# Amicus Brief — Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1742%3A07

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 434 U.S. 412

## Text

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

No. 76-1383
CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT Company, Petitioner.
3
EQuaL ENWTLOYW MEN T OpporruNtry CoM MISSION,
Pe sponde nt.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE
NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER
AS AMICUS CURIAE

Of Counsel:

LAWRENCE B. Kraus Ronert J. Hickey
NATIONAL CHAMBER Gi. Brock wen Ileytrn
LITIGATION CENTER KIRLIN, CAMPBELL &
1615 H Street, N.W. K RATING
Washington, D.C. 20062 1150 Connecticut
(202) 659-6036 Avenue N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-4911

STerHen A. Boxart
STaNn.ey T. Karteczyc, JR.
NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER
1615 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
(202) 659-6218

Counsel for the National
Chamber Litigation
Center

Paess of Ban S. Adams Fates, Inc., Wasnincron, D.C

—ͤ—1—— —H ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
. 6 ooo 5 6.0066 cncédddadccctcvees 1
rere eee eee e 2
QuesTION PaäsnN T 3
eee sees sse ses sss s esssese s 3

I. Tae History or Atrorney’s Fees in THE UNITED
States as WELL as THE LeoisLative History AND
PLalx Meantine or Section 706 (K) EstaBiisH THAT
Prevaitine Derenpants SHOULD Be Awarpep Ar-
TORNEYS’ FRES oN THE Same Basis as PREVAILING

PO 1—L— . ̃ 3
A. History of Attorneys Fees ................. 3
B. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Civil Rights Act
＋„57„'2 wade sedesesds cocdeascessees 6
C. Legislative History of Section 706(k) ........ 7
D. Other Attorneys’ Fees Provisions in the Civil
r ͤ ˙i . eee 11

E. Conformity with Other Prevailing Statutes .. 12

II. Pune Ponce Supports tHe Awarp or Arror-
neys’ Fees to Prevaminc DEFENDANTS ON THE

Same Basis as To Prevamine PLAINTIFFS ........ 13
A. The Title VII Respondent .................. 14
B. The Title VII Plaintiff ..................... 17
C. Society Benefits from the Defense of Actions

as Well as Their Prosecution ............... 19

III. Tae Firra AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED States Requires Equa, TREATMENT OF
PLaIntTiFFs AND DerENDANTS IN ReGaRD TO THE
Awarp or Atrorngeys’ FE. 20

IV. Tue App.icasBLe Stanparp Is Equa Treatment... 21

r ˙—˙ ee 23

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Casxs: Page
Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir.

738 (N.D. Cal. 19769))))) „ ees 16
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

421 U.S. 240 (19750) . 4 „
Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (N. D. Miss.

196500 „„ „ „ „ „ „„„„P„ͤ 4, 5, 7
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) . .. . . 5 20
Califano v. Goldfarb, — US. —, 97 S. Ct. 1021

(197% 2 . f f .
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F. 2d 993 (2nd Cir.

1976)))))))))::,,l u 2 „ ee eee

E
Eoull Bag 579 ( baa se ay 16, 18
q m 5 — 2 ommission v. Metro-
politan Atlanta Giris Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006
(N. D. Ga. 19760 ʒ )ʒ) nee e ener eee teens 14, 15

a 4. —1— 4 — 898 (W. D. Ok. = 16
mplo unity Commission v.
Coreliea National Bank, 12 FEP Cases 1565
(D.S.C. 19760))))):ꝛ 4 22
Equal Employment rtunity Commission v. West-
ern Electric, 10 FEP Cases 1275 (D. Md. 1975) .. 22

Ernst d Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185 (1976) ...... 6
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386

U.S. 714 (19877777 4 eens 3,4
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) 21
Garnett v. Holy Cross Hospital, —— F. Supp. ——,

14 FFP Cases 354 (D. Md. 1975) .. 14
Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F. 2d 973 (D. C. Cir. 1976) 7,9
Hall v. Cole, 412 US 1 (1973)))): cece eee e se eees 3,4
International Brot od of Teamsters v. United

States, —— US ——, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977) 19
Johnson v. Robinson, 415 US 361 —_— Weesen 20
Lamphere v. Brown oT — F.2d ——, slip

op., p. 11 (Ist Cir. April 25, eee
Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) ........ 7

Leibman v. J. W. Peterson Coal d Oil Co., 63 F. R. D. 684
(N.D. III. 197⸗c)))))))ʒ eee eee ee ee eens 18

