# Petition — Henry v. United Overseas Marine Corp.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 820

## Text

Supreme Court, US ~
FILED

MAY 2 197?

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

in the Supreme Court of the
Unjted States

October Term, 1976

No 76-1520

ROBERT HENRY,

Petitioner
and HELEN HENRY, h/w

vs.

UNITED OVERSEAS MARINE
CORPORATION,

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Morris M. SHUSTER,

Myra B. JOSEPHSON,

SHUSTER & BECKMAN,
Attorneys for Petitioner

700 Widener Building
1339 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Murrelle Printing Co., Law Printers, Box 100, Sayre, Pa. 18840

~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION:

Statutory Provisions Involved .................c0seceeeeeees
eB GI perrnsterieinrieneienen

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

I. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari
To Resolve Important Questions of Federal
Law Posed by the 1972 Enactment of 33
2 10

A. Pre-amendment law—a brief summary 10
B. §905(b) and post-amendment law—the

unanswered questions .......................00++ 13
C. Why certiorari in this case ...................... 25
APPENDIX
Sur Petition for Rehearing ....................cccccccccceeeeeoee la
SD GED ciccenctnsrensinsnntntatnnstntennsmenmensenmncnnenses 2a
a Be irittiicecititniitititienitnriatsiinaitictesta tea 4a
EEE GES TTIED cccccecsctterctcceeeenmncen 5a
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES:
Anuszewski vs. Dynamic Mariner Corp., Panama,
540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) 00. 15

i

Ballwanz vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457
I I i aie 16

Barlow’s, Inc. vs. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D.
Idaho 1976), probable jurisdiction noted
a 18

Brown vs. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3rd
Cir. 1976), pet. for cert. filed 2/26/77, No.
pERESS SRE AN AT ree OS 9, 15,17, 18

Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d
,f ( % Peni: ca eee
2,9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25

Fisher vs. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp. 815

Oe eee 12,17
Gay vs. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d

a ee eee 15
Giacona vs. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp.

ff ee 15
Guerra vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., 546 F.2d

§ 4, | asks 15, 16

Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S.
ee ee
2,9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25

Kermerac vs. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,

I 11
Knox vs. United States Lines, 294 F.2d 354 (3rd
a RRR eR NEAR 12

Lindsay, Executrix vs. McDonnell Douglas Air-
craft Corporation, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.

RSS SERS ae eee 17
Marant vs. Farrell Lines, Inc., No. 76-1383 (3rd

ia 17
Napoli vs. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 536 F.2d 505 (2nd

FR Re ee ee ae 15

Ryan Stevedoring Co. vs. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,

Se es Ge CED eiterectennennsensenseeneesenen 20
Slaughter vs. S.S. Ronde, et al., 390 F. Supp. 637
ee GE, RD cendinetseeeentitioninn 15

Teofilovich vs. d’Amico Mediterranean/Pacific
Line, No. CV 75-1269 (C.D. Cal. 6/11/76) .. 24

Victory Carriers, Inc. vs. Law, 404 U.S. 202

SII icissdhsoatissieterstiadinasstataidsinaaiaininadiieailininsiendigtedions 20
West vs. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959) ....... 12
STATUTES:

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C.A.:

III - dintasdipteipareeamusnnes 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14,

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26
IIIIED: | qcpsesiiiisienmenmiendigesnsembtguunveiduea 4,5
II ania ssidasiteieatatei aint tiathleneaeneneeemeeraentemmneie 5

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C.A. §651, et seq. ..........000 17, 18, 21, 24, 26

RF 2

TEXTS:

Restatement (2d) of Torts:
Ee 12
eae 12
ee 12
Ee 12
STI inetenseuipenesiatenemammneniantmninnsimisninennmmmsnenmennes 12, 16
ee 12, 16
oe 12, 16
ee 12
$414, and coms. a and c thereto ...................... 18

Restatement of Torts:

TUTTIIOY cnsinernesiaesinndiilimensidancemnnnssienieidetiinbiaimeiamiimeanimenest 12
MISCELLANEOUS:
Cooper and Company Longshoring Study Report,
. se ew 21, 26
Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Ed.
GRUTOTED ‘cenbiestnssencinnensiisieaneneesabliatintnennisntsenmnniatiiiadsiatd 11,17

Harper & Kime, The Duty To Control the Con-
duct of Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886 (1933-
aE 12

House Report, No. 92-1441 (9/25/72), 1972 US.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 4698, et seq. ....13, 15, 22

Robertson, David W., Negligence Actions by Long-
shoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Har-
bor Workers’ Compensation Act, 7 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 447 (April,
SD. ceuvcennesensesncsnensnmniennennnnennsreqmemnenenenin 15

Senate Report, No. 92-1125 (9/14/72) ............00+0. 13

iv

Opinions Below

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, Robert Henry, respectfully prays that
a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment
without a full opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered on January 6, 1977,
rehearing denied February 2, 1977.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rendered its judgment order affirming the decision
of the court below on January 6, 1977 (2a). Petition
for rehearing en banc was denied on February 2, 1977
(la). The opinion in the District Court was rendered
orally from the bench on March 12, 1976 (5a). How-
ever, since the affirmation on appeal, shipowner’s counsel
has requested that the District Court publish its opinion,
which said Court has agreed to do.

Jurisdiction and Questions Presented

JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
US.C.A. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Where the facts are undisputed and Respondent con-
cedes that Petitioner would have prevailed under pre-33
U.S.C.A. §905(b) maritime negligence law pursuant to
Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206
(1963), and Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331
F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964), should not the Supreme Court
grant certiorari now to decide the following important
questions of Federal law:

1. Since §905(b) authorizes a negligence remedy
against the vessel “in accordance with .. . §33,” and
Congress reenacted §33(a) and (i) without amendment,
did Congress intend to preserve and continue intact pre-
amendment maritime negligence law, as developed by the
Federal Courts, or to preserve some but not all of pre-
amendment law, or to preserve none of it?

2. Does the lower courts’ rejection of the Gutierrez-
Ferrante standard of care further or thwart a paramount
objective of Congress in enacting §905(b) of promoting
safety in the hazardous longshoring industry?

Questions Presented

3. Do repeated Congressional statements, that
§905 (b) will place the harbor worker and the vessel on
the same footing as an employe: and a land-based third
party, mean that the vessel would only be liable when
it is at fault, or is it also a mandate to the Federal Courts
to develop a new standard of care for vessel owners by
adopting land-based negligence principles which were
previously found repugnant to maritime negligence law?

Statutory Provisions Involved

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. 33 US.C.A. $905 (b):

In the event of injury to a person covered under this
Act caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person,

the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly

stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if

the injury was caused by the negligence of persons en-

gaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If
provi

mitted if the injury was caused by the
persons engaged in providing ship building

repair ser-
vices to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this
subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of sea-
worthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury
occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall

2. 33 USCA. §933(a):

If an account of a disability or death for which com-
pensation is payable under this Act the person entitled to
such compensation determines that some person other

Statutory Provisions Involved

than the employer or a person or persons in his employ
is liable in damages, he need not elect whether to receive
such compensation or to recover damages against such
third person.

3. 33 US.C.A. §933(i):

(i) The right to compensation or benefits under this
Act shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee when
he is injured, or to his eligible survivors or legal repre-
sentatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of
any other person or persons in the same employ: Pro-
vided, That this provision shall not affect the liability
of a person other than an officer or employee of the

Statement of the Case

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This diversity personal injury action was brought by
Robert Henry, a longshoreman, against a foreign ship-
owner and it is governed by maritime law. On March
12, 1976, the action, by agreement, proceeded as though
a jury had been impaneled, with plaintiff resting after
introducing into evidence the parties’ stipulation and sup-
plemental stipulation of facts. Shipowner then moved
for a directed verdict under F.R.C.P. 50. The parties
had agreed that if the Court denied the motion, then judg-
ment would be entered for Henry by agreement in the
amount of $30,000. The Court, however, granted the
motion. At the same time, the Court rendered its opinion
from the bench. Judgment was entered in favor of the
shipowner, which was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.

On February 28, 1973, Robert Henry, a longshore-
man, was employed by Northern Metal Company, a
stevedoring company, along with other longshoremen, to
discharge cargo from the shipowner’s vessel, the SS Pacific
Breeze. Henry and the other members of his gang were
assigned to work in the vessel’s No. 3 lower tween-deck.
The cargo discharge operation was pursuant to permis-
sion and authority of the shipowner and by virtue of a
contract between the stevedore and the vessel's time
charterer.

