# Petition — Ward v. Maryland

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 1011

## Text

Suprs = Court, U. 8.
i f I D

SEP 22 1977

| MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

™___97°458

ROBERT DAVID WARD,

Petitioner,

STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

MALCOLM W. HOUSTON

3720 Farragut Avenue
Kensington, Maryland 20795
(301) 946-3099

Attorney for Appellant.

Washington, O. C. THIEL PRESS + (202) 638-452!

(3)

Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI kk 1
CITATION TO OPINION BELOW ........ceeeceeceeees 1
JURISDICTION ..... eecccces — „60% 66 640 2
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW... 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces 2
STATEMENT OF THECASE ...... — Te 5% % «6G
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WMW WPʒ— 4
CON CLV „„ 8

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases: ö
Allegheny Airlines u. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F.Supp.

871, 238 F.2d 8111T[TTLL¶L¶Ls2 „eee eee eee
American Airlines u. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp.

226, 398 F.2d 369, Cert. Denied 393 U.S.1017 ....... 6
City of Newark v. Eastern Amlines, 159 F.Supp. 750 6
Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F.Supp.

914 US. District Ct. (1970) C.D. Calif. ........ ecccce ©
Lockheed di Terminal v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 668

(1972) U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Ninth Cir. ............. 6
Lockheed di Terminal u. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. 624

eon ee „„ 6
Statutes:

Article 1A, Annotated Code of Maryland,

Section 10-1002 and 10-1003 .......... „ese ee
49 USCA 1301 et seg. (Federal Aviation Act 1958) ....... 42a
59 USCA 171 et seq. (Air Commerce Act of 1926) .......

49 USCA 401 et seg. (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) ..... 5
Constitution of the United States of America,
Article 1 Section 8, Clause 3; Article 6,Clause2 ...... 2

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No.

ROBERT DAVID WARD,

Petitioner,

‘STATE OF MARYLAND,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Petitioner, Robert D. Ward, respectfully urges this
Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
in the above captioned case.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, is
reported as Ward v. State and cited as 374 A.2d 1118 and
is fully set out in the Appendix at la.

1

2

JURISDICTION

The opinion and order of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, the highest court of that state was decided
June 24, 1977 and its mandate entered on the 25th day
of July, 1977. Jurisdiction is founded upon Article II,
Section 2, Constitution of the United States.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 has pre-
empted to the Federal government control over the
operation of aircraft and pilots so as to preclude state
legislation in the same area, thus rendering the Maryland
Aviation Act (as well as similar Acts of other states)
unconstitutional, or alternatively put, whether it is the
expressed intention of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

that the Federal government not share its regulatory power
with the states.

Whether the Maryland Aviation Act conflicts with the
Federal Aviation Act.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Article I, Section 8 Clause 3

The Congress shall have the power

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states and with the Indian Tribes;

Article 6 Clause 2

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

3

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Title 49, U.S. Code
Annotated Section 1301 et seq:

The Maryland Aviation Act, Article 1A Section 10
-1002 and 3; as set forth in this Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 19, 1975 Robert David Ward was the holder
of a valid student pilot license and medical certificate
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
pursuant to the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR’s).

On that day, the Petitioner engaged in low flight while
piloting an aircraft over Greenbelt, Maryland, and within
eight (8) hours of consuming alcoholic beverages.

He was charged by the State with reckless operation of
an aircraft by reason of the low flying and flying while
under the influence of alcohol, Article 1A Section 10-
1002, Annotated Code of Maryland. The latter charge
was subsequently deleted.

At both the District and Circuit Court levels the De-
fendant moved to dismiss the charge solely on the basis
of the unconstitutionality of the charging statute, in view
of the preemptive nature of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.

The motion was denied in both instances, and the
Defendant was convicted in District Court on September
19, 1975 and in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, Maryland, on July 20, 1976.

Upon conviction he was fined $500 and sentenced to
90 days. The execution of the prison sentence was sus-
pended upon the condition that he not fly an airplane in

4

the State of Maryland for one year from the date of
conviction.

Simultaneously eight charges of violations of the Fed-
eral Air Regulations were brought against Ward by the
Federal Aviation Administration resulting in the revoca-
tion of his flying license.

After an intensive investigation of Ward’s level of
aeronautical knowledge and the facts of the flight itself
the Federal Aviation Administration granted permission
to reissue his license six (6) months after surrender to it.
By the terms of this Order Ward was authorized to fly
again in June of 1976.

Upon Ward’s conviction in the highest nisi prius court
of Marytand in July of 1976 he petitioned for Certiorari in
the Cour of Appeals of Maryland, the highest appellate
Court ot that State, which writ was granted. The sole
questions raised were whether the State Aviation Act was
void because of conflict and the preemptive nature of the
Federal Act. In its opinion filed June 24, 1977 that Court
held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was not pre-
emptive so as to preclude state action in the control of
pilots and ali craft and that there was no conflict between
the Maryland Act and the Federal Act.

The dissenting opinion held that there was a conflict.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

As set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, “The issue for decision is narrow in lineation
but sweeping in implication” (p. 2)

While the narrow issue is the validity of the Maryland
Aviation Act in the face of the Federal Aviation Act the
sweeping issue is the ity of the Aviation Acts of
some thirty-five other states.

5

A decision in this case will determine, once and for all,
whether control over the operation of aircraft will rest
solely with the Federal Government or will be shared by
the States.

The historical concept is that since aircraft do not
recognize geographic boundries these must be a single,
unifiea plan for this control which balances safety and
efficiency both on the ground and in the air. This single
plan was authorized by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
and its predecessors, and promulgated by the Federal
Aviation Regulations.

If the present decision is left standing it will be open
season for every state to share in the control of aircraft,
destroying completely the uniformity of control which
now exists and which is imperative due to the nature of
flight.

Numerous cases have held or indicated that the Federal
Aviation Act is preemptive. Unfortunately, for clarity of
decision, the State acts were usually in conflict with the
Federal Aviation Act and were struck down on both
grounds.

The Federal Aviation Act, title 49, U.S. Code Anno-
tated, at Sec. 1508(A) says:

(A) “The United States of America is declared to

possess and exercise complete sovereignty in the

airspace of the United States.

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was held to be

preemptive in Alleghney Airlines v. Village of Cedar-
hurst, 132 F.Supp. 871, 1955 U.S. District Court, N.Y.
239 F.2d 812, 2nd Circuit.