Table of Authorities Continued iii

Page
Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 14 FEP
(8b. Tr. 1977) 0 Cases 05 18
Matthews v. Lucas, — US. —, 96 8. Ct. 2755
eee ee eee 20-21

McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 533 (5th Ci
1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 896 (1972), nh dow 409

U.S. 1050 (1972) 6. eee cece cece ceeecee. 14
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 US 375 (1970) ........ 4
— 55 Webster College, 423 F. Supp. 615 (E. D. Mo.
NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 435 tis 662

eee eee eee en 20

eee 13. 1
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 US 400 10
in
‘ 5 Pa, 1974) eee n — 16

arker v. thews, 13 FEP Cases 595 (D. P. C. 1976) 17
Patterson v. American Tobacco C P Ca

(E.D. Va. 1975) „ ; : — — 86 16
Rood v, Rood, 006 US. 71 (1971) ....... e 21

osenfeld v. Southern Pacific Rail Co. EP

Cases 72 (D.C. Cal. 15715 W me © — 16
Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.

1975), U.S. App. 1 1 No. 76-1060 16
Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den.

394 U.S. 1020 (1969), reh. den. 395 U.S. 941 (1969
Taylor v. Goodyear Tire & R bbe 6 ; to
672 (D.C. Ala. 1973) — 5 — 16

“ee eee eee

eee cases 6

Cir. Z 6, 16
Van Hommissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (oth Gir
eee 6

iv Table of Authorities Continued —
Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th
Cir. 1974) 0... ccc ceccenccccecccccccsccccccces

Weinbe v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) ....... 20

Willett 1 Buen 4 Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631 9
(W. D. Va. 1977) ) „ —

Fick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

Srarurokr Provisions:

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 USC § 2000
et oon 1974)

42 UBC J hůh h 6. 8, 11
42 USC 920001... aga eceecteestesteses 12, 17
2 1 246, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21

Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 USC $15
1

Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 USC § 1857h-2(d)
(Supp. 1977) ))))))))))

Copyright Act, 61 Stat. 652, 17 USC 6116 (1952) .... 5

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88
Eg . 891, 29 USC § 1132(g) (1975)

Em t Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat.
10B (1974) 0... kn . 10, 13

Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 USC § 3612(c)
(DTT). cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccsecoosces

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as
"amended, 29 USC 216(b) (1965))/)/ 5

Labor 1. 29 Ul and Disclosure Act, 73
Stat. 29 USC 501(b) (197) 5

Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1243, 42 USC
§$4911(d) 197777. 13

Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, USC §77k(e)
GIDE). cccccccccocsccvcescccessoesesonseoss 5,12

Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1176, 15 USC
§ 77www(a) (197i7777777j ee eees

Table of Authorities Continued v

Page
MISCELLANEOUS:

Committee Print, Legislative History of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 (November

— PP 10, 11
110 Cong. Rec. 13668-69, 1421214, 32110-13 (1963) .... 8,9
117 Cong. Ree. 31979-80, 32110-13 (1971) ....... eee
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv L.

, de 18

H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 32 (1971) .. 12

Hearing before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess., Part 1, p. 653 (1963) .......... 8

Hickey, Government Re ton of Union Racial Poli-
cies, 7 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 191 (1966) .. 7

Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal

Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 GWLR
% ————A A 10

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Wages, First Quarter of 1975,

i Eo ot iy a RaD 14
Wolfrom, The Antibiotics Case, 1976 Research Journal
. Ger a Ere 16

ees

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 76-1383

CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CoMPANY, Petitioner,
V.
EquaL EMPLOYMENT OpportTUNITY COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE
NATIONAL CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER
AS AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF INTEREST *

The National Chamber Litigation Center [herein-
after the Center] is a non-profit, tax-exempt corpora-
tion organized and operated under the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Center members include trade asso-
ciations and corporations of all sizes, representing a
cross section of employees throughout the United
States. The Center is organized and operated as a busi-

* Written consent of the parties to the filing of this brief has
been obtained as required by Rule 42(2) of the Supreme Court
Rules.

2

ness-oriented, public interest law firm, with its attor-
neys serving as counsel in matters important to com-
merce and industry.

The Center’s membership is comprised of employers
subject to the provisions of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act, including those provisions relating to
the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs at issue here.

