# Memorandum — Massachusetts v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Memorandum
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 435 U.S. 444

## Text

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OctToser Term, 1976

THe COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

Wape H. McCree, Jr..
Solicitor General,

Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1500
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER
Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOH A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the federal
excise tax imposed upon the use of civil aircraft by Sec-
tion 4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26
U.S.C.), as applied to aircraft owned by petitioner and
used for official purposes.' In this refund suit brought in
the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts,’ the district court upheld the tax. as a valid user

'The aircraft in question in this case is a helicopter purchased
by petitioner in 1969 for use by the Massachusetts state police.
Petitioner registered it with the Federal Aviation Administration as
a public use aircraft and uses it primarily to promote highway safety.
In performing that function, it serves as an airborne command post
and provides transportation in medical emergencies. On occasion.
the helicopter is also used in searches for criminals and escapees
from correctional facilities.

"Petitioner sought the return of $130 in tax (plus interest and
penalties) (Pet. App. A-5).

(1)

2

charge for services rendered (Pet. App. A-1 to A-4). The
court of appeals affirmed on the same ground, stating
that “‘[nJo logical reason exists why users of the air
transportation system should not pay their fair share of
such costs’ ” (Pet. App. A-5 to A-10, quoting from Srate
of Texas v. United States, 30 A.F.T.R. 2d 5935, 5938
(W.D. Tex.), affirmed per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d 1473
(C.A. 5)).

1. Section 4491 of the Code was enacted in connection
with the Airport and Airway Development and the Airport
and Airway Revenue Acts of 1970, 84 Stat. 219, 236. These

Statutes provide for substantial expansion and im-

provement of the airport and airway system, to be financed
in large measure “through the imposition and application of
airport and airway user charges” (H.R. Rep. No. 91-601,
9ist Cong., Ist Sess., p. | (1969)), including an annual ex-
cise tax imposed upon the use of taxable civil aircraft under
Section 4491. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, supra, at 38; S.
Rep. No. 91-706, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5(1970). “Taxable
civil aircraft” is defined by the pertinent Treasury Regula-
tions as any engine driven craft registered or required to be
registered with the Federal Aviation Administration.
including “civil aircraft owned by the United States and
State and local governments.” See Section 4492 of the Code;
Treasury Regulations, Section 154.3-1(b)(2) (26 C.F.R.),
Appendix, infra, p. 4a; H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, supra, at
48-49.

The direct link between the Development Act and the
excise tax here in issue was established by Section 208 of the
Airport and Airway Revenue Act, 84 Stat. 250, which
created the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. This fund was
to be the depository of the proceeds of the various airport
and airway user charges, from which the airport develop-
ment expenditures were to be made. H.R. Rep. No. 91-601,

3

supra, at 41. Since the user charge imposed under Section
4491 was “based upon the premise that all aircraft should
pay a basic fee as an entry fee to use the system” (H.R. Rep.
No. 91-601, supra, at 40), Congress eliminated the
exemptions previously granted to state and local
governments and to the federal government, with respect to
the companion excise tax on the transportation of persons
by air (Section 4261 of the 1954 Code). Section 205(a)(2)
and (3) of the Airport and Airway Revenue Act, 84 Stat.
238.

2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 4-5) that in upholding the
validity of the federal aircraft use tax, the decision below:
(1) undermines the principle of intergovernmental tax
immunity; (2) conflicts with National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833; and (3) conflicts with State of
Georgia v. United States, N.D. Ga., No. 75-11S5A, de-
cided April 13, 1977, in which the district court ruled
that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to aircraft
owned by the states.

a. As the court of appeals correctly observed (Pet. App.
A-7), the federal aircraft use tax is “a charge for services
rendered * * * and represents a quid pro quo, and * * *
as such, is outside the scope of the doctrine of implicd
intergovernmental tax immunity” (quoting from State of
Texas v. United States, supra, 0 A.F.1.R. 2d at 5938).
These user taxes or “charges” are specifically earmarked
for air transportation development, and are paid into the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund established solely for
that purpose. In particular, they are to be utilized in the
development of airports, from the planning stages through
construction, and for the planning, research, development,
operation and maintenance, of air traffic control, air
navigation, communications, and supporting services tor
the airway system. These latter services. provided almost

+

exclusively by the Federal Aviation Admiti'stration. are
available to all users of the airway system, whether public
or private. Thus, in withdrawing the exemptions from the
companion air transportation excise tax previously ex-
tended to various governmental and educational organiza-
tions, the House Committee Report stated that “since this
tax is now generally viewed as a user charge * * * there
would appear to be no reason why these governmental
and educational organizations should not pay for their
share of the use of the airway facilities.” H.R. Rep. No.
91-601. supra, at 46. See also 114 Cong. Rec. 8987
(1968).

