# Petition — Britt v. San Diego Unified Port District

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 859

## Text

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——

Supreme Court, U. &

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF .THE ov Fn eee JR., CLERK
OCTOBER TERM 197

No.

77-148

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,

Petiti
vs. t oners,

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

JERROLD A. FADEM

MICHAEL M. BERGER

of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE
& NORTON

A Professional Corporation

501 Santa Monica Boulevard
Suite 600

P. O. Box 2148

Santa Monica, CA 90406
(213) 451-9951

Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1977
No.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

JERROLD A. FADEM

MICHAEL M. BERGER

of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE
& NORTON

A Professional Corporation

501 Santa Monica Boulevard
Suite 600

P. O. Box 2148

Santa Monica, CA 90406
(213) 451-9951

Attorneys for Petitioners

~~ ower

a od

Oe 8 ee,

me

TOPICAL INDEX

Page
Table of Authorities iii
Opinion Below 2
Jurisdiction 2
Questions Presented for Review 2
Constitutional, Statutory and
Regulatory Provisions 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT | 8

1

FEDERAL STATUTES EXPRESSLY AUTH-
ORIZE THE TYPE OF COMMON LAW
ACTIONS FORECLOSED BY THE COURT
OF APPEAL 14

2

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESS-

LY REJECTED THE COURT OF APPEAL'S

IDEA THAT, ". . . FEDERAL PREEMPTION

OF THE FIELD OF AIRPORT NOISE REGULA-
TION LEAVES NO ROOM FOR LOCAL CONTROLS

- « « «" (67 Cal App.3d at 368) 20

i

3

THE COURT OF APPEAL MISREADS
FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDES THAT THE PORT DISTRICT
(AS AIRPORT OPERATOR) HAS NO POWER
TO CONTROL THE NOXIOUS BY-PRODUCTS
OF THE JET AGE EMITTED BY THE PORT
DISTRICT'S TENANTS

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth Appellate District,
filed February 18, 1977

APPENDIX B

Constitutional, Statutory and
Regulatory Provisions

ii

29

36

a ae ee —

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Air Transport Assn. v. Crotti
(N.D. Cal. 1975)

389 F. Supp. 58 12,

Allegheny Airlines v. Village
of Cedarhurst
(E.D. N.Y. 1955)
132 F. Supp. 871, aff'd.,
(2d Cir. 1956)
238 F.2d 812

American Airlines, Inc. v. City
of Audubon Park
(W.D. Ky. 1968)
297 F. Supp. 207, aff'd.
(6th Cir. 1969)
407 F.2d 1306

American Airlines, Inc. v. Town
of Hempstead
(E.D. N.Y. 1967)
272 F. Supp. 226, aff'd.
(2nd Cir. 1968)
398 F.2d 369

British Airways Board and
Compagnie Nationale Air
France v. Port Authority of
New York & New Jersey
(2nd Cir. 1977)

Docket No. 77-7237 12, 32,

iii

31

31

31

33

Cases Page

City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal (1973)
411 U.S. 624 29, 31, 32

Farmer v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters (1977)
ae © ps
51 L.Ed.2d 33 18

Florida Lime and Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul (1963)
sees G8. 35a 19

Griggs v. Allegheny County (1962)
369 U.S. 84 13

City of Inglewood v. City of
Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1971)
451 F.2d 948 6, 16

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc. (1976)
426 U.S. 290 17

National Aviation v. City of
Hayward (N.D. Cal. 1976)
418 F. Supp. 417 32

Port of New York Authority v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc.
(E.D. N.Y. 1966)
259 F. Supp. 745 32

iv

Cases Page

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon (1959)
359 U.S. 236 20

San Diego Unified Port Dist. v.
Superior Court (1977)
67 Cal.App.3d 361,
136 Cal.Rptr. 557 2

Schwartz v. Texas (1952)
344 U.S. 199 14

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) 2

Clear Air Amendments of 1970

42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. 16
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) 4, 16
49 U.S.C. Chapter 20 16, 17

Federal Aviation Act

49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. 8

49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 15
Noise Control Act of 1972

49 U.S.C. § 1431 17
49 U.S.C. § 1506 2, 4, 8, 16, 17

Statutes Page
Airport and Airway Development
Act of 1970
49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 -16

Constitution

United States Constitution

Article VI, Clause 2 4
Regulations
se C.F RR. § 36.5 4, 10
vi

POF ME FIRS OS TE oe

f
:
'

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1977

No.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, and
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE

Petitioners Roger A. Britt, et al.,
(hereafter Homeowners) respectfully pray
that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the decision of the California Court of
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Divi-
sion One, in the case at bench and, upon
such review, a decision issue which makes
it clear that "federal pre-emption" of
airspace management does not bar state
court suits for damages by neighbors of
airports against airport operators.

1.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the California Court of
Appeal presented for review by this peti-
tion is reported as San Diego Unified
Port Dist. v. Superior Court (1977) 67
Cal.App.3d 361, 136 Cal.Rptr. 557. A
copy of the opinion is attached hereto as

an Appendix.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the California Court
of Appeal sought to be reviewed was filed
and entered on February 18, 1977. A
timely Petition for Rehearing was denied
by that Court on March 15, 1977. A
timely Petition for Hearing in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was denied (after
the Court extended its time to consider
the Petition) on April 28, 1977.

This Court's jurisdiction is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).

Questions Presented for Review

1. Assuming arguendo that Congress in-

tended to preempt local regulation of
commercial aviation, does the "saving
clause" contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1506

2.

ee oe te 2 So oe oe en

Or" eg NL ePyeeD ot eel ee

. ay PhP

permit private citizens to maintain com-
mon law tort actions in state courts for
the adverse consequences of the regulated

activity?

2. In light of the consistent - and
recent - expressions by the FAA as well
as the Federal judiciary, that airport
operators have power to control the use
of their airports in order to prevent the
infliction of jet noise injuries on neigh-
boring people and properties, is it con-
trary to Federal law for a state court to
deprive airport neighbors of the right to
sue an airport on common law tort causes
of action on the ground that

@ local regulation is prohibited;

@e an award of damages is the same

as regulation;

@ therefore an award of damages is
prohibited?

3. Are damage actions brought due to
jet aircraft noise around airports (where
the aircraft, operating conditions, geo-
graphical conditions, etc. are different
for each airport) on tort theories based

on failure of the airport operator to

3.

take steps to protect airport neighbors

from the noise, more appropriately
brought against the individual airport
operators (who each have the authority

to determine where the airport is located
and what kind of aircraft are permitted
to use it) in state courts, rather than
against the United States (on the theory
that the entire field has been "federally
pre-empted" and any fault therefore
resides in the United States) in U.S,

District Courts?

Constitutional, Statutory and
Regulatory Provisions

The following constitutional, statu-
tory and regulatory provisions are
involved in this Petition. Each is repro-
duced in full in Appendix "B" attached
hereto:

United States Constitution, Article VI,
Clause 2;

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) ;
49 U.S.C. § 1506;

14 C.F.R. § 36.5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by more than
260 families (more than 900 people) to
recover damages from the San Diego Uni-
fied Port District (the operator of
Lindbergh Field in San Diego, California)
for damage to person and property cased
by the noise, fumes, smoke and vibrations
created by jet aircraft operating to and
from Lindbergh Field.

The Homeowners seek damages to their
property and their person on the follow-

ing legal theories:

@ inverse condemnation;
® nuisance;

@ negligence;

® trespass;

@ operating without a valid permit
from the California Department of

Aeronautics;

® breach of grant agreements with the
FAA which require protection of the

interests of airport neighbors as a

.-

pre-condition to obtaining Federal s In a capsule, the Court of Appeal held:

funds (see City of Inglewood v.
City of Los Angeles [9th Cir. 1971]
451 F.2d 948).

@® the Federal government has

preempted all control of
aircraft; and

The Port District demurred to the
@® as a consequence, the Port

counts sounding in nuisance, negligence,
; District (as airport operator)
trespass, and operating without a valid
state airport permit. The ground of the
demurrer was that "federal pre-emption"

somehow immunized the Port District from @ since the Port District can-

has no control over aircraft;
and therefore,

the consequences of any of its actions. not control the source of

The Superior Court overruled the the noise (i.e., the air-

demurrer. craft), it cannot be liable

1° in tort for the noise pro-

Thereafter, the Port District sought
duced by aircraft beyond the

an extraordinary writ, commanding the

Superior Court to sustain the demurrers. , TORS Sere e es

Although the Court of Appeal purported | This holding is contrary to Federal
to deny the issuance of a peremptory writ statutory and case law, as well as the
(67 Cal.App.3d at 378), it instructed most recent expressions of the FAA as to
the trial court not to permit the recov- the power of local airport operators to
ery of any tort damages based on noise, control aircraft which use their facili-
fumes, vibrations and soot created by ties.
aircraft in flight. That instruction is
legally erroneous (as discussed hereafter)
and is tantamount to the issuance of a
writ.