The issue of awards of attorneys’ fees is crucial to
the Center’s own operations. Entirely dependent upon
membership dues and other voluntary contributions for
its fiscal well-being, the Center’s only other potential
source of operating revenues rests in the award of at-
torneys’ fees upon conclusion of litigation. Judicial
application of a restrictive standard to prevailing em-
ployer/defendants discriminates against the Center as
well as others representing employer interests in Ticle
VII cases. Where statutes permitting awards of at-
torneys’ fees to prevailing parties exist, they must ap-
ply on an equal basis to each prevailing party. To do
otherwise would be an invidious discrimination of the
variety justly struck down by this Court in the past.

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) provides:

In any action or * — under this sub-
chapter the court, in its di on, may allow the
ater | party, other than the Commission or the

nited States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part
of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private

person.

3

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should the standard applied by district courts in ex-
ercising their discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to
a prevailing defendant in a Title VII action under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C

be 212
— : the same as the standard for a prevailin g

ARGUMENT

A. History of Attorneys’ Fees

In the absence of statutory or contractual provisions
to the contrary, a prevailing litigant in the United
States is not ordinarily entitled to collect attorneys’
fees from the loser. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v
Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975) ; Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 386 U.S
114, 717 (1967). Two nonstatutory exceptions to this

American Rule” have been developed by the courts

in the exercise of their equitabl
412 U.S. 1,45 (1973). On

The first exception is that attorneys’ f i
allowed to a successful litigant, — @e “‘Hidieation
confers a substantial benefit on the members of an as-
certainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an

The amicus relies on Petitioner's sta
—— te : ;
recitation of the Opinion Below and Juri —— 2 the case and its

4

award that will operate to spread the costs propor-
tionately among them.“ Id. quoting Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 393-394 (1970). The second
exception to the American Rule is that federal courts
can award attorneys’ fees to a litigant where the op-
ponent has acted ‘‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly
or for oppressive reasons.’’ Hall v. Cole, supra;
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
supra at 258-259.

In addition to these common law”’ exceptions to the
American Rule, Congress has made “‘specifie and ex-
plicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees
under selected statutes granting or protecting various
federal rights.“ Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., supra
at 260. These statutes greatly expand the exceptions
to the American Rule by providing for the payment
of attorneys’ fees in a wide diversity of cases. It is im-
portant to emphasize that the statutory expansion is
in addition to and not a codification of the common law
exceptions. This Court stated in Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, footnote 4
(1968):

4. If Congress’ objective had been to authorize the
assessment of attorney’s fees against defendants
who made completely groundless contentions for
p of delay, no new statutory provision
would have been necessary, for it has long been
held that a federal court may award counsel fees
to a successful plaintiff where a defense has been
maintained ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons.’

Thus, the Court must start with a statutory standard
beyond the bad faith exception provided by common
law. See also, Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472,
474 (N.D. Miss. 1965).

——

5

These statutory attorneys’ fees provisions fall into
several categories depending on what Congress was at-
tempting to accomplish in each statute. Some statutes
allow only prevailing plaintiffs to recover fees, but
under other statutes, either party can recover if he or
she prevails. Furthermore, under some statutes, the
payment is mandatory. For example, under Section 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973), payment of
attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs is mandatory,’
while under Section 812 of the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(e) (1974), attorneys’ fees may
be awarded only to a prevailing plaintiff at the discre-
tion of the court.“ Numerous statutes similar to that in
the instant case allow the payment of attorneys’ fees,
at the discretion of the court, to the prevailing party.“
Thus, as this court has held:

Under this scheme of things, it is apparent that
the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are
to be awarded and the range of discretion of the
courts in making those awards are matters for

Congress to determine. Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co., supra at 262.

It is evident that Congress knew how to treat plaintiffs
and defendants differently where there existed a rea-
sonable basis for that difference. Thus, where no such

difference exists, the Court should not infer different
standards.

* See also, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
Alyeska, supra at note 34.

* See also, Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
§ 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1975).

* See, e. g., Copyright Act, § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952) ; Trust In-
denture Act of 1939, § 323, 15 U.S.C. § 77 www(a) (1971) ; Securi-
ties Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1971).

B. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Civil Rights of 1964.

Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1974) provides that:

In any action . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commis-
sion or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee....

Where the plain meaning of a statute is clear on its
face, it is unnecessary to refer to the legislative history.
United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 217
(1920); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648
(1961). Where the language of the statute is clear, it is
not for a court to say that a legislative act encompasses
a more restrictive meaning. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfel-
der, 425 U.S. 185, 200-201 (1976); United States v.
Kelly, 519 F.2d 251, 256 (8th Cir. 1975). The meaning
of this section is clear and unequivocal on its face ; if
either party, except the Commission, prevails, it is en-
titled to be considered for an award of attorneys’ fees.
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation, 503 F.2d 1131,
1133 (9th Cir. 1974).° No distinction is drawn by the
statute between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing de-
fendants. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
supra at 402, this Court set the test for award of at-
torneys’ fees under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.° There, the court held that a prevailing plain-

* Accord, United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d
359, 362 (3rd Cir. 1975).