There is a fundamental difference between a tax that is
designed to produce revenue to support general govern-
mental activities, and a user charge which is designed to
recoup part of the cost of governmental facilities and
services directly from those who benefit from them. Thus, in
substantially analogous cases, this Court has held that
charges for services rendered by state and local govern-
ments for pilotage or wharfage, even though graduated by
tonnage, do not violate Article I1, Section 10, clause 3 of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]Jo State shall * * * lay
any Duty of Tonnage.” See, e.g.. Clyde Mallory Lines v.
Alabama, 296 U.S. 261; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543;
Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, Packet Co. v.
Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 84. Cf. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230
U.S. 352, 405. See also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
595-596. Similarly, the Court has upheld state motor vehicle
license and registration fees levied as compensation for the
use of highway facilities furnished by the state. See. ¢.g..
Capitol Grevhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. $42, Aero
Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 332 U.S. 495, Hendrick v.
Marvland, 235 U.S. 610.

a

ed

5

Finally. the Court has sustained state and local enplan-
ing charges upon commercial airline passengers as com-
pensation for the use of state-provided airport facilities
(Evansville Airport vy. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707), against
the challenge that, because they were imposed upon vehicles
OF Passengers in interstate as well as intrastate commerce.
they impermissibly interfered with the former. As the Court
stated in Hendrick v. Marvland, supra, 235 U.S. at 623-624,
“there can be no serious doubt that where a State at its own
expense furnishes special facilities for the use o! those
engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may
exact compensation therefor.”

Here, too, the annual excise tax on the use of civil aircraft
iS a payment by the user for airport and airway facilities and
services furnished by the federal government. Accordingly.
petitioner can no more claim the right to free use of these
facilities and services than it could, for example, post its
mail without purchasing stamps.

At all events, petitioner's claim that there is an implied
constitutional immunity of the states and localities from
federal taxation is sertously open to question. The Court
originally recognized such an immunity in [he Collector v.
Day, || Wall. 113, except where the states engage in
business of a private non-governmental! character (see, ¢.g..
South Carolina vy. United States, 199 U.S. 437; Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360). But in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U.S. 405, the Court sustained a federal income tax on
salaries of employees of the bi-state Port of New York
Authority. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed the
distinction drawn by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch vy. Marviand, 4 Wheat. 316, between the
position of the national government (acting with powers of
supremacy under the Constitution) and the states. which are
not accorded such preeminent powers.

6

Similarly, in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, the
Court upheld a federal tax upon the sale of mineral water by
the State of New York. While the case could have turned
upon the distinction drawn in the earlier cases between
governmental and private activities, none of the opinions of
the members of the Court voting to sustain the tax rested
upon that narrow ground. Rather. under the various tests
suggested in the plurality opinions, the aircraft use tax at
issue here would be valid.

Those tests are: (1) whether the tax is nondiscriminatory
(326 U.S. at 582-584, Frankfurter, J.); (2) whether Congress

expressly stated its intention that the tax apply to —

governmental organizations (id. at 584-586, Rutledge, J.):
and (3) whether the tax unduly interferes with the
performance of the sovereign functions of government, in
the sens of actual impairment of state or city functions (id.
at 586-590, Stone, C.J.). See also National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra, 426 U.S. at 843-844 and nn. 13, 14; id. at
863-864 (Brennan, J.. dissenting); McCormack, /n-
tergovernmenial Immunity and the Eleventh Ainendment,
S51 N.C. L. Rev. 485, 493 (1973). It is therefore not
surprising that shortly after the decision in New York v.
United States, supra, one commentator concluded that
“since the beginning of 1938, it is apparent that the Court
has rejected the reciprocal rule of tax immunity, returned to
the basis of earlier decisions and reaffirmed Chief Justice
Marshall's understanding that immunity doctrine protected
the Federal Government against taxation by the states but
did not equally shield the states against the exercise of the
delegated and supreme taxing power of the Federal

Government.” Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of

Governmental Tax Immunity—A Legal Myth, \\ Fed. Bar
J. 3, 27 (1950).

7

b. Given the status of the aircraft excise tax as a user
charge, this Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery, supra, does not control this case. There, the Court
held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act that extended the Act's minimum wage and hour
provisions to almost all employees of the states and their
political subdivisions were unconstitutional. In so ruling,
the Court concluded that “insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by * * * [the Commerce Clause]” (426
U.S. at 852). In the Court's view, “the vice of the Act as
sought to be applied here is that it directly penalizes the
States for choosing to hire governmental employees on
terms different from those which Congress has sought to
impose” (id. at 849).

Here, however, the imposition of a nondiscriminatory
charge for the use of federally-improved airport facilities
is not comparable to the imposition of federal wages and
hours standards with respect to state and local govern-
ment employment. By imposing this user charge, Con-
gress sought to require that all aircraft using the national
airway system, including the aircraft of the states, pay
their proportionate share of the cost of improving and
maintaining the essential airport facilities.

c. While we believe that the court of appeals correctly
upheld the constitutionality of the federal aircraft use tax
as applied to the states, we agree with petitioner (Pet.
5. 7-8) that the decision below conflicts with that of the
district court in State of Georgia v. United States, supra.
Since the district court held the statute unconstitutional as
applied to the states, that decision can only be reviewed
by direct appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1252. The

8

= , ; ' APPENDIX
Solicitor General has authorized a direct appeal in the
State of Georgia case and our appeal will be docketed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.):
shortly. Hence, the issue in this case warrants plenary SEC. 4491 [as added by Sec. 206(a), Airport and Air-
consideration by this Court.’ Accordingly, we do not way Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat.
oppose the granting of the petition for a writ of certiorari. | 236, 243]. IMPOSITION OF TAX.

