# Opposition — Beame v. Friends of the Earth

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 902

## Text

re

Sup.cme Court, U. &
—~ FILEQ .

Nos. 76-1718 and rer nso eae
1
, JR., CLERK

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1977

ABRAHAM BEAME, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

HuGH L. CAREY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.,
Solicitor General,

JAMES W. MOORMAN,
Acting Assistant Attorney General,

EDMUND B. CLARK,
MICHAEL D. GRAVES,

NEIL T. PROTO,
JOAN BERNSTEIN, Attorneys,
General Counsel, Department of Justice,
GERALD K. GLEASON, Washington, D.C. 205380.
Deputy Associate General Counsel,
LAWRENCE NOVEY,
Attorney,

Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, D.C. 20460.

INDEX
Page
EES ee a 2
Jurisdiction _............... I TRESS Ti i de 2
Ee ae 2
Statutes involved Aa ns BRM ret tei 2
CMS RE I SS Se te 3
FREE TE CR an AO eRe a a 13
Conclusion 18
TE cialisdiserteshcniapeesiapinticedstahciaseivebshinasiailcesliicigeesaiiae la
CITATIONS
Cases:
Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d
BS RENT Ren ane ee eo et oa 15
Brown v. Environmental Protection Agen-
Oe ne 8,9
City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d
681, certiorari denied, 424 U.S. 927_. 15
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d
ERROR ROR re Ce 8
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v.
Train, 528 F.2d 1136, affirmed on other
grounds, No. 75-978, February 23,
fae RTE ERIE a ns nt ee 16
Environmental Protection Agency v.
Brown, Nos. 75-909, 75-960, 75-1050
and 75-1055, decided May 2, 1977.8, 13, 14
Friends. of the Earth v. Carey, 401 F.
Supp. 1386 _ 6
Friends of the Earth © v. y. Carey, 422, F.
AE ee 7,8

Cases—Continued

Friends of the Earth v. Carey (Friends
pS 2. | een
Friends of the Earth v. Environmental
Protection Agency (Friends 1), 499 F.

PF Re eee oe 5, 10,

Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F.
SO IID chi i cnsinnnsecliintiioaincentlinnlaghaniecas FS
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 _.___.
Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, certiorari
Cee, Ge EA EEO
Granite City Steel Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 925 ___.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 554
SI ite iekaaiicsc ule shiatadoiabpeiadeliiataatiiaidber sa
Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310.
Maryland v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 521 F.2d 215 _.._______.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Environmental Protection Agency,
§ gg RRP at ee
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
I ga icittrisinnecil hid nibesi wilrmgiabapaniain
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train,
a
Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F.2d 940.
Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Assoct-
ates, 501 F.2d 390, certiorari denied,
I Fe I icici aheiaiccciiicstecbitedi clint
Sun “pts gin Ltd. v. ee 532 F.2d

Page

11,17

Cases—Continued

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
ae
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 _ .
United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co. he
545 F.2d 1, certiorari granted April 4,
1977, No. 76-911 aS ES
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414.

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act of 1970, 77 Stat. 392, as
amended and added, 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857 et seq.:

Section 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 1857

GI. icinstttsinincenininisimaensnmwinasinnases
Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-2

SE. schalihnihcshaishin Gicsteibiadindiiiabistiaiieisaitminaion
Section 109, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-4
Section 110, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

SEES Seay ee
Section 110(a), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.

TI voici temecnin sedaien
Section 110(a) (1), 42 U. S.C. 1857¢-5

ee
Section 110(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. 1857-5

es Ane
Section 110(a) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C.
1857¢e-6(a) (2) (B) -........-
Section 110(a) (2) (G), 42 U.S.C.
1857e-6(a) (2) (G)
Section 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857c-5(a) (3)

15, 16

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued Page
Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.
V) 1857¢e-5(c) slahiphctinsitinitelendais la, 6a
Section 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857c-5(c)(1) -------- 8, 6a
Section 113, 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-8 6
Section 304, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2 4, 9a
Section 307, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)
| RR Serer aes 11, 13, 18, 12a
Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.
VP ED Sa de 4,7
Section 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857h-5(b) (1) 4
Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857h-5(b) (2) 16
28 U.S.C. 2101(¢) __.... 12
Miscellaneous:
5 ER SRE LDL 3
Ge a i ae. 8

S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.

(RNR ad hci cnigka sy poten, 16

Iu the Suprene Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 76-1718

ABRAHAM BEAME, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

No. 76-1737

HuGH L. CAREY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. |
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY IN OPPOSITION *

* This brief was filed with this Court and served in type-
written form on August 3, 1977. The only substantive changes
appearing in this printed brief are footnote 2, infra, and the
second sentence of paragraph 2 on page 4, infra.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at
552 F.2d 25 and is reproduced as Appendix I to
the petition in No. 76-1718.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
on January 18, 1977 (No. 76-1718, Pet. App. I, 1-3),
and a timely petition for rehearing was denied on
March 4, 1977 (No. 76-1718, Pet. App. II, 62-66).
The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 76-1718
was filed on June 2, 1977. The petition for 4 writ of
certiorari in No. 76-1737 was filed on June 6, 1977.’
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the provisions of a Transportatior Control
Plan, prepared by the State of New York with the
cooperation of the City of New York and approved by
the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to
Section 110 of the Clean Air Act can be enforced
against the State and the City in a “citizen suit”
under Section 304 of the Act.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act are
reproduced in the Appendix, infra.’

