# Appendix — Humboldt Placer Mining Co. v. Andrus

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 836

## Text

In The .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1976

No. 76-1856

HUMBOLDT PLACER MINING COMPANY,

Petitioner,
Vv.

CECIL ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VOLUME I A-1 to A-63

William Braly Murray
Attorney for Petitioner
1610 Standard Plaza
Portland, Oregon 97204
Telephone: (503) 226-3819

INDEX TO APPENDIX
VOLUME I

Order denying petition for
rehearing Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit Case No. 74-2763,

249 F2d 622, January 6, 1977

Summary Judgment, U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District
of California, Civil S-2755,
entered June 12, 1974.

Interior Board of Land Appeals
Decision December 20, 1972,
8 IBLA 407, IBLA 70-205

Decision of Francis A, Patton,
Acting Chief, Office of Appeals
and Hearings, June 9, 1970.

VOLUME II
Decision of Hearing Examiner,
Rudolph M. Steiner, March 6,1969

Hearing Examiner's Rulings or:
Proposed Findings, March 6, 1969

Requested Findings and Findings
Adopted

Administrative Procedure Act
5 uScC §557, Agency Findings

Common Varieties Act, 30 USC §611l

Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure - Summary Judgment

Page

A-2

A-39

A-64

A-91

A-96

A-130
A-132

A-133

A-1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HUMBOLDT PLACER MINING COMPANY, )
a corporation, and DEL DE ROSIER. )Filed
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )Mar. 28,
)1977
vs. )
)No. 74-
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ) 2762
INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF )
AMERICA, ) ORDER
Defendant~-Appellee. )

Before: MERRILL and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit
Judges, and JAMESON, District
Judge

The panel as constituted in the above
case has voted to deny the petition for
rehearing. Judge Hufstedler has voted to
reject the suggestion for rehearing in
banc and Judges Merrill and Jameson have
recommended such rejection,

The full court has been advised of the
suggestion for an in banc hearing, and no
judge of the court has requested a vote
on the suggestion for rehearing in banc.
Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied
and the suggestion for a eetibaring in
banc is rejected.

A-2

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HumBoipr PLacer Minina Company, a corpo |
ration, and De. De Rosmsr,
Plaintifs-Appellants, | 01, 74.0762

V8.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE InTE- | OPINION
RIOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee. ;

[January 6, 1977]

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California

Before: MERRILL and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges,
and JAMESON,® District Judge

MERRILL, Circuit Judge:

At issue are appellants’ rights to compensation for the seizure
by the United States of appellants’ interests in certain unpat-
ented placer mining claims, located on Stuart’s Fork of the
Trinity River in Trinity County, California. On June 27, 1957,
the United States commenced a condemnation action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California to secure title
to these claims and other property for use in connection with the
construction of Trinity Dam and Reservoir. Later, on March 17,
1960, the Secretary of the Interior commenced administrative
proceedings to contest the validity of the claims. The jurisdic-
tional propriety of these proceedings was challenged but ulti-
mately upheld. Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334
(1963). In this action appellants seek judicial review of those

proceedings.

*Honorable William J. Jameson, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.

A- 3
2 Humboldt Placer Mining Con-.pany, et al. vs.

Appellants’ claims were all located more than fifty years ago,
but applications for patents were not made until 1954. The dis-
covery originally claimed was of gold, assertedly embedded in
the gravel of what is known as the Weaverville Formation
on Stuart’s Fork. The appellants’ claims are northeast of the
LaGrange mine, which is on the same Weaverville Formation
and for many years was operated with apparent success.

Before a hearing examiner of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, appellants asserted that the claims had value not only as
a gold placer but also as a gravel deposit. Under the Act of
July 23, 1955, 30 U.S.C. §611, deposits of “common varieties”
of gravel are declared not to be valuable mineral deposits within
the meaning of the mining laws. Thus the facts present four dates
having varying points of relevance: that of the patent applica-
tion in 1954, that of the effective date of the common varieties
act in 1955, that of the taking of the claims by the United
States in 1957 and that of the filing of contest by the United
States in 1960. Arguments can be advanced in support of any
one of them as the critical date for ascertainment of either gold
or gravel value. We resist the temptation to resolve the question.
Instead, we assume for the purposes of this case that if value
existed on any one date, it existed on all.

The hearing examiner held that value was lacking both as to
gold and as to gravel. His decision was upheld by the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). United States v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., 8 I.B.L.A. 407 (1972). Appellants then sought
judicial review and revereal of the IBLA decision. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and
this appeal followed. We affirm.

Gold

In support of its contest the United States conducted a com-
prehensive exploration program on the claims between 1957 and
1961.1 Four mining engineers and geologists testified before the

|
:
H

A- 4
Sec’y of the Depart. of the Interior of the U.S.of America 3

hearing examiner that as a result of this exploration program
they had formed the opinion that on none of the claims had
there been a valid discovery of gold of value sufficient to meet
the prudent-man test. See United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S.
599, 602 (1968), citing the standards set in Castle v. Womble,
19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894): “Where minerals have been found and
the evidence is of such a character that a person of ordinary
prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his
labor and means with a reasonable prospect of success in devel-
oping a valuable mine.”

In support of their claim of gold value, appellants submitted
various reports. The hearing examiner acted well within his dis-
eretion as a finder of fact in discounting these reports. Some of
them were business records of the appellants, written prior to
1942. While they reflected some significant gold values, they were
very general. The appellants also submitted a report by Merrill
Yost which included some drill logs and contained evidence of
high gold values. This evidence, however, was refuted by the
appellee’s sampling conducted in the immediate vicinity of Yost’s
excavations and drill holes. Moreover, Yost did not testify and
subject himself to cross-examination to support his report,
although he was apparently available. In weighing the evidence,
the hearing examiner could reasonably have found the appel-
lants’ reports to be unpersuasive.

Much of appellants’ case was based on the fact that the claims
were on the Weaverville Formation, the value of which had been
established by the success of the LaGrange mine. Discovery must,
however, be made on the claims themselves. The LaGrange prox-
imitvy might indeed persuade a reasonable prospector to continue
to search for valuable minerals, but he must succeed in his search
before discovery occurs. Henault Mining Co. v. Tysk, 419 F.2d
766 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 750 (1970). The reason-
ably prudent man we are concerned with is the miner who has
made his discovery and not the prospector who is still looking.

Appellants also rely on testimony by Florian Gibson, a geolo-
gist, that the claims had high value placer gold deposits. As to
this testimony the hearing examiner stated:

“The fantastic gold values reported by Gibson were based
on surface samples taken over a five hour period, as con-

A-5
ms Humboldt Placer Mining Company, et al. vs.

trasted with the extensive exploration program conducted by
the Contestant involving several man-years. The samples were
assayed by the so-called Douglas process involving the use
of unidentified solutions. There is no supporting evidence of
the nature of the unidentified solutions or positive evidence
of the process by which the gold could be recovered. Gold
values averaging one hundred dollars per cubic yard, consist-
ing of either coarse or microscopic particles, would surely
be identifiable by normal fire assay. The Douglas tests refiect-
ing average gold values of one hundred dollars per cubic
yard, and as high as two hundred dollars gold per cubic
yard of material in place, are simply unworthy of belief.”

