# Opposition — National Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 1045

## Text

Supreme Court, U. S,
FILED

—_ —_——_——— SEP 211977

[MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No YY" 448

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,

V.

CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Respondent.

APPENDICES TO THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BERT W. REIN

JON PAUGH

ROBERT K. HUFFMAN
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

EDWIN O. BAILEY, Esq.
1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel for
National Airlines, Inc.

September 1977

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page
APPENDIX A
Delta Air Lines v. CAB, et al., Nos. 76-1241,
et al. (D.C. Cir., June 23, 1977) (Slip Op.) A-1

APPENDIX B
» CAB Order 76-3-93 (March 15, 1976) B-1

APPENDIX C
CAB Order 76-6-120 (June 16, 1976) C-1

APPENDIX D
Order Amending Opinion of June 23, 1977
(D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) D-1

APPENDIX E
Order Amending Judgment of June 23, 1977
(D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) E-1

APPENDIX F
Order Denying National’s Petition for Rehear-
ing (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) F-1

APPENDIX G
Order Denying National's Petition for Rehear-
ing En Bane (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) G-1

APPENDIX H
Order Denying National’s Motion for Stay of

Mandate (D.C. Cir., August 2, 1977) H-1
APPENDIX I

Judgment (D.C. Cir., June 23, 1977) I-1
APPENDIX J

Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. $$ 1371(d)
(2), 1386, and 1486; Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 706(2)(D) J-1

re

APPENDIX A

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested
to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 76-1241
DELTA AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT *
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., INTERVENORS

No. 76-1309
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS

* In order to distinguish this case from others of the same
name, readers are encouraged to cite it as: Delta Air Lines
v. CAB [Miami-Los Angeles route].

App. A-2
No. 76-1429
NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER
v.

CrvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS

No. 76-1602
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER
v.
CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., INTERVENORS

Petitions for Review of Order of
the Civil Aeronautics Board

Argued September 23, 1976
Decided June 23, 1977
Robert Reed Gray, with whom James W. Callison and

Louis Hayner Kurrelmeyer were on the brief, for peti-
tioner in No. 76-1241.

Wie eae -

App. A-3

James F. Bell, with whom Richard D. Mathias and
Joseph M. Oliver, Jr. were on the brief, for petitioner in
No. 76-1309 also entered appearances for intervenor,
Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Bert W. Rein, with whom Jon Paugh and Edwin O.
Batley were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 76-1429.

J. William Doolittle, Jr., for petitioner in No. 76-1602.
Alfred V. J. Prather, Ky P. Ewing, Jr. and Carl B.

Nelson, Jr., were on the brief for petitioner in No. 76-
1602.

Alan R. Demby, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board,
with whom James C. Schultz, General Counsel, Jerome
Nelson, Deputy General Counsel, Glen M. Bendixsen,
Associate General Counsel, Robert L. Toomey, Thomas
L. Ray, Attorneys, Civil Aeronautics Board, Carl D. Law-
son and Lee I. Weintraub, Attorneys, Department of
Justice, were on the brief, for respondent. B. Barry
Grossman, Edward E. Lawson, Attorneys, Department
of Justice, and Michael Stempler, Attorney, Civil Aero-
nautics Board, also entered appearances for respondent.

Emory N. Ellis, Jr., with whom Gerald P. O’Grady
was on the brief, for intervenor, Western Air Lines, Inc.

Ronald D. Eastman entered an appearance for inter-
venor, Northwest Airlines, Inc.

Before MCGOWAN, LEVENTHAL and Ross, Circuit
Judges.

McGowAN, Circuit Judge: These consolidated cases
present the first occasion for judicial review of a matter
which has already occupied the attention of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board for nearly ten years—the award of com-
petitive nonstop authority on the Miami-Los Angeles
route. Of the various contentions pressed upon us by
the several contending parties, only three warrant discus-
sion in some detail:

App. A-4

1. The claim by Delta Air Lines, Inc., that it was
entitled to priority by reason of its 1972 merger with
Northeast Airlines, Inc.

2. The challenge by National Airlines, Inc., the
incumbent monopoly carrier on the route, to the
Board’s alleged failure to comply with the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.

3. The contention (echoed by National) of Pan
American World Airways, Inc., the carrier recom-
mended for the route by the Administrative Law
Judge but displaced at the Board level by Western
Air Lines, Inc., that the Board unfairly took into
account events occurring during the three-year in-
terval between the closing of the record and the
Board’s decision.

We find no basis in either of the first two for dis-
turbing the Board’s action. The third, however, presents
procedural problems which cause us to conclude that the
case should be remanded to the Board for reconsideration
after opportunity is afforded for adversarial inquiry into
matters occurring after the closing of the record in 1973.

I

On March 10, 1967 the Board initiated the Southern
Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation. The Miami-Los
Angeles route was among the eighteen markets under con-
sideration in that proceeding. Single carrier nonstop serv-
ice between the two cities had originally been authorized
in the Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B.
701 (1961) (see also 14 C.F.R. § 202.11 (1976)), and
from 1961 until 1969 National enjoyed monopoly certifi-
cation over the route.

The Board, in July, 1969, awarded competitive nonstop
authority in the Miami-Los Angeles market to North-
east Airlines, Inc. “for route strengthening purposes.”
On petition for reconsideration, Eastern Airlines, Inc.,

App. A-5

a competing applicant, suggested that, given Northeast’s
comparatively weak financial posture, Northeast might
be a likely candidate for a merger, and that, under such
circumstances, the Board’s solicitude for the welfare of
Northeast’s route structure might be ill-advised. In re-
sponse, Northeast categorically assured the Board that
no merger was contemplated. Apparently in reliance
on this representation, the Board, without discussion, af-
firmed its award to Northeast in an order issued Septem-
ber 18, 1969. Six days later, Northeast decided to seek a
merger. Meanwhile, on October 1, 1969, Northeast com-
menced nonstop service under its new authority.

Northeast’s first prospective merger partner was North-
west Airlines, Inc. In August, 1970, after a public hear-
ing, the Board’s Examiner recommended that the proposed
merger be approved, and that all of Northeast’s certifi-
cates, including that which covered the Miami-Los An-
geles route, be transferred to Northwest. The Examiner
reached this result over the objections of Delta and an-
other carrier, and despite his recognition that Miami-Los
Angeles authority had only been granted to Northeast in
an effort to counterbalance existing limitations in North-
east’s route system. The Board itself was not quite so
accommodating in its review of the proposed merger. Al-
though conceding that the transaction would prove econ-
omically beneficial to both parties, and would entail no
monopoly dangers, a three-member majority of the Board
was unwilling to accept transfer of the Miami-Los An-
geles authority without an opportunity to reconsider the
route award in the light of post-merger circumstances.
The December, 1970 order accompanying the Board’s
opinion approved the merger subject to the conditions

(a) that the authorization of Northwest Airlines to
operate segment 7 of Northeast’s certificate for Route
27 (Miami-Los Angeles) be stayed pending final
decision in a proceeding for the purpose of reexami-
nation of such authorization to be institued upon

App. A-6

transfer of the certificate, and (b) that the trans-
ferred certificate for Route 27 shall be subject to
whatever determinations are made regarding segment
7 in such proceeding... .

Some of the Board’s pertinent remarks are set forth in
the margin.’

» The Board is fully aware that Northwest may with-
draw from the merger unless it receives the Miami-Los
Angeles route outright. Nonetheless, the Board has re-
luctantly concluded that the public interest and the in-
tegrity of the Board processes can be vindicated only if
the Board retains the power to reconsider that route
award in later section 401(g) proceedings. Otherwise,
we would find that the merger would be inconsistent with
the public interest. Thus, the Board finds itself com-
pelled to stay the authorization for Northwest to operate
the Miami-Los Angeles route pending completion of the
subsequent proceedings.

Acceptance of the examiner’s view can only encourage
the formulation of merger plans, intentionaily or other-
wise, based upon the outcome of pending route proceed-
ings. In order to avoid that result, the Board believes
that it must reexamine the pre-merger route award in
the light of the circumstances as they exist following the
merger. nae

The Board hopes that Northwest will reconsider its
threat to withdraw from the merger if the Miami-Los
Angeles route is stayed. The Board has not rejected
Northwest’s claim to the route; it has simply concluded
that the question must be decided in a new evidentiary
proceeding. If Northwest consummates the merger, it
will have full opportunity in the section 401(g) proceed-
ing to justify its retention of the route. In this connec-
tion, Northwest will be free to argue that (as the exam-
iner concluded) the Northeast system should be regarded
as an integrated whole, with the profitable routes needed
to offset the marginal ones. And Northwest can repeat
its assertions that the Miami-Los Angeles route inte-
grates well with its present authority beyond California
to Hawaii and the Orient.

App. A-7

Northwest petitioned for reconsideration, but, in an
opinion dated March, 1971, the Board remained stead-
fast in its refusal to permit transfer of the Miami-Los
Angeles route. One factor influential in stiffening the
Board’s resolve was Delta’s expressed willingness to merge
with Northeast “whether or not the Miami-Los Angeles
segment is transferred to Delta as part of the merger.”
Rather than proceed in accordance with the restrict-
tions imposed by the Board, Northwest withdrew from
the prospective merger. In May, 1971, Northeast and
Delta entered into a merger agreement, and another
hearing was held by the Board; and, in October, 1971,
the Examiner recommended that the merger be approved
subject to certain conditions, including a stay of author-
ity to operate the Miami-Los Angeles route pending com-
pletion of a section 401(g) proceeding.* With minor
variations not relevant here, the Board in May of 1972
concurred in the Examiner’s recommendations. The lang-
uage in that order referring to the Board’s treatment of
the Miami-Los Angeles route was essentially identical to
that employed on the same subject in connection with the
proposed Northwest merger. See text accompanying note
1 supra. Petitions for reconsideration raising issues un-
related to the present controversy were denied, and the
Delta-Northeast merger finally approved, in July, 1972.

? Section 401(g) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1871(g) (1970), provides, in pertinent
part:

The Board upon petition or complaint or upon its own
initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend,
modify, or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in
part, if the public convenience and necessity so require,
or may revoke any such certificate in whole or in part,
for intentional failure to comply with any provision of
this subchapter or any order, rule, or regulation issued
hereunder or any term, condition, or limitation of such
certificate ....

App. A-8

On July 31, Northeast terminated its Miami-Los Angeles
service, and National once again became a monopoly car-
rier between the two cities.

Approximately three weeks later, the Board, honoring
its commitment to undertake a post-merger reevaluation
of the Miami-Los Angeles market, instituted an investi-
gation designated as the Miami-Los Angeles Competitive
Nonstop Case. The stated purpose of this investigation
was

to determine whether the public convenience and
necessity require (a) the alteration, amendment, or
modification of any carrier certificates so as to au-
thorize nonstop service . . . between Miami-Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., and Los Angeles-Ontario-Long
Beach, Calif., and (b) the alteration, amendment, or
modification of Delta Air Lines’ certificate for route
27 so as to suspend, terminate, or otherwise modify
authority to operate over segment 7.

An expedited hearing was scheduled, and on June 13,
1973, the ALJ issued his decision, finding a continuing
need for nonstop competition on the Miami-Los Angeles
route, and authorizing Pan American to provide the neces-
sary service. On June 19, 1973, the Board, on its own
initiative, granted discretionary review of the ALJ’s
determination.