Ve

inn ee.

REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT

INTRODUCTION

First. Assuming, arguendo, that the
Federal Government has preempted the
regulation of aircraft in flight, Con-
gress EXPRESSLY stated that common law
suits for damages are permitted.

The Homeowners have not asked the
Superior Court to issue any orders to
the Port District to control its method
of operations. While such action might
be appropriate, all that is sought is
money damages. Nonetheless, the Court
of Appeal concluded that:

e local regulation is prohibited;

e an award of damages is the same

as regulation;

e therefore an award of damages is

prohibited.

The Court of Appeal is wrong.

When Congress passed the Federal Avia-
tion Act (49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.), it
included the following (49 U.S.C. § 1506):

[ —-—— uo © «+
‘
.

-

"Nothing contained in this chap-
ter shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing
at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this chapter

are in addition to such remedies."

Thus, even if Congress intended to pre-
empt regulation, it also intended to per-

mit actions for damages for the adverse

consequences of the regulated activity.

Second. The Federal Government did

NOT intend to completely preempt the

field of aircraft regulation so as to pre-

vent airport proprietors from controlling

the noise nuisances created by aircraft

using their facilities.

The United States government has
repeatedly taken the position that the
proprietor of an airport - such as the

Port District at bench - has the power
to regulate the use of its airport in
order to protect its neighbors from jet
aircraft nuisances. Indeed, the airport

proprietor has the ultimate control: the

power to decide whether specific types of

9.

aircraft may operate from its airport
(see 14 C.F.R. § 36.5).

The most recent expression of this
position was on November 18, 1976, ina
document issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration, entitled Aviation Noise
Abatement Policy. There, the FAA states:

"Our concept of the legal frame-
work underlying this policy state-
ment is that proprietors retain
the flexibility to impose such
restrictions if they do not vio-
late any Constitutional proscrip-
tion. We have been urged to

undertake - and have considered

carefully and rejected - full

and complete federal preemption

of the field of aviation noise

abatement. In our judgment the

control and reduction of air-
port noise must remain a shared
responsibility among airport
proprietors, users, and govern-
ments." (p. 34; emphasis added.)

10.

+
>

~~

"The primary obligation to address
the airport noise problem always
has been and remains a local
responsibility." (p. 2)

Thus, in light of the FAA's recent,
explicit comment that it has ". .. con-
sidered carefully and rejected - full and
complete federal preemption of the field
of aviation noise abatement ...", it is
hard to understand how the Court of
Appeal could characterize as "correct"
(67 Cal.App.3d at 369) the conclusion

that:

". . . federal preemption of the
field of airport noise regulation
leaves no room for local controls
-- including civil tort actions

for money damages." (67 Cal.App.3d
at 368)

Third. The decision conflicts with

earlier decisions of federal courts on an

issue of federal law.

Federal courts have recently and
repeatedly held that an airport operator

has power to regulate aircraft to

ll.

control noise (Air Transport Assn. v.
Crotti [N.D. Cal. 1975] 389 F.Supp. 58,
63-64 [three judge District Court];
National Aviation v. City of Hayward
([N.D. Cal. 1976] 418 F.Supp. 417, 424;
British Airways Board and Compagnie

Nationale Air France v. Port Authority
of New York & New Jersey [2d Cir. 1977]
Docket no. 77-7237).

The Court of Appeal expressly chose

to disregard these holdings of Federal
courts on issues of Federal law (67 Cal.
App.3d at 368, 374).2/

Finally. The decision of the Court of

Appeal conflicts with the clear policy of

this Court that the airport operator is

responsible for injuries inflicted on

airport neighbors by airport users.

2/ Air Transport and National Aviation

~ were expressly considered and disre-
garded by the Court of Appeal. British
Airways Board, the most recent expression
of this rule by a Federal Court, was de-
cided after the Court of Appeal's deci-
sion herein.

12.

This policy was announced in 1962 in
Griggs v. Allegheny County (1962) 369
U.S. 84. The Court made it plain that
since it is the individual airport opera-

tor that decides where its airport is to
be located, how much land is to be
acquired for buffer zones and what type
of aircraft service is desired, the air-
port operator is liable for injuries
inflicted on neighbors. This Court had
before it in Griggs all potentially
liable defendants, the airport operator,
the airlines and the United States.
This Court held that liability for
damages caused by aircraft flight rested
with the airport operator.

13.

1

FEDERAL STATUTES EXPRESSLY AUTH-

ORIZE THE TYPE OF COMMON LAW

ACTIONS FORECLOSED BY THE COURT
OF APPEAL

The Court of Appeal's conclusion that
tort actions for damages are somehow
"federally pre-empted" is puzzling. It
is all the more so when the argument is
viewed in light of the very statutes to
which the Port District and the Court of
Appeal attribute this "pre-emptive"
effect.

A study of these statutes is funda-
mental to determine congressional intent.
This Court has repeatedly held that pre-
emption rests on Congressional intent to
preempt. For example, in Schwartz v.
Texas (1952) 344 U.S. 199, 202, 203, the
Court stated:

"If Congress is authorized to
act ina field, it should manifest
its intention clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal
statute was intended to supersede
the exercise of the power of the

14.

state unless there is a clear man-

ifestation of intention to do so.

The exercise of federal supremacy
is not lightly to be presumed.

"The principle thus appli-
cable has been frequently stated.
It is that the Congress may cir-

cumscribe its regulation and
occupy a limited field, and that

the intention to supersede the
exercise by the State of its
authority as to matters not
covered by the federal legisla-
tion is not to be implied unless
the Act of Congress fairly inter-
preted is in conflict with the
law of the State. [citations]"
(Emphasis added.)

Well, then, what's the situation at
bench? Did Congress intend a total pre-
emption? Or, was its goa. more limited?

Congress has enacted four groups of
statutes regulating the field of aviation.

Each of them permits damage actions.

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 is the most pervasive.

15.

It occupies chapter 20 of Title 49 of the
United States Code, and governs the CAB
as well as the FAA, and economic as well
as safety and noise regulation of civil
aviation.

Notwithstanding this extensive regu-
lation, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 expressly permits

common law suits such as those at bench:

"Nothing contained in this
chapter shall in any way abridge
or alter the remedies now exist-
ing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this chap-
ter are in addition to such reme-
dies."

The Airport and Airway Development
Act of 1970 (49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742) has
been held expressly enforceable by air-
port neighbors in suits against airport
operators. City of Inglewood v. City of
Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1971) 451 F.2d 948,
955-956.

The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., also expressly
permits suits by private citizens, in
§ 1857h-2(e):

16.

;

"Nothing in this section shall
restrict any right which any per-
son (or class of persons) may
have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any
emission standard or limitation
or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency)."

The Noise Control Act of 1972, 49
U.S.C. § 1431, is codified as part of
chapter 20 of Title 49 U.S.C. it is thus
subject to 49 U.S.C. § 1506 quoted above.

Indeed, this Court recently confirmed
the propriety of private, common law
actions in areas subject to exclusive
federal (CAB) regulation. See Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. (1976) 426 U.S.
290, 298-300.

Thus, assuming arguendo that Congress

had an intent that local regulation be

"pre-empted", private actions for damages

are permitted for any adverse consequences

of the regulated activity.

This Court recently dealt with a sim-
ilar problem (also arising in California)

17.

under the National Labor Relations Act.
In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Car-
penters (1977) _—_—>U«.S. __,:~- S51 L.Ed.2d
338, this Court vacated the judgment of

a California Court of Appeal and held that

the National Labor Relations Act did not
preempt the right of a union member to
sue a union for tort in state court. In
upholding the individual's right to main-
tain common law, state court suits ina
Federally regulated area, this Court em-
phasized the state's interest in protect-
ing its citizens from tortious injury,
and the concurrent lack of Federal inter-
est in protecting tortious conduct (___
U.S. at _, 51 L.Ed.2d at 349-352).