? See page 12, infra.
2 Quotations herein from the Clean Air Act do 1°t reflect

the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, signed on August 7,
1977. Those Amendments do not affect any issues ir this case.

STATEMENT

1. The Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is directed by the Clean Air
Act, 77 Stat. 392, as amended and added, 42 U.S.C.
(and Supp. V) 1857 et seg. (the Act), to establish
standards governing maximum concentrations of par-
ticular pollutants in the air (Section 109, 42 U.S.C.
1857c-4). On April 30, 1971, the Administrator pro-
mulgated national primary and secondary air quality
standards for those pollutants resulting chiefly from
motor vehicle emissions. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186. There-
upon, it became the responsibility of each state gov-
ernment to “specify the manner in which * * * air
quality standards will be achieved and maintained”’
within the state (Sections 101(a)(3), 107(a), 42
U.S.C. 1857(a) (3), 1857¢-2(a) ).

Under the Act, each state must submit to the Ad-
ministrator a plan for “implementation, mainten-
ance and enforcement” in that state of the national
primary and secondary standards (Section 110(a)
(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(1)). These implementa-
tion plans provide the regulatory scheme for control-
ling emissions from stationary and moving sources of
pollution to the extent necessary to attain the na-
tional standards. The required elements of a state
implementation plan include, inter alia, such methods
of pollution control “as may be necessary * * *, in-
cluding, but not limited to, land-use and transporta-
tion controls” (Section 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.
1857c-5(a) (2) (B)), and a procedure for “inspection
and testing of motor vehicles” (Section 110(a) (2),
(G), 42 U.S.C. 1857¢-5(a) (2) (G)).

4

The Administrator’s approval or disapproval of an
implementation plan is subject to judicial review pur-
suant to Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)
1857h-5(b), which provides that a petition for review
of the Administrator’s action “shall be filed within 30
days from the date of such promulgation, approval, or
action, or after such date if such petition is based
solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.” That
section also provides that actions of the Administrator
with respect to which review could have been obtained
under the section shall not be subject to judicial re-
view in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.
In addition, Section 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857
h-2, authorizes “citizen suits,’ whereby “any per-
son” may commence a civil action against any fed-
eral, state or local instrumentality for violating a
provision of a state implementation plan.

2. The New York State Implementation Plan was
submitted to EPA on January 31, 1972, and ap-
proved by the Administrator on May 31, 1972, pur-
suant to Section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(2). This plan did not contain
transportation control measures. On April 17, 1973,
the State of New York, after consultation with peti-
tioners in No. 76-1718 (hereafter “City petitioners”),
submitted its Transportation Control Plan (Plan), in-
cluding a plan to control motor vehicle pollution in
the New York City metropolitan area. The Plan
submitted by the state was approved by the Adminis-
trator on June 22, 1973, with minor exceptions.

8. Within the 30-day statutory deadline provided
in Section 307(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V) 1857h-

5

5(b) (1), respondents challenged the Administrator’s
approval of the Plan in the court of appeals. The pri-
mary challenges related to the vagueness of portions
of the Plan, and the failure of the state to begin its
implementation. The court upheld the plan in all sub-
stantial respects, remanding only for further expla-
nation of certain points. The court held, however,
that it lacked jurisdiction to order the state to imple-
ment the Plan in a Section 307 proceeding. Friends
of the Earth v. Environmental Protection Agency
(Friends I), 499 F.2d 1118 (C.A. 2).

On October 11, 1974, respondents filed a “citizen
suit” under Section 304(a) of the Act, seeking a man-
datory injunction against appropriate state and city
Officials requiring compliance with the New York
Plan. The district court denied the request for in-
junctive relief in light of the “total lack of expertise
in the court” and “the existence of a federal agency
with such expertise charged with the enforcement of
the highly technical and difficult problems involved.”
Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F. Supp. 1394,
1395 (S.D. N.Y.). The court noted, however, that
“the State and City do not found their opposition to
the preliminary injunction on the grounds that they
are in compliance”; that, in fact, counsel for the
State “stated in open court * * * that ‘this plan is a
legally enforceable plan, is a legally adequate plan
and that the state is committed [obligated] to fulfill-
ing its responsibilities thereunder’” (id. at 1395).
“He went on to say,” the court noted further, “that
the State apparently had no intention of implement-

6

ing certain strategies of the plan and observed, ‘If
there is a valid legal ground for such a refusal, we
have not been able to find it, your honor.’ ” bid.
After EPA found that the State and City were in
violation of certain aspects of the Plan, respondents
returned to the district court seeking a preliminary
injunction against both state and city officials order-
ing Plan enforcement. On August 28, 1975, the dis-
trict court denied the request for relief, Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 401 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. N.Y.).
The court of appeals reversed. Friends of the
Earth v. Carey (Friends II), 535 F.2d 165 (C.A. 2).
It held that once a suit is commenced under Section
304 the “district court is obligated upon a showing
that the state has violated the plan, to issue appro-
priate orders for its enforcement” (id. at 173), re-
gardless of whether EPA sought judicial enforcement
under Section 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-8 (ibid.).
“I]t is beyond serious dispute,” said the court, “that
the defendants are now almost a year in default in
carrying out the principal strategies of the man-
dated Plan, which are central to achieving the pri-
mary ambient air quality standards prescribed by
Congress, with the result that the public of New York
City is exposed to carbon monoxide pollution that has
in the meantime climbed to over five times the federal
health standards. The court cannot consistently with
its duty be a party to the delaying process that has
led to this situation.” Jd. at 180. It remanded the
case, ordered the district court to enter partial sum-
mary judgment for respondents and expeditiously

7

“take such further steps as are necessary to insure
enforcement.” Ibid.