The cargo to be discharged from the No. 3 tween-
deck consisted of crates of plywood which were first un-

Statement of the Case

loaded and bales of hemp. The bales of hemp weighed
approximately 275 pounds each and were stowed in the
forward part of the hatch and continued aft along ap-
proximately one-quarter of the coaming on botn sides
so that the stow was in a “U” shape. The hemp was
stowed 7 or 8 bales high and the entire stow was 14 to
16 feet off the deck.

The longshoremen commenced to discharge the hemp
at about 10:10 a.m. The actual discharge of the hemp
had been in progress for approximately 342 hours prior
to Henry’s accident. During that time period, the long-
shoremen used the same equipment and followed the
same method of discharge. The equipment used in the
discharge consisted of the vessel’s winches, for which the
ship supplied the power, the vessel’s booms and runners,
and the stevedore’s bale hooks.

The longshoremen were not supplied any staging to
do their work. Therefore, since they were unable to reach
the top of the stow, they placed their bale hooks in the
bales on the face or front of the stow as high as possible.
The bale hooks were then attached to the ship’s booms
and runners, and the ship’s winches pulled the bales from
the stow and out of the hatch. By discharging in this way,
bales which remained in the stow were caused to shift
and/or fall. This method of discharge was authorized
and approved by Northern Metal’s gang boss and ship
boss, but not by its stevedoring superintendent.

Prior to Henry’s accident, the vessel's chief mate
and third mate made periodic inspections of the cargo
operation in the No. 3 lower tween-deck. Prior to Henry's
accident, the chief mate and third mate had actual knowl-

Statement of the Case

edge that the method being used to discharge the hemp
was not reasonably safe. Prior to Henry’s accident, the
chief mate and third mate had actual knowledge of the
reasonably safe method of discharge of the hemp, i.e.,
discharge the hemp from the very top tier down. North-
ern Metal’s stevedoring superintendent, who was the ship
and gang bosses’ supervisor, also had this knowledge.

Nonetheless, at no time prior to Henry’s accident did
the chief mate or third mate stop the discharge by cutting
off the power to the vessel’s winches until the method of
discharge was made reasonably safe or take any other
corrective action, such as warning the stevedoring super-
intendent that the method of discharge that was con-
tinually being used was not reasonably safe.

Henry was injured at about 2:30 p.m. when bales
of hemp fell from the stow and struck him.

Henry’s accident occurred subsequent to the 1972
enactment of §905(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §901, ef seq.
(LHWCA).

The District Court held that this amendment altered
pre-existing general maritime negligence law; that Con-
gress did not intend to make a vessel owner liable for
failure to take any corrective action when he knows of
a stevedore’s improper method of operation except only
when the shipowner has exercised control over the man-
ner or method of doing the work.

The Third Circuit's judgment order which affirmed
the District Court specifically cited those portions of the
lower court’s opinion, turning on control over the man-

Statement of the Case

ner or method of doing the work, as well as a prior 33
U.S.C.A. §905(b) decision in Brown vs. Ivarans Rederi
A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
filed 2/26/77, No. 76-1182.

The courts below rejected Petitioner’s contentions
that (1) the negligence standard set forth in Gutierrez
vs. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963),
and followed in Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines,
331 F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964), were still applicable after
the 1972 enactment of §905(b); (2) Congress did not
intend to overrule or replace the Gutierrez-Ferrante negli-
gence standard by the enactment of the 1972 Amendments
to the LHWCA, since that negligence standard furthered
a paramount Congressional objective of promoting safety
in the hazardous longshoring industry; (3) in enacting
the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, Congress recog-
nized, endorsed and preserved the pre-existing judicial
methodology in developing maritime negligence principles.

10
Reasons for Granting the Writ

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Supreme Court Should Grant Certiorari To
Resolve Important Questions of Federal Law Posed by the
1972 Enactment of 33 U.S.C.A. §905 (b)

A. Pre-Amendment Law—A Brief Summary:

Prior to the 1972 enactment of §905(b), this Court
had evolved two distinct bases for harbor workers and
seamen to recover damages under maritime tort law.
One was unseaworthiness, the other was negligence.
Initially, in 1903, the unseaworthiness remedy, liability
without fault, was held available to seamen. In 1920,
through the passage of the Jones Act, a negligence rem-
edy, liability based on fault, was provided for seamen.
In 1926, this Court held that the Jones Act negligence
remedy also was available for longshoremen. Six months
thereafter, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (LHWCA) was enacted, with its ex-
clusive liability provision granted to the stevedore, the
longshoreman’s employer. The longshoreman’s right to
sue third parties, including shipowners, was left unim-
paired.

In 1946, this Court held that the unseaworthiness
remedy, available to seamen, was also available to long-
shoremen. From 1946 to 1972, this Court has held
that both seamen and longshoremen, who do work
traditionally done by seamen, are entitled individually

11
Reasons for Granting the Writ

and/or jointly, to the unseaworthiness and negligence
remedy against the shipowner. During the same time
period, this Court also has held that the shipowner was
entitled, in most instances, to recover full indemnity
from the stevedore so that the stevedore in effect bore

the cost of the longshoreman's damages, notwithstanding
the exclusive liability provision of the LHWCA.

These developments led to a substantial number of
maritime tort cases, to be filed and decided by the Fed-
eral Courts. However, decisions based on the negli-
gence/fault remedy were relatively sparse in compari-
son with the unseaworthiness/no-fault remedy, which
was a less burdensome basis for recovery. For a full
history with citations and discussion of these develop-
ments, see Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty,
2d Ed., pp. 272-280, 436-448 (1975).

In Kermerac vs. Compagnie Generale Transatlanti-
que, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959), an action based on
maritime negligence, this Court held that:

. . . the owner of a ship in navigable waters
owes to all who are on board for purposes not
inimical to his legitimate interest, the duty of ex-
ercising reasonable care under the circumstances of
each case.

Subsequently, in Gutierrez vs. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), this Court, in a longshore-
man’s maritime negligence case, held in an 8-1 decision
and opinion by Mr. Justice White that a shipowner’s duty
of care required the shipowner to take corrective action
when it knew of the stevedore’s unsafe method of op-

12
Reasons for Granting the Writ

eration. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals followed
this precedent without any deviation based on factual
distinctions, Ferrante vs. Swedish American Lines, 331
F.2d 571 (3rd Cir. 1964). In fact, decisions in the
Third Circuit had recognized this duty of care prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Gutierrez, supra. See
Knox vs. United States Lines, 294 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir.
1961); Fisher vs. United States Lines Co., 198 F. Supp.
815 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Moreover, the development of
this negligence standard reflected the ongoing judicial
process of creativity and flexibility in the development
of a uniform maritime tort law by adopting and/or modi-
fying accepted principles of land-based law relating to
duties arising from special relationships between par-
ties.' See Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§314A, B, 315,
318, 344; Restatement of Torts, §344; Harper & Kime,
The Duty To Control the Conduct of Another, 43 Yaie
L.J. 886 (1933-34). No Federal Court, during the pre-
1972 Amendment era, however, adopted or incorporated
into maritime negligence law land-based principles of
negligence law applicable to landowners such as stated
in Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§342, 343, 343A.

—_—_— le or

'In West vs. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), this Court
held that a shipowner whose vesse] was out of navigation, has
a duty to provide a shipyard worker with a safe place to work
only when the shipowner had control over the ship or control over
the repair work done. The West holding did not deter this Court
from its subsequent ruling in Gutierrez, supra, since during cargo
operations, a vessel js in navigation and the shipowner is in control
of its vewel. Moreover, a basis for a special relationship between
a longshoreman/harbor worker and the vessel owner exists be-
cause of the ship’s officer’s expertise in cargo operations, which
does not exist in shipyard repair operations.

13
Reasons for Granting the Writ

Prior to the 1972 enactment of §905(b), Petitioner
would have at least been entitled to a jury determination
of his claim and would have prevailed in view of the
parties’ stipulation. The shipowner recognized and con-
ceded this in the courts below. The shipowner contended
in the courts below that the enactment of §905(b) re-
sulted in the Congressional overruling of Gutierrez vs.
Waterman Steamship Corp., supra, and its progeny. The
courts below have agreed with this contention.

B. §905(b) and Post-Amendment Law—The Un-
answered Questions:

Section 905 (b) provides for:

(1) a remedy against the vessel (owner) for
injury caused by negligence;

(2) an elimination of the warranty of sea-
worthiness;

(3) an elimination of the vessel's (owner's)
right of indemnity against the stevedore.

