# Petition — Taylor Industries, Inc. v. Panduit Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 857

## Text

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JUL 18 WV

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IN THE " welll:

Supreme Court of the United Siates

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

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TAYLOR INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.
PANDUIT CORPORATION,
Respondent. |

—_*
oa

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

Lp.
vv

JOHN A. ARTZ
Attorney for Petitioner
1500 North Woodward Avenue
Birmingham, Michigan 48011

Of Counsel
JOHN A. BLAIR
LYMAN R. LYON
HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE
1500 North Woodward Avenue
Birmingham, Michigan 48011

"ieterstate Beiel 6 Record Co.. 1615 Michigan 48216
962-8745

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. SS eh gi de De Ue a ale we ss l

Sh. Se. Rae he CbeGReNadibcsueesedcdccececes 2

III. Questions Presented for Review ................. 2
IV. Constitutional Provisions and Federal Statutes

DEE SG Sebd eh ecebee luce ccnsees doves cic 3

A. Constitutional Provisions .................. 3

eT ae a a 3

Vv EEE os oven tuscece sete neuctevic 5

VI. Reasons for Granting the Petition ................ 8

en BR a ee eee 5

B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 5

C. Statement of Pertinent Facts ............... 6

VI. Reasons for Granting the Petition ................ ®

Ne ee teens 8

B. Second and Third Questions ............... 8

Vil. Argument as to the First Question ............... 9

VIII. Argument as to the Second and Third Questions .. 12

EE ea Te Oe Pe ee 16

Court of Appeals’ Order — April 19, 1977 ........ 17

District Court’s Preliminary Injunction — August
£8, WR sv ccccscccvescstncsdduneeacensnenneanal 18

Judge Fox’s Ruling From Bench — August 4, 1976 21
Motion for Preliminary Injunction — March 31,

POTD ccncccccenciteceudncedivetsceasenn 26
Compiniat — Boag 85, S5GD on cvcckesictaspuvanes 27
Affidavit of Phillip W. Taylor — September 1,
DOUG. . veer yevecsciccseicesesuceiensineneen 30
Summary of Pertinent Portions of Transcript of
Amaat 4, FS TERMED os cccccctvtvecsquuhesesas 33
Comparison of Claim 5 of Patent in Suit with Prior
Art Western Electric Fanning Strip .............. 35

Panduit Brochure Showing its Patented Fanning
GUD on cvccscedéctcastbucunecesns anpenennel 36

“**

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Star Electric
is Es MEME ccccccccccccceeus 15
Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal, Inc., 404 F. 2d 256 (6th
NE LEIS LO SE 13
George Cutter Co. v. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co..,
MD Cols cot cecdcececceceeees 9.10
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423,
39 L.Ed.2d 435, 94 S.Ct. 1113 (1974) .............. 13
Hieger v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1324 (6th Cir.
ES ASS TE 10,15
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320
U.S. 661, 88 L.Ed. 376 (1944) .................... 10
National Electric Products Corp. v. Grossman, 70 F.2d
Den cc ce eanbechccsecseccs 9

Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 173
U.S.P.Q. 326 (N.D. Iil. 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 428
a in cc cccdhbcbeesacpeevcéetees 14

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 298
F.Supp. 435 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd., 430 F.2d 221
EE a 7,8,11

iV
Page

Philips Electronic & Pharmaceutical Industries Corp.,
v. Thermal & Electronics Industries, Inc., 450 F.2d

CORSE Ga STD. on ns tudkcasKulhest eet diweiteesse 10
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Daly-Herring Co., 294 F.Supp. 754

GRAS e. TE cacsacvibeecdel sedusvcddndisstss 15
United Nickel Co. v. New Home Sewing Machine Co..,

So F, PPOs GEE GN OMe secsucecdpec case 14

Constitution of the United States:

Article I, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 8 ................. 3
Statutes:
Patent Act of 1952
Fe SE nec ekenckswedeussenensensdanetnenenns 3
RT PPT eee re ee 3,4
SD ls GE Cadeccuccdcdevctcess cqawesttecheigne 4
PO aha nee cb dv kc. ve kécctececheedsemabees 4

Jurisdictional Statutes

SD Ses ME, Raosescavacecedancodbencntaeneebees 5
Se Se GENE Sc abbdebvacnadcbdnbed pss eeneekousel 2,4
ep CD % ncedadscdencdtQesncdeasceaeedees 5
Treatises:
11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:
See ae, GPS in hicedosceeccigvaddesdetes 13

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977
No. *e 28© @

a.
._s

TAYLOR INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
PANDUIT CORPORATION,
Respondent.

= =
a

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

.
A

Now comes petitioner Taylor Industries, Inc.
(hereinafter Taylor) and prays that this Court review a
judgment of The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, affirming a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

I. OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the courts below have not yet been
reported but are appended hereto.

Il. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Sixth
Circuit sought to be reviewed was filed April 19, 1977.

No order respecting a rehearing or an extension of tirfle
within which to petition for certiorari has been filed.

Jurisdiction to review said judgment by writ of
certiorari is conferred by 28 USC 1254 (1).

Ill. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. First Question

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted in a
patent infringement action without a consideration of
prior art cited by the accused party which invalidates the
patent in suit.

B. Second Question

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted in a
patent infringement action without any evidence on or a
consideration of irreparable harm or any of the other
necessary equitable considerations.

C. Third Question

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted seven
years after an action was commenced without there being
any change in the situation between the parties during
that period of time.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
FEDERAL STATUTES INVOLVED

A. Constitutional Provisions

Article 1, Section 8. ‘‘The Congress shall have
Power * * *

(Clause 3) ‘‘To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes; * * *

(Clause 8) ‘‘To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries; * * *”’

B. Statutes

(1) Pertinent Portions of the Patent Act of 1952.
35 USC 101:

‘“‘Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title”’

35 USC 102(b):

‘*A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—

* * ke KK K *

4

‘(b) the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States, or...”

