 a.m. when D 723
was finally turned over to the Tower. Therefore, any actions Mr.
Taylor was required to take to avoid traffic conflicts in the area
— of Millis were not relevant to the service or lack thereof to

26a
Optnion of Court of Appeals

failing to deal properly with all of the aircraft under his
control. That Mr. Taylor may have been reacting to feel-
ings of worry and concern, while understandable, will not
justify the Government for failing to afford appropriate
services when it could have done so. We must hold, there-
fore, that Mr. Taylor’s handling of D 723 was negligent.

Our finding that Mr. Taylor’s omissions constituted
negligence does not end the inquiry, however. Though
falling below the requisite standard of care, an act or
omission is not actionable unless also shown to be a sub-
stantial cause of the injury complained of. We consider
next the district court’s finding that there was no causal
connection between the way in which D 723 was handled
by air traffic control and the accident.

III

Our finding of controller negligence in failing to follow
established mandatory procedures is grounded on the
premise that the unexcused violation by a federal employee
of procedures established by the Government which have
as their purpose the protection of those who were in fact
harmed constitutes negligence. This is analogous to the
familiar tort principle that violation of a statute or ad-
ministrative regulation is either negligence per se, see
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 288B(1), or evidence of
negligence, see Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp.,
267 Mass. 501, 516, 167 N.E. 235, 242 (1929). Cf. Gill v.
United States, supra, 429 F.2d at 1075 (federal regulations
may impose duties and standards of conduct on actors in
suit under Federal Tort Claims Act). While such a finding
exposes the Government to the possibility of liability it
must also be shown that the negligent conduct is a legal

27a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

cause of harm; here there must be a proven causal rela-
tionship between Mr. Taylor’s omissions and the crash
of D 723. Accord, Spaulding v. United States, swpra,
455 F.2d at 225-26. See generally Moisant Field, supra.
Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states

in part,
“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of

harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm.”

See also Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., Inc. 266 Mass. 25,
27-28, 164 N.E. 612, 613 (1929). Thus, “[i]t is not enough
that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not
been negligent”, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431,
comment a. The act must be a “substantial” cause in
bringing about the harm.

“The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact
that the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to
regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular
sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsi-
bility, rather than in the so-called ‘philosophic sense’,
which includes every one of the great number of
events without which any happening would not have
occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-
called ‘philosophic sense’, yet the effect of many of
them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would
think of them as causes.”

The question of legal cause is for the factfinder; the
issue involves essentially no legal judgments. Therefore,
we must uphold the district court’s finding unless it is
clearly erroneous.

28a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

In attempting to establish that Mr. Taylor’s conduct was
a substantial cause of the crash of D 723, Delta and the
individual plaintiffs had the burden of persuasion."* See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B; Prosser, supra
at 241. They were thus required to convince the district
court as factfinder that it was more likely than not that
the omissions by Mr. Taylor were a “substantial” cause
of the accident. This they failed to do. The district court
found that the sole cause of the crash was the negligence
of the Delta crew and in so doing made the factual de-
termination that there was not sufficient proof of a causal
connection between air traffic control service, however
characterized, and the accident.

While causation in fact is often a determination that
can be made based on inferences from common knowledge,
the present case is one where laymen, unaided, could not
be expected to draw such inferences. Expert testimony
was of utmost importance. The district court, having
heard all the evidence, was entitled to weigh the conflicting
testimony of expert witnesses and to draw all reasonable in-
ferences from the testimony it credited.”

12 Only if there existed a tort rule analogous to the Pennsylvania
Rule in maritime law, see Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Rederi
AB/Disa, 213 F.2d 772, 775 (1st Cir. 1954), could the proof of
negligence on the present facts shift to the Government the burden
of persuasion on the issue of causation. Such a rule would have
the effect of making the Government an insurer and there is no
support for this concept in either Massachusetts law or the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. Nor are we convinced that this would
be desirable as a matter of policy.

22 The individual plaintiffs appeal from the court’s virtual re-
jection of the testimony of Roys Jones, an expert witness called
by them. They claim that the court must have applied an incor-
rect legal standard or Jones’ testimony would have been credited.
“The trial court has wide discretion in determining when a pur-
ported expert is sufficiently qualified to take the stand and render

29a
Opinion of Court of Appeals ;

Viewing all of the evidence, even in the light most
favorable to appellants, we think that the district court
had ample support for its finding that there was no causal
relationship between air traffic control service and the
accident. Delta’s expert conceded that no one of the ir-
regularities in service would, by itself, cause a problem
for a well-trained airline crew. He explained that, stand-
ing alone, the vector requiring a 45° intercept would be
no problem, that failing to receive a position report prior
to reaching the outer marker would not preclude a satis-
factory approach, that having to intercept the glide slope
from above would not be an insurmountable task, that not
being told to go to the Tower at or before the outer marker
and being switched well inside the outer marker would not
necessarily prevent successful completion of the approach.
Although stating that a combination of any two or more
would adversely effect the cockpit workload, the expert
testified that even so, the lack of services and the attendant
problems “would [not] necessarily cause any great alarm”,
and that, in fact, the approach of D 723 was not unman-
ageable and was not, as a practical matter, totally unac-
ceptable for everyday purposes until the very last stages
of flight. There is evidence that the crew was not con-
cerned by the lack of air traffic control service. As the
aircraft intercepted the localizer some two miles from the
outer marker, D 723 called Approach, asked if it were
cleared for the ILS approach, then acknowledged the
clearance by saying “alrighty”. There was testimony that