The Congressional discussion of these three aspects
of §905(b) are exactly the same in the Senate Report, No.
92-1125, September 14, 1972, and the House Report, No.
92-1441, September 25, 1972, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Adm. News 4698, et seg. It is lumped together under one
heading, “Elimination of Unseaworthiness Remedy,” 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 4701-05.

Section 905(b) and its legislative history raises at
least these significant federal questions which remain unan-
swered by this Court:

14
Reasons for Granting the Writ

(1) Since §905(b) authorizes a negligence
remedy against the vessel “in accordance with .. .
§33,"" and Congress reenacted §33(a) and (i) with-
out amendment, did Congress intend to preserve and
continue intact pre-amendment maritime negligence
law, as developed by the Federal Courts, or to pre-
serve some but not all of pre-amendment law, or to
preserve none of it?

(2) Does the lower courts’ rejection of the
Gutierrez-Ferrante standard of care further or
thwart a paramount objective of Congress in enacting
$905 (b) of promoting safety in the hazardous long-
shoring industry?

(3) Do repeated Congressional statements,
that §905(b) will place the harbor worker and the
vessel on the same footing as an employee and a land-
based third party, mean that the vessel would only
be liable when it is at fault, or is it also a mandate to
the Federal Courts to develop a new standard of
care for vessel owners by adopting land-based negli-
gence principles which were previously found repug-
nant to maritime negligence law?

(4) Under §905(b), are the negligence stan-
dards applicable to longshoremen the same as those
standards applicable to seamen?

(5) In eliminating the vessel's right to in-
demnity, did Congress intend to narrow the vessel’s
duty to exercise reasonable care?

Questions 1, 3 and 4 are related. Among the Courts
of Appeals which have passed upon the negligence stan-

15
Reasons for Granting the Writ

dard of care issue, all of them, Second, Third, Fourth and
Fifth Circuits, have held that §905(b) creates a new negli-
gence action.’ Napoli vs. Hellenic Lines Lid., 336 F.2d
505 (2nd Cir. 1976); Brown vs. lvarans Rederi A/S, 545
F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1976); Anuszewski vs. Dynamic
Mariner Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976);
Gay vs. Ocean Transport and Trading, Lid. and Guerra
vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., 346 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir.
1977).

The Second, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, in reaching
this conclusion, have relied primarily on a statement in
the Congressional Reports that for the vessel to be liable,
it must act “in a negligent manner such as would render
a land-based third party in nonmaritime pursuits liable un-
der similar circumstances.” 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Adm. News 4704. Of all the generally accepted land-
based negligence principles available to the Second, Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, they have opted for the restrictive land-
based principles applicable to owners and possessors of
land. No reason or logic or policy is given for this choice.
In the name of uniformity, the Restatement (2d) of Torts

* Prior to the Cireuit Courts’ decisions, most District Courts’
decisions also held that $905 b) ereated a new negligence action.
Two Distriet Courts, however, have held that $905 b) did pot
create a new negligence action, Slaughter vs. 8. 8. Ronde, et al,
390 F. Supp. 637, 640 (8.1. Ga. 1974), and Giacona vs. Capricorn
Shipping Co., 394 PF. Supp. 1189, 1192-94 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See
Robertson, David W.. Negligence Actions by Longshoremen
Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amedments to the Long
shoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 7 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commeree 447 (April, 1976), where the
author effeetively reviews and analyzes all post-$905(b) litiga-
iton throughout the country to the date of publication.

16
Reasons for Granting the Writ

has been utilized by these courts as a statement of the
applicable legal principles.

The Fourth Circuit has opted for §343. The Second
Circuit has rejected §343 and has chosen §343A. The
Fifth Circuit has selected §§342, 343 and 343A, with an
indicated preference for §343A. However, that Circuit has
held that §343A is not applicable when the danger is
initially created by the stevedore, since this is not the type
of danger the longshoreman must face, notwithstanding
knowledge, Guerra vs. Bulk Transport Corp., et al., supra,
p. 1242. This conclusion is contrary to the poignant de-
scription of the longshoreman’s plight in Ballwanz vs.
Isthmian Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 1963),
where the Court stated:

The plaintiff was one of a gang of eight long-
shoremen working in the hold of the defendant ship.
He had no responsibility for, or authority over, any
of his fellow workers. His duty was to do his work
as he was instructed. He was in no sense obligated
to protest against the method of operation which he
had been instructed to follow or to devise a safer
method, nor was he obligated to call for additional

or different equipment.

The opinions of these Circuits do not consider or dis-
cuss whether such negligence standards further Congress’
intention to promote safety. The opinions of these Cir-
cuits do not consider that, historically, the Federal Courts
in the development of maritime tort law prior to the enact-
ment of §905(b) incorporated recognized land-based neg-
ligence principles, but never had adopted the restrictive
negligence standards applicable to landowners because of

17
Reasons for Granting the Writ

their assumption of risk underpinning. See Gutierrez vs.
Waterman Steamship Corp., supra; Ferrante vs. Swedish
American Lines, supra; Fisher vs. United States Lines Co.,
supra; Lindsay, Executrix vs. McDonnell Douglas Air-
craft Corporation, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972). More-
over, these opinions do not consider pre-§905 (b) maritime
negligence decisions by this Court on the assumption that
§905(b) wiped the slate clean. There is also an im-
plicit rejection without discussion or ana. /sis of the cogent
position taken by the respected legal writers, Gilmore and
Black, that the negligence standards under $905 (b) should
be the same as those applicable to seamen, Gilmore and
Black, The Law of Admiralty, 2d Ed., pp. 453-455.

The Third Circuit has taken a different route. It has
rejected §343A because of its assumption of risk under-
pinning, Brown vs. /varans Rederi A/S, supra, pp. 863-
864. In Brown, supra, the Court held that pre-Amend-
ment maritime negligence law continues to govern the
longshoreman’s negligence action against the vessel, so
long as such pre-amendment legal principles are not in-
consistent with §905(b). The Court suggested and later
held in Marant vs. Farrell Lines, Inc., No. 76-1383 (3rd
Cir. 1977), opinion reproduced in Brown vs. Ivarans
Rederi A/S, petition for cert. No. 76-1182, that the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 US.C.A.
§651, et seqg., and the longshoring safety regulations there-
under, which were a part of the pre-§905(b) maritime
law, mandated in the post-§905(b) era that the major
responsibility for the safe conduct of the work be borne
by the stevedore.’

* However, reliance on OSHA to effectively enforce safety
regulations and enforee accident prevention measures by the

18
Reasons for Granting the Writ

Thus, the vessel's potential liability was narrowed
when the stevedore’s negligence was a contributing cause
of the accident. In Petitioner's case, the Court extended
this principle and held that where the stevedore is initially
negligent, the vessel, despite actual knowledge and ability
to take corrective action, has no duty to exercise reason-
able care."

In Petitioner’s case, neither the District Court nor
the Court of Appeals, which cited Brown, supra, analyzed
or discussed why their rejection of the Gutierrez-Ferrante
duty was mandated by §905 (b) , or why and how this duty
was inconsistent with §905 (b) .

Thus, the Third Circuit, along with the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits, have answered Question (2) and related

stevedore is being undermined at another level. Recent judicial
developments hamper OSHA's investigatory power, holding that
inspections without a warrant, pursuant to OSHA regulations,
are a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Barlow's, Inc. vs. Usery,
424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), probable jurisdiction noted
April 18, 1977, No. 76-1143. For the longshoreman, it looks like
Cateh-22.

‘In affirming the Distriet Court, the Court of Appeals held
that a vessel's duty of care would exist if it exercised control
over the stevedore’s work method. This, too, is a recognized land-
based negligence principle. See Restatement (2d) of Torts, $414.
However, the Distriet Court, with the implicit approval of the
Court of Appeals, opted for Restatement (2d) of Torts, §414,
com. e's, rather than com. a’s, deseription of control. These
comments are contradictory. Under eom. a, Henry would be
entitled to a jury determination of the “control” issue, and under
com. ¢, he would not. Moreover, where the duty of care arises
from a special relationship such as the Gutierrez-Perrante duty,
the control required is over the premises or the chattel generally,
and not the specifie details of the work being done.