There the Court said:
“The Plaintiff’s contention that the legislative action
by Congress together with the regulations, adopted

6

pursuant thereto, have regulated air traffic in the

navigable airspace in the interest of safety to such

an extent as to constitute preemption in that field

ts upheld. The States, including the Village of

Cedarhurst, are thus precluded from enacting valid

contrary or conflicting legislation.” (Emp. Supplied)

A similar result was read in City of Newark v. Eastern
Arlines, 159 F.Supp. 750, 1958 U.S. D. C., New Jersey
where the court held, referring to the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938:

“This legislation clearly evidenced the intent of
Congress to preempt the exclusive power of regula-
tion and control in the field of interstate air com-
merce.” page 755 and the court noted:

“It seems obvious that in the field uniformity of

regulations is essential if the maximum standards of

safety are to be maintained” page 757

The principle was again enunciated in American Air-
lines v. Town of Hempstead, 1967, 272 F.Supp. 226,
E.D.N.Y. USDC, affirmed 298 F.2d 369 (2nd Cir.) 1968,
Cert. Den. 393 U.S. 1017, 1969.

The most recent articulations of the preemption of
the 1958 act and its scope are:

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F.Supp.
914 US. District Court (1970) C.D. Calif.

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d
668 (1972) U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Ninth Cir.

Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 411 U.S.
624 (1973) U.S. Supreme Ct.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
seemed to set forth the rule clearly: (page 671)

“The pervasiveness of federal regulations in the filed

of air commerce, the intensity of the national in-

7

terest in this regulation, and the nature of air com-
merce itself require the conclusion that state and
local legislation in that area has been preempted.

In this case we have found the conclusion of federal

preemption unavoidable.

Therefore, the states may not exercise concomitant

or supplementary powers over the identical activity.

(Emp. Supplied.)

In the Burbank case at page 549, the first page of the
Court’s opinion, the Supreme Court disposes of the matter
on preemption grounds alone:

“The District Court found the ordinance to be un-
constitutional on both Supremacy Clause and Com-
merce Clause grounds. 318 F.Supp. 914. The Court
of Appeals affirmed on the grounds of the Supre-
macy Clause both as respects preemption and as
respects conflict.”

* In view of our disp osition of this appeal under

the doctrine of preemption, we need not reach this

question. (Emp. Supplied.)

It is now said that the Burbank case related only to the
Noise Control Act or that, at any rate, the states may
exercise complimentary controi.

What is said to be complimentary however, does not
always turn out to be as in the Ward case where a pilot
who was reissued his federal authority to pilot an aircraft
any where within the United States was specifically pro-
hibited from flying within the State of Maryland.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is preemptive so as
to preclude state or municipal legislation effecting control
over the operation of aircraft, even though the statute
expresses itself as merely complimentary to the Federal
Statute.

The Maryland Statute, with its sentencing provisions
is clearly in conflict with the Federal Statute and the
FAR’s issued thereunder.

Respectfully submitted,

MALCOLM W. HOUSTON

3720 Farragut Avenue
Kensington, Maryland 20795

Attorney for Appellant.

— —

APPENDIX

[1118]

la
APPENDIX

Robert David WARD
v.

STATE of Maryland.
No. 87.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
June 24, 1977.

* * *

Malcolm W. Houston, Kensington, for ap-
pellant.

Alexander L. Cummings, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty.
Gen. and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before SINGLEY, SMITH,
DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH
and ROBERT F. SWEENEY (Specially As-
signed), JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

For over a quarter of a century it has
been a crime under the laws of Maryland
“to operate an aircraft in the air, or on the
ground or water, while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other
habit-forming drug,or, . . in a care-

[1119]

2a
less or reckless manner so as to endanger

the life or property of another.” Acts 1949,

ch. 422, § 29; Acts 1974, ch. 368, § 2;
Maryland Code (1961) and (1957) Art. 1A,
§ 29; Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol.,
1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, 6 20-1002! See

Maryland Code (1967, 1971 Repl Vel, 1974

Cum.Supp.) Art. 38,§ 1. The. statute has
never been before the appellate courts of
this State. Robert David Ward presents it
to us in this appeal. In challenging the
judgment entered against him upon being
found guilty of operating an aireraft in a
reckless manner, he does not dispute the
accuracy of the facts and circumstances re-
sulting in his arrest and prosecution by the
State. Nor does he present any question as

Acts 1974, ch. 363 repealed former article 1A,
“Aeronautics”, and enacted present article LA,
“Aviation,” to take effect 1 July 1974. The
identical l of former § 29 appears in me
present § 10-

2. As initially executed, the Statement of

Charges under which Ward was prosecuted by
Maryland, in addition to the charge that he
operated an aircraft “in a reckless and unsafe
manner,” alleged that he operated an aircraft
“while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor.” For reasons not disclosed in the record
before us, the charging document was amended
by deleting the latter charge.

3a

to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus de-
licti of the offense and his criminal agency.
And he offers no claim that the penalties
imposed were in any way at variance with
the sanctions authorized. The issue he rais-
es is that Maryland was precluded from
prosecuting him because the statute pro-
scribing the conduct was preempted by fed-
eral law. He therefore, claims error in the
denial by the trial court of his motion to
dismiss the charges.

The issue for decision is narrow in linea-
tion bet sweeping in implication. The
great majority of the states have enacted
legislation similar to the Maryland statute,
some in identical language, making it a
crime to operate an aireraft so as to endan-
ger the person or property of another.’ If

oes wa )
| BEST. COPY. Mn

3. Most of the state statutes speak in terms of

operating an aircraft recklessly or while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or habit-

forming drugs. See, for example:
Alabama-Ala. Code, tit. 4, § 20 (30) 5 (1958);
Alaska-Alas. Stat. § 02.30.030 (1962);

_ Arizona-Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1744 (1976);
Arkansas-Ark. Stat. Ann. § 74-109 (1957);
California-Cal. Pub. Utilities Code § 21407

(West 1965);
Connecticut-Conn. Genl. Stat. § 15-72 (1977);
Deiaware-Del. Code Ann. tit. 2, § 304 (1974);

[footnote continued

4a

Ward's view that the state statutes are
preempted prevails there could be no crimi-
nal prosecution, under existing laws, by any
state, or, as we shall see, by the federal

Florida-Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 860.13(1)(b) (1976);

Georgia-Ga. Code Ann. § 11-101 (1973);

Hawaii-Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 263-11 (1968);

Idaho-Idaho Code § 21-112 (1947);

Indiana-Ind. Stat. Ann. § 8-21-4—8 [14-109]
(Burns 1973);

lowa-lowa Code Ann. § 328.41 (Supp. 1976);

Maine-Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 6 § 202(9)

(idee; |

Michigga-Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 259.180
(2887), a |