4. On April 30, 1976, the district court ordered
implementation and enforcement of appropriate por-
tions of the Plan. In the interim, the City petitioners
sought rehearing in the court of appeals “to raise
constitutional issues with respect to the Plan which
had not previously been considered” (Pet. App. I,* 6).
On June 2, 1976 the court denied the petition (id.
at 6-7):

‘[W]ithout prejudice to consideration by the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York of constitutional issues not
decided prior to the entry of the order which was
the subject of the notice of appeal * * * and with-
out prejudice to the right of the defendants to
move in the said District Court to set aside the
order of the District Court dated April 30, 1976,
on the aforesaid constitutional grounds.’
Thereafter the City petitioners moved the district
court to vacate the partial summary judgment en-
tered on April 30, 1976, and for summary judgment
in the city’s favor based on 10th Amendment infirmi-
ties.

On July 13, 1976, the district court granted the
City petitioners’ motion. Friends of the Earth v.
Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. N.Y.). The court
concluded that it could consider constitutional objec-
tions to the Plan raised by the City petitioners for
the first time in this enforcement proceeding despite

*“Pet. App.” refers to the petition in No, 76-1718,

8

their failure to raise them under Section 307(b)
within 30 days after the Plan was approved by EPA.
Id. at 640-641.

On the merits of the City petitioners’ contention,
the district court examined cases presenting Tenth
Amendment challenges by various state governments
to transportation control plans (TCP’s) prepared
for them by the Administrator of EPA pursuant to
Section 110(c)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.
V) 1857c-5(c)(1). District of Columbia v. Train,
521 F.2d 971 (C.A. D.C.); Maryland v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 530 F.2d 215 (C.A. 4);
Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d
827 (C.A. 9).* In general, these cases held that the
Administrator was not authorized by the Clean Air
Act to compel a State or municipality to implement
certain aspects of an EPA-formulated TCP against
polluters. The district court characterized the Plan
here, although formulated by New York State, as the
“functional equivalent of the suggestions of an inter-

* At the time of the district court decision, this Court had
granted certiorari in each of these cases. On May 2, 1977, the
judgments were vacated and the actions remanded for con-
sideration of mootness, in light of EPA’s representation that
certain modifications to the regulations were necessary. En-
vironmental Protection Agency Vv. Brown, Nos. 75-909, 75-
960, 75-1050 and 75-1055. Those modifications have now been
made. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30504 (June 15, 1977). The issues in
Brown are now ripe for consideration by the courts of appeals
and, if necessary, by this Court. The state petitioners in both
Brown and Maryland have stated to the respective courts
of appeals that the issues are not moot. Oral argument on
both the question of mootness and the merits has been sched-
uled in Brown.

ested party,” and concluded that “approval of the plan
was the functional equivalent of promulgation by the
Administrator of his own plan.” 422 F. Supp. at 645.
Therefore, the court reasoned, although the New
York Plan was formulated by the City and State, “it
is in the same posture as a plan which the Adminis-
trator has promulgated” for a state under Section
110(c)(1) (422 F. Supp. at 645), and as in Brown
v. Environmental Protection Agency and similar cases
supra, the State and City cannot be compelled to im-
plement the New York Plan pursuant to a citizen
suit. Jd. at 643.

The court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. I). The
court noted its decision to permit the City petitioners
to raise “constitutional issues” but stated that in “so
ruling we did not authorize the district court to en-
gage in reinterpretation that would contradict our
own prior considered construction of it or our de-
termination as to the scope of enforceability.” Pet.
App. I, 6-7.

On the merits, the court of appeals characterized
the district court opinion as having “emasculated the
Plan as an enforceable instrument.” Pet. App. I, 9.
Its analysis began with the fact that the “State of
New York, with the assistance of the Department of
Air Resources of the New York City Environmental
Protection Administration and other city agencies,
prepared and promulgated the Plan here at issue
** *” (Pet, App. I, 18-14, and n. 3), and that the
“State has not only failed to join the City in asserting
the latter’s defenses to enforcement of the Plan but,

ont

10

to the contrary, has defended the Plan and concedes
that it is enforceable against it.” Pet. App. I, 30-31.
The court concluded that the City petitioners were
precluded from raising objections that could have
been raised in a Section 307 petition for review. The
court stated (Pet. App. I, 33-34):

The purpose of § 307 was to assure that once
an implementation plan had been promulgated
by a state and approved by the EPA and a
reasonable time had been allowed for affected
parties to seek by way of a petition for review
to have it modified or nullified, it would have
finality and become enforceable. If states and
their subdivisions, after preparing and through
their responsible executives accepting the obliga-
tion of enforcing implementation plans under the
Act, were allowed to disregard their commit-
ments and to renege upon the obligations under-
taken by them, the plans would amount to noth-
ing more than voluntary, unenforceable declara-
tions of principles. * * *

In order to protect public health effectively
Congress provided that such plans, after fair
allowance for due process, would be enforceable.
For these reasons § 307 has been upheld as a
bastion of enforceability. See Union Electric Co.
v. EPA, 44 U.S.L.W. 5060 (June 25, [1976]) ;
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Getty Oil Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).

