# Appellants Brief — Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellants Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 437 U.S. 617

## Text

IN THE FEB 15 i978 |

Supreme Court of the United Mates... JR, CLERK

Octoser Term, 1977

No. 77-404

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE, LANDFILL
AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, MAC SANITARY LAND-
FILL, INC., KINSLEY’S LANDFILL, INC., and DeLORENZO-
INTERSTATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC. (now INTER-
STATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY and RICHARD

J. SULLIVAN, Commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Protection of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

a a

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

JOHN J. DEGNAN,
Attorney General of New Jersey,

Attorney for Appellees, State of New Jersey,
Department of Environmental Protection of
the State of New Jersey and Commissioner
of the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection of the State of New Jersey,

State House Annex,
Trenton, New Jersey 08625.
STEPHEN SKILLMAN,
Assistant ~~ | ,
Of Counsel and on the Brief.

DEBORAH PORIT
NATHAN EDELSTEIN,
Attorneys General,
n the Brief.

"Adams Press Street, Newark, N. J. 07102—(201) 623-8611

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
QuesTION PRESENTED — 2
CounTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Summary oF ARGUMENT ‘ 14

ARGUMENT:

Point I—Since the Federal Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 expressly recog-
nizes that the disposal of waste on the land
may present a danger to public health and the
environment and that the states have primary
responsibility for planning and management
to reduce this danger, the Act permits a state
to restrict the use of landfills within its
boundaries to the disposal of waste generated
in the state 16

Point II—The requirement that the use of land-
fills within a state be restricted to the dis-
posal of waste generated in that state falls
( within the basic power of the state to pro-
tect its environment and the health of its in-
habitants and thus does not violate the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitu-
; tion 28

Point II1I—The record before the Supreme Court
of New Jersey provided a reasonable basis
for sustaining the legislative finding that the
public health and environmental problems
caused by landfills are exacerbated by forcing
New Jersey to accept waste generated out of
state and thus there was no need for a plenary
hearing before the trial court

ConcLUSION

8 &

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Cases Cited
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S.

SE. GED cnnsmnesnsiniencesnneneitneiniigleameaamanan 27
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com’n,

15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973) -.................... 42, 43
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) ws 32
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411

EO 16, 23
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 200. 29

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) ....29, 33
Bradley v. Public Utility Com’rs, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) 44

Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) ... 33

Brotherhood of Loc. F & E v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R.
eR 29, 33

City of Philadelphia v., State Dept. of Environ.
Protec., 73 N. J. 562, 376 A. 2d 888 (1977) 00... 14

Clason v. State of Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939) ....31-34, 50

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Con-

tinental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963) 20. 20
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851) ... 28
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) 0... 29
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 481 U.S. 265

PNET snsncsssisemsennasseinntansinsnnmpmeiimeaiee 48
MPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) 202 24, 27
Eveo v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972) oo 36, 42, 57
Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N. J. 92,

219 A2d 50 (1966) —......... 54

TABLE OF CONTENTS ili
PAGE
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S.

132 (1963) 16
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) 28
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230

(1907) 51
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) -............. 48
Great A.&P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)..28, 29
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1918) 58
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) 48
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) ................ 48

H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ..28, 33,
49

H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79

(1939) 20
Hughes v. Alexandria Serap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976) 45, 46, 58

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) 16, 29, 48
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 US.

617 (1971) 27
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) ...... 51
Irving Isko v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Livingston, 51

N. J. 162, 238 A2d 457 (1968) o4+
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) ...... 25

Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1952) ..36, 57

Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farms Products,
306 U.S. 346 (1939) 29

Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) 16

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Missouri v. Illinois & Chicago District, 180 U.S. 208
(1901) 51
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S, 833
(1976) esas aearictanaeiatacaea amas 24, 33
New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931)... 51
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) ........... 51

New York State Dept. of Social Services y. Dublino,

I a 27
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) ...... 51
Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229

gt ERIE AEE a 49
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Publie Service

Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947) ..ncccccccccceccccccccseseoceos--.. 47
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) 37, 47
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) ..48, 49
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977) ... 14
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970) .................. 31
Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915) 0 32

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) 47

Rahrer, In re, 140 U.S. 545 SD aia 47
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877 | 33
Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198 ( Ee . 32
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) 16, 55
Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 ss 33
Senior Appeal Examiners, In re, 60 N.J. 396, 290

A. 2d 129 (1972) ............. m 59

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

PAGE

Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) 30, 31, 37

Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 443 (1904) 46
South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell

Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) ..29, 57

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) 29, 30

So. Ocean Landfill v. Mayor & Coun. Tp. of Ocean, 64
N. J. 190, 314 A2d 65 (1974) 50

The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) -......... 32

United States v. Bishop Processing Company, 287 F.
Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd 423 F.2d 469 (4th
Cir.), cert. den. 398 U.S. 904 (1970) 48

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal As-
sociation, 242 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff’d
357 F.2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. den. 384 U.S.

961 (1966) ... 48
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) 42
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) ..06, 57

West v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)... 49
Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245

(1829) 30
Statutes Cited
J. Pub. L. 1973, Ch. 363 ..................... 2-4, 13-14, 25-27, 34,
ore 42, 46-48, 53-54, 59
N.J. Pub. L. 1975, ¢. 326 23

N.J.S.A. 13:1E-1 (Solid Waste Management Act of
1970) sccapisinnnnndeaneubansnnansaniniankaininheieeninmuneets 23, 50

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
N.J.S.A. 13 :11-9 2, 59
N.J.S.A. 13:11-10 .. 3, 26
N.J.S.A. 48:13A (Solid Waste Utility Control Act,
1970) 50
Pub. L. 91-604 24
Pub. L. 94-580 ....16, 40
28 U.S.C.:
Sec. 1257(2) .............. .. 06
42 U.S.C. (Clean Air Act):
See. 1857 .............. ‘ . siberian .24, 48
42 U.S.C. (Federal Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976) ........................ 2, 14-16, 18-21, 23, 27, 42
IEEE SE ae eT ee ROT 16, 40
a ae
Pas MID" shicisiesecsdertdaaditichensnsccuiestspscnmeaieie 40
SUUEEE SUIIITIIED sacisssinesnssicinsesisinbecieiesinsicaddesdlanmnidadadniaennaaiin 21
tA | ssteedlstnchcehtiedietetedasiiittiicemriasaetiuencamiiisbaniiaiceslladins 18
IT sheeting Dia ieee 19
Sei: TTD shasta dibecehibicseteehiacahiecintenbccae apaimnemiia 19, 21
Sain aI enc hicedlidahaecidaeiaapacliiadicaee aaa 19, 21
ee UIE sicistibecsciitapesiiniasinteiiinceiiasieeiihnishiaubahlacl 19, 21
SEIy ITTY Uist diecnibadlitaeeheieliteapacatialaiaineadaisaathebliisia 19, 21
See. 6925 - sshelaiaiaaaiainiaieiitditeniaall 19, 21
NES a OO CDEC CE RTT ORE 19, 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

PAGE

42 U.S.C. (Federal Resource Conservation and Ke-
covery Act of 1976):

See. 6927 21
GS ya seis 21
Sec. 6929 21
See. 6930 ...... 21
Sec. 6981 .............. 21
See. 6941 = 24
EEE —
Sec. 6942(b) ‘i 22
i SEITE sscctesnsstisneriistebinaienpeeduiitiiinieanieaianimenaimeieiidkiabonipapaigie 24
See. 6946(a) 22
See. 6946(b) 22
See. 6946(c) .22, 23
See. 6947(b) 23
A TE ccisernianissaettetiinernaninceendiais 3 a
BR: GI cccccsnetisinsatintieninesnsigemnnniimmncnignn 19
See. 6984 19

| OT Re gf. © See een 4

42 Fed. Reg. 24926, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 255-2... 23

viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
Other Authorities Cited
Blannan, Janet and Mirdza Peterson, “Survival of
Fecal Coliforms and Fecal Streptococci in a Sani-
tary Landfill,” News of Environmental Research
in Cineinnati, U.S. Environmental Protection
OS
122 Cong. Ree. (1976):
____ EEO roo ne ee TN 18, 24
11071 sninininttedtiiinsenaipidseenenatenaianiinnidinuianes 18, 24
SEUTITTTET -csibdhcsistenesssmsinesonseniuinnnindenteanitdadnesiiiaceiembesiosiimieiiaiadueametaiends 18, 24
ITED scnicsicneniaenioncnicintsdapesinniaenimmnavaiindisemaisnidiinsii 18, 24
Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fair-
ness and Convenience, Perspectives of Law 69
SASTTTTED senshbapniscdesiisniseiindecseiiiainiaaldiaiidtinapiaetiibibaiiaiiiaatceaiiati 37

Esmaile, Houshang, “Control of Gas Flow from Sani-
tary Landfills,” Journal of the Environmental En-
gineering Division, Proceedings of the American
Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 101, EE4, August
SPO siiciabustsdaistatehdaleapiliatttebaioibbiahbiai dial ipdiiinialitiitieicaaiatbaiiae 37, 40

Gas and Leachate from Landfills: Formation, Col-
lection and Treatment, Proceedings of a Research
Symposium held at Rutgers University, U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency, March 1976 .. 37

Flower, Franklin, “Case History of Landfill Gas
Movement Through Soils”

Haxo, Henry F., “Assessing Synthetic and Ad-
mixed Materials for Lining Landfills,” Gas
Ee SUITED: sesihscsherscssseicsistadniccdinechacidensbentuasteiiions 40

TABLE OF CONTENTS ix

PAGE

Pohland, Frederick G., “Landfill Management
with Leachate Recycle and Treatment: An
Overview” 40

Hazardous Waste Disposal Damage Reports, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste Management Programs, June a 37, 40
H. Rep. No. 94-1491 25

Miller, David, Frank DeLuca and Thomas Tessier,
Ground Water Contamination in the Northeast
States, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
June 1974 37

Report, “Basis and Background for the Proposed
Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management” +

Report of the State of New Jersey County and
Municinal Government Commission, Solid Waste:
A Coordinated Approach (1972) 36, 56

Schmalensee, Richard, Ramachandra Ramarathan,
Wolfhard Ramm and Dennis Smallwood, Measuring
External Effects of Solid Waste Management, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, March 1975 .. 37

S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976) ........18, 20
21, 24

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Can Congress
Compel State Cooperation in Achieving National
Environmental Standards? 11 Harv. Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties L. Rev. 701 (1976) 24

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TERM, 1977

No. 77-404

—@—

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE,
LANDFILL AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, MAC
SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., KINSLEY’S LAND-
FILL, INC., and DELORENZO-INTERSTATE WASTE
REMOVAL CO., INC. (now INTERSTATE WASTE
REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,
v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY and RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Com-
missioner of the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

>

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

Question Presented

Is a state which allows land to be used for the disposal
of waste generated within its boundaries compelled either
by the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 or the Commerce Clause to allow that land also
to be used for the disposal of waste generated in other
states?

Counter-Statement of the Case

On January 2, 1974, the Governor of New Jersey signed
into law chapter 363 of the Laws of 1973, which was to
become effective on February 1, 1974. This legislation
contained an express finding that:

“, .. the volume of solid and liquid waste continues
to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal
of these wastes continues to pose an even greater
threat to the quality of the environment of New
Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill
sites within the State are being diminished, that the
environment continues to be threatened by the treat-
ment and disposal of waste which originated or was
collected outside the State, and that the public
health, safety and welfare require that the treatment
and disposal within this State of all wastes gener-
ated outside of the State be prohibited.” N.J.S.A.
13:11-9 (App. 75).