Mtgneseta-Minn. Stat. Aan. § 360.07§ (1965);

Mississippi-Miss. Code, § 61-—11-—1 (1972);

Missouri-Mo. Rev. Stat. § 305.030 (1969);

Montana-Mont. Rev. Code § 1-603 (1968);

Nevada-Nev. Rev. Stat. § 493.130 (1973);

New York-N.Y. Genl. Bus. Law § 245 (L.C.P.
Tum. Supp. 1976);

North Carolina-N.C. Genl. Stat. § 63-18
(1975 Repl. Vol.);

Ohio-Ohio Rev. Code § 4561.15 (Anderson
1967);

Oregon-Ore. Rev. Stat. § 493.160 (1973);

South Carolina-S.C. Code, ch. 1, § 2-10
(1962);

South Dakota-S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 50

13-16 (1967);
Tennessee-Tenn. Code Anno. 5 42-113 (1964
Repl. Vol.);
Virginia-Va. Code § 5.1—13 (1973 Repl. Vol.);
Wisconsin-Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 114.09 (1974).

footnote continued]

[1120]

5a

government, for operating an aircraft in a
careless or reckless manner or while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcot-
ics, or other habit-forming drug, no matter
how flagrant the conduct proscribed and
regardless of the seriousness of the danger
to life and property occasioned by that con-
duct. We have not been referred to a deci-
sion of another jurisdiction, state or federal,
which addresses the matter of preemption
of a statute prohibiting such operation of
an aircraft. There being no decision pre-
cisely on point to bind or persuade wi, we
shall follow the path laid out by the dexi-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United
States concerning the doctrine of preemp-
tion to determine whether the Maryland
statute is enforceable.

There are other state statutes which speak only
in terms of operating an aircraft while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or habit-
forming drugs. See, for example:
Illinois-Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 15's, § 22.43d
(Smith-Hurd, Cum. Supp. 1977);
Massachusetts-Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 90, § 44
(1975);
New Jersey-N.J. Stat. Ann. § 6:1—18 (1973);
Pennsyivania-Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 1475(a)
(Purdon 1963),
Texas-Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 46f-3 (1977);
Wyomhing-Wy. Stat. § 10-13 (1959).

6a

I

To put the issue for decision in perspec-
tive we recount what Ward did and what
happened as a result. Ward was the hold-
er of a valid student aircraft pilot license
and medical certificate issued by the Feder-
al Aviation Administration (FAA), pursuant
to the applicable Federal Aviation Regula-
tions (FAR). On the late afternoon of 18
May 1975 he made an instructional flight
from Hyde’s Airfield in Clinton, Prince
George’s County, Maryland. Thereafter, he
and his instructor pilot enjoyed a quiet din-
ner complete with pre- and post prandial
liquid refreshment in an amount sufficient,
when Ward was examined some hours later,
to show a blood alcohol level of 0.17 per-
cent.“ Later that evening, after a visit
with Ward’s parents, Ward and his instruc-
tor returned to the airport. Ward slept in

submitted on “stipulation of facts.” That stip-
ulation is not in the record before us, but the
facts are presented to us on an agreed state-
ment pursuant to Maryland Rule 828 g.

evidence of intoxication. Maryland Code
(1974, 1975 Cum.Supp.) Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article § 10-307(e).

7a

his car for some hours. On awakening in
the early morning he decided to practice
some “touch and gos”—taking off and land-
ing without leaving the airport pattern.
Inadvertently entering clouds, he chmbed
above the cloud layer and circled what he
assumed to be the Chesapeake Bay area,
until breaks were visible in the overcast. It
was about 6:00 A. M. when he descended
through a hole in the clouds. He estab-
lished that his position was over Greenbelt,

State Police officer in a helicopter who fol-
lowed the plane back to the airport. Ward
was arrested upon landing.

1975.”* Upon Ward’s petition we issued a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s Coun-
ty.

In a civil proceeding, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration determined that Ward
had violated seven Federal Aviation Regu-
lations in his operation of the aircraft on 19
May 1975, including FAR 91.9, prohibiting
the careless or reckless operation of an air-
craft so as to the life or property
of another. It ordered that his airman cer-
tificate be revoked. Subsequently, how-
ever, “after a thorough investigation of Mr.
Ward, his instructor, his level of aeronauti-
cal knowledge and the flight leading to his
prosecution, FAA granted permission to
reissue his license six (6) months after sur-
render to it.”

II

The opinion of the Court in Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2
L.Ed.2d 1393 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.), re-
minded, at 375, 78 S.Ct. at 1805, that the
Constitution of the United States “is one of

[1121}

is under our system the responsibility of the

Constitution alone does not deny Maryland

—
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I
ill

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3%

an
8
8

d
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i

10a

the power to enact the challenged statute.
“While federal pre-emption of state stat-
utes is, of course, ultimately a question
under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.,
Art. VI, cl. 2° analysis of pre-emption is-
sues depends primarily on statutory and not
constitutional interpretation.” City of Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey, —— U.S. ——,
——, 97 S.Ct. 987, 988, 51 L. Ed.2d 224
(1977). Thus, we are required to decide
only whether federal laws in the field of
aviation preclude Maryland from enforcing
its statute.

The Supreme Court of the "Jnited States
traced the path, “clearly laid out” by its
prior decisions, which must be followed to
answer this question. Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., —— U.S. N , 97 S.Ct. 1305,
1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). We summarize

lla

what was said. The first inquiry is whether
Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate
commerce, has prohibited state regulation
in the area. That is, has Congress occupied
the field to the exclusion of state action.
Where, as here, the field which Congress is
said to have preempted has been tradition-
ally occupied by the States . ‘[wle
start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be

superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress. Id. It is when Congress has un-
mistakably . . . ordained,” either ex-
plicitly by command in the statute’s lan-
guage, or implicitly by the statute’s struc-
ture and purpose, that its enactments alone
are to regulate a part of commerce, that
state laws regulating that aspect of com-
merce must fall.

If Congress has not so occupied the field
as to exclude all state action, inquiry turns
to whether the federal and state laws con-
flict. “Congressional enactmenfs that do
not exclude all state legislation in the same
field nevertheless overrule state laws with
which they conflict.” Id. State and feder-
al laws are so inconsistent that state law
must give way when, under the circum-
stances of the particular case, the state’s

NTT Oo), EE ooo

[1122]

12a

law “stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.” In this
determination, there is considered “the rela-
tionship between state and federal laws as
they are interpreted and applied, not mere-
ly as they are written.” Id.