The Court also questioned the propriety of the fact
that the City was raising objections to the Plan it
helped design, after remaining silent through the criti-

11

cal period of Plan approval by EPA and judicial
review in Friends I.

[T]he picture before us is one where the City,
having voluntarily cooperated with the State in
the drafting and promulgation of the very strate-
gies now attacked by it, seeks in effect to renege
on its own creation and commitment.
The architects of the Plan were not Congress
or the EPA but the State and City of New York.
* * * In clear and unmistakeable [sic] terms the
Plan obligates them to carry out the very strate-
gies which the City now contends that it cannot
be ordered to enforce [ Pet. App. I, 35-36. ]
To permit the City petitioners now to attack the
validity of the Plan, the court stated, would be “di-
rectly contrary to our holding that ‘acceptance by the
EPA and judicial ratification by this court’ resulted
in the Plan becoming ‘binding upon and enforceable -
against state and local officials’ * * *.” Id. at 44.

Despite the restrictions in Section 307, 42 U.S.C.
(and Supp. V) 1857h-5, and the binding effect of
Friends I, the court noted that the state possessed an
available statutory remedy to deal with funding or
personnel problems. “Should the State conclude that
the Plan should be revised, it may submit such revi-
sions as are necessary to the Administrator for ap-
proval under § 110(a) (3) of the Act.” Pet. App. I,
42. See also id. at 43-45.

Finally, the court rejected the district court’s con-
clusion that EPA’s approval of a state-developed TCP
was no different from EPA’s promulgation of one
(id. at 45). It stated (id. at 47-48):

12

Although the district court here attempted to
place the present case within the mold of Brown,
District of Columbia and Train, the facts and the
issues here are significantly different and clearly
distinguishable. The most fundamental differ-
ence lies in the fact that, in contrast to those
cases, the State here has clearly and unequivo-
cally promulgated its own pollution-control plan
which represents its own policy decision, formu-
lated through public notice by the State to its
citizens and local governments, and through
State-conducted public hearings.

Nor did the court of appeals find this Court’s decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, an obstacle to citizen enforcement.

The present case represents neither an interfer-
ence with integral governmental functions of the
City, nor a usurpation of State or City decision-
making. On the contrary, the Plan reflects State
and City policy decisions to be carried out by
them according to their own dictates rather than
those of the federal government. In formulat-
ing, proposing, and revising the Plan through
public notice and public hearings, the State ex-
ercised its sovereign powers to make policy
choices participated in by its citizens and its
political subdivisions. [Pet. App. I, 52-53.]

EPA’s approval of the Plan was mandatory once
the criteria of the Act were met, and did not alter
the substantive provisions of the Plan or affect the
State’s “policy choices” which resulted in those pro-
visions. Jd. at 53.

13
ARGUMENT

1. The petition in No. 76-1737 is jurisdictionally
out of time under 28 U.S.C. 2101(c). The court of
appeals denied rehearing on March 4, 1977. The time
for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari was not
extended and, accordingly, expired on June 2, 1977.
The petition was filed June 6, 1977. Further refer-
ences to “petitioner” or the “petition” in this brief
refer to No. 76-1718.

2. Petitioners’ contention (Pet. 5) that this case
“presents the Court with the occasion to deal with the
issues previously presented to it in EPA v. Brown and
its companion cases * * * and upon which the Court
did not finally decide” is incorrect. |

First, no such issues can be reached at all unless
this Court were to reject the holding of the Court of
Appeals that the objections were made too late in
light of Section 307 of the Act. See Point 3, infra.
But, in any event, the Brown issue is not present here.

Brown and its kindred cases presented a signifi-
cantly different issue: whether EPA could lawfully
promulgate binding transportation control plans for
states which had failed to prepare their own plans as
required by Section 110, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)
1857c-5. As this Court said in vacating and remand-
ing the cases, “[t]hese cases * * * raise questions
concerning the authority of the Administrator * * *
to compel various types of implementation and en-
forcement actions by the States. * * * The critical
fact about all the foregoing obligations was that
they were imposed on the states, under 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.23, as elements of an applicable implementation

14

plan.” Slip op. 1-2. Unlike the transportation control
plan promulgated for California by the Administrator
in Brown, supra, and its companion cases, the New
York Plan was “prepared and promulgated” by the
State of New York with the “cooperation and exten-
sive effort” of City petitioners. Pet. App. I, 13-14,
and n. 3. The issue of whether the federal govern-
ment may “coerce” States and localities into imple-
menting an EPA-prepared plan, allegedly in violation
of the Tenth Amendment, is simply not present here.
Contrary to the district court’s view, the fact that
New York was required by Congress to adopt a plan
does not reduce New York to a mere “interested
party” in a federal proceeding, nor does it make this
Plan indistinguishable from one imposed on a state by
the Administrator. The narrow view of the district
court entirely overlooks the fact that the Administra-
tor is required to approve a State plan that conforms
to the statute. See Train v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79. Unlike the situation
in Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, supra,
New York here was “at liberty to adopt whatever mix
of emission limitations it deem[ed] best suited to its
particular situation.” Jd. at 79. It was given “vir-
tually absolute power in allocating emission limita-
tions so long as the national standards are met,”
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 267, and so is in no position
to claim that the EPA has imposed a plan upon it.°

*The court of appeals stated the “present case presents
neither an interference with integral governmental functions
of the City, nor a usurpation of State or City decision-making.
On the contrary, the Plan reflects State and City policy de-

15

3. Petitioners further contend (Pet. 22-25) that
the court of appeals erred in refusing to allow objec-
tions to the New York transportation control plan in
this proceeding because petitioners failed to raise
them in the manner prescribed by Section 307 of the
Act. As we have noted, that was an independent
ground supporting the court’s judgment, which if cor-
rectly decided, alone disposes of petitioners’ challenges
to the plan.