Based on this finding the New Jersey Legislature directed
that:

“No person shall bring into this State any solid or
liquid waste which originated or was collected out-
side the territorial limits of the State, except gar-

3

bage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey,
until the commissioner [Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection] shall determine that such action
can be permitted without endangering the public
health, safety and welfare and has promulgated
regulations permitting and regulating the treatment
and disposal of such waste in this State.” N.J.S.A.
13:11-10 (App. 75-76).

Pursuant to the authority of chapter 363 the Commis-
sioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection promulgated rules and regulations, which were
to become effective concurrently with the statute, providing
that:

“No person shall bring into this State, or accept
for disposal in this State, any solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside the terri-
torial limits of this State. This section shall not

apply to:
“(a) Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of
New Jersey;

“(b) Any separated waste material, including
newsprint, paper, glass and metals, that is free
from putrescible materials and not mixed with
other solid or liquid waste that is intended for a
recycling or reclamation facility;

“(c) Municipal solid waste to be separated or
processed into usable secondary materials, includ-
ing fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility
provided that not less than 70 per cent of the
thru-put of any such facility is to be separated or
processed into usable secondary materials; and

“(d) Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical
waste, bulk liquid, bulk semi-liquid, which is to be

4

treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste
disposal facility which is registered with the
Department for such treatment, processing or re-
covery, other than by disposal on or in the lands
of this State.” N.J.A.C. 7:1-4.2 (App. 81)

The complaint in this matter, which was filed with the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, on January
22, 1974, sought a declaration that chapter 363 is violative
of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions and
temporary and permanent injunctive relief restraining the
Department of Environmental Protection from enforcing
the legislation (App. 82-104). The case was brought be-
fore the trial court on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment.

In support of the State’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, a report was submitted, entitled “Basis and
Background for the Proposed Rules of the Bureau of Solid
Waste Management,” which appropriately describes the
crisis in solid waste disposal leading to the enactment of
the ban on the dumping of waste originating out of state:

“Recent studies indicate that sanitary landfills
have environmental problems all their own. We
have learned that keeping a landfill truly ‘sanitary’
involves much more than daily soil cover and the
use of massive machinery, although these by no
means are unimportant. In New Jersey virtually
all sanitary landfills can be expected to produce
leachate, a noxious and highly polluted liquid which
is seldom visible and frequently pollutes our ground
and surface waters. The natural decomposition proc-
ess which occurs in sanitary landfills generates a
mixture of gases. Much of this mixture is com-
posed of methane, the same ‘natural’ gas used in
cooking and heating.

er

5

“There are some 340 landfills now disposing of
solid waste in New Jersey, and almost all were in
existence at the time the Solid Waste Management
Act (1970) became effective. Most of these opera-
tions are situated on lands once considered ‘mar-
ginal.’ Tidal lands, floodplains, and abandoned sand
and gravel mines have been favored as locations
for disposing of our wastes because such lands were
inexpensive, and it was felt that sanitary landfill
was a suitable method of reclaiming those lands.
While it is possible to bring these areas up to a
more useful grade through sanitary landfill, little
consideration has been given to the wisdom of do-
ing so.

e s 6

“Sanitary landfills produce leachate when water
infiltrates the fill. More than half of our wastes
consist of paper or other absorptive materials. A
sanitary landfill is frequently likened to a sponge
because of this ability to absorb and hold liquids.
Yet, like the sponge, the absorptive capacity of a
sanitary landfill is finite. Water is introduced into
the fill through a variety of mechanisms. Natural
rainwater percolation, off-site drainage into the fill,
natural fluctuations in the groundwater level, tidal
influences, and the water produced through the de-
composition of the organic wastes themselves all
are absorbed by the landfill ‘sponge.’

“Eventually, the landfill becomes saturated, and
ean absorb no more liquid. At that point, each
ounce of liquid introduced to the fill causes a cor-
responding ounce of leachate to be displaced and
leave the fill. Leachate produced in a sanitary land-
fill is a highly polluted liquid characteristic of the

6

waste in which it was produced. Leachates from
municipal wastes (household and commercial
wastes) are typically 50 to 100 times as polluting
as raw sewage, and landfills have been known to
leach for as long as 20 years, although contaminant
concentrations can be expected to decrease in time.

“While examples of leaching sanitary landfills
have been studied and documented for many years,
only recently have researchers begun to study
leachate generation in detail. As recently as 1972,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in its
report entitled ‘Sanitary Landfill Design and Op-
eration,’ stated the following:

‘Some investigators believe that even in a sani-
tary landfill, leachage production is inevitable
and that some leachate will eventually enter sur-
face water or groundwater. This has not been
proven but neither hes the opposite view. The
present philosophy held by the Office of Solid
Waste Management Programs, most State solid
waste control agencies, and many experts in the
field is that through sound engineering and de-
sign, leachate production and movement may be
prevented or minimized to the extent that it will
not create a water pollution problem.’

“One particularly disconcerting feature of leach-
ate production is the time delay created by the
absorptive character of the wastes. Frequently,
landfills do not begin leaching until some time after
the fill has been completed and the waste has
reached its saturation level. Climatie conditions in
New Jersey are favorable to leachate production
and, unless extreme measures are taken to prevent

ey

any liquid from infiltrating the waste, leachate will
be produced in New Jersey’s landfills. The prob-
lem then becomes one of preventing the pollution
of our ground and surface waters by the leachate.

“Water pollution from sanitary landfills is deter-
mined by a number of factors, including the site
hydrology, geology, topography, method of opera-
tion, the type of wastes received for disposal, and
other physical and chemical factors which vary
from fill to fill. Clearly, then, the potential for
polluting our ground and surface water resources
should be a strong factor in the selection of a sani-
tary landfill site, and in its design and method of
operation.

oe e e

“Gas is produced in sanitary landfills as a prod-
uct of the decomposition process. During the early
stages of decomposition, air is present in the fill
and the decomposition process is therefore called
‘aerobic.’ The principal gas produced during aero-
bic decomposition is carbon dioxide (CO:.).

“As the oxygen in the fill is consumed to produce
CO., the decomposition process becomes increasing-
ly anaerobic (the absence of air). The gaseous
products of anaerobic decomposition are CO. and
methane (CH,). In the latter stages of decom-
position almost half the gas present is methane.
Methane is the ‘natural gas’ commonly used for
cooking and heating in our homes, and is explosive
when present in air at concentrations between 5
and 15 percent. Since methane is only produced
in landfills where there is no oxygen present, it
does not pose an explosive threat in the fill itself.
Methane is, however, much lighter than air and,

8

therefore, tends to migrate upward in a sanitary
landfill. The gases in the landfill are normally un-
der a slight pressure, and the methane would there-
fore travel from the fill along the path of least
resistance, sometimes moving laterally where it
cannot easily vent to the atmosphere. For this
reason, methane can constitute an explosion hazard
if it is allowed to accumulate in enclosed struc-
tures on or near a sanitary landfill.

“The introduction of bulk liquids into a landfill
ean greatly affect the generation of leachate with-
in the fill, and leaching from fills which have ac-
cepted hazardous wastes can have a particularly
devastating effect on the quality of our resources.
For these reasons, the proposed regulations would
require any sanitary landfill which accepts such
wastes to establish and maintain water monitoring
facilities, and to undertake immediate corrective
measures should the monitoring disclose contami-
nation. Additionally, the proposed regulations
would ban the disposal of hazardous wastes and
bulk liquids at conventional sanitary landfills after
March 15, 1975. This, it is felt, is sufficient lead-
time for the construction of recovery, treatment
and disposal facilities with sufficient safeguards to
properly handle hazardous and bulk-liquid wastes.

“Tn 1971, at least 11% million tons of solid waste
generated outside of New Jersey were buried with-
in this State. The failure on the part of our neigh-
boring states to provide suitable disposal facilities
of their own has consumed thousands of landfill
acres in New Jersey, has contributed to the de-

9 | ‘

gradation of our environment, and is increasing the
cost of disposal for our own municipalities. The
depletion of landfill space and the enforcement of
stringent air quality standards in the metropoli-
tan regions of our neighboring states is increasing
the volume of out-of-state waste disposed of in New
Jersey at an ever-increasing rate.

“It is estimated that our metropolitan counties
of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Passaic and Union have
no more than three years of landfill space remain-
ing. In an effort to slow down the landfill deple-
tion process, the Department of Environmental
Protection, in conjunction with the Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission, recently
instituted a ban on the disposal of out-of-state
waste within the Hackensack Meadowlands Devel-
opment Commission district. The Hackensack Mea-
dowlands ban caused collectors of out-of-state
waste to travel into the suburban regions of the
state, thus threatening the life expectancy of those
disposal sites. This increased the cost of solid
waste collection and disposal for New Jersey’s resi-
dents, for when nearby disposal sites are depleted,
collectors must haul their waste longer and longer
distances into the State’s suburbs and rural areas.

“Since the Solid Waste Management Act took
effect in 1970, over forty landfill sites have closed.
During that same period only nine new disposal
sites have commenced operations and, of these, only
three accept general municipal-type wastes for dis-
posal. Concurrently, more and more landfill op-
erations are discovering that their acreage includes
unusable flood plain or tidal marsh areas and orig-
inal estimates of their waste capacity were errone-
ously high. The lands now utilized for sanitary

10

landfills are limited, and both industry and local
government have expressed concern over the scarcity
of suitable new sites.

“One measure of the problem is the increasing
volume of waste which requires disposal each year.
While the rate of waste generation within New Jer-
sey is rising steadily, the volume of waste imported
from other states is increasing at an alarming rate.
The depletion or abandonment of solid waste fa-
cilities in our neighboring states has greatly af-
fected the tonnage of solid waste which is brought
ints New Jersey for disposal.” (App. 149-160).

The extent of the environmental harm and the danger to
public health from landfills has been further discussed in a
series of affidavits submitted by administrators of the
Solid Waste Administration of the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection. Bernhardt Lind, then
Chief of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management, ex-
plained:

“At the present time, the only viable method of
solid waste disposal that exists in New Jersey is
through sanitary landfills. Thus, sanitary landfills
are necessary. However, even though they are nec-
essary, they are, at best a necessary evil. Sanitary
landfills are a vast improvement over former open
and often burning dumps and polluting incinerators.
But sanitary landfills have environmental problems
all their own. In New Jersey, virtually all sanitary
landfills can be expected to produce leachate, a
noxious and highly polluted liquid which is seldom
visible and frequently pollutes our ground and sur-
face waters. The natural decomposition process
which occurs in sanitary landfills generates a mix-

11

ture of gases including methane, the same ‘natural’
gas used in cooking and heating. It was once be-
lieved that solid waste could be used to make
swamps into good, usable lands. Examination of
terminated landfills reveal that their use for build-
ing purposes is not desirable due to the high cost
of required pilings and gas accumulation prevention
measures. The environmental insults resulting from
sanitary landfills demand that the number, size and
height of landfills be held to a minimum until such
time as viable alternative methods are developed
and implemented.” (App. 255-256).