The first delay encountered was precipitated by Nation-
al’s contention that certification of a nonstop competitive
carrier “would constitute a major Federal action signi-
ficantly affecting the quality of the environment,” and
would therefore require a detailed environmental state-
ment under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seg. (1970). The ALJ re-
jected this position, and the Board purportedly followed
suit in an order dated September 27, 1973. However, de-
spite its belief that further formal exploration of en-
vironmental questions was not statutorily required, the

App. A-9

Board announced its intention to accord such matters a
thorough airing, and therefore instructed the Director of
the Board’s Bureau of Operating Rights “to prepare a
statement with respect to the environment for consider-
ation and comment by the parties, other environmentally
concerned Federal agencies, and other interested per-
sons.” A preliminary draft of this environmental assess-
ment was not completed until August, 1974, and the
final version did not become available until the following
December. Meanwhile, all other proceedings in the Miami-
Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop Case were deferred
pending completion of the environmental study. The
Bureau’s ultimate conclusion matched that reached eight-
een months earlier by the ALJ, namely, that

the award of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity authorizing nonstop air transportation
between Miami-Ft. Lauderdale and Los Angeles-
Ontario-Long Beach to one of the nine applicants, and
the commencement of operations by the carrier
selected, would not constitute a “major Federal ac-
tion significantly affecting quality of the human en-
vironment” within the meaning of section 102 (2) (c)
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

J.A. 717. No party has challenged this conclusion before
either the Board or this court.*

*For a detailed treatment of the NEPA aspect of the
Miami-Los Angeles route proceeding, see Burger, Miami-Los
Angeles and NEPA: The Use of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 as an Anticompetitive Weapon, 42 J. Air
L. & Com. 529 (1976). The author observes that economic
regulatory agencies such as the CAB generally lack the tech-
nical expertise necessary for the analysis of environmental
issues, and that the difficulties are compounded when such
analysis must take place in the context of a licensing proceed-
ing. In the aftermath of the lengthy delay occasioned by
NEPA considerations in the Miami-Los Angeles case, the
CAB has adopted a set of regulations, instituting a regular-
ized NEPA compliance system. See id. at 567-73; 40 Fed.
Reg. 37,184-203 (1975); and 14 C.F.R. Part 312 (1976).

Se ee?

App. A-10

Oral argument was finally heard by the Board on April
16, 1975. Eleven months passed before the Board, on
March 15, 1976, issued its decision, affirming the ALJ’s
finding of a need for competition on the Miami-Los
Angeles route, but reversing his award of operating
authority to Pan American, and certifying Western in-
stead. At the same time, the Board denied a January,
1976 motion by National to postpone further action until
after preparation of a statement under the EPCA estimat-
ing “the probable impact on energy efficiency and energy
conservation of nonstop competitive authority in the
Miami-Los Angeles market.” Also denied in March, 1976
was a November, 1974 motion by Continental to reopen
the record on the ground that changes in circumstances
occurring since the close of economic hearings undermined
the evidentiary basis for the ALJ’s selection of Pan
American, and made profitable operation of the Miami-
Los Angeles route by Pan American unlikely.

Pan American had opposed the motions of both National
and Continental. However, on the morning of March 15,
1976, only hours before the Board’s decision was released,
Pan American itself filed a motion to reopen the record
for further evidentiary presentations. This motion to
reopen was denied, and, on June 16, the Board promul-
gated an order rejecting various petitions for reconsider-
ation and denying requests for a stay of the award pend-
ing judicial review. Such a stay was similarly denied
by a motions panel of this court on July 2, 1976, but
with directions for expedited hearing on the merits.

II

Delta has attempted to persuade us of its entitlement
to preferential treatment. Unimpressed by any of the
theories advanced, and convinced that Delta had agreed,
as one of the conditions of Board approval of the Delta-
Northeast merger, to compete on an equal footing with

nc

App. A-11

other applicants for Miami-Los Angeles authority, we
affirm the Board in its rejection of Delta’s claims to
special status.

During the Examiner’s review of the proposed North-
west-Northeast merger in 1970, Delta urged that, what-
ever the Board’s conclusion as to the overall advisability
of the merger, in no event should the Miami-Los Angeles
segment of Northeast’s Route 27 be transferred to North-
west as part of the deal.‘ Criticizing what it characterized
as Northeast’s “emotional plea” for route strengthening
in the Southern Tier investigation, the success of which
was followed immediately by Northeast’s initiation of
merger negotiations, Delta argued that, if transfer of
Miami-Los Angeles authority were permitted, other fi-
nancially weak carriers would be encouraged to seek
route awards for use as merger “bait.” Technical prob-
lems with respect to effectuating the nontransfer could
be solved, Delta suggested, by inclusion of the following
statement in the Board’s order concerning the pro-

posed merger:

Segment 7 of Northeast’s Route 27 shall not be
transferred to the surviving carrier. ... [T]he
actual amendment of the certificate for Route 27
to incorporate the restriction specified above cannot
be accomplished until the outcome of a Section 401
(g) proceeding to alter, amend, or modify the cer-
tificate with respect to the above-certificated au-

* Apparently, CAB grants of additional operating authority
are ordinarily implemented through the tacking of a new seg-
ment, embodying the newly-awarded route, onto an existing
route certificate held by the carrier and involving at least one
of the terminal points of the new route. See CAB Brief at 76
n.37 and 80 n.39. While the reason for this practice has not
been explained to us, we cannot discern any indication in the
record that the Board has deliberately employed this device
to facilitate subsequent route structure manipulation, and to
permit evasion of statutory procedural requirements.

App. A-12

thority. At the time of the transfer of the certificate
for Route 27 to Northwest, however, we will stay
those portions of Northeast’s certificated authoriza-
tions which we have found would be inconsistent with
the public interest to transfer to Northwest.

This language, although somewhat opaque, appears to
contemplate transfer of the entire Route 27 certificate
to Northwest, accompanied by an annotation to the effect
that segment 7 itself would not be transferred and that
authority to operate segment 7 would be stayed pending
completion of the described § 401(g) proceeding.

The actual wording adopted by the Board (see text ac-
companying note 1 supra) omitted any express declaration
that segment 7 would not be transferred. Nevertheless,
the intention of the Board to proceed substantially in
the manner proposed by Delta was clear. Equally clear
was the fact that Delta fully appreciated the import of
the Board’s formulation. As noted previously, Delta, in
opposition to Northwest’s petition for reconsideration,
sought to dispel potential Board fears that the perceived
benefits of merger might be lost due to the conditions im-
posed by the Board. To this end, Delta announced its
own desire to merge with Northeast “whether or not
the Miami-Los Angeles segment is transferred to Delta
as part of the merger.” Moreover, Delta represented that,
in the event the latter merger materialized, Delta would
be “amenable to participating in a Section 401 proceeding
vying for the [Miami-Los Angeles] authority along with
other interested applicants.”* In rejecting Northwest’s
petition, the Board declared its hope that Northwest

* At the same time, Delta purported to have detected in the
Board’s original opinion an implication that “if Northwest
did go ahead with the merger on the basis stipulated, North-
west might have some advantage over the other applicants in
the 401(g) proceeding ....” We find no such implication in
our reading of the relevant portion of the Board’s opinion.

App. A-13

would nevertheless proceed with the merger, but in no
way suggested that, should the transaction go forward,
Northwest would receive preferential treatment in the
subsequent Miami-Los Angeles proceeding. Contrarily, the
Board reminded Northwest of “the possibility of persuad-
ing the Board in the section 401(g) proceeding that the
Miami-Los Angeles route should be permanently awarded
to Northwest,” but quickly cautioned that “[w]Je intimate
no views as to the outcome of that proceeding.” Respond-
ing to a point raised by another carrier, the Board stated:

Braniff expresses concern that the Board’s opinion
might be construed as limited to modifications of the
Northeast permit, without considering applications by
other carriers for such route authority under section
401(b) of the Act. It was not our intention to so con-
fine the contemplated proceeding.*

Thus, in March, 1971, at the close of the Board’s examina-
tion of the proposed Northeast-Northwest merger, Delta
had no reason whatever to believe that Northwest could
assert any special claim to Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles
authority if that merger actually took place.

Nothing occurred in the course of the Board’s investiga-
tion of the proposed Delta-Northeast merger that can
justify Delta in the conclusion that, after merger, Delta’s
status regarding the Miami-Los Angeles route is different

* Subsections 401(a) and (b) of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), (b) (1970), pro-
vide:

(a) No air carrier shall engage in any air transporta-
tion unless there is in force a certificate issued by the
Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such
transportation.

(b) Application for a certificate shall be made in writ-
ing to the Board and shall be so verified, shall be in such
form and contain such information, and shall be accom-
panied by such proof of service upon such interested
persons, as the Board shall by regulation require.

App. A-14

from that which Northwest might have enjoyed had it
pursued the Northeast deal to completion. Indeed, Delta
has conceded on two separate occasions in its brief that
the relevant conditions imposed by the Board on the
Delta-Northeast merger are “in all significant respects
identical to the conditions earlier imposed upon the
Northwest-Northeast merger.” Delta Brief at 15, 24.

Furthermore, during its consideration of the Delta-
Northeast agreement, the Board plainly apprised Delta
of the character of the planned proceeding on Miami-
Los Angeles authority. First, in November, 1971, just
a week after release of the Examiner’s initial decision
recommending approval of the Delta-Northeast merger
subject to the restrictions outlined above, the Board is-
sued an order in the Houston-Miami Phase of the South-
ern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation. Responding
to this court’s partial remand of the Board’s original
Southern Tier order (see Continental Air Lines v. CAB,
443 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir 1971)), the Board directed that
further evidentiary hearings be held on an expedited
basis “on the issue of whether the public convenience
and necessity require competitive nonstop service be-
tween Houston and Miami, and which carrier or car-
riers, if any, should be selected for such authority.” In
a footnote, the Board announced that it

reserve[d] the right at a later time to consolidate
into the present proceeding the issue of competitive
nonstop service in the closely related Miami-Los An-
geles market, in the event that we approve the pend-
ing merger agreement between Delta and Northeast
Airlines but find that the public interest requires
that we stay the transfer of Northeast’s Miami-Los
Angeles route, also granted in the Southern Tier
case, pending a section 401(g) proceeding to deter-
mine whether the route should be so transferred,
should be awarded to a different applicant, or should
be allowed to lapse. (Emphasis added.)

el

App. A-15

This description of the issues which might be con-
sidered in a proceeding subsequent to conditional ap-
proval of the Delta-Northeast merger was removed from
the realm of speculation and formally repeated by the
Board in its April, 1972 order and opinion ruling on the
Delta merger. When proceedings in the current docket
were instituted, the Board specifically identified the pos-
sibility that authority to operate the Miami-Los Angeles
route would be deleted from the certificate transferred
from Northeast to Delta. See text at 3 supra. At no
point in all this did the Board even remotely suggest
that, if Delta executed the merger with Northeast, Delta
could expect primary ranking among applicants for
Miami-Los Angeles authority.

Despite the foregoing, Delta has advanced a two-
pronged argument drawn from the language of § 401 (g)
(see note 2 supra) and supposedly supporting Delta’s
claim to a preferred position.’ First, the carrier main-
tains that, regardless of the segment 7 designation em-
ployed by the Board in 1969 when appending Miami-Los
Angeles authority to Northeast’s existing Route 27 cer-
tificate, the award of such authority in reality consti-
tuted the grant of a new and separate certificate which,
whether held by Northeast or Delta, could not be revoked
absent a showing of “intentional failure to comply” with
applicable statutes, rules, or regulations. Secondly, Delta
contends that the Board’s power under § 401(g) to alter,
amend, or modify airline certificates has not historically
been exercised to eliminate an entire major route over
carrier objection, and that, even if the Board’s power
does extend far enough to permit such a termination,
the requisite “public convenience and necessity” finding
was not and could not have been made in this case.

‘In the absence of such an entitlement, Delta does not
quarrel with the Board’s finding that the selection of Western
for the Miami-Los Angeles route will produce greater public
benefits than the selection of Delta.

App. A-16

We reject both parts of Delta’s argument for essen-
tially the same reason. The Miami-Los Angeles Competi-
tive Nonstop Case was not an ordinary § 401(g) pro-
ceeding. Rather, it was convened in accordance with the
Board’s decision in the Delta-Northeast merger case. The
Board’s order instituting the Miami-Los Angeles investi-
gation relied specifically not only on § 401(g), but also
on §408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1378(b) (1970). The latter provision states that

Any person seeking approval of a consolidation,
merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acqui-
sition of control, specified in subsection (a) of this
section, shall present an application to the Board, and
thereupon the Board shall notify the persons involved
in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, oper-
ating contract, or acquisition of control, and other
persons known to have a substantial interest in the
proceeding, of the time and place of a public hearing.
Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds that the
consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating con-
tract, or acquisition of control will not be consistent
with the public interest or that the conditions of this
section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order ap-
prove such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease,
operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon
such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just
and reasonable and with such modifications as it
may prescribe....