„The language of the attorneys’ fees provision of Title II is al-
most identical to that here. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1974). The
only differences in language are that Section 202(b) refers to ‘the
United States while § 706 (k) refers to the Commission or the
United States and Section 202 (b) begins In any action com-

7

tiff should ordinarily recover his attorney's fees un-
less special circumstances would render such an award
unjust“. This test has been held appropriate in award-
ing attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs in Title VII
litigation. Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir.
1971). Despite this, the Fourth Circuit in the instant
litigation ignored the plain meaning of Section 706(k)
and the Supreme Court’s instruction in Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, that the statutory
standard went beyond the bad faith common law ex-
ception.

C. Legislative History of Section 706(k)

Although resort to legislative history is not neces-
sary to determine the meaning of this statute, a review
of this confirms its plain language. The legislative his-
tory of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes that
Congress had a dual purpose in providing that prevail-
ing parties in Title VII litigation could obtain at-
torneys’ fees. Those purposes were to encourage plain-
tiffs of limited means to bring meritorious actions, and
equally important, to deter the bringing of lawsuits
without foundation. Trubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ; U.S. v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 872-

73 (D. R. I. 1970), quoting with approval, Bell v. Ala
matt Motel, supra.

The only discussion in the legislative history which
is truly illuminating as to the intent of Congress in en-

menced pursuant to this title’’, while 706(k) begins In any action
or proceeding under this fitle.’’

Although not part of its official history, Title VII has its origin
in many laws going back to 1944. See, Hickey, Government Regula
tion of Union Racial Policies, 7 B.C.Ind. and Comm. L. Rev. 191
(1966). However, the principa’ thrust for the present statute was

8

acting the attorneys’ fee provision is the statement
made by Senator Pastore on the Senate floor during
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964:°

The purpose of this provision in the modified sub-
stitute is to discourage frivolous suits. Here the
court within its discretion is given power to order

yment of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.
First of all, it is within the discretion of the court.
It is not favoritism toward one party, as against
the other. When a person realizes that he takes
the chance of having attorneys’ fees assessed
against him if he does not prevail, he will deliber-
ate before he brings suit. He will make certain that
he is not on frivolous ground. (emphasis added)
110 Cong. Ree. 14214 (1963).

Senator Lausche concurred in this assessment stating:

that language was inserted in the bill to deter the
bringing of lawsuits without foundation.

In this bill we wanted to discourage the bringing
of lawsuits and we therefore provided that attor-
ney’s fees shall be allowed only in favor of the
victorious party. 110 Cong. Rec. 13668-69 (1963).

a bill introduced in 1963 by Representative Celler. Section 204 (b)
of that proposal provided for attorneys’ fees for the person ag-
grieved’’. Hearing before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., Part
1, page 653 (1963). The substitution of the phrase ‘‘ prevailing
party for the person aggrieved’’ in the statute introduced the
following year indicates a conscious awareness that plaintiffs and
defendants should be treated equally.

* Senator Pastore s remarks were directed toward the attorneys’
fee provision of Title II of the Act. As previously noted that pro-
vision is essentially identical to the one in Title VII. See, supra,
n. 6.

The remarks of Senators Pastore and Lausche regard-

ing this interpretation of the provision were undis-
puted.’

Relying upon the comments of the two Senators, the
court in United States v. Gray, supra at 873, agreed
that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be
treated equally and awarded attorneys’ fees to the
defendants.” Similarly, the United States Court of
— for the District of Columbia Circuit has
stated:

But second, and equally important, Congress in-
tended to deter the bringing of leneniin without
foundation _by providing that the ‘prevailing

rty’—be it plaintiff or defendant-—could obtain
egal fees. Were this not Congress’ intent, it would
have authorized fees only to prevailing plaintiffs,
or to any party as it has done in many other cir-
cumstances (emphasis added). Grubbs v. Butz,
supra, at 975-76.

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Congress
was as concerned with the rights of successful defend-
ants vis-a-vis attorneys’ fees as it was with those of
successful plaintiffs and that fees should be awarded to
successful parties on the same basis.

= See also remarks of Senator Miller that ambulance chasing’’ is
discouraged by the fact that attorneys’ fees are awarded to the pre-
vailing party. 110 Cong. 14213-14 (1963).