35 USC 103:

‘‘A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention was made.”’

35 USC 283:

‘*‘The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under
this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable.”’

(2) Jurisdictional Statutes:
28 USC 12541):

‘*Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court by the following methods:

‘(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after
rendition of judgment or decree;* * *”

28 USC 1338):

‘‘Patents, copyrights, trade-marks, and unfair
competition.

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents, copyrights and trade-marks. Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states
in patent and copyright cases. * * *”’

1S USC 1121:

‘The district and territorial courts of the United States
shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of
the United States shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all
actions arising under this chapter, without regard to the
amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity
of the citizienship of the parties.”’ |

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is an action for patent infringement under the
Patent Act, Title 35, United States Code. One claim of
one United States patent is involved, claim 5 of Walch
Patent 3,024,301 for ‘*Wiring Grille’. The patent is
owned by Panduit Corporation (hereinafter Panduit) and |
Taylor makes four types of accused wiring ducts.

B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

The present action was commenced on May 15, 1969
(Appendix 5). On March 31, 1976, almost seven years

6

after the suit was filed, Panduit brought a motion for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Taylor’s manufacture and
sale of the accused products (Appendix 4). On August 4,
1976, that motion was granted by District Judge Noel P.
Fox, and a preliminary injunction was issued on August
11, 1976 (Appendix 2,3). An appeal of the preliminary
injunction was made to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. In a summary opinion and order dated
April 19, 1977, the Court of Appeals affirmed the granting
of the preliminary injunction (Appendix 1).

C. Statement of Pertinent Facts

Panduit is a Delaware corporation having its principal
office and place of business in Tinley Park, Illinois.
Taylor is a Michigan corporation having its principal
place of business in Marble Falls, Texas.

This action was commenced in May, 1969, when
Panduit filed a Complaint against Taylor for patent
infringement (Appendix 5). The Walch patent in suit,
U.S. No. 3,024,301, issued on March 6, 1962 from an
application filed on October 5, 1955. In 1972, Panduit
filed an Amended Complaint which limited its allegation
of infringement to a single claim (claim 5) of the Walch
patent. All of Taylor’s responsive pleadings in the case
denied Panduit’s allegations and further positively
averred that the patent in suit was invalid and not
infringed.

Both Panduit and Taylor make wiring ducts for use by
the electronics industry and in machine tools and are
direct competitors in the marketplace. Taylor makes four

7

types of ducts which are alleged to infringe the patent in
suit. Taylor started manufacturing and marketing two of
these types of wiring ducts in the mid-1950’s and began
manufacturing and selling the other two types in early
1969.

The Walch patent in suit was enforced earlier against a
party completely unrelated to Taylor: Panduit Corp v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 435 (W.D.
Mich. 1969), affd., 430 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1970)
hereinafter the ‘‘Stahlin Bros.’’ case).

Taylor and Panduit actively. engaged in discovery
efforts throughout the period from 1969 to 1976. Through
its efforts, Taylor turned up a number of prior art
references which were more pertinent than the references
relied upon in the earlier Stahlin Bros. case and which
invalidate the Walch patent.

On March 22, 1976, almost seven years after the suit
was filed, Panduit brought a motion for a preliminary
injunction (Appendix 4). On August 4, 1976, an oral
hearing was held on that motion after which Judge Fox
— orally from the Bench — granted the relief requested
(Appendix 3).

At the hearing, the only evidence presented by Panduit
related to the issue of infringement. No evidence was
presented relative to the validity issue, nor to any of the
factors which must be reviewed in ruling on a motion for
preliminary injunction, such as irreparable harm and
maintenance of the status quo. As to the patent issues,
the District Court treated the validity issue as stare
decises in view of the earlier Stahlin Bros. case and

8

refused to let Taylor introduce any evidence thereon,
including the prior art that Taylor had discovered and
that was not presented or considered in the Stahlin Bros.
case (Appendix 7). In one instance, Judge Fox held that
the decision in the Stahlin Bros. case was ‘‘res judicata’’
against Taylor.

As a result of its decision, the District Court, on
August 11, 1976, issued a Preliminary Injunction Order
which enjoined Taylor from further manufacture and sale
of all of the accused wiring ducts, as well as any
‘‘colorable imitation or equivalent thereof’’ (Appendix 2).
A timely appeal was made to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and that Court, on April 19, 1977, affirmed the
decision of the Lower Court (Appendix 1).

VI. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. First Question

1. The decisions below conflict with the federal policy
enunciated by decisions of this Court against enforcement
of invalid patent monopolies.

2. Notwithstanding a previous holding of validity of a
patent, a preliminary injunction should not be granted
against a new party without a consideration of all new
invalidity defenses.

3. The question is one of importance and is fraught
with public interest.

B. Second and Third Questions

1. The decisions of the courts below are erroneous
and conflict with Section 283 of the Patent Act which
requires that injunctions be granted in patent cases only
‘“*in accordance with the principles of equity.”’

VII. ARGUMENT AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted in a
patent infringement action without a consideration of
prior art cited by the accused party which invalidates the
patent in suit.

The courts below concluded that because the patent in
suit had been held valid in a prior suit against another
party, it was unnecessary to consider any new evidence
of invalidity offered by Taylor before issuing a
preliminary injunction. This was clearly erroneous.

