# Amicus Brief — Parker v. Flook

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0002%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 437 U.S. 584

## Text

BOR ARGUMENT

* Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
APR 5 i978
— JR., CLERK
Supreme Court of the Uni ,
| October Term, 1977
a No. 77-642

LUTRELLE F. PARKER, Acting Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks,

Petitioner,
v.

DALE R. FLOOK,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION

Ricuarp E. Kurtz
Woopcock WaAsHBURN KuRTz
& MACKIEWICZ

1800 United Engineers Building
30 South 17th Street

Philadelphia, Penna. 19103

MicHaEL G. GiLMAN
New York, N. Y.

wagues J. SCHERBACK

Attorney s for Amicus Curiae,

Oil Corporation
Of Counsel:

CuHaries A. Huccetr
General Patent Counsel .
Mobil Oil Corporation
New York, N. Y.

international Printing Co., 711 So. 50th St., Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page

I. THe NATURE AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS ............, 1

II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............0ceeeeeees 2

Se MEE Crock bunddeas qhuebodekds be seesoctesetes 3
A. Benson has been properly applied by the C. C. P. A.

oe ca conaneiegkeeseesenansens 3

B. An inventor's idea or discovery is part of the invention
as a whole and must be considered in determining
I i wos dacdon ce cu Venseues cdcundertpes 6

C. Exclusion of a broad area of the useful arts from pro-
tection under the federal patent statutes will be
detrimental to the advancement of the useful arts... 9

EE ee Peery epee PRES Ge aren 12

TABLE OF CITATIONS.

Cases: Page
In re Aufhauser, 399 F. 2d 275 (C. C. P. A. 1968) .......... 7
In re Bergy, 563 F. 2d 1031 (C. C. P. A. 1977) ............ 12
In re Chakrabarty, — F. 2d —, 369 BNA-P. T. C. J, D-l
SR EY Sac ada bee eeiadhs Gnkapeneakoes 12
In re Chatfield, 545 F. 2d 152 (C. C. P. A. 1976) ........... 3
In re Christensen, 478 F. 2d 1392 (C. C. P. A. 1973) ........ 3
In re Conover, 304 F. 2d 680 (C. C. P. A. 1962) ............ 7
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U. S. 219 (1976) .................5. 3,4
In re deCastelet, 562 F. 2d 1236 (C. C. P. A. 1977) ......... 4
In re Deutsch, 553 F. 2d 689 (C. C. P. A. 1977) ............ 3,5

Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U. S.

EE i656 Weeanecin das aeebaess Sek daneeuen 7
In re Flook, 559 F. 2d 21 (C. C. P. A. 1977) ............... 4
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U. S$. 127 (1948) 8
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973) .............. 10
Gottschalk v. Benson et al., 409 U. S. 63 (1972) ........ 2, 3, 4,6,9
Graham et al. v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City et al., 383

SD svcd Geullensned ecdeeekel bondeea bens 7
In re Johnston, 502 F. 2d 765 (C. C. P. A. 1974) ............ 3

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 416 U. S. 470 (1974) .10, 11
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of
Repartamy, SHB Gs GBB COD. oo kc cw vcecenesdscccasess 8
In re Noll, 545 F. 2d 141 (C. C. P. A. 1976) ............... 3
In re Richman, 563 F. 2d 1026 (C. C. P. A. 1977) .......... 4
In re Roberts and Burch, 470 F. 2d 1399 (C. C. P. A. 1973)... 7

Ex parte Ruehle, Appeal No. 320-89, Pat. Office Bd. of App.
Ce I 6410 0.065 tions denncuwadcekesese 5

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964) .... 9
Trio Process Corporation v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F. 2d
ee EE coc katveseincheduveeseusatvdabunus 7
U. S. v. Adams et al., 383 U. S. 39 (1966) .................. 7
In re Waldbaum, 559 F. 2d 611 (C. C. P. A. 1977) ......... 4
In re Warmus, — F. 2d —, 195 U. S. P. Q. 234 (C. C. P. A.
SE b:ctsnerdedabenbediansgennssenedeesiskete neue 4

White-Smith v. Apollo, 209 U. S. 1 (1908) ................. 9, 10

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Coutimued).

Statutes: Page
EE, rf CEN oe ROTOR ey,
EE 9 i RRR TIRES, NACE CSRS er ete 3, 4,8, 1
Ss a 2,3, 4, 6,7, 11
35 U.S. C. § 106 (proposed, H. R. 5924, 90th Cong,, Ist Sess.) 11
PSE NS ENE ee aE RUACS in AOS Seine ape 1
To cuuaeeiekeen 5

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States _

——

OcroBER TERM, 1977

No. 77-642

LUTRELLE F. PARKER, ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS,
Petitioner,

v.