(Emphasis added. )

The factual context in which the Delta-Northeast
merger occurred plainly demonstrates that Board ap-
proval was conditioned upon a stay of authority to oper-
ate the Miami-Los Angeles route, pending a fresh as-
sessment of the need for competition in the Miami-Los
Angeles market and of the relative merits of the various
applicants for authority to serve that market. Thus, we
find it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the

App. A-17

Board’s characterization of the Miami-Los Angeles route
as a segment of a previously-existing certificate rather
than as a new and separate certificate unto itself.*

Similarly, we need not evaluate Delta’s contention that
the Board’s § 401(g) power to alter, amend, or modify
certificates does not embrace the prerogative to eliminate
an entire major route from a carrier’s authority. Even
if Delta’s points were well taken with respect to § 401
(g) proceedings generally, they completely ignore the
fact that, under §$ 408(b), the Board may approve a
merger “upon such terms and conditions as it shall find

*On the other hand, we also express no opinion as to the
correctness of the Board's interpretation of the term “certifi-
cate” as used in § 401(g). The Board insists that, properly
read,

the “certificate” to which Congress had reference in
Section 401(g) is the carrier’s overall operating author-
ity rather than each of the particular routes awarded the
carrier. .. . Any other interpretation of the Act would
be entirely illogical, as some carriers’ route authoriza-
tions are contained in one certificate while other car-
riers have a number of certificates covering one or more
routes. Whether a carrier’s route authorizations are con-
tained in one or more documents turns upon such mat-
ters as historical accident, distinctions between author-
izations which require Presidential approval and those
which do not, and administrative convenience... .

While appealing in some respects, the Board’s construction is
surely not obligatory, and, in fact, directly contradicts the
District Court’s holding in Pan American World Airways v.
Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.D.C. 1962), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Alaska Airlines v. Pan American World
Airways, 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Board asserts
that the latter case is not “persuasive precedent,” apparently
for no reason other than that it did not conform to the prior
position of the Board. Finding resolution of the issue un-
necessary to our decision herein, we leave to another day the
precise definition of “certificate” as used in § 401(g).

App. A-18

to be just and reasonable ... .”° In this case, one of
the terms imposed was a de novo consideration of the
Miami-Los Angeles route award originally made to
Northeast in 1969. If such a proceeding does not fall
neatly within the mold of the ordinary § 401(g) pro-
ceeding, perhaps the Board should have been more cir-
cumspect about its use of the §401(g) label. Since we
can discern no obvious interrelationship between § 401
(g) and § 408(b) in the statutory scheme of the Federal
Aviation Act, we see no reason why the Board could not
have omitted mention of § 401(g) altogether, and simply
provided a brief description of the proceeding it pro-
posed to conduct, pursuant to § 408(b), in connection
with the Delta-Northeast merger.’"® While this may con-

* Delta’s citation of the Supreme Court’s stress on “route
security” as an element of Congressional concern underlying
§ 401(g) is inapposite. No merger was involved in CAB v.
Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316 (1961). and, accordingly, no
question of the Board’s broad powers under § 408(b) arose
in that case.

Likewise, Delta’s reliance on Western Air Lines v. CAB,
495 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is misplaced. Because the
court in Western was dealing with a non-merger situation,
its comments related solely to § 401(g) viewed independently
of § 408(b). However, even accepting the court’s language in
Western at face value, we find no merit in Delta’s position.
In § 401(g), the court said, “[t]he Board was given the power
to respond to changed economic conditions and redefinitions
of ‘the public convenience and necessity’ by adjusting the
operating authority of carriers.” 495 F.2d at 156. Surely an
important transaction like the merger of Delta and North-
east may present an appropriate occasion for a redefinition
of “the public convenience and necessity” to which the Board
may respond under § 401(g).

* The Board’s dependence upon § 401(g) appears to be
traceable to a footnote in the United-Capital Merger Case,
33 C.A.B. 307 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Northwest Airlines v.
CAB, 302 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The facts in that pro-
ceeding were significantly different from those now before

App. A-19

ceivably have been the preferable course for the Board
to follow, its failure to do so did not prejudice Delta.

Ill

We turn now to National’s contention that the Board
has not produced the energy impact statement contem-

us. Capital Airlines, Inc. was in dire financial] straits. The
Board found, and this court agreed, that Capital would not
have survived if the merger with United had been disap-
proved. Two carriers, Delta and Eastern,

requested that the Board condition approval of the
merger on United’s acceptance of the nontransfer of
certain portions of Capital’s route authority. ... At the
oral argument before the Board, Eastern proposed an
alternative procedure; i.e., that the Board approve the
merger conditioned upon (1) the simultaneous institu-
tion of an investigation under section 401(g) of the
Act to determine whether the alteration, amendment,
modification, or suspension in whole or in part, of any
or all of the certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity of Capital is required by the public convenience and
necessity; and (2) the maintenance of the status quo
with respect to Capital’s nonstop operations during the
investigation.
The Board, concerned that any attempt to impose major
route authority restrictions might jeopardize the impending
merger, rejected both suggestions, and this court upheld that
decision, on both practical and legal grounds. See especially
303 F.2d at 397-98, 400-01.

In the course of its opinion, the Board ventured the follow-
ing aside, describing the mechanism by which Eastern’s pro-
posal could have been implemented, if its substance had been
accepted by the Board:

As a procedural matter, any withholding of Capital’s
route authority from United would have to be accom-
plished through staying the appropriate portions of the
Capital certificates transferred to United and instituting
a sec. 401(g) proceeding to alter, amend, modify, or
suspend the portions of the certificates in question. While
we could, within the scope of this proceeding, place limi-

App. A-20

plated by § 382(b) of the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6362(b) (Supp. V 1976).
Section 382(b) declares that five federal agencies, among
them the CAB,

shall, where practicable and consistent with the eXx-
ercise of their authority under law, include in any
major regulatory action (as defined by rule by each
such agency) taken by each such agency, a statement
of the probable impact of such major regulatory
action on energy efficiency and energy conservation.

In considering the application of this language to the
Miami-Los Angeles route case, a brief comparison with
relevant portions of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) may prove useful. As indicated
above, the Board’s Bureau of Operating Rights concluded,
after a lengthy investigation, that NEPA did not require
a formal environmental impact statement (EIS) in con-
nection with the current proceedings, and that finding
has not been questioned by the parties. This background
is especially significant in view of NEPA’s relatively
rigid statutory scheme. Although § 382(b) of EPCA is
reminiscent of NEPA’s EIS requirement, at least two
distinctions between the statutes are immediately evi-
dent. First, the statement required by EPCA is not
described in the detail which Congress employed in pre-
scribing the content of a formal EIS under NEPA. Sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C)

tations upon United’s use of the authority received by
transfer to United, action upon the certificates them-
selves, to alter, or terminate, the routes involved would
require a public convenience and necessity inquiry under
sec. 401(g) of the Act.
33 C.A.B. at 318 n.52. The Board cited no authority for the
proposition that certificates could not be amended, even in
the merger context, without resort to a § 401(g) proceeding.
The Board’s power to impose merger conditions under § 408
(b) was not discussed at this juncture.

[Continued]

App. A-21

(1970), lists five subjects which must be specifically
treated in every such environmental statement, and also
admonishes that no such statement shall be prepared
prior to consultation with other appropriate federal
agencies. Secondly, under EPCA, the affected agencies
enjoy greater flexibility, not just because of the less-
structured format of the energy impact statement, but
also because of the incorporation of a statutory safety
valve making such a statement mandatory only where
“practicable and consistent” with the exercise of agency
authority under existing law.

Preliminarily, we note an important administrative
development occcurring since oral argument. On Decem-
ber 22, 1976, the Board published in the Federal Regis-
ter proposed regulations implementing EPCA’s command
that the phrase “major regulatory action” be defined by
each agency covered by Section 382.% 41 Fed. Reg.
56669-73 (1976) (to be codified in 14 C.F.R. § 313). We
mention four salient features of these proposed regula-
tions.

Although recognizing the arbitrary character of a
quantitative standard (see id. at 56671), the Board, em-
phasizing ease of administration, has determined that

(Continued ]

However, the Board did find that unrestricted approval of
the merger would result in excessive diversion from two car-
riers already partially supported by government subsidy,
Allegheny and Mohawk. Therefore, the Board determined
to make certain comparatively minor route adjustments in the
authority transferred from Capital to United. Despite its
earlier indication that § 401(g) proceedings would have been
required in connection with the restrictions proposed by
Eastern and Delta, the Board accomplished the modifications
it deemed desirable in a rather informal fashion with no
mention of § 401(g).

“ Before taking final action on the proposed regulations,
the Board will consider all comments received by February
14, 1977.

App. A-22

particular conduct should qualify as “major regulatory

action” if it a
m]jay cause a near-term net annual change in air-
pose. yee consumption of 10 million (10,000,000)
gallons or more, compared to the probable consump-
tion of fuel were the action not to be taken;

if it is “speci i Board.” *
or if it is “specifically so designated by the
We observe in passing that the Board’s Bureau of Operat-
ing Rights has calculated that, on an annual basis,
Western’s twice daily nonstop round-trip service between
Miami and Los Angeles would consume 16.5 million gal-
ons of fuel.

The second noteworthy aspect of the Board's proposed
regulations is their extremely imprecise definition of
“energy efficiency” as that term is used in § 382 (b) of
EPCA. If finally enacted, § 313.3(b) of the regulations
would provide that

i i ful
“Energy efficiency” means the ratio of the use
output of services in air transportation to the energy
consumption of such services.

In commenting upon this proposed definition, the Board
has sketched a variety of methods for measuring fuel
efficiency, and has suggested, on the basis of recent ex-
perience, that none constitutes an entirely satisfactory
approach under all circumstances. Therefore, the Board
has declined “to be more specific or to render the defini-
tion in quantifiable terms at this time.” Highly relevant
in the present context are the Board’s remarks with re-

12 The ten million gallon figure represents approximately
one-tenth of one percent of

rtificated route carriers’ total consumption of aviation
pose and jet fuel in calendar year 1972, which is the
last full year not reflecting the effects of the Arab oil
embargo and OPEC price escalation, and the resultant
petroleum conservation measures.

41 Fed. Reg. at 56671 (footnote omitted).

App. A-23

spect to the difficulties encountered in the use of com-

parative load factors as a means for assessing the impact
of Board actions on energy efficiency :

(S]ome Board actions which on their face may be per-
ceived to have detrimental impact on energy ef-
ficiency in the short run may in fact be intrinsically
neutral or even beneficial. An example, in our view,
is the certification of first competitive service. His-
torically, load factors in competitive markets have on
the whole been lower than in monopoly markets.
Moreover, it is generally—although not universally—
the case that one consequence of the certification of a
competitor in a monopoly market is to depress load
factors in the short term, since neither normal traf-
fic growth nor the new traffic often stimulated by
new service is usually able to absorb the additional
capacity introduced in the market in the first year of
operations. In such an instance, it would appear that
energy efficiency has suffered. However, over time
there is no intrinsic reason why, at any given fare
level, a competitive market cannot reach an equilib-
rium of demand and supply whereby market load
factor returns to a reasonable level. Thus, reliance
on forecast year comparisons of fuel efficiency may
well be meaningless or even substantially misleading
in the typical competitive route case.

Id, at 56672 (emphasis added).

Thirdly, the proposed regulations, together with the
Board’s explanatory statement, demonstrate the Board’s
conviction that the burdens imposed by EPCA are not so
severe as their NEPA counterparts. In the Board’s view,
EPCA does not demand extensive new procedures designed

to produce detailed energy statements in advance of ordi-
nary Board hearings:

In the absence of any specific requirements of
EPCA to the contrary, and we perceive none, we be-
lieve it preferable as a general matter to integrate
the Board’s EPCA procedures in hearing cases with-

App. A-24

in our normal hearing process rather than the unique
NEPA procedures. Thus, we will provide that the
initial or recommended decision integrate findings
and conclusions with respect to the energy conserva-
tion and efficiency consequences of the various alter-
native actions in issue in the case, including where
appropriate a brief analysis of such consequences
in light of the other public convenience and neces-
sity factors relevant to the decision. These findings
and conclusions shall constitute the energy “state-
ment” required by EPCA. This is the procedure we
have in essence followed on an ad hoc basis since
enactment of EPCA [citing, inter alia, the Miami-
Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop Case]... . As is
the case with all other aspects of an initial or recom-
mended decision, the adequacy of the energy state-
ment is subject to Board review under our usual dis-
cretionary review procedures.