The district court in Gray appears to have misapplied the
standard set by this court in Newman v. Piggie Park, supra. There,
this Court said that absent exceptional circumstances, successful
plaintiffs should be awarded attorneys’ fees in Title II cases. The
district court, although noting Piggie Park and expressing its be
lief that plaintiffs and defendants should be treated equally, ap-
plied a meritless standard in awarding fees to the defendant.
See, infra, p. 22.

10

This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative his-
tory of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 which amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The most significant change wrought by
the 1972 Act was, of course, to vest the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission with the power to sue
to enforce the Act, thereby eliminating the prior Act’s
almost total reliance on individuals pursuing relief
with their own resources.”

The 1972 legislative history indicates no disagree-
ment either with the meaning ascribed to the attorneys’
fees language by Senator Pastore, supra, or with the
interpretations of the courts in awarding attorneys’
fees on an equal basis to plaintiffs and defendants. Al-
though several attempts were made in 1972 to amend
the attorneys’ fee section of the 1964 Act, the final bill
left it unchanged. While not ultimately adopted, the
proposed amendments are instructive as to Congress’
interpretation of the 1964 Act.

In this regard, the Senate had adopted an amend-
ment which would have mandated the payment of at-
torneys’ fees to small businesses and unions in any
Title VII actions brought by the EEOC or the govern-
ment, unless it was found that the defense had been
put forth in bad faith. Leg. Hist. 1177-1180, 1185.“ The
Senate receded from the amendment in conference, ap-
parently because of concern that it would encourage

™ 86 Stat. 103 (1972).

12 See, Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 G.W.L.R. 824 (1972).
Leg. Hist. references are to the Committee Print. Legislative

History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (No-
vember 1972).

* —

11

unworthy defenses and because it was not related to
the outcome of the litigation. Leg. Hist. 1183-84, 8.
Rep. No. 92-681, 92nd Cong., 2d. Sess. 19 (1972). Yet
the concern of Congress with the heavy financial bur-
den imposed on defendants was clear.

This concern is also indicated by the House’s rejec-
tion of a bill which would have amended Section
706(k) to allow only prevailing plaintiffs’ to be
granted attorneys’ fees. Under that proposal, defend-
ants would have been able to recover attorneys’ fees
only under the American Rule. This revision of the bill
was replaced on the House floor by a substitute which
left 706(k) unchanged.” Rejection of the ‘prevailing
plaintiff' language indicates that Congress believed
section 706(k) required a test other than the bad faith
test of the American Rule. If Congress had felt that the
traditional American Rule left defendants adequately
protected, no purpose would have been served in drop-
ping the Committee revision of the bill.

Thus, it is significant that the attorneys’ fee section
was attacked from both sides; by those who wanted to
restrict it to plaintiffs, and those who wished to make it
mandatory for defendants. That the amendment
emerged unscathed is certainly indicative of the fact
that Congress believed the original provision applied
equally to both plaintiffs and defendants.

D. Other Attorneys’ Fees Provisions in the Civil Rights Act.

We have already noted that the attorneys’ fees pro-
vision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000 a-3(b), Section 204, contains language es-

Compare H. Rep. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong. Ist Sess. 32 (1971)
with 117 Cong. Ree. 31979-80, 2110-13 (1971).

12

sentially identical to that in Title VII. Moreover, an
examination of the attorneys’ fee provision in Title III
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1
(1974)"* which contains no provision for actions by pri-
vate plaintiffs (actions can only be brought by the At-
torney General!) is illuminating.

There Congress provided that attorneys’ fees could
be imposed upon the government, but the government
was not allowed to collect fees. Thus, Congress was not
concerned with allowing private defendants to recover
attorneys’ fees from the government where it is an
unsuccessful plaintiff as it was in the instant case. But
more importantly, it indicates that Congress in enact-
ing the Civil Rights Act was fully able to structure a
provision which provided that attorneys’ fees could be
awarded differently based on the identity of the par-
ties. Because such a provision is conspicuous by its
absence in Section 706(k), it should not be so construed.

its legislative history, but also with the interpretation
accorded similar provisions of other statutes. In this
regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in applying the attorneys’ fees provi-
sion of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §77k(e) (1971)” held that the test to be ap-
plied to both plaintiffs and defendants was to be the

“42 U.S.C. § 2000b-1 provides: In any action or proceeding
under this subchapter the United States shall be liable for costs,
including a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the same as a private person

15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) authorizes a fee award if the court believes
the suit or the defense to have been without merit

13

same. Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468,
471 (2d Cir. 1975). In Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484
F.2d 1331, 1338 at n. 7 (Ist Cir. 1973), the court held
that under Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §1857(h)-2d (1969),” the parties should be
treated equally in awarding fees, since ‘‘. . . the identity
of the party . . . would be of little moment.“ Moreover,
under other acts with attorneys’ fees provisions similar
to those here, there are no indications of any different
treatment of plaintiffs and defendants. Noise Control
Act of 1972, § 12, 42 U.S.C. §4911(d) (1977); Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502,
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g) (1975).