[1] It seems, in the final analysis, that a
federal statute preempts a state statute
when such was the Congressional intent.
Even when Congress exercises its para-
mount authority it may determine how far
its regulation shall go. “There is no consti-
tutional rule which compels Congress to
occupy the whole field. Congress may cir-
cumscribe its regulation and occupy only a
limited field. When it does, state regula-
tion outside that limited field and otherwise
admissible is not forbidden or displaced.”
Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 US. i,
10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1987). The
Court said in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
360, n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 933, 938, 47 L. Ed. 2d 43
(1976), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 78-79, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581
(1941) (Stone, J. dissenting):

Every Act of Congress occupies some
field, but we must know the boundaries
of that field before we can say that it has

— 2 —— 4 —

13a

precluded a state from the exercise of
any power reserved to it by the Constitu-
tion. To discover the boundaries we look
to the federal statute itself, read in the
light of its constitutional setting anJ its
legislative history.
The intent to supersede the exercise by a
state of its police power as to matters not
covered by federal legislation is not to be
inferred from the mere fact that Congress
has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation
and to occupy a limited field. Such intent
is not to be implied unless the act of Con-
gress is in actual conflict with the law of
the state, and, as the Supreme Court has
said, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, 97
S.Ct. at 1309, an “actual conflict” occurs
only when the state’s law ‘stands as an
obstacle to accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress’.” See Governor of Maryland v. Exx-
on Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1125.
Furthermore, It ſhe application of the prin-
ciple is strongly fortified where the state
exercises its power to protect the lives and
health of its people.” Kelly v. State of
Washington, supra, 302 U.S. at 13, 58 S.Ct.
at 93.

l4a

III

The federal law which Ward urges
preempts the Maryland statute is the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 749, 49
U.S.C.A. (1970) § 1301 et seg. which had its
roots in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44
Stat. 568, and the Civil Aeronauties Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 973. It has been said that the
main stimulus for the enactment of the
1958 Act was the undesirable state into
which the quality of safety regulation of
aeronautics had fallen. See 1958 U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 3741, 3742;
Comment, 39 J.Air § Com. 521, 526-527
(1973). The 1958 Act created the Federal
Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C.A. (1970) ch. 20.
It is apparent that the Federal Aviation
Program established a comprehensive
scheme for the safe and efficient use of the
nation’s airspace. 1958 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin. News, p. 3741. See Arney v. Unit-
ed States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401,
1404 (9th Cir. 1969); Pike v. C. A. B., 303
F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1962); Air Line
Pilots Association, International v. Quesada,
276 F.2d 892, 894 (2nd Cir. 1960); South-
eastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn.
639, 355 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1962). That

15a

scheme, however, did not inelude the erimi-
nal prosecution of a person who operated an
aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so

as to endanger the life or property of an-
other.

Subchapter III of the Federal Aviation
Program sets out the organization of the
Federal Aviation Administration and the
powers and duties of its Administrator.
Section 1348(a) of subchapter III authorizes
and directs the Administrator to develop
plans for and formulate policy with respect
to the use of navigable airspace and assign
by rule, regulation or order the use of navi-
gable airspace under such terms, conditions,
and limitations as he may deem necessary
in order to insure the safety of aircraft and
the efficient utilization of such airspace.
Section 1348(c) authorizes and directs him
to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations
governing the flight of aircraft, for the
navigation, protection and identification of
aircraft, for the protection of persons and
property on the ground, and for the effi-
cient utilization of the navigable airspace,
including rules as to safe altitudes of flight
and rules for the prevention of collision
or water vehicles, and between aircraft and

16a

[1123] airborne objects. Section 135. a) of sub-

chapter III empowers the Administrator to
make rules and regulations as he deems

necessary to carry out the program and to
perform his powers and duties.

Subchapter VI of the Federal Aviation
Program deals with safety regulation of
civil aeronautics. Section 1421 of subchap-
ter VI empowers the Administrator, and
makes it his duty, to promote safety of
flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing and revising from time to time,
among other things, such reasonable rules
and regulations as he finds necessary to
provide adequately for safety in air com-
merce.

A Federal Aviation Regulation, 14 Code
of Federal Regulations (1976) § 91.9, pro-
hibits the reckless operation of an aircraft:

No person may operate an aircraft in a
careless or reckless manner so as to en-
danger the life or property of another.“

It is clear that FAR 91.9 was made under
the authority of subchapter III and sub-
chapter VI. See 14 CFR at page 105.

9. There is also a Federal Aviation Regulation
pertathing to alcoholic beverages and drugs
and the operation of an aircraft. See 14 Code
of Federal Regulations (1976) § 91.11.

17a

Violation of FAR 91.9 is not a crime; no
criminal sanctions are authorized. Section
1472(a) of 49 U.S.C.A. (1970), under the
heading “Criminal Penalties,” provides gen-
erally:

Any person who knowingly and willful-
ly violates any provision of this chapter
(except subchapters III, V, VI, VII, and
XII of this chapter), or any order, rule, or
regulation issued by the Administrator or
by the Board under any such provision or
any term, condition, or limitation of any
certificate or permit issued under sub-
chapter IV of this chapter, for which no
penalty is otherwise provided in this sec-
tion or in section 1474 of this title, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be subject
for the first offense to a fine of not more
than $500, and for any subsequent of-
fense to a fine of not more than $2,000.
If such violation is a continuing one, each
day of such violation shall constitute a
separate offense. (emphasis added).

Subsections (b) through (p) provide penal-
ties for specific acts, none of which includes
careless or reckless operation of an aircraft.
Subchapter IV and § 1474 of Title 49 do not
concern FAR 91.9 See 14 CFR § 13.23. On

18a

the other hand, § 1471 of Title 49 specifical-
ly provides that any person who violates the
provisions of subchapters III and VI, or any
rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder,
shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
more than $1,000 for each violation. See 14
CFR § 13.15. Also, the Administrator may,
from time to time, reexamine any airman,
and if, as a result of any such reexamina-
tion or as a result of any other investigation
made by him, he determines that safety in
air commerce or air transportation and the
public interest requires, he may issue an
order suspending or revoking an airman
certificate. 49 U.S.C.A. (1970) § 1429. See
14 CFR § 13.19.

As we have indicated, the conduct pro-
scribed by FAR 91.9 is a crime under Mary-
land law. Penalties authorized by Mary-
land Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum.
Supp.) Art. 1A, § 10-1003(a) are a fine of
not more than $500 or imprisonment of not
more than 90 days or both. Section 10
1003(b) provides that “in addition to or in
lieu of [those penalties] or as a condition to
the suspension of a sentence which may be
imposed . the court in its discre-
tion may prohibit the violator from operat-
ing an aircraft within the State for such

[1124]

19a

period as it may determine but not to ex-
ceed one year.”