Id. at 56670.

Finally, the Board has taken advantage of the oppor-
tunity provided by publication of its proposed regula-
tions to inform interested parties that practicality may
require limitation of the scope of the Board’s energy
impact statements. For example, while the Board fore-
sees little problem in evaluating the effects of particular
actions on aviation fuel consumption, it expresses con-
cern that so-called secondary effects, such as variations
in automobile fuel consumption, may prove impossible
to determine. See id. at 56670 n.2. The commentary
does not reveal whether feasible EPCA inquiries, as con-
ceived by the Board, would entail consideration of in-
creasing American reliance on foreign fuel, or potential
peculiarities of local and regional fuel demands, two fac-
tors the importance of which is stressed by National.

While the proposed regulations have not yet received
final approval, we have canvassed them in some detail
because they inevitably color our perception of the argu-

App. A-25

ments made herein pertaining to EPCA. National has
maintained since January 7, 1976, less than one month
after passage of EPCA, that the Board is obligated to
issue a formal energy impact statement in connection
with the Miami-Los Angeles route proceeding. One of
the Board’s responses in its March, 1976 order was that
the award of competitive authority in the Miami-Los
Angeles market did not constitute a “major regulatory
action” within the meaning of § 382(b) of EPCA. At
the time, some credence might have attached to this
stance, especially in light of the earlier unchallenged
conclusion that Docket 24694 did not involve “major
Federal action significantly affecting quality of the hu-
man environment” under NEPA. However, after exam-
ining the Board’s newly-proposed EPCA regulations, we
believe that the Board cannot, in good faith, continue
to assert that its decision in this case was not a “major
regulatory action.” ** Given the predicted levels of fuel
consumption for Western’s Miami-Los Angeles operation,
the present route proceeding would clearly qualify as a
major action under the new rules, if adopted.

**In its brief to this court, submitted several months be-
fore publication of the proposed regulations, National flirted
with the argument that the Board, since it had not yet estab-
lished a formal definition of “major regulatory action,” could
not legitimately exclude the Miami-Los Angeles case from
the “major action” category. We do not believe that as a
consequence of EPCA’s enactment, five federal agencies be-
came obligated either to treat future administrative matters
as “major regulatory actions” or else to suspend further pro-
ceedings pending the outcome of rulemaking on the appro-
priate definition of the statutory phrase. Of course, the agen-
cies were duty-bound to proceed in a responsible and speedy
fashion toward the adoption of the statutorily prescribed
regulations. However, they were not thereby precluded from
making reasonable interim determinations that particular
agency decisions did not rise to the level of “major regula-
tory actions.”

App. A-26

Assuming, then, that major regulatory action is in-
volved herein, the question becomes whether the Board
has complied with the terms of EPCA’s § 382(b). We
believe that it has. We agree, at the outset, that the
energy impact statement required under EPCA need not
be as elaborate or as formal as the environmental state-
ment demanded by § 102(2)(C) of NEPA. The Board’s
opinion in this case leaves no doubt that energy factors
did receive timely consideration (see J.A. 159-64), and
that the public benefit to be derived from competition in
the Miami-Los Angeles market was found to justify the
additional fuel consumption which competitive service
would entail.’* Moreover, as disclosed by the Bureau of
Operating Rights study, Western’s predicted fuel needs
were virtually identical to those of Northwest, and less
than those of any other applicant for Miami-Los Angeles
authority. J.A. 561. Thus, the Board appears to have
chosen a carrier which will provide competition on the
Miami-Los Angeles route at a minimal expenditure of
fuel.

While we do not suggest that the “practicable and con:
sistent’”’ terminology of § 382(b) confers upon the Board
carte blanche to ignore energy considerations whenever
it finds it convenient to do so, we do express sympathy
for the Board’s position that this already much-delayed
proceeding should not have been further postponed to
permit preparation of a detailed energy statement which

* National’s admirable concern for fuel economy is com-
promised somewhat by the carrier’s representation to the
ALJ in Docket 24694 that, if National retained its monopoly
status on the Miami-Los Angeles route, it planned to com-
mence operation of a third daily round trip by 1974, the fore-
cast year employed by the ALJ. J.A. 133-34. National never
did, in fact, initiate such service, even though it continued to
enjoy monopoly authority through the summer of 1976. Nev-
ertheless, the mere promise of a third flight reveals National’s
judgment that additional fuel consumption might be neces-
sary to adequately serve the Miami-Los Angeles market.

App. A-27

would have been highly unlikely to affect the outcome.
Indeed, although future experience may not conform en-
tirely to the Board’s expectations, load factors forecast
for the Miami-Los Angeles route after the initiation of
competitive nonstop service compare favorably with those
actually achieved by National during 1972. J.A. 163.
At least according to this yardstick, therefore, the Board’s
award of Miami-Los Angeles authority to Western
should yield not a decline, but an improvement, in over-
all energy efficiency. Of course, National contends that
the Board’s figures reflect an inflated estimate of the
stimulative effect which the introduction of competition
may be expected to produce in the Miami-Los Angeles
market. But, even if discounted te allow for possible
overoptimism, the Board’s projections are impressive in
light of the Board’s own observation that “generally .. .
one consequence of the certification of a competitor in
a monopoly market is to depress load factors in the short
term....” 41 Fed. Reg. at 56672.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we agree with
the Board that, as applied to individual route proceed-
ings, § 382(b) is primarily intended to ensure that car-
rier selection is not accomplished in such a manner as
to disregard energy conservation considerations. We do
not read § 382(b) to impose on the Board an obligation
to review all aspects of the airline industry’s fuel poli-
cies in each route proceeding. As the Board stated in
its March, 1976 order,

fuel consumption should be properly considered on
an industrywide basis. . . . [N]ational fuel conser-
vation efforts as they pertain to air transportation
should, to the extent feasible, be borne equally by
all segments of the air transportation system. Fuel
conservation efforts should not deprive particular
communities of needed service simply because that
service has not been operated before.

App. A-28

J.A. 162. Finding ourselves in basic accord with the
sentiments thus expressed, we conclude that the Board
has committed no violation of EPCA in this case.

IV

There remain those complaints emanating from the
Board’s action in shaping its decision by reference to a
forecast year different from that used by the ALJ. Both
Pan American and National assert that the Board erred
in shifting from calendar year 1974 to fiscal year 1977
without affording petitioners an opportunity to participate
in supplementing the record to reflect intervening eco-
nomic developments.

We recognize the difficult and recurring problems
faced by administrative agencies trying to cope with the
inevitable time lag between the creation of an eviden-
tiary record and the announcement of final agency action.
We also acknowledge that, as the Board here contends,
necessary updating may on occasion be accomplished by
an agency acting independently and informally, without
resort to adversarial procedures. However, in the present
case, we are persuaded by a combination of factors that
fundamental fairness required the Board to give Pan
American a chance to submit its own version of changes
in circumstances occurring between 1973 and 1976 and to
comment upon the relevance of those changes to the
award of Miami-Los Angeles route authority.

The factors which, when considered together, impel
us to this conclusion are as follows:

(1) the delay involved was substantial, and covered
a period peculiarly characterized by new circum-
stances affecting air transportation:

(2) the record adjustments made by the Board
operated significantly to the detriment of a
particular carrier;

App. A-29

(3) that carrier has presented plausible arguments
refuting the Board’s interpretation of certain
facts and challenging the Board’s alleged fail-
ure to take account of other newly available in-
formation; and

(4) by attaching such great weight to diminished
estimates of Pan American’s beyond segment
traffic potential, the Board has at least argu-
ably departed from its earlier position concern-
ing the importance of beyond segment service
as a carrier selection criterion in transcontin-
ental route cases.

Given all the elements of the situation, we believe the
Board was obligated to seek the benefit of Pan American’s
views regarding the impact of the passage of time upon
the record evaluated by the ALJ.”

In several cases, the vast majority of them involving
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Supreme Court
has addressed itself to the closely related subjects of
agency rehearings and reopenings of administrative rec-
ords. The basic rule, repeatedly endorsed, is that recon-
sideration or supplementation, in whatever form, is a
matter entrusted to agency discretion. The classic state-
ment of this general principle, recently reiterated with
approval in both Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 294-95 (1974), and
United States v. ICC (Northern Lines Merger Cases), 396

Ss As noted above, National also challenged the Board’s in-
dependent updating of the record. We do not believe, how-
ever, that National was injured in any way by the Board’s
refusal to permit participation by the parties. In its 1976
orders, the Board reaffirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the
public convenience and necessity required competition on the
Miami-Los Angeles route. National has not drawn our atten-
tion to any factors which indicate that procedural shortcom-
ings caused the Board to ignore evidence suggesting a con-
trary outcome on the need for competition issue.

App. A-30

U.S. 491, 520-21 (1970), may be found in JCC v. Jersey
City, 322 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1944). There, Justice Jack-
son wrote, in an opinion for the Court:

One of the grounds of resistance to administrative
orders throughout federal experience with the ad-
ministrative process has been the claims of private
litigants to be entitled to rehearings to bring the
record up to date and meanwhile to stall the enforce-
ment of the administrative order. Administrative
consideration of evidence—particularly where the
evidence is taken by an examiner, his report sub-
mitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their
exceptions to it—always creates a gap between the
time the record is closed and the time the administra-
tive decision is promulgated. This is especially true
if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and
the consideration of the case deliberate and careful.
If upon the coming down of the order litigants might
demand rehearings as a matter of law because some
new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has
been observed, or some new fact discovered, there
would be little hope that the administrative process
could ever be consummated in an order that would
not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a
rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of
right, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it
has been considered that the discretion to be invoked
was that of the body making the order, and not that
of a reviewing body.
Justice Jackson observed that only once had the Court
reversed an agency “for refusing to grant a rehearing on
the contention that the record was ‘stale.’” Jd. at 515.
That case, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 284
U.S. 248 (1932), was soon limited to its special facts,
and has had little precedential influence. See, e.g., United
States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 288 U.S. 490 (1933) ; Balti-
more & O. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 389
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ; and 1 K. Davis, Ap-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.18 at 603 (1958).

App. A-31

We note in passing that the facts in the current liti-
gation are far more similar to those presented in Atchison
than to those confronted by the Court in either Jersey
City or Northern Lines.** We also note that on scattered

‘*In Atchison, the ICC had entered an order prescribing
maximum rates for the shipment of grain in the western part
of the United States. The evidentiary record had been closed
in September, 1928, but the Commission’s final order was
only issued in April, 1931, after two applications for rehear-
ing had been denied. The Supreme Court held unanimously
that the existing record in the case pertained to a different
economic era, and that it was incumbent upon the Commis-
sion to conduct a new hearing to determine the effects of the
Great Depression, “the outstanding contemporary fact, domi-
nating thought and action throughout the country.” 284 U.S.
at 260.

By contrast, in Jersey City, the ICC’s order granting a
fare increase on the so-called Hudson Tubes was issued less
than nine months after the conclusion of extensive eviden-
tiary hearings. Two months later, in August, 1943, a limited
rehearing was held, confined to the issue of the most prac-
ticable means of collecting a nine-cent fare, given the war-
time coin scarcity. The Supreme Court decided, not surpris-
ingly, that opponents of the fare increase had no right to
relitigate the propriety of the increase in the 1943 rehearing.

Northern Lines was a railroad merger case in which terms
were negotiated between the parties by 1961, approved by an
ICC Hearing Examiner in 1964, and finally accepted by the
Commission in 1967. Throughout the proceedings, the North-
ern Pacific Stockholders’ Protective Committee objected to
the agreed-upon exchange ratio governing transfers of stock
between shareholders of the two principal parties to the
merger, Great Northern and Northern Pacific. In reviewing
the Commission’s endorsement of the merger, the Supreme
Court rejected the Committee’s contention that the ICC should
have reopened the record in 1967 for the taking of new evi-
dence on the exchange ratio. The Court was obviously im-
pressed by the fact that the exchange ratio was the product
of hard bargaining between the parties, and had twice been
approved by overwhelming majorities of Northern Pacific
shareholders.