The same is true here. California
has a legitimate interest in protecting
its citizens from tortious injury in-
flicted by jet noise. Likewise, though
Congress has sought to foster aviation,
it does not condone nor require operation
of jet aircraft in such a manner or loca-
tion that injury is inflicted on airport
neighbors. Quite the contrary. As dis-
cussed hereafter, the position of the
Federal government has been consistent
and clear: it is the responsibility of

18.

ee ——

each airport operator to ensure that its
airport is operated under such regula-
tions as will avoid injury to nearby
people and property - even if that means
excluding noisy aircraft.

As this Court expressed it in Florida
Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
(1963) 373 U.S. 132, 146-147:

» « « we are not to conclude

that Congress legislated the
ouster of this California stat-
ute by the marketing orders in

the absence of an unambiguous con-
gressional mandate to that effect.
We search in vain for such a
mandate."

The same is true in the case at bench.
One would indeed ". . . search in vain for
+ « « @ Mandate” that common law tort ac-
tions are barred by "federal pre-emption".
The search would be as futile as Ponce de
Leon's quest for the "fountain of youth",

because Congress expressly said the con-

trary: common law actions are permitted.

19.

2

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESS-

LY REJECTED THE COURT OF APPEAL'S

IDEA THAT, ". . . FEDERAL PREEMP-

TION OF THE FIELD OF AIRPORT NOISE

REGULATION LEAVES NO ROOM FOR LOCAL

CONTROLS . . ." (67 Cal.App.3d at
368)

The Court of Appeal's conclusion that
the FAA has preemptive power to issue
regulations to control jet noise is ex-
pressly disavowed by the FAA itself. In
fact, the FAA says that significant auth-
ority and responsibility properly and
necessarily remain with the airport oper-
ator. Since preemption cannot exist
without an intent to preempt, the FAA's
views are important. (See San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon [1959] 359 U.S.
236, 243, 247.)

The views of the Federal government
are most recently expressed in a document
issued by the FAA on November 18, 1976,
entitled Aviation Noise Abatement Policy.

The Aviation Noise Abatement Policy
makes it clear that the FAA does not
believe it has the preemptive power at-

tributed to it by the Court of Appeal,
20.

or that the State of California (operat-
ing through the Port District) is impo-
tent to issue regulations to control jet
noise for the protection of Californians.
The following passages from the FAA
policy statement are revealing:

"Our concept of the legal frame-
work underlying this policy
statement is that proprietors
retain the flexibility to impose
such restrictions if they do not
violate any Constitutional pro-
scription. We have been urged
to undertake - and have con-
sidered carefully and rejected -

full and complete federal pre-

emption of the field of aviation

noise abatement. In our judg-

ment the control and reduction
of airport noise must remain a
shared responsibility among air-
port proprietors, users, and
governments." (p. 34, emphasis
added. )

"The primary obligation to address
the airport noise problem always
has been and remains a local re-
sponsibility." (p. 2)

21.

Thus, in light of the FAA's recent,
explicit comment that it has ". . . con-
sidered carefully and rejected - full and
complete federal preemption of the field
of aviation noise abatement .. ." (Policy
Statement, p. 34), it causes wonder as to
how the Court of Appeal could character-
ize as "correct" (67 Cal.App.3d at 369)
the conclusion that:

". . . federal preemption of the
field of airport noise regulation
leave no room for local controls

-- including civil tort actions

for money damages." (67 Cal.App.3d
at 368)

There are sound policy reasons for
the FAA's rejection of total preemption.
These are discussed in the FAA policy
statement (p. 50):

"The Airport Proprietor's Respons-
ibility

"Substantial benefits will be
achieved through federal actions
to abate source noise and control
operational flight procedure and
airspace, but much of the noise

22.

problem is airport-specific and
must be addressed by individual
proprietors. Noise impact at

any airport is in part due to
local decisions on airport loca-

tion, continuation of airport

operations on a particular site,

the layout and size of an air-

port and the purchase of buffer

areas for noise abatement pur-
poses. It is local decision-
making that permits residential
development near an airport.
For these reasons, the Supreme
Court concluded that proprie-
tors are liable for aircraft
noise damages. In addition,

airport proprietors, particu-

larly those that are public

agencies, generally encourage

more service to their airports

in Civil Aeronautics Board

route proceedings.
* * *

"The airport proprietor is closest
to the noise problem, with the
best understanding of both con-

ditions, needs and desires, and
23.

the requirements of the air car-
riers and others that use his
airport. The proprietor must

weigh the costs the airport and

the community must pay for failure

to act, and consider those costs

against any economic penalties

that may result from a decision

to limit the use of the airport
through curfews or other restric-
tions for noise abatement pur-
poses." (Emphasis added.)

The injuries alleged in the complaint
(though obviously caused by noise emitted
[in part] by jet aircraft in flight) are
the result of the failure by the Port
District to face its responsibilities.
While the FAA retains control of aircraft
in flight, the injuries inflicted on the
Homeowners are the result of what the FAA
referred to as “airport-specific" problems.
In fact, the “airport-specific” problems
noted above by the FAA are all involved
at bench.

® curfew;

@ airport location;

24,

i
x
¥

e continuation of airport opera-
tions on a particular site;

e the layout and size of the air-
port; and

e the [non-] purchase of buffer
areas.

If - as the FAA concludes - the Port
District has the power to act, why should
the Court of Appeal immunize the Port
District from the consequences of its
failure to act?

The consequences of permitting the
precedent to stand will be widespread.
Airport neighbors, seeking recompense for
airport noise damage, will go to the
Federal courts - as they will be the only

courts which can give damages for injury
to person as well as property. There are
thousands of such cases pending in Cali-
fornia courts now. And others across the
Nation. Their shift to Federal courts
will not serve the ends of justice. The
financial consequences for airport opera-
tors’ mismanagement of their airports

will fall on the United States. It hardly

seems to require argument to point out
25.

the psychological effect on airport oper- ee This conclusion conforms to the FAA's

ators if the financial consequence of rejection of total federal preemption.

their indifference to airport noise is Note particularly that airport operators

borne by someone else. Too little atten- May restrict airport use even though the

tion is already paid to the plight of air- restrictions may discriminate against

port neighbors under the existing liabil- some airport users and interfere with

ity burden. interstate and foreign commerce, so long

The kind of control which the FAA as the discrimination is not “unjust",

believes that airport proprietors have and the interference with commerce is not

. . . . " "
is likewise revealing: unreasonable".

"Airport Proprietors are primar- Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeal's

ily responsible for planning and conclusion, the FAA believes that ". ..
the reasonableness of the operation of
airports . . ." (67 Cal.App.3d at 369) is

subject to examination. How else could

implementing action designed to
reduce the effect of noise on

residents of the surrounding

area. Such actions include one determine whether discrimination is

optimal site location, improve- "unjust", or interference with commerce

. . . . ° Hy " "
ments in airport design, noise is “unreasonable”?

abatement ground procedures, land

acquisition, and restrictions on

airport use that do not unjustly

discriminate against any user,

In its most recent policy statement,

the FAA has forcefully and repeatedly
told airport operators, like the Port
District, that they not only have the

impede the federal interest in power to so act, but they must exercise

safety and management of the air that power. (See Policy Statement, pp.

navigation system, or unreasonably 5, 33, 34, 50, 47.)

interfere with interstate or foreign

In short, the very federal agency for

mmerce." Policy Statement ‘
vi ' d ‘ which the Court of Appeal says Congress

p. 5; emphasis added.) 27

26.

preempted the field, has expressly con-
cluded that:

Re
Be

Congress did no such thing; and

neither Congress nor the courts
should do so; because

"The primary obligation to address
the airport noise problem always
has been and remains a local
responsibility." (Policy State-
ment, p. 2)

"Our concept of the legal frame-
work underlying this policy state-
ment is that proprietors retain
the flexibility to impose such
restrictions if they do not
violate any Constitutional pro-
scription. We have been urged

to undertake - and have consid-

ered carefully and rejected -

full and complete federal pre-

emption of the field of aviation

noise abatement. In our judgment

the control and reduction of air-
port noise must remain a shared
responsibility among airport

28.

proprietors, users, and govern-
ments." (Policy Statement,
p. 34; emphasis added.)