19
Reasons for Granting the Writ

Question (5) above. Without discussion or analysis,
those Circuits have concluded that the Gutierrez-Ferrante
standard of care was inconsistent with and thwarted a
paramount Congressional objective of promoting safety
in the hazardous longshoring industry. The development
of an important body of Federal law should not be per-
mitted to stand on such misguided and unspoken founda-
tions. The Gutierrez-Ferrante duty of care does promote
safety. It is not inconsistent with §905(b). The follow-
ing analysis will substantiate these conclusions.

Shipowners (in an amici brief filed below) argued
that to expose them to liability for negligence under Peti-
tioner’s circumstances results in removing the incentive
for the stevedore to be safe and, in fact, encourages the
stevedore to engage in unsafe practices. The heart of this

argument lies in the Congressional enactment which in-
sulates the stevedore from any liability to the shipowner

arising from the shipowner’s liability to the longshoreman.
Shipowners initially attempted to convince the courts that
concurrent negligence principles should not apply under
the Amendments. Shipowners argued that it would be
manifestly unfair to require them to pay one hundred per
cent of the damages when they were not one hundred per
cent at fault and the stevedore was not only not required
to contribute, but was reimbursed its compensation pay-
ments from the recovery made from the. shipowner. The
courts have thus far uniformly rejected this argument.

The shipowners have now turned this argument to
attempt to convince the courts to interpret the 1972

Amendments to place a very narrow burden or duty upon
them to exercise reasonable care. They now argue that
to hold the shipowner and the stevedore concurrently neg-

20
Reasons for Granting the Writ

ligent under Petitioner's facts would result in a windfall
to the stevedore and destroy the stevedore’s incentive to
eliminate dangerous conditions or practices which the
stevedore has created aboard the vessel. The effect of this
argument would be to leave exclusively to the stevedore
the responsibility for eliminating such conditions.”

When the 1972 Amendments are viewed against pre-
1972 Amendment history, it is evident that Congress did
not intend to leave that responsibility exclusively to the
stevedore. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the law,
through the “Ryan” bridge, created a greater economic
incentive on the stevedore to avoid unsafe and dangerous
work practices than presently exists under the 1972
Amendments. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the steve-
dore was liable not only for compensation, but was also
liable to fully indemnify the shipowner who was liable
to a longshoreman under the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine
of negligence. Despite this economic incentive, high in-
jury frequency rates persisted and escalated in the long-
shoring industry.’

*The loss from avoidable unsafe methods employed by the
stevedore would then be allocated between the stevedore and the
longshoreman. Here, as in any compensation system, the in-
jured employee bears part of the cost for injuries caused by
avoidable unsafe practices, ie., loss of one-third earnings, loss
of recovery for physieal and mental pain and suffering.

* Ryan Stevedoring Co. vs, Pan-Atlantic 8.8. Corp., 350 US.
124 (1956).

* Longshoring has long been recognized as an extremely
hazardous oceupation. The injury statisties cited by Justice
Douglas in his dissent in Victory Carriers, Inc. vs. Law, 404 US.
202, 218 (1971), revealed 92.3 accidents per million man hours
worked, indicating that a stevedoring employee whw works fairly

21
Reasons for Granting the Writ

At the same time, the accident prevention incentive
of the Gutierrez-Ferrante negligence doctrine on the ship-
owner was completely diluted by the “Ryan” bridge. This
occurred because the shipowner could recoup all losses
from the stevedore resulting from the shipowner’s failure
to act reasonably to prevent unsafe stevedore work prac-
tices or conditions of which the shipowner knew or should
have known.

In view of the above, the following realities existed
prior to the 1972 Amendments:

1. The economic and coercive incentives to elimi-
nate unsafe working conditions by the stevedore was in
fact exclusively on the stevedore.

2. The exposure of the shipowner for negligence
as an incentive for him to correct unsafe stevedore work
conditions involving ship’s equipment, of which he knew
or should have known, was ineffectual because of the

shipowner’s right to indemnity. .

3. There existed countervailing factors or incen-
tives which negated the cost savings incentive of accident
reduction for the stevedore, such as graphically detailed
in a section of the Cooper and Company Federally-funded

regularly can expect an accident roughly every five years. Con-
cerned about the high longshoring accident rate, the Oceupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), which ad-
ministers the maritime safety program, commissioned a private
consulting firm, Cooper and Company, to conduct a research
study of the longshoring industry. According to that report, in
1971, the lost time injuries per million employee hours increased
to 71.1, as compared to 69.1 in 1970, Cooper and Company Long-
shoring Study Report, Feb. 5, 1976.

22
Reasons for Granting the Writ

study of the longshoring industry. The negative incentives
cited by the report include the push for higher produc-
tivity and shorter loading time, since stevedoring time is
considered dead time. Thus, shipping company operators
have economic pressures to have loading and unloading
conducted as quickly as possible, which results in cutting
corners and taking chances. The study also noted that
there are negative incentives on management operating
against accident reduction measures, despite the high in-
surance premiums and high cost of accidents. These fac-
tors include the fact that stevedores and shipping com-
panies are closely linked and that often, owners of shipping
companies also own the stevedores, and/or that many
shipping companies do their own stevedoring.

It is against this background of the 1972 Amendments
that the following Congressional statement* must be meas-
ured, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News at 4704:

Thus, nothing in the bill is intended to derogate
from the vessel’s responsibility to take appropriate
corrective action when it knows or should have
known about a dangerous condition.

The 1972 Amendments encompass more than com-
promises to allocate the cost of longshore injuries between
the longshoreman, the shipowner and the stevedore. The
elimination of the shipowner’s right of indemnity from
the stevedore now creates a meaningful economic incen-

“Congress has also stated: “. . . it would be fairer to all
concerned and fully consistent with the objective of protecting the
health and safety of employees who work on board vessels for the
liability of vessels as third parties to be predicated on negligence,
rather than the no-fault concept of unseaworthiness ... .” 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News at 4703.

23
Reasons for Granting the Writ

tive for the shipowner, through its officers who are trained
in cargo operations safety,” to participate in accident pre-
vention when it knows or should know of a stevedore’s
unsafe or dangerous work practice or condition, which in-
volves ship’s equipment, since otherwise the shipowner
alone will bear the total cost of the loss.

Moreover, this incentive also results in giving the
shipowner the motivation to maintain an ongoing business
relationship with the stevedore who follows safe work
practices with the resultant reduced accident probability.
Such a stevedore will thus reduce the likelihood of the
shipowner bearing the cost of the loss, as well as the
cost necessary to defend any claim against the shipowner.

The argument made by the shipowners that carrying
forward the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine of negligence into
the 1972 Amendment era would create an incentive for
the stevedore to adopt unsafe practices is unrealistic. To

*For example, the Merchant Marine Academy in Kings
Point, New York, was established in 1943 under the Maritime
Administration of the Department of Commerce. It offers a
four-year undergraduate program to prepare and train deck and
engineering officers. In the catalogue for 1975-1976, courses in
cargo are listed as mandatory for those students pursuing the
nautical science curriculum, the course of study which prepares
deck officers. U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Catalogue 1975-
1976 at 28, 32. The course descriptions indicate that safety in
cargo operations and mathematics of cargo stowage to fulfill prin-
ciples of cargo handling are included. Jd. at 47. The Catalogue
also states that “(d)eck officers are responsible for the safe navi-
gation of the vessel, loading and discharge of cargo, vessel mainte-
nance and shipboard safety.” Jd. at 50. The curriculum is thus
designed to train deck officers in cargo safety to enable them to
accept and fulfill their professional responsibilities.

24
Reasons for Granting the Writ

the contrary, the Gutierrez-Ferrante doctrine of negligence
gives to the stevedore these additional incentives to act
initially in a safe manner beyond the cost of compensation
and the OSHA regulations:

1. A stevedore will know that if it engages in unsafe
work practices aboard a vessel, that it will likely be stopped
and subject to economic loss by payment to the shipowner
for his loss sustained by a work stoppage for this reason.”

2. A stevedore will know that it is subject to lose
the business of a shipowner who is exposed to liability
as a result, in part, of the stevedore’s unsafe work practices.

These factors clearly nullify the questionable nega-
tive incentive which may come from the windfall recoup-

ment by the stevedore of compensation payments'' under
these circumstances.