We submit that there is no rational reason for ignor-
ing the intent of Congress and treating prevailing de-
fendants any differently under this statute than they
are under any of the other statutes with similar pro-
visions.

0

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’
FEES TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS ON THE SAME BASIS AS
TO PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS.

The plain language of Section 706(k), the legislative
history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1972
amendments thereto, and an analysis of the evolution
by statute and case law of the right to attorneys’ fees,
all support the position that in Title VII cases, plain-
tiffs and defendants deserve equal treatment when a
court exercises its discretion to award attorneys’ fees.
The same position is reached as a matter of public

Section 304(d) permits an award to any party, whenever the
Court determines such an award is appropriate

14

policy. There is no generic difference between plaintiffs
and defendants, and the potential award of attorneys’
fees should be focused as much on encouraging meri-
torious litigation as on discouragement of suits without
merit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, supra.

A. The Title VII Respondent

The potential of a Title VII lawsuit confronts not
only giant industries, but also individuals employing
as few as 15 persons per working day for twenty calen-
dar weeks a year. Section 701(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(a) & (b) (1974).“ The broadly phrased statutory lan-
guage of Title VII encompasses non-profit organiza-
tions and charitable groups such as hospitals, churches,
schools and community service organizations. See, e. g.,
Mosby v. Webster College, 423 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mo.
1976) ; Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp.
631 (W.D. Va. 1977); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F. 2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) cert. den. 409 U.S. 896 (1972),
reh. den. 409 U.S. 1050 (1972) ; Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls
Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976); and
Garnett v. Holy Cross Hospital, —— F. Supp. —— 14
FEP Cases 354 (D. Md. 1975).“

In all of these cases, the defendant organization had
to bear its own attorneys’ fees, and in all of these cases

The Department of Labor estimates that 98% of the businesses
subject to state unemployment laws employ 99 or less employees.
US. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
and Wages, First Quarter of 1975, p. 20 (1976).

This and subsequent citations refer to the cases as reported in
the Bureau of National Affairs Fair Employment Practices Cases.
These cases have not been officially reported.

15

except in Metropolitan Atlanta Girls Club the defend-
ant prevailed. It is fair to assume the money for these
fees came from funds that would otherwise have been
directed toward education, medical care and com-
munity service. As the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit noted:

For private colleges and universities, not only
do heavy litigation expenses impose a financial
burden which may ultimately be passed on in some
measure to students or be absorbed to the detri-
ment of some educational function, but the process
of involving every department in depth in fact
finding and defense may well be deeply disruptive
to the institution’s mission. In both a material and
non-material sense they are fragile, not perhaps
in their capacity to endure but in their capacity to
remain effective while enduring. This is not to sug-
gest that other institutions, such as hospitals or
small businesses, may not be similarly burdened.
Lamphere v. Brown University, —— F.2d ——,
slip opinion, p. 11 (1st Cir. April 25, 1977)

The size of fees to defend a Title VII case which is
a burden even for large businesses, is a financial dis-
aster for small businesses and non-profit organizations.
This fact has been judicially recognized in at least one
reported decision in which the EEOC argued against
attorneys’ fees for a prevailing employer defendant on
the basis that its suit was brought in good faith:

Plaintiff reads something into the pertinent stat-
ute, supra, which is not there. The Court does not
uestion Plaintiff’s faith but this is not all
t should be consi under the Statute in the
exercise of discretion on this point. Considerations
regarding Defendant’s size and financial stature
and the im yh Sat, 4 T5 tion
dictate in opinion of Court that it should

16

recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee herein. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Service
we Corp., 418 F. Supp. 898, 901 (W. D. Ok.