[Continued]

App. A-32

occasions, the Board itself has agreed to reopening of the
record for reasons hardly more compelling than those
raised by petitioners here. See, e.g., Service to Omaha and
Des Moines Case, Order 72-8-72 (August 16, 1972); At-
lanta-Detroit/Cleveland/Cincinnati Investigation, Order
72-7-98 (July 28, 1972); and Additional Service to San
Diego Case, Order 71-4-112 (April 16, 1971).*” On the

% [Continued]

Although the changed economic conditions present in Atchi-
son were clearly more acute than those involved here, the
earliest of the three cases described above still seems to re-
semble the current situation more closely than do either Jer-
sey City or Northern Lines. One further point remains to
be made. Both Atchison and Jersey City were rate-making
cases, and Northern Lines involved a merger, presumably
desirable to the primary participants therein. Here, by con-
trast, we are concerned with competing applicants for author-
ity to operate air service over a given route. Arguably, at
least, the impetus toward reopening an administrative record
is greater where an agency’s task is to choose between
similarly-situated private parties, all of whom are doubtless
capable of providing the service at issue.

17 In Omaha and Des Moines, the Board had deferred action
on petitions for reconsideration filed shortly after issuance of
a 1970 order. When, almost two years later, the Board fi-
nally began to review the petitions, it decided to reopen the
record saying

[t]he existing record—with 1967 as the base year and
1970 as the forecast year—is clearly too stale to permit
a decision on the merits without further evidentiary pro-
ceedings. In addition, the normal growth rates adopted
by the examiner on the basis of 1964-1967 historical ex-
perience appear to be too optimistic in light of more re-
cent traffic trends. New record evidence is therefore
desirable.

In Atlanta-Detroit, reopening was ordered to consider pos-
sible effects of the Allegheny-Mohawk and Delta-Northeast
mergers on various carrier selection criteria. Conceding that
the record, with 1968 as the base year and 1971 as the fore-
cast year, was “somewhat stale” by July, 1972, the Board
also expressed a desire to take account of “recent traffic

eT ee er - .

App. A-33

other hand, in Bowman a unanimous Court concluded
that there was “sound basis for adhering to [the] prac-
tice of declining to require reopening of the record, ex-
cept in the most extraordinary circumstances,” despite
the fact that “the evidentiary material [in the record]
pertained to service conditions which were dated by five
years at the time the Commission rendered its de-
cision.” * 419 U.S. at 294, 296.

The most important point for our purposes, however,
is that petitioners here do not seek reopening merely on
the ground of delay. As Pan American has emphasized,
the complaint focuses not so much on staleness as on the
selective character of the updating voluntarily undertaken
by the Board. Pan American objects first of al! to the
Board’s adjustment of the beyond-segment traffic figures
generated by the ALJ. In his 1973 decision, the ALJ con-
cluded that a primary reason for certification of Pan
American on the Miami-Los Angeles route was the car-
rier’s projected ability to serve over 132,000 beyond-

trends” which indicated that the growth ratio adopted by the
examiner had been too high.

In San Diego, the Board erroneously used fiscal 1971 rather
than calendar 1971 traffic estimates in attempting to deter-
mine whether Western could continue to operate profitably
if competition were certificated on the San Diego-Denver
route. The revised figures made an already close question
even closer, and the Board decided to reopen the record to
get the benefit of the most recent traffic and cost data.

a8 Why the Bowman Court felt constrained to discuss the
reopening issue is something of a mystery. Justice Douglas’s
opinion purports to respond to concerns expressed by the
three-judge District Court, but the cited portion of the Dis-
trict Court’s lengthy opinion contains virtually no reference
to the undesirable consequences of administrative delay. The
private appellants in the Supreme Court suggested that the
District Court had invalidated the ICC order under review at
least partially because that order was based on a stale record.
See Brief for Private Appellants at 54. This position finds

App. A-34

segment passengers during calendar year 1974. This
figure was far greater than the beyond-segment benefits
claimed by other applicants; it was even further in ex-
cess of the beyond-segment traffic which the ALJ believed
other applicants had a legitimate possibility of carrying.”
Nevertheless, in March, 1976, when the Board issued its
first opinion in the Miami-Los Angeles proceeding, that
opinion declared that “on a relative basis, the record
shows that Western will be able to provide more sig-
nificant beyond benefits than any other applicant.” *

no support in the District Court’s opinion. Indeed, the lower
court’s only direct reference to the age of the record appeared
not in its opinion on the merits but in its opinion three weeks
later, denying the Commission’s motion to amend the judg-
ment and remand for further proceedings. See Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 1239,
1266-72 (W.D. Ark. 1973). See also Appellees’ Brief to the
Supreme Court at 61. Given this background, the preceden-
tial value of the reopening aspect of Bowman seems highly
dubious.

**® A beyond-segment passenger is one who must utilize
Miami-Los Angeles service in connection with a longer trip
whose point of or‘zin or destination or both is neither Miami
nor Los Angeles.

20 Western offered the second largest beyond-segment poten-
tial, t.e., nearly 57,000 beyond-segment passengers in 1974.
The ALJ reduced this estimate to a figure just below 44,000.

71 In a footnote, the Board delivered its appraisal of the
statistics upon which its comments were based:

The traffic estimates are those set out by the administra-
tive law judge, which are not seriously challenged by the
other applicants. However, Western’s exhibits show far
more beyond traffic, and the Board agrees that in view
of market growth since the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing and the use of a later forecast year, it is likely
that the estimates reflected in the initial decision under-
state Western’s total support traffic. Nevertheless, for
present purposes we shall assume that the administra-
tive law judge’s estimates are reasonable, since the use
of Western’s higher figures would not materially affect
our conclusions in this case.

App. A-35

Addressing itself to the greatly superior beyond-
segment potential attributed to Pan American by the
ALJ, the Board announced that

we share the uniform judgment of all of the other
applicants that Judge Dapper’s estimates . . . ser-
iously overstate the support traffic that Pan Amer-
ican is in any way likely to obtain. It is our con-
clusion that as a result of the cumulative effect of
the overstatements that we have found extant in
traffic forecasts for Pan American and the changes
to its beyond-terminal services since the conclusion
of the evidentiary proceedings, Pan American will not
be able to realize, at the outside, more than 50
percent of the beyond-segment traffic support pre-
dicted by Judge Dapper, or about 65,000 passengers
annually. Even this figure, in our judgment, is in
all likelihood too optimistic by an appreciable margin,
but we accept it for present purposes.

Three explanations were advanced for the Board’s re-
duction of Pan American’s predicted beyond-segment
traffic. In the first place, actual experience in the wake
of the ALJ’s decision had revealed that the growth es-
timates employed were too high, and that therefore traf-
fic in many contributory markets had not reached expected
levels. Secondly, the Board cautioned that

the value of Pan American’s proposed single-plane
flights will be compromised to a far greater extent
than anticipated in the initial decision by the extreme-
ly long-haul nature of the carrier’s proposed service
in many markets. ... These considerations signifi-
cantly reduce the stimulative value of Pan American’s
proposed service. At the same time, they increase
the possibility that Pan American will lose Miami
passengers to other carriers for at least a portion
of the complete trip.

Finally, “substantial alterations in Pan American’s route
structure and service patterns” occurring since the close

App. A-36

of economic hearings in 1973 were said to have “fatally
undermine[d] Pan American’s asserted ability to flow
enough traffic over the Miami-Los Angeles segment to
support its proposed level of service.” In particular, the
Board feared that Pan American’s suspension of service
at “many important Caribbean points” would render the
carrier incapable of meeting its beyond-segment traffic
goals.

In its petition for reconsideration before the Board
and in its brief to this court, Pan American has responded
to the Board’s new calculations by accusing the Board of
selectively ignoring certain factors, some of them favor-
able to Pan American, other adverse to Western. For
example, Pan American contends that its termination of
service to various Caribbean markets occurred as a result
of Board-approved agreements with Trans World Airlines
and American Airlines, pursuant to which Pan American
obtained increased access to trans-pacific traffic. Accord-
ing to Pan American, its augmented beyond-segment po-
tential in the Pacific would largely, if not completely, off-
set any diminution of beyond-segment traffic originating
in or destined for the Caribbean. Pan American also
objected to the Board’s uncritical acceptance of Western’s
beyond-segment traffic as projected by the ALJ in 1973.
Since that date, Miami-Las Vegas and Miami-San Fran-
cisco service by other carriers had improved significantly,
according to Official Airline Guide schedules, thereby
casting doubt on the estimated numbers of beyond-segment
passengers Western could hope to carry in those markets.
In addition, Pan American challenged the Board’s convic-
tion that Western would benefit 7,000 beyond-segment pas-
sengers with single-plane service between Miami and
Seattle. The unadjusted ALJ figure was seriously jeop-
ardized, Pan American argued, by the Board’s 1976 in-
vitation to Braniff, Continental, and Eastern to apply for
removal of restrictions which, if granted, would permit
the latter airlines to offer single-plane Miami-Seattle serv-

App. A-37

ice via shorter and faster routings through Texas and
St. Louis.

The Board’s alleged shortcomings with respect to beyond-
segment traffic estimates were exacerbated in Pan Ameri-
can’s view by the Board’s failure to modify Pan Ameri-
can’s proposed service frequency in order to approximate
a rational carrier reaction to reduced levels of available
traffic. Pan American notes that the Board, in attempting
to demonstrate that National could continue to operate
profitably after certification of a competitor on the
Miami-Los Angeles route, assumed that National would
provide only two daily round trips, despite the carrier’s
representation during the economic hearings that three
such trips would be offered. The Board justified this
assumption on the ground that twice daily round trip
service would constitute a “rational response’ by Na-
tional to Western’s entry into the Miami-Los Angeles
market. Yet, in assessing the merits of Pan American’s
application, the Board first drastically cut the amount of
traffic which the applicant could be expected to carry, and
then left undisturbed the applicant’s service proposal of
three round trips daily. As a consequence, the Board con-
cluded that

[t]he nearly 300,000 additional seats per year pro-
posed by Pan American are. . . not needed for the
local market. ... The loss of . . . forecast support
[i.e., beyond-segment] traffic would fatally impair
Pan American’s ability to operate its proposed three
daily round trips on a profitable basis, and conse-
quently vitiates any basis for selecting Pan American
in preference to Western.”

In rebuttal, Pan American submitted a revised service
proposal, designed to illustrate that, even with the reduced
numbers of passengers predicted by the Board, the car-
rier could still operate two daily round trips profitably.
See Appendix A to Pan American’s Petition for Recon-
sideration, J.A. 510-11.

App. A-38

The above summary describes Pan American’s most
serious criticisms of the Board’s performance in the cur-
rent route proceeding.” Although not specifically raised
by the parties, one further facet of the Board’s treatment
of beyond-segment traffic deserves attention here. In
1969, when competitive authority on the Miami-Los
Angeles route was originally awarded to Northeast, the
Board casually dismissed beyond-segment service as an
important carrier selection criterion in transcontinental
markets:

*2 Two other grievances should be mentioned briefly. The
first relates to the Board’s fear that Pan American’s lengthy
flights to overseas destinations would detract from the car-
rier’s ability to serve the local Miami-Los Angeles market.
By contrast, the Board praised Western’s service proposal
because one of the two daily round trips would be devoted
exclusively to the Miami-Los Angeles run and the other would
serve only a single beyond destination, Seattle. In actual
operation, however, Western’s flights have originated each
day in Honolulu and Anchorage, and the latter flight has
served Seattle as well. Not surprisingly, Pan American ques-
tions whether the Board could legitimately have preferred
Western on the basis of superior attention to the Miami-Los
Angeles route.

Secondly, Pan American notes that, with respect to at
least one flight daily, Western has not fulfilled its promise of
“convenient morning and late afternoon departures from both
Miami and Los Angeles and convenient arrivals at both
points.”” Western has in fact been operating a so-called “red-
eye” flight departing Los Angeles each evening at 10:20 P.M.
and arriving in Miami the following morning at 6:15 A.M.