In our view, the court of appeals rightly concluded
that Section 307(b)(2) of the Act precludes peti-
tioners from challenging the validity of the plan at
this late date. See Union Electric Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246; Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 427-436.° Congress required that

cisions to be carried out by them according to their own dic-
tates rather than those of the federal government.” Pet App.
I, 52-58. “Federal imposition of policy never took place in
this case * * *.” Jd. at 59.

Instead, the court found the federal-state-local relationship
in this case analogous to that envisioned in the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, upheld in Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542, and distinguished by the Court in National
League of Cities, supra. Pet. App. I, 57-60.

* See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. United States Envir-
onmental Protection Agency, 554 F.2d 884 (C.A. 8) ; Lubrizol
Corp. V. Train, 547 F.2d 310 (C.A. 6) ; City of Highland Park
v. Train, 619 F.2d 681 (C.A. 7), certiorari denied, 424 U.S.
927; Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515
F.2d 654, 661 (C.A. D.C.) ; Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 512 F.2d 1351
(C.A. D.C.) ; Granite City Steel Co. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 501 F.2d 925 (C.A. 7); Plan for Arcadia, Inc.
Vv. Anita Associates, 601 F.2d 390, 392 (C.A. 9), certiorari
denied, 419 U.S. 1084; Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d
1301-1805 (C.A. 10); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations) v.

16

challenges to the validity of a transportation coMtrol
plan be raised promptly “[i]n order to maintai” the
integrity of the time sequences provided throughout
the Act.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
41 (1970). Cf. Yakus v. United States, suprd» 321
U.S. at 489.

The court found the application of the pri®ciple
underlying Section 307(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.
V) 1857h-5(b) (2), particularly relevant to th® ©"
duct of petitioners, who “cooperated with the State
in the drafting and promulgation of the very ¢tvate-
gies now attacked by [them]”. Pet. App. I, 35. They
devised a plan which “fi]n clear and unmista*eable
[sic] terms * * * obligates them to carry ov the
* * * strategies * * *. Indeed, the Plan repeatedly
refers to and lists the different State and City d@P4't-
ments and agencies that are to implement these StT@-
tegies * * *” (id. at 36). “[T]he Plan itself ™akes
it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that bot! the
State and City represented that their responsible
officials would carry out each of the detailed str2ts!e
outlined in the Pian, using the State and City p®™5°”-
nel and facilities described in the plan.” /d. at 42-43.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied,
409 U.S. 1125; United States v. Adamo Wrecking C2 545
F.2d 1 (C.A. 6), certiorari granted April 4, 1977, No. “911.
Courts applying the parallel judicial review provision °! the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act also have held +®#* re-
view must be had promptly or not at all. See Sun Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Train, 582 F.2d 280, 287 (C.A. 2) ; B. 1, 2 Pont
de Nemours and Co. V. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1187 aP@ ®- 1,
1142 (C.A. 4), affirmed on other grounds, No. 75-978
February 28, 1977; Peabody Coal Co. v. Train, 518 F°24 940
(C.A, 6).

17

Moreover, petitioners failed to pursue their opportuni-
ties to avoid their obligations either by advising the
Administrator before Plan approval in 19738, or by
petitioning for review pursuant to Section 307(b) (1).
Petitioners also could have raised “defenses” or ob-
jections by intervention or amicus curiae participation
in Friends I, or in the subsequent district court en-
forcement proceeding, F'riends of the Earth v. Wilson,
889 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. N.Y.). Instead, the City
told the district court it was “in compliance with the
plan”; that enforcement should not occur because of
“necessary expense and diversion of manpower dur-
ing the present hiring freeze”; and because the is-
sues were “highly technical.” Jd. at 1395-1396. It was
not until four years after EPA approval that the peti-
tioners first sought to raise their present “defenses”
to a plan the court of appeals had previously concluded
in Friends | was “binding upon and enforceable
against state and local officials” (Pet. App. I, 42-
45).

4. Petitioners are not without recourse, however.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions (Pet. 24-25), the
Clean Air Act does not “bind a State and its subdivi-
sions to their initial voluntary commitments, notwith-
standing that significant changes may thereafter oc-
cur * * *.” Section 110(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.
V) 1857c-5(a) (3), prevides a mechanism that per-
mits a revision of the Plan on the State’s initiative.
As this Court noted in Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, supra, 421 U.S. at 80, the revi-
sion section is “the mechanism by which the States
may obtain approval of their developing policy choices

18

as to the most practicable and desirable methods of re-
stricting total emissions to a level which is consistent
with the national ambient air standards.” Thus, the
State has complete discretion in proposing substantive
revisions to the Plan if it thinks “significant changes’’
have occurred since the Plan’s approval.’