Appellants criticized the exploratory work of the government
as not extensive enough to establish a lack of value. They assert
that the government drill holes should have been extended down
to bedrock, where gold is most likely to lodge. Appellants, how-
ever, mistake the burden of proof in these cases. The burden of

nited States in contesting validity is to make out a prima

i of lack of value. The burden then shifts to the claim-
by a preponderance of evidence, that the claim is
ited States v. Springer, 491 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir.),
419 U.S. 834 (1974); United States v. Zweifel, 508
1157 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829, reh.
U.S. 1008 (1975). The United States here undoubt-
established a prima facie case. If anyone had the bur-
to bedrock it was appellants in order to rebut the
the government.

examiner concluded that the United States had
its prima facie case of lack of value and that appel-
not met the burden of overcoming that case. IBLA, in

cEfe
ret

Toe
4! ae

A-6
Sec’y of the Depart. of the Interior of the U.S.of America 5

gravel occur in the claims. Substantial deposits of material
suitable for fill and sub-base in highway construction and
more limited deposits of recent stream gravels suitable for
use as concrete aggregate do occur on the claims. However,
these deposits do not constitute valuable mineral deposits
unless they are shown to be marketable. There is not a shred
of evidence in the record that there has ever been any
demand for the subject sand and gravel deposits, or that
any portion thereof has ever been removed from the claims
for use in concrete aggregate or for any other purposes.
The fact that there is a very limited annual market in small
towns in Northern California which have other existing
sources of supply, and the possibility of the future con-
struction of highways and dams in the area, do not consti-
tute evidence of a demand for these particular deposits.
In the absence of more specific evidence that these particular
sand and gravel deposits could have been removed and dis
posed of-at a profit on or before July 23, 1955, it must be
concluded that the same do not constitute valuable mineral
deposits within the meaning of the mining laws.”

marketed at a profit prior to July 23, 1955. Moreover, appel-
lants have failed to establish by substantial and probative

Appellants, citing Verrue v. United States, 457 F.2d 1202,
1204 (9th Cir. 1972), argue that lack of sales of gravel from the
claims figures unduly in the findings of the hearing examiner
and IBLA to the effect that marketability of the material had
not been established. In Verrue we held that “positive evidence
in the record of marketability” was not offset by evidence of the
lack of sales of material and the availability of comparable mate-
rial from other sources.*? Verrue does not apply here. Here there
was no positive evidence of marketability to to overcome the gov
ernment’s prima facie case. Further the determination of IBLA
that the government had made out a prima facie case of lack
of discovery was supported by testimony disparaging the quality
of the gravel on the claima

F
t
see
FE

A-8
Sec’y of the Depart. of the Interior of the U.S.of America 7

The first record citation is apparently an error. The second has
reference to the following testimony of government witness,
George Scarfe, on cross-examination:

“Q Now, do you agree with this statement that: ‘Sand
and gravel deposits along the Trinity River and Stuart’s
Fork are being considered as sources for concrete aggregate
for the Trinity and Lewiston Dams and tunnel lining, while
gravels which occur upon land contained in the above Placer
Mining locations are being considered as the sources to the
required impervious embankment material for the Fairview
Dam.’

Do you agree with this statement that the material on
these claims among which are those that you examined are
suitable for this particular purpose?

A They said they are being considered. I agree, well, I
have no reason to disagree. I hadn’t seen this report.”

Finding No. 6 is to read as a paraphrase of this testimony;
it is the only construction supported by the record. So construed
we do not find it to conflict with the Board’s decision. See Ideal
Basic Industries, Inc. v. Morton, No. 74-2298 at 5-8 (9th Cir.
Sep. 28, 1976).

Judgment affirmed.

PERNAU-WALSH PRINTING 0O., SAN FRANCISCO 1-13-77—410

A-9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUMBOLDT PLACER MINING COMPANY, )
a corporation, and DEL DE ROSIER. ) Civil
Plaintiffs, )S-2755

Vv. )

)

)

)

)

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,

Defendant

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
having been submitted to the Court on Aug-
ust 30, 1973, and the Court having con-
sidered the pleadings in the action, de-
fendant’s Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities, dated May 22, 1973, Plaintiff Hum-
boldt’s Motion for Summary Judgment in
Response to Defendant's Motion, filed Aug-
ust 13, 1973, Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Response to Plain-
tiff’s Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed August 28,
1973, and the certified administrative
record, and having found that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and
having concluded that defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, it is
hereby

ORDERED, that defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is in all respects
granted, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiffs’ Complaint in the above entitled
action be and hereby is dismissed with

A-10

prejudice.
Dated: [June 12, 1974]

/s/ a anh P. Wilkins
UNITED STATES DI JUDGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS
4015 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington VA

22203

UNITED STATES
Vv.
HUMBOLDT PLACER MINING COMPANY
and
DEL DE ROSIER

IBLA 70-205 Decided December 20, 1972

Appeal from decision (California Con-
test 10-474) of the Office of Appeals and
Hearings, Bureau of Land Management, hold-
ing mining claims null and void.

Affirmed.

Mining Claims: Discovery: Marketability~--
Mining Claims: Common Varieties of Minerals:
Generally--Mining Claims: Placer Claims

To satisfy the requirements for dis-
covery on a placer mining claim located
for common varieties of sand and gravel
before July 23, 1955, it must be shown
that the materials within the limits of
the claim, by reason of accessibility,
bona fides in development, proximinty
to market, existence of present demand,
and other factors, could have been
extracted, removed, and marketed at a
profit as of that date.

A-11l IBLA 70-205

Mining Claims: Discovery: Marketability
The Government may raise a presumption
that the material on mining claims could
not be extracted and marketed at a pro-
fit by introducing evidence that the
Claimant has done nothing to develop
the claim,

Mining Claims: Contests--Mining Claims:
Discovery: Generally
Government mineral examiners have no
affirmative duty to search for indica-
tions of a discovery on a mining claim;
nor do they have a duty to go beyond
examining the discovery points of a
Claimant. Their function is to examine
the discovery points made available by
a claimant and to verify, if possible,
the claimed discovery.
8 IBLA 407

Rules of Practice: Appeals: Burden of

Proof--Contests and Protests: Generally
Where the Government has made a prima
facie showing of a lack of discovery,
the burden of producing preponderating
evidence of the existence of a valuable
mineral desposit sufficient to support
a discovery is upon claimant.

Rules of Practice: Evidence
The weight and creditibility of evi-
dence are matters properly considered
by an Administrative Law Judge in the
first instance. His findings, when
in accord with the preponderance of
the substantial and probative evidence
adduced, will not be disturbed.

APPEARANCES: William B, Murray, Esq.,
Portland, Oregon, for the appellants;

A-12 IBLA 70-205

Charles F, Lawrence, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, Department of Agriculture,
San Francisco, California; Burton J. Stan-
ley, Esq. Office of the Solicitor, Depart-
ment of the Interior, Sacramento, Califor-
nia,

OPINION BY MR, FISHMAN

The Humboldt Placer Mining Company and
Del de Rosier have appealed from a decision
dated June 9, 1970, rendered by the Office
of Appeals and Hearings, Bureau of Land
Management, hereinafter termed the "Bureau
decision.” That decision affirmed a decis-
ion of a Hearing Examiner 1/ dated March 6,
1969. which declared the placer mining
Claims in issue null and void for lack of
a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
on any of the claims,

The Humboldt Placer Mining Company is
a corporation which was organized in 1896.
All of its mining claims in issue were lo-
cated prior to 1920. On November 19, 1954,
Humboldt filed a patent application for
the claims in issue, On June 27, 1957,
the United States commenced an action in
the District Court to condemn certain pro-
perty which included the land embraced
within the claims in order to construct
the Trinity River Dam and Reservoir. After
obtaining a writ of possession in the
District Court, the United States, on

I7 The United States Civil Service Com-
mission has changed the title "Hearing
Examiner" to “Administrative Law Judge.”
37 F. R. 16787 (August 17, 1972). Here-
inafter that official will be referred to
as “Judge”.