It is well established that in considering motions for
preliminary injunctions, prior validity adjudications carry
little if any weight in the face of more pertinent prior art
that was not considered in the prior litigation. National
Electric Products Corp. v. Grossman, 70 F.2d 257, 258
(2d Cir. 1934), George Cutter Co. v. Metropolitan
Electric Mfg. Co., 275 F.158, 164 (2d Cir. 1921). As
stated in Metropolitan Electric:

‘*But where a preliminary injunction is sought,
the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case free from reasonable doubt. The
presumption flowing from the grant of the patent
alone does not entitle the inventor to his
preliminary injunction.

The appellee recognizes this rule, but relies
upon 224 Fed. 717, 140 C.C.A. 257, as its support.
However, the decision in this case did not prevent
the appellant setting up such new matters as it has
done here. A prior adjudication is not a finality. It
is limited to the relativity to the decision and facts
in the prior case. A prior decision does not prevail
in a subsequent case where the facts are different

10

from those in the prior case or in addition to
those of the prior case in respect of matters that
establish a new state of facts. Cons. Valve Co. v.
Safety Valve Co. 113, U.S. 157, 5 Sup. Ct. 513,
28 L.Ed. 939; Paul Steam System Co. v. Paul
(C.C.) 129 Fed. 757; Hall Signal Co. v. Genl. Ry.
Signal Co., 153 Fed. 907, 82 C.C.A. 653.
(Emphasis Added.)

See also, Philips Electronic & Pharmaceutical Industries
Corp. v. Thermal & Electronics Industries, Inc., 450 F.2d
1164 (3rd Cir. 1971), in which the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals said, at page 1176:

‘‘(W]here relevant prior art was not before the
court [upholding the validity of the patent], its
decision has little precedential value. Judge Shaw
was not bound to follow the Massachusetts court,
not only because the parties were not the same,
but also in the light of new and _ persuasive
evidence regarding the prior art.”’

Thus, where new prior art is cited, it is erroneous to
issue a preliminary injunction without a finding that the
new prior art is no more pertinent than that previously
considered.

To issue a preliminary injunction without considering
newly cited prior art also violates the well established
principle that the public interest in striking down invalid
patents overrides the private interests of litigants.
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320
U.S. 661, 665, 670, 88 L.Ed. 376 (1944), Hieger v. Ford
Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1324, 1327 (6th Cir. 1975).

Several of Taylor’s newly cited prior art references
standing alone invalidate the patent in suit. If this prior

art had been considered in either the Patent Office or the
Stahlin Bros. case, the Walch patent would never have
been issued or upheld. For example, the “prior art
Western Electric fanning strip looks and functions exactly
the same as the wiring wall called for by Walch claims. It
was not considered either by the Patent Office or in the
Stahlin Bros. case. An analysis of Walch’s claim 5
showing its complete anticipation by the Western Electric
plastic fanning strip is attached hereto (Appendix 8).
Moreover, Panduit has tacitly admitted that the Western
Electric fanning strips are covered by the Walch patent
as evidenced by Panduit’s marking of its own same
fanning strips with the number of the Walch patent, and
by Panduit’s own published brochure illustrating and
describing its fanning strip as ‘‘patented’’ (Appendix 9).

The fanning strip by Western Electric alone is
sufficient for a finding that the only claim in suit of the
Walch patent is invalid. Thus, if the Courts below had
not treated the earlier Stahlin Bros. case as controlling,
but instead had reviewed the prior art that Taylor
repeatedly attempted to put before them, there would
have been no basis for issuing the preliminary injunction.

Taylor Has Been Denied Due Process

As a result of a summary proceeding in which the
Stahlin Bros. case against an unrelated company was
erroneously treated as controlling and in which proper
legal standards were neither taken into account nor
applied, Taylor has been forced to terminaie sales of
approximately sixty percent (60%) of its product line.
Delay incident to design and retooling of a new product
line inherently entails loss of customers as well as loss of
substantial goodwill and reputation in the marketplace.

12

Although there has not been a full and fair hearing nor a
trial on the merits of this case, Taylor has been put into
the position of a losing party with all of the harmful and
prejudicial implications and effects which go along with
that position.

Panduit has now forced its only competitor out of the
market and has secured an improper and unwarranted
monopoly allowing it to rise its prices substantially —
which it has done to the detriment of the public.

Also, the preliminary injunction now in force enjoins
Taylor from making the accused products specifically in
suit, as well as ‘“‘any colorable imitation or equivalent
thereof." This puts Taylor in a very tenuous and
prejudicial position; any equivalent or generally similar
wiring it makes in the future will be subject to a charge of
contempt — whether it actually infringes the patent in
suit or not.

Further, notwithstanding prior art patents which
anticipate the patent in suit, Taylor is also put in the
absurd position of being subject to contempt proceedings
if it makes a product in accordance with any of these
nrior art patents and that product is an equivalent of its
‘ormer product.

VIII. ARGUMENT AS TO THE SECOND
AND THIRD QUESTIONS

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted in a
patent infringement action without any evidence on or a
consideration of irreparable harm or any of the other
necessary equitable considerations.

Whether a preliminary injunction can be granted seven
years after an action was commenced without there being

any change in the situation between the parties during
that period of time.

a

13

Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary and drastic
remedies which are to be granted only where the need is
Clearly shown. Because of the seriousness of such
relief, certain standards and tests have been developed
which are universally taken into account before such
drastic relief is granted. Section 283 of the Patent Act
incorporates these standards as it requires that
injunctions in patent cases be granted only ‘‘in
accordance with principles of equity.’’ The courts below
failed to follow the proper and requisite standards and
erroneously issued the preliminary injunction against
Taylor.