Mr. Lind in his affidavit of March 15, 1977 cogently
described how waste originating out of state has magnified
the scope of these health and environmental problems.
After noting that the pereentage of the solid waste dis-
posal in New Jersey originating out of state had grown
to 20%, Lind concluded:

“The figures above can only be viewed with ex-
treme alarm. For as predicted in previous affida-
vits in this matter, expansions of old landfills (both
legal and allegedly illegal) have occurred at the
expense of scarce rural New Jersey acreage and at
at the expense of an increasingly precious rural
environment, because the New Jersey landfills sim-
ply cannot keep pace with the increasing disposal
volume burdening New Jersey while also conforming
to public health and safety regulations. For in-
stance, during 1976, plaintiff Fazzio Landfill was
closed and during 1977, plaintiff Mac Sanitary Land-
fill was closed because of environmental (including
odor problems) and aesthetic considerations; on the
other hand, the loss of volume from these closures

12

was picked up by other landfills like Kinsley Land-
fill and Florence Landfill.

“Further problems exist as a result of the need
to ope. up and expand existing facilities beyond
their design capacity. For example, due to the
closing of Mae Landfill and Fazzio Landfill, a sig-
nificantly increased volume of waste is being dumped
at Big Hill Landfill. The subsurface geology of
this landfill consists primarily of highly permeable
sands which could allow dripping and dangerous
leachate (a noxious and highly polluted liquid often
caused by landfills) as well as methane gases to
percolate and flow through the earth’s strata and
into the important groundwater of the State. Fur-
thermore, expanding existing landfills could lead to
increased health hazards caused by rodents, fires
and scavenger birds; landfills also, needless to say,
do not help New Jersey’s aesthetic appearance nor
New Jersey’s noise or water or air pollution prob-
lems. In fact, citizen complaints regarding noise
and odors have been received by DEP regarding
Big Hill Landfill and there are also indications that
said landfill may be causing water pollution prob-
lems in the underlying Cohansey and Kirkwood
aquifers. Thus, it can be concluded that the above
potential environmental insults demand that New
Jersey not perpetuate ‘bad’ landfills and that the
number of landfills be held to a minimum.” (Motion
for Clarification, etc., at 62sa-65sa).*

* This affidavit, which was inadvertently omitted from the ap-
pendix, will be included in a supplemental appendix to be filed by
appellants.

13

On the basis of the cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the trial court concluded that waste is a proper sub-
ject of interstate commerce, that chapter 363 discriminates
against such commerce and that the statute therefore vio-
lates the Commerce Clause (App. 6-13).

On appeal by the State, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey found that the objective of chapter 363 was “. ..
to prolong the useful lifespan of landfill areas within the
state . . .” and thereby serve “. . . the needs of public
health as well as endeavoring to preserve the environ-
ment.” (App. 54). It further found that the legisla-
tion did not discriminate against interstate commerce,
observing that “. . . the purpose of the legislation is to
protect the inhabitants and vital resources of New Jer-
sey, not to impose economic barriers or create commer-
cial restrictions.” (App. 55). The court therefore con-
cluded that the Commerce Clause had not been violated:
“(Where the effect upon trade and commerce is rela-
tively slight, as is here the case, and where at the same
time the values sought to be protected by the state legis-
lation are as crucial to the welfare of its citizens as is
here true, we have no hesitancy in sustaining the state
action (App. 58).

On January 9, 1976, appellants filed an appeal with
the Court (App. 303) and on April 5, 1976, probable juris-
diction was noted. 425 U.S. 910 (1976).

At the oral argument on November 3, 1976, the Assist-
ant Attorney General appearing for the State of New
Jersey noted in response to a question from Mr. Justice
White that twelve days previously the President had
signed into law the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, which would expand the federal role in deal-
ing with solid waste problems. On February 23, 1977, the
Court, with four justices dissenting, issued a per curiam

14

opinion vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey and remanding the case for reconsideration in
light of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977)
(App. 59-61).

On the remand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, by
opinion dated June 20, 1977, held that chapter 363 is fully
consistent with the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and again unanimously upheld its validity. City of
Philadelphia v. State Dept. of Environ. Protec., 73 N. J.
562, 376 A. 2d 888 (1977) (App. 62-74).

Summary of Argument

In New Jersey and elsewhere the government, in dis-
charge of its responsibility to provide for the health,
safety and welfare of its people, makes provision for the
disposal of waste, either by performing this service itself
or by regulating private parties. However, the State and
its people pay a social cost for this public service. At the
present time the primary means of waste disposal in New
Jersey is through landfills. As expressly found by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, landfills present numerous
dangers to public health and the environment. Virtually
all landfills can be expected to produce leachate, a noxious
and highly polluted liquid which contaminates our ground
and surface waters. Landfills also generate a mixture of
gases which may cause fires and which greatly limit the
potential future uses of the land. This means that while
landfills are necessary for the lisposal of waste generated
in New Jersey, they are at best a necessary evil.

Congress, by the enactment of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, has expressly recognized

*

15

that waste disposal practices vitally affect public health
and the environment and that they should therefore be the
subject of comprehensive planning and regulation by gov-
ernment. The Act also recognizes that the problems of
solid waste disposal are primarily of local, not national,
concern, and that the states have broad discretion in
determining the elements of their individual solid waste
management planning. Therefore, the legislation does not
preclude a state from restricting the use of its landfill
space to the disposal of waste generated within the state.

Nor does the Commerce Clause by its own force com-
pel a state which allows land to be used for the disposal
of waste generated within its boundaries also to allow
land to be used for waste generated in other states. The
restriction on the use of New Jersey landfills to wastes
generated in the State does not implicate any substantial
national interest in the maintenance of an open economy
which the Commerce Clause was designed to protect.
Rather, it represents a proper exercise of the basic power
of the State to protect its environment and the health of
its inhabitants by reducing the overall volume of waste
disposed on land within the state. This conclusion is re-
inforeed by the provisions of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act which recognize that solid waste dis-
posal should be conducted in accordance with comprehen-
sive government regulation and that it is primarily a
subject of local rather than a national concern. There-
fore, the Court should affirm the conclusion of the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey that a state may prohibit the
use of its land as a disposal site for waste generated
within a political subdivision of another state.

16

ARGUMENT
POINT I

Since the Federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 expressly recognizes that the
disposal of waste on the land may present a danger
to public health and the environment and that the
states have primary responsibility for planning and
management to reduce this danger, the Act permits a
state to restrict the use of landfills within its bound-
aries to the disposal of waste generated in the state.

It is now well established that an intent to pre-empt
state legislation should not be inferred unless there is
“an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect.”
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
147 (1963). The Court has been particularly reluctant
to find an intent to pre-empt state legislation which has
been enacted to serve environmental interests (Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325
(1973) ; Turon Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) )
or to protect public health. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S.
346 (1933) ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 147-149 (1902).
Therefore, the appellants must bear the heavy burden
of demonstrating an unambiguous congressional mandate
that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seq., (hereinafter “the
Act”) pre-empts the New Jersey legislation restricting
the use of landfills located within its boundaries to the
disposal of waste generated in New Jersey.

The appellants have failed to satisfy that burden, be-
cause they have not shown that the Act on its face in
any way undermines the validity of the New Jersey legis-
lation. On the contrary, the Act constitutes an express

17

congressional recognition that the problems of solid waste
disposal are primarily of state and local, not national
concern. Thus, section 1002(a)(4) (42 U.S.C. $6901 (a)
(4)) states that “. .. the collection and disposal of solid
wastes should continue to be primarily the function of
State, regional and local agencies. .. .” This point is un-
derscored by the comments during deliberations on the
bill on the floor of the Senate. The co-sponsor of the bill,
Senator Randolph, stated:

“In developing this legislation, the members of
the Committee on Public Works recognized that
solid waste is a uniquely local problem and that
programs in this area should be developed and
managed at the local government level.

“This is not an area which lends itself to ex-
tensive planning and operation from the Federal
level. The role of the Federal Governme:t in solid
waste activities should be one primarily of provid-
ing financial and technical assistance. Guidelines
authorized by this legislation are to be descrip-
tive of the cptions available to local and regional
bodies responsible for solid waste management.
These guidelines should not be taken as directives
from the Federal Government for a position by the
local authorities.

“Guidelines should provide the States and area
planning agencies with maximum flexibility, while
assuring that such agencies or organizations have
adequate information to effectively implement the
planning provisions.

“To assure that the Federal Government adopts a
proper place in this program, I emphasize the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection

18

Agency is required to notify the Congress before
the publication of guidelines, information or model
codes, ordinances or statutes. The agency is re-
stricted under the provisions of the bill from ad-
vocating specific policy alternatives at the State
or local level. These matters are best left—and I
emphasize this—to local choice since they involve
substantial regional variations. It is not appro-
priate for the Environmental Protection Agency to
become involved other than in the provision of
technical assistance on request.” 122 Cong. Ree.
11069 (1976) (remarks of Senator Randolph).

These views were echoed by Senator Stafford of Vermont
(/d. at 11071), Senator Baker of Teanessee (Jd. at 11072)
and Senator Dole of Kansas (/d. at 11094-11095). No
contrary view was expressed. See also 8S. Rep. No. 94-
988, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11 (1976).

A review of the individual subsections of the Act also
shows that its overall design was to foster the waste dis-
posal programs of the state rather than to pre-empt the
field at the federal level. The Act represents a signifi-
cant new federal commitment to participate in solving
the problems of solid waste collection and disposal. How-
ever, with limited exceptions discussed below, the Act
does not purport to override state legislation dealing with
the problems of solid waste management. The Act pro-
vides at section 2003 (42 U.S.C. §6913) for the establish-
ment by the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency of “Resource Conservation and Recovery
Panels”, consisting of technica’. marketing, financial and
institutional specialists, which will have the responsibility
of providing “States and local governments upon request
with technical assistance on solid waste management, re-
source recovery and resource conservation.” Section 2004

19

(42 U.S.C. §6914) establishes a program of federal grants
to assist private and public purchasers of tire shredders.
Section 7007 (42 U.S.C. §6977) authorizes federal grants
to train State and local personnel to carry out solid waste
and resource recovery programs. Federal funding of re-
search and development and demonstration projects are
authorized by section 8001 (42 U.S.C. §6981) and section
8004 (42 U.S.C. 46984). The sections are all elements of
an overall congressional design to leave the responsi-
bility for dealing with the problem of solid waste dis-
posal at the state and local level but at the same time to
provide federal financial and technical assistance.

The one area in which the Act imposes a direct regu-
latory responsibility upon the federal government is haz-
ardous waste. The Administrator has the responsibility
under section 3001 (42 U.S.C. §6921) for identifying the
characteristics of hazardous waste and for listing par-
ticular hazardous wastes not later than eighteen months
after enactment of the Act. The Administrator is re-
quired within the same period to promulgate regulations
governing the generation, storage, transportation and
disposal of hazardous waste. Section 3002-3005 (42 U.S.C.
§6922-6925). The Administrator also may delegate the
responsibility for regulation of hazardous wastes to state
authorities. Section 3006 (42 U.S.C. §6926).

Although the exact parameters of the eventual federal
regulation of hazardous waste are difficult to predict at
this time, it is clear that the assumption of federal regu-
latory control over the subject has no immediate impact
upon New Jersey’s prohibition against the disposal of
waste originating out-of-state. First, these sections of
the Act are not self-implementing but rather are de-
pendent upon the promulgation by the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency of a list of hazard-

20

ous wastes ond of regulations governing their generation,
storage, transportation and disposal. Since the Admin-
istrator has eighteen months from enactment of the Act
within which to promulgate such lists and regulations
(and it is anticipated this timetable will be extended), the
federal regulation of this area probably will not become
operative for at least another six months. It is firmly
established that such potential future regulation of a sub-
ject matter by a federal agency does not pre-empt present
regulation by the states. Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Commission v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 723-
724 (1963); H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S.
79, 84-85 (1939).

