# Opposition — Parking Realty Co. v. Sherline

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 856

## Text

AUG 16 }977

IR., CLERK |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

October Term 1977

PARKING REALTY CO. AND EAN ERIE,
FORMERLY HOPE VAN RIPER,
Petitioners,

Vv
HOWARD SHERLINE,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK
and STONE

Gilbert E. Gove
Carl H. von Ende
R. Richard Livorine

300 Wabeek Building

Birmingham, Michigan 48011
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent

EEE
THE INLAND PRESS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN

i

SUBJECT INDEX

Page
eee ii
i a ea 1
I pili liscinisiciiiscessiensibcbeiabimmnemebejitheuibinbisiimentbiihanidinih 2
Counter-Statement of Questions

PE COD hncdinectsincinecinesniossccnttliablasnentindibipimnciics 2
Counter-Statement of the Case 2022.22... cececeeceeeeeeeeee 3

Argument
1. The substantive issue upon which petitioners
seek this Court’s review was neither presented
to nor decided by the courts of Michigan; hence,
this Court’s consideration of that issue as raised
in the instant Petition would be inappropriate ... 6

2. The claim of petitioner Erie of a right to repre-
sent, as counsel, persons other than herself fails
to raise a federal question of substance —.............. 11

3. A state’s reservation of the privilege to engage
in the practice of law to natural persons, and the
denial of that privilege to corporations, raises no
substantial Federal question unucr the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution — 2.0.0.2. 14

il

INDEX TO AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Federal
Black v Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 76 S.Ct. 824,

ee Ses SN SIU cee Mi ccielintenhctsbictincsoniniitines diisiomasieaiiabean 6
Buck v California, 343 U.S. 99, 72 S.Ct. 806, 96 L.Ed.

Sis SUE CED: <inisstscetemsisinitnncttacdinsiocktathcinanintiiincsininiindintiabiaeion 6
Cohen v Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-124, 81 S.Ct. 954,

© aes Se I cecilia cichesincicpiiniaeprisichtaciancieaenieaianiaces 12
California Water Service Co. v City of Redding, 304

U.S. 252, 58 S.Ct. 865, 82 L.Ed. 1323 (1937) -........... 11,12
Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129,

42 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed. 166 (1921) ..2.2.2.n.u..........eeeeeees 15
DeBacker v Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 29-30, 90 S.Ct. 163,

Se Ek els ee GI decciensennndinnienahasonantenies 11
Dent v West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32

as TE CMI. iinicoclovceniccnccencicichenidestiiiansicniioalainaladbiliais 13
Durley v Mayo, 351 U.S. 227, 76 S.Ct. 806, 100 L.Ed.

Se CI eecinsubiaenneneraiiainadlstinmdneinimaattnatee 6
Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10

Se I UP NOT. ciieunitnintinesntenicbininibainatelibsddcuilind 14, 16, 17
Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95

S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed. 2d. 572, 588 (1975) ...................... 12
Hacken v Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 88 S.Ct. 325, 19 L.Ed.

els SET CRIED cctciniicisnenvdeieensicgmiaitadiilinidaiciiiieastias ees 12
Herb v Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 59, 89 L.Ed.

Fe. COMPGIGD . jraisitnicsceningenitsibesinilaptasneniiciiipaicentinsiidst Ne paid aie, 9

International Bd. of Trustees v Denver Milk Producers,
Tnc., 334 U. 8. 809, 68 S.Ct. 1015, 92 L.Ed. 1741 (1948) 11

ili
Page
Kentucky Finance Corp. v Paramount Auto Exchange

Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 43 S.Ct. 636, 67 L.Ed. 112 (1923) 16

Konigsberg v State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252,
IN I TI ras nseteiremaasidaidesdiahbannaisbigtes deelaphiasiabiaa 13

Lathrop v Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 231, 6 L.Ed.
I wulinaedo 13

Law Student’s Research Council v Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154, 157, 91 S.Ct. 720, 27 L.Ed. 2d. 749 (1971) ............ 12

Leonard v Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Pacific Railroad
Co., 198 U.S. 416, 25 S.Ct. 758, 49 L.Ed. 1108 (1904) 11

Martin v Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S.Ct. 1, 7 L.Ed. 2d. 5
et aE ene ere acn 13

Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway
Co. v C. L. Merit Co., 198 U.S. 416, 41 S.Ct. 142

a as aah cath tects iaiialiselbeleiedtamitine 11
Osborne v The Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) 2... ceeeeeeeeeeeeee 16
Ownbey v Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed.