The equitable considerations which must be reviewed
in ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction are set
forth in numerous sources. Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal,
Inc., 404 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1968), Granny Goose
Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441, 39 L.Ed.2d
435, 94 S. Ct. 1113 (1974), and //] Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2948, pp. 430-431.
These considerations are:

(1) Possible irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the
injunction is not granted;

(2) Injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted;
(3) Balance of the equities and rights of the parties;

(4) Ability of the defendant to compensate the
plaintiff in money damages;

(5) Probability of success at trial on the merits;
(6) Maintenance of the status quo; and

(7) The public interest.

14

If these considerations had been reviewed, they
overwhelmingly would have led to the denial of Panduit’s
motion. For example, there was no evidence submitted or
a finding made by the courts below that a preliminary
injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
Panduit. In fact, Panduit did not even bring its motion
until seven years after filing this suit and this conclusively
shows that it could not have been suffering irreparable
injury. United Nickel Co. v. New Home Sewing Machine
Co., 17 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). Moreover, Taylor's
ability to compensate Panduit in money damages
precludes a finding of irreparable injury. Preliminary
injunctions cannot be granted if the movant can secure
adequate rectification of his grievance by an award of
damages. Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc.,
173 U.S.P.Q. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 428
(7th Cir. 1972).

Preliminary injunctions also are not to be granted
where they would upset the status quo. In direct conflict
to these principles, the decisions of the courts in this case
completely upset the status quo by eliminating Taylor
from over fifteen years of competition in the product
lines in question.

On the other side of the coin, a preliminary injunction
would cause substantial and irreparable damage to
Taylor. This is brought out in the affidavit of Phillip W.
Taylor, President of Taylor (Appendix 6). Taylor would
be forced to partially close its plant and lay off the
majority of its employees while expensive new tooling
was obtained and installed. It also would have to
warehouse its present inventory of accused wiring ducts
or scrap and recycle it. Taylor further would lose a
substantial part of its business in wiring ducts and also

15

lose the goodwill of many of its customers. Such
irreparable harm to Taylor by itself fully justifies the
reversal of the preliminary injunction. Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Daly-Herring Co., 294 F. Supp. 754, 759 (E.D.N.C.
1968), Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Star
Electric Co., 199 F. 185, 186-187 (N.D.N.Y. 1912).

In this appeal, Panduit has taken the position that the
term of the Walch patent is due to expire in a few years
and that it has never had the chance to monopolize the
marketplace. This is a fanciful argument and does not
constitute sufficient ground for granting of the
preliminary injunction. Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph
Co. v. Star Electric Co., 199 F. 185 (N.D.N.Y. 1912).
Panduit’s right to exclude all of its competitors and
monopolize the marketplace is simply not a basis on
which a preliminary injunction can be based —
particularly since its patent is invalid in view of Taylor’s
newly cited prior art. Moreover, Panduit’s interests are
far outweighed by the interests of the public in striking
down invalid patents. As stated in Hieger v. Ford Motor
Co., 516 F.2d 1324, 1327 (6th Cir. 1975):

‘““[Ajn invalid patent is a blight on ‘the
important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality
a part of the public domain’, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).”’

If Panduit’s position were given any credence, it would
cause patent owners to delay as long as possible (in order
to make the harm more and more “‘irreparable’’) before
moving for injunctive relief. This is directly contrary to
long settled equitable principles, particularly those
relating to the doctrine of laches which penalizes litigants
who have waited too long to take action.

16

IX. CONCLUSION

It is submitted that few cases have resulted in the
forcing of a defendant into a corner — as has been done
to Taylor in this case — without the benefit of a full and
fair consideration of the legal and equitable rights of the
parties. Taylor has been denied due process and Panduit
has been given an unwarranted monopoly in the
marketplace. Granting of certiorari is necessary to
prevent manifest injustice.

July 15, 1977
JOHN A. ARTZ
1500 North Woodward Avenue
Birmingham, Michigan 48011
(313) 642-7000
Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel

JOHN A. BLAIR
LYMAN R. LYON

HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE
1500 North Woodward Avenue
Birmingham, Michigan 48011
(313) 642-7000

APPENDIX

17

APPENDIX 1
ORDER

(Panduit Corporation, Plaintiff-Apellee
v.
Taylor Industries, Inc., Defendant-Appellant)

(United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit)

(Filed April 19, 1977)

Before: Phillips, Chief Judge; Peck, Circuit Judge, and
Green, District Judge.*

This appeal, perfected from an order of the district
court dated August 11, 1976, issuing a _ preliminary
injunction has been submitted on the record on appeal
and on the briefs and oral arguments of counsel. Being
fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering
said order, and therefore,

It Is Ordered that the order of the district court issuing
a preliminary injunction be and it hereby is affirmed; and
it is further ordered that the order of this Court dated
September 10, 1976, staying the preliminary injunction be
and it hereby is vacated.

Entered By Order Of The Court

/s/ John P. Hehman
Clerk of Court

* Honorable Ben C. Green, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

18

APPENDIX 2
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(United States of America
In the District Court of the United States
For the Eastern District of Michigan)

(Filed August 11, 1976)

Pursuant to the decision of this court, rendered August
4, 1976, due notice having been given and the court being
apprised in the premises hereof:

It Is Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed that a
preliminary injunction be and the same is hereby granted.

As used herein the term “‘infringing product’’ means
any product covered by claim 5 or the United States
Letters Patent No. 3,024,301, any colorable imitation or
equivalent thereof, and in particular but without limiting
the foregoing, the products identified in the captioned
case as defendant’s Type *‘O’’, ‘‘OA’’ (presently referred
to by defendant in its catalog as ‘“‘Open Slot’’), ‘‘W’’, and
‘‘WA”’ (presently referred to by defendant in its catalog
as ‘‘Closed Slot’’) wiring ducts.