A-13 IBLA 70-205

May 15, 1958, instituted a contest pro-
ceeding in the local Land Office of the
Bureau seeking an administrative deter-
mination of the validity of the unpatented
mining claims. Humboldt thereupon brought
suit to enjoin the administrative proceed-
ings, contending that the proper jurisdic-
tion to determine the validity of the
claims was in the courts. The issue of
jurisdicticn was ultimately decided by the
United States Supreme Court — Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining C 371 U.S.
337 (1963), in which it was held chet the
issue of the validity of the claims was

to be resolved by the Department of Inter-
ior. In the interim, contestees prosecuted
an appeal to the Secretary of the Interior
from a decision rejecting their answer to
an amended complaint, and denying their
motion to dismiss the complaint. The
Secretary reinstated the contest proceed-
ings by decision United States v. Humboldt

Placer Mini ny and Del De Rosier,
K-30058 (Bape) Checembor Te, 1864)

The contestant, the United States, filed

a second amended complaint on July 20, 1966,
alleging in part as follows:

a. There is not disclosed within

the boundaries of the mining claims

mineral materials of a variety sub-

to the mining laws, sufficient in

quantity, quality, and value to

constitute a discovery.

b. The land embraced within the
Claim or claims is nonmineral in
character.

c. With res=-ct to the public lands
in each and -il of the mining claims
identified in Paragraph III of this

A-14 IBLA 70-205

Second Amended Complaint, contest-
ant charges separately and collec-
ively that each 10-acre legal sub-
division or part thereof is non-
mineral in character and therefore
should be excluded from the respec-
tive alleged mining claims.

ad. The Cademartori placer claim, as
described in the location notice,
embraces incontiguous tracts of
land, and is therefore contrary to
law.

Contestees answered the second amended
complaint generally denying the allega-
tions contained therein, A hearing was
held on November 28, 29, 30, and Decem-
ber 1, 1967, and on January 8 and 9, 1968.
All parties were represented by counsel
at the hearing,

The contested claims are located on
the south side of Stuart Fork of the Trin-
ity River, in Trinity County, California,
upstream from the recently constructed
Trinity Dam, The most significant geo-
logical characteristic in the area is the
Weaverville Formation with a reported
depth where greatest of over 800 feet,

It is an old tertiary river channel which
has been bisected by streams and has been
preserved by the relative uplifting of
the older hard and resistant sediments
around it, The tertiary gravels are un-
consolidated, deeply weathered, red-col-
ored clay gravels resulting from volcanic
activity and reworking, and which are
estimated to be approximately 35 million
years old, The claims also expose some
recent and present stream gravel, and
some ultramafic and granitic intrusive

A-15 IBLA 70-205

rocks. The bedrock series in the area
are the Bragdon Formation (Mississippian),
Copley Greenstone (Devonian), and Salmon
Schist,.

The principal issue on this appeal is

whether the evidence presented at the
hearing established a discovery of a
valuable mineral deposit on any of the
claims within the meaning of 30 U.S.C.
§22 (1970). Appellants assert that the
evidence supports such a discovery with
respect to both gold and gravel on each
claim,

A discovery exists “where minerals have
been found and the evidence is of such a
character that a person of ordinary pru-
dence would be justified in the further
expenditure of his labor and means, with
a reasonable prospect of success in id
developing a valuable mine ***,” Castle
v. Womble, 19 L. D. 455, 457 (1894); see

n tates v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599
(1968).

In applying this rule to the present
case, we are of the opinion that the pre-
ponderance of the credible evidence fails
to support a discovery on any of the claims,
Six qualified geologists and engineers
testified for appellee. None was called
by appellants, and only one geologist testi-
fied on behalf of Archibald,:a party per-
mitted to intervene in the hearing.2/

27 3. 0. Archibald was allowed to inter-
vene at the hearing and assert an interest
in some of the claims under a lease agree-
ment. However, he did not appeal and is no
longer a party to the proceedings

A-16 IBLA 70-205

The assay methods used for the geologist
called by Archibald were not explained.

GRAVEL

Common varieties of sand and gravel
were withdrawn from location under the
mining laws on July 23, 1955. See/30 U.
S.C. §611 (1970). Consequently, to satis-
fy the requirements for discovery on a
placer mining claim located for common
varieties of sand and gravel before July
23, 1955, it must be shown that the mater-
ials within the limits of the claim, by
reason of accessibility, bona fides in
development, proximity to market, exis-
tence of present demand, and other factors,
could have been extracted, removed, and
marketed at a profit as of that date.
United States v. Coleman, supra, Foster v.
Seaton, 271 F2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Barrows v. Hickel, 447 F2d 80 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Isbell Construc-
tion Co., 4 IBLA 205, 79 I.D. 385 (1971).

e the record discloses that gravel
was an abundant commodity on the claims
(Tr. 250, 344, 957), there is no evidence
of any sales of gravel from the deposits.
George W. Nielsen, a mining engineer em-
ployed by the Bureau of Land Management
and called by appellee, testified that at
no time has the Weaverville Formation been
mined and processed for the production of
sand and gravel. (Tr 960). He further
testified that the Weaverville Formation,
because of weathering, is generally too
dirty and too soft to make concrete aggre-
gate, although it oculd be used for sub-
base and fill material (Tr 961). Robert
Middleton, a mining engineer called by
appellee, testified that he examined the

A-17 IBLA 70-205

Claims (Tr 292), and further testified
that no aggregate has been produced from
the claims, and that there was no evi-
are on the ground of any removal. (Tr

This evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case that the gravel on
the claims could not have been marketed at
a profit prior to July 23, 1955. As stated
in United States v. E. A. Barrows and
Ester Barrows, 76 I.D. 299, 306 (1969):

***(Wjhile the fact that no sale had

been made at the critical time is not

controlling in itself, the fact that
nothing is done toward the development
of a claim after its location may raise

a presumption that the market value of

the minerals found therein was not -

sufficient to justify the expenditure
required to extract and market them,

(Citing cases)

Where, as in the present case, the Govern-
ment has made a prima facie showing of a
lack of a discovery, the burden of produc-
ing preponderating evidence of the exis-
tence of a valuable mineral deposit suffi-
cient to support a discovery is upon claim-

ants. Foster v. Seaton, supra; United
States v. Wayne Winters ab fa Piedras Del
Sol wining ompany, ‘ I.D.

In an attempt to meet this burden, appel-
lants called James R, Miller, a marketing
consultant, to testify. He expressed an
opinion that gravel could have been mined
from the claims and removed and disposed of
at a profit prior to July 23, 1955 (Tr 721).
However, there is no evidence in the record

that Miller was in the Trinity County Area
in or prior to 1955); nor was his testimony

A-18 IBLA 70-205

based upon personal knowledge. Cf.

Verrue v. United States, 457 F2d 1202

)Sth Cir. 1972). He admitted that he

did not examine the sand and gravel on

the claims (Tr. 693, 734) and it is
apparent from the record that his opinion
was based upon conversations with other
persons who were not called upon to testi-
fy (Tr 694, 735) and literature which he
studied on the market potential of sand
and gravel generally in the State of Cali-
fornia and the United States. Moreover,
Miller qualified his opinion by condition-
ing it on the ability to commercially pro-
duce gold (Tr. 719, 721), and stated that
he was “not prepared to say whether the
amount of gold that"*s been evidenced would
be a commercial operation” (Tr 721).

In expressing his opinion, Miller
failed to articulate whether he was re-
ferring to gravels of the type which can
only be used for fill and similar uses, or
whether he was referring to gravels of the
type which could be used to make concrete
aggregate. The distinction is crucial,

In determining the marketability of mater-
ials on a mining claim, sand and gravel
which can only be used for fill purposes
or for other comparable purposes cannot
be considered since such materials have
never been locatable under the mining
laws. See United States v. E. A. Barrows
and Esther Barrows, supra, and cases
cited therein.