I lila sheasitaphenigen Saselabinideatebe 15
Phillips Petroleum Co. v Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S.Ct.

is RS CU III ercsceciccceensnesensecasnensinnrensslinnnnsiain 15

Rescue Army v Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331
U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1966 (1947) 0000. §=610

Simmons v West Haven Housing Authority, 399 U.S.

510, 90 S.Ct. 1960, 26 L.Ed. 2d. 764 (1970) .2000... 11
Sperry v Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383,
83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed. 2d. 428 (1963) ........ 00. 12

iv

Page
United Mine Workers v Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S.
217, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed. 2d. 426 (1967) ..............-....- 13
Wilson v Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 793,
CRUD ccscccensuvacinnicsicnsitstiainsabiaintiiatinamn ssininthichieiseaanedidantbeatsinin 6
Zucht v King, 260 U.S. 174, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194
CRD ccxincixiscsssinsicesiiiciseccidintanepiibichbindinesdieliduiiualeamiadaatatini 11
State
Bennett v School District of City of Royal Oak, 10
Mich. App. 265, 159 N.W.2d. 245 (1968) .................... 8
Detroit Bar Ass’n. v Union Guardian Trust Co., 282
Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365 (1938) 0.0... ...-........scecse000 15
Genesee Prosecutor v Circuit Judge, 386 Mich. 672,
ype FR , RE re ear eee soon 8
Quigley v Township of Dexter, 43 Mich. App. 604, 204
Fh Ss CIE scesehiaptoniniicisnaleiniencdintptirinniin 8
State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 132,
BG ee We PRE . so ssciintesdpticnicsbctinatniamieqniiaancinations 15

Constitutional Provisions

Fourteenth Amendment, Constitution of the United
ID ccnecicscccsiunididiaiabiianieetieinandsllpapidee ardaeainpnecalapipsiamiinnie 14, 16

Statutes
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, Section 600.916... 15

Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, Section 450.681.. 15
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, Section 600.8408 16

vV

Rules

Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
I I ictal

Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
IT is ala slencemiaammaanitiin

Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
IN II TIDY sn cctsctesanlacndidelediineeebaneniiMlppenetaiite

Michigan General Court Rules, Rule 405.1 ..................
Michigan General Court Rules, Rule 806.3 ......................
Michigan General Court Rules, Rule 852.1 -.......0..2........
Michigan General Court Rules, Rule 711 .............00.......

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

October Term 1977

ERS Ps eee

PARKING REALTY CO. AND EAN ERIE,
FORMERLY HOPE VAN RIPER,
Petitioners,

Vv
HOWARD SHERLINE,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Respondent, Howard Sherline, respectfully files the fol-
lowing brief in opposition to the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Michigan filed by peti-
tioners.

OPINION BELOW
As indicated in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Michigan (herein ‘‘the Petition’’), no
formal opinion was issued by the Michigan Supreme Court.

2

That court’s Memorandum Order (attached to the Petition
as Appendix A) explicitly states, however, that its con-
sideration of the matter at hand was confined to a holding
that ‘‘. . . plaintiffs-appellants have failed to persuade the
Court that the questions presented should now be reviewed
by the Court or that appellants will suffer substantial harm
by awaiting final judgment or determination before taking
an appeal.’’ This Memorandum Order discloses no con-
sideration by the Michigan Supreme Court of the substan-
tive issue sought to be presented to this Court in the
Petition.

JURISDICTION

The respondent accepts the statement of this Court’s
jurisdiction contained in the Petition. Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 40(3), respondent makes no counter-statement
thereof.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Without conceding that the Petition properly raises an
issue of constitutional dimension, respondent makes no
counter-statement of the constitutional provisions cited
therein.

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Ought this Court to entertain the substantive issue
raised in the Petition when the Supreme Court of Michigan
has not considered that issue and this Court has previously
denied an application by petitioners to seek its review?

2. Inasmuch as this Court has repeatedly recognized the
right of a state to regulate the practice of law, does a state

3

prohibition against non-lawyers representing persons and
entities other than themselves in its circuit courts present
a substantial federal question?