The following cases, while involving awards of at-
torneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs, are illustrative
of the burden of successfully defending a Title VII
suit. For example in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Enterprise Ass’n., 542 F.2d 579 (2nd
Cir. 1976), an award of $50,000 in attorneys fees was
affirmed, while the. charging party had originally
sought $128,092. An intexim fee of $125,000 was
awarded following a request for $263,038 in fees in
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 11 FEP Cases 586
(E.D. Va. 1976). A minority class action brought
$35,000 in attorneys’ fees in Sabala v. Western Gillette,
Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), U.S. App. Pending,
No. 76-1060 while $27,244 went to plaintiff’s attor-
neys for a sex bias class action in Ostapowicz v. John-
son Bronze Co., 12 FEP Cases 1468 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Railway Co., 4 FEP
Cases 72 (D.C. Cal. 1971), a non-class sex discrimina-
tion case brought $30,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $20,000
in fees for plaintiffs plus $5,000 for intervenors was
awarded in Taylor v. Goodyear Tire d Rubber Co., 6
FEP Cases 672 (D.C. Ala. 1973). Intervenors’ attor-
neys were more fortunate in Alanis v. California Pro-
cessors, Inc., 13 FEP Cases 738 (N.D. Cal. 1976) re-
covering $35,000 in a Title VII proceeding. And in at
least one Civil Rights Act case, attorneys’ fees ex-
ceeded $200,000. United States v. United States Steel
Corporation, 7 FEP Cases 320 (D. Ala. 1973).“ Some

*° In non-civil rights cases, fees have reached ten million dollars.
Wolfrom, The Antibiotics Case, 1976 Research Journal 251, 327-37,
359.

17

courts have even offered incentive bonuses in Title
VII ͤ cases. Parker v. Matthews, 13 FEP Cases 595,
602-603 (D. D.C. 1976).

When Title VII defendants incur similar expenses
in opposing invalid lawsuits, they should be entitled to
a fee award on the same basis as a successful plaintiff.
In the absence of being able te recover these fees, the
financial burden could conceivably cause the collapse
of small and non-profit employers. The net result of
such a collapse would be a loss of jobs for the com-
pany’s employees, and, in the case of the non-profit
organization, termination of important community
services.

B. The Title VII Plaintiff

Title VII provides that suit may be filed by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or by the
person aggrieved. Of course, when the Commission
loses a case and is held responsible for the prevailing
defendant’s attorneys’ fees, the courts need not be con-
cerned with that award discouraging the Commission
from instituting future actions, since as one court noted
in awarding $160,000 in attorneys’ fees against the De-
partment of Labor in a sex discrimination class action,
„the United States . . has infinite ability to pay.“
Copeland v. Usery, 14 FEP Cases 1677, 1678 (D. D.C.
1977). Furthermore, Congress in enacting the Civil
Rights Act recognized in Title III, discussed supra,
that the government could afford to pay a prevailing
defendant.

In Title VII cases where the government is not the
plaintiff, individuals will often posture their cases as
class actions in which substantial recoveries are sought.
Policy reasons exist for making these class action plain-

18

tiffs responsible for attorneys’ fees in cases where they
are unsuccessful. The availability of a class designation
may actually generate lawsuits, since the conduct of
some attorneys in actions under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that they believe ‘‘the
rule was adopted for their benefit rather than for the
multitude of individuals comprising the class whose
rights they were presumably vindicating.’’ Leibman v.
J. W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 63 F. R. D. 684, 701 (N. D.
III. 1974). Similar judicial concerns also exist in Title
VII class actions. Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 14
FEP Cases 561, 570-575 (S.D. Tx. 1977). See also De-
velopments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1318 (1976).

Since members of the class must opt in“ in order
to share benefits in a Title VII class action suit, there
is no reason why the class should be eligible for the
benefit without assuming equal responsibility for de-
fendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs should the action
fail. The risk could spread among the class, which, by
definition, must be of sufficient size in order to meet
the numerosity requirements of Rule 23. Weathers v.
Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1974).
Moreover, individual plaintiffs and class action plain-
tiffs in Title VII cases are often assisted in their efforts
to obtain redress. HEOC v. Enterprise Ass’n, supra.
These groups, such as unions, have a greater capability
of spreading the litigation costs among their member-
ship than do small employers and non-profit corpora-
tions. In light of the above, it is clear that the standard
for attorneys’ fees should be the same for successful
plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII actions.