DALE R. FLOOK,
Respondent.

On Writ or CERTIORARI To THE UNITED STATES
Court Or Customs AND PATENT APPEALS.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION.

I.

THE NATURE AND INTEREST OF
THE AMICUS.

This brief amicus curiae is submitted by Mobil Oil
Corporation in accordance with Rule 42(2) of this Court.
Letters of consent from both parties have been filed with
the Clerk of the Court.

Mobil Oil Corporation has as its principal business
the exploration for, production, refining and marketing of
petroleum and products derived therefrom on a worldwide
basis. As a supporting activity, Mobil has several research
facilities in different parts of the country utilized for orig-
inal research to develop the full potential of computer

2 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

applications in its various fields of activity. Mobil’s com-
puters are in twenty-four hour a day use to find petroleum,
to control its refineries, to increase the yield of petroleum
products, and to develop new processes for converting
coal to liquid petroleum products such as gasoline. Its
large expenditures in research and practical applications
involving computer operation have given rise to pro-
prietary information deemed of great value. Mobil has
an extensive licensing program under which its patented
proprietary technology is generally made available for use
by others around the world. Computer related technology
has not been included, however, because of uncertainty as
to protection afforded by the patent laws.

I.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

A. The C. C. P. A. has carefully applied this Court's ruling
in Gottschalk v. Benson et al, 409 U. S. 63 (1972) , (here-
inafter Benson). Digital computers are used in numerous
arts and technologies, a variety of which have been con-
sidered by the C. C. P. A. since the Benson decision. No
general rule of law can justly prescribe the patentability
of all of them. Petitioner wrongly urges this Court to
adopt a general rule of law denying patentability to all
inventions which are implemented by digital computers.

B. In urging unpatentability, Petitioner uses an approach
inconsistent with the well established principle codified in
35 U. S. C. § 103, that the invention as a whole must be
considered in determining patentability. Petitioner would
separate the inventor's original idea, or discovery from the
mode of implementing it. In accordance with Petitioner's
approach, this mode of implementation must be inventive
in and of itself. This would rule out large numbers of
important patents in which the inventor's idea or discovery

Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil 3

rather than its mode of implementation is the inventive
contribution.

C. If the Petitioner's position is adopted, large segments
of the useful arts would be excluded from protection under
the federal patent statutes. These innovations would be
protected, if at all, only under the proprietary rights laws
of the various states. The disparity in protection, and
attendant confusion as to whether protection exists in a
given state, would unnecessarily limit the exchange of
technology. The patent statutes should be construed as
applying to all newly developed technologies unless Con-
gress specifically excludes them from protection.

IT.
ARGUMENT.

A. Benson Has Been Properly Applied by the C. C. P. A.
in Many Appeals.

Digital computers are use in geophysical exploration ',
banking *, graphic display *, controlling systems of other
computers *, operating systems of oil refineries®, data

1. In re Christensen, 478 F. 2d 1392 (C. C. P. A. 1973); 35
U.S. C. § 101 rejection affirmed by C. C. P. A.

2. In re Johnston, 302 F. 2d 765 (C. C. P. A. 1974); 35
U. S. C. §§ 101 and 103 rejections reversed by C. C. P. A.; reud. as
to 35 U. S. C. § 108 rejection sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U. S.
219 (1976).

3. In re Noll, 545 F. 2d 141 (C. C. P. A. 1976); 35 U.S. C. § 101
rejection reversed by C. C. P. A.; cert. denied — U. S. —, 195
U. S. P. Q. No. 5, p. IL.

4. In re Chatfield, 545 F. 2d 152 (C. C. P. A. 1976); 35 U.S. C.
ag a reversed; cert. denied — U. S. —, 195 U. S. P. Q.
No. 5, p. II.

5. In re Deutsch, 553 F. 2d 689 (C. C. P. A. 1977); 35 U.S. C.
§ 101 rejection reversed by C. C. P. A.

4 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

processing °, catalytic cracking of hydrocarbons‘, control-
ling machine tools *, aircraft navigation ® and selling auto-
mobiles *°. These arts were involved in ten appeals which
the C. C. P. A. decided since this Court’s decision in
Benson. No general rule can justly prescribe the patenta-
bility of all of the foregoing technologies. The presence
or absence of a programmed general purpose digital com-
puter in a patent application claiming an innovation
neither confers upon nor detracts from the patentability of
that innovation. Nevertheless, the Patent Office has taken
the position that Benson precludes patentability of all of
the foregoing arts which use digital computers, a position
reasserted by petitioner in this appeal. Petitioner is at-
tempting to do the very thing which this Court so care-
fully guarded against in Benson when it stated:

“It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any

program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.”