3. Does a state’s regulation of the practice of law,
which reserves the privilege to practice law to natural per-
sons and denies that privilege to fictional persons such as
corporations, create a substantial federal question concern-
ing the classification of persons under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution?

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Howard Sherline, individually and as trustee,
is a minority shareholder in five corporations. He is a
director and officer of each of those corporations. Dorothy
Turkel is the majority shareholder in, and a director and
officer of, each of those corporations. Petitioner Erie is her
daughter, and is neither a shareholder, director or officer in
any of those corporations. Respondent initiated this action
below, alleging gross corporate mismanagement, and joined
as defendants therein Ms. Turkel, Ms. Erie and the five
corporations.

Ms. Turkel is an attorney licensed to practice in the State
of Michigan; Ms. Erie is not. During the course of the pro-
ceedings in the trial court, the individual and corporate
defendants have been represented, in succession, by three
attorneys licensed to practice in the State of Michigan. Ms.
Turkel has not been active, as an attorney, in the repre-
sentation of the defendants.

In August, 1976, Paul J. G. Gravel, Esq., the second of
defendants’ three attorneys, filed a motion to disqualify
the Honorable John M. Wise, the trial judge assigned to

4

hear this cause. The motion was first heard by Judge Wise,
as provided by local court rule, and was denied. An inter-
locutory appeal from this ruling was sought by Mr. Gravel
and dismissed by the Michigan Court of Appeals on the
ground that Michigan General Court Rule 405.1 required
that the matter first be considered by another judge of the
same trial bench. Mr. Gravel was thereupon discharged as
counsel to the defendants.

The defendants then retained Frederick B. Bellamy, Esq.,
who refiled the motion for disqualification in November,
1976. Pursuant to local court rule, this motion was assigned
to the Honorable Roman 8S. Gribbs. In January, 1977,
petitioner Erie filed a supplemental motion for disqualifica-
tion which was also assigned to Judge Gribbs. Both motions
were assigned for hearing on February 4, 1977. At that
hearing, petitioner Erie discharged Mr. Bellamy as counsel
and announced her intention to proceed on the motion for
disqualification on behalf of herself, her mother and the
five defendant corporations. Judge Gribbs indicated to
petitioner Erie that he would entertain the motion as one
made on her own behalf, but that, as a non-lawyer, she could
not represent her mother or the five corporations. Judge
Gribbs adjourned the hearing until February 15, 1977 to
permit him an opportunity to review the hundreds of pages
of material filed by Ms. Erie.

In the interim between February 4, 1977 and February
15, 1977, petitioner Erie sought emergency review by the
Michigan Court of Appeals of Judge Gribbs’ comments
concerning her right to represent persons other than her-
self. That court denied her application by its Order dated
February 15, 1977.

At the resumed hearing before Judge Gribbs on Feb-

5)

ruary 15, 1977, argument was offered on the motion for
disqualification and Judge Gribbs gave his oral ruling
thereon, denying the motion. A formal order denying the
motion was entered by Judge Gribbs on March 4, 1977. A
copy of that Order is annexed hereto as Appendix A.

Petitioners’ account of these proceedings before Judge
Gribbs, as set forth in their Petition, is erroneous in two
respects. First, Judge Gribbs did not dismiss petitioner
Erie’s motion for disqualification ‘‘... on the ground solely
that the motion was not presented by an attorney-at-law
duly licensed to practice by the State of Michigan.’’ (Peti-
tion at 1). To the contrary, Appendix A annexed hereto
clearly discloses that Judge Gribbs considered the motion
on its merits, as one filed by a party acting im propria
persona, and denied it. Second, petitioners contend through-
out their argument that Judge Gribbs held that corpora-
tions may not have access to Michigan courts without a
licensed attorney. Again, this is factually inaccurate. Judge
Gribbs’ oral comments, excerpts from which appear on
page 3 of the Petition, were confined to the question of
whether Ms. Erie could provide legal representation to
persons other than herself.

Subsequent to the hearings described above, petitioner
Erie sought simultaneous review, on an emergency basis,
in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme
Court. The applications filed by her consisted of a jumbled
collage of hundreds of pages of corporate minutes, reprints
of law review articles, lists of alleged CIA agents, Freud-
ian analyses of Judge Wise’s alleged psychiatric problems
and quotations from treatises on satanism and witchcraft.
Both appellate courts dismissed Ms. Erie’s applications.
The orders of dismissal are annexed to the Petition as
Appendices A and B.