Congress clearly intended to provide job safety in-
centives to both the stevedore and the shipowner as to

In Teofilovich vs. d’ Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line, No.
CV 75-1269 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 1976), the Court noted at p.
13 that: “. . . if a condition is found which is unsafe for the
professional longshoremen, as a rule the contractor can remedy it
at the expense of the shipowner ; that if the stevedoring operations
are thereby delayed, the shipowner normally must pay for standby
time ....°’ If, as the Teofilovich court recognized, the stevedore
may charge the shipowner for idle standby time resulting from
unsafe conditions aboard created by the vessel, then conversely,
the v sel can remedy unsafe stevedoring methods in a similar
fashion—by providing by contract that they will be remedied at
the stevedore’s expense and that the stevedore must bear the
economic brunt of any delays thus occasioned.

"' It is uncertain whether the repayment of past com pensa-
tion benefits in any way affects future compensation insurance
rates. There is nothing in this record which indicates this.

25
Reasons for Granting the Writ

the manner that the stevedore performed its work aboard
a vessel which involves the use of ship’s equipment. These
incentives would operate together to increase accident pre-
vention activities and promote safety for longshoremen in
the following manner. Initially, the stevedore would be
exposed to the job safety incentives affecting it. If those
job safety incentives did not result in a safe method of
work involving ship’s equipment, then the second line of
defense against avoidable accidents to longshoremen
would tien come into play through the safety incentives
which affect a shipowner through its officers who are
knowledgeable in cargo operations safety, when they know
or should know of the stevedore’s unsafe work method
involving ship’s equipment.

The Gutierrez-Ferrante duty of care, if imposed on
the shipowner pursuant to §905(b), would therefore,
carry out a paramount Congressional objective of requir-
ing both the stevedore and the shipowner to become in-
volved in accident prevention by providing each with
appropriate incentives to do so.

C. Why Certiorari in This Case:

This Court should exercise jurisdiction in Petitioner's
case because it is an appropriate one in which to decide
some, if not all, of the important Federal law questions
discussed above.

In Petitioner’s case, the facts are not in dispute. Re-
spondent has conceded that, under the pre-amendment
maritime negligence law, Petitioner would prevail. Thus,
Petitioner’s case places sharply into focus several of the
questions posed by the enactment of §905(b).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Moreover, a decision in this case, irrespective of the
result, will terminate this litigation without any further
extensive judicial proceedings. On the assumption that
this Court will eventually address itself to the questions
raised here, judicial economy will thus be promoted by
this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under these circum-
stances.

Nearly 412 years have elapsed since §905(b) be-
came law. In that time period, it has been determined
that since OSHA's inception, and continuing into the post-
$905 (b) era, the injury frequency rate for longshoring
has not substantially changed."*

During this time period, the Courts of Appeals and
the District Courts have continued to be flooded with liti-
gation to resolve issues posed by §905(b). These courts
have agreed on some issues, disagreed on others, and
have reached results on other issues without discussion or
analysis. It would be appropriate for this Court now
to exercise its jurisdiction over this case to give guidance
to persons affected by §905(b) and to the lower Federal
Courts, as well as to make certain that the Federal Courts
fulfill Congress’ intent and objectives in enacting $905 (b) .

Respectfully submitted,
Morris M. SHUSTER,
Myra B. JOSEPHSON,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

700 Widener Building,
Philadelphia, PA 19107

'? Cooper and Company Longshoring Study Report, February
5, 1976.

la
Order Dated February 2, 1977

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 76-1618

Helen Henry
Robert Henry
v.
United Overseas Marine Corporation
Robert Henry, Appellant

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: Seitz, Chief Judge, and Van Dusen, Al ‘i-
sert, Adams, Gibbons, Rosenn, Hunter, Weis, and Garth,
Circuit Judges, and Knox, District Judge.

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the
above entitled case having been submitted to the judges
who participated in the decision of this court and to all
the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular
active service, and no judge who concurred in the deci-
sion having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the cir-
cuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not hav-
ing voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition
for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,
(s) Aldisert
Judge
Dated: February 2, 1977

2a
Judgment Order

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 76-1618

Helen Henry
Robert Henry

V.

United Overseas Marine Corporation
Robert Henry, Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 73-1613)

Argued January 6, 1977 before: Aldisert and Weis,
Circuit Judges, and Knox, District Judge.*

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of all contentions raised by ap-
pellant, and for the reasons set forth in the district court
oral opinion by The Honorable Alfred L. Luongo on

*Hlonorable William W. Knox, of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by desig-
nation.

3a
Judgment Order

March 12, 1976 (as set forth at pages 42a-53a of the
joint appendix)’, it is

ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the judgment of
the district court be and is hereby affirmed.

Costs taxed against appellant.
By the Court,
(s) Aldisert
Circuit Judge
Attest:

(s) Thomas F. Quinn
Thomas F. Quinn, Clerk

Dated: Jan 6 1977

Certified as a true copy and issued in liew of a formal man-
date on February 10, 1977.

Test :
Thomas F. Quinn
Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circwtt
Costs taxed in favor of appellee as follows;
DUG couséocstesesaul $666.00
See also Brown v. Rederi, —— F.2d —— (No. 76-1087)

(3d Cir., Nov. 4, 1976).

Civil Judgment

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 73-1613

Robert Henry
vo
United Overseas Marine Corporation

CIVIL JUDGMENT

Before Honorable Alfred L. Luongo

AND NOW, this 12th day of March 1976, in ac-
cordance with civil jury trial, and the Court having
GRANTED defendant's motion for directed verdict,

IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be and the same
is hereby entered in favor of defendant United Overseas
Marine Corporation and against plaintiff Robert Henry,
together with costs.

By the Court:

Attest: (s) Lee V. A. Yates

Deputy Clerk
Civ1 8/75

Argument on Motions

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civil Action No. 73-1613
Robert Henry
vs.
United Overseas Marine Corporation
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 12, 1976

Before: Hon. Alfred L. Luongo, J.

ARGUMENT ON MOTIONS

THE COURT: All right, in the matter of Henry
versus United Overseas.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor pleases, so that
Your Honor may be in the appropriate procedural pos-
ture to decide the matter now pending before you, Mr.
White and I have agreed that Your Honor may proceed
as if a jury had been empaneled in this matter and heard

6a
Argument on Motions

the evidence which will be presented to you upon which
Mr. White is going to make his motion.

MR. WHITE: And I certainly agree with that pro-
cedure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then we will assume for
this purpose that the jury had been empaneled and you
may now proceed.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor please, at this
time I would like to formally offer into evidence the stip-
ulation and supplemental stipulation of the parties which
are already filed of record.

THE COURT: And they are marked and docketed
as Documents Nos. 43 and 44.

MR. SHUSTER: With that, sir, the plaintiff rests.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. White.
MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you make the argument, you
have a motion?

MR. WHITE: Yes. I would come up to the micro-
phone and make the motion.

THE COURT: Just for the moment make the mo-
tion from there and then I want to make a brief statement.

MR. WHITE: Your Honor, pursuant to Rule 50
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant
moves for a directed verdict at the conclusion of plain-
tiff’s evidence.

THE COURT: I am agreeable to proceed in the
fashion requested by counsel since the stipulation which

7a
Argument on Motions

has been filed contemplates filing a motion for directed
verdict under Rule 50 by the defendant, and the stipula-
tion proceeds further to provide that in the event the Court
denies the defendant's motion for directed verdict, in such
case judgment is to be entered by agreement for the plain-
tiff, Robert Henry, against the defendant in the amount
of $30,000. It is clear, therefore, that the parties have
covered every contingency for the function of the jury,
and I am, therefore, agreeable to proceed in this fashion.
And, Mr. White, you may now argue your motion.

MR. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.

If Your Honor please, as a result of a stipulation
that has been entered into between the parties, there is
certainly no crec ibility issue in this case.

Defendant’s motion for directed verdict is basically
premised on two principles: Namely, that on the stipulat-
ed set of facts, as a matter of law defendant owed no duty
to plaintiff in this matter. That is for Your Honor to de-
cide, whether the facts as stipulated give rise to a duty
owed by the shipowner to plaintiff longshoreman un-
der the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen and

id

Har-
duty more
con-

is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law.

Argument on Motions

1 would like to address myself initially to the duty
that the shipowner owes to a longshoreman under the
amendments, and secondly to the matter of proof based
principally on the arguments relied on by plaintiff in his
brief.

As Your Honor knows, as a result of being on the
panel in Lucas I, the purpose of the 1972 amendments
was to take away the warranty of seaworthiness to the
plaintiff longshoremen and to remove the shipowner’s ac-
tion for indemnity against the stevedore. The reasons
and purpose have been set forth in a number of opinions
and I do not intend to go into that in any great detail ex-
cept to say that the quid pro quo for the shipowner under
the amendments was not only the abolition of its right to
indemnity against the stevedore, but a narrow standard of
care under the negligence action which Congress still per-
mitted. This narrow standard of care, of course, is pur-
suant to land based principles. That, I think, has been
rather well established by the opinions that have ad-
dressed this issue in the past two and three years.