IV

[2] We have do difficulty whatever in
deciding that Congress has not occupied the
entire field of aeronautics by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. There is no such
command explicitly stated in the language
of the Act, and we do not find it implicitly
contained in the statute’s structure and
purpose. Generally accepted, for example,
is that in the economic area of aeronautics
all state legislation is not excluded. See
Calkins, Federal-State Regulation of Avia-
tion, 5. Va.L.Rev. 1386, 13991402 (1964);
Comment, 39 J.Air L. & Com. 521, 529-531
(1973); Means & Chasnoff, State Regula-
tion of Air Transportation: The Texas Aer-
onautics Commission, 53 Tex.L.Rev. 653,
656-659 (1975). The Supreme Court has

10. Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol., 1974

Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, § 10-1002 provides: Pen-
alties for the violation of this section shall be as
prescribed by § 10-1003(a) of this article. As
we have indicated, § 10-1003(a) authorizes a
fine and imprisonment. Neuber § 10-10@2 nor
§ 10-1003(a) refers to § 10-1003(b) and its
additional sanctions.

20a

held that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tor in conjunction with the Environmental
Protection Agency “has full control over
aircraft noise, preempting state and local
control.” City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 688, 93 S.Ct.
1854, 1859, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973). But that
conclusion was not because Congress had
“unmistakably ordained” that its enact-
ments alone were to regulate air commerce
in its entirety, but because the 1968 amend-
ment (82 Stat. 395) and the 1972 amend-
ment (The Noise Control Act, 86 Stat. 1234)
to the 1958 Act established “the pervasive
nature of the scheme of federal regulation
of aircraft noise.” We construe the holding
as limited to that aspect of aeronautics.
Id., 411 U.S. at 683, 93 S.Ct. 1854, at 1859.

Maryland has expressly retained its police
powers with respect to crimes related to
aeronautics. It declared in its Aviation
Act, § 3-307 that “{ajll crimes
committed by or against an airman or pas-
senger while in flight over this State shall
be governed by the laws of this State.

Congress has recognized the
right of a state to do 80. In 1961 the
Federal Aviation Act of 1968 was amended
by designating criminal penalties for specif-
ic crimes. 49 U.S. C. A. (1970) § 1472{i)-{p).

— —

21a

See 14 CFR 5 13.28. House Report 968 on
the case of crimes committed in the
airspace over States of the United States,
most of the acts with which this legislation
deals would be violations of the laws of one
or more of such States.” 1961 U.S. Code
Cong. & Adm. News p. 2563. It declared:
“The offenses punishable under this legisla-
tion would not replace any State jurisdic-
tion but would, where both Federal and
State law provided for punishment for the
same act, be in addition to the State crimi-
nal Law.” Id., at 2564. In discussing the
need for the legislation, the report stated,
id., at 2565:

As is well known, the Federal Govern-
ment does not provide a general criminal
code for all crimes committed in the Unit-
ed States. That is the province of the
various ates. However, criminal codes
of the States are at times supplemented
by Federal Law in fields where the Fed-
eral Government has responsibilities.

We wish to emphasize that it is not our
intent to divest the States of any jurisdic-
tion they now have. This legislation
merely seeks to give the Federal Govern-

[1125]

22a

ment coseurrent jurisdiction with the

States in certain areas where it is felt
that concurrent jurisdiction will contrib-

ute to the administration of justice and

protect air commerce.
The Report asserted:

This, we want to make clear, does not
preempt any State jurisdiction but would
only supplement it. Id., at 2565.

We reject Ward’s suggestion that the en-
tire [Maryland Aviation] Act should be
struck down.”

Having determined that Congress has not
excluded all state action in the field of
aeronautics or even in the more limited
field of air safety, we center on § 10-1002
of the Maryland Aviation Act to ascertain
whether it conflicts with the federal law in
the field. Although the Maryland Statute
and the federal regulation prescribe. identi-
cal conduct with respect to the careless or
reckless operation of an aircraft," the two

11. Section 10-1002, Art. 1A of the Maryland

Act requires that “{ijn any proceeding charging
careless or reckless . of aircraft in
violation of this section, the court determining |
whether the operation was careless or reckless
shall consider the standards for safe operation
of aircraft prescribed by federal statutes or
regulations governing seronautics.”

23a

laws are not coterminous because of the
sanctions prescribed. When the relation-
ship between the Maryland and federal
laws as they are written, as they are inter-
preted and as they are applied, is con-
sidered, it is manifest that the Maryland
law does not stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress, name-
ly, “to provide for the regulation and pro-
motion of civil aviation in such manner as
to best foster its development and safety,
and to provide for the safe and efficient use
of the airspace by both civil and military
aircraft.” 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.
News, p. 3741. On the contrary, the Mary-
land law enhances the Congressional pur-
poses and objectives by deterring through
criminal sanctions the operation of an air-
craft in such manner as to endanger the life
and property of others. It would be incon-
gruous indeed, in light of the federal pur-
poses and objectives, if Maryland were to
be constitutionally precluded from the crim-
inal prosecution of a person for such con-
duct because a federal regulation authoriz-
ed civil penalties.

We are not persuaded that there is a
conflict of constitutional dimension simply

24a

because the State court may prohibit a vio-
lator of its statute from operating an air-
craft within Maryland for up to one year
even though the violator holds a federal
airman certificate which would permit him
to operate an aircraft. Section 10-1008 of
the State Statute expressly provides:

In no event shall this subsection be
construed as warrant for the court or any
other agency or person to take away,
impound, hold or mark any federal air-
man or aircraft certificate, permit, rating
or licen ne

In amy event, we do not see how prohibit-
ing, for a limited time, the operation of an
aircraft within Maryland by a person who

has been found guilty in a court of law of

operating an aircraft in a careless or reck-
less manner so as to endanger the life or
property of another could be said to stand
as an obstacle to the-Congressional purposes
and objectives.

[3] In short, it was the clear intent of
Congress that criminal prosecution of the
proscribed conduct be left with the states,
and there is no conflict within the contem-
plation of the doctrine of preemption be-
tween the State and federal laws.