an opinion in a certain area.” Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon
Co., 5382 F.2d 758, 762 (1st Cir. 1976). Here the court allowed
Jones to testify, but as a factfinder found that his lack of recent
experience as a controller and the fact that he had no fiving ex-
perience in commercial jets deprived his opinions of probative
value. That finding was not clearly erroneous.

30a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

this implied that the crew felt ready to make the ap-
proach. It can thus be reasonably inferred that in the
early stages of the ILS approach, the crew of D 723 was
not disturbed by the omissions of Mr. Taylor.

In contrast to the somewhat tentative testimony on
behalf of Delta, the Government’s expert, an FAA flight
examiner in the DC-9, testified unequivocally that the non-
standard air traffic control service received by D 723 could
not have caused the accident. He testified that the Captain
had, at all times, not only the option but the obligation to
make a missed approach if too many difficulties developed.
A missed approach can be executed in a DC-9 from very
low levels and in a matter of seconds. A reasonable in-
ference from the fact that D 723 did not go around and
apparently made no attempt to do so would be that even
in the last stages of the flight, none of the additional work-
load caused by the lack of service to D 723 appeared to the
Captain to create a problem of major proportions even
with the added factor that the flight director was not
functioning properly and the aircraft was, for much of the
approach, well left of the localizer.**

As to the specific effects of the various omissions, there
was convincing evidence that the excursions to the left
of the localizer course were related to the faulty signals

18 The individual plaintiffs’ contention that transmissions from
the Tower during the time the aircraft was approaching decision
height seriously distracted the pilots, is likewise without strong
support. Pilots testified that it was better to get the weather in-
formation even late in the approach than not to receive it at all.
Moreover, in the opinion of the Government’s expert, although the
Captain was the one who should have been making the callouts,
see note 1 supra, and he was also the one who was handling the
radio, there was no reason for the radio work to interfere with the
altitude callouts. Nor would the communications be seriously dis-
tracting to the First Officer who was flying the plane but not talk-
ing on the radio.

3la
Opinion of Court of Appeals

from the flight director and not to the angle of intercept
provided by Approach. The flight profile shows that the
45° turn onto the localizer was accomplished without ex-
cessive deviation to the right of course as might be ex-
pected if the required turn was too great. The cockpit
voice recorder reveals that during the approach the First
Officer expressed concern about the flight director and,
ultimately, that the Captain ordered that he stop using
the sophisticated device altogether. It was therefore rea-
sonable for the district court to find it more likely than
not that the cause of the deviations from the localizer
had nothing whatever to do with the service or the lack
thereof by the controller.

We find more troublesome the question of whether the
lack of a position report and the intercept above glide
slope were causally connected to the aircraft’s speed con-
trol difficulties and the fact that D 723 was never stabilized
on the glide slope and eventually flew into the ground short
of the runway. The answer is that D 723 had apparently
coped adequately with any speed and rate of descent prob-
lems by the time it had reached decision height. There
was expert testimony to the effect that from the outer
marker inbound, a gradual reduction in speed took place
so that shortly before the aircraft reached decision height,
it had also reached the target speed of 124 knots. More-
over, although the aircraft was never established on the
glide slope, the rate of descent during most of the period
was within normal limits and, according to expert testi-
mony, the plane’s glide path flattened out just after it
dropped below the glide slope. That the speed and the
rate of descent were basically under control toward the
end of the approach is corroborated to some extent by the
testimony of Delta’s expert that the approach was, until

32a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

the end, acceptable, if not ideal. A reasonable inference,
then, is that whatever difficulties might have been caused
by poor controller service had been handled successfully
by the time D 723 reached decision height. While unques-
tionably something occurred at about the time the plane
reached decision height—the rate of descent went from
approximately 700 fet per minute to 1200 feet per minute
and the speed increased to 130 knots where it remained
until impact—on the evidence we think that the district
court was entitled to find that the controller services were
unrelated to the last minute loss of control.