Appellants, in our view, failed to over-
come the prima facie case established by
the Government, Their evidence was too
vague and inconclusive to establish that
locatable gravels: from the claims in issue
could have been extracted and marketed at
a profit prior to July 23, 1955. More-
over, appellants have failed to establish

a

A-19 IBLA 70-205

by substantial and probative evidence

the existence of a demand for the gravel
as of that date from these claims. United
States v. William A. McCall, Sr., et al.,

GOLD

Mining engineers and geologists conducted
on behalf of the contestant, a comprehen-
sive mineral examination on the claims
from 1957 to 1961. Samples were taken in
accordance with accepted standard proced-
ures by excavating churn drill holes, auger
holes, surface channels, pits and trenches.
The samples were taken at points selected
by contestant's engineers and at points
which contestees had indicated in their
patent application the existence of signif-
icant mineral values, The samples were
assayed in accordance with accepted stan-
dard procedures, The record discloses the
following data with respect to each claim :

Ukiah Placer Mining Claim
ee of seven channel and trench sam-

ples taken from this claim contained no
gold values. (Contestant's Exhibit Q). The
remaining four samples contained gold val-
ues ranging from .076 to 5.65 cents per
cubic yard. An auger hole drilled to a
depth of 25 feet revealed gold values of
-142 cents per cubic yard,

Covelo Placer Mining Claim

ee of nine channel and trench samples
taken from this claim revealed no gold
values (Contestant’s Exhibit F). The re-
maining six samples contained gold values
ranging from .192 to 1.40 cents per cubic
yard. An auger hole 25 feet in depth re-
vealed gold values of.045 cents per cubic
yard,

A-20 IBLA 70-205

Humboldt Placer Mining Claim

- Three channel samples were taken from
this claim. Two of the samples contained
no gold (Contestant's Exhibit 0). The
third channel sample contained gold values
of .549 cents per cubic yard. An auger
hole drilled to a depth of 46 feet revealed
gold values of .071 cents per cubic yard.
The auger hole was put down on a deposi-
tional contact of the Weaverville Formation
on the Bragdon.

White Placer Mining Claim

“Three channel samples taken from present
stream gravels on this claim contained gold
values rangaing from .107 to .688 cents per
cubic yard (Contestant’s Exhibit R). Two
auger holes, drilled to depths of 17 and
57 feet, revealed respective gold values
of .049 and .095 cents per cubic yard,

Tanne Placer Mining Claim
e contestant tok Your samples from

this claim, (Contestant‘s Exhibit J.) A
channel sample taken from the exposed
Weaverville Formation contained .576 cents
gold per cubic yard. An auger hole, 21.8
feet deep, revealed no gold values. Two
churn drill holes, each 45 feet deep, re-
vealed gold values of1.13 cents and .157
cents per cubic yard.

Furnell Placer Mining Claim

Five of the sixteen samples taken from
this claim contained no gold. Six samples
ranged from .3 to 1.1 cents per cubic yard.
A sample from a channel cut on a slope along
a road had a value of 8.3 cents per cubic
yard, Four sample shafts were put down in
recent gravels along Slate Creek which runs
northeasterly through the claim. A sample
from a shaft 2.8 feet ot bedrock in sec. 3

Ae21 IBLA 70-205

showed a cubic yard value of 17.4 cents.
In sec, 2, a shaft showed the following
values per cubic yard: the top 3.2 feet,
1,4 cents; the next 4.7 feet, 42.8 cents;
and the last foot in cemented Weaverville
bedrock, 2.1 cents. In a third shaft the
values per cubic yard were: the first 6
feet, 0.5 cents, the next 1,2 feet 49
cents; and th last foot in cemented bed-
rock, 2.1 cents. The sample from the
fourth test shaft went down 3.4 feet through
to cemented bedrock and had a value of 67
cents per cubic yard. (Contestant's
Exhibits D TBLA
© ngs,
when in accord with the preponderance of
the substantial and probative evidence
adduced, will not be disturbed. Id.

XIII: 4/

XVII-XVIII

Contestees finall argue that the ad-
ministrative action taken by the Depart-
ment of the Interior in declaring the
mining claims invalid amounts to an un-
lawful exercise of plenary power, and a
taking of property without compensation,
all in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States.

Thig argument has no merit, The United
States Supreme Court in Best v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., supra, had stated
that “the Department Es been granted
plenary authority over the administration
of public land, including mineral lands***,"
The Court also clearly recognized that the
determination of the validity of the min-
ing claims was an issue to be resolved in
administrative proceedings before the
Department. We are of the opinion that
this issue has b een decided in accordance
with due process of law.

After due consideration we adopt as our
own the Judge’s rulings on each of the

47 This relates to parts XVII and XVIII
of appellants’ brief. All other Roman
numbers deal with identical designations
in appellants’ brief.

Paragraphs designated XII, XIV, XV,
and XVI of appellants’ brief were con-
sidered under the heading of "Gold" and
"Gravel".

A-3 7 IBLA 70-205

proposed findings of fact submitted by
appellants,

Therefore, pursuant to the authority
delegated to the Board of Land Appeals
by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR
4.1, the decision appealed from is
affirmed,

/s/ Frederick Fishman
~ Frederick Fishman,Member

We concur:

/s/ Douglas E, Henriques
Douglas E. Henriques, Member

¢2/ Joseph W. Goss
osep . ss, Member

DECISION OF ACTING CHIEF
OFFICE OF APPEALS AND HEARINGS

Mining Claims; Discovery 3413

To constitute a valid discovery on a
placer mining claim it must be shown
that minerals have been found within
the limits of the claim in such quality
and of such quantity as to warrant a
man of ordinary prudence in the further
expenditure of his labor and means, with
a reasonable prospect of success, in
developing a valuable mine; where a
Claim contains deposits with negligible
gold values or deposits with somewhat
better gold values which are very
limited in quantity, there is no suffi-
cient prospect of success to warrant
expenditures to that end,

A-38 Office of Appeals

Alleged secret solutions permitting
greater extraction of gold from low-
value deposits, of which no evidence
was introduced by the mining claim-
ants showing the nature of the solu-
tions or that they have been actually
used in mining operations in recover-
ing greater values from low-grade
deposits than can be done by conven-
tional mining methods, are not suffi-
cient to show that expenditures would
be justified with the expectation of
developing a paying mine, especially

where no showing has been made that

minerals of such quality exist in
such quantities as to make a profitable
operation reasonably possible.

To satisfy the requirements of discovery
on placer mining claims located for

sand and gravel before July 23, 1955,

it must be shown that the deposits
within the limits of each claim could
have been extracted, removed and mar-
keted at a profit as of that date, and
where the evidence shows that the limit-
ed market in the area had been supplied
from existing sources and there is no
evidence that the claims were developed
for sand and gravel, the claims are
properly declared null and void.

A-39 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Land Management

Washington, D. C. 20240

DECISION
United States,
Contestant

) Contest No, 10-747
) (Sacramento)

V. ) Ukiah, Covelo, Humboldt,
Humboldt Placer ) White, Tannery, Tannery
Mining Company, a) No. 2, Jackson, Cademar-
corporation, and ) tori, Furnell, Last
Del de Rosier, ) Chance, Lewis. Enough

Contestees 1/) and Faurell placer

~ mining claims, situated
in secs. 5,6,and 7, T.
34 N., R. 8 W.; and
secs. 1, 2 and 3, T.34
N., R. 9 W.3 and-secs.
34 and 35, T. 35 N.,

R. 9 W.; all in M.D.M.,
Trinity County. Calif.

Decision Affirmed

The Humboldt Placer Mining Company and
Del de Rosier have appealed from a decis-
ion of a Hearing examiner dated March 6,

bl > al

} + alana

y J. O. Archibald, a sublessee of a

United States v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co. essee of certain of the mining claims

et al., Contest No, 10-747 (Sacramento involved, was allowed to intervene and

(June 9, 1970) was representated by separate counsel at
the hearing. Archibald has not filed an
appeal. Accordingly, whatever rights he
may have had have terminated and he is no
longer designated as a party to the pro-
ceeding.

ge a

oe oem

A-40 Office of Appeals
June 9. 1970

1969, which declared the above-identi-
fied placer mining claims null and void
for the lack of a discovery of a valuable
mineral deposit on any of the claims and
which rejected the mineral patent appli-
cation originally filed for the claims
on November 19, 1954.