Respectfully submitted. | (a) Imposition of tax.—A tax is hereby imposed

Wave H. McCree. Jr.. on the use of any taxable civil aircraft during any year
Solicitor General. at the rate of
(1) $25, plus

May 1977. (2) (A) in the case of an aircraft (other than a
turbine-engine-powered aircraft) 2 cents a
pound for each pound of the maximum cer-
tificated takeoff weight in excess of 2,500
pounds, or (B) in the case of any turbine
engine powered aircraft, 3'4 cents a pound
for each pound of the maximum certificated
takeoff weight.

(b) By whom paid.—Except as provided in sec-
tion 4493(a), the tax imposed by this section shall be

paid —

(1) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft described
in section 4492(a)(1), by the person in whose
name the aircraft is, or is required to be,

‘In order to provide for congressional review of the airport im- registered, or .

povemens preem. os 7 ©. nome in this case is due to expire (2) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft de-

after July 1, (see 26 U.S.C. l(e)). See S. Rep. No. 91-706, ori

supra, at 3. However, the considerations underlying the constitutional scribed in section 4492(a)(2), by the United

question are equally applicable to the federal air passenger ticket States person by or for whom the aircraft is

excise tax provided by 26 U.S.C. 4261. See City of New York v. owned.

United States, 394 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed per curiam, ; ' :

538 F. 2d 308 (C.A. 2). certiorari denied. October 4. 1976 (No. (c) Proration of tax.—l\f in any year the first use of

75-1684). the taxable civil aircraft is after the first month in such
year, that portion of the tax which is determined under
subsection (a) (2) shall be reckoned proportionately

DOJ- 1977-05

2a

from the first day of the month in which such use occurs
to and including the last day in such year.

(d) One tax liability per vear.—

(1) /n general.—-To the extent that the tax im-
posed by this section is paid with respect
to any taxable civil aircraft for any year, no
further tax shall be imposed by this section
for such year with respect to such aircraft.

(2) Cross reference..

For privilege of paying tax imposed by this
section in installments, see section 6158.

(e) Termination.—On and after July |, 1980, the

tax imposed by subsection (a) shall not apply.

SEC. 4492 [as added by Sec. 206(a), Airport and Air-
way Revenue Act of 1970, supra]. DEFINITIONS.

(a) Taxable civil aircraft.—For purposes of this
subchapter, the term “taxable civil aircraft” means
any engine driven aircraft—

(1) registered, or required to be registered
under section S0I(a) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C., sec. 1401(a)), or

(2) which is not described in paragraph (1) but
which is owned by or for a United States
person.

(b) Weight.—For purposes of this subchapter, the
term “maximum certificated takeoff weight”
means the maximum such weight contained in the type
certificate or airworthiness certificate.

(c) Other definitions.—For purposes of this sub-
chapter

| i

3a

(1) Year.—The term “year” means the one-
year period beginning on July |.

(2) Use.—The term “use” means use in the
navigable airspace of the United States.

(3) Navigable airspace of the United States.—
The term “navigable airspace of the United
States” has the definition given to such term
by section 101(24) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C., sec. 1301(24)), ex-
cept that such term does not include the
navigable airspace of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico or of any possession of the
United States.

Temporary Regulations in Connection with the Airport
and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 (1954 Code) (26
C.F.R.):

§ 154.3-1 Tax on use of civil aircraft.

(a) Purpose of this section. In general, section
4491 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by
the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, imposes a
tax upon the use, at any time during the taxable period,
of any taxable civil aircraft in the navigable airspace
of the United States. This tax is imposed upon such use
during any taxable period beginning on July |, 1970,
and on each subsequent July | before July 1, 1980.
This section sets forth rules as to the general applica-
bility of the tax and also sets forth rules, as authorized
by section 449%(a), to provide a method whereby certain
lessees of taxable civil aircraft may elect to be liable
for the tax. Further, this section provides administrative
provisions relating to the payment of tax and the filing
of tax returns.

(b) Definitions.—(1) Use. The term “use” means
use in the navigable airspace of the United States, as

4a

defined in section 4492(cM3). except that such term
does not include use by a manufacturer, dealer. whole-
saler, retailer, exporter, or importer of aircraft solely
for demonstration, testing, or delivery purposes. Mere
possession of a civil aircraft does not constitute “use.”

(2) Taxable civil aircraft. —The term “taxable civil
aircraft” means any engine powered aircraft which is
either registered or required to be registered under
section 50l(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. 1401(a)) or which is owned by or for a U.S.
person. Such term includes civil aircraft owned by the
United States and State and local governments. Military ©
aircraft and aircraft of the National Guard are not
within the definition of taxable civil aircraft.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1781%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