It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed that an
immediate, preliminary injunction, to take effect
immediately, is hereby issued against defendant, its
divisions, subsidiaries, related companies, directors,
officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys,
successors and assigns, and all those in active concert or
participation with them, herein called defendant, as
follows:

19

1. Defendant is enjoined from:

(a) Making. having made, selling, using, offering
for sale or leasing any infringing product, or from
soliciting orders in any manner from customers, potential
customers, or others for any infringing product.

(b) From utilizing, selling, assigning, licensing,
lending, leasing, renting or otherwise transferring to
another, any tools or dies especially adapted for
producing infringing products, located in any of the
facilities of the defendant, or located elsewhere and under
the control or direction of defendant.

(c) From using any past, current or future
literature, price sheets or promotional material in
possession of defendant which illustrates or refers in any
manner to any infringing product or any infringing
product manufactured, sold or offered for sale by
defendant in the past.

(d) From accepting or completing any agreement,
contract or order, either existing or future and whether
solicited or unsolicited, from any person, firm or
corporation which identifies the product or products to be
supplied thereunder as an infringing product or which
requires, calls for or threatens to require or call for, the
making and/or selling of any infringing product.

(e) From packaging to fill orders, from filling
orders, from shipping in accordance with orders, or in
any manner whatsoever completing any orders heretofore
or hereafter submitted to the defendant for any infringing
product.

(f) From referring existing or future orders,
contracts, agreements, or work, contracts, leads.

20

customers, potential customers or others requesting
supply of or information about an infringing product to
another person, firm, or corporation, except plaintiff, for
the purpose of having infringing products supplied by
others.

(g) From assisting, directly or indirectly, any
Other party in the infringement of claim 5 of United
States Letters Patent No. 3,024,301.

III. The defendant shall immediately notify all sales
personnel, sales representatives, distributors, and dealers
of defendant that such sales personnel, sales
representatives, disributors and dealers cannot:

(a) Solicit, accept, complete or fill any orders for
any of defendant’s infringing products, and

(b) Cannot use any of defendant’s literature,
price sheets or other promotional material, showing,
describing or referring to defendant's infringing products.

III. The defendant shall recall all literature, price
sheets, or other promotional material, illustrating,
describing, or referring to any of defendant’s infringing
products, from its personnel, distributors, sales
representatives, and dealers and shall recall all infringing
products, from the possession or control of customers,
sales representatives, distributors or dealers, the title to
which infringing products and literature has not passed
from defendant.

So Ordered.
Dated: August 11, 1976.

/s/ Noel P. Fox
Chief District Judge

21

APPENDIX 3
COURT’S OPINION FROM THE BENCH

(In the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division)

(Filed August 4, 1976)

Before the The Honorable Noel P. Fox, U.S. District
Judge, Western District of Michigan

Preliminary Injunction Proceedings, Federal Court,
Detroit, Michigan, Wednesday, August 4, 1976

Appearances: Petherbridge, Lindgren & Gilhooly.
Chartered, by Roy E. Petherbridge, Esq., 53 West
Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604, and Charles
R. Wentzel, Esq., Patent Counsel, Panduit Corp., 17301
Ridgeland Avenue, Tinley Park, Illinois 60477, on behalf
of the Plaintiff; Hauke & Patalidis, by Claude A.
Patalidis, Esq., and Allard A. Braddock, Esq., 26400
Southfield Road, Lathrup Village. Michigan 48076, on
behalf of the Defendant.

The Court: Plaintiff moves for a_ preliminary
injunction against further infringement by the Defendant
upon Plaintiff's patent.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff need show
that there was a prior adjudication in favor of the validity
of the patent which has a scope sufficient to include the
accused constructions. Gordon Johnson Company versus
Hunt, 109 Fed. Supp. 571 (Northern District of Ohio
1952). That here has been a full, complete adjudication in
favor of the validity of the patent before the Court cannot

22

be denied. Panduit Corporation versus Stahlin Brothers
Fibre Works, Inc., 298 Fed. Supp. 435 (Western District
of Michigan, 1969); affirmed 430 Fed. 2nd 221 (Sixth
Circuit, 1970.)

The Defendant Stahlin Brothers was later found in
contempt because its modified structure was the
equivalent of the original in its relation to the patent in
the earlier suit. Panduit versus Stahlin Brothers, 338 Fed.
Supp. 1240 (Western District of Michigan, 1972); and
affirmed 476 Fed. 2nd 1286 from the Sixth Circuit in
1973.

Therefore, Plaintiff need show only that the
Defendant’s construction is within the scope of the patent
held valid in the above cases.

I have already ruled on the question of laches, and I
incorporate my ruling earlier today in that regard from
the bench opinion.

The reasoning of this Court in the earlier contempt
proceedings against Stahlin Brothers is helpful.

In considering whether the structures in question are
within the scope of the patent previously adjudicated
valid, the Court must necessarily read the claim in the
light of the decision finding the claim valid.

In the earlier contempt proceeding, it was found that
the Walch patent, which is here in question, U.S. Patent
Number 3,024,301, was designed to achieve the following
functions or results:

A) Easy insertion of wires in the duct.

B) Prevention of accidental removal of wires from the
duct.

23

C) Provision of maximum useful space for bringing
wires from the duct.

And, D) Facilitation of intentional removal of wires
from the duct. 338 F. Supp. at 1243.

Claim 5 of Walch patent was also reproduced in the
opinion of 338 F. Supp. 1243.

Plaintiff herein asserts that Claim 5 of the Walch patent
reads literally on Defendant's type OA and type WA
ducts or that the structures achieve the functions or
results of the Walch patent as above stated.

Defendant claims that that part of Claim 5 which reads,
quote, ‘‘and defining substantially parallel edges on
longitudinally spaced fingers,"’ does not read on the
Taylor Type OA and Type WA ducts.