3

THE COURT OF APPEAL MISREADS
FEDERAL AUTHORITY AND ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDES THAT THE PORT DISTRICT
(AS AIRPORT OPERATOR) HAS NO POWER
TO CONTROL THE NOXIOUS BY-PRODUCTS
OF THE JET AGE EMITTED BY THE PORT
DISTRICT'S TENANTS

The Court of Appeal adopted the Port
District's fervent argument that this
Court, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal (1973) 411 U.S. 624, held that
airport operators can exert no control

over jet noise.
This Court held no such thing.

In Burbank, the municipality which

sought to regulate the airport was not
the airport operator. All that was de-
cided in Burbank was that municipalities

cannot use their police powers to regu-
late airports which they do not operate.

The power of an airport operator - as

29.

landlora2/ - to control what goes on at

its own airport was expressly not decided:

". . . But, we are concerned
here not with an ordinance imposed
by the City of Burbank as 'pro-
prietor' of the airport, but with
the exercise of police power.
While the Hollywood-Burbank Air-
port may be the only major air-
port which is privately owned,
many airports are owned by one
municipality yet physically
located in another. For example,
the principal airport serving
Cincinnati is located in Kentucky.
Thus, authority that a munici-
pality may have as a landlord is
not necessarily congruent with
its police power. We do not con-
sider here what limits, if any,

apply to a municipality as a

2/ The conventional tool airport pro-
prietors use to control noise is
their lease to the airline users. By
agreement, the airline is limited as to
hours, Class of aircraft, number of
flights, etc.
30.

proprietor." (City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal [1973]
411 U.S. 624, 636, fn. 14.)

The problem with the Court of
Appeal's analysis in this case, is that
it confuses two separate (but peacefully
co-existing) lines of federal authority.
One line deals with the power of airport
proprietors. The other deals with the
power (or more properly, lack of power)
of local governments in or near which

airports are located, but which are not
the airport proprietor.

Burbank is simply the latest ina

line of cases initiated by the Cedarhurst,

Hempstead and Audubon Park litigation,2/

in which the courts have consistently
held that a government agency other than

the airport operator has no power to

3/ Allegheny Airlines v. Village of
Cedarhurst (E.D.N.Y. 1955) 132 F.
Supp. 871, aff'd (2d Cir. 1956) 238 F.2d

812; American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of
Hempstead (E.D.N.Y. 1967) 272 F. Supp.
226, aff'd (2d Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 369;
American can Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audu-
n Park (W.D. Ky. 1968) 297 F. Su 207,
aff'd (6th Cir. 1969) 407 F.2d "1306,

31.

issue regulations dealing with aircraft

control the use of the airport
noise. , .
1s a necessary concomitant,

On the other hand, no court - before whether it be directed by state

I
:
{

the opinion brought to this Court for police power or his own initia-

review - has ever held that an airport tive. . . . That correlating
operator itself lacked the power to so right of proprietorship control
regulate. Quite the contrary. See, e.g., is recognized and exempted from
Port of New York Authority v. Eastern judicially declared preemption
Airlines, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1966) 259 F. by footnote 14." (Emphasis
Supp. 745; Burbank, supra, 41l U.S. at added; footnote omitted.)

636, fn. 14; National Aviation v. City of
Hayward (N.D. Cal. 1976) 418 F. Supp. 417;
Air Transport Assn. v. Crotti (N.D. Cal.
1975) 389 F. Supp. 58, 63-64 (three judge
District Court); British Airways Board

The most recent expression occurred

in the Concorde case (British Airways

Board, supra), where the Court of Appeals
rejected the notion that the Port Auth-
ority of New York and New Jersey lacked

and Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
(2d Cir. 1977) Docket No. 77-7237.

the power to establish the conditions and

regulations under which the Concorde
might be allowed to use its airport
This consistent position of the Fed- Seat Riches
eral judiciary was perhaps best summed
up by the three judge District Court in

Crotti, supra, 389 F. Supp. at 63-64:

"We need not tarry long over
the issue that heretofore has

occupied center stage in this

It is now firmly established litigation. We believe the

that the airport proprietor is grounds for Judge Pollack's

responsible for the consequences grant of summary judgment, that

which attend his operation of a Secretary Coleman's order pre-

public airport; his right to empted the conflicting exercise

32. fi 33.

of power by the Port Authority,

is simply untenable and erroneous.

Accordingly, we will reverse.

"In response to our request,

the United States filed an amicus

brief in which it urged that
Secretary Coleman's order was
never intended to deprive the
Port Authority of the right to
condition utilization of the
facilities at JFK on the Con-
corde's compliance with reason-
able noise regulations. The
Government, indeed, went further,

and denied that existing legis-

lation authorized the Executive

under any circumstances to pre-

empt airport proprietors from

promulgating their own noise

regulations.

"This conclusive statement of
the United States position con-
firms our independent assessment
of the public record." (slip
opinion, p. 12; emphasis added.)

34.

Neither Congress nor the Federal
judiciary intended to bar airport owner-
operators from regulating their own air-
ports.

Quite the contrary.

The Port District's misreading of the
federal authorities has caused much grief
for the neighbors of Lindbergh Field, as
the Port District has for many years re-
fused to take action to protect them. If
the Port District's lawyers have told
their client what they tell the courts,
it then becomes understandable why the
Port District has seemed so arrogant in
its indifference to its neighbors' plight.

Sadly, the Court of Appeal has now
put into mischief-making precedent this

erroneous, self-abnegating reasoning.

It is time the Port District ceased
its self-imposed regulatory celibacy and
acted to abate the problems. That would
be a constuctive way to rid itself of the
prospect of litigation such as this,
rather than putting its resources toward
efforts to muddy the law, such as the one
presented to this Court.

35.

CONCLUSION

With respect, the premise of the
Court of Appeal (i.e. that awarding dam-
ages is tantamount to regulation, and
regulation is "federally preempted") is
doubly flawed:

first, as the FAA recently noted,
the field of regulation is not

preempted; and

second, regardless of regulatory

preemption, Congress expressed
its intent that common law actions
be allowed to proceed.

WHEREFORE, the Homeowners pray that
a writ of certiorari issue, so that all
are made aware of who is responsible for
evolving a solution to jet noise problems.

Respectfully submitted,

JERROLD A. FADEM
MICHAEL M. BERGER
of FADEM, BERGER, MCINTIRE

& NORTON
A Professional Corporation

By: MICHAEL M. BERGER

Attorneys for Petitioners

36.

APPENDIX A

A Oe RN ae a

er

.
re ~~ wee ee ee

'

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA

COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH
DIST. FILED FEB 18, 1977
ERVIN J. TUSZYNSKI, Clerk
R. J. Smith, Deputy Clerk

4 Civ. No. 16142
(Sup. Ct. No. 367963)
THE SAN DIEGO UNIFIED PORT DISTRICT, et al,
Petitioners,
Vv.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,

Respondent.

ROGER A. BRITT, et al,
and
EVERETT SINCLAIR BANKS, et al.

Real Parties in Interest.

PROCEEDING in prohibition/mandate.
Order to show cause discharged. Petition
for peremptory writ denied.

Luce, Forward, Hami'ton & Scripps, by
Louis E. Goebel, Michael S. Gatzke, Ronald
W. Rouse and Walter J. Cummings, III, for

Petitioners.
-l-

No appearance for Respondent,

Fadem, Berger, McIntire & Norton, by
Michael M. Berger and Patsy Mumiston Car
Carter, for Real Parties in Interest.

INTRODUCTION

A group of homeowner-plaintiffs
(Britt) tis seeking damages on various
theories from the San Diego Unified Port
District (Port District), the operator is
San Diego International Airport (Lind-

bergh Field). Before this Court, the par-

ties are engaged in two theaters of liti-
gation. This proceeding (4 Civ. No.
16142) is a challenge to an order over-
ruling a general demurrer to causes of
action in nuisance, negligence, trespass
and failure to obtain a state operating
permit. The other proceeding (4 Civ. No.

FOOTNOTE 1: Plaintiffs are 936 individ-
uals and one church. They
brought two actions, Britt, et al, v.
San Diego Unified Port Dist., San Diego
Superior Court No. 367963, and Banks, et
al, v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., San
Diego Superior Court No. 379755, which
were consolidated by the superior court.