Western and the Board explain that the scheduling dis-
crepancies stressed by Pan American are attributable to
Western’s current need for a new DC-10 aircraft which has
already been ordered. The Board expresses confidence that
Western “will shortly be able to institute schedules that are
consistent with its service proposal.” Given our disposition
of this case, we would, of course, anticipate that the likeli-
hood of Western’s adherence to its original proposal will be
considered by the Board after suppleinentation of the record.

———

App. A-39

[Wje do not believe that beyond-segment benefits
should be accorded significant weight in the trans-
continental route awards. By their very nature
transcontinental markets afford little opportunity for
substantial traffic development beyond the terminals.

Notwithstanding these earlier comments, the ALJ in 1973
obviously assigned considerable weight to what he per-
ceived as Pan American’s markedly superior beyond-
segment potential. In reversing the ALJ three years
later, the Board did not rely upon its previously an-
nounced disregard for beyond-segment benefits in trans-
continental cases. Rather, the Board appeared to con-
cede that beyond-segment traffic was a significant fac-
tor, but differed with the ALJ in his estimates of the
amount cf such traffic which Pan American would carry,
and of the impact such traffic would have on Pan Ameri-
ean’s ability to serve the Miami-Los Angeles market.

Inconsistency in agency application of policy guidelines
has long posed a problem for reviewing courts. On the
one hand, it is clear that administrative agencies require
a broad flexibility in order to accomplish their statutorily
conferred tasks, and that therefore court-developed prin-
ciples of res judicata and stare decisis cannot be mechan-
ically applied in the administrative process. See, e.g.,
Outagamie Cointy v. CAB, 355 F.2d 900, 906 (7th Cir.
1966) (“the Board is not required in every case to weigh
in the balance all of the possible factors that may be
considered .... [A] circumstance may weigh heavily
in the balance in one case but be missing from the scales
completely in another baiance.’’). See also Note, Devel-
opments in the Law—Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. REV.
818, 865-74 (1950).

On the other hand, the probability of frustration is
plainly high when interested parties are told in 1969
that beyond-segment benefits are essentially irrelevant

App. A-40

to transcontinental route awards, only to find in 1976
that the Board, when examining the very same route,
behaves as if the prior statement had never been made.
Respected commentators have frequently deplored agency
decision-making which fails to adhere to promulgated
policy choices, at least where such departures are not
accompanied by explicit articulation of the reasons there-
for. See, e.g., Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards
(pt. 2), 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1096 n. 329 (1960)
(“the Board ought [to] be able to say something as to
how {earrier selection] factors are weighed—which are
more important and which less—and to develop some use-
ful quantitative tests of these . . . factors through care-
ful economic study”) (emphasis in original) ; Robinson,
The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Proce-
dure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. REv. 485, 529 n. 173 (1970) ;
and Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Prac-
titioner, 43 MINN. L. REV. 607, 613 (1959). And courts
have upset agency action for unexplained departures
from earlier reasoning. See, e.g., City of Lawrence v.
CAB, 343 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965). In this case, where
the Board’s seemingly inconsistent policy posture is com-
bined with Pan American’s credible attacks on the
Board’s selective updating technique, we are convinced
that supplementation of the record is necessary to assure
fairness to the competing applicants.

In advocating the result we reach, Pan American has
referred us to two cases which it claims support such
an outcome. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 442 F.2d
730 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and Northeast Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 345 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845
(1965). Intervenor Western has replied by maintaining
that both Delta and Northeast are distinguishable on

App. A-41

their facts from the present situation. Indeed, the for-
mer case certainly does present a more egregious exam-
ple of the type of abuse which we confront here.” But

* In Delta the Board addressed itself to the award of new
authority on several routes connecting major markets in the
southeastern United States. In granting such authority to
Southern Airways, the Board twice strayed from the correct
procedural path. In the first place, the Board, while retaining
and continuing to use 1969 estimates of Southern’s annual
costs, simultaneously factored into its profitability calcula-
tions a 1970 forecast of the airline’s operating revenues. This
forecast was independently developed by the Board after the
close of economic hearings. More pertinent for our purposes,
Southern was the only applicant for which such a 1970 fore-
cast was made. This court held that “updating can only be
justified if done on a comparative basis, i.e., updating the
forecasts for all parties.” 442 F.2d at 736. Judge Wilkey’s
opinion listed several procedural alternatives which might
allow updating to be accomplished without the necessity for
a new formal hearing. Jd. In a footnote, the opinion warned,
but did not decide, that some form of adversarial device might
be required.

Even if the parties had had opportunity to update their
own forecast data to the year 1970, we are not saying
that required administrative procedure would have been
satisfied without an opportunity for the adverse parties
to subject the various caiculations to cross-examination
and analysis.

Id. at 736 n.25.

The precise facts in Northeast are a bit murky, but the
basic point is clearly the same. On remand after an earlier
First Circuit ruling, the Board elected to take notice of some
recent operating statistics without affording Northeast an
opportunity to rebut or explain the figures. The carrier ap-
parently wished to submit additional figures as well as certain
“expert testimony of an interpretive and prognostic variety.”
The court agreed that Northeast should have that chance.

[A]s soon as [the Board] elected to look at matters
[beyond the record as it originally existed,] it could not
pick and choose, at least to the extent of denying an ob-
jecting party the rights . . . to rebut not only those mat-

App. A-42

even if the errors committed in past cases are conceded
to be more flagrant than any involved here, the opinions
of this court and the First Circuit still support the gen-
eral proposition which we now apply, namely, that when
an agency chooses to update an administrative record,
it must proceed in a manner fair to all concerned. Under
certain circumstances, especially where the delay is long,
the case close, and the intervening events significant,
participation by interested parties may well be indis-
pensable. Thus, we remand this case for adversarial ex-
ploration of the recent developments considered by the
Board in reaching its decision to prefer Western over
Pan American. We direct the Board to reexamine that
decision in light of the updated record so produced. In
the interim, the Board’s 1976 orders will not be vacated,
and service by Western on the Miami-Los Angeles route
will not be suspended.

ters it looked to, but also the inferences which were
sought to be drawn therefrom. Due process could permit
no less. ...

Having opened the door to new data, the Board was
obliged to take a full look.

345 F.2d at 486-87. It is impossible to tell from the court’s
intentionaily limited opinion exactly how grievous the Board’s
indiscretion was.

Cee ee —

APPENDIX B

tt

App. B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DOCKET 24694

MIAMI-LOs ANGELES COMPETITIVE NONSTOP CASE

Decided: March 15, 1976

Western Air Lines, Inc.’s certificate for Route 35
amended to authorize nonstop service between
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., on the one hand, and
Los Angeles-Ontario, Cal., on the other.

Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s certificate for Route 27 amended
to remove segment 7 therefrom.

All other applications are denied, and the proceeding
terminated.

This decision does not constitute a major Federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment (See p. 33).

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the initial decision, and, in addition, the
following:

John Ferraro, for the Los Angeles Area Chamber of
Commerce, and the Department of
Airports, City of Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia.

App. B-2

OPINION
By THE BOARD

This proceeding involves a determination of the need
for competitive nonstop service between Miami-Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, and Los Angeles-Ontario-Long
Beach, California. The long and complicated history
of the Board’s efforts to resolve this question is de-
tailed in the following section. For present purposes
we note that this case was set for hearing as a result
of the Board’s decision in the Delta-Northeast Merger
Case to reexamine the authority it had previously
granted Northeast Airlines to compete in the Miami-
Los Angeles nonstop market with National Airlines,
the only other carrier certificated to provide nonstop
service in that market. Following a public hearing,
Administrative Law Judge William H. Dapper issued
an initial decision in which he determined that the
public convenience and necessity continue to require
the authorization of competitive nonstop service, and
that Pan American World Airways should be selected
to provide that service. The Board has exercised its
right of discretionary review, briefs to the Board have
been filed, and oral argument has been heard.

Upon consideration of the matters presented, the
Board has decided to affirm Judge Dapper’s finding
of need for competitive service in the market at issue.
On the other hand, we have determined that the pub-
lic convenience and necessity would best be served by
selecting Western Air Lines as National’s nonstop
competitor. Accordingly, except to the extent modi-
fied herein, we adopt as our own the findings and con-
clusions of the administrative law judge, whose initial
decision is attached as an appendix.

We now turn to a detailed discussion of findings and
conclusions.

App. B-3

l. Background

An appreciation of the long and complicated his-
tory of this case is necessary to an understanding of
our decision in this proceeding. That history may be
divided into two phases: the first phase involves the
Board’s decision to reexamine Northeast’s Miami-Los-
Angeles nonstop route award; the second phase in-
volves a number of important procedural events oc-
curring subsequent to the issuance of Judge Dapper’s
initial decision.

A. Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles Nonstop Authority

National Airlines was authorized to serve the
Miami-Los Angeles nonstop market in the Southern
Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 726 (1961),
and that carrier had a monopoly for approximately
eight years, until six years ago, when the Board found
that competitive service was required by the public
convenience and necessity. Northeast Airlines was
awarded competitive nonstop authority, based upon a
finding that the route would strengthen the financially
beleaguered carrier, and upon assurance from the car-
rier that it was not seeking the route simply to make
itself more attractive to prospective merger partners.
See Orders 69-7-135 and 69-9-111. As it turned out,
shortly after Northeast’s authority became effective,
the carrier’s management made a firm decision to seek
a merger with Northwest Airlines.

The two carriers submitted the resulting merger
agreement to the Board for approval, but the Board
found that the proposed merger vitiated the basis of
the Board’s earlier award to Northeast and that, in
such circumstances, the proposed merger would be
consistent with the public interest only if the authority
of the surviving carrier—Northwest—to operate the
Miami-Los Angeles route was stayed and reexamined

App. B-4

in a separate investigation. Order 70-12-162. It is
Significant to point out at this juncture that in the
Northwest-Northeast Merger Case Delta Air Lines,
which now claims that Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles
authority must be transferred to it as a matter of law
(infra, at 11), opposed the transfer of the Miami-Los
Angeles segment to Northeast on the grounds that
such transfer would permit Northeast to “traffic” in
certificates. More importantly, Delta stated to the
Board in that proceeding that it “stands ready and
willing to merge with Northeast under terms and
conditions agreeable to both parties whether or not
the Miami-Los Angeles segment is transferred to
Delta as part of the merger,” and that Delta “is amen-
able to participating in a Section 401 proceeding vying
for the [Miami-Los Angeles] authority along with
other interested applicants.” Order 71-3-8, p. 6, fn. 16.

The Northwest-Northeast merger collapsed, princi-
pally because Northwest was unwilling to accept the
conditions the Board attached to Northeast’s Miami-
Los Angeles authority. Shortly thereafter, Northeast
entered into a merger with Delta. The Board approved
the merger, again subject to the condition that any
authority to operate over the Miami-Los Angeles seg-
ment should be stayed pending completion of an an-
cillary investigation to determine “whether the route
should be transferred to Delta, awarded to a different
applicant, or allowed to lapse.” Delta-Northeast Mer-
ger Case, Orders 72-5-73/74, at pp. 27-29. The Board
emphasized that “all of the essential! factors that led
us to our stay of the Miami-Los Angeles route in
Northwest-Northeast are present here virtually un-
changed and we cannot apply a different test to North-
east in this case.””’ Moreover, the Board noted that
“both Delta and Northeast were fuliy aware of the
Board’s position on the Miami-Los Angeles route at

App. B-5

the time they concluded their merger discussions, and
thus neither can contend that transfer and stay will
occasion an unforeseen financial impact on it.’’ Order
72-5-73 at pp. 27-28. Delta accepted the terms and
conditions which the Board attached to its approval
of the merger. Pursuant to the stay, competitive ser-
vice in the Miami-Los Angeles market was terminated
in July, 1972, and, by Order 72-8-95 (August 23, 1972).
the instant Miami-Los Angeles Competitive Nonstop
Investigation was instituted. The instituting order
advised that the investigation was being conducted
pursuant to the Board’s general powers under Section
204 of the Act, and insofar as Delta’s claim to the
Miami-Los Angeles segment is concerned, pursuant
to the Board’s power to (1) alter, amend, or modify
certificates under Section 401(g), and (2) impose
terms and conditions on mergers approved pursuant
to Section 408(b).