Thus, the substantive objections raised by peti-
tioners can be embodied in proposed revisions to the
Plan and submitted to EPA; the Agency action would
then be subject to a timely petition for review under
Section 307.°

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the petitions for
a writ of certiorari should be denied.
WADE H. MCCREE, JR.,
Solicitor General.
JAMES W. MOORMAN,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
EDMUND B. CLARK,

JOAN BERNSTEIN, MICHAEL D. GRAVES,
General Counsel, NEIL T. PROTO,
GERALD K. GLEASON, Attorneys.
Deputy Associate General Counsel,
LAWRENCE NOVEY,
Attorney,
Environmental Protection Agency.
AuGust 1977. |

' To date, the State of New York has chosen not to seek a

revision of the Plan; on the contrary, the State has defended
the validity of the TCP and has acknowledged its obligation
to implement its provisions. Pet. App. 13-14 and n. 3.
_ ® Petitioners’ objections (Pet. 14-19) to the district court’s
order following the remand in this case (Pet. App. IV, 79-163)
have not yet been presented to the court of appeals and thus
are not properly before this Court.

la

APPENDIX

Relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, 77 Stat.
$92, as amended and added, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)
1857 et seq. provide:

Section 107(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-2(a):

Each State shall have the primary responsi-
bility for assuring air quality within the entire
geographic area comprising such State by sub-
mitting an implementation plan for such State
which will specify the manner in which national
primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards will be achieved and maintained with-
in each air quality control region in such State.

Section 110(a), (c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and
Supp. V) 1857c-5(a), (c):

(a) Submission to setietecter: time for sub-
mission; State procedures; required con-
tents of plans for approval by Administra-
tor; approval of revised plan by Adminis-
trator.

(1) Each State shall, after reasonable notice
and public hearings, adopt and submit to the Ad-
ministrator, within nine months after the promul-
gation of a national primary ambient air quality
standard (or any revision thereof) under sec-
tion 1857c-4 of this title for any air pollutant,
a plan which provides for implementation, main-
tenance, and enforcement of such primary stand-
ard in each air quality control region (or por-
tion thereof) within such State. In addition, such
State shall adopt and submit to the Administra-
tor (either as a part of a plan submitted under
the preceding sentence or separately) within nine

2a

months after the promulgation of a national
ambient air quality secondary standard (or re-
vision thereof), a plan which provides for im-
plementation, maintenance, and enforcement of
such secondary standard in each air quality con-
trol region (or portion thereof) within such
State. Unless a separate public hearing is pro-
vided, each State shall consider its plan imple-
menting such secondary standard at the hearing
required by the first sentence of this paragraph.

(2) The Administrator shall, within four
months after the date required for submission
of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or dis-
approve such plan, or any portion thereof. The
Administrator shall approve such plan, or any
portion thereof, if he determines that it was
adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and
that—

(A) (i) in the case of a plan implement-
ing a national primary ambient air quality
standard, it provides for the attainment of
such primary standard as expeditiously as
practicable but (subject to subsection (e)
of this section) in no case later than three
years from the date of approval of such plan
(or any revision thereof to take account of
a revised primary standard) ; and (ii) in the
case of a plan implementing a national sec-
ondary ambient air quality standard, it
specifies a reasonable time at which such
secondary standard will be attained;

(B) it ineludes emission limitations,
schedules, and timetables for compliance
with such limitations, and such other meas-
ures as may be necessary to insure attain-

8a

ment and maintenance of such primary or
secondary standard, including, but nut limit-
ed to, land-use and transportation controls;

(C) it ineludes provision for establish-
ment and operation of appropriate devices,
methods, systems, and procedures necessary
to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze data
on ambient air quality and, (ii) upon re-
quest, make such data available to the Ad-
ministrator ;

(D) it includes a procedure, meeting the
requirements of paragraph (4), for review
(prior to construction or modification) of
the location of new sources to which a stand-
ard of performance will apply;

(E) it contains adequate provisions for
inter-governmental cooperation, including
measures necessary to insure that emissions
of air pollutants from sources located in any
air quality control region will not interfere
with the attainment or maintenance of such
primary or secondary standard in any por-
tion of such region outside of such State or
in any other air quality control region;

(F) it provides (i) necessary assurances
that the State will have adequate personnel,
funding, and authority to carry out such
implementation plan, (ii) requirements for
installation of equipment by owners or op-
erators of stationary sources to monitor
emissions from such other sources, (iii) for
periodic reports on the nature and amounts
of such emissions; (iv) that such reports
shall be correlated by the State agency with
any emission limitations or standards es-

4a

tablished pursuant to this chapter, which
reports shall be available at reasonable times
for public inspection; and (7) for authority
comparable to that in section 1857h-1 of this
title, and adequate contingency plans to im-
plement such authority ;

(G) it provides, to the extent necessary
and practicable, for periodic inspection and
testing of motor vehicles to enforce com-
pliance with applicable emission standards;
and

(H) it provides for revision, after public
hearings, of such plan (i) from time to time
as may be necessary to take account of re-
visions of such national primary or second-
ary ambient air quality standard or the
availability of improved or more expeditious
methods of achieving such primary or sec-
ondary standard; (ii) whenever the Ad-
ministrator finds on the basis of informa-
tion available to him that the plan is sub-
stantially inadequate to achieve the national
ambient air quality primary or secondary
standard which it implements.

(3)(A) The Administrator shall approve any
revision of an implementation plan applicable to
an air quality control region if he determines
that it meets the requirements of paragraph (2)
and has been adopted by the State after reason-
able notice and public hearings.