6

On or about April 8, 1977, petitioner Erie filed an ‘‘ Ap-
plication for Emergency Appeal or, In the Alternative,
Claim for Superintending Control’’ with this Court. That
application, like the instant Petition, sought this Court’s
review of petitioner Erie’s claim of the right to represent
the other defendants in this cause. By letter dated April
25, 1977, Ms. Erie’s application was returned, with the
notation ‘‘Application denied April 23, 1977 Potter
Stewart.’’ A copy of the letter of notification is annexed
hereto as Appendix B.

This matter remains pending in the Cireuit Court for
the County of Wayne, Michigan and is awaiting trial.

ARGUMENT

1. The substantive issue upon which petitioners seek this
Court’s review was neither presented to nor decided by
the Courts of Michigan; hence, this Court’s consideration
of that issue as raised in the instant Petition would be
inappropriate.

This Court has long recognized and consistently declared
that, in reviewing the judgments and opinions issued by the
courts of the several states, this Court’s consideration
should be reserved for those Constitutional issues fairly
presented to, and squarely decided by, the courts of last
resort of those states. Black v Cutter Laboratories, 351
U.S. 292, 76 S.Ct. 824, 100 L. Ed. 1188 (1956); Durley v
Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 76 S.Ct. 806, 100 L. Ed. 1178 (1956) ;
Buck v California, 343 U.S. 99, 72 S.Ct. 502, 96 L. Ed. 775
(1952) ; Wilson v Cook, 327 U.S. 474, S.Ct. 663, 90 L. Ed. 66
(1952). This doctrine is rooted both in the basic concept of
federalism upon which our system of jurisprudence is
based and in the elementary notion that a court’s decisions

7

should not be evaluated as to issues not fairly presented
for its consideration in the first instance.

In the case at bar, petitioners seek this Court’s con-
demnation of ‘‘{t]he refusal of the Michigan Courts to
permit a corporation to represent itself in litigation . . .’’
In respondent’s view, this phrasing of the issue wholly
mischaracterizes the matters presented to and decided by
the Michigan courts in this cause and substantially exceeds
the proper bounds of aggressive advocacy.

The comments of the trial judge concerning Ms. Erie’s
attempts to represent persons other than herself are fairly
presented in the excerpts from his remarks quoted on page
3 of the Petition. Plainly stated, Judge Gribbs ruled only
the Ms. Erie could not represent, as counsel, her mother and
five corporations of which she is neither a shareholder,
officer nor director.’ It is worthy of mention that this ruling
was delivered from the bench as an observation in the
course of argument on the defendants’ motion for disquali-
fication of the trial judge. No order concerning this issue
was ever requested by petitioners or entered by the court.

It ought further to be noted that, contrary to the asser-
tion in the Petition, Judge Gribbs did not dismiss petitioner
Erie’s motion for disqualification because she is a non-
lawyer. Indeed, the trial court’s comments to Ms. Erie set
forth in the Petition include the court’s statement that
‘¢| |. you may appear on the 15th on your own behalf .. .”’
for the purpose of pursuing the motion for disqualification.
Judge Gribbs’ Order clearly states that petitioner Erie’s
motion was considered and denied.

1The Petition includes the statement (at page 4) that Ms. Erie is
“managing agent” of Petitioner Parking Realty Co. and the other
four defendant corporations. No mention of this term, nor any facts
which would support its use, appears in the record below.

In this posture, this matter was brought simultaneously
to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme
Court on pleadings authored by petitioner Erie and
variously entitled Application for Emergency Appeal, or
in the Alternative, Claim for Superintending Control and
Cross-Application for Emergency Appeal or, in the Alter-
native, Claim for Superintending Control. As noted above,
these pleadings were exceedingly voluminous, contained
reams of extraneous materials dealing with random is-
sues, and requested extraordinary relief on an interlocu-
tory basis.