B. Subsequent Procedural History

Evidentiary proceedings were held in early 1973,
and, on June 13, 1973, Judge Dapper issued his initial
decision. The Board granted discretionary review of
the initial decision and briefs were submitted to the
Board. However, in response to a contention raised
by National Airlines in its brief, further review pro-
ceedings were then deferred to consider the environ-
mental impact of a possible award in this case. In
response to the Board’s order, the Bureau of Operating
Rights prepared and circulated an assessment of the
environmental consequences of competitive service.
The assessment was not completed until December
1974. The Bureau concluded that the certification and
implementation of any of the service proposals pre-
sented by the applicants would not constitute a “major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment” within the meaning of section

App. B-6

102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969. Having determined that a draft environ-
mental impact statement was unnecessary, the Bu-
reau presented its findings in the form of an Environ-
mental Negative Declaration.

Two other matters of procedural importance war-
rant comment here. First, by motion filed on Novem-
ber 27, 1974, Continental Air Lines seeks a reopening
of the record in this case and a remand of this pro-
ceeding on the matter of carrier selection. Continen-
tal argues, inter alia, that in view of substantially
changed circumstances since the close of the eviden-
tiary hearings, it is unlikely that Pan American could
profitably operate the service which the administrative
law judge found it could provide. Second, by motion
filed on January 6, 1976, National seeks to defer all
further procedural steps in this proceeding “pending
an investigation and statement of the probable impact
on energy efficiency and energy conservation of non-
stop competitive authority in the Miami-Los Angeles
market.”

By Order 75-1-114 (January 28, 1975) the Board
decided to defer consideration of Continental’s motion
pending oral argument. That order also reopened the
record to permit BOR to file its environmental assess-
ment and to allow interested persons the opportunity
to file comments.

Oral argument, the final procedural step, was held
on April 16, 1975.

2. The Need for Competitive Nonstop Service

As noted, the Board has previously determined that
the public convenience and necessity require competi-

*The motions of Continental and National will be denied. See
pp. 32-38 infra.

App. B-7

tive nonstop service in the Miami-Los Angeles market.
Judge Dapper concluded that the record in this pro-
ceeding confirms the Board’s prior determination. He
found that the Miami-Los Angeles market, the largest
monopoly market in the country in terms of revenue
passenger-miles, was large enough to support competi-
tive service, and that competitive service was required
because of historic and existing service deficiencies and
the public benefits that competition may be expected
to bring in assuring the future development of the mar-
ket. LD. 16-31.

On review, all parties, except National, support his
decision that there is a need for competitive nonstop
service between Miami and Los Angeles.* National
contends that its services have been excellent; that its
moderate load factors demonstrate that there is no
need for additional capacity; that the market cannot
sustain competitive operations; that even if the mar-
ket could support such operations, a competitive award
would be inconsistent with Board decisional standards ;
and that competition would result in excessive “iver-
sion from National.

The Board agrees with Judge Dapper’s conclusions.

In deciding to authorize competition in 1969, the
Board found the basic deficiency in National’s Miami-
Los Angeles service to be the carrier’s failure to de-
velop its monopoly market aggressively, and, in pa’-

*The City of Long Beach, which is not a formal party to this
proceeding, has filed a statement with the Board indicating that
it neither seeks nor desires additional air service to Long Beach
in this proceeding. It requests that the Board not include Long
Beach as a hyphenated point as recommended by the administrative
law judge. The City’s request will be granted. There is no evidence
in the record that the traveling public would be adversely affected
by a granting of the City’s request. In fact, no carrier applicant
proposes to provide Miami-Los Angeles service via the Long Beach

airport.

App. B-8

ticular, to provide a sufficient level of nonstop frequen-
cies. At that time, National was providing two daily
nonstop round trips, which translated into 1.4 nonstop
flights per 100 passengers. The administrative law
judge concluded in this proceeding that National has
continued to neglect the service needs of the Miami-
Los Angeles market. He found, inter alia, that Na-
tional still provides only two daily nonstop round trips
and, more significantly, that it provides fewer nonstop
flights per 100 passengers than it did in 1969 when the
Board first found its service to be deficient.* Our re-
view of the evidence discloses that National’s monop-
oly service continues to be characterized by a prepon-
derance of multistop flights. In fact, notwithstanding
National’s exclusive nonstop authorization, the record
reveals that two-thirds of the carrier’s Miami-Los An-
geles flights have consisted of one-, two-, or three-stop
frequencies. Our review of the carrier’s schedules since
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings also discloses
that National has not upgraded the quality of its mo-
nopoly nonstop service. The carrier continues to op-
erate a basic pattern of two daily nonstop round trips,
with some additional service on the weekends. One of
its westbound flights does not arrive in Los Angeles
until almost 1 a.m.‘ As a result, the record discloses
that only slightly over 80 percent of the Miami-Los
Angeles local passengers today utilize nonstop sched-
ules, despite the substantial inherent advantages such
schedules offer in terms of shorter flight times and
fewer occasions for delays. For a long-haul market of

*Judge Dapper found that based upon the most recent figures
available National was offering the Miami-Los Angeles market only
0.76 nonstop frequencies per 100 passengers. He noted that al-
though National had switched operations with wide-bodied aircraft,
a weighing of National’s nonstop frequencies to account for Na-
tional’s increased capacity produced a figure of only 1.27 nonstop
flights per 100 passengers. I.D. at 22.

*See O.A.G. March 1, 1976.

2 eee a wee

App. B-9

such density, the percentage of travelers not using non-
stop service in this market appears to us relatively
high, reflecting the relative paucity of nonstop sched-
ules by National; with the stimulus of competition, we
would expect this percentage to diminish materially.

The quality of National’s nonstop service in the
Miami-Los Angeles market is in striking contrast to
the quality of service in other southern tier markets
where it must compete. Thus, for example, although
Miami-Los Angeles accounted for more than 50 per-
cent of National’s total Miami-Los Angeles/Houston/
New Orleans passengers in 1974, it accounted for only
25 percent of National’s Miami-Los Angeles/Houston/
New Orleans nonstop flights in that year. In these cir-
cumstances, we are concerned that without the spur of
competition, National will continue to focus its atten-
tion on southern tier competitive markets to the detri-
ment of the needs of Miami-Los Angeles travelers for
improved service. Viewed from this perspective, it is
clear that competition is the best guarantee that good
service will be provided in the Miami-Los Angeles mar-
ket, and that the market will be developed in a manner
commensurate with its travel requirements.

National is correct in its assertion that its Miami-
Los Angeles load factors are not high. We do not, how-
ever, share its contention that its load factors obviate
the need for a competitive award. To begin with, the
market is quite large and does not receive the atten-
tion which National accords its competitive markets.
There is no evidence that National has aggressively
promoted its Miami-Los Angeles nonstop operations.
Indeed, although National was required by the terms
of Judge Dapper’s Prehearing Conference Report to
submit evidence of its Miami-Los Angeles promotional
efforts, it provided none, stating that it “does not have

App. B-10

the requested information available.’ In short the
Board cannot attach significant weight to load-factor
data where, as here, it is likely that the carrier’s mod-
est load factors on the nonstop flights are attributable,
at least in part, to National’s focus on multistop flights,
casual promotional efforts, or both. In any case, we do
not believe that this market should be deprived of the
benefits of competition even if we assume for present
purposes that National’s load factors support its asser-
tion that it has provided ample service, and that the
carrier will (as it claims) add additional nonstop
flights as the growth of the market requires. In this
connection, we have already stated that “[ajs the Board
has often observed and as the courts have recently em-
phasized, the Act required the Board to foster compe-
tition as a means of enhancing the development of air
transportation on routes which can support competing
carriers—except where the benefits of competition are
outweighed by other public interest considerations.
See Continental Air Lines v. CAB, No. 74-1651, Sep-
tember 22, 1975.’ Thus, the mere fact that an incum-
bent claims to be ready to meet growing traffic demand
does not foreclose a competitive award.

As discussed, we share Judge Dapper’s conclusion
that the record establishes that, at the very least, com-
petition is necessary to assure the continued growth
and development of the market. Further, as we shall
now discuss, the record also shows that the Miami-Los
Angeles market is sufficiently large and strong to sup-
port competition.

The administrative law judge in the proceeding be-
low estimated that O&D plus interline connecting traf-

*See National’s cross-reference list to Information Exhibits.
*Remanded Reno-Portland/Seattle Nonstop Service Investiga-

tion, Order 75-11-45, November 12, 1975. See, also Philadelphia-

Rochester/Syracuse Case, Order 76-1-119, January 30, 1976.

App. B-11

fic in the Miami-Los Angeles market would total
261,000 O&D and interline connecting passengers in
the forecast year, CY 1974, before competition. After
competition, he projected a total market of 313,000
local O&D and interline connecting passengers. I.D.
16-21. The Board’s O&D Survey indicates, however,
that traffic did not reach the predicted level in CY 1974.
National uses the difference between forecast and sur-
vey traffic levels as a springboard for arguing that the
market will not be able to support competition. In
doing so, however, it does not give due consideration to
two important and interrelated considerations. First,
the market’s failure to reach predicted levels reflects
in part the effects of the economic recession and related
lag in traffic growth, National’s own service deficien-
cies, and, more recently, a prolonged strike by Nation-
al’s employees which eliminated nonstop service in the
market for about three and one-half months. Second,
notwithstanding the foregoing problems, the market
continues to grow—although not at the rate forecast
by the administrative law judge. Thus, between 1972
and 1973, traffic increased by about 7 percent on an
annual basis. Traffic growth dipped to about 3 percent
during 1974, and, according to figures provided by
National, continued at this rate of growth during the
first six months of 1975. We note, however, that traffic
increased by more than 8 percent in the second quarter
of 1975 when compared to a similar period in the pre-
ceding year.

In any case, it is likely that the year ending June 30,
1977, will be the first full year of service, rather than
the forecast year used by the parties and adopted by
the administrative law judge. To compute traffic in
the forecast year, we have applied growth and stimula-
tion factors of 7 percent and 20 percent, respectively,
to 1974 O&D plus interline connecting traffic reported

App. B-12

in the Board’s Survey.’ The resulting traffic estimate
of 269,403 annual passengers before competition, and
323,000 passengers after competition, approximates
the figures predicted by Judge Dapper, and therefore
eorroborates his finding that there is ample traffic
available to support competitive service.

Our assumed growth rate reflects our judgment that
traffic growth in the market will neither rebound to
historic levels reflected in the record and used by Judge
Dapper (11 percent), nor continue at its present low
rate (3 percent), but, rather, will level off at a rate
falling between these two figures. As noted, the evi-
dence is that traffic in the market has been unusually
depressed in recent years by the combined effects of
substandard service, no service during National’s
strike periods, and the nation’s general economic ma-
laise, which has depressed the industry’s growth rate.
In these circumstances, we are confident that the forces
of competition will eliminate the service-related de-
pressants, and, based on recent indications, that eco-
nomic conditions in general and in the industry will
improve sufficiently to permit realization of the modest
rate of growth here predicted for the Miami-Los An-
geles market.* Furthermore, we find no basis in the
record to question the administrative law judge’s use
of the 20 percent stimulation figure in view of existing
service deficiencies and the benefits that first effective
competition should provide.

* Traffic estimate:

Forecast Year Forecast Year

Annaal Market Without Market With

1974 Market* Growth Competition Stimulation Competition
227,350 7% 269,403 20°. 323,284

* Local O&D plus interline connecting traffic, from C.A.B. Traffic
Survey Tables 8 & 10.

*Cf. Reopened Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, Order
75-9-19, dated September 8, 1975, at 5.

eee eee ee

App. B-13

Our conclusion that the Miami-Los Angeles route
can support competition is confirmed by evidence show-
ing that National and Western, the applicant that we
have selected as National’s new competitor, can both
operate at substantial profits. We discuss Western’s
prospects for viable operations in greater detail at pp.
20-21 of this opinion. At this point, we focus pri-
marily on our conclusion that National can operate
profitably in competition with Western. National’s
contrary view is based essentially on its representation
during the economic hearings that it would operate
three daily round trips in the forecast year of record,
i.e. 1974, with or without competition. Two years have
passed since the conclusion of the economic hearings
and National has failed to provide three daily round
trips as predicted. Assuming, therefore, that Western
operates in proposed nonstop frequencies, and assum-
ing a rational response by National, it is unlikely that
National will operate three round trips in competition
with Western in the forecast year.