25a

[4,5] Ward suggests that the declara-
tion in § 10—1002 of the Maryland Aviation
Act that the court in determining whether
the operation of an aircraft was careless or
reckless, shall consider the standards for
safe operation of an aircraft prescribed by
federal statutes or regulations governing
aeronautics (see footnote 11 supra) would
seem to be an unconstitutional delegation
of power” if the federal statutes and regu-
lations must be followed. He refers only to
a decision of the Court of Oyer and Termin-
er of New Jersey, State v. Larson, 10 N.J.
Misc. 384, 160 A. 556 (1932), which invalida-
ted a New Jersey statute. Larson is inap-

_ posite. There the question was whether the

New Jersey Legislature was constitutional-
ly permitted to authorize the conviction of a
crime “when it has fixed no standard of
conduct to be conformed to by the citizen
but has left that standard to be fixed by the
regulations of a subordinate administrative
authority, either in its untrammeled discre-
tion, or to conform substantially to the leg-
islation of another sovereignty, such legisla-
tion being referred to in the act, but not
incorporated therein.” Id., 160 A. at 557.
Furthermore, there was a provision of the

26a

[1126] New Jersey Constitution, Art. 4, § 7, par. 4,

expressly forbidding the latter. Here the
standard of conduct was fixed by the stat-
ute—an aircraft shall not be operated care-
lessly or recklessly so as to endanger the
life or property of another—and the trial
court was merely directed to look for guid-
ance to federal standards with regard to
such operation, ostensibly to promote uni-
formity. Larson observed, 160 A. at 558:
“It may well be a sound exercise of legisla-
tive discretion to have the regulations for
the conduct of a matter, so oblivious of
artificial land boundaries as aviation, sub-
stantially identical for both intrastate and
interstate commerce. Nor is there any-
thing unconstitutional in the state’s adopt-
ing as its own the federal policy.“ Ward
does not claim, and it is clear, that the
“careless or reckless” standard is not so
vague and indefinite as to offend due proc-
ess of law. See Lashley v. State, 10 Md.
App. 136, 142, 268 A.2d 502, cert. den. 259
Md. 733, appeal dism., cert. den. 402 U.S.
991, 91 S.Ct. 2169, 29 L.Ed.2d 158 (1970).
And see Samson v. State, 27 Md.App. 326,
335, 341 A.2d 817 (1975) giving at least tacit
approval to a legislative provision regarding
control of dangerous substances, Maryland
Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,
§ 278(c), that any new substance which is

27a

designated as controlled under federal law
shall be similarly controlled under Maryland
law absent objection by the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene.

We find that Maryland Code (1957, 1968
Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum.Supp.) Art. 1A, §§ 10-
1002 and 10-1003 are not preempted by
federal law. We hold, therefore, that the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
did not err in denying the motion to dismiss

the charges.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

ELDRIDGE, Judge, concurring in
and dissenting in part: “ay
Section 10-1002 of Maryland Code (1957,
1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1A, makes it unlawful
“for any person to operate an aircraft
while under the influence of in-

toxicating liquor or to operate
an aircraft in a careless or reck-
less manner A violation of this

section is generally punishable by fine or
imprisonment under subsection (a) of § 10
1003. However, subsection (b) of § 10—1003
also provides for special sanctions for reck-
less operation of aircraft in addition to

28a

those provided for in ‘subsection (a). It
states, in part:
“(b) Special—For any violation of
§ 10 1002 of this article, in addition to, or
in lieu of, the penalties provided by sub-
section (a) of this section, or as a condi-
tion to the suspension of a sentence which
may be imposed pursuant thereto, the
court in its discretion may prohibit the
violator from operating an aircraft with-
in the State for such period as it may
determine but not to exceed one year.
Violation of the duly imposed prohibition
of the court may be treated as a separate
offense under this section or as a con-
tempt of court. 8

I agree with the majority that, in light of
the absence of federal criminal penalties for
reckless operation of aircraft, the sanctions
of fine and imprisonment provided in sub-
section (a) would not appear to be preempt-
ed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 et seg. However, I cannot
agree with the majority that there is no
“conflict of constitutional dimension” be-
tween the federal act and subsection (b) of
the State law which authorizes the court to
prohibit an individual from operating an

[1127]

29a

aircraft within the state even though that
person may hold a valid federal airman’s
certificate entitling him to operate an air-
craft. This prohibition, which apparently
would extend to both interstate as well as
intrastate operations, is, in effect, a suspen-
sion of a federally issued airman’s certifi-
cate. As the issuance and suspension and
revocation of a pilot’s license is a matter
subject solely to federal regulation, I be-
lieve that § 10—1003%(b) is invalid by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause, United States
Constitution Art. VI, Cl. 2. See Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, 331 U.S.
218, 236, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947).

The Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (F.A.A.) is authorized
to “issue airman certificates specifying the
capacity in which the holders thereof are
authorized to serve as airmen in connection
with aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 1422. An air-
man’s certificate is required for operation
of a civil aircraft in air commerce. 49
U.S.C. § 148Q(aX2). Air commerce is broad-
ly defined as “interstate . . air com-
merce . or navigation of aircraft
within the limits of any Federal airway or
any operation or navigation of aircraft
which directly affects, or which may endan-

30a

ger safety in, interstate, overseas, or for-
eign air commerce.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4).
The F.A.A. is empowered to reexamine any
civil airman and, if, as a result of any
such reexamination, or if, as a
result of any other investigation made by
the Administrator, he determines that safe-
ty inaircommerce . . and the pub-
lic interest requires, the Administrator may
issue an order . suspending, or
revoking . . ay . . airman
certificate ..” 49 U.S.C. § 142%a).

It has been held that Congress has sought
to insure the safety of civil aviation by
extending federal safety regulations to vir-
tually all civil aviation, including wholly
intrastate flights. See Rosenhan v. United
States, 131 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 790, 68 S.Ct. 998, 87 L.Ed.
1156 (1943); United States v. Drumm, 55
F.Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944); see also Cal-
kins, Federal-State Regulation of Aviation,
50 Va. L. Rev. 1386, 1395-1398 (1964). And
in order to insure safety in civil aviation,
Congress has delegated to the F. A. A. the
responsibility of certifying pilots as compe-
tent to operate aireraft and has provided
that the Administrator should revoke or
suspend such certification when necessary
in the interest of safety in air commerce.