Secondly, and even more importantly, when the federal
regulatory program does hecome operative, it will be lim-
ited to “hazardous wastes”. This term is generally un-
derstood in the field of solid waste management to apply
solely to industrial wastes which are inherently dangerous
to plant and animal life. The Senate Committee on Pub-
lie Works noted in its report on the Act that “[m]aterials
of major concern are arsenic wastes, insecticide and pes-
ticide residues, waste oil, explosive wastes, sludge con-
taminated with metals such as chromium and zine, and
radioactive wastes.” S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 3 (1976). In the Act, “hazardous waste” is de-
fined as:

- ; ts :
. .. a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes,

which because of its quantity, concentration, or
physical, chemical or infectious characteristics
may—

- — :;
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an in-

crease in mortality or an increase in serious irre-

versible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or

21

“(B) pose a substantial present or potential haz-
ard to human health or the environment when im-
properly treated, stored, transported, or disposed
of, or otherwise managed.” Section 1004(5) (42
U.S.C. $6903(5)).

Furthermore, the Administrator is directed, in listing the
“hazardous wastes” which will be subject to federal regu-
lation, to take into account “. . . toxicity, persistence, and
degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tis-
sue, and other related factors such as flammability, cor-
rosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics.” Section
3001 (42 U.S.C. §6921). It seems clear that ordinary
household and commercial waste, or garbage, would not
fall within these criteria for defining “hazardous waste”
and thus would not be subject to federal regulation under
sections 3001-3011 (42 U.S.C. §69°1-§6931) of the Act.
This conclusion is supported by the Report of the Senate
Committee on Public Works on the Act which expressly
states that the permit system for hazardous wastes “.. .
is not to be used to control the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances used in households or to extend control over gen-
eral municipal wastes based on the presence of such sub-
stances.” S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 16
(1976). Since the New Jersey statute, as limited by its
implementing regulations, is primarily directed towards
general municipal waste, and since the appellants appar-
ently are engaged solely in the disposal of such waste, the
federal regulation of “hazardous waste” would have no
effect on the subject matter of the instant appeal.

In addition to providing for direct federal regulation
of “hazardous waste”, the Act establishes a system
of incentives for regional planning with respect to the
reclamation or disposal of other solid wastes. The Act
contemplates joint federal-state action to identify regions

appropriate for solid waste planning and to adopt regu-
lations for solid waste management. Section 4002(a)
(42 U.S.C. §6942(a)) provides that within 180 days after
enactment of the Act, the Administrator “. . . after consul-
tation with appropriate Federal, State, and local author-
ities, shall by regulation publish guidelines for the iden-
tification of those areas which have common solid waste
problems and are appropriate units for planning regional
solid waste management services.” Section 4006(a) (42
U.S.C. §6946(a)) provides that within 180 days after
adoption of the federal guidelines, “. . . the Governor of
each State, after consultation with local elected officials,
shall promulgate regulations based on such guidelines
identifying the boundaries of each area within the State
which, as a result of urban concentrations, geographic
conditions, markets, and other factors, is appropriate for
carrying out regional solid waste management.” Section
4006(c) (42 U.S.C. §6946(c)) also provides that such re-
gions may embrace more than one state, in which event
“... the Governors of the respective states ... shall enter
into agreements identifying the boundaries of such re-
gion.” Section 4006(b) (42 U.S.C. §6946(b)) provides
that within a third 180 day period the State shall “. ..
(A) identify an agency to develop the State plan and
identify one or more agencies to implement such plan and
(B) identify which solid waste functions will, under such
State plan, be planned for and carried out by the State
and which such functions will, under such State plan, be
planned for and carried out by regional or local authority
or a combination of regional or local and State author-
ities.” Section 4002(b) (42 U.S.C. §6942(b)) provides
that eighteen months after enactment of the Act “. .. the
Administrator shall, after consultation with appropriate
Federal, State, and local authorities, promulgate regula-
tions containing guidelines to assist in the development

23

and implementation of State solid waste management
plans.” The Act also authorizes appropriations for solid
waste planning for states with a state plan that has
been approved by the Administrator. Section 4007(b)
(42 U.S.C. $6947(b)).

There is no incompatibility between these provisions and
the restriction of the use of landfills located within New
Jersey to the disposal of waste originating in the State.
The only way chapter 363 could conflict with the Act
would be if the plans of New Jersey and its neighboring
states included “interstate regions” pursuant to section
4006(c) (42 U.S.C. §6946(c)). However, the “Interim
Guidelines” for “Identification of Regions and Agencies
for Solid Waste Disposal” adopted by the Administrator
on May 16, 1977 (42 Fed. Reg. 24926, 40 C.F.R. $255) do
not purport to mandate the establishment of an “interstate
region” in any particular area and the Governor of New
Jersey, pursuant to section 4006(c), has designated solely
intrastate regions. See N.J. Pub. L. 1975, e. 326 (N.J.S.A.
13:1E-1 et seg.). There is thus no conflict between the
Act, at least as presently administered, and the restric-
tion by New Jersey of the use of its landfills to waste
originating in New Jersey. Therefore, as in Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., supra, at 336“...

- it will be time to resolve any such conflict between federal

and state regimes when it arises.”

Furthermore, the planning provisions of the Act are
clearly intended to be voluntary. The first section of the
planning subchapter states that its “objectives . . . are
to assist in developing and encouraging methods for the
disposal of solid waste which are environmentally sound
and which maximize the utilization of valuable resources
and to encourage resource conservation ... through Fed-
eral technica! and financial assistance . . . designed to
foster cooperation among Federal, State, and local gov-

24

ernment and private industry.” Section 4001 (42 U.S.C.
$6941). This language clearly contemplates voluntary un-
dertakings, rather than mandatory obligations. The vol-
untary nature of the planning provisions of the Act is
also evident in the specific section dealing with “inter-
state” regions, which states that the establishment of these
regions shall be by “agreement of the respective gov-
ernors. Furthermore, there is no provision for the Ad-
ministrator imposing an interstate plan in the event the
governors fail to agree.’

The intent of Congress to make interstate regional
planning voluntary is confirmed by the numerous state-
ments in the legislative history that “. . . States and
areawide solid waste management planning agencies have
free choice in selecting the elements of their solid waste
management plans.” S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 11 (1976). See also 122 Cong. Ree. 11069 (1976)
(comments of Senator Randolph) ; 7d. at 11071 (comments
of Senator Stafford); Jd. at 11072 (comments of Senator
Baker); 7d. at 11094-11095 (comments of Senator Dole).*

' The essentially voluntary planning provisions of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act are dramatically different from the
mandatory planning provisions of the Clean Air Act, as amended
in 1970. Pub. L. 91-604, 42 U.S.C. §1857-1858a. See The Clean
Air Amendments of 1970: Can Congress Compel State Cooperation
in Achieving National Environmental Standards? 11 Harv. Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 701 (1976). If it were possible to
read the planning provisions of the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act as mandatory, a substantial question would be presented
as to whether Congress has the authority to impose mandatory plan-
ning obligations upon the states in the environmental area. Cf. EPA
v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) ; National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976).

2 One exception to the general design of local option with respect
to state plans is the requirement that open dumps be eliminated.
See section 4005 (42 U.S.C. §6945).

25

This point is stated with particular clarity in the Report
of the House Commerce Committee:

“It is the Committee’s intention that federal as-
sistance should be an incentive for state and local
authorities to act to solve the discarded materials
problem. At this time federal preemption of this
problem is undesirable, inefficient, and damaging
to local initiative.

“Simply, the discarded materials problem is one
of planning and the Committee anticipates that fed-
eral guidelines for planning will foster the neces-
sary cooperation between the federal government,
states, and local regions, to meet very broad and
flexible objectives of this act. If those objectives
are not met, the states and local authorities within
the states will lose the federal or technical assist-
ance. However, the provisions of this legislation,
specifically do not authorize the federal government
to take over the responsibility for discarded mate-
rials disposal planning.” H. Rep. No. 94-1491, at
33.

Therefore, even if the guidelines promulgated by the Ad-
ministrator under section 4002(a) (42 U.S.C. §6942(a))
were at some later date to suggest the appropriateness of
an interstate region encompassing New Jersey, the Gover-
nor of New Jersey still will have the option whether to
agree to such a plan.

In any event, assuming arguendo that the Act could be
read to impose mandatory obligations upon the respective
states to participate in interstate planning, chapter 362
would not stand as an obstacle to compliance with that
obligation. Cf. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977). Chapter 363 does not by its terms preclude the

26

Governor of New Jersey from conferring with the gover-
nor of a sister state regarding regional solid waste plan-
ning. And if the procedures of the Act eventually were
to result in an agreement between the governors which
was inconsistent with a total ban on the disposal in New
Jersey of out-of-state waste, this could be easily im-
plemented, as found by the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey (App. 72-73), through a further exercise by the Com-
missioner of Environmental Protection of his power to
adopt exceptions from the total ban where that can be
done “. . . without endangering the public health, safety
and welfare. .. .” N.J.S.A. 13:11-10. Furthermore, an
authorization resulting from bilateral discussions between
the responsible officials of the two states to dispose of
waste originating out-of-state in New Jersey would be sig-
nificantly different from Philadelphia’s unilateral decision
to use New Jersey as its disposal site. Such authorization
undoubtedly would be the product of a careful and coor-
dinated evaluation of the disposal needs and the environ-
mental and health concerns of the two states rather than
the unplanned result of certain New Jersey entrepreneurs
seeking to maximize profits without regard to the health
and environmental concerns of the rest of the citizenry.

Finally, it should be noted that the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, has taken
a firm position that the Act does not pre-empt chapter
363. In his memorandum on the application for stay pend-
ing appeal, the Solicitor General stated:

“We think that the <Act’s full purposes may be
achieved whether or not New Jersey accepts waste
from other States, at least in the absence of any
experience or regulations establishing the presence

of a hindrance.
. o *

27

“(T]he explicit provision for partial preemption in
section 3009 strongly suggests that no further pre-
emption is intended.

“The fact that Subchapter IV is no more than a
method of providing federal assistance to cooperat-
ing States indicates that Congress did not intend
to bring coercive pressure to bear upon the State
or to oust any of their laws.” *

If there were any doubt concerning the intent of Con-
gress to permit the states to implement regulatory pro-
visions such as chapter 363, the position of the United
States Government, as expressed through the Solicitor
General, should tip the balance in favor of finding that
chapter 363 is fully consistent with the legislative scheme
envisioned by Congress. Cf. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99,
103 (1977); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 696-697 (1976); New York State Dept. of Social»
Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 420-421 (1973); Invest-
ment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).

Therefore, the enactment of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 does not in any way undercut
the validity of the New Jersey legislation prohibiting the
disposal of waste originating out of state. Rather, it re-
flects congressional concurrence with the view that the dis-
posal of waste does not involve the national interest in
maintenance of an open economy, but instead the discharge

8 Obviously, the brief filed by the Solicitor General represents the
authoritative statement of the United States Government as to the
compatibility of chapter 363 with federal legislation. Therefore the
contrary statement four years ago by a middle echelon official of
EPA, set forth at pp. 133-136 of the appendix and heavily relied
upon in appellants’ brief, should be disregarded.