;
:
:
7
—

16053), retransferred to this Court by
the Supreme Court for hearing, challenges
on First Amendment grounds the denial of
an order protecting Britt from discovery.
Except for the possibility the sustain-
ing of demurrers to the tort causes of
action might render moot the discovery
question, the two proceedings are unre-
lated.

THE ACTION

Plaintiffs allege in Count 1 the op-
eration of Lindbergh Field by the Port
District has so interfered with their
ownership rights as to constitute a take
ing of their property for public use
within the meaning of the Federal and
State Constitutions. They claim such
interference, usually referred to as in-
verse condemnation, entitles them to just
compensation. The Port District does not
contest the overruling of its demurrer to
this count, accepting for the purposes of
these proceedings that if a taking has
occurred the Port District is the

responsible entity.”

In addition, plaintiffs seek recovery
for both property damage and personal in-
jury on theories of nuisance (Counts 3
and 4), negligence (Counts 5 and 6),
trespass (Counts 7 and 8), and failure
of the Port District to obtain a proper
state operating permit (Counts 9 and 10).
The respondent court overruled a general
demurrer to these Counts (3 through 10)
and it is that action which is contested
in this petition by the Port District.
Other remaining Counts (13 and 14), for
breach of contractual obligations to a
third party beneficiary under contracts
between the Port District and the FAA,

are not at issue.

ISSUE

The issue presented is whether fed-
eral law in the field of aircraft noise
regulation preempts all state and local

FOOTNOTE 2: See Griggs v. County of Alle
Allegheny, Pennsylvania,

369 U.S. 34 [82 S. Ct. 531]. But see

Note, "Shifting Aircraft Noise Liability

to the Federal Government," 61 Va. L.

Rev. 1299.

age

{tary
a,

controls and therefore precludes civil
actions against airport operators based
upon common law or statutory causes of

action.

DISCUSSION

A. Propriety of reviewing the ques-

tion on petition for prerogative writ.

Only with "extreme reluctance" are
prerogative writs employed to afford in-
termediate review of rulings on pleadings
(Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 84l,

851).

""'In most .. . cases, as is true of
most other interim orders, the par-
ties must be relegated to a review
of the order on appeal from the
final judgment.'" (Id., quoting
Oceanside Union School Dist. v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 180, 185,
fn. 4.)

Nevertheless, in circumstances of a "grave
nature" or of "significant legal impact,"
appellate courts may be compelled to in-
tervene through the issuance of an extra-
ordinary writ (Babb v. Superior Court,

supra, 3 Cal.3d 841, 851).
The issue presented is a significant

question of law. If the respondent court
erroneously permitted tort causes of
-5-

action to be pursued, substantial discov-
ery and trial expenses are needlessly im-
posed on the Port District (directly) and
the public (indirectly). The difference
between the action as it stands, requir-
ing discovery of the medical histories

of hundreds of individual plaintiffs,

and the action as the Port District con-
tends it should stand, requiring "merely"
appraisal of about 200 parcels of prop-
erty, is spacious. In the memorandum of
points and authorities in opposition to
the petition, Britt argues only that the
respondent court correctly decided the
issue on its merits and nowhere suggests
review should be deferred until appeal
from Suhqnent< Pec these reasons our in-
tervention by issuance of an order to

show cause was justified.

B. Merits.
1. Contentions.

The Port District summarizes its

argument as follows:

FOOTNOTE 3: See 5 Witkin, Cal. Proc.2d
(1971), Extraordinary Writs,

§43, p. 3817.
-6-

OR rae

"1. Federal legislation and au-
thorized agency regulation in the
field of aircraft and airport
noise is so pervasive that it has
preempted all state and local con-
trols. City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal (1973) 411 U.S.
624, 638, 93 S.Ct. 1854 ....
The multitude of interrelated con-
siderations in this field permits
only a uniform and exclusive sys-
tem of Federal regulation. Id.,
411 U.S. at 639. al

"2. This preemption precludes not
only local regulation by legisla-
tive action, but regulation by
local judicial action as well. E.
$: Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee,

71 F.Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis.
1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 387, 390-
391.

"3. The tort counts (Counts 3-10)
of plaintiffs' complaint require
adjudication of the 'reasonableness'
of conduct in the operation of
Lindbergh Field. These counts re-
quire the respondent Court to adju-
dicate questions of whether or not
noise impact on plaintiffs resulting
from jet aircraft operations at
Lindbergh Field, if any, could be
reduced by changes in specific oper-
tional procedures.

"4. The awarding of money damages
is every bit as much a regulation
of conduct by a court as the exer-
cise of its equitable jurisdiction
to regulate by injunction. E.g.,

~

San Diego Blgd. Trades Council v.
Garmon (1959) 359 0-5. 236, 246-

247, 79 S.Ct. 773. . . . Indeed,
plaintiffs' request for money dama-
ges under the tort counts is merely
a back door approach to placing
airport operational procedures un-
der judicial direction.

"5. The inverse condemnation count
is not directly affected by this
federal preemption because:

"a. If there is judicial determi-
nation that the level of interfer-
ence with plaintiffs' properties
is sufficiently great to consti-
ture a ‘'taking' under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, (United
States v. Causby (1945) 328 U.S.
256, 66 S.Ct. 1062 .. .) they are
entitled to 'just compensation'
because Congressional or agency
action may not operate to deprive
citizens of constitutionai rights;
and,

"b. Inverse condemnation as a
legal theory of recovery does not
require adjudication of the con-
duct of airport operational pro-
cedures. Essentially, it only re-
quires findings of a substantial
interference with private property
for public purposes and a diminu-
tion in the market value of the
property."

Britt responds in essence the duty of

an airport proprietor, as land occupier,

=§-

to operate airport facilities nontor-
tiously is unaffected by cases recogniz-
ing federal preemption in the field of
noise regulation. Distinction is drawn

between the exercise of police power by a

municipality to control airport noise and
the exercise of proprietary power by the

owner-operator of an airport.

2. Discussion.
a. Federal Law.

The seminal case in the area of fed-
eral preemption of airport noise regula-
tion is City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 [93 S.Ct.

1854]. Both parties rely on this case in

support of their positions and claim it
disposes of the issue at bar.

In Burbank the owner-operator of the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport brought suit in
federal court against the City of Burbank

to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance

forbidding any pure jet aircraft from tak-
ing off from the airport getween 11 p.m.
of one day and 7 a.m. of the next, and
forbidding the airport operator from per-
mitting any such takeoffs. The District

=~

Court enjoined enforcement of the ordi-
nance, and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. In a five-to-
four decision, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding "FAA, now in con-
junction with EPA, has full control over
aircraft noise, pre-empting state and
local control." (Id. p. 633 [93 S.Ct.

p. 1859].)

The United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly left open what limits, if any,
apply to the exercise of proprietary
rights by a municipality which owns and
operates an airport. In a controversial
footnote the Court explained:

"The letter from the Secretary of
Transportation also expressed the
view that 'the proposed legisla-
tion will not affect the rights

of a State or local public agency,
as the proprietor of an airport,
from issuing regulations or estab-
lishing requirements as to the per-
missible level of noise which can

be created by aircraft using the
airport. Airport owners acting as
proprietors can presently deny the
use of their airports to aircraft

on the basis of noise considera-
tions so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory.' (Emphasis added.)
This portion as well was quoted with
approval in the Senate Report. Ibid.

-10-

=
oe
> om,

"Appellants and the Solicitor General
submit that this indicates that a munic-
ipality with jurisdiction over an air-
port has the power to impose a curfew on
the airport, notwithstanding federal re-
sponsibility in the area. But, we are
concerned here not with an ordinance im-
posed by the City of Burbank as 'proprie-
tor' of the airport, but with the exercise
of police power. While the Hollywood-
Burbank Airport may be the only major
airport which is privately owned, many
airports are owned by one municipality
yet physically located in another. For
example, the principal airport serving
Cincinnati is located in Kentucky. Thus,
authority that a municipality may have
as a landlord is not necessarily congru-
ent with its police power. We do not
consider here what limits, if any, apply
to a municipality as a proprietor." (Id.
p. 635, fn. 14 [93 S.Ct. p. 1861, fn. 14].)