31a

Despite the fact that the F. A. A. has been
delegated the authority by Congress to is-

sue airman’s certificates necessary to oper-
ate aircraft in civil aviation, the majority
holds that a state may prohibit a holder of
such a license to operate an aircraft. In my
view, the conclusion is inescapable that a
state statute which would prohibit that
which is expressly permitted by a federal
license, issued pursuant to federal law with-
out qualification, is in direct and irreconcil-
able conflict with the federal law and there-
fore invalid under the supremacy clause.
This was the conclusion reached by the Su-
preme Court in Sperry v. State of Florida,
373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428
(1963). There, the state of Florida sought
to enjoin a non-lawyer, registered to prac-
tice before the United States Patent Office
by the Commissioner of Patents, from coun-
seling clients and preparing patent applica-
tions in Florida on the ground that such
activities constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in violation of state law. The
Supreme Court noted that the states have
“a substantial interest in regulating the
practice of law within the State” and could,
in the absence of federal legislation, prohib-
it nonlawyers from engaging in the type of

[1128]

32a

activities necessary for the preparation of
patent applications. Id. at 383, 83 S.Ct. at
1325. However, Congress had by statute
specifically authorized the Commissioner of
Patents to prescribe regulations governing
the representation of applicants before the
Patent Office by “ ‘agents, attorneys, or
other persons, id. at 384, 83 S.Ct. 1322.
Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner, the petitioner was duly reg-
istered to represent applicants before the
Patent Office. In holding that the state
could not enjoin the petitioner from engag-
ing in activities expressly authorized by
federal law, the Supreme Court stated (373
U.S. at 385, 83 S.Ct. at 1326):

“The statute thus expreasly permits the
Commissioner to authorize practice be-
fore the Patent Office by non-lawyers,
and the Commissioner has explicitly
granted such authority. If the authoriza-
tion is unqualified, then, by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, Florida may not deny
to those failing to meet its own qualifica-
tions the right to perform the functions
within the scope of the federal authority.
No State law can hinder or
obstruct the free use of a license granted

33a

under an act of Congress.’ Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13
How. 518, 566, 14 L.Ed. 249.”

Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 447, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d
852 (1960).

The fact that a state limitation on the
exercise of the federally granted right is
imposed only as a sanction incident to a
conviction under an otherwise valid crimi-
nal statute does not alter this result under
the Supremacy Clause. In Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 75 S.Ct. 191, 99
L.Ed. 68 (1954), an interstate motor carrier
doing business under a certificate of conve-
nience and necessity issued by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission pursuant to
the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 301 et seq., instituted an action to restrain
Illinois officials from enforcing a statute
providing for the suspension of the carrier’s
right to use state highways for a period of
one year for repeated violations of state
imposed weight limitations. The Illinois
Supreme Court had held that the statute
was invalid insofar as it applied to the
carrier’s interstate operations, conducted
pursuant to its federal certificate, on the
ground that it conflicted with the Federal
Motor Carrier Act. The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision.

34a

The Supreme Court in Castle, in an opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Black, reasoned that the
Federal Motor Carrier Act was a “compre-
hensive plan for regulating the carriage of
goods by motor truck in interstate com-
meree greatly reducing the power of the
states to regulate interstate carriers. 348

U.S. at 68, 75 S.Ct. at 192 The Court

pointed out that, although the states were
free under the federal act to regulate the
weight and distribution of loads carried in

interstate trucks, nevertheless the federal
government had the exelusive power to de-
termine which carriers could operate in in-
terstate commerte. Evidence of this exclu-
sive power was found in the extensive con-
ditions set forth in the act governing the
issuance and revocation or suspension of
certificates of necessity and convenience by
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Noting that the suspension of a carrier’s
right to use state highways “is the equiva-
lent of a partial suspension of its federally
granted certificate,” and given the compre-
hensive federal procedures governing the
issuance of certificates of convenience and
necessity, the Supreme Court said that “it
would be odd if a state could take action
amounting to a suspension or revocation of
an interstate carriers commission-granted

35a

right to operate.” Id. at 64, 75 S.Ct. at 193.
In response to the contention that without
the power to suspend a carrier’s right to use
state highways, the state could not effec-
tively enforce otherwise valid regulatory
statutes, the Supreme Court stated (id. at
64-65, 75 S.Ct. at 193):

“It is urged that without power to im-
pose punishment by suspension states will
be without appropriate remedies to en-
force their laws against recalcitrant mo-
tor carriers. We are not persuaded, how-
ever, that the conventional forms of pun-
ishment are inadequate to protect states
from overweighted or improperly loaded
motor trucks. Moreover, a Commission
regulation requires motor carriers to
abide by valid state highway regulations.
And as previously pointed out, the Com-
mission can revoke in whole or in part
certificates of motor carriers which will-
fully refuse to comply with any lawful
regulation of the Commission. If, there-
fore, motor carriers persistently and re-
peatedly violate the laws of a state, we
know of no reason why the Commission
may not protect the state’s interest, ei-
ther on the Commission’s own initiative
or on complaint of the state.”

36a

I believe that Castle v. Hayes Freight
Lines, supra, is controlling. The regulation

[1129] of safety along highways has traditionally

been viewed as an area of local concern,
with the states being permitted great lati-
tude in the absence of federal regulations.
See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510,
82 L.Ed. 734 (1988). However, even in this
area, the state cannot interfere with the
exercise of a federal right. Aviation safe-
ty, on the other hand, is an area which,
because of its nature, can only be adequate-
ly regulated through national control. As
Mr. Justice Jackson said in Northwest Air-
lines v. State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
308, 64 S.Ct. 950, 956, 88 L.Ed. 1283 (1944)
(concurring opinion):
“Air as an element in which to navigate
is even more inevitably federalized by the
commerce clause than is navigable water.
Local exactions and barriers to free tran-
‘sit in the air would neutralize its indiffer-
ence to space and its conquest of time.
“Congress has recognized the national
responsibility for regulating air com-
merce. Federal control is intensive and
exclusive. Planes do not wander about in
the sky like vagrant clouds. They move

37a

only by federal permission, subject to fed-
eral inspection, in the hands of federally
certified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands. The mo-
ment a ship taxis onto a runway it is
caught up in an elaborate and detailed
system of controls. It takes off only by
instruction from the control tower, it
travels on prescribed beams, it may be
diverted from its intended landing, and it
obeys signals and orders. Its privileges,
rights, and protection, so far as transit is
concerned, it owes to the Federal Govern-
ment alone and not to any state govern-
ment.”