409 U. S. at 71, (emphasis added ).
Furthermore, in urging a broad proscription of patent-
ability, Petitioner has ignored this Court's subsequent
observation that the holding in Benson was “limited” to
the patentability of the process in question. Dann v.
Johnston, supra, 425 U. S. at 224.

The C. C. P. A. has carefully applied Benson on a case
by case basis, eschewing the broad proscription of patent-

6. In re Waldbaum, 559 F. 2d 611 - C. P. A. 1977); 35
U. S. C. § 101 rejection affirmed by C. C. P. A.

7. In re Flook, 559 F. 2d 21 (C. C. P. A. 1977); cert. granted
sub nom. Parker v. Flook, — U. S. — (1977) (No. 77-642).

8. In re deCastelet, 562 F. 2d 1236 (C. C. P. A. 1977); 35~

U. S. C. § 101 rejection affirmed by C. C. P. A.

9. In re Richman, 563 F. 2d 1026 (C. C. P. A. 1977); 35 U.S. C.
§ 101 rejection aflirmed by C. C. P. A.

10. In re Warmus, — F. 2d —, 195 U. S. P. Q. 234 (C. C. P. A.
1977); 35 U. S. C. § 103 rejection affirmed by C. C. P. A. without
reaching rejection under 35 U. S. C. § 101.

~~ a

Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil 5

ability urged by Petitioner. That court found patentable
subject matter in five cases and found unpatentable subject
matter in the remaining five cases. In these ten cases, the
C. C. P. A. very carefully analyzed exactly what the ap-
plicants claimed. Only such a careful analysis on a case
by case basis will enable the patent system to meet the
constitutional mandate for advancing the useful arts. If
this Court adopts Petitioner’s position as set forth on page
18 of its brief, however, all of the careful analysis by the
C. C. P. A. will be ignored by the Patent Office.

As one example of the problems and further appeals
which would be engendered by such a holding, consider
the patent application, assigned to amicus, and involved
in In re Deutsch supra, n 5. That patent application re-
lates to the computer control of a system of multiple
plants, such as oil refineries. The C. C. P. A. unanimously
found the subject matter claimed in the Deutsch applica-
tion to be patentable. The Patent Office did not petition
this Court for certiorari, but neither did the Patent Office
issue the patent. Despite the fact that the C. C. P. A.
handed down its decision on May 5, 1977, the Patent Office
has not yet taken even preliminary steps toward issuance
of the patent. Action on this application and numerous
other patent applications, which in all respects comply
with the requirements for patentable subject matter, has
been suspended pending a decision on the broad issue
which the Petitioner would have this Court decide ™.

1l. The Patent Office normally sends a Notice Of Allowance

requesting payment of a fee. After payment of the final fee, the
oe on is A ee ar and issued. 37 C. F. R. § 1.316.

12. As a further example of the manner in which the Patent
Office has suspended proceedings, reference is made to Ex Parte
Ruehle, Appeal No. 330-89, Pat. Office Bd. of App. Although the
Board of A agreed that early decisions on ap are
normally in the best interests of the parties and the public, it denied
a petition to expedite a decision on an appeal relating to seismic

6 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

Amicus submits that Benson, as it has been carefully ap-
plied by the C. C. P. A., properly carries out the constitu-
tional mandate to promote the progress of the useful arts.

B. An Inventor's Idea or Discovery Is Part of the Inven-
tion as a Whole and Must Be Considered in Determin-
ing Patentability.

Thousands upon thousands of patents have been
granted to amicus and others on chemical, electrical and
mechanical inventions in which implementation of the
idea is perfectly clear from the idea itself. Petitioner
argues that:

“To merit monopoly protection, it is not sufficient that
a claim embody a concrete, tangible application of a
mathematical or scientific principle; it must also ex-
tend beyond the routine, conventional, or uninventive
applications that follow once the applicant possesses
the idea.” Petitioner's Brief at 19.

This contention is antithetical to the law which has
upheld the validity of numerous patents in which the in-
ventor'’s contribution was a discovery or an idea. As just
one example, compositions of matter useful in catalytic
cracking of gasoline can usually be conventionally pro-
duced after the inventor discovers the composition. Peti-
tioner argues that the means or mode for implementing
the discovery must be unobvious, but this is completely
contrary to the established principle, codified in 35 U. S. C.
§ 103, that the invention as a whole must be considered in

12. (Cont'd. )
exploration. As its reason, the Board stated that “. . . Parker v.
Flook may have @& substantial impact on the law governing the

on) in this appeal.” (Unpublished decision dated March 14,

Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil 7

determining patentability." Graham et al v. John Deere
Co. of Kansas City et al, 383 U. S. 1, 3, 32 (1965). This
Court has consistently considered the invention as a whole
in determining patentability.

In Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper
Co., 261 U. S. 45 (1923), the patentee discovered that
wrinkling and malformation of paper in a paper making
machine that had baffled an entire industry for decades
occurred because the stock did not flow fast enough at a
critical point in the process. Eibel simply increased the
pitch of the path of the stock to take advantage ofthe
force of gravity to increase the flow rate. This Court up-
held the patent, deciding that the patentee had made a
patentable contribution in discovering the problem even
though once discovered the solution was routine.

In U. S. v. Adams et al, 383 U. S. 39 (1966), a patent
on a water activated battery was upheld. The imple-
mentation of this battery required only ordinary skill, but
it was the idea that imparted patentability to the patent.

The invention as a whole, and not the particular form
or language used to describe it, must be considered in
determining the patentability of the subject matter in-
volved in any particular case. If the subject matter is
implemented with the aid of a computer, the appropriate

13. 35 U. S. C. § 103 provides:

§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in § 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made.

14. See Trio Process Corporation v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc.,
461, F. 2d 66, n. 18a (3 Cir. 1972); In re Aufhauser, 399 F. 2d 275,
277 (C. C. P. A. 1968); In re Conover, 304 F. 2d 680, 683 (¢ C.
A. wey and In re Roberts and Burch, 470 F. 2d 1399 (C. C.

_ A.

8 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

language with which to define this subject matter is mathe-
matics, a language which the technologist utilizing the
computer understands. Analogously, the biologist under-
stands species named in Latin. Ergo, biological inven-
tions often make use of Latin terms to define species. The
language used to define an invention ought not to be
dispositive of patentability—rather patentability should be
judged by the invention as a whole, however, described.
For example, many chemical process patents claim inven-
tion in controlling a particular process variable within
specified limits. One acceptable way of claiming such
might be “controlling the pressure of a reaction between
100 and 500 psi as a function of the reaction temperature.”
This could also be accurately written:

P = f(T); from P = 100 pss.i. to P = 500 pss.i.

Whether a patent claim is written in prose or in mathe-
matical format is not determinative of patentability.

“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical ex-
pression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure (process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter) created with the aid of
knowledge of scier tific truth may be.” Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of America,
306 U. S. 86, 94 (1939) (Parenthetical matter added
from 35 U. S. C. § 101)

The inclusion of a mathematical relationship in a patent
claim does not necessarily destroy patentability.
Petitioner's brief distorts the patent law by improperly
expanding the limited holding of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant, 333 U. S. 127 (1948). In that case, the
alleged invention related to a principle of nature. Prin-
ciples of nature or natural phenomena, such as that in-
volved in the Funk case, are not patentable because they
are not related to the useful arts for which the Constitu-

nO ee ee

Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil g

tion mandates patent protection. Where the invention as
a whole relates to a principal of nature, or a fundamental
natural law, only the unobvious implementation is patent-
able, not the particular law itself. Where the invention
relates to one of the useful arts, however, such as the
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons involved in
the case at bar, it is only necessary that the invention as
a whole, including the idea or discovery, be unobvious.

C. Exclusion of a Broad Area of the Useful Arts From
Protection Under the Federal Patent Statutes Will
Be Detrimental to the Advancement of the Useful
Arts.

The desirability of uniformity under a federal patent
system is well stated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964):

“Thus the patent system is one in which uniform

federal standards are carefully used to promote in-

vention while at the same time preserving free com-
petition.”

Petitioner argues that Benson precludes patentability
of substantial numbers of patents for computer imple-
mented inventions.” If the Petitioners position is
adopted, the same situation will exist that existed with
respect to sound recordings after White-Smith v. Apollo,
209 U. S. 1 (1908) precluded statutory federal copyright
protection for these recordings. In the interim between
White-Smith v. Apollo and passage in 1971 of the Federal
statute providing copyright protection for sound record-
ings, the states were free to enact statutes providing pro-
tection for sound recordings. This Court noted that a
copyright granted by a particular state had effect caly

15. Petitioner’s Brief at 24. Petitioner estimates the number of

such applications to be 600 to 900 now pending with approximately
450 such applications being filed each year.

10 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

within its boundaries, thus having no coercive effect on
“record or tape piracy” outside of those boundaries. Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U. S. 546, 558 (1973), reh. den. 414
U. S. 883. The analogy between the exclusion of sound
recordings from the copyright laws before 1971 and the
potential exclusion of “new technology” from the 1952
Patent Act, as argued for by petitioner, is too strong to be
ignored.