(B) As soon as practicable, the Administra-
tor shall, consistent with the purposes of this
chapter and the Energy Supply and Environ-
mental Coordination Act of 1974, review each
State’s applicable implementation plan and re-

port to the State on whether such plans can be
revised in relation to fuel burning statutory
sources (or persons supplying fuel to such
sources) without interfering with the attainment
and maintenance of any national ambient air
quality standard within the period permitted in
this section. If the Administrator determines
that any such plan can be revised, he shall notify
the State that a plan revision may be submitted
by the State. Any plan revision which is sub-
mitted by the State shall, after public notice and
opportunity for public hearing, be approved by
the Administrator if the revision relates only to
fuel burning stationary sources (or persons sup-
plying fuel to such sources), and the plan as
revised complies with paragraph (2) of this sub-
section. The Administrator shall approve or dis-
approve any revision no later than three months
after its submission.

(4) The procedure referred to in paragraph
(2) (D) for review, prior to construction or modi-
fication, of the location of new sources shall (A)
provide for adequate authority to prevent the con-
struction or modification of any new source to
which a standard of performance under section
1857c-6 of this title will apply at any location
which the State determines will prevent the at-
tainment or maintenance within any air quality
control region (or portion thereof) within such
State of a national ambient air quality primary
or secondary standard, and (B) require that
prior to commencing construction or modification
of any such source, the owner or operator there-
of shall submit to such State such information as

6a

may be necessary to permit the State to make a
determination under clause (A).

(c) Preconditions for preparation and publica-
tion by Administrator of proposed regula-
heartage Set coed Sitcigalines getanel io

promul
gation # gh - tions by Administrator;

(1) The Administrator shall, after considera-
tion of any State hearing record, promptly pre-
pare and publish proposed regulations setting
forth an implementation plan, or portion there-
of, for a State if-—

(A) the State fails to submit an imple-
mentation plan for any national ambient air
quality primary or secondary standard with-
in the time prescribed.

(B) the plan, or any portion thereof,
submitted for such State is determined by
the Administrator not to be in accordance
with the requirements of this section, or

(C) the State fails, within 60 days after
notification by the Administrator or such
longer period as he may prescribe, to revise
an implementation plan as required pur-
suant to a provision of its plan referred to
in subsection (a)(2)(H) of this section.

If such State held no public hearing associated
with respect to such plan (or revision thereof),
the Administrator shall provide opportunity for
such hearing within such State on any proposed
regulation. The Administrator shall, within six

7a

months after the date required for submission of
such plan (or revision thereof), promulgate any
such regulations unless, prior to such promulga-
tion, such State has adopted and submitted a plan
(or revision) which the Administrator deter-
mines to be in accordance with the requirements
of this section.

(2)(A) The Administrator shall conduct a
study and shall submit a report to the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the
United States House of Representatives and the
Committee on Public Works of the United States
Senate not later than three months after June
22, 1974, on the necessity of parking surcharge,
management of parking supply, and preferential
bus/carpool lane regulations as part of the ap-
plica»le implementation plans required under this
section to achieve and maintain national pri-
mary ambient air quality standards. The study
shall include an assessment of the economic im-
pact of such regulations, consideration of alter-
native means of reducing total vehicle miles
traveled, and an assessment of the impact of
such regulations on other Federal and State pro-
grams dealing with energy or transportation.
In the course of such study, the Administrator
shall consult with other Federal officials includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Secretary of Trans-
portation, the Federal Energy Administrator, and
the Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality.

(B) No parking surcharge regulation may be
required by the Administrator under paragraph
(1) of this subsection as a part of an applicable

implementation plan. All parking surcharge

8a

regulations previously required by the Adminis-
trator shall be void upon June 22, 1974. This

subparagraph shall not prevent the Administra-
tor from approving parking surcharges if they
are adopted and submitted by a State as part of
an applicable implementation plan. The Admin-
istrator may not condition approval of any im-
plementation plan submitted by a State on such
plan’s including a parking surcharge regulation.

(C) The Administrator is authorized to sus-
pend until January 1, 1975, the effective date or
applicability of any regulations for the manage-
ment of parking supply or any requirement that
such regulations be a part of an applicable im-
plementation plan approved or promulgated un-
der this section. The exercise of the authority
under this subparagraph shall not prevent the
Administrator from approving such regulations
if they are adopted and submitted by a State as
part of an applicable implementation plan. If
the Administrator exercises the authority under
this subparagraph, regulations requiring a re-
view or analysis of the impact of proposed park-
ing facilities before construction which take ef-
fect on or after January 1, 1975, shall not apply
to parking facilities on which construction has
been initiated before January 1, 1975.

(D) For purposes of this paragraph—

(i) The term “parking surcharge regula-
tion” means a regulation imposing or re-
quiring the imposition of any tax surcharge,
fee, or other charge on parking spaces, or
any other area used for the temporary stor-
age of motor vehicles.

(ii) The term “management of parking
supply” shall include any requirement pro-
viding that any new facility containing a
given number of parking spaces shall re-
ceive a permit or other prior approval, is-
suance of which is to be conditioned on air
quality considerations.

(iii) The term “preferential bus/carpool
lane” shall include any requirement for the
setting aside of one or more lanes of a street
or highway on a permanent or temporary
basis for the exclusive use of buses or car-

pools, or both.