Britt contends the Court in Burbank

expressly “acknowledged that the operator

of an airport does have the power to is-
sue regulations." Since this is so, the
conduct of the Port District as operator
of Lindbergh Field is not shielded by
federal preemption; its alleged impotence
to impose reasonable noise controls is
illusory, and it should be held responsi-
ble for its tortious conduct. Such an
interpretation of footnote 14 ignores
the rationale of the text of the opinion.
elie

A majority of the Supreme Court

reasoned in Burbank the interdevendence

of such concerns as safety, efficiency
and noise control “requires a uniform
and exclusive system of federal regula-
tion if the congressional objectives
underlying the Federal Aviation Act are
to be fulfilled." (Id. pp. 638-639 [93
S.Ct. p. 1862].) If a curfew interferes
with this perceived requirement of uni-
formity, it should make no difference
whether the curfew is imposed on the au-
thority of local police power or the
owner's proprietary power. The impact
of the curfew remains the same -- inter-
ference with flight schedules at other
airports and local flight congestion im-
mediately before and after the hours of

curfew.

Britt thus offers an anomaly: a mu-
nicipality or governmental agency may
impose noise regulations in its capacity
as airport proprietor which it could not
impose under its police power. Even
though the District Court for the Nor-
thern District of California has very

recently reached such a conclusion in

=12=

National Aviation v. City of Hayward, Cal.

418 F.Supp. 417, we doubt the Supreme
Court intended such a result.

The Burbank Court acknowledged "the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only
major airport which is privately owned."
(City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal
Inc., supra, 41l U.S. 624, 635, fn. 14
[93 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, ‘nm. 14].) The vast
majority of national airports are operated
by municipalities or governmental entities
such as the Port District. If the limita-

tion of footnote 14 is construed as Britt

suggests, local regulation by municipal
airport "proprietors" would not be pre-
empted by federal law, and "Burbank be-
comes a decision of nearly unique appli-
cation" (Warren, "Airport Noise Regula-
tion: Burbank, Aaron, and Air Transport,"
5 Environmental Affairs 97, 106, fn. 56).

"If the great bulk of airport noise cases

are not to be affected. ... the ratio-
nale of Burbank is defeated" (Id. p.
106).

The Port District focuses on the rea-

soning of the Burbank case. Counsel con-

tends federal preemption of the field of
o}) 3e

airport noise regulation leaves no room
for local controls -- including civil

tort actions for money damages. Relying
primarily upon San Diego Building Trades

Council, etc., v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
{79 S.Ct. 773], the Port District urges

the awarding of money damages is as much

a regulation of conduct as an injunction

or legislative activity. In San Diego

Building Trades Council, the United States

Supreme Court stated:

"Our concern is with delimiting
areas of conduct which must be free
from state regulation if national
policy is to be left unhampered.

Such regulation can be as effectively

exerted through an award of damages
as through some form of preventive
relief. The obligation to pay com-
pensation can be, indeed is designed
to be, a potent method of governing
conduct and controlling policy.

Even the States' salutary effort to
redress private wrongs or grant com-
pensation for past harm cannot be
exerted to regulate activities that
are potentially subject to the ex-
clusive federal regulatory scheme."
(Id. pp. 246-247 [79 S.Ct. 780].)

The Port District urges if money damages
were to be awarded in this action, it
would be punished for conduct which is

=yY=

essentially within federal jurisdiction.
If juries in 50 states are permitted to
assess the reasonableness of the opera-
tion of airports, it would be impossible
to attain a national uniform scheme of
airport noise regulation. This conclu-
sion seems correct.

The Port District adamantly urges
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521] F.2d
387, is indistinguishable from this ac-

tion. In that post-Burbank case, prop-

erty owners were suing the County of
Milwaukee, as owner and operator of Gen-

eral Mitchell Field, the major Milwaukee
airport, and five federally certified
airlines which utilized the airport fa-
cilities. The plaintiffs charged that
aircraft, in taking off and landing at
Mitchell Field, flew over their property
at low altitudes, causing noise, vibra-
tion, fumes and the dropping of dust and
noxious substances on their property.
The plaintiffs claimed the defendants
deprived them of their property without
just compensation in violation of the
Constitution. In addition, they claimed
the defendants created a nuisance in
violation o: state law.

-15-

"As relief, the plaintiffs [sought]
actual and punitive damages, a man-
datory injunction directing the
County to initiate condemnation
proceedings against their property,
and a promulgation, by the district
court, of rules and regulations to
govern the aircraft and airport
operations at Mitchell Field." (Id.
p. 389.)

The District Court granted defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the complaint.
On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged the right of the plaintiffs to
seek inverse condemnation damages, but
rejected their claims for injunctive
relief and tort damages. The Court

stated:

"The district court properly held
that relief in the form of judicially-
made rules and regulations to govern
the airport and airline operations

at Mitchell Field was not available
to the plaintiffs. In City of Bur-
bank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.
Ed.2d 547 (1973), the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), in conjunction
with the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), ‘has full control over
aircraft noise, pre-empting state
and local control.' 411 U.S. at 633,
93 S.Ct. at 1859. ‘'[T]he pervasive

-16-

control vested in EPA and in FAA
under the [Noise Control Act of
1972] leave[s] no room for local
curfews or other local controls.'
411 U.S. at 638, 93 S.Ct. at 1862.
The Court has similarly noted that
in the area of aircraft emissions,
Congress ‘has also pre-empted the
field.' Washington v. General
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114,

92 S.Ct. i396, 31 L.Ed.2d 727 (1972).
See Virginians for Dulles and Volpe
344 F.Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972).
As the court below recognized, it is
irrelevant that the plaintiffs here
are asking a federal district court,
rather than a state body, to promul-
gate the rules governing Mitchell
Field. The rules and regulations
which the plaintiffs seek would,
nonetheless, result in the type of
local control which the Supreme
Court in Burbank found to be invalid.

"The remainder of the plaintiffs'
claims charge both defendants with
common law nuisance and negligence
and violation of § 114.04 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, which makes it
unlawful, inter alia, for an air-
craft to fly ‘at such a low altitude
as to interfere with the then exist-
ing use to which the land or water,
or the space over the land or water,
is put by the owner.' These claims
are apparently based on pendent
jurisdiction. The district court
held that even if it were to con-
sider these allegations, see United

“17

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725-726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d
218 (1966), the plaintiffs' action
on these counts could not be main-
tained. We agree.

"Since the federal laws and regula-
tions have preempted local control
of aircraft flights, Burbank, supra,
the defendants may not, to the ex-
tent they comply with such federal
laws and regulations, be charged
with negligence or creating a nui-
sance. Similarly, § 114.04 of the
Wisconsin Statutes cannot be invoked
to make unlawful flights which are
in accordance with federal laws and
regulations. If, as the plaintiffs
allege, the aircraft flights have
resulted in the 'taking' of their
property, the plaintiffs have actions
at law to recover just compensation
from the County. Griggs, supra;

- « « - To the extent that the
County may be violating the federal
laws or regulations, the plaintiffs
should, as explained. .. , exhaust
their administrative remedies."
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521
F.2d 387, 390-391.)

Since the tort causes of action were dis-
missed against the County of Milwaukee,
as owner and operator of General Mitchell
Field, as well as against the airline
defendants, the case is factually on
point. Britt's attempt to distinguish
Luedtke is disingenuous.

oie

Sak 2 il aay

The Port District correctly points
out a decision of a lower federal court
on a federal question, though not bind-
ing, is "persuasive and entitled to
great weight" (People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.
3d 80, 86; see also 16 Cal.Jur.3d,
Courts, §157, p. 288). The persuasive-

ness of the Luedtke decision is some-

what diminished, however, by the Court's
use of the Burbank case to dismiss

causes of action against two different
types of defendants, the airport oper-
ator and the airlines, without distinc-
tion. In fact, the Burbank case in-

volved an attempted exercise of police
power by a nonproprietary city, and the
Supreme Court expressly declined to con-
sider what controls might be imposed by

the owner-operator of an airport.

Two other recent federal decisions,
Air Transport Association of America v.
Crotti, 389 F.Supp. 58, and National
Aviation v. City of Hayward, Cal., supra,
418 F.Supp. 417, bear on the issue of

preemption. In Crotti an association
of air carriers sued the managing offi-
cials of major California airports

-19-

seeking a declaratory judgment that state
noise regulations adopted pursuant to
the state Public Utilities Code were
invalid. The challenged regulations
were of two types: (1) Community Noise
Equivalent Level (CNEL) standards, which
prescribed for continued operation of
airports with monitoring requirements
aimed at achieving a future maximum
noise level, and (2) Single Event Noise
Exposure Level (SENEL) standards, which
were prohibitions applied to the insep-
arable feature of noise generated by an
aircraft engaged in flight.