Michigan General Court Rules 806.3 and 852.1 set forth
the standards which must be met by an applicant seeking
interlocutory review by the Michigan Court of Appeals
and Michigan Supreme Court respectively. In general,
these provisions require a showing of one or more of
the following factors: 1) involvement of a controlling ques-
tion of law or an issue of major significance to the juris-
prudence of the state, 2) clear error in the decision below,
3) involvement of a challenge to the validity of a legislative
act or an issue of substantial public interest, and 4) likeli-
hood of substantial harm if an adjudication is delayed.
The power of superintending control over inferior courts
in granted to Michigan appellate courts in Michigan Gen-
eral Court Rule 711. The authorities uniformly indicate
that this power is discretionary, that its office is to control
inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction and that
it should not be utilized where adequate alternative reme-
dies are available. Genesee Prosecutor v Circuit Judge,
386 Mich. 672, 194 N.W.2d 693 (1972) ; Quigley v Township
of Dexter, 43 Mich. App. 654, 204 N.W. 2d 257 (1972);
Bennett v School Dist of City of Royal Oak, 10 Mich. App.
265, 159 N.W.2d 245 (1968). It is against the background

9

of the foregoing facts and the above-described rules of
procedure applicable to their consideration of cases, that
the orders of the Michigan appellate courts must be evalua-
ted.

The order of the Michigan Court of Appeals (Appendix
B to the Petition) dismissed Ms. Erie’s various applica-
tions on two bases: 1) that petitioner Erie had failed
‘*. . . to persuade the Court of the need for immediate
appellate review .. .,’’ and 2) that the applications and
briefs filed by her were ‘‘. . . grossly lacking in compliance
with . . .”’ applicable procedural rules. Discussion of the
first of these grounds may be deferred and considered in
connection with the similar ruling of the Michigan Supreme
Court. As to the latter ground, while no mention thereof
is made in the Petition, undersigned counsel assures the
Court that the procedural irregularities in Ms. Erie’s
pleadings were both substantial and fundamental. Clearly
no federal question cf substance is presented by this latter
holding. Herb v Pitcarin, 324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 59, 89 L.Ed.
789 (1944).

The order of the Michigan Supreme Court (Appendix A
to the Petition) also reflects two grounds upon which Ms.
Erie’s applications were dismissed, namely: 1) that she
had ‘‘. . . failed to persuade the Court that the questions
presented should now be reviewed by the Court . . .,’’ and 2)
there had been no showing that the defendant-appellants
‘¢ | will suffer substantial harm by awaiting final judg-
ment or determination before taking an appeal.’’ As to the
first of these grounds (and the similar ruling by the Michi-
gan Court of Appeal), it is patent that the court’s ruling
evidences merely the conclusion that the facts presented
did not merit the exercise of its conceded discretion to grant
or withhold extraordinary relief on an emergency hasis in

10

an interlocutory matter. As to the latter ground, the court’s
opinion simply refleets its failure te perceive imminent and
substantial harm to the defendant-appellants. It may be
inferred that this conclusion is grounded in the fact that
Judge Gribbs did accord Ms. Erie a full and complete op-
portunity to present her motion on her own behalf, and
that little prejudice could result from her inability to
present the same motion on behalf of parties other than
herself.

In effect, the instant Petition requests this Court to issue
an advisory opiuion to the Michigan appellate courts di-
recting them as to how and when to exercise their discre-
tion in considering emergency appeals in interlocutory
matters. Petitioners’ claim that this case presents the ab-
stract issue of ‘‘corporate self-representation’’ is plainly
belied by the record. By their orders, the Michigan appellate
courts plainly indicate that their consideration of this
matter was confined, and properly confined, to a determina-
tion of whether the facts here presented warranted the
exercise of their discretion in granting extraordinary in-
terlocutory relief. That exercise of discretion, we submit,
is not properly reviewable by this Court on a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. Moreover, Mr. Justice Stewart’s denial
of petitioner Erie’s previous application to this Court for
review of the issue raised in her current Petition provides
additional support for the conclusion that the Petition now
before the Court ought to be dismissed.

Finally, given the voluminous, rambling, and obfuscatory
nature of petitioner Erie’s pleadings in the Michigan ap-
pellate courts, all of which pervades and clouds the record,
this Court, in its discretion, should deny the Petition.
Rescue Army v Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S.