28

by government under the police power of a fundamental
responsibility to provide for the disposal of waste gen-
erated by its inhabitants with the least possible adverse
impact upon health, the environment and land use.

POINT II

The requirement that the use of landfills within a
state be restricted to the disposal of waste generated
in that state falls within the basic power of the state
to protect its environment and the health of its in-
habitants and thus does not violate the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.

It has been well established at least since Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851) that the Com-
merce Clause not only provides an affirmative grant of
authority to Congress, but also “. . . even without imple-
menting legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States.” Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
252 (1946). It is equally well established, however, “. . .
that under our constitutional scheme the States retain
‘broad power’ to legislate protection for the citizens in
matters of local concern such as public health, . . .” Great
A.€P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976). As the
Court noted in H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525, 533 (1949), “[the] distinction between the power of
the State to shelter its people from menaces to their
health and safety and from fraud, even when those dan-
gers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of
power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such com-
merce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted
in both our history and our law.” The local concerns over
which the states retain comprehensive authority, even
when interstate commerce may be affected, include pro-

29

tection of the environment. Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); cf. Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).

The Court frequently has been confronted with chal-
lenges to state legislation which furthered legitimate local
interests but simultaneously imposed a significant burden
upon interstate commerce. In such eases, “. . . the Court
in absence of congressional guidance is called upon to
make ‘delicate adjustment of the conflicting state and fed-
eral claims,’ . . . thereby attempting ‘the necessary accom-
modation between local needs and the overriding require-
ment of freedom for the national commerce.’” Great
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra, at 928. The leading
eases in this area well illustrate how delicate this process
of accommodation has been. Thus, in Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), the Court found the
Commerce Clause to be violated by a statute requiring
a particular type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and
trailers operated within a state, but in South Carolina
State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938) it sustained state limitations on the weight and
width of trucks and trailers. In Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), the Court held state stat-
utes imposing limitations on the length of freight cars
to be violative of the Commerce Clause, but it has con-
sistently sustained state full crew laws. See e.g. Brother-
hood of Loc. F & E v. Chicago, RI. & P.R.R. Co., 393 U.S.
129 (1968). And in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951), the Court held the Commerce Clause to be
violated by an ordinance which prohibited the sale of
milk in a municipality unless it had been pasteurized and
bottled at an approved plant located within five miles of
the municipality, but in Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg
Farms Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939), it sustained a stat-
ute requiring interstate milk dealers to keep records, to

30

post a bond to guarantee prompt payment to purchasers
and to pay minimum prices to producers. Although the
results varied, the Court was confronted in all these cases
not only with a legitimate local interest but also an in-
disputable burden upon the open national market which
the Commerce Clause was designed to protect. There-
fore, it carefully scrutinized any burdens on the free flow
of interstate commerce with the consequence that any dis-
crimination against interstate transactions almost invar-
iably resulted in a declaration of invalidity.

There have been other cases, however, in which no sub-
stantial interests in national commerce were implicated
and local concerns were paramount. The Court has sus-
tained state legislation under such circumstances without
engaging in the delicate process of balancing required
when “. . . regulation of local matters may also operate
as a regulation of commerce .. . .” Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona, supra, at 768. Cf. Wilson v. The Blackbird
Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829). Local interests are
most clearly paramount in preventing the transportation
into a state of articles which are inherently injurious
to public health, safety and welfare. As the Court stated
in Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 60 (1915):

“The power of the state to prescribe regulations
which shall prevent the production within its bor-
ders of impure foods, unfit for use, and such ar-
ticles as would spread disease and pestilence, is
well-established. Such articles, it has been declared
by this Court, are not the legitimate subject of trade
or commerce, nor within the protection of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. ‘Such articles are
not merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects
of trade and commerce. They may be rightly out-
lawed as intrinsically and directly the immediate

31

sources and causes of destruction to human health
and life. The self-protecting power of each state,
therefore, may be rightfully exerted against their
introduction, and such exercises of power cannot be
considered regulations of commerce prohibited by
the Constitution.

“‘Nor does it make any difference that such regu-
lations incidentally affect interstate commerce, when
the object of the regulation is not to that end, but
is a legitimate attempt to protect the people of the
state... .’” 237 U.S. at 60 (citations omitted).

To the same effect, the Court said in Pike v. Bruce Church,
397 U.S. 137, 143-144 (1970):

“[T]o the extent the Act forbids the shipment of
contaminated or unfit produce, it clearly rests on
sure footing. For, as the Court has said, such pro-
duce is ‘not the legitimate subject of trade or com-
merce, nor within the protection of the commerce
clause of the Constitution.’ ”

This principle was applied in Clason v. State of In-
diana, 306 U.S. 439, 442-443 (1939), where the Court up-
held an Indiana statute which in effect prohibited the in-
terstate transportation of animal carcasses not slaughtered
for food. The Court, relying on Sligh, recognized that
the statute was “a sanitary and health measure not in-
tended to cause discrimination against or to burden inter-
state commerce. . . .” 306 U.S. at 443. The Court em-
phatically stated:

“Here, contrary to what seems to be the insistence
of counsel, the State has not recognized dead horses
as legitimate articles of intrastate commerce. It
permits them to be sold only to licensed operators

who raust transport them immediately under strict
sanitary regulations for prompt delivery to a li-
censed plant there to be rendered innocuous with-
out delay by prescribed methods. All this is part
of a workable scheme to secure prompt removal of
decaying carcasses and thus protect against obvi-
ous evils.

“We can find no substantial basis for the charge
of discrimination against legitimate interstate com-
merce. That any real burden upon commerce which
the State is not free to inhibit will result from the
challenged statute seems impossible.

“There is no suggestion of conflict with a federal
enactment. The mere power of the Federal Gov-
ernment to regulate interstate ecommerce does not
disable the State from adopting reasonable meas-
ures designed to secure the health and comfort of
their people. The statute under consideration is
an effort to discharge an obligation to the public;
the means adopted we think are clearly appropri-
ate to this lawful end.” Jd. at 443-444.

See also Price v. Illinois, 2838 U.S. 446 (1915); The Minne-
sota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 406-408 (1913); Asbell v.
Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181
U.S. 198 (1901).

It is clear that the prohibition against the disposal
within New Jersey of waste originating out of state falls
within the basic power of the State to protect its en-
vironment and the health of its inhabitants and thus does
not violate the Commerce Clause. It does not matter
whether it is found that waste intended for disposal is
not a legitimate item of commerce (Clason vy. Indiana,
supra) or that environmental and health concerns of the

33

State are paramount to the commercial interests of the
appellants. Cf. Robertson v. California, 328 US. 440,
458-459 (1945). The conclusion is the same. As stated
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “. . . where the
effect upon trade and commerce is relatively slight, . . .
and “. .. where at the same time the values sought to be
protected by the state legislation are . . . crucial to the
welfare of its citizens . . .”, there should be “. . . no hesi-
tancy in sustainnig the state action.” (App. 58).

The transportation and disposal of waste is vastly dif-
ferent from the commerce in which the Founding Fathers
sought to maintain an open national market. The appel-
lants’ business does not involve the sale of a product or
resource, such as milk, H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
supra, natural gas, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra;
West Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra, or livestock, Brim-
mer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891); Railroad Co. v. Husen,
95 U.S. 465 (1877). Nor does it involve an instrumen-
tality of national ecommerce, such as railroads, Brother-
hood of Loc. F & E v. Chicago, Rl. € PRM. Co., supra,
or highways, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, supra.
Rather, their business involves the fundamental respon-
sibility of government, under the police power, to provide
for the disposal of waste generated by its inhabitants.
Clason v. Indiana, supra; Cf. Nat’l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

Furthermore, the sole purpose and effect of the statute
is not economic protectionism but rather to further the
health and environmental interests of the State. No New
Jersey commercial interests stand to gain advantage over
competitors from outside the state as a result of the ban
on dumping out-of-state waste. On the contrary, among
the appellants are New Jersey landfill operators. The
complaint is not that New J ersey has forged an economic
preference for its own commercial interests, but rather

34

that it has denied a small group of its entrepreneurs an
economic opportunity to traffic in waste in order to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry at
large. Clason v. Indiana, supra. The ban on dumping
out-of-state waste therefore does not implicate any sub-
stantial national interest in the maintenance of an open
economy which the Commerce Clause was designed to pro-
tect.

On the other hand, the ban does serve a vital local in.
terest in the preservation of the state’s environment and
the health of its inhabitants. There is a solid waste crisis
in New Jersey. The nature of the crisis was stated in
emphatic terms by the New Jersey Legislature and the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Section 1 of chapter 363
declares :

“The Legislature finds and determines that since
the enactment of P.L. 1973, ¢. 39 (C. 13:11-1, et
seq.) the volume of solid and liquid waste continues
to rapidly increase, that the treatment and dis-
posal of these wastes continues to pose an even
greater threat to the quality of the environment of
New Jersey, that the available and appropriate
landfill sites within the State are being diminished,
that the environment continues to be threatened by
the treatment and disposal of waste which orig-
inated or was collected outside the State, and that
the public health, safety and welfare require that
the treatment and disposal within this State of all
wastes generated outside of the State be pro-
hibited.”

Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, referring
to its own findings in prior litigation involving solid
waste problems as well as taking judicial notice of legis-
lative studies, stated:

35

“The Court is acutely aware of the solid waste
disposal problem which now exists in the State of
New Jersey. Very recently we recognized that it
had reached ‘crisis proportions’ due to the increas-
ing scarcity of sites for dumping and _ landfill.
Southern Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor and Cowr
cil of the Township of Ocean, 64 N.J. 190, 193, 314
A. 2d 65 (1974).

6 es e

“Compounding the shortage problem are other
extremely important environmental considerations.
Many existing landfills within the State are located
within ecologically sensitive areas, such as flood-
plains, wetlands, or on State-owned public trust
tidelands. The operation of landfills now located in
these areas may have to be limited or discontinued.
An example of this is the action taken by HMDC
in preserving some 1,500 acres of virgin wetlands
which had formerly been tentatively designated for
use as landfill sites. Further actions of a similar
nature are contemplated, thus reducing the esti-
mates of the potential lifespans of such existing
facilities.

s & eo

“Our Appellate Division has recognized that gar-
bage and refuse may provide a direct threat to
the public health. Shaw v. Byram Township, 86
N.J. Super. 598, 602, 207 A. 2d 570 (App. Div.),
certif, denied, 45 N.J. 35, 210 A. 2d 780 (1965) and
indeed the point is self-evident. Likewise, the de-
trimental effects which sanitary landfills have upon
the environment have been acknowledged:

‘* * * Sanitary landfi!'s conducted on virgin land
forever ruin the possibility of preserving the site
for conservation. Additionally, such landfill op-

36

erations can have an adverse effect on the eco-

logical balance of the surrounding area. A sani-

tary landfill operation also has severe limiting
effects on future development of the property.

Problems of settlement, gas generation, and fires

make it difficult to construct structures on former

landfill sites. [Municipal Sanitary Landfill Au-
thority v. Hackensack Meadowlands Development

Commission, 120 N.J. Super. 118, 122 (App. Div.