If a broad area of computer implemented tech-
nology is excluded from protection under the federal
patent statutes, the only proprietary rights in this tech-
nology will be under such laws as the various states may
enact.'"® The result of this varied protection will be a
burden upon interstate commerce as well as a detriment to
the American economy. If Petitioner's position is adopted,
the states presumably would be free to enact laws extend-
ing beyond the normal trade secret type of protection.
This Court has previously held that:

“The only limitation on the States is that in regulat-
ing the area of patents and copyrights they do not
conflict with the operation of the laws in this area
passed by Congress . . .” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. et al, 416 U. S. 470, 479 (1974).

16. While the Federal Copyright Law may provide some
nationwide protection for computer programs, the protection ex-
tends only to the particular form of expression of the particular
computer program and not to the underlying technical advance
expressed in different form. Moreover, the reasoning of White-
Smith v. Apollo might be applied to find that the Copyright Act of
1978 does not extend protection to each use of a program in
physical form in a machine. The new copyright act provides that
copyrighted matter fixed in physical form is a copy: but 17 U. S. C.
§ 117 provides that existing law will be applied notwithstanding
other provisions of the statute. Many questions remain as to the
application of this new act to computer technology. A commission
to study changes in the copyright laws relating to protection of
computer programs is currently at work, but it is by no means
certain when and if Congress will act on its recommendations.

Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil 11

Kewanee reconciled the potential conflict between federal
patent laws and state proprietary rights laws. Kewanee
also recognized that some inventions which do not meet
the standards of patentability set forth in 35 U. S. C. § 101
are protectible only under state law. The situation clearly
cries out for broad construction of 35 U. S. C. § 101 to in-
clude as much technology as possible under the federal
patent laws. Such a construction will help prevent conflict
between federal and state laws.

The uses made by this amicus, and almost all other
uses of computer technology extend beyond the confines of
a single state. To rely solely on the trade secret protection
of multiple states (or upon patent-like statutes which the
states might enact) would unnecessarily complicate and
restrict the disclosure and transfer of proprietary informa-
tion about this technology. A better approach is recog-
nized in Kewanee. Federal patents should be granted to
encourage disclosure of those inventions which are so
meritorious that they meet the standards of 35 U. S. C.
§ 103. Trade secret protection would be available to
encourage investment in the areas of doubtfully patentable
and clearly unpatentable technologies. |

Petitioner, having already decided that the patent
laws are not applicable to computer implemented tech-
nology, suggests at page 25 of its brief that Congress pro-
vide some other form of protection.” If it is necessary
to await Congressional action, confusion as to the nature

17. Congress has considered legislation makiȢ computer pro-
s unpatentable. H. R. 5924, proposed, 35 U. S. C. § 106, 90th
— Ist Sess. (1967) provided:
“Computer Programs Not Patentable: A plan of action or set
of operating instructions, in whatever form presented, to cause
a controllable data a or or computer to perform selected
operation shall not be patentable.”
This legislation was proposed and hearings were held, but the
legislation was not adopted. Similar legislation has not been sub-
sequently proposed.

12 Brief Amicus Curiae for Mobil

and scope of protection will exist in the interim. The bet-
ter reasoned approach is to construe the patent statutes
as applying to all areas of technology unless Congress
specifically excludes a given area from patentability.

We are presently witnessing man’s entry into exciting
new areas of technology.’* Are the patent statutes to be
so narrowly construed that this Court must decide whether
each of these new technologies is statutory subject matter?
If the narrower approach is taken, the patent laws could
be construed as not applying to many important new tech-
nical advances in our rapidly changing technology.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

American jurisprudence is built upon the principle of
adaptability. Much of today’s commonplace technology
was the science fiction of 1952; much of tomorrow’s tech-
nology would seem like science fiction today. This Court
should not construe the 1952 Patent Act so meanly and
narrowly as to require Congress to reenact it as each previ-
ously uncontemplated technology emerges. ;

Respectfully submitted,

RicHarp E. Kurtz
MIcHAEL G. GILMAN
WILLIAM J. SCHERBACK
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
Mobil Oil Corporation
Of Counsel:
Cuares A. HuGGETT

18. For example, consider the creation of new living organisms.
See In re Bergy, 563 F. 2d 1031 (C. C. P. A. 1977) and In re
Chakrabarty, — F. 2d —, 369 BNA-PTC] D-1 (C. C. P. A. 1978).
The PTC Journal comment on page A-3 refers to the filing by the
Government of petitions for certiorari in both cases.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385005_0002%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.