I realize that by analogizing to land based princi-
ples the Court is not bound by any particular law of any
particular state. The Court can refer to land based prin-
ciples, be governed by land based principles, and yet in
effect establish a Federal admiralty common law. But
certainly Congress intended the courts to be guided by
common law or land based principles.

With that brief background I would refer to three
—or two, at any rate, possibly three important facts in
the stipulation that I think are crucial in determining the
motion.

9a
Argument on Motions

The first crucial fact is that the shipowner in this
case did not engage the stevedore. That engagement was
made by the time charterer of the vessel, and the time
charterer is not a party to this lawsuit. There was no con-
tractual relationship between the shipowner and the steve-
dore.

The second fact that is rather clear from the stipula-
tion is that the stevedore was negligent in the manner in
which they discharged the bales of sisal. They pulled out
intermediate tiers causing the topmost tiers to be unsecure,
and as a result of doing this a bale fell and struck Mr.

Henry.

The third factor from the stipulation that | think is
crucial is the fact that the shipowner, through its third
officer and its chief officer, had knowledge of the method
being used by the stevedore. The legal question, there-
fore, is what effect, if any, does that knowledge have in
terms of liability to the shipowner. And defendant sub-
mits it has no effect whatsoever, and does not give rise to
any duty.

We have stipulated that the knowledge that existed
was actual knowledge. For purposes of legal argument,
actual and constructive knowledge are the same. So it
would make no difference whether the third officer and
the chief officer did not have actual knowledge, but that
the condition existed long enough that they would have
constructive knowledge. It makes no difference. The two,
for purposes of argument, are considered in the same
boat, and, again, defendant asserts there is no liability on
the basis of that actual or constructive knowledge.

10a
Argument on Motions

It is our position that the defendant shipowner, once
it turns over the vessel to a stevedore, is obligated to have
the vessel in a reasonably safe condition so that the steve-
dore utilizing its expertise can stevedore the vessel in a
safe manner. Once that is done there is no liability to the
shipowner for anything that happens subsequently as a
result of the improper method of stevedoring that is being
utilized by the stevedore through its employees and su-
pervisory personnel. This is consistent with numerous
state and Federal cases.

In my brief I have pointed out the case of Fisher
versus United States, which was a decision from this cir-
cuit, applying Pennsylvania law. I have referred to the
numerous Pennsylvania cases on the point which all held
that once a landowner—and we are using the landowner
as the analogy for the shipowner—once the landowner
turns the work over to an independent contractor and ex-
ercises no control over that independent contractor in
terms of the methods utilized by that contractor, there is
no liability for an improper method or an unsafe condi-
tion created by that independent contractor through _ its
employees.

Fisher, of course, involved the United States of
America. It was a construction site accident where the
Government had safety inspectors on the job site, and the
court held that the Government, through the personnel it
had on the job site, was not liable for any injury to an
employee of an independent contractor, notwithstanding
that the safety inspectors and supervisors of the Govern-
ment knew or should have known of the dangerous con-
dition which ultimately caused the accident. We have
precisely the same situation in this case.

lla
Argument on Motions

The chief officer and third officer were, of course,
employees of the shipowner, but under Fisher, and the
cases relied on by Fisher, there is no legal duty to do any-
thing; there is no duty created between the employee of
the independent contractor and the landowner, even with
knowledge. And I think this is an accurate reflection of
realities in the modern business world. A _ shipowner
comes into the port, in this case the Pacific Breeze was a
Chinese vessel. It is really unrealistic to assume that a
foreign shipowner operating through a foreign crew is go-
ing to be able to do anything to upgrade the safety pro-
gram of a stevedore when the stevedore utilizes an im-
proper method; unrealistic in terms of a foreign shipown-
er-stevedore relationship.

The stipulation concedes that the stevedore was neg-
ligent. The stipulation includes that the stevedoring su-
pervisory personnel knew that the method being used was
improper. If they knew it already, isn’t it superfluous for
the shipowner, through its crew members to say anything
to them: “Hey, you are using an improper method.” It
is an exercise in futility. They are telling them something
they already know and, therefore, no legal duty should be
created.

In the last part of the stipulation, the original stipu-
lation, there are pointed out four things that the shipown-
er didn’t do, and that has been admitted. The shipowner
didn’t request Northern Metal Company to change the
method. But there is no evidence in the stipulation that
such a request would have been acted on. Therefore, how
can it be a proximate cause of the accident, and plain-
tiff, of course, has the burden of proof on proximate

12a
Argument on Motions

causation. He has to introduce sufficient evidence upon
which reasonable men might conclude that the failure to
make a request was the proximate cause. There has been
no such evidence entered into the record.

Secondly, the stipulation says that there was no sug-
gestion made to Northern Metal by the shipowner that
they change their method. The same argument holds true
with the failure to make a suggestion. There is no evi-
dence that any suggestion would have been followed and,
therefore, as a matter of law it cannot be the proximate
cause of the accident.

Thirdly, the stipulation contains the fact that there
was no order made by the shipowner to the stevedore to
change its method of discharge. Again, the stipulation
doesn’t contain any facts that such an order would have
been followed. Indeed the shipowner didn’t even con-

tract with the independent contractor. That was done by
the time charterer.

The final point that is made is that the shipowner
did not stop the discharge until such time as the method
was changed. There is no question but that the shipowner
had it within its power to do that. They could have turned

off the electrical supply to the winches and stopped the
discharge procedure.

Comment D, I believe it is, to Section 14 of the Re-
statement of Torts, covers that precise situation when it

deals with the issue of control of an independent contrac-
tor by a landowner.

THE COURT: Section 14?

=_ 6+ ee

l3a
Argument on Motions

MR. WHITE: Section 414 of the restatement, and
it is Comment C to that section where it states, “It is not
enough that he—” referring to the employer of an inde-
pendent contractor—and I am not suggesting that the
shipowner is an employer of an independent contractor,
because they didn’t contract with the stevedore in this case,
but they are referring to aii employer of an independent
contractor when they say, “It is not enough that he has
merely a general right to order the work stopped or re-
sumed to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make
suggestions or recommendations which need not neces-
sarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations or devi-
ations. Such a general right is usually reserved to em-
ployers, but it does not mean that the contractor is con-
trolled as to his methods of work as to operative detail.”

It is defendant’s position that even though ultimate-
ly the shipowner could have cut off the power to the
winches, that that does not create a duty upon the ship-
owner to do so, and certainly does not give the shipown-
er the necessary control over the methods of work of the
independent contractor, the stevedore in this situation, to

impose a duty.

On the issue of control, plaintiff's brief by and large
relies upon pre-1972 cases, Maritime cases, and it is pri-
marily addressed to the issue of control. And the argu-
ment is made that there are sufficient facts in this stip-
ulation, and in the supplemental stipulation, which a jury
could conclude, or could infer that the shipowner had
control over the stevedoring operation. Defendant con-
tends that there is no sufficient evidence, and I refer to
Comment C of Section 414; I refer to Fisher versus Unit-

14a
Argument on Motions

ed States, where there were two or more personnel from
the Government on the job site; I refer to Hader; I refer
to Crane; I refer to Brletich; I refer to Sylvania—Moore
versus Sylvania Products, all of which, as a matter of law,
refused to impose a duty on the landowner for negligence
of the independent contractor.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank vou, Mr. White.

MR. SHUSTER: If Your Honor please, [ hope-
fully will be very brief. I just want to make a couple of
points because I know Your Honor has had the briefs
and is aware of what they contain. I would just like to
State the issue simply, sir, or differently.