11

549, 67 S. Ct. 1409, 91 L. Ed. 1966 (1947); International
Board of Teamsters v Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 334 U.S.
809, 68 S. Ct. 1015, 92 L. Ed. 1741 (1948); DeBacker v
Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 29-30, 90 S. Ct. 163, 24 L. Ed. 2d 148
(1969); Simmons v West Haven Housing Authority, 399
U.S. 510, 90 S. Ct. 1960, 26 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1970).

2. The claim of petitioner Erie of a right to represent, as
counsel, persons other than herself fails to raise a
federal question of substance.

Rule 19.1 of the United States Supreme Court Rules
provides :

; **A review on Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only where there are special and important
reasons therefor.’’ (Emphasis supplied).

Subsection (a) of Rule 19 indicates the character of reasons
which will be considered by the Court in exercising such
discretion :

‘*Where a state court has decided a federal ques-
tion of substance not theretofore determined by this
Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in
accord with applicable decisions of this Court.’’

In analyzing what consitutes a ‘‘substantial’’ federal
question for purpose of Supreme Court review, this Court
has repeatedly held that a question is not substantial where
previous decisions of the Court are uniform and consistent
in resolving it. California Water Service Co. v City of
Redding, 304 US. 252, 58 S. Ct. 865, 82 L. Ed. 1323 (1937) ;
Zucht v King, 260 U.S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed. 194
(1922) ; Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway
Co. v C. L. Merit Co., 254 U.S. 376, 41 S. Ct. 142, 67 L. Ed.
312 (1920); Leonard v Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Pacific

12

Railroad Co., 198 U.S. 416, 25 S. Ct. 758, 49 L. Ed. 1108
(1904). The question which petitioners seek to foist upon
this Court is precisely of this character. Properly framed,
‘¢.. its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous
decisions of this Court as to foreclose the subject.’’ Calt-
fornia Water Service Co., supra, at 255.

This Court has long recognized:

‘« . . that the states have a compelling interest in
the practice of professions within their boundaries,
... they have broad powers to establish standards for
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of
professions. ... The interests of the states in regulat-
ing lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been
‘officers of the court.’ ”’

Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 8. Ct.
2004, 44 L.Ed. 2d 572, 588 (1975); Sperry v Florida ez rel.,
Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed. 2d
428 (1963) ; Cohen v Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-124, 81 S. Ct.
954, 6 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1961); Law Student’s Research Coun-
cil y Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 157, 91 S. Ct. 720, 27 L. Ed.
2d 749 (1971). Clearly, the single most important aspect of
proper regulation of the practice of law is the power of the
state to prohibit unlicensed and unqualified individuals,
such as petitioner Erie here, from acting as attorney and
counselor to others. Petitioners ignore this Court’s empha-
tic acknowledgment of this fundamental state power and
argue, in effect, that the Constitution confers upon Ean
Erie an unfettered right to represent others. Claims of such
a right have been uniformly rejected by this Court as being
utterly without merit.

In Hacken v Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 88 8. Ct. 325, 19 L. Ed.

13

2d 347 (1967), a non-lawyer, having represented an indi-
gent prisoner in an Arizona state court was convicted under
an Arizona statute making the unauthorized practice of law
a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied a
Petition for Habeas Corpus, affirming the conviction. Ap-
peal was made to this Court and, in a per curiam opinion,
was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
In Martin v Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S. Ct. 1, 7 L. Ed. 2d 5
(1961), a lawyer, admitted to the Bars of Kansas and
Missouri, brought an action in mandamus in Kansas to
compel a judge of the Kansas probate court to permit him
to try cases in the Kansas probate court without the asso-
ciation of Kansas counsel. Kansas statutes and court rules
provide that an attorney admitted to the Kansas bar, who
is also a member of the Bar of another state and regularly
engaged in the practice of law in that state, must associate
with local counsel in Kansas before he can appear in
Kansas courts. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed a
lower court’s order quashing the Writ in spite of a claim
that the Kansas statutes and court rules were in contra-
vention of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a per curiam
opinion, this Court dismissed the appeal for want of a
substantial federal question, holding that the statute and
rules at issue were ‘‘.. . not beyond the allowable range of
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Martin,
supra, at 26.7

*In numerous cases prior to Martin and Hacken, both supra, this
Court has recognized and upheld the state’s power to regulate the
privilege to practice law, to ensure that only qualified individuals
presume to counsel others as to their legal interests. Konigsberg v
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S. Ct. 722, 1 L. Ed. 2d 810
(1957) ; Dent v West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. Ed.
623 (1889); Lathrop v Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 81 S. Ct. 1826, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 1191 (1961); United Mine Workers v Illinois State Bar,
389 U.S. 217, 88 S. Ct. 353, 19 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1967).