The record shows that in June 1957
the United States filed a condemnation
action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia to obtain possession of and title
to certain property, including the sub<-
ject placer claims, required for the con-
struction of the Trinity River Dam and
Reservoir in California. Thereafter,
on May 15, 1958, the State Supervisor,
Bureau of Land Management, filed a con-
test complaint against the subject claims.
The contestees contended that jurisdiction
to dtermine the validity of the claims was
in the courts, Ultimately this question
was resolved by the United States Supreme
Court which held that resort to condemna-
tion in order to obtain possession of the
mining claims did not preclude the United
States, as titleholder, from initial ad-
judication of their validity by administra-
tive procedures, Best vy. Humboldt Placer

: Mining Company, 371 U.S. 334 (1963). Mean-

e, the contestees appealed to the
Secretary of the Interior from a decision
rejecting their answer to an amended com-
plaint and denying their motion to dis-
miss the complaint, By decision of Decem-
b er 16, 1964, United States v, Humboldt

Placer Mining Co and Del de sier,
A<-30055 (Sipp.), the Secretary of the

Interior reinstated the contest proceedings.

A-41 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

A second amended complaint was filed
by the contestant on July 20, 1966, charg-
ing: (a) there is not disclosed within
the boundaries of the mining claims min-
eral materials af a variety subject to
the mining laws, sufficient in quantity,
quality, and value to constitute a dis-
covery; (b) the land embraced within the
claim or claims is nonmineral in charac-
ter; (c) with respect to the public lands
in each and all of the mining claims iden-
tified in Paragraph III of this Second
Amended Complaint, contestant charges
separately and collectively that each 10-
acre legal subdivision or part thereof
is nonmineral in character and therefore
should be excluded from the respective
alleged mining claims, and (d) the Cade-
martori placer claim, as described in: the
location notice, embraces incontiguous
tracts of land, and is therefore con-
trary to law.

Contestees filed a timely answer to
the second amended complaint. A hearing
was held on November 28, 29, 30, and De-
cember 1, 1967, and on January 8 and 9,
1968, All parties were represented by
counsel at the hearing,

The contested claims are on the south
side of Stuart Fork of the Trinity River,
in Trinity County, California, upstream
from the recently constructed Trinity
Dam, At the time of the hearing, por-
tions of some of the claims had been inun-
dated by water of Clair Engle Lake. The
Tannery No, 2 was located in 1901, the
Furnell was located in 1919, and the
other eleven named placer claims were lo-
cated in the 1890*s, Other physical
features frequently eeferred to are
Tannery Gulch, Slate Creek, and Smith
Gulch,

ieee ne ee te as ee oe eee ee ee

Nh en te npr ea ee eS eo
sarareetonessneyhany

A-42 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

The geology of the area is sketched on
Exhibit B in various colors. It is
based upon a geological reconnaissance
of the general area of the claims. The
most extensive geological feature is the
Weaverville formation with a reported
depth where greatest of over 800 feet.
It is an old Tertiary river channel which
has since been bisected by streams, and
has been preserved by the relative up-
lifting of the older hard and resistant
sediments around it. The Tertiary gravels

__ are unconsolidated, deeply weathered, red

colored clay gravels resulting from vol<-
canic activity and reworking. The claims
also expose some recent and present
stream gravels, and some ulta mafic and
granitic intrusive rocks. The bedrock
series ‘in the area are the Braqdon forma-
tion (Mississippian) , Copely Greenstone
(Devonian), and Salmon Schist,

There has been exploratory activity in
the area during the past 70 years directed
primarily toward the recovery of gold
from the Weaverville formation and more
recent stream gravels, The minerals most
frequently mentioned at the hearing were
gold, and sand and gravel,

The have reviewed carefully the entire
record made at the hearing, the Hearing
Examiner*s decision, and the appellants’
statement of reasons for their appeal.
The testimony will be summarized herein
only to the extent deemed necessary.

The Hearing Examiner's summarization
of the testimony pertaining to the exten-
sive testing of the contested claims by
the contestant's mineral examiners did
not mention specifically the sampling that
was performed on the Cademartori, Jackson

A-43 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

and Furnel’ claims, 2/ It is not to be
inferred that the Hearing Examiner did
not consider the testimony relating to
them.

The appellants contend that the Hear-
ing Examiner erred by failing to give
reasons for rejecting their affirmative
defenses, which were set forth in their
answer alleging essentially (1) that the
claims were taken without just compensa-
tion in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution; (2) that the
contestees were denied trial by jury;

27 Cademartori Placer Mining Claim, The
Claim embraced two incontiguous tracts,
Contestees at the hearing abandoned one

of the tracts, claiming that portion which
comprises the N1/2NE1/4 sec. 3, and the
NW1/4NW1/4NW1/4 Sec. 1, T. 34 N., R. 9 W.,
M.D.M. (Tr. 153, 316-317). In the retained
portion of the claim three samples had been
taken. A channel cut in an 8 foot bank of
weathered Weaverville formation contained
gold values of .8 cents per cubic yard.

A pit sample from a gully in Irish Gulch
revealed gold values of 1.2 cents per

cubic yard. A channel sample along an

old ditch showed nil, (Exhs. D-D and E-E,
Tr. 460-461 and 470-471.) —

Jackson Placer Mining Claim, Eight
samples taken from this claim showed gold
values ranging from 0.5 to 34,8 cents per
cubic yard, The next highest value was
8.5 cents per cubic yard, The highest
came from a test shaft put down by the
mineral examiner in recent gravels in
Slate Creek. (Exhs. D-D. E<E, Tr, 464,
465, 467-468, 470.)

A-44 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

(3) that the Government should be es-
topped as a matter of equity from deny-
ing contestees and their predecessors

Footnote 2 continued--

Furnell Placer Mining Claim, Five of
the sixteen samples taken ion this claim
contained no gold, Six samples ranged
from .3 to 1.1 cents per cubic yard, A
sample from a channel cut on a slope along
a road had a value of 8.3 cents per cubic
yard, Four sample shafts were put down
in recent gravels along Slate Creek which
runs northeasterly through the claim. A
sample from a shaft 2,8 feet to bedrock
in sec. 3 showed a cubic yard value of
17.4 cents. In sec, 2, a shaft showed
the following values per cubic yard: the
top 3.2 feet, 1.4 cents; the next 4,7
feet, 42,8 cents: and the last foot in
cemented Weaverville bedrock, 2.1 cents.
In a thir shaft the values per cubic
yard were: the first 6 feet, 0,5 cents:
the next 1,2 feet, 49 cents; and the last
foot in cemented bedrock, 2.1 cents. The
sample from the fourth test shaft which
went down 3.4 feet through to cemented
bedrock had a value of 67 cents per cubic
yard, (Exhs. D-D, E-E, Tr. 457-469,)
George O, Scarfe, Jr., who examined
these three claims. was of the opinion
that the mineralization on the Cademartori

Claim was of such low grade, and that there

was such an insufficient quantity of
gravels carrying gold on the Jackson and
Furnell claims that each of the claims
does not warrant any further expenditures
with the hope of developing a paying
mine on any of them, (Tr. 478-480.)

A-45 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

in interest uninterrupted and undisturbed
possession of the mining claims for some
70 years; and (4) that the Department of
the Interior has no right to determine
that the contestees have no rights and
that their rights have no value.