If Your Honor please, as I see the issue, I see it
slightly differently than Mr. White. I see what is before
you, as Your Honor looks at the 1972 amendment and
tries to fashion what Congress intended the Federal Courts
to do, whether this stipulation and the reasonable infer-
ences therefrom, creates a jury question which Your Hon-
or otherwise would have to present to a jury for them to
determine whether or not the shipowner in this case was
negligent or not. And in this instance, sir, briefly sum-
marized, what the stipulaiton indicates is that the ship-
owner’s winches and gears were used, that their emplov-
ees knew of a dangerous condition, knew the dangerous
condition was persisting, knew that the stevedore was not
changing that dangerous condition, had a way of stopping
it and did nothing. And it seems to me in light of the his-
tory of the Act that says the shipowner too has to partici-
pate in accident prevention under circumstances when

—

15a
Argument on Motions

they know of a dangerous condition, that this at least cre-
ates a jury question in terms of the stipulation, the rea-
sonable inferences.

| just want to make one comment about what—ac-
tually two comments about what Mr. White said. One is
a question of a foreign shipowner coming into this port.
I think it is obvious when a foreign shipowner comes into
this port he is subject and has to be bound by the laws
of the United States; he takes advantage of the courts of
the United States. As far as the question of proximate
cause as to the first three items of 42-A, B, and C, Mr.
White has argued that there is no indication in the stip-
ulation had these things been done, that is suggesting to
change the method that in fact this would have been done.
This may be a minor technicality, sir, but I would just
like to point out to you that in stipulation number 38, it
indicates that it was the ship boss and the gang boss who
had to approve the method and, therefore, were aware
of it. The ship superintendent was aware of the proper
method, and there was nothing in the stipulation that he
was actually aware of the fact that this improper method
was going on and he, of course, being a superior to these
two men, a jury could then infer had this been brought
to his attention he would have seen to it that people under
his supervision would have corrected it.

THE COURT: Just a minute. Whai about stip-
ulation number 28?

MR. SHUSTER: Yes, sir. The supervisory em-
ployees, I think if you look at 28 with 38 you get which
supervisory employees you are talking about.

16a
Argument on Motions

THE COURT: lIamsorry. All right.

MR. SHUSTER: Well, sir, if I lost on that one,
sir, in terms of what the inferences are, in terms of prox-
imate cause, it seems to me you get down to the basic
question that they did have the ability to stop the method.
There is no question about that as far as proximate cause
is concerned. That is all I have to say, sir.

THE COURT: I can understand that counsel have
made a very conscious effort to try to devise a pro-
cedure which will guarantee appellate review of a fact
situation so that we can begin to fill in the outlines of
the obligation of the vessel owner under the 1972 amend-
ment to the Longshoremen and Harborworkers’ Act.

Under normal circumstances I believe | would have
accommodated counsel and filed a written, and perhaps
lengthy, and hopefully scholarly opinion, setting forth my
reasons for what I am about to do. But | think that the
factual situation in this case, as defined and limited by
the stipulation of facts filed by counsel, renders this case
of relatively minor significance in the overall pattern of
the cases which will ultimately define the outlines of the
shipowners’ obligations as they relate to cargo operations.

I will start at the end, or pirhaps we will call it
the beginning because if indeed a jury were here in the
jury box, the beginning and the end would be the same.
I grant the defendant’s motion for directed verdict. That
would be all I would say if a jury were in the box and
leave it to counsel to do something at a later stage. But |
think that the circumstances here require some exposi-
tion, albeit brief, of my views, and the considerations that

me Oper = oe ee

17a
Argument on Motions

have caused me to direct the verdict in favor of the de-
fendant.

Northern Metals Company, the stevedore, and plain-
tiff’s employer, is clearly, by any definition, an indepen-
dent contractor hired to discharge cargo. Indeed in this
case Northern Metal was not even hired by the vessel
owner. It was hired by the time charterer of the vessel.
I make no great issue of that. That is not the important
element here.

What is important is that there is no evidence in this
stipulation which has been submitted to the Court that the
vessel owner, or the charter party retained any right to
control the method and manner of doing the work. | have
no idea whether under other factual circumstances, or
other types of evidence that might be presented, custom of
the trade, or otherwise, there might be some evidence of
the degree of control retained by a vessel owner of the
precise manner and method of doing the work for which
the stevedore, presumably an expert, was engaged to per-
form.

The only evidence in this stipulation, that which re-
lates to the checking of the cargo holds by the chief mate
and the third mate where work was being performed, is
consistent with the vessel owner’s checking of the prog-
ress and results of the work, much as the role performed
by the safety inspectors in Fisher versus United States, one
of the cases relied upon by defendant, 441 Fed. 2d 1288,
Third Circuit (1971).

In plaintiff's brief —not so much in the oral argument
here today, but in the brief—plaintiff has argued that
there is a fact question as to whether the shipowner rea-

18a
Argument on Motions

sonably should or should not have expected the stevedore
to change the method of discharge. And the stipulation
does provide that there is no evidence that any request, or
suggestion, or even an order to change the method of work
was made.

On the other hand, as defendant has pointed out,
there is no evidence that had such a request or sugges-
tion, or order been issued, that it would have had any ef-
fect. And this, again, goes back to the earlier statement
that | made, that there is nothing in the evidence before
me to indicate that the shipowner retained any right to
control the method and manner of performing the work.

I can envision situations in which the method used
by the independent contractor creates such a high degree
of risk and danger to persons, and property, as to justify
the extreme measure of cutting off the power to the
winches. But this is not such a case. I can envision a
case, for example, where the independent contractor’s
personnel has come aboard and it becomes obvious in
short order that they have broken into the bonded cargo
and have drunk themselves into a state of intoxication, and
in some fashion show a complete lack of control and a
degree of conduct, or lack of control as to create a seri-
ous danger that would require a vessel owner to take the
extreme measure and put a halt to the operations.

I do not accept the argument made by plaintiff's
counsel that the control over the power source is the kind
of control that makes the shipowner liable for the acts
of the independent contractor. I shudder to think that if
1, as a home owner, hired an independent contractor, and
that independent contractor makes use of my source of

+

=" — ae wae =

19a
Argument on Motions

electricity, my source of water, and that that will be in-
terpreted, the fact that he does make use of them, would
be interpreted as a measure of control on my part over the
method and manner in which he performs his work, is
unthinkable. And I reject the fact that the vessel owner
has control over the power source to the winches as a ba-
sis {ur concluding that the vessel owner has the right to
control the manner and method of the work performed
by the stevedore.

In my view, Congress intended to relieve the vessel
owner of liability for the negligent performance by the
stevedore of the work which the stevedore was hired to
do. Congress did intend to make the vessel owner liable
for its own independent acts of negligence, not for the
vessel owner’s failure to correct the stevedore in what the
vessel owner regarded as an improper method of doing
work the stevedore was hired to perform.

There are many acts of negligence for which a vessel
owner may be liable, as for example, oil on the deck
placed there by the carelessness of ship’s personnel, or
oil on the deck pre-existing the arrival of the stevedores.
And, incidentally, the oil on the deck I believe was an il-
lustration used in the legislative hisory of the 1972 amend-
ment; or a loose step about which the stevedore might not
become aware when the stevedore comes aboard to do
the work. I agree that there is liability and should be li-
ability, and | believe Congress intended that there be li-
ability for such independent acts of negligence on the part
of the vessel.

Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted the opinion in
Marant versus Farrell Lines, Inc., Civil Action 73-2615 in

20a
Argument on Motions

this Court, as reflecting the view that in the Lucas case,
the three-judge panel of this Court, of which I happened
to be a member, intended that there be concurrent negli-
gence on the part of the vessel owner and the stevedore.
My interpretation of the Lucas language differs from the
Judge who wrote the opinion in Marant.

In my view, Lucas simply intended to refute the argu-
ment by the counsel for the vessel owners in Lucas, that
Congress intended there to be liability only if the negli-
gence of the vessel was the sole cause of the accident.
My interpretation of Lucas is that it is possible for there
to be independent causes of an accident which can join
together, in which case there could be fault on the part
of the stevedore and there could be fault on the part of
the vessel, in which case the vessel will be responsible and
liable if it independently was at fault. But I do not be-
lieve that it is a proper interpretation of Lucas to regard
as concurrent negligence the failure of the vessel owner
to correct the negligent act on the part of the stevedore in
the performance of his duties. In that respect I differ
with the Marant court.

1 add a word, simply as further reason for my con-
clusion. To adopt the interpretation advanced by plain-
tiff in this case, would be to create chaos in stevedoring
operations.

If the vessel owner were placed in the situation of
having to correct an improper method of operation, imag-
ine what would happen in the course of operations: The
chief mate observes a certain method and he then gets in-
to a dispute with the gang boss, and thereafter the super-
intendent and the ship boss over what is or what is not

——

21a
Argument on Motions

the proper method of operation. They may disagree as to
whether the operation being performed by the stevedore
is a proper or an improper one. I recognize that that is
not the fact here. It is stipulated that everyone was aware
that this was not a reasonably safe method. But | am sim-
ply speaking now to what Congress contemplated by this.