(E) No standard, plan, or requirement, re-
lating to management of parking supply or pref-
erential bus/carpool lanes shall be promulgated
after June 22, 1974, by the Administrator pur-
suant to this section, unless such promulgation
has been subjected to at least one public hearing
which has been held in the area affected and for
which reasonable notice has been given in such
area. If substantial changes are made following
public hearings, one or more additional hearings
shall be held in such area after such notice.

Section 304 of the Act, 42 US.C. 1857h-2:
(a) Establishment of right to bring suit.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf—

(1) against any person (including (i)
the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency to the
extent permitted by the Eleventh Amend-

10a

ment to the Constitution) who is alleged to
be in violation of (A) an emission standard
or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limita-
tion, or

(2) against the Administrator where
there is alleged a failure of the Administra-
tor to perform any act or duty under this

chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, with-
out regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an
emission standard or limitation, or such an or-
der, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be.
(b) Notice.

No action may be commenced—

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this sec-
tion—

(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff
has given notice of the violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in which

lla

any person may intervene as a matter of
right.

(2) under subsection (a) (2) of the section
prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of such action to the Administrator.

except that such action may be brought im-
mediately after such notification in the case of
an action under this section respecting a viola-
tion of section 1857c-7(c)(1)(B) of this title or

order issued by the Administrator pursuant
to section 1857c-8(a) of this title. Notice under
this subsection shall be given in such manner as
the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.

(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator.

(1) Any action respecting a violation by a

12a

(e) Non-restriction of other rights.

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any emission standard or limita-
tion or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator or a State agency).

(f) Definition.

For purposes of this section, the term “emis-
sion standard or limitation under this chapter”
means—

(1) aschedule or timetable of compliance,
emission limitation, standard of perform-
ance or emission standard, or

(2) a control or prohibition respecting a
motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive,

which is in effect under this chapter (including
a requirement applicable by reason of section
1857f of this title or under an applicable im-

plementation plan.
Section 307 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V)

1857h-5 :

(a)(1)' In connection with any determination
under section 1857c-5(f) or section 1857f-1(b)
(5) of this title, or for purposes of obtaining
information YI section 1857f-1(b)(4) or
ye 4) of this title, the Administrator
for the attendance and tes-
many of Giibanen Gul ee onueenalt as
vant papers, books, and documents, and he may

' So in original, Subsec. (a) was enacted without a par. (2).

18a

administer oaths. Except for emission data, upon
a showing satisfactory to the Administrator by
such owner or operator that such papers, books,
documents, or information or particular part
thereof, if made public, would divulge trade se-
crets or secret processes of such owner or opera-
tor, the Administrator shall consider such rec-
ord, report, or information or particular portion
thereof confidential in accordance with the pur-
poses of section 1905 of Title 18, except that
such paper, book, document, or information may
be disclosed to other officers, employees, or au-
thorized representatives of the United States
concerned with carrying out this chapter, to per-
sons carrying out the National Academy of Sci-
ences’ study and investigation provided for in
section 1857f-1(c) of this title, or when relevant
in any proceeding under this chapter. Witnesses
summoned shall be paid the same fees and mile-
age that are paid witnesses in the courts of the
United States. In case of contumacy or refusal
to obey a subpena served upon any person under
this subparagraph, the district court of the
United States for any district in which such per-
son is found or resides or transacts business, up-
on application by the United States and after no-
tice to such person, shall have jurisdiction to
issue an order requiring such person to appear
and give testimony before the Administrator to
appear and produce papers, books, and documents
before the Administrator, or both, and any fail-
ure to obey such order of the court may be pun-
ished by such court as a contempt thereof.

(b) (1) A petition for review of action of the
Administrator in promulgating any national pri-

l4a

mary or secondary ambient air quality standard,
any emission standard under section 1857c-7 of
this title, any standard of performance under
section 1857c-6 of this title, any standard under
section 1857f-1 of this title (other than a stand-
ard required to be prescribed under section 1857
f-1(b) (1) of this title), any determination un-
der section 1857f-1(b) (5) of this title, any con-
trol or prohibition under section 1857f-6c of this
title or any standard under section 1857f-9 of this
title may be filed only in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A pe-
tition for review of the Administrator’s action
in approving or promulgating any implementa-
tion plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or
section 1857c-6(d) of this title, may be filed
only in the United States Court of Appeals for
the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall
be filed within 30 days from the date of such
promulgation or approval, or after such date if
such petition is based solely on grounds arising
after such 30th day.

(2) Action of the Administrator with respect
to which review could have been obtained under
paragraph (1) shal! not be subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings or en-
forcement.

(c) In any judicial proceeding in which re-
view is sought of a determination under this
chapter required to be made on the record after
notice and opportunity for hearing, if any party
applies to the court for leave to adduce addi-
tional evidence, and shows to the satisfaction
of the court that such additional evidence is ma-
terial and that there were reasonable grounds for

15a

the failure to adduce such evidence in the pro-
ceeding before the Administrator, the court may
order such additional evidence (and evidence in
rebuttal thereof) to be taken before the Admin-
istrator, in such manner and upon such terms
and conditions as to the court may deem proper.
The Administrator may modify his findings as
to the facts, or make new findings, by reason
of the additional evidence so taken and he shall
file such modified or new findings, and his recom-
mendation, if any, for the modification or setting
aside of his original determination, with the re-
turn of such additional evidence.

® wv. &. sovaenwent paimtine orrice; 1977 248283 44

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1953%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