It was Delta’s theory, in essence, that had the weather
been as reported, the sloppy approach would not have
mattered. However, because D 723 was in an unstabilized
position at decision height, due in part to the service it
had received from the controller, the crew was unable to
deal succesfully with the fog bank which was purportedly
entered unexpectedly after establishing some ground con-
tact. Thus, the really important factual question in this
case is whether the crash would not have happened if
D 723 had been switched to the Tower frequency at the
outer marker and so had learned of the fog bank at the
beginning of the final approach instead of a minute and
a half later, less than 20 seconds before impact. On this
point, airline pilots testified that the information about
the fog bank would be useful and welcome at any phase of
the approach. Delta’s expert explained that the new in-
formation would require rapid evaluation and decision-
making of the type regularly engaged in by pilots. The
witness further stated that the transmission D 723 received
from the Tower would not indicate to him that he would
be unable to complete the approach to a landing but only
that he might have to fly through some fog before reach-

33a
Opinion of Court of Appeals

ing the runway. Moreover, while there was some testimony
that the weather report D 723 received early in its flight—
estimated 400 feet overcast, 14% miles in fog—would not
have caused a pilot to be particularly concerned about the
possibility of a missed approach, there was other testi-
mony by witnesses for both Delta and the Government
that, given the forecast for the area, the weather report
received, and the unpredictability of fog, especially near
the water, any pilot would be anticipating the possibility
of a missed approach that morning. Finally, the cockpit
voice recorder reveals that the crew did not react at all
to the Tower transmission reporting the fog bank when
it was finally received. We cannot say that the court could
not reasonably have inferred that, as Delta’s expert indi-
cated, the pilots simply did not consider the report to have
any major bearing on the probability that they would be
able to go ahead and land. If, as one might conclude from
both the testimony and the evidence of a lack of reaction
to the additional weather information, the crew continued
for some reason to believe that the weather at the airport
was basically as it had been reported to them earlier, the
argument that receiving news of the fog a minute and a
half sooner would have made the crew act differently is
not conclusive. The district court was entitled to find that
Delta and the individual plaintiffs did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between
D 723’s having learned of the fog bank only late in the
approach and the accident.

Without an established causal connection, the fact that
the controller did not provide proper services in several
respects is not a sufficient basis for holding the Govern-
ment liable.

Affirmed.

34a

Opinion of District Court

In re ArrcrasH Disaster at Boston, MassacHUSETTS,

Juty 31, 1973.°

United States District Court,
D. Massachusetts.
Feb. 19, 1976.

OPINION

_ Carrrey, Chief Judge.

I. IntrRopvction

All of the above-captioned cases arise out of the tragic
crash of a Delta Airlines, Inc. (Delta) DC-9 twin-engine
jet airliner at approximately 11:08 a.m.,' July 31, 1973,
at Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts.

The aircraft, which was identified as Delta Flight 723
(hereafter D 723) was scheduled to fly that morning from
Burlington, Vermont to Logan Airport. It made an un-
scheduled stop at Manchester, New Hampshire, and then
flew from Manchester to Boston. In attempting to effec-
tuate an Instrument Landing System (ILS)? approach at

* Titles of Consolidated cases are listed following Appendix, see
pages ——--——.

Control tower records and transmissions between the tower
and various aircraft are expressed in terms of Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT). 10:00 a. m. Eastern Daylight Savings Time appears
in the exhibits as 1400 GMT; 11:00 a. m. appears in the exhibits
as 1500 GMT.

* The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is a system in the air-
eraft which provides the lateral, longitudinal, and vertical guid-
ance necessary for a landing. The ground equipment consists of

35a
Opinion of District Court

Runway 4-R* at Logan Airport, the aircraft smashed into
a seawall along the edge of the airport. The elevation of
the runway is 16 feet above sea level, and the elevation of
the ground at the point of impact with the seawall is 11.45
feet above sea level. The aircraft impacted 4153 feet short
of the so-called ILS touchdown point,‘ and about 165 feet
to the right of the center line of the runway. The wreckage
of the aircraft was scattered along a magnetic heading of
017° in an area 250 feet wide and 790 feet long. The head-
ing of Runway 4-R is 035°.

All 89 persons aboard the aircraft died as a result of
the crash. A large number of lawsuits were filed against
Delta by representatives of the estates of the 82 passen-
gers, Delta, in turn, commenced litigation charging the
United States with liability premised on the alleged negli-
gence of various air traffic controllers employed at Logan

two highly directional transmitting systems and, along the ap-
proach, three (or fewer) marker beacons. The directional trans-
mitters are known as the localizer and glide slope transmitters.
The system may be divided functionally into three parts:

(1) Guidance information-localizer, glide slope,
(2) Range information-marker beacons, and

(3) Visual information-approach lights, touchdown and cen-
ter line lights, and runway lights.

* Runways are numbered by reference to the heading expressed
in degrees which their center line runs as compared to true north.
Runway 4R at Logan Airport has a center line 42/5 from true
north.

‘The displaced threshold is designated on the approach charts
for Runway 4-R as being a point located a distance of 2507 feet
from the approach end of the runway. This is the nearest point
to the approach end at which an aircraft using this runway may
touch down on that runway when making a landing when visual
flight rules (VFR apply).

The ILS touchdown point is 3660 feet up the runway from the
approach end thereof. This is the earliest point at which an air-
eraft may touch down for its landing when making an approach
when instrument flight rules (IFR) apply.

36a
Opinion of District Court

Airport. Additional suits were filed directly against the
United States on behalf of the estates of all members of
the crew of D 723, as well as a suit on behalf of the estate
of Joseph E. Burrell who was occupying the jump seat in
the cockpit of this aircraft. Litigation is still pending be-
tween the Burrell estate and Delta to determine whether

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0029%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