1972) ; emphasis in original]’

“We recognize, and now emphasize, that the ob-
jectives of the statutes and regulations in question
are not only to preserve the health of New Jersey
residents by keeping their exposure to solid waste
and landfill areas to a minimum, but also to pre-
serve for the benefit of both present and future
generations the natural habitat and ccological
values which landfill usage would destroy.” (App.
38, 40, 51-52).

These legislative and judicial findings are solidly
grounded on the Basis and Background Statement of the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
quoted in the Counterstatement of the Case, and the re-
port of the State of New Jersey County and Municipal
Government Commission, entitled Solid Waste: A Co-
ordinated Approach (1972), of which judicial notice was
taken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey (App. 40).
Since there is a reasonable basis in the record for the
findings of the New Jersey Legislature and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, they should be accepted on appeal
by the Court. Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972);
Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 197 (1952);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). As the Court noted
in Evco v. Jones, supra, the factual findings of a state

37

supreme court will be re-examined only in “exceptional
circumstances.” No showing of such “exceptional circum-
stances” has been made in this case.

On the contrary, the general literature on the subject,
of which the Court can and should take judicial notice
(Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, swpra, at 61; see also Davis, A System of
Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, Per-
spectives of Law 69 (1964)), fully corroborates the find-
ings of the Supreme Court of New Jersey concerning the
danger to the environment and public health from land-
fills. It has been widely recognized that landfills are un-
sightly, a source of noxious odors and vermin and, with

*Gas and Leachate from Landfills: Formation, Collection and
Treatment, Proceedings of a Research Symposium held at Rutgers
University, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, March 1976
(hereinafter Gas and Leachate); Esmaile, Houshang, “Control of
Gas Flow from Sanitary Landfills,” Journal of the Environmental
Engineering Division, Proceedings of the American Society of
Civil Engineers, Vol. 101, EE4, August 1975 “hereinafter Control
of Gas Flow’; Hazardous Waste Disposal Damage Reports, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste Manage-
ment Programs, June 1975; Schmalensee, Richard, Ramachandra
Ramarathan, Wolfhard Ramm and Dennis Smallwood, Measuring
External Effects of Solid Waste Management, U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, March 1975 (hereinafter Measuring External
Effects); Blannan, Janet and Mirdza Peterson, “Survival of Fecal
Coliforms and Fecal Streptococci in a Sanitary Landfill,” News of
Environmental Research in Cincinnati, U. S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, April 12, 1974 “hereinafter Survival of Fecal Coli-
forms”; Miller, David, Frank DeLuca and Thomas Tessier, Ground
Water Contamination in the Northeast States, U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, June 1974 (hereinafter Ground Water C ontami-

nation).

38

the introduction of heavy machinery, exceedingly noisy.®
It is also now known that landfills are almost certain
sources of ground and surface water pollution,® that they
produce dangerous gases as a byproduct of both aerobic

5 “Noise at sanitary landfill sites is generated by the unloading of
refuse, including the operation of compactor and transport trucks as
they disgorge their cargoes and the constant operation of the heavy

equipment used for spreading, compacting, and covering the refuse.”
Measuring External Effects, supra at 219.

Since powerful machinery is required for spreading and compact-
ing in order to reduce vermin, odors and later land settling, noise is
a major problem, especially for landfills located in residential areas.

*In Ground Water Contamination, supra, an evaluation of water
contamination in 11 northeast states including New Jersey, the
authors consider that the hundreds of reported cases of such con-
tamination represent only a small fraction of the actual pollution
present. They conclude that:

“The thousands of acres of landfills containing municipal and
industrial solid wastes are an almost universal source of
ground-water contamination in the region.” Jd. at 1.

Though new landfill developers in New Jersey are attempting to
install liners and to treat the leachate collected, “little experience
exists with regard to the various methods that might be successful
in the handling of this complex fluid.” Jd. at 208. It is felt that state
regulations are helpful but that the true characteristics of leachate
from the various types of landfills, the ability of soils to reduce the
concentration of pollutants and the effects of cover materials at land-
fill sites are not sufficiently understood. The technology

“. .. for eliminating the landfill as a continuing source of con-
tamination (has) not been developed, and, because of this,
there do not appear to be any clear-cut guidelines or policies
that can be followed.” Jd. at 218.

39

and anaerobic decomposition’ and that they are severely
limited as to potential use when completed.* The stand-
ards originally set for the operation of sanitary landfills
(daily compaction and soil cover) are understood today
to be inadequate. Attempts to minimize the “leaching” of
organic and inorganic pollutants from landfill sites

7 All landfills (sanitary or otherwise) produce gases—initially car-
bon dioxide and later, as the oxygen level decreases, methane. “[T]he
greater the quantity, putrescibility, moisture content and temperature
of the refuse . . . the higher the rate of gas production within the
landfill.” Measuring External Effects, supra at 326.

Completed landfills are not easily converted into safe building sites
although gas vents have been used with limited success for controlled
escape and burning.

“The problems of fire and explosion hazards from landfills
occur when methane gas . . . seeps into enclosed areas such as
adjacent sewer lines or the foundations of buildings located
above the fill. . . . Methane seepage from completed landfills
is both inevitable and sufficiently abundant to produce a sig-
nificant hazard.” Jd. at 238, 239.

The authors discuss a study of gas seepage in a 29 building public
housing project constructed on fill. Within 21 months after con-
struction explosive mixtures of methane were found in crawl spaces
below two of the buildings in the development. As attempts to seal
the foundations proved unsuccessful it became necessary to install
automatic ventilation equipment, especially since the methane accum-
ulation had rapidly increased during the sceond and third years of
monitoring.

8 Fill materials slowly decompose causing a gradual shifting and
settlement over the extent of a given site. Many factors are involved :
the weight and composition of the fill, the weight of cover materials,
the amount of rainfall and, if the land is used for construction, the
weight of the structure placed there. Since a number of these factors
are unpredictable (the diverse nature of fill materials for example)
“landfills are a particularly poor foundation material for construc-
tion”. Id. at 259.

40

through the use of liners are still in the experimental
stage.’ Many have been found faulty. Attempts have been
made to vent accumulated gases but the danger of fire
and explosion has not been eliminated.’®

The generally recognized fact that solid waste disposal
poses substantial dangers to the environment and public
health was also expressly acknowledged by Congress in
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub.
L. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. §6901, et seg. Thus, section 1002(b)
(42 U.S.C. §6901(b)) states:

® Haxo, Henry E., Assessing Synthetic and Admixed Materials
for Lining Landfills,” Gas and Leachate, supra, 130. In “Survival
of Fecal Coliforms,” supra, the authors conclude that pathogenic
microorganisms may be “transmitted into the environment through
the leaching process” past an eighteen inch clay soil liner (considered
reasonably “safe” by many experts in the field). Jd. Even where
leachate is collected for treatment, inert organic matter and totally
dissolved inorganic solids cannot easily be removed. See Pohland,
Frederick G., “Landfill Management with Leachate Recycle and
Treatment: An Overview,” Gas and Leachate, supra, 159.

© Flower, Franklin, “Case History of Landfill Gas Movement
Through Soils,” Gas and Leachate, supra, 177, and “Control of Gas
Flow,” supra at 555. “Case History” describes the death of peach
trees in commercial orchards in Glouchester County, the death of
ornamental vegetation and the entry of combustible gases into pri-
vate homes in Camden County and the destruction of farm crops in
Burlington County. The author comments, “Sometimes gas vents

prevent the lateral migration (of possibly flammable gas) and some-_

times they do not.” /d. at 188.

Also, in Hazardous Waste Disposal Damage Reports, compiled by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Solid Waste
Management Programs, supra, the agency describes three separate
instances of waste disposal practices which resulted in arsenic poison-
ing, the destruction of farmland and, in New Jersey, the death of a
bulldozer operator.

41

“ENVIRONMENT AND HeattaH.—The Congress finds
with respect to the environment and health, that—

“(1) although land is too valuable a national re-
source to be needlessly polluted by discarded mate-
rials, most solid waste is disposed of on land in
open dumps and sanitary landfills;

“(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste
in or on the land without careful planning and
management can present a danger to human health
and the environment;

“(3) as a result of the Clean Air Act, the Water
Pollution Control Act, and other Federal and State
laws respecting public health and the environment,
greater amounts of solid waste (in the form of
sludge and other poilution treatment residues) have
been created. Similarly, inadequate and environ-
mentally unsound practices for the disposal or use
of solid waste have created greater amounts of air
and water pollution and other problems for the
environment and for health;

“(4) open dumping is particularly harmful to
health, contaminates drinking water from under-
ground and surface supplies, and pollutes the air
and the land;

“(5) hazardous waste presents, in addition to the
problems associated with non-hazardous solid
waste, special dangers to health and requires a
greater degree of regulation than does non-hazard-
ous solid waste; and

“(6) alternatives to existing methods of land dis-

posal must be developed since many of the cities in
the United States will be running out of suitable

42

solid waste disposal sites within five years unless
immediate action is taken; ... .”

Significantly, the appellants do not directly challenge
the factual finding of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
that landfills pose a serious threat to public health and
the environment. Rather they seek to satisfy the burden
imposed by Evco v. Jones, supra, by simply describing
the web of federal and state statutes and regulations
which address the problems of waste disposal (Appel-
ants’ brief, pp. 45-58). However, no responsible authority
asserts that these measures are likely in the foreseeable
future to eliminate the health and environmental prob-
lems of waste disposal, any more than the extensive fed-
eral and state efforts in the field of law enforcement are
likely to eliminate crime. On the contrary, the voluminous
statutory and regulatory provisions cited by appellants,
the congressional reports on the bills enacted as the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 and the
congressional findings set forth in the Act, all attest in
dramatic terms to the fact that the country is far away
from a point where it accurately can be said, as urged
by appellants, that the disposal of waste poses no real
health or environmental problems.

The appellants also point to statements that chapter
363 was enacted to preserve available landfill space for
the disposal of New Jersey waste and seek to infer that
the legislation was not designed to serve health or en-
vironmental interests of the State. Initially, it should be
noted that appellants have failed to cite any authority
for the proposition that the Commerce Clause disables
a state from enacting legislation to limit an activity
which has a deleterious impact on land use. Cf. Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); American
Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com’n, 15 Ore. App.

43

618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). In any event, the landfill pres-
ervation, and health and environmental objectives of chap-
ter 363 cannot be rigidly separated in the manner assumed
by appellants’ argument. It is at precisely the point when
existing capacity has been exhausted that landfills pre-
sent the most severe threat to public health and the en-
vironment. As noted by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, even at the present time “. . . many landfills
within the State are located within ecologically sensitive
areas, such as floodplains, wetlands, or on State-owned
public trust tidelands.” (App. 40). It is clearly desirable
to discontinue or at least to limit the use of such land-
fills. However, the plain fact is that the exhaustion of
available landfills space through overutilization increases
the risk that disposal in the most environmentally sens:-
tive areas will have to be increased. As noted by the Su-

-preme Court of New Jersey, “. . . it is entirely reasonable

to forecast that the extension of the lifespan of existing
landfills, resuiting from the exclusion of out-of-state
waste, may be of crucial importance in preventing fur-
ther virgin wetlands or other undeveloped lands from
being devoted to landfill purposes.” (App. 43). In short,
there is a direct and immediate relationship between the
legislative objectives of preserving existing landfill space
for the maximum period possible and minimizing the
health and environmental dangers of landfills.”