Although the Hearing Examiner's de-
cision discloses these allegations no
express ruling was made on them. We
find, however, that the Supreme Court in
Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,supra,
explicitly or implicitly struck down
the alleged affirmative defenses when it
found that the “Congress had entrusted
the Department of the Interior with the
management of the public domain and pre-
scribed the process by which claims
against the public domain may be per-
fected, The United States, which holds
legal title to the lands, plainly can
prescribe the procedure which a claimant
must follow to acquire rights in the
public sector," The court concluded
"That the institution of the [condemna-
tion] suit in the District Court was an
appropriate way of obtaining immediate
possession, that it was not inconsistent
with the administrative remedy for deter-
mining the validity of the mining claims,
and the District Court acted properly in
holding its hand until the issue of val-
idity of the claims has been resolved by
the agency entrusted by Congress with
the task,” Where a mining claim in-
volved in a condemnation suit is admin-
istratively determined to be valid,
thereafter the value of such claim for
condemnation purposes is within the juris-
diction of the court, This is what
Justice Douglas was talking about when
he said that the District Court acted

. “<a

re Pte Senter

A-46 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

properly in holding its hand, supra.

The Hearing Examiner emmneinl found
that the testimony of the contestant's
expert witnesses is based upon unusually
extended and comprehensive exploratory
examination conducted in accordance
with accepted standard procedures and
upon the assay results of the samples
taken which assays were also conducted
in accordance with accepted procedures.
He pointed out that the testimony shows
that the Weaverville formation exposed
on the claims bears average gold values |
of .276 cents per cubic yard; that the
material exposed in the slopes and
washes bears average gold valves of less
than three cents per cubic yard; that
the recent stream gravels bear average
gold values of less than nine cents per
cubic yard; and that the portions of the
deposits of the recent stream gravels
which bear greater than average gold
values are extremely limited in extent.
He properly found that deposits bearing
such negligible gold values. or deposits
with somewhat better gold values which
are limited in volume, are not worthy
of development since the mining costs
would exceed the value of the gold which
could be recovered.

The Hearing Examiner next found, and
we agree, that the contestant established
rima facie, that the deposits exposed
on the claims do not bear sufficient min-
eralization to warrant development there-
of, and hence do not constitute valuable
mineral deposits within the meaning of
the mining laws.

A-47 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

The Examiner pointed out that the
documentary evidence submitted by Hum-
boldt consists of the material sub-
mitted with its application for patent,
including the Yost report, and other
reports made prior to 1942,

The decision appealed from properly
found that the evidence of high gold
values shown in the Yost report has
been refuted by the contestant's evi-
dence relating to the results of sam-
pling conducted in the immediate vicin-
ity of the excavations and drill holes
put down by Yost, Further, since Yost
was not called as a witness to support.
the findings related to his report, the
report is properly accorded less evi-
dentiary weight than the reports and
opinions of the contestant's witnesses
which were made subject to cross-exam-
ination,

The Hearing Examiner noted that the
other reports submitted by the contestees
as business records of the Humboldt
Placer Mining Company were all prepared
at least twenty-five years ago, He
added that these old reports, while re-

. flecting some significant gold values,

appear to be very general in nature and
were made without benefit of informa-
tion which resulted from the auger and
churn drilling performed on the claims
by Yost and the contestant's engineers
in 1959, The Examiner then found, and
we concur, that, since the reports and
opinions of the contestant's witnesses
are based on more extensive and more
recent exploratory information, those
reports are accorded much greater weight
than the opinions and old reports sube<«
mitted by the contestees.

Stet if

— oe - e) Eee eee Oe ee

oe . "aS SS ee ee ee eres ae ee eee
1

A-48 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

The Hearing Examiner stated that
the fantastic gold values reported by
Gibson were based on surface samples
taken over a five hour period, as con-
trasted with the extensive exploration
program conducted by the contestant in-
volving several man-years, The samples
were assayed by the so-called Douglas
process involving the use of unidentified
solutions. He rightfully pointed out
that there is no supporting evidence of
the nature of the unidentified solutions
or positive evidence of the process by
which the gold could be recovered, and
that gold values averaging one hundred
dollars per cubic yard, consisting of
either coarse or microscopic particles,
would surely be identified by normal
fire assay. It as his opinion that the
Douglas tests reflecting average gold
values of one hundred dollars per cubic
yard, and as high as two hundred dollars
in gold per cubic yard of material in
place, are simply unworthy of belief.

The decision below pointed out that
a considerable portion of the contestees'
evidence was devoted to the contention
that valuable deposits of sand and gravel
occur on the claims, and properly found
that substantial deposits of material
suitable for fill and subbase in high-
way construction and more limited depos-
its of recent stream gravels suitable
for use as concrete aggregage occur on
the claims. The decision appropriately
stated that these deposits do not consti-
tute valuable mineral deposits unless
they are shown to be marketable, The
Hearing Examiner correctly found that
there is no evidence in the record that

A-49 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

there has ever been any demand for the
subject sand and gravel deposits, or
that any portion thereof has ever been
removed from the claims for use in con-
crete aggregate or for any other pur-
pose, He added that the fact that there
is a limited annual market in small towns
in Northern California which have other
existing sources of supply, and the pos-
sibility of the future construction of
highways and dams in the area, do not
constitute evidence of a demand for
these particular deposits, He concluded,
and we concur, that in the absence of
more specific evidence that these par-
ticular sand and gravel deposits could
have been removed and disposed of at a
profit on or before July 23, 1955, it
must be concluded that the same do not
constitute valuable mineral deposits
within the meaning of the mining laws,

The Hearing Examiner properly ex-
plained that an applicant for a mineral
patent has the burden of proving a valid
discovery at the time his application is
filed, citing Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S.
286 (1920); Best v. Humboldt Placer
Mining Co., Supra, and he found that
the contestees ve failed to sustain
that burden, He also found, and we
agree, that:

The contestant has established by

an overwhelming preponderance of

the more credible evidence ad-

duced at the hearing that valuable

minerals have not been found on any

of the claims of such character

that a person of ordinary prudence

would be justified in the further

expenditure of his labor and means

~ OT eee 4.445 eee a

A-50 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

with a reasonable prospect of suc-
cess in developing a valuable mine.

The Examiner than concluded that no
valuable mineral deposits have been ex-
posed within the limits of any of the
contested claims and declared each of
them invalid. He made no ruling on the
other charges.

Appellants allude to their having a
possessory right, In that regard, under
the mining laws one may take possession
of vacant public land open to location
under those laws and, after filing no-
tice of location, retain that possession
against all except the Government while
he is in diligent prosecution of his
efforts to discover valuable minerals
therein, While he is in possession of
the land, he is not regarded as a tres-
passer because he is on the land with
the tacit consent of the Government.
However, when the Government withdraws
that consent, either by withdrawing the
land from the operation of the mining
laws or by the institution of adverse
proceedings against the claim, the
Claimant must show that he has made a
discovery of valuable mineral deposits
within the limits of his claim in order

to retain that posssession. United States

v. Everett Foster et al,. 65 I.D,
Appellants maintain that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture is not a proper
party to this contest. The contested
claims embrace public lands some of
which are administered by the Department
of Agriculture by reason of being situ<
ated in a national forest, and the re<
mainder are administered by the Depart-

A-51 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

ment of the Interior, In these circum-
stances, it is proper for both depart-
ments to join in the prosecution of the
contest. United States v, San Juan Ex-
loration Co., A-30965 (March 27, 1969).
Under the mining laws of the United
States, 30 U.S.C.§21 et seq. (1964), a
discovery of a “valuable mineral deposit"
within the limts of a mining claim is
essential to its validity. The mining
statutes do not specifically define a
"discovery," but it has been held that
one exists
{[W]here minerals have been found and
the evidence is of such a character
that a person of ordinary prudence
would be justified in the further
expenditure of his labor and means,
with a reasonable prospect of suc-.
cess, in developing a valuable mine.
* * *. Castle v. Womble,19 L.D. 455,
457 (1894); Chrisman v. Milier,197
U.S. 313, 322 (1905). <2
This has come to be known as the "“pru-
dent man test." Only when this test is
satisfied can it be said that a discovery
has been shown. The Supreme Court in
Chrisman v. Miller, supra, in further
describing what constitutes an adequate
or valid discovery under the mining laws,
quoted an earlier statement of Justice
Filed that:
The mere indication or presence of
gold or silver is not sufficient***.
The mineral must exist in such quan-
tities as to justify expenditure of
money for the development of the mine
and the extraction of the mineral.
197 U.S. at 322 (Emphasis added).