This Court presently holds that the finger edges of the
Taylor Type OA duct are substantially parallel within the
meaning of the Walch patent.

The finger edges are not mathematically parallel. Claim
5, however, requires only substantial parallelism.

The word ‘‘substantial’’ is derived from the word
‘‘substance’’ and means “‘consisting of, relating to,
sharing the nature of, or constituting substance: existing
as or in substance.’’ Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary (1963).

In substance, the finger edges of the Type OA duct are
parallel. They are certainly parallel enough to define,
quote, ‘‘longitudinally spaced substantially parallel slits.”’

The edges clearly define, quote, ‘‘fingers,”’ which
achieve the functional results of the Walch patent, and
therefore are substantially parallel.

24

In the words of Claim 5, the fingers of the Type OA
duct are narrow at ‘‘the outer ends of the slits and
provide restricted passages for the wires between the
finger ends and thereby prevent accidental removal of the
wires in between the fingers,’ and ‘‘said fingers are
flexible to permit their deflection and provide wider
finger spacing at the free ends to facilitate positioning and
removal of wires between said fingers.”

In this Court’s original opinion, it stated: *“‘But even
with the words of the claim read precisely on Defendant's
product, that is not quite ‘the end of it.’ Infringement is
not a mere matter of words. General Electric Company
versus Allis-Chalmers Company, 178 Fed. 273, 276, the
Third Circuit, I guess it is — (Third Circuit, 1910);
Westinghouse versus Boyden Power Break Company, 170
U.S. 537, 18 S. Ct. 707, 42 Lawyers Edition 1136 (1898);
Linde Air Products Company versus Morse Dry Dock
and Repair Company, 246 Fed. 834, 838 (Second Circuit,
1917).

“The question of infringement involves considerations
of practical utility and substantial identity, and therefore
must be quantitative as well as qualitative.’ Goodyear
Shoe Machine Company versus Spaulding, 101 F. 990,
994 (C.C. 1900).

‘The doctrine of equivalents has been used to extend
the protection of the patent to an equivalent which
‘performs substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to obtain the same result.’ Graver Tank and
Manufacturing Company versus Linde Air Products
Company, supra (339 U.S. 605) at 608, (70 S. Ct. 854, 94
Lawyers Edition 1097) 298 Fed. Supp. at 448.

‘Unquestionably the Type OA duct is the equivalent of
Claim 5, of the Walch patent. It accomplishes the same
function or result through the use of substantially the

a

_———— ewe 2-5" ane «een

25

same mechanism — the only possibie point of contention
being the slope of finger edges. The Type OA duct
accomplishes all four of the functional advantages of the
Walch patent set forth above. It does so by a device in
all respects identical to the device described in Claim 5.”

This Court is presently of the opinion the Type OA
duct is the equivalent of the Walch device and, hence, is
within the scope of the Plaintiff's patent.

Taylor also claims that its Type WA duct is not within
the scope of the Walch patent. This WA Type duct is
identical to the Type OA duct, except for the fact that
the finger ends are joined rather than open.

Defendant is referred to the earlier decisions of the
Court in Panduit I and Panduit II which found such
closed-slot ducts to be ‘‘direct infringements’’ of the
Walch patent. Supra, 298 Fed. Supp. at 449; Supra, 338
F. Supp. at 1245. Type WA is the equivalent of the
structures there held to infringe and achieves the
functions and results of the Walch patent.

Therefore it presently appears to this Court that the
Taylor OA and Type WA ducts are within the scope of
the patent owned by the Plaintiff and previously
adjudicated valid.

For these stated reasons, I find the preliminary
injunction is now in order.

I will consider this proposed p: euminary injunction and
let each of you, if you have any objections to it, to the
form — to the form, not the substance, or if — I haven't
read it, so I will let you also comment on the substance.
Get this to me within the next five days, if you can, and I
will -.nsider it and make a decision whether — a
decision on how the preliminary injunction should read.

All right.

26

APPENDIX 4

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
UNDER F.R.Civ.P. 65

(In the United States District Court
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division)

(Filed March 31, 1976)

Plaintiff, Panduit Corp., by its attorney, hereby moves
this court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the
Defendant from making, having made, selling, using, or
offering for sale, any product covered by Claim 5 of U.S.
Patent No. 3,024,301, any colorable imitation or
equivalent thereof, and in particular, but without limiting
the foregoing products identified as Defendant's, Taylor
Industries, Inc.’s, wiring duct types *‘O"’, *‘W’’, ““OA”’,
and *“‘WA”’.

Concurrence for the relief sought was requested from
Counsel for Defendant, Mr. Claude A. Patalidis, who
indicated on March 22, 1976 that the Defendant would
not stipulate to the relief sought.

Plaintiff's supporting memorandum and the Affidavits
of Roy E. Petherbridge and Roy A. Moody are filed
herewith.

In accordance with Rule IX of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the
date for hearing on the above motion is set for Monday,
May 17, 1976 at 10:00 A.M.

Respectfully submitted:

By: /s/ Roy E. Petherbridge, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Petherbridge, Lindgren & Gilhooly
Chartered

53 West Jackson Blvd.

Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 922-1018

ae

27

APPENDIX 5
COMPLAINT

(In the United States District Court
Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division)

(Panduit Corporation, Plaintiff v. Taylor Electric, Inc.,
and Taylor Plastic Corporation, Defendants.)

Civil Action No. 32796
Complaint For Infringement
Of United States Letters
Patent No. 3 024 301

(Filed May 15, 1969)

To the Honorable Judge of the United States District
Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division:

Plaintiff complains of the Defendants and alleges:

(1) That Plaintiff Panduit Corporation, is a Delaware
corporation having its office at 1730! Ridgeland Avenue,
Tinley Park, Illinois.