1! Although this claim was nowhere made in their previous briefs
filed with the Court, appellants have now asserted that the motivation
for enactment of chapter 363 was economic rather than environmental.
This belated assertion is frivolous. The primary authority for the

' assertion is a press release by the then Acting Governor which the

appellants apparently located in the archives of the New Jersey State
ha in Trenton, New Jersey. Initially, it should be noted that
this document is not part of the record. In any event, the part

(Footnote continued on following page)

44.

Therefore, the appellants have failed to set forth any
grounds for questioning the findings of the New Jersey
Legislature and Supreme Court of New Jersey that the
disposal of waste in landfills represents a present threat
to the health and environment of the inhabitants of New
Jersey.

It also is fully consistent with the Commerce Clause to
deal with this problem by taking reasonable steps to re-
duce the overall volume of waste being disposed on New
Jersey land. Thus, in Bradley v. Public Utility Com’rs,
289 U.S. 92 (1933), the Court rejected a Commerce Clause
challenge to the denial by the Ohio Public Utilities Com-
mission of a certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate an interstate bus route based upon the fact that
the highway over which the service was to be conducted
was already overly congested. In a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Brandeis, the Court said that “[s]afety
may require that no additional vehicle be admitted to the
highway” (289 U.S. at 96), even though the effect was
to absolutely prevent the operation of the proposed new
interstate bus route. If such a restriction may be im-

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of that document selectively quoted in the text is strikingly dif-
ferent from the full document, quoted in footnote 10 of appel-
lants’ brief, which leaves no doubt that the essential purpose of
the bill was protection of the New Jersey citizenry from the grave
environmental and health dangers caused by the land disposal of
waste. The quotes attributed to the sponsor of A-1132 and former
Governor Cahill on pp. 7-8 of appellants’ brief and the selections from
the Pereira deposition (App. 181-187) have been similarly pulled out
of context. Finally, a reading of the entire Basis and Background
Statement (App. 148-166), rather than simply the short passage
quoted by appellants, leaves no doubt that the essential objectives of
the State in the enactment of chapter 363 and the implementing regu-
lations was the protection of public health and the environment.

45

posed on a basic instrumentality of interstate commerce,
it follows a fortiori that the transportation into a state
of waste intended for dumping may be prohibited so as
to reduce the overall magnitude of an established public
health and environmental problem.

This case is similar in many respects to Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Hughes
involved the environmental hazard of disposing of aban-
doned automobiles; this case deals with the environmental
hazard of disposing of all forms of solid wastes. In
Hughes, the State of Maryland pursued its environmental
interests in part by a statutory system of bounties de-
signed to encourage the recycling of abandoned automo-
biles. To prevent state funds from being dissipated by
payments for automobiles abandoned in other states, it
enacted amendments which had the practical effect of
restricting the bounties to Maryland processors. This
made it economically impractical for out-of-state proc-
essors to compete with Maryland processors in the pur-
chase of abandoned automobiles from wreckers thereby
substantially reducing this form of interstate commerce.
The Court upheld this legislation essentially on the theory
that the payment of bounties by the State to further its
environmental interests was not the kind of action with
which the Commerce Clause is concerned. Since New
Jersey has pursued its environmental interests in limiting
the ruin of its land by landfill operations by prohibiting
the transportation into New Jersey for disposal of waste
originating out of state, rather than expending state
funds for this purpose, the subsidy rationale of Hughes
is not directly applicable. However, the underlying pur-
pose “. . . of protecting the State’s environment” (/d. at
809) is common to the two statutes, and there are a num-
ber of significant respects in which the New Jersey stat-
ute implicates the free market principles of the Commerce

46

Clause to a lesser extent than did the Maryland statute.
First, whereas the Maryland statute confers an economic
advantage upon Maryland processors to the detriment of
out-of-state processors, the New Jersey statute creates no
economic preference for local economic interests. On the
contrary, some of the appellants are New Jersey landfill
operators who claim that they will lose business as a
result of New Jersey’s effort to protect its environment.
Secondly, whereas the recycled scrap metal affected by
the Maryland statute was indisputably an appropriate
subject of interstate commerce, the New Jersey statute
does not affect any materials intended for re-cyeling but
rather is limited to the disposal of waste. Finally,
whereas it was cogently argued in Hughes that Mary-
land’s environmental interests could be pursued equally
effectively with less impact upon interstate commerce,
there is no reasonable alternative available to New Jersey
to reduce the overall quantity of waste being dumped
within its borders. Therefore, the exclusion of out-of-
state waste transported for disposal within New Jersey
is more clearly compatible with the free market objectives
of the Commerce Clause than the program of economic
subsidization for the recycling of abandoned automobiles
upheld in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.

Finally, even if there were some doubt concerning the
compatibility of chapter 363 with the Commerce Clause,

2 Appellants argue that chapter 363 on its face purports to be a
prohibition on the entry of all solid and liquid wastes (except gar-
bage for swine) for any purpose whatsoever. However, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey recognized that the statute must be read
with the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto prior to its effec-
tive date as only applicable to waste destined for disposal. The Court
is bound by this interpretation of chapter 363 of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey. Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 443, 455 (1904).

47

that doubt would be put to rest by the fact that Congress
has recently enacted comprehensive legislation dealing
with the problems of solid waste disposal without under-
taking to force states to allow their land to be used for
the disposal of waste originating out of state. It is
firmly established that “Congress has . . . power to define
the distribution of power over interestate commerce.”
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service
Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 521 (1947). See also Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545
(1891). As discussed in greater detail in Point IJ, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act represents a
clear congressional determination that the problems of
waste disposal are primarily of local rather than national
concern, thus strongly supporting the conclusion that
waste disposal is a subject within the local police power
which does not implicate any substantial national interest
in the maintenance of an open economy. Furthermore,
the Act expressly recognizes that solid waste should only
be disposed on the land in accordance with careful gov-
ernmental planning and management at the state and local
level, thus supporting the conclusion that patterns of
waste disposed are too important to public health and the
environment to be left to the unregulated whims of the
marketplace. The Act thus reinforces the conclusion that
chapter 363 is consistent with the Commerce Clause.

The appellants, in seeking to avoid the line of cases
holding that the Commerce Clause does not prevent the
states from enacting legislation to protect the health,
safety and welfare of their citizens, rely on cases which
have no bearing upon the restrictions which the Com-
merce Clause places on the states, but deal instead with
the breadth of the power which the clause confers upon

48

Congress. See e.g. United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse
Removal Association, 242 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965),
aff’d 357 F. 2d 806 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. den. 384 U.S. 961
(1966). Thus, the Court has held that Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation
prohibiting the interstate transportation of prostitutes
(Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)) and kid-
napped persons. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124
(1936). However, it would be ridiculous to suggest that
the Commerce Clause may be invoked to prevent action
by the states to combat these evils. Therefore, although
United States v. Bishop Processing Company, 287 F.
Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), aff’d 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.),
cert. den. 398 U.S. 904 (1970), recognized that the move-
ment of air pollutants across state lines provides an ade-
quate jurisdictional basis under the Commerce Clause for
the enactment of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §1857,
et seq.), this does not mean that the Commerce Clause
would present an obstacle to the enactment of legislation
by New Jersey to prevent all of Pennsylvania’s air pol-
lution from being collected and shipped to New Jersey
for release on the property of a well-paid entrepreneur.
Similarly, if the ships in Huron Portland Cement vy. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) were collecting all of the
smoke which was produced while steaming the Great
Lakes and were releasing it in Detroit Harbor, an ordi-
nance prohibiting such a practice would not be struck
down by the Court. The cases dealing with the reach of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause are thus
inappropriately relied upon by the appellants. Cf. Doug-
las vy. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 282 n. 17
(1977); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45,
57-58 (1911).

The appellants also rely on the “natural resource” cases
to support their attack upon chapter 363. Pennsylvania v.

49

West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas
Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). However, these cases
all dealt with statutes which attempted, as described in
Pennsylvania vy. West Virginia, “to regulate the inter-
state business to the advantage of the local customers.”
262 U.S. at 597-598. Furthermore, it is clear that natural
resources such as oil and gas, are located in some states
but not in others, and that restrictions upon interstate
commerce in resources would have an adverse impact upon
the national economy. See Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). No comparable claim can
be made with respect to the disposal of waste. It is also
clear that disposal of waste presents immediate prob-
lems with respect to health and environment which were
not present in the “natural resource” cases. Therefore,
these cases involve, under the analysis contained in H.P.
Hood &€ Sons v. DuMond, supra, state regulation to “. . .
constrict the flow of . . . commerce for [local] economic
advantage .. .”, not an attempt by the State “. . . to shel-
ter its people from menaces to their health or safety. .. .”
336 U.S. at 533.

It is also significant that Pennsylvania does not take
the same cavalier attitude towards the health and environ-
mental dangers of landfills manifested by Philadelphia’s
brief when the landfills are located on the Pennsylvania
side of the border. On the contrary, Pennsylvania law
leaves political subdivisions of that state free to exclude
waste originating outside of their boundaries. As stated
in the affidavit of the Commissioner of Streets of the City
of Philadelphia:

“13. Sanitary landfills in Pennsylvania are not
- public utilities. The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources has been legislatively em-

50

powered to regulate such facilities, but cannot com-
pel same to accept solid waste from any source
whatever.” (App. 221;'* See also App. 249-252).

The appellant Pennsylvania political subdivision is thus
in the anomalous position of invoking the Commerce
Clause as a sword to force New Jersey to accept its
waste in an effort to solve disposal problems caused by
the laws of its own state which allow the immediately
surrounding Pennsylvania political subdivisions to exclude
Philadelphia waste."* This circumstance serves to under-
score the fact that what is involved in this case is not
preservation of an open national economy but an attempt
by a political subdivision of one state to use the soil and
environment of a sister state in the discharge of its obli-
gation under the police power to provide for the disposal
of the waste of its inhabitants. Clason v. Indiana, supra.

13 By contrast, New Jersey has comprehensive legislation regulat-
ing disposal of waste which prohibits one political subdivision from
excluding solid waste originating in another political subdivision.
N.J.S.A. 48:13A, et seq. (Solid Waste Utility Control Act, 1970) ;
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-1, et seq. (Solid Waste Management Act of 1970) ;
See So. Ocean Landfill v. Mayor & Coun. Tp. of Ocean, 64 N. J.
190, 314 A2d 65 (1974).

14 As in Pennsylvania, the majority of states permit local political
subdivisions to prohibit the disposal of waste originating outside of
their boundaries. Since such local ordinances may be effectively
used to exclude waste originating out of state, the statement in ap-
pellants’ brief to the effect that only seven states prohibit the disposal
of waste originating out of state (appellants’ brief, at 33, n. 26) is
quite misleading. In fact, the need for such provisions probably only
arises in states such as New Jersey which have enacted legislation
providing for intrastate regional waste disposal planning.

51

Indeed, where efforts by one state, or its political sub-
divisions, to dispose of waste in a manner harmful to
the inhabitants of another state have come before the
Court, it has not been the disposing states which have
sought to invoke the Commerce Clause as a license for the
exportation of their waste problems, but rather the recip-
ient states that have brought original actions, often suc-
cessfully, against the disposing states to prevent actions
harmful to their health and environment. See, e.g., [illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); New Jersey v.
New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); New York v. New Jer-
sey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. IWinois & Chicago
District, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). The Court in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., swpra, in granting an injunction
to prevent a Tennessee company from discharging noxious
gas from its factory into Georgia, appropriately noted
that:

“It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part
of a sovereign that the air over its territory should
not be polluted on a great scale by sulfurous acid
gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they
better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction
they have suffered, should not be further destroyed
or threatened by the act of persons beyond its
control, that the crops and orchards should not be
endangered from the same source.” 206 U.S. at
238.