The Association's position narrowed
"to the simple contention that any con-
trol and regulation of the levels of
noise generated by aircraft in direct
flight is preempted by the federal gov-
ernment" (Air Transport Association of
America v. Crotti, supra, 389 F.Supp. 58,
62), and the CNEL standards and related

monitoring requirements and SNEL prohi-
bitions were therefore void.

The District Court found this argu-

ment to be overbroad:

-20.

vay

"We believe that the Airlines' total
reliance upon Burbank is misplaced.
The factual picture supporting Bur-
bank is of narrow focus, a single
police power ordinance of a munici-
pality -- not an airport proprietor
-- intending to abate aircraft noise
by forbidding aircraft flight at cer-
tain night hours. The holding in
Burbank is limited to that proscrip-
tion as constituting an unlawful
exercise of police power in a field
pre-empted by the federal government,
and we take as gospel the words in
footnote 14 in Burbank: ‘' [A]uthority
that a municipality may have as a
landlord is not necessarily congruent
with its police power. We do not
consider here what limits, if any,
apply to a municipality as a propri-
etor.' (Emphasis supplied.)

"It is now firmly established that
the airport proprietor is responsi-
ble for the consequences which at-
tend his operation of a public air-
port; his right to control the use
of the airport is a necessary con-
comitant, whether it be directed by
state police power or his own initi-
ative." (Id. pp. 63-64.)

The Court then concluded the CNEL
monitoring procedures, which were "a
passive function" "innocuous to aircraft
traffic" and not in direct conflict with
federal regulations, were not affected
by the Burbank case. The Court ruled.

a2ie

"The State dictated employment of
shielding and ground level facility
configurations, as well as develop-
ment of compatible land uses under
the provisions of CNEL, is so patent-
ly within local police power control
and beyond the intent of Congress in
the federal legislation that further
discussion would be wasteful." (Id.
p. 65.)

not on whether police or proprietary
power was being exercised, but rather on
the activity regulated. The CNEL regu-
lations, which dealt with ground noise
level management through land use plan-
ning, were not preempted; the SENEL regu-
lations, which sanctioned the noise levels
However the Court held: of aircraft themselves, were preempted.

“The SENEL provisions and regula- Airport land and facilities use (proprie-
tions are not so favored. We are
satisfied and conclude that the
SENEL provisions and regulations
of noise levels which occur when
an aircraft is in direct flight,
and for the levying of criminal
fines for violation, are a per se

tary functions) were subject to local
regulation, but noise emanating from air-
craft in flight (federally regulated)

was not.

unlawful exercise of police power
into the exclusive federal domain
of control over aircraft flights

and operation, and air space man-
agement and utilization in inter-

In National Aviation v. City of Hay-

ward, Cal., supra, 418 F.Supp. 417, four

related commercial airlines sought to
have a City of Hayward ordinance declared

state and foreign commerce. The :
thrust of the alenka Event Noise unconstitutional. The challenged ordi-

Exposure Levels is clear and direct
and collides head-on with the fed-
eral regulatory scheme for air-
craft flights delineated by and
central to the Burbank decision."
(Id. p. 65.)

nance, expressly enacted pursuant to the
City's authority as owner, operator and
proprietor of its local airport, prohibi-
ted all aircraft in excess of a fixed

decibel level from landing or taking off
from the Hayward Air Terminal between the
hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. The
District Court defined its task at the

This application of the "proprietor
exception" of the Burbank case achieves

some accomodation between state and
federal interests. The Court focused outset:

-22- -23-

"(T]he Burbank court's finding of
preemption was made only with regard
to a nonproprietor municipality's
attempt to regulate aircraft noise
pursuant to its police power. Indeed,
in footnote 14 of the majority opin-
ion, Mr. Justice Douglas expressly
acknowledges that the court 'do[es]
not consider here what limits, if
any, apply to a municipality as a
proprietor.' 411 U.S. at 635-36 n.
14. As a result, this court must now
attempt to do so." (Id. p. 421.)

There was no doubt if the ordinance had
been passed by a local government not the
proprietor of the airport, it would run
afoul of Burbank and would constitute an
impermissible exercise of police power in

an area preempted by Congress.
The Court found itself

" ~ . . caught on the horns of a
particularly sharp dilemma: If on
one hand, we follow the dicta in
footnote 14 of the Burbank opinion,
which is intended to comport with
the court's holding in Griggs, we
will severely undercut the rationale
of Burbank's finding of preemption.
If on the other hand, we disregard
the proprietor exception as dicta in
order to fully effecuate the Burbank
rationale, we impose upon airport
proprietors the responsibility under
Griaqs for obtaining the requisite
noise easements, yet deny them the
authority to control the level of

athe

o> Eiht

noise produced at their airports."

(Id. Pp. 424.) F
The dilemma was resolved in favor of the
ordinance for two reasons. First, the
Court interpreted Air Transport Associa-
tion of America v. Crotti, supra, 389 F.

Supp. 58, 63-64, as holding "proprietor-
ship control is recognized and exempted
from judicially declared preemption by
[Burbank's] footnote 14." The language
quoted does not comport precisely either
with footnote 14 or with what the court
deciding Crotti, actually did. The
Court in Burbank said merely: "We do not

consider here what limits, if any, apply

to a municipality as a proprietor."
(Emphasis added.) That is a far cry
from, "No limits apply to a municipality
as a proprietor." Furthermore, both the
CNEL and SENEL regulations considered in
Crotti were exercises of state police
power, rather than proprietary power. If
the category of power exercised were dis-
positive, as the National Aviation court
implies, both types of regulation should
have fallen. Instead, the Crotti court
focused on the nature of the regulation,

i.e., land management v. air space
-25-

management.

The second basis for upholding the
ordinance was the clear expression of
Congressional intent not to "'prevent
airport proprietors from excluding any
aircraft on the basis of noise considera-
tions.'" (National Aviation v. City of
Hayward, Cal., supra, 418 F.Supp. 417,
424, quoting Sen. Rpt. No. 1353, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7.)

The result reached in National Avia-

tion v. City of Hayward, Cal., supra,

severely undercuts the Burbank decision.

Five members of the Supreme Court found
the Burbank ordinance incompatible with a
perceived need for a uniform and exclusive
system of federal aircraft noise regula-
tion. The City of Hayward ordinance

seems equally incompatible; yet it was
permitted to stand as an exercise of pro-
prietary power.

b. State Law.
Britt adduces several California
cases in support of the respondent court's
overruling of the demurrers. For diverse
reasons, reliance upon these cases is
misplaced.
-26-

In Loma Portal Civic Club v, American
Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.2d 582, Britt con-
tends, the Supreme Court held that while

airlines could not be prohibited from
flying, damages could be sought from the
airport's owner-operator on a nuisance
ecey.” Although the California
Supreme Court did reject the airlines'
claim of federal preemption, the short
answer to Loma Portal, the Port Dis-

trict retorts, is that the case was
decided nine years before Burbank. In

rejecting federal preemption the Cali-

fornia Court noted:

FOOTNOTE 4: In fact the holding was
more narrow. The operator

of the field was not a party to the

action. The Court stated merely:

"Nothing herein is intended
to be a determination of the
rights of landowners who suffer
from airplane annoyances to ek
damages from the owners or oper-
ators of aircraft or to seek
compensation from the owner or
operator of an airport." (Id.
pp. 590-591.)

«27

"A holding of federal preemption
would have the effect of disabling
the state from any action in the
entire field, and placing in the
federal government complete and

sole responsibility for regulation
of all aspects of that field. Such
a holding by a single state court
would have, of course, no effect on
the conduct of other states with
respect to regulation of that field,
and unless Congress had in fact in-
tended such preclusion of state regu-
lation and were to carry out its
responsibilities, there would result
within that state a lacuna which the
state would be powerless to fill.

As was said in Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505 [82

S. Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483], quoting
from the opinion of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court: ‘In the
absence of a clear holding by the
Supreme Court of the United States
that Federal jurisdiction has been
made exclusive, we shall not make
what would be tantamount to an
abdication of the hitherto undoubted
jurisdiction of our own courts.'"
(Loma Portal Civic Club v. American

Airlines, iInc., 61 Cal.2d 582, 591.)

Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal.