14

A final and fatal blow to the patently frivolous claim of
petitioners is provided by Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
83 S. Ct. 1028, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93, 95 ALR 2d 1347 (1963). In
Ferguson, a Kansas statute restricted the business of ‘‘debt
adjusting’’ to licensed attorneys. Plaintiff claimed the sta-
tute violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court was
unanimous in rejecting the claim, saying: ‘‘If the State of
Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid it.’’ Ferguson, supra, at
732.

Petitioners ignore all these cases and the fundamental
concept they reflect in baldly asserting that Ean Erie has
a constitutional right to act as an attorney for others. The
decided cases of this Court are uniform and emphatic in
rejecting such claims. The Petition fails to raise a sub-
stantial federal question and should be rejected.

3. A state’s reservation of the privilege to engage in the
practice of law to natural persons, and the denial of
that privilege to corporations, raises no substantial
federal question under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.

Respondent earnestly submits that the arguments pre-
sented in the foregoing sections of this Brief thoroughly
dispose of petitioners’ contention that this Court should
entertain review of the abstract issue of ‘‘corporate self-
representation’’ posed in the Petition. It is without trepida-
tion, however, that respondent addresses that issue on the
merits.

We begin with the acknowledgement that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution includes corporations as persons within

15

its purview and prohibits discrimination among persons
by classifications which lack rational basis. This Court has
recognized, nonetheless, that distinctions between corporate
persons and natural persons, where based on rational dis-
tinctions, are constitutionally sound. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S. Ct. 611, 80 L. Ed. 943,
reh. denied, 298 U.S. 691, 56 S. Ct. 745, 80 L. Ed. 1409
(1936) ; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129,
42 S. Ct. 42, 66 L. Ed. 166 (1921); Ownbey v Morgan, 256
U.S. 94, 41 S. Ct. 433, 65 L. Ed. 837 (1921).

In the matter at hand, the Michigan legislature has re-
served the privilege to practice law to those natural persons
licensed by it (M.C.L.A. §600.916) and has forbidden
corporations from practicing law for others (M.C.L.A.
§450.681). The Michigan Supreme Court has concluded that
corporations must appear in its circuit courts by a licensed
attorney. Detroit Bar Ass’n v Union Guardian Trust Co.,
282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365, reh. denied, 282 Mich. 707, 711,
N.W.432 (1938). Respondent suggests that this classification
is both rational and necessary. Perforce, a corporation
cannot practice law; it must, if it is to appear in court,
appear through some natural person. It would be equally
ludicrous to suggest that a corporation could practice
surgery. The Michigan regulation of the practice of law
simply requires that all such natural persons who seek to
practice law for others than themselves be licensed to do
so. The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently noted that
the substantial state interests which underlie this regulatory
scheme include the protection of the public and the assur-
ance that practitioners of the law are subject to disciplinary
procedures. State Bar of Michigan v Cramer, 399 Mich. 116,
132, 134, ...... NW 2d ....... (1976). The legitimacy of these
important state interests is beyond dispute.

16

It is of no moment, we submit, that the Michigan legisla-
ture has permitted corporations to appear in its small
claims courts without counsel (M.C.L.A. §600.8408), since
this very section prohibits the participation of attorneys
in small claims cases, except on their own behalf. Hence,
unless corporations were permitted to appear through non-
lawyers, they could not appear at all.

We further submit that petitioners’ reliance on this
Court’s opinion in Kentucky Finance Corp. v Para-
mount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 43 S. Ct.
636, 67 L. Ed. 112 (1923), is misplaced. There, this Court
faced a state statute which placed on corporate litigants a
vexatious and irrational burden in connection with the
situs of the production of its corporate records. Here, the
Michigan regulatory scheme imposes no analogous burden.
Rather, it has merely identified the indisputable fact that
corporations are inherently incapable of appearing in court
except through a natural person and that, in consequence,
they must so appear through a natural person licensed and
authorized to practice law. This conclusion does not offend
the Equal Protection Clause and is in harmony with this
Court’s decision in Osborn v The Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (1824). Petitioners
cite no authority to the contrary.