A-52 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

It is obvious that the finding of
just some mineral will not do. Further,
if the quality and quantity of the min-
eral found would justify further ex-
ploration but not development, then the
test has not been met and a discovery
has not been shown. Converse v. Udall,
399 F2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969).

When the Government contests a mining
Claim on public lands, it bears only the
burden of going forward with sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie
case; the burden then shifts to the min-
ing claimant to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that his claim is valid.
Foster v. Seaton, 271 F2d 836 (D.C.Cir.
1955).

The courts recently have made it
abundantly clear that the test of what
is a “valuable mineral deposit" involves
consideration of economic values. In
discussing the ‘prudent man test" and
the phrase "valuable mineral deposits”
as it appears in the mining statues, the
Supreme Court said:

Under the mining laws Congress had

made public lands available to

people for the purose of mining
valuable mineral deposits and not

for other purposes. (Footnote omit-

ted.) The obvious intent was to

reward and encourage the discovery
of minerals that are valuable in an-
economic sense. Minerals which no
prudent man will extract because

there is no demand for them at a

price higher than the cost of ex-

traction and transportation are
hardly economically valuable. Thus.

ee

A-53 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

prositapi lity is an important con-
sideration in applying the prudent
man test***." United States v. Cole-
man, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968). (Em-
phasis added).

More recently the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in the Converse
case, supra, a case involving gold, held
that the prudent man test, complemented
by the marketability test, judicially
approved in Coleman, supra, is applicable
to all mining claims.

It is not required of a mining claim-
ant to prove a discovery to show that he
has actually engaged in profitable min-
ing operations or even that profitable
operations are assured, but it is re-
quired that there be a showing of a pros-
pect of profit which is sufficient to
invite reasonable men to expend their
means in attempting to reap that profit
by extracting and marketing the mineral,
as distinguished from evidence of value
which will entice men to invest their.
money only to gain control over land
and hold it in the hope or expectation
that at a future date the land may be
found to be valuable for the minerals
which it contains. United States v.
Bryan Gould, A-30990 (May 7, 1969),
and case cited therein.

The present marketability test, which
is a refinement of the prudent man test,
requires a showing that the mineral in
question can be extracted, removed and
prsently marketed at a profit. This
present marketability, as to materials

a awe

Pera Pe ee

A-54 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

of widespread occurrence, can be dem-
onstrated by a favorable showing as to
such factors as the accessibility of
the deposit, bona fides in development,
proximity to market, and the existence
of a present demand. Foster v. Seaton,
271 F2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Further-
more, since Congress withdrew common
varieties of sand and gravel from loca-
tion under the mining laws on July 23,
1955, 30 U.S.C.§611(1964), it is incum-
bent upon one who located a claim prior
to that date for a common variety of
sand and gravel to show that all the re-
quirements for a discovery, including

a showing that the materials could be
extracted, removed, and marketed at a
a had —— met by that date.

a rv. Dr e -gyrporation., 398 F2d
791 (Sth Cir. ‘

The Government when it contests a
mining claim undertakes only to show
that the discernible evidence of miner-
alization is insufficinet to constitute
a discovery. The Government is not
obligated to provide affirmative proof
either that the land embraced in a
mining claim is nonmineral in charac-
ter or that no discovery has been made.
A Government mineral examiner is under
no obligation to make such an exhaustive
search of the land and test of the
minerals as would normally be done by
a prospector. Rather, his function is
one of verifying, if possible, the
Claimed discovery. poste States v.
Frank Coston, A-3083

cases cited; United States Vv.

Bryan ‘Gould, supra.

A-55 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

Appellants contend that the Govern-
ment's samples were not taken in accor-
dance with accepted standards in that
they were not drilled or otherwise

taken down to bedrock. There is no merit

to this contention. Many of the Govern-
ment samples did go down to bedrock. In
those instances where bedrock was not
reached, the Government mineral examiners
went as deep or deeper than the contes-
tees or their lessees did in their sam-
pling. Nothing more was required, as
the purpose of the Government's examina-
tion of a mining claim is to verify what
the mineral claimant has exposed. We
agree that the proper procedure for a
prospector or claimant in order to best
evaluate his claim, is to go down to
bedrock, but even that in some instan-
ces may not be economically feasible

for him. In any event, we concur with
the Hearing Examiner's finding in that
the mining engineers and geologists who
testified for the Government had compre-
hensively tested the claims for the pur-
poses of verification in accordance
with acceptable procedures. We add that
each fulfilled his function of attempt-
ing to verify the claimed discoveries,
and their testimony established a prima
facie case for the Government,

It is urged by appellants that the
sampling procedures of the Government
were incorrect as they included the silt
and topsoil and as a result the values
were diluted. It is standard procedure
in the testing of a placer mining claim
to take channel samples from top to
bottom of a cut, trench or pit, and in

A-56 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

taking samples by churn or auger dril-
ling to include the overburden in ar-
riving at the mineral values for the
cost of memoval including the removal
of the overburden is a factor in deter-
mining whether a prudent man would be
justified in the further expenditure of
his labor and means, with a reasonable
prospect of success, in developing a
valuable mine. United States v. Robert
W. Carnes, A-28178 (May 23, 1960). it
is not unlike the adjustment of values
in lode claims to a minable width in
order to obtain realistic values,
United States v. Jes

se ,W. Crawford
A-30820 (January 29, 25, 1968). f1 j

A-57 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

350 F2d 949 (9th Cir, 1965), cert. den.
380 U.S. 940 (1966).

Appellants maintain that the Hearing
Examiner rejected contestees' Exhibits
7, 8, 10 and 11, the reports of Percy,
Yost, Hubbard and Lowden, respectively.
The Hearing Examiner did' not reject
them, He explained that he gave little
weight to the Yost report because Yost
was living at the time of the hearing
in Sacramento and was not called upon
to testify as to his examination and
report on the claim. As to the other
reports, submitted as business reports
of Humboldt, prepared more than 25 years

—_ eS Oe ee

ht i i

ago without benefit of the results of the
more recent auger and churn drilling per-
formed in 1959, the Examiner pointed out
that since the reports and opinions of
the contestant's witnesses are based

upon more extensive and more recent ex-
ploratory information, they are accorded
greater weight than the opinions and
older reports submitted by the contestees.
It is a proper function of a Hearing
Examiner, the finder or trier of fact,

to assess the weight of evidence in con-
sidering the whole of the evidence pre-
sented at the hearing. United States v.

It is asserted that the Hearing
Examiner erred in failing to condider
the volume of gravel over the entire
length of Tannery Gulch. This assertion
is without merit. Each mining claim
stands by itself with regard to the
demonstration of a discovery. Tannery
Gulch extends for a considerable dis-
tance in its northeast-southwest trend
and is covered by many mining claims,
most of which are not involved in this
contest. Therefore, the Hearing Exam-
iner properly did not consider the vol-

ume of mineral bearing gravel over the Evel 9 t al. ,A-30827 (Jul

Se ee = the Sagem Valuable i; t5c8t, agus United States Vv. es
nera sposits must be found within F ‘1 -30780 (

the limits of each mining claim, 30 Taylor. Hicks = eae

U.S.C.§23, 35 (1964). A discovery on
one claim does not inure to the benefit

of another. United States v. Charles H. Appellants aver that the Government

presented no evidence concerning the

Henrikson et al., 70 I.D. 212, 215 Faurell claim. This averment has no
nrikson v. Udall, 229 merit. The Hearing Examiner's decisior:

F. Supp. 510 (D. Cal. 1964), aff'd at page 8 refers to the fact that this

- eS eS ero

A-58 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

claim embraces two incontiguous tracts
and sets out the results of the sam-
pling conducted on the claim by the
Government which are shown in Exhibits
U and G, respectively. The testimony
of Mining Engineer Middleton, who ex-
amined the claim, appears in the trans-
cript at pages 299-304, 330, 333, 336
and 340.