If conduct offensive to New Jersey took place solely in
Pennsylvania as, hypothetically, by the appellants pro-
jecting their waste across the Delaware River into New
Jersey, it would require such an action for New Jersey
to protect the interests of its inhabitants. Hewever, since

52

the actual method of the disposal of Pennsylvania waste
in New Jersey involves conduct within the jurisdiction of
New Jersey, it was able to deal with the problem directly
through prohibitory legislation. In any event, the point
is that actions by one state which adversely affect the
air, land and water of another state have never been con-
ceived to be protected by the Commerce Clause.

In sum, this case simply does not involve the national
interest in the maintenance of an open economy which
the Commerce Clause was designed to protect. Rather, it
involves the fundamental responsibility of a state to
provide for the disposal of waste generated by its inhabi-
tants with the least possible adverse impact upon health,
the environment and land use. Therefore, the Court
should affirm the conclusion of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey that a state may prohibit the use of its land as a
disposal site for waste generated within a political sub-
division of another state.

53

POINT III

The record before the Supreme Court of New Jersey
provided a reasonable basis for sustaining the legis-
lative finding that the public health and environmen-
tal problems caused by landfills are exacerbated by
forcing New Jersey to accept waste generated out of
state and thus there was no need for a plenary hear-
ing before the trial court.

Appellants’ final argument is that the Supreme Court
of New Jersey somehow thwarted their efforts to develop
a full record and thereby denied them due process of law.
This contention is frivolous.

It was appellants’ trial strategy which determined the
course of proceedings in the state courts. Soon after the
filing of their complaint, the appellants moved for sum-
mary judgment “. . . only upon the issues of federal pre-
emption and discrimination against interstate commerce
... (App. 189) and the State cross-moved for sum-
mary judgment. Thus the essential thesis upon which the
matter was submitted to the trial court was that, regard-
less of the impact upon public health and the environ-
ment, if New Jersey permitted the dumping in landfills of
waste originating within the state, it was also obligated
by the Commerce Clause to accept out-of-state garbage
for dumping in its landfills. On the appeal by the State
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, appellants again
essentially relied upon the thesis that chapter 363 vio-
lated the Commerce Clause by “discriminating” against
waste originating out of state. No serious question was
raised as to the validity of legislative findings that en-
vironmental degradation was being aggravated by the
dumping in New Jersey of wastes originating out of state.
Nor did the appellants pursue, as alternative grounds

54

for affirmance, any of the other legal theories which had
been projected. in shot gun form in their original com-
plaint.”” Rather, it was only after the Supreme Court of
New Jersey had issued its opinion upholding the consti-
tutionality of chapter 363 that the appellants, on a motion
for remand to the trial court, first raised questions con-
cerning the finality of the judgment (App. 216-218). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey, over the strenuous objec-
tions of the State, granted this motion for remand “.. .
for such further proceedings, if any, that that court may
deem appropriate .. .” (App. 299). Therefore, assuming
that any facts remained to be heard, the appellants were
given an opportunity to develop those facts. However,
the appellants deliberately elected not to proceed before
the trial court and instead to enter into a consent dis-
missal with prejudice. As conceded by counsel for appel-
lants at the prior oral argument before the Court, the
appellants thus waived any right they might have had to
pursue other counts of their original complaint (Tran-
seript, p. 25).

There is, therefore, absolutely no factual basis for the
appellants’ contention that they were denied due process
of law by the course of proceedings in the state courts.

'5 It is well established under New Jersey practice that a judgment
may be supported on appeal not only on the grounds relied by the
lower court but on any other grounds which will support the result.
Irving Isko v. Planning Bd. of Tp. of Livingston, 51 N. J. 162, 175.
238 A2d 457, 464 (1968). It is also a fundamental policy of state
judicial administration that all aspects of a controversy should be
joined together in a single legal proceeding so as to avoid the delay
and wastage incident to the fragmentation of litigation. Falcone v.
Middlesex County Med. Soc., 47 N. J. 92, 219 A2d 50 (1966). This
means that where feasible a party who has prevailed in a lower court
on one of several alternate theories should present any theory which
might suppor! the judgment to an appellate court.

55

Rather, the appellants properly may be bound to the
record as they elected to develop it in the state courts.
As the court stated in Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137,
152 (1902) in a related context:

“The accused seems to have been content to rest his
defense upon such grounds as arose upon the face
of the local statute, without reference to any evi-
dence bearing upon the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of the particular methods adopted by the
state to protect its domestic animals. He seems to
have been willing to risk the case upon the simple
proposition—based upon the words of the state en-
actment and upon the act of Congress, reinforced
by certain regulations made by the Agricultural
Department—that the local statute was inconsistent
with that act, and with the general power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce.

“As therefore, the statute . .. only prescribes
certain methods to protect the domestic animals
of Colorado from contact with live stock coming
from that territory between certain dates, and as
those methods have been devised by the state under
the power to protect the property of its people from
injury, and do not appear upon their face to be
unreasonable, we must, in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary, assume that they are appro-
priate to the object which the state is entitled to
accomplish.”

Appellants’ explanation for their failure to pursue the
remand to the trial court is to say that they needed an
injunction against the effectiveness of chapter 363 and,
since the Supreme Court of New Jersey had foreclosed
the grant of that relief in the state system, it was not

56

in their strategic best interest to continue with state
court proceedings. However, appellants’ strategic situa-
tion did not differ from that of any other party who has
been denied preliminary injunctive relief by a state court,
since the right of appeal from the state courts to the
Supreme Court of the United States is limited under 28
U.S.C. §1257(2) to final judgments. Therefore, if there
were any substance to appellants’ argument, 28 U.S.C.
§1257(2), to the extent it permits appeals to the Supreme
Court of the United States only from final judgments,
would be subject to attack on due process grounds. The
Court therefore should reject the appellants’ attempt to
characterize the end result of their own procedural
maneuvering as a denial of due process by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.

Most importantly, even apart from the fact that it was
appellants’ trial strategy which determined the course of
proceedings in the state courts, it is clear that the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey based its decision upon a
fully adequate record. As discussed in Point I], the Sua-
preme Court of New Jersey had before it the Basis and
Background Statement of the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection, the report of the State of
New Jersey County and Municipal Government Commis-
sion entitled Solid Waste: A Coordinated Approach
(1972), the affidavit of the Chief of the New Jersey Bureau
of Solid Waste Management and of course the court’s
own findings in prior proceedings. These materials snowed
a reasonable basis for the legislative findings that the
disposal of waste causes environmental and public health
problems, that there is a shortage of landfill space in the
state and that the disposal of waste originating out-of-
state increases the overall volume of waste dumped within
the state and thereby exacerbates the state’s solid waste
disposal problems. The New Jersey Legislature’s con-

57

clusions as to the dangers from solid waste disposal are
re-inforced by additional documentary materials of which
the Court may take judicial notice and the findings of
Congress. All of these sources provide a reasonable basis
for sustaining the judgment of the New Jersey Legisla-
ture in banning the dumping within New Jersey of waste
originating out of state. Evco vy. Jones, supra; Local
Union No. 10 v. Graham, supra; Welch v. Swasey, supra.

The mere fact that an opinion may have been expressed
by appellants that landfills can be operated without dam-
age to public health and the environment does not give
rise to a material contested issue of adjudicative fact
requiring a trial. The judgment of the New Jersey Legis-
lature is not subject to invalidation simply on the possi-
bility that, after a contest between expert witnesses, a
court may conclude that the experts attacking the legis-
lative judgment have made the more persuasive case. As
the Court stated in South Carolina State Highway Dep’t
vy. Barnwell Bros., supra, at 191-192:

“(CJourts do not sit as legislatures, either state
or national. They cannot act as Congress does
when, after weighing all the conflicting interests,
state and national, it determines when and how
much the state regulatory power shall yield to the
larger interests of a national commerce.

“Since the adoption of one weight or width regu-
lation, rather than another, is a legislative not a
judicial choice, its constitutionality is not to be
determined by weighing in the judicial scales the
merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if
the weight of evidence presented in court appears
to favor a different standard. ... Being a legisla-
tive judgment it is presumed to be supported by

58

facts known to the legislature unless facts judicially
known or proved preclude that possibility. Hence,
in reviewing the present determination we examine
the record, not to see whether the findings of the
court below are supported by evidence, but to as-
certain upon the whole record whether it is pos-
sible to say that the legislative choice is without
rational basis.”

The same principles of judicial restraint were expressed
in Justice Holmes’ opinion in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S.
297, 303-304 (1918):

“If the character or effect of the article as in-
tended to be used ‘be debatable, the legislature is
entitled to its own judgment, and that judgment
is not to be superseded by the verdict of a jury,’
or, we may add, by the personal opinion of judges,
‘upon the issue which the legislature has decided.’
Price vy. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446, 452. ... The answer
to the inquiry is that the provisions are of a kind
familiar to legislation and often sustained, and that
it is impossible for this court to say that they
might not be believed to be necessary in order to
accomplish the desired ends.”

See also Hughes vy. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra, 426
U.S. at 812-814. Similarly, since the record in the present
case contains adequate support for the legislative find-
ing that the exclusion from New Jersey of waste orig-
inating out of state reasonably would serve to protect
the State’s health and environment, there would be no
basis for holding trial proceedings even if the appellants
had not deliberately declined to avail themselves of this
opportunity.

Finally, it should be noted that if any appellant landfill
operator really were in a position to establish that it could
conduct a disposal operation for waste originating out of
state without threat to the health, safety and welfare of
New Jersey citizens, it could obtain a further exemption
from the prohibitory impact of chapter 363. The statute
confers broad power upon the Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection to permit waste originating out of state
to be brought into the State where he determines that
this can be done “. . . without endangering the public
health, safety and welfare. ...” If any party were able to
show that any exemptions from the prohibition against
dumping waste originating out of state could be adopted
“ . . without endangering the public health, safety and
welfare ...”, it must be presumed that the Commissioner
would extend the scope of the existing exemptions. More-
over, under the broad principles of judicial reviewability
of administrative actions which exist in New Jersey (see
In re Senior Appeals Examiners, 60 N.J. 356, 290 A. 2d
129 (1972)) if the Commissioner in exercising his power
under the law were “arbitrary, unreasonable and capri-
cious,” his actions could be set aside on appeal to the
courts. However, in the procedural posture in which ap-
pellants have placed this matter before the Court, it
must be assumed, as has been found by the New Jersey
Legislature and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “. ..
that the environment continues to be threatened by the
treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was
collected outside of the State, and that the public health,
safety and welfare require that the treatment and dis-
posal within this State of all wastes generated outside of
the State be prohibited.” N.J.S.A. 13:11-9. Therefore,
the record is fully adequate to sustain the constitution-
ality of chapter 363.

60

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that for the foregoing

reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey should be affirmed.

Joun J. DEGNAN

Attorney General of New Jersey
Attorney for Appellees, State of
New Jersey, Department of
Environmental Protection of
the State of New Jersey and
Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Environmental Pro-
tection of the State of New

Jersey

STEPHEN SKILLMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Of Counsel and On the Brief

DeporaH Poritz
NatHan EDELSTEIN
Deputy Attorneys General
On the Brief

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2535%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