In all these circumstances, we have projected what
we believe to be a reasonable estimate of National’s
prospects for competitive nonstop operations.’ Based
upon evidence of record and other officially noticeable
data, it is our judgment that National will carry a total
of about 167,000 annual nonstop passengers over the
Miami-Los Angeles route, or more than 450 passengers
a day. This traffic figure translates into an average

* Traffic projection for National and Western:

Forecast Year*

Competition Yen Cache Bewent _ Sout

Lecal O&D plus Traffic Share Segment Nonstop

Interline Con- at at Traffic Segment Annual* Lead

necting trafic 90% 50% Support Traffic Seats Factors
National 145,478 21,822 167,300 356,269 47%
Western 523,284 290,956 145,478 43,800 189,278 342,248 55%

* See p. 7, supra.
** Source, Exs. NAL-200-R and 378-R.

App. B-14

al load factor of about 47 percent on National's
ate flights for the first full year of competitive
service—an average which is considerably above its
break-even load factors for the route and aircraft in
question.” This traffic projection warrants three ex-
planatory comments here. First, we have assumed
that since both National and Western will each pro-
vide two daily nonstop round trips, they will divide
the nonstop market equally. We point out, ge
that National may in fact carry a greater share of the
nonstop traffic, at least imtially, in view of its en-
trenched position and the greater capacity that it
proposes to offer. Second, we agree with Judge Dap-
per that at least 90 percent of the total passengers in
the market should be carried on nonstop flights, as-
suming that National and Western each offers at least
two well-timed daily nonstop frequencies. National,
however, argues that historic experience in the mar-
ket indicates that only 81 percent of total market
passengers will use nonstop services. In our judgment,
National’s figure supports, rather than refutes, our
finding, since the first truly effective competitive non-
stop operations should be able to increase nonstop par-
ticipation by at least 10 percent to reach the 90 percent
figure that we have found reasonable. Third, consis-
tent with Board precedent, we have included support
traffic that is likely to be available to National, but
not its competitor, and vice versa. National has not
provided evidence that would permit a definitive esti-
mate of the level of such traffic. Nevertheless, as
pointed out by a number of parties, and as recognized
by the administrative law judge," there is a substan-
tial discrepancy between the O&D plus interline con-
necting traffic reported in the Board’s surveys for the
Miami-Los Angeles route and the traffic actually car-

* See Oral Argument Tr. at 169.
“1D. at 21.

App. B-15

ried over the route by National, and the difference be-
tween the two figures represents, in significant part,
National’s on-line beyond-segment traffic support.
For example, National’s exhibits. show that in CY 1971
it carried 22 percent more traffic over the segment
than is reported as local O&D and interline connecting
passengers in the Board’s Survey data. Other discrep-
ancies range as high as 26 percent. Giving due con-
sideration to the possibility of statistical error, and to
flow traffic which Western may intercept, we may
reasonably conclude that the O&D plus interline con-
necting traffic projected in the table above for Na-
tional should be conservatively increased by at least
15 percent to reflect beyond-segment traffic support
that National is likely to carry on its Miami-Los An-
geles nonstop flights in the forecast year.

National argues that even if the Miami-Los Angeles
route can support competition, competition should not
be authorized unless the Board determines that both
National and its competitor can achieve load factors
in the 52.5-55 percent range. National asserts that a
contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with the
Domestie Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 6B,
Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971. Alternatively, National
maintains that if the Board determines that the mar-
ket requires competition, competiticn should be au-
thorized on a “contingent basis,” with its competitor’s
new route authority effective only if National’s load
factors reach a certain level for a specified period of
time, e.g., 65 percent for nine consecutive months.”
The administrative law judge properly rejected Na-
tional’s last-ditch efforts to avoid competition over the
Miami-Los Angeles route.

We perceive two fundamental and interrelated de-
fects in National’s contentions. First, they are based

* See Transcript of Oral Argument at 186.

App. B-16

upon the unsupported assumption that load factors
are the sole criterion for determining the need for
competitive service, and, second, they seriously ignore
the needs of the traveling public. Although load fac-
tors are evidence of the relationship between supply
and demand, the Board has repeatedly stated that the
load-factor standards established in the DPFI were
never intended to replace all evidence in route pro-
ceedings with respect to the need for competition in
particular markets. Those standards merely remain
overall industry averages for the purpose of establish-
ing reasonable fares on an industry-wide basis. See
Order 71-4-54 at 27-28 and 34-35. Furthermore, adop-
tion of either of National’s load factor-related argu-
ments could serve to deprive the traveling public of
the benefits of competition under circumstances that
would provide a monopolist with considerable incen-
tive to secure windfall profits. Given the fact that the
monopolist could manipulate seats offered in a par-
ticular market to influence ultimate load factors—as,
for example, by scheduling a few flights at unattrac-
tive times for one or two months of the year—it is
questionable whether competition would ever see the
light of day under either of National’s hypotheses
even if service deficiencies were to develop.

Finally, National argues that competition will re-
sult in excessive diversion regardless of the carrier
selected. It estimates that Western will divert between
$4.7 and 6.7 million in the first year. On a relative
basis, however, it indicates that Western will divert
less revenue from it than most of the other appli-
cants."* Western estimates that it will divert only

* National estimates that only Northwest and TWA wouid divert
less revenues from it in the primary market than Western, with
Northwest diverting the least (between $4.5 and $6.6 million in the
first year). However, according to National’s figures it is apparent

that the difference in diversionary impact resulting from the selec-
tion of either Western or Northwest is very little.

App. B-17

$1.2 million from National in all markets.

The forecasts of National and Western are based
on traffic and revenue projections which have been
largely outstripped by the passage of time and changed
circumstances. Nevertheless, on the basis of more re-
cent officially noticeable data, we find that the range
of diversion resulting from Western’s competition pre-
dicted by National is reasonable.

To compute the diversionary effects of Western’s
competition we have first estimated what National’s
share of local O&D traffic plus interline connecting
passengers would have been in 1974 had it operated
for a full year by applying its historic share (90 per-
cent) to 1974 market figures. We have then increased
National’s share by 7 percent annually to arrive at
its forecast-year traffic (year ending June 30, 1977).
We have thereafter compared these totals to Nation-
al’s traffic and RPMs in the same year with the addi-
tion of competition by Western. National should re-
tain 50 percent of the total (including stimulated)
O&D plus interline connecting traffic in the market.
Our computations produce a gross diversion figure of
about $11 million."* However, we agree with the ad-
ministrative law judge that it is appropriate to offset
this figure by normal traffic growth between the base
and forecast years in view of the public benefits that
should result from the selection of Western and the
fortuitous profits that National has enjoyed as a re-
sult of the absence of effective competition in the
market since it was first authorized by the Board in
1969. Accordingly, application of “growth-offset” re-
duces the Miami-Los Angeles passenger revenues that

a Based upon National’s average 1975 yield per RPM in the
Miami-LosAngeles market of about $.058, as reported in updated
Exhibit NA-302-I.

App. B-18

Western will divert from National in the first year to
approximately $5.8 million. In addition, Western’s
exhibits show that, at National’s current domestic
system yield, Western will divert about $750,000 from
National in other markets, producing a total diversion
of about $6.5 million in passenger revenues.

To be sure, our estimate of diversion is substantial
on an absolute basis. We cannot find, however, that
the diversionary effect of our award represents a con-
vincing ground for depriving the traveling public of
the long-overdue benefits of improved service. In the
first place, the evidence is that competition should pro-
duce public benefits far outweighing the diversionary
impact on National.’* National is a financially healthy
carrier and the operating revenues that may be di-
verted amount to only a small percentage of its total
system operating revenues. There is, in this connec-
tion, no evidence that the operations of Western will
either significantly impair National’s overall financial
position or its public service. Furthermore, our esti-
mate of diversion overstates the actual harm to Na-
tional, because it does not include cost savings that
should accompany the loss in revenues, and because

* We have assumed for present purposes that $750,000 is a rea-
sonable approximation of the revenue that Western will divert from
National in other markets. However, we point out that our review
of Western’s forecast in light of more recent officially noticeable
data and our accepiance of Judge Dapper’s downward adjustment
of Western’s beyond-segment traffic potential, establishes that it

is likely that Western will divert less revenues from National in
other markets.

* We have reached similar conclusions with respect to the diver-
sionary effect of our awards on other carriers. Although Western’s
operations will have their greatest impact on National, they will
also, to varying degrees, divert some additional revenue from other
carriers. However, as in the case of National, there is no evidence
that such operations will seriously harm any other airline. Overall,
the Board finds that the public benefits of the award we make
today far outweigh the detrimental impact resulting from the
diversion of revenues from other carriers.

App. B-19

it is based only on short-term considerations. Put
another way, the record shows that, in the long run,
competition should contribute to the further growth
and development of the market, and therefore to the
economic benefit of both competing carriers. More-
over, in deciding the weight to be attached to the di-
version issue, the Board believes that it is important
to consider that, although the Board first authorized
competition in the market in 1969, none has been effec-
tively provided. As a result, National has been the
beneficiary of a market monopoly for more than six
years.

3. Standing of the Applicants

Delta argues that it stands in a preferred position
vis-a-vis the other applicants in this proceeding. It
contends that, if the Board determines that there is
a need for competitive nonstop service in the Miami-
Los Angeles market, Delta must, as a matter of law,
be permitted to provide that service. It argues that,
aside from what the Boad may have intended with
respect to the ultimate disposition of Northeast’s
Miami-Los Angeles authority, the technical language
of condition(13) of its certificate’ and the technical
language framing the issues in the Miami-Los Angeles
proceeding establish that the segment in question has
been transferred to Delta, subject only to a stay of
its operations pending completion of a subsequent
proceeding to determine whether there is still a need

* The literal language of segment 7 of Delta’s Route 27 authorizes
the carrier to engage in air transportation with respect to persons,
property, and mail “[{bJetween the terminal point Miami-Fort
Lauderdale, Fla., and the terminal point Los Angeles-Ontario-Long
Beach, Calif.” Condition (11) of Delta’s Route 27 states that “[t])he
authority of the holder to operate segment 7 is stayed pending final
decision in a proceeding to be hereafter instituted for the purpose
of reexamination of such authorization, and this certificate shall

be subject to whatever determinations are made regarding segment
7 in such proceeding.”

App. B-20

for competitive service in the Miami-Los Angeles
market. Therefore, in Delta’s view, if the Board re-
affirms its previous finding in this regard, Delta must
be selected to provide that service, unless the carrier
is “decertificated” pursuant to section 401(g) of the
Act. However, Delta argues that no such determina-
tion can be made on the basis of the present record.

Judge Dapper found that Delta’s contentions are
without merit. The Board agrees. In our judgment,
there is no basis for concluding that Delta retains
either a paramount legal or equitable right to, or any
other priority claim in, the Miami-Los Angeles non-
stop route segment.

To begin with, Delta’s current argument ignores
relevant decisional criteria, is inconsistent with the
positions previously advanced by the carrier, and
otherwise disregards fundamental standards of fair
play in administrative proceedings. As discussed in
great detail above, the Northeast-Northwest and the
Northeast-Delta merger cases were conducted and de-
cided in significant part on the basis of the important
principle that since a merger of Northeast would viti-
ate the basis for Northeast’s award of Miami-Los An-
geles authority, the segment could not be uncondition-
ally transferred to the merged carrier without further
evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the
route should be so transferred, awarded to a different
carrier, or allowed to lapse. In other words, all inter-
ested persons were fully advised that the surviving
carrier would have no legal! or priority claim to the
segment, but would have to compete for the authority
with other applicants in a subsequent proceeding.
Now, after having received the many other benefits of
a merger with Northeast, Delta would have the Board
declare that the carrier has a paramount legal right
to the segment in question. However, Delta’s attempts

App. B-21

to secure reconsideraiion and reversal of a principle
established by the Board to govern Northeast’s at-
tempts at merger should not now be countenanced
after administrative proceedings have been conducted
and decided on the basis of such principle. Indeed, as
noted, Delta was a strong supporter of the Board’s
approach to Northeast’s Miami-Los Angeles authority
in Northeast-Northwest, and later accepted the cer-
tif

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2579%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