If the states are precluded from effectively
revoking or suspending a federal license
through enforcement of criminal statutes in
an area such as highway safety, where ex-
tensive state regulation has historically
been permitted, then surely they may not
do so in an area requiring almost exclusive
federal control. —

The Federal Aviation Act, like the statu-
tory scheme considered in Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, supra, provides for a compre-
hensive federal licensing procedure govern-
ing the issuance and the revocation or sus-
pension of the federal license. As there,

38a

because of its comprehensive nature, this
regulation is exclusive. And as discussed
above, this regulation extends to intrastate
as well as interstate activities, unlike the
regulatory scheme involved in Castle v.
Hayes Freight Lines, supra. Given this ex-
clusive and even more comprehensive feder-
al regulation, I do not believe that the
state, either directly, or indirectly, as an
incident to enforcement of valid regulatory
statutes as in Castle v. Hayes Freight
Lines, supra, may hinder the exercise of a
right granted pursuant to a federal statute.
Although the state does have an interest in
protecting its citizens from the reckless op-
eration of aircraft, this interest can be pro-
tected through the more traditional sane-
tions of fines and imprisonment as provided

for in § 10—-1008(a). Moreover, as the re-

ord in this case demonstrates, the Federal
Aviation Administration can revoke or sus-
pend an airman’s certificate if necessary to
protect the public. The conduct prohibited
by § 10-1002 is the same as that prohibited
by the Federal Aviation Regulations. I
cannot see why this is not sufficient to
protect the state’s interest without interfer-
ence in the comprehensive and otherwise
uniform federal regulatory seheme.

[1130]

39a

For these reasons, I would hold that sub-
section (b) of § 10-1003 of the Maryland act
is invalid under the Supremacy Clause and
that, therefore, the circuit court had no
authority to prohibit the defendant from
operating an aircraft in this state for one
year.!

SMITH, J., has authorized me to state
that he joins in the views expressed herein.

1. An additional question would be presented in
this case if we were reviewing the sentence
originally imposed by the District Court rather
than the sentence imposed by the circuit court.
The circuit court did not place the defendant on
probation but directly imposed the prohibition

_ ‘against flying pursuant to the purported au-

. thority set forth in subsection (b) of § 10—1003.
As explained above, I believe that this statuto-
ry provision is unconstitutional. However, the
District Court had made the prohibition against
operation of an aircraft a condition of proba-
tion. While it is true that criminal courts gen-
erally have wide discretion in imposing reason-
able conditions of probation, it is recognized
that the imposition of certain conditions is be-
yond the power of the courts. See Bird v.
State, 231 Md. 432, 190 A.2d 804 (1963); Unit-
ed States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Lumberd, J., concurring); Best and Birzon,
Conditions of Probation, 51 Geo. L. J. 809
(1963); Note, Judicial Review of Probation

Conditions, 67 Colum.L.Rev. 181 (1967). It is
doubtful whether a state imposed prohibition

[footnote continued]

40a

against operating an aircraft pursuant to a fed-
eral license, which could not be imposed direct-
ly as a sanction for violation of a criminal
statute, could be imposed indirectly as a condi-
tion of probation. However, because we are
‘reviewing the sentence of the circuit court fol-
lowing a de novo appeal instead of the sentence
of the District Court, the question of whether
or not a prohibition against operation of an
aircraft could be imposed as a condition of
probation is not presented.

4la

Article 1A

ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND
Section 10-1002

It shall be unlawful for any person to operate an air-
craft in the air, or on the ground or water, while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or other
habit-forming drug, or to operate an aircraft in the air or
on the ground or water, in a careless or reckless manner
so as to endanger the life or property of another. In any
proceeding charging careless or reckless operation of air-
craft in violation of this section, the court determining
whether the operation was careless or reckless shall con-
sider the standards for safe operation of aircraft pre-
scribed by federal statutes or regulations governing aero-
nautics. Penalties for the violation of this section shall
be as prescribed by § 10-1003 (a) of this article.

Section 10-1003

(a) General. - Any person violating any of the provi-
sions of this article, unless otherwise specified, and any
person violating any of the rules, regulations or orders
issued pursuant to this article, shall be punishable by a
fine of not more than $500.00 or by imprisonment of
not more than 60 days, or both, in the discretion of the
court.

(b) Special. - For any violation of § 10-1002 of this
article, in addition to, or in lieu of, the penalties pro-
vided by subsection (a) of this section, or as a condition
to the suspension of a sentence which may be imposed
pursuant thereto, the court in its discretion may prohibit
the violator from operating an aircraft within the State
for such period as it may determine but not to exceed
one year. Violation of the duly imposed prohibition of
the court may be treated as a separate offense under this
section or as a contempt of court. Upon a plea of guilty
or conviction under § 10-1002 of this article in any case

42a

involving a registrant under § 6-602 of this article, the
court shall cause a notation of such plea or conviction
and of the sentence imposed to be marked upon the pilot
certificate or other evidence of pilot registration or receipt
provided by the Administration under § 6-602. In no
event shall this subsection be construed as warrant for
the court or any other agency or person to take away,
impojmd or hold any State registration certificate or
other evidence of registration or payment of fees.

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
Title 49, Section 1508(A)
Declaration of National Sovereignty in airspace;
operation of foreign aircraft

(a) The United States of America is declared to
possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace of the United States, includ-
the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace
above those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas,
bays, and loakes, over which by international law or
treaty or convention the United States exercises national
jurisdiction. Aircraft of the armed forces of any foreign
nation shall not be navigated in the United States, in-
cluding the Canal Zone, except in accordance with an
authorization granted by the Secretary of State.

Title 49, Section 1348 (a) (c)

Airspace control and facilities
(a) The administrator is authorized and directed to
develop plans for the formulate policy with respect to the
use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule, regula-
tion, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such
terms, conditions, and limitations as he may deem neces-

43a

sary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient utilization of such airspace. He may modify or
revoke such assignment when required in the public in-
terest.

(c) The administrator is further authorized and di-
rected to prescribe airtraffic rules and regulations govern-
ing the flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection,
and identification of aircraft, for the protection of per-
sons and property on the ground, and for the efficient
utilization of the navigable airspace, including rules as to
safe altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of
collision between aircraft, and land and/or water vehicles,
and between aircraft and airborne objects.

Title 49, Section 1341 (a)
Federal Aviation Administration

(a) There is established the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration, referred to in this chapter as the “‘Administra-
tion.” The Administration shall be headed by an Admin-
istrator who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The adminis-
trator shall be responsible for the exercise of all powers
and the discharge of all duties of the Administrator, and
shall have authority and control over all personnel and
activities thereof. In the exercise of his duties and the
discharge of his responsibilities under this chapter, the
Administrator shall not submit his decisions for the
approval of, nor be bound by the decisions or recom-
mendations of, any committee, board, or other organiza-
tion created by Executive order.

Title 49, Section 1304
Public Right of Transit

There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of
any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom

44a

of transit through the navigable airspace of the United
States.

Title 49, Section 1422 (a)
Airman Certificates
(a) The Administrator is empowered to issue airman
certificates specifying the capacity in which the holders
thereof are authorized to serve as airmen in connection
with aircraft.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2589%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