Query: Would this call then for a stoppage of work
while they then call for an arbitrator to decide who is
right as to what is the proper method of operation? Cer-
tainly the facts of life in the commercial world would not
accept that as a viable alternative to placing the control
of the method of operation on the person who was en-
gaged to perform that kind of work with the limited res-
ervation that I expressed earlier, when the conduct of the
stevedore reaches a certain stage, then any reasonable per-
son would have to, even at the extreme expense of the
cost of shutting down operations, have to shut down op-
erations. As | said, I do not think that this is such a sit-
uation.

There were several other thoughts that occurred to
me, but I cannot think of them at this moment.

One of the things that I did want to express, | am
aware of the various standards that have been espoused
in a number of the cases. This case does not call upon
me to say what standard should be applicable ultimately.
On this fact situation | am simply noting that I could not
submit to a jury and have them speculate on these issues
of control.

I am not at all certain that those cases which have
equated the vessel owner’s responsibility under the 1972

a

22a
Argument on Motions

amendment to a land based landowner’s obligation to the
workmen of an independent contractor will ultimately be
the test applicable in this Federal common law relating to
vessel owner and longshoremen. My own personal view
is that in the course of time there will develop a Federal
common law which will be peculiar to the relationship
between vessel owner, stevedore and longshoremen. It
will be as Congress mandated, a uniform Federal law. It
will not be bound to any particular state law or state the-
ory, but I think what will ultimately emerge at the very
least is that the vessel owner will not bear the responsi-

bility for failing to tell the stevedore how properly to per-
form his duty.

(Off the record discussion.)

THE COURT: Interestingly, one of my colleagues
on the three-judge panel on the Lucas case, Judge Huy-
ett—indeed he was the author of the Lucas opinion—in
the case of Shields, et al. versus A. P. Moller, Civil Ac-
tion No. 74-1032, i:. a nonjury trial on January 23, 1975,
ruled that there was no liability on the part of the vessel
owner for bringing aboard a gas forklift truck into a hold
in which there were no ventilators where ship’s person-

nel on the main deck apparently were present when the
forklift truck was taken aboard.

I was looking through the transcript here to see if
I could find any specific comment. I can only say that
one of Judge Huyett’s conclusions of law, as reflected in
the transcript, is that there is no retention of control by
the shipowner of the work performed by the stevedore
company. Next, since there was no retention of control
by the defendant shipowner, there was no duty on the part

nme ee

23a
Argument on Motions

of the defendant to protect the plaintiffs against the equip-
ment of their own employer, which equipment had been
brought on the ship by the plaintiff's own employer, and
found that there was no negligence on the part of the ves-
sel owner under those facts.

He added this comment: “May I say that I believe
that it would undermine and be completely contrary to
the congressional purpose of the 1972 amendments to hold
a shipowner liable where the stevedore company had com-
plete control of the work being done and where the steve-
dore company had brought the gas forklift truck on board,
which was the equipment involved in this case, and di-
rected its operation, and of course where the ship had no
notice or knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condi-
tion.” I note that last statement of Judge Huyett’s,
of course, is a complete distinction from the facts before
me where it is stipulated that the shipowner does have
knowledge. But I thought it would be interesting, in any
event, to get the reaction of the author of the Lucas opin-
ion to his theory of liability.

I have not undertaken to list the various cases by
name. Counsel have set them forth in their briefs: The
Hite case, the Frasca case, and all of the rest of them, in-
cluding the one cited by Mr. Shuster. But, as I say, I
don’t think that this is an appropriate case to go into an
extended exposition as to what the ultimate standard will
be. I conclude only that the shipowner has no liability
for failure to correct the kind of improper work that was
taking place on this vessel on the day in question.

MR. SHUSTER: If your Honor please, for pur-
poses of clarification of the record, do I gather from Your

24a
Argument on Motions

Honor’s ruling that Your Honor is rejecting the princi-
ples that were stated in Fisher versus United States, and
Ferrante, and the line of pre-amendment cases—

THE COURT: You don’t mean Fisher versus Unit-
ed States. You mean Fisher versus Norships.

MR. WHITE: I think he means Fisher versus
United States Lines Company.

THE COURT: Just a moment. I thought you were
referring to—well, maybe it is referred to by the name
“Fisher versus Norships”’.

MR. WHITE: That is Judge Davis’ opinion.

MR. SHUSTER: I am talking about Wallace Fish-
er, sir.

THE COURT: (Pause.) Oh, yes. Yes. I am
aware of all of the cases cited in your brief. I have read
them all carefully. I am saying that the new Act effects a
change, and whatever the pre-1972 law was, I think Con-
gress meant it when it said that the vessel owner shall not
be liable, or vice versa—I guess it is the stevedore shall
not be liable directly or indirectly for the negligence of
somebody else. And I believe they meant the other to be
true also.

MR.SHUSTER: Thank you, sir.

One other matter of clarification. Can I also as-
sume, based on Your Honor’s ruling, and in reference to
the other Fisher case, that Your Honor has considered the
principles as stated in the Restatement of Torts 343 and
343-a—

25a
Argument on Motions

THE COURT: I have considered all of those. I
am not called upon to rule in this case precisely whether
if those cases had been applicable—or rather if the facts
in this case warranted I would have applied 343 and 343-a
to this case. I have said to you that I do not think any
one specific brand or style, or principle, or statement of
land based law is going to outline the duty of the vessel
owner. I simply said that on the facts of this case—and

that, remember, is my ruling, I direct a verdict in favor
of the defendant.

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Everything else I said was pure
dictum.

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

On the question of proceeding, I would like to call
Your Honor’s attention to a matter which is now pending
before the Court of Appeals. As I understand it, at the
present time there is pending before the Court of Appeals
the case—and I will spell the plaintiff's name, it is rath-
er difficult to pronounce—it is Z-u-k-a-u-s-k-a-s versus So-
ciety, it is a foreign company, it is Appeal No. 74-166 in
the Court of Appeals. Briefing has been completed and
I understand it is scheduled for oral argument sometime
this month in which the issue presented is, to the Court
of Appeals for the first time, what is the duty for negli-
gence in the post-1972 era.

Now at this point, Your Honor, as I see it, there are
two options available to me, and I would like, if Your
Honor would have no objection, to give me your feelings.
And one is to go directly to the Court of Appeals, the oth-

26a
Argument on Motions

er is to file a motion for a new trial with you and ask you
to hold that in abeyance pending—

THE COURT: I will give you an answer immedi-
ately. Go directly to the Court of Appeals. I doubt seri-
ously that whatever that case is on appeal it is going to
rule all the rest of the cases. If you decide, after you have
taken the appeal, and if the Court of Appeals comes down
and its ruling is such that it will change everything, may-
be Mr. White will agree that the appeal be withdrawn by
agreement and you come back and we would agree then
to have judgment entered in your favor rather than wait
and have it reversed on appeal. But why waste time?
This is a very short record, extremely short. You have a
stipulation and your notice of appeal. That is your whole
record, plus the transcript of what was said in this oral
argument. That is the whole record, is it not?

MR.SHUSTER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I cannot think of a cheaper, easi-
er case to appeal than this one. Maybe a bad case to ap-
peal, but nevertheless I cannot think of a cheaper or easi-
er case to appeal. In the meantime, if the Court of Ap-
peals rules in the Zukauskas case in such a fashion that
makes it abundantly clear that | am wrong, Mr. White,
| am sure, is a reasonable man and | will agree to a with-

drawal of the appeal and pay your $30,000. It is as simple
as that.

One thing is certain: The Court of Appeals will not
send this case back to me for retrial. It will either af-
firm me or reverse me, in which case it will direct, or it
will return it to me with a direction to enter judgment in

27a
Argument on Motions

your client’s favor for $30,000. So anything else we do
would be simply a marking of time and wasting of time.

MR. SHUSTER: All right, sir.

THE COURT: I suggest instead that you file your
notice of appeal.

MR. WHITE: If Your Honor please, I would sim-
ply, for the record, ask you to enter judgment on the di-
rected verdict.

THE COURT: Yes. There is no reason why judg-
ment should not be entered, no reason whatsoever for
motions for new trial in a case submitted on stipula-
tions. I am either right or I am wrong.

I direct the judgment be entered on the directed ver-
dict in favor of the defendant, United Overseas Marine
Corporation. And, I take it, that will be accomplished in
the course of the day.

MR.SHUSTER: Thank you.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1792%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