Lastly, petitioners ask this Court to engage in a debate
with the State of Michigan as to the wisdom of confining
the practice of law to natural persons. In the great tradition
of federalism, this Court has declined such invitations. In
Ferguson, supra, the Court stated:

‘*We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need,
or appropriateness of the legislation. . . . this Court
does not sit to subject the State to an intolerable
supervision hostile to the basic principles of our

—— = oe

a ee

ee te — -

17

Government and wholly beyond the protection which
the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to secure.’’ Ferguson, supra, at 730.

Petitioners simply ignore this settled and fundamental
principle of federalism and insist ‘‘there is no good reason

. why Parking Realty Co. should not be permitted to
have petitioner Ean Erie represent it .. .’’ (Petition at 9)
The State of Michigan, in its wisdom, has decided there
are very good reasons to regulate who may appear in its
courts as attorneys for others. That wisdom, and the power
to effect it, has always been respected by this Court.

18

CONCLUSION

The issue which the Petition requests this Court to ad-
dress was never considered by the Michigan appellate
courts. Those courts properly confined their attention to
an examination of whether the facts presented to them
justified the exercise of their discretion in granting emer-
gency interlocutory review of the trial judge’s actions in
this cause. This Court has never considered the exercise
of such discretion properly reviewable.

Respondent further submits that the claim asserted by
Ms. Erie that she may represent, as counsel, her mother and
five corporations of which she is neither a shareholder,
director nor officer is patently frivolous and wholly fails
to present a substantial federal question. Finally, we urge
that the statutes and appellate decisions under which
Michigan has reserved to licensed attorneys the privilege
of engaging in the practice of law do not present a color-
able claim of improper classification or discrimination
against corporations under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. We urge that the Petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone
Gilbert E. Gove
Carl H. von Ende
R. Richard Livorine

300 Wabeek Building

Birmingham, Michigan 48011
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent

Dated: August 10, 1977

19

APPENDIX A

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
COUNTY OF WAYNE

HOWARD SHERLINE, Individually
and as Executor and Trustee,

Plaintiff,
vs. No. 75-071-519-CK
PARKING REALTY COMPANY, et al.

Defendants.

Carl H. von Ende (P-21867)
Attorney for Plaintiff

ORDER DENYING SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY THE JUDGE

At a session of said Court held in the City of Detroit,
County of Wayne, State of Michigan on March 4, 1977.

PRESENT: HONORABLE ROMAN S. GRIBBS, Cir-
cuit Court Judge

This matter having come before the Honorable Roman
S. Gribbs by designation by Presiding Judge James N.
Canham for consideration of the Supplemental Motion to
Disqualify the Judge filed by defendant Ean Erie, a/k/a
Hope Van Riper, and hearings on said Motion having been
conducted on February 4, 1977 and February 15, 1977; and
the Court having heard argument from defendants Erie
and Turkel and from counsel for the plaintiff; and the
Court having fully considered the contents of the afore-
said Supplemental Motion and the Reply and Brief filed
in opposition thereto by counsel for the plaintiff; and the
Court being fully advised in the premises ;

20

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Supplemental
Motion to Disqualify the Judge filed in this cause by
defendant Ean Erie be, and the same hereby is, denied.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the oral
motion by plaintiff’s counsel for the award of costs and
actual attorneys fees in connection with said Supplemental
Motion is reserved for consideration by the judge to whom
this case is assigned.

/s/ ROMAN S. GRIBBS
Circuit Court Judge

A TRUE COPY
JAMES R. KILLEEN, Clerk

oe ee
Deputy Clerk

21

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

April 25, 1977
Ms. Ean Erie
1420 David Whitney Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Re: Ean Erie, formerly Hope Van Riper v.
Howard Sherline, et al., A-871

Dear Ms. Erie:

Your applications in the above-entitled case have been
presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, who has endorsed thereon
the following:

‘* Application denied
April 23, 1977
Potter Stewart’’

Please notify opposing counsel of this action.

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., Clerk

By: /s/ PETER K. BECK
Assistant Clerk

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2204%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.