3d 920, Britt notes, was a case brought
by hundreds of individual plaintiffs
against the City of Santa Monica as
operator of the Santa Monica Airport.
The plaintiffs were permitted to go

=28e

_

my * G

forward on four theories: inverse con-
demnation, nuisance, negligence and zon-
ing violations. The Port District cor-
rectly responds (1) Nestle was decided
approximately one year before Burbank,

and (2) governmental immunity under
state law, and not federal preemption,

was at issue.

In City of San Jose v. Superior Court,
12 Cal.3d 447, Britt claims, the Supreme
Court noted that a nuisance action can be

maintained against a public airport. In
fact, the Court nowhere addressed federal
preemption in that case and was concerned
solely with class action issues. Although
San Jose was decided after Burbank, it

cannot fairly be said to be, as Britt
argues, the “current law of California"

on issues not contested.

In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,
40 Cal.App.3d 471, homeowner plaintiffs

successfully sought inverse condemnation
damages for harm caused by air traffic
at Los Angeles International Airport.
The court rejected the City's contention
that federal preemption precluded local
regulation of airport noise and absolved

~29e

the City of responsibility for the inter-
ference with plaintiffs’ use and enjoy-
ment of their property caused by air
traffic. The court noted nothing in
Burbank relieved airports of the duty

to appropriate necessary land and air
easements (id. p. 489; see Griggs v.
County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, supra,
369 U.S. 84 [82 S.Ct. 531]). The Port

District accurately replies:

“What is significant about Aaron is
that the case was tried, and dis-
cussed on appeal, solely upon an in-
verse condemnation theory of recov-
ery. The Court of Appeal, commenc—
ing at page 487 of its opinion, —
pointed out that Federal preemption
would not obviate the responsibility
of the airport operator to compen-
sate private property owners (as re-
quired by the Constitution) for any
taking of their property for airport
operations, citing Griggs Vv. Alle-
gheny County, supra. That is, of”
course, consistent with the posi-
tion which has been taken by the
Port District in this petition.
Aaron did not discuss the effect of
Federal preemption on tort theories
of recovery requiring adjudication
of airport operational procedures."

CONCLUSION

We conclude the plaintiffs may not
recover tort damages from the Port
District for harm caused by aircraft in
flight. Of the federal decisions which
have dealt with the authority of airport
proprietors after Burbank, we accept the

reasoning of the court in Air Transport
Association of America v. Crotti, supra,
389 F. Supp. 58, which distinguished
between airport land and facility use
(held subject to local regulation) and
aircraft in flight (held subject to
federal regulation only). To authorize

recovery from the proprietor of an air-
port for injuries caused by aircraft in
flight would permit local liability for
conduct within exclusive federal control.

FOOTNOTE 5: "'Federal control is inten-
Sive and exclusive. vlanes
do not wander abovt in the sky like
vagrant clouds. -ney move only by fed-
eral permission, subject to federal in-
spection, in the hands of federally cer-
tified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands. The moment
a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught
up in an elaborate and detailed system
of controls.'" (City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal Inc., supra, 41l U.S.
Continued)

=~3l1-

5

It is no rebuttal to this reality to
argue that the Port District could reduce
or avoid its tort liability by selec-
tively or entirely excluding aircraft
from Lindbergh Field. Such regulations
to avoid tort liability would have the
same deleterious effect on interstate
air traffic flow as the Burbank ordi-

6 . . .
nance. In our view, civil damages for

FOOTNOTE 5 Continued:

624, 633-634 [93 S. Ct. 1854, 1860],
quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.

Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 [Jackson,

J., concurring].)

FOOTNOTE 6: "If we were to uphold the
Burbank ordinance and a sig-

nificant number of municipalities
followed suit, it is obvious that
fractionalized control of the time
of take-offs and landings would
severely limit the flexibility of
the FAA in controlling air traffic
flow. The difficulties of schedul-
ing flights to avoid congestion and
the concomitant decrease in safety
would be compounded. In 1960 the
FAA rejected a proposed restriction
on jet operations at the Los Angeles
airport between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.
because such restrictions could
‘create critically serious problems
to all air transportation patterns. '
25 Fed Reg 1764-1765. The complete
FAA statement said:

(Continued)
«32

the noxious by-products of aircraft in
flight, like the Burbank ordinance and
like the SENEL regulations invalidated

FOOTNOTE 6 Continued:

"'The proposed restriction on the
use of the airport by jet aircraft
between the hours of 10 p.m. and

7 a.m. under certain surface wind
conditions has also been reevaluated
and this provision has been omitted
from the rule. The practice of pro-
hibiting the use of various airports
during certain specific hours could
create critically serious problems
to all air transportation patterns.
The network of airports throughout
the United States and the constant
availability of these airports are
essential to the maintenance of a
sound air transportation system.

The continuing growth of public ac-
ceptance of aviation as a major
force in passenger transportation
and the increasingly significant
role of commercial aviation in the
nation's economy are accomplishments
which cannot be inhibited if the
best interest of the public is to be
served. It was concluded therefore
that the extent of relief from the
noise problem which this provision
might have achieved would not have
compensated the degree of restric-
tion it would have imposed on domes-
tic and foreign Air Commerce.'

"This decision, announced in 1960,
remains peculiarly within the
(Continued)
-33<

in Crotti, are a form of state regulation ’ flights may have resulted in the "taking"

in an area which must remain free of such of their property, plaintiffs are rele-

regulation if national air safety, traf- gated to a recovery of just compensation

fic and noise policy are to be left un- in inverse condemnation against the Port

District (Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee,

hampered.

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Supra, 521 F.2d 387, 391; see also Griggs

flying aircraft about which they complain
did not comply with federal laws and re-

v. County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania,
supra, 369 U.S. 84 [82 S. Ct. 531].)

gulations. Since federal laws and regu- However, nothing in the Burbank deci-
lations have preempted local control of sion suggests an airport operator is
aircraft in flight, flights which comply relieved by federal law of the common
with such laws and regulations may not law duty to act nontortiously as a pro-
be classified as negligent, nuisances or prietor. If the Port District has tor-
trespasses, and the Port District cannot tiously managed and maintained the facil-
be held liable for tort damages alleged : ities at Lindbergh Field to the harm of
to arise from them. To the extent such some or all of the plaintiffs, the action

is not precluded by the doctrine of fed-

eral preemption.
FOOTNOTE 6 Continued: Pp ption

"This decision, announced in 1960, Since the allegations in the com-
remains peculiarly within the com- tates
petence of the FAA, supplemented now p ne seek ee for harm caused by
by the input of the EPA. We are not proprietary actions and omissions as
at liberty to diffuse the powers well as for hare : ;
given by Congress to FAA and EPA by s for harm caused by aircraft in
letting the States or municipalities flight, they are broad enough to state a
in on the planning. If that change couse of , n
is to be made, Congress alone must oie bssaretaney and the general demur
do it." (City of Burbank v. Lockheed rers at issue were properly overruled.
Air Terminal Inc., supra, 411i U.S. meverthe}

= S. Ct. 1854, 1862- eless, recovery for tort damages
1863) .) . at trial should be limited to those

-34- -35-

to

damages, if any, which arise out of the ,
operation of the airport itself and

should not include damages caused by

aircraft in flight.

The order to show cause is dis-
charged, and the petition for a peremp-
tory writ is denied.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

Ault
J.

> APPENDIX B
WE CONCUR;

Brown
P.J.

Cologne
J.

-36-

20 See, ere RAE OMe ©

0

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Article VI,
Clause 2:

This Constitution, and the laws
of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding.

42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e):

Nothing in this section shal!
restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any emission standard
or limitation or to seek any other
relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State agency).

49 U.S.C. § 1506:

Nothing contained in this chapter
shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions
of this chapter are in addition to
such remedies.

B-1.

14 C.F.R. § 36.5: .

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 1421(b)
(4), the noise levels in this part
have been determined to be as low
as is economically reasonable,
technologically practicable, and
appropriate to the type of aircraft
to which they apply. No determina-
tion is made, under this part, that
these noise levels are or should be
acceptable or unacceptable for
Operation at, into, or out of any
airport.

= =
10844 VENTURA BOULEVARD

THE BRIEF SHOP NORTH HOLLYWOOD. CA. 91604

LAWYERS BRIEF SERVICE ’ ;
LEGAL & COMM. PRINTING (213) 877-8620 763-2965

B-2.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2283%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