(2) That Defendants, Taylor Electric, Inc. and Taylor
Plastic Corporation, are corporations duly incorporated in
the State of Michigan and have regular and established
places of business at Fisher Road, Howell, Michigan in
this Southern Division of this Eastern District.

(3) That this is a suit for infringement by Defendants
of United States Letters Patent No. 3 024 301, granted
March 6, 1962 and that Plaintiff is the owner of said
Patent No. 3 024 301. That this action is being
brought under the patent laws of the United States

28

(35 U.S.C. 281) for which original jurisdiction is vested in
the Federal District Courts under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a).

(4) That on or before October 5, 1955, the patentee
Kurt R. Walch did conceive and invent certain
improvements in a ‘‘Wiring Grille’’ and upon that date
applied for a United States Letters Patent covering the
same, said patent having been issued and granted as
aforesaid, on March 6, 1962, under No. 3 024 301: that
Plaintiff, Panduit Corporation, was assigned said patent
prior to its date of grant and has been the owner of said
patent since said grant.

(5) That, since the date of grant of said patent,
Defendants, jointly and severally, have been making,
selling, and have sold and advocated the use of articles
and products responding to and coming within the scope
of the disclosure and claims of the said patent and have
thereby infringed the claims of said patent within this
Southern Division of this Eastern District of Michigan
and elsewhere in the United States, willfully and without
the consent of Plaintiff.

(6) Plaintiff has applied the statutory notice as
required by 35 U.S.C. 287 on all Wiring Grilles
manufactured and sold by it under said patent.

(7) That Defendants, jointly and severally, have made
unlawful gains and profits from such infringement and
Plaintiff, due to Defendants’ unlawful infringement, has
been deprived of rights and profits which would

ee ee. eae Se os

29

otherwise have come to Plaintiff but for such
infringement and has thereby caused Plaintiff irreparable
damages and threatens to continue to cause Plaintiff
additional damages.

Wherefore, Plaintiff demands an injunction against
further infringement by Defendants and those controlled
by Defendants, an accounting for profits and damages, an
award of damages, and an assessment of costs and
attorney’s fees against Defendants, and such other relief
as the Court may deem just.

PRICE, HENEVELD, HUIZENGA
& COOPER

By: /s/ Peter P. Price

Preld Building

2336 Eastern Avenue, S.E.
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49507
(616) 452-6911

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Of Counsel:

Petherbridge, O’ Neill & Lindgren
53 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois 60604

(312) 922-1018

30

APPENDIX 6
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP W. TAYLOR

(In the United States District Court
Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division)

(Filed September 1, 1976)

State of Michigan
County of Oakland—ss.

I, Philip W. Taylor, being duly sworn depose and state
as follows:

1. That I am a citizen of the United States residing at
Burnet, R.R. #1, 112A Texas 78611.

2. That I am the President of Taylor Industries,
Inc., defendant in the above captioned civil action.

3. That Taylor Industries, Inc. has already suffered
and will continue to suffer irreparable damages unless the
oreliminary injunction in date of August 11, 1976 against
said Taylor Industries, Inc., is stayed pending appeal of
the order granting said preliminary injunction. Said
Taylor Industries, Inc., will suffer irreparable injury for
the following reasons:

a. Taylor Industries, Inc. is daily losing sales and the
good will of its customers by being prevented from
delivering orders already accepted and will subject itself
to a multiplicity of law suits for breach of contract;

b. Panduit Corporation is engaged in a crash customer
Stealing campaign and at the same time attempting to
delay the consideration of a stay by asking for an
extension of time in which to brief the court. (see
attached Panduit literature)

Dy me

sh les

31

c. Such loss of sales and of customer good will will
be impossible to recapture even in the event that the
Court’s decree and order granting Plaintiff a preliminary
injunction is revcrsed on appeal;

d. There is a strong likelihood that upon a plenary
trial on the merits with full proofs and admission of
pertinent prior art the patent in suit will be declared
invalid and that Taylor Industries, Inc., will not be
permanently enjoined, in which event Taylor Industries,
Inc., will nevertheless have suffered considerable
irreparable injury as a result of the loss of its customer
good will. Taylor Industries, Inc. is in the position of
being presumed guilty without having been able to
present a defense at trial;

e. Taylor Industries, Inc., will be forced to partially
close its plants and thus to lay off the majority of its
employees while appropriate new tooling is obtained for
the purpose of producing new designs of wiring ducts, the
manufacture and sale of which is not enjoined by said
decree and order in date of August 11, 1976; and

f. Irreparable injury will be caused to Taylor
Industries, Inc., as a result of being forced to warehouse
its present inventory of wiring ducts whose sale has been
preliminarily enjoined or, in the alternative, in scrapping
and recycling such inventory until the preliminary
injunction is lifted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, or the patent in suit is found invalid on a plenary
trial on full proof or until the expiration of the term of the
patent in suit, March 6, 1979, resulting in a considerable
economic waste which is against public policy at the time
when conservation of energy is of prime importance to
this nation.

32

4. That the consuming public will suffer considerable
injury as a result of Plaintiff, Panduit Corporation, having
been able to eliminate from the industry all products
directly competitive with its own wiring duct and to
remain the sole producer in the United States of so-called
“open Slot’’ wiring ducts after having been successful in
eliminating from the marketplace Stahlin Brothers Fibre
Works, Inc., Jody Manufacturing, Inc., ECP Corporation
and now Taylor Industries, Inc., thus permitting Plaintiff,
Panduit Corporation, to dictate and impose its own prices
to the consuming public.