*
*
5
5
§

19

C. Society Benefits from the Defense of Actions as Well as
Their Prosecution.

No social goals warrant making a distinction between
plaintiffs and defendants insofar as the award of at-
torneys’ fees is concerned, a fact which has been ree-
ognized. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, supra. Evenhanded
treatment of the imposition of attorneys’ fees encour-
uges both plaintiffs and defendants to consider the
merit of bringing or contesting a lawsuit, while a more
permissive standard for fee awards for plaintiffs than
defendants could sérve to discourage a defendant from
vigorously opposing a suit. Assertion of proper de-
fenses is an essential ingredient in the proper develop-
ment of the law, since a defendant is optimally situated
to assist the court in considering all aspects of the is-
sues being litigated.

Moreover, an effective Title VII defense will often
inure to the good of a company’s employees since bene-
fits held by certain employees are often challenged in
Title VII actions. See e.g., International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, —— U.S. ——, 97 S. Ct.
1843 (1977). In the absence of an active defense, the
employees’ rights to these benefits will often go unpro-
tected. In addition, civil rights actions can generate
claims for reverse discrimination when an unlawfully
imposed remedy for past bias limits opportunities for
persons who are not members of the protected class. Cf.
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2nd
Cir. 1976).

A vigorously presented defense brings these impor-
tant issues into sharper focus for the court. Lastly, the
failure of an employer to present adequate defenses

may result in severe restrictions on the income of the
business to the detriment of both the enterprise and its
shareholders. NAACP v. Federal Power Commission,
425 U.S. 662 (1976). A vigorously presented defense
brings these important issues into sharper focus for the
court.

Although the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution contains no equal protection’’ clause
equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause is ap-
plicable to the Federal government through the Fifth
Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). If
a classification would be invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also
inconsistent with the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
Thus, unjustifiable discrimination against women may
violate the Fifth Amendment on equal protection
grounds. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975). Diseriminatory enforcement of a neutral stat-
ute can also be a violation of the equal protection re-
quirement which ‘‘prohibits discriminatory admini-
stration of valid statutes. United States v. Falk, 479
F. 2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d
852 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 394 U.S. 1020 (2969),
reh. den. 395 U.S. 941 (1969).

Obviously not all legislative distinctions present
questions of Constitutional violations. As this Court
noted in Matthews v. Lucas:

21

Statutory classifications, of course are not per se
unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the
character of the discrimination and its relation to
legitimate legislative aims. —— U.S. ——, 96 S.
Ct. 2755, 2761 (1976).

Thus, although classifications may be made to pass con-
stitutional muster they must not treat similarly situa-
ted persons differently. Califano v. Goldfarb, U.S.
„97 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (1977) ; Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).

The language of Section 706(k) demonstrates that
Congress has not specified different standards for pre-
vailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in Title
VII cases. The courts below, however, took it upon
themselves to impose an unreasonable classification
upon petitioner which placed it in a less favored posi-
tion in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).

IV
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD IS EQUAL TREATMENT

In light of the plain meaning of section 706(k), the
legislative history of that section, and the relevant
policy considerations, it is mandatory that prevailing
defendants be treated the same as prevailing plaintiffs
when awarding attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the test
for award of attorneys’ fees expressed by this Court in
Newman v. Piggie Park, supra, should be applied to
prevailing defendants in Title VII actions. That is that
fees should ordinarily be awarded, unless special cir-
cumstances would render such an award unjust.”

* Even if this Court should not agree that the Piggie Park test is

The application of an objective test such as this
eliminates continuing litigation over the meaning of a
subjective standard, such as the common law bad faith
exception followed below. Moreover, as one court has
stated :

Under the standard proposed by plaintiff [subjec-
tive good faith] in its opposition brief, no attor-
neys’ fee could ever be awarded against the Com-
mission as long as the EEOC attorneys subjec-
tively felt that their litigation zeal was exercised
in good faith for the noble cause of employment
—wv- EEOC v. Western Electric Co., supra, at
1276.

EEOC v. South Carolina National Bank, 12 FEP Cases 1565, 1566
(D.S.C. 1976); EEOC v. Western Electric, 10 FEP Cases 1275,
1276 (D. Md. 1975).

For the foregoing reasons, the decision below should
be reversed and the cause remanded for determination
of an appropriate attorneys’ fee.

Respectfully submitted,

Of Counsel:

LAWRENCE B. KRAUS
NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER

Rosert J. Hickey
G. Brockwet HeEyYLIN
KIRIIN, CAMPBELL &

1615 H Street, N. W. KEATING

Washington, D.C. 20062 1150 Connecticut

(202) 659-6036 Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-4911

SrepHen A. Boxart
STan.ey T. Kaeczyc, Jr.
NATIONAL CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
(202) 659-6218

Counsel for the National
Chamber Litigation
Center

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1742%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