Appellants take issue with the Hear-
ing Examiner characterizing as fantastic
the reported values in Gibson's samples,
which were assayed by the so-called
Douglas process involving the use of
unidentified solutions, We note the
contrast between the values reported in
Gibson's samples and those in the Gov-
ernment’s samples, which differences
apparently prompted the Hearing Exam-
iner’s statement. This novel "assay"
process allegedly recovers invisible
gold values presumed lost by standard
assaying methods, This new process is
in its experimental stage as shown by
Gibson's testimony and requires further
refinement. There has been no compar-
ison by the contestees using portions
of the same samples to show the results
obtained by the novel process and the
results that could be obtained by stan-
dard fire assay. Neither has it been
demonstrated that this laboratory-type
extraction technology is economically
feasible in a commercial operation.

The cost estimates of such an opera-
tion are all hypothetical as there has
never been such an operation upon which
to base testimony of actual costs, and
the cost of the secret solution is

A-59 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

based solely on hearsay. Moreover,
there has been no showing that there

is a sufficient quantity of material
within the limits of any claim con-
taining these alleged high invisible
gold values which would support such

an operation. As a consequence, the
Claimants have not established that

the novel extraction process when
applied to the material on these lands
would justify a person of ordinary
prudence in risking his labor and means
with a reasonable expectation of devel-
oping a valuable mine, United States
v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 74 1I.D. 191
T1967)

With regard to the claimants' con-
tention that valuable deposits of sand
and gravel occur on the claims, it is
asserted on appeal that marketability
was not presented as an issue in the
second amended complaint. Appellants
cannot claim surprise. The record in-
dicates that the claimants at a prehear-
ing conference a day prior to the hear-
ing asserted that there are valuable
deposits of sand and gravel on the
claims. The record also shows that
appellants were aware that the market-
ability of the sand and gravel would be
an issue in the case. as one of their
witnesses, James R, Miller, was a mar-
keting consultant, who testified that
he made a study of the market potential
of sand and gravel. (Tr. 690-749.) In
any event, as was stated in Coleman,
supra, the marketability test is a
Iogical complement to the prudent man
rule in determining whether the require-
ments of a discovery have been met.

A-60 Office of Appeals
June 9, 1970

Mr. Nielson, a Government mining
engineer, testified that he studied
the sand and gravel situation in Trinity
County, where the subject claims are lo-
cated. (Tr, 957). He testified that
sand and gravel in Trinity County is
quite an abundant commodity, They have
a very fine quality of gravel, the pri-
mary source lying along the Trinity
River and its tributaries. Much gravel
has been drived from old hydraulic mines
that were worked. These mines added the
quality of upgrading to it. Also gravel
along the banks and bars of the Trinity
River is of rather good qualty, by
reason of having traveled many miles most
of the softer constituents are missing.
(Tr, 958.) He mentioned that in this
general area a sand and gravel plant
capable of supplying specification con-
crete aggregate is operating at Douglas
ity and supplying the needs of the area.
Farther to the north is a small plant
which operated intermittently supplying
local demand, but the plant is not ade-
quate for the production of héehway spe-
cification concrete aggregate. With re-
gard to gravel from the Weaverville for-
mation, he stated that as a general rule
the Weaverville formation is both too
dirty and too soft due to weathering to
make concrete aggregate, although it
could be used for sub-base and fill mater-
ial. He also testified that the market
is so limited that the two producers
mentioned adequately supply it. He poin-
ted out that the biggest handicap is the
remoteness of some of the market requir-
ing a long haul, as the places are so
remote and small that they cannot support
a plant of their own. (Tr. 959-962).

A-61 Office of Appeals
June 9. 1970

Mr. Miller, testifying for the con-
testees, stated that he did not examine
the sand and gravel on the contested
claims, but made a study of the market
potential for sand and gravel in the State
of California and in the United States,
that he had talked with one sand and gra-
vel producer in the area of the claim,
and that he had studied all the available
literature on the subject. He testified
that there has been a market for sand
and gravel in Trinity County since 1850,
that there was a pronounced increase in
that market in the last two decades, and
that a peak year was 1957. He added that
the increase was due to the development
of highways and roads, He expressed the
opinion that there was an existing market
for gravel in July 1955, and there is a
market at the present time, (Tr. 702).

He explained that the existing market
would involve primarily road use and then
in the future at intermittent times a
large temporary demand for other types

of public works, construction, primarily
dams, paving areas, improved Forest Ser-
vice camps and this type of thing, in-
cluding general construction use. (Tr.
707 a )

The issue is whether the sand and
gravel on the subject claims could be
extracted, removed and marketed at a pro-
fit on or before July 23, 1955, the date
on which Congress withdrew common varie-
ties of sand and gravel from location
under the mining laws, supra, The re-
cord contains no evidence that there was
as of the critical date or since, a de-
mand for the sand and gravel deposits on

A-62 Office of Appeais
June 9, 1970

the subject claims, The fact that there
was general limited market for sand and
gravel in the area which was supplied
from existing sources does not constitute
evidence of a demand for these particular
deposits, Furthermore, the record is
barren of any evidence that these claims
were ever developed for sand and gravel.
The lack of proof of sales of sand and
gravel from the claims as of July 23,
1955, or since, although not decisive of
the issue of marketability, suggests that
certain factors must have been involved
that prevented the sale; i.e., it is in-
dicative that the materials on the claims
could not have been extracted, removed,
and marketed at a profit as of that date
or since, United States v. Alfred N.
Verrue, 75 1.D. 300 (1968).

It is argued on appeal that the con-
tested claims contain impervious fill
material which is suitable for earth dam
construction purposes and therefore, the
fill material “has some property giving
it distinct and special value,” There
was general testimony to the effect that
the Bureau of Reclamation had tested many
places in the vicinity of Trinity River
for impervious fill material, including
some of the subject claims, for use in
the construction of Trinity Dam, It was
disclosed that fill material from sources
closer than these claims was used in the
construction of that dam, Materials used
for fill purposes are not subject to lo-
cation under the miing laws, United States

v. William M, Hinde et-.al., A-30634 (July

, and cases cited, the fact that
there may have been temporary local demand
for fill material with the property of

A-63 Office of Appeals
July 9, 1970

being impervious, does not make it lo-
catable (Holman v. Utah, 41 L. D. 314

(1912) or make it other than a common

variety of material, Evyen if such

' material was locatable, or is considered

to be an uncommon variety, the require-
ments for a discovery have not been met
in view of the lack of demand and lack
of bona fides in development, as stated
above,

We conclude, as did the Hearing Exam-
iner, that the contestees have failed to
meet the burden of proof upon them to
show by a preponderance of the evidence
that a valid discovery has been made on
each and any of their claims,

Accordingly, the d cision appealed from
is affirmed. 3/

{Information concerning right of appeal
is omitted.].

/s/ Frances A Patton
Acting Chief, Office of
Appeals and Hearings

37 Patent application Sacramento 049136,
which included the subject claims, was
closed out by a Bureau decision dated
August 18, 1969, dismissing an apeal for
failure to file a statement of reasons
for the appeal within the extended period
allowed for filing. As no appeal was
taken from that decision, it has become
final,

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_2088%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