5. I cannot overemphasize the urgency in this matter
as the lead times for delivery of this product are very
short. Irreparable injury occurred almost immediately
upon our being enjoined and will continue daily until we
will no longer be a viable wiring duct manufacturer even
though we have not had our ‘‘day in court’’.

6. The attached Panduit literature has caused many of
our customers to conclude that we can only supply ducts
with round side holes. Sales are being lost daily because
of this erroneous impression.

Philip W. Taylor

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of
August, 1976.

/s/ Ruth Heffington
Notary Public Burnet County, Texas
My commission expires June 1, 1977

33

APPENDIX 7

Summary of Pertinent Portions of the
Transcript of the Hearing of August 4, 1976

It is clear from the transcript that the District Judge
refused to consider any prior art, whether it had been
considered in the prior litigation or not. This subject is
discussed in particular at pages 62-68, 102, and 112-116 of
the transcript of the August 4, 1976 Hearing.

When counsel for Taylor sought to introduce in
evidence a specimen of the prior art Taylor duct that was
considered in the Stahlin Bros. case for the purpose of
showing the limited scope of the patent in suit, the
District Judge sustained plaintiff's objection thereto,
saying:

‘The issue is closed. I decided it in the
principal case. That Exhibit was before me in the
principal case. I made the final judgment in it. It
is closed. It is res judicata.’’ (Tr. 62-64)

Next, counsel for defendant sought to introduce
testimony regarding the Davis patent, U.S. No. 667,195
(Tr. 65-68). The District Judge sustained plaintiff's
objection saying (Tr. 68):

‘*Well, I am not prepared and I don’t intend to
retry prior arts in this preliminary injunction
hearing, and any claim or any prior art that was
before me in the original Panduit trial I will not
consider in this preliminary injunctive
proceeding.’’*

* Actually it does not appear from the published decisions that the
Davis patent was considered by the Court. However, it was
considered by the Patent Office in connection with claims other than
patent claim 5, in suit.

34

Later, the Court sustained an objection to an offer of a
model of the Davis patent (Tr. 102) and further sustained
objections to questions regarding it (Tr. 112-116).

At Tr. 102, Taylor’s counsel had marked as exhibits a
copy of Carlson patent, U.S. No. 2,507,886, and a model
of the Carlson device. The Court sustained plaintiff's
objection to this as prior art. (Note: there was no claim
made that this prior art had been considered or that
anything like it had been considered and counsel for
defendant pointed this out to the Court, but to no avail.
Tr. 102-103).

At pages 115-116, the following exchange occurred:

‘*Mr. Patalidis: Oh, I have no desire, your
Honor to retry the Stahlin case all over again. We
have newly discovered prior art that goes to the
heart of the presumption of validity of the Walch
patent, which your Honor will not let us
introduce. And if I understand your Honor’s
ruling, your Honor doesn’t want any evidence to
be introduced into this Court which relates to
prior art. I think I may not have understood your
Honor this morning when you said relates to the
prior art, meaning the prior art that was before the
Court in the Stahlin case, but —

x* * * *

Mr. Patalidis: I think this is very relevant.

The Court: I have already ruled on
propositions of prior art. I am not going to retry
that case at this time. I may consider it on the
principal case.”’

3.

4.

35

APPENDIX 8

Claim 5 of Walch Patent 3,024,301 Compared With

Prior Art Western Electric Fanning Strip

Walch Cluim 5

A wall for supporting and ; ae :
orienting wires comprising:

A side wall

‘ having longitudinally spaced sub-

stantially perallel slits ” i

open at one edge of said wall

and defining substantially
parallel cdges on longitudinal]
spaced fingers

the free ends of suid fingers ~
being enlarged * DEPOSITION

EXHIBIT

to narrow the outer ends of the
slits and provide restricted

passages for the wires Létween
the finger ends and thereby pre- 4
vent accidental removal of the
wires from between the pe

said fingers being flexible to . FANNING STRIP
permit their deflection and pro-

vide wider finger spacing at . y

their free ends to facilitate

positioning and removal of wires
between said fingers

36

APPENDIX 9

Panduit Brochure Illustrating Its Fanning Strip

Covered By Walch Patent 5,024,301.

ae Pea?
welch cloin § , ; 08 BOND abGEsbOrES
BR wall for suprertin9 — HARE
t/. waa + 7 , . :
non sida CC Patenicd Fanning Sirip renmaventiy tsovares

wall eg es e
‘—_ a = -CONRLLI OS INLPROPTI POSITION
having longitudinelly agecad sand -@ “mat ee eee
stantially porelicl slits rn me nd teem Se ‘ <=
et nate wot nn he ae
open at one edgr © 5 cen - seh
: ee ee ee ee tr hi Veceat
and ecfining sub.tentially - Fee on | erect fete Le ant pea
peralie! edges ee eat we begs $4 mgs hi SAULT \\ . :
speced finyers re pao ore 4 ml Nab |
the free ends of eaid fingers ; Sunes uned's - agp) y+ ames © < eebs Geeta, v0 0 enses-en
being cnlerged : ad 1 eee Rad Es oo aiiss sate + 3
to narrow the outer ents of the 5 heAst. _: 4 fy eee © ee
elit: and provide serteicted ee nl f: en = f7
pessege: for the wires between i of oe vite
the finger ends ond thereby pre- - a. 28 6 Sactindnienranastentinemtieterteseant
vent accidental 1 rovel of the wstai PAEETEF of OFF errs Danmeng Sire, Ct ty preper tength, smepe tn holver
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beers o- ht rer beter = ~~
wide wider fingsr Spacing at On her beard, cents tor tr weet beemens nag — -

their free endis to facilitate
positioning and removal of wires
retween said fingers

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-24-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2228%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
