# Appendix — Frank Lyon Co. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1978
- **Citation:** 435 U.S. 561

## Text

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBeR TERM, 1976

No. 76-624

Frank Lyon Company, Appellant,
v.

Unitep States or AMERICA, Appellee.

ON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

VOLUME I
(Pages 1-312)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FILED NOVEMBER 3, 1976
CERTIORARI GRANTED FEBRUARY 22, 1977

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1976

No. 76-624

Frank Lyon Company, Appellants
Ve

Unirep States or America, Appellee

Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed November 3, 1976
Certiorari Granted February 22, 1977

INDEX
Page
Compiaint, filed September 27, 1973 ................ 6
Answers, filed November 26, 1973 ...............5.. 8
Stipulation, filed September 16, 1974 ................ 9
Supplemental Stipulation, filed December 23, 1974 ... 14
Transcript of Proceedings, November 26, 1974 ...... 17

Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Re, es a ED gn cccsccvceceesesocsce 299

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law... 301
Judgment, filed June 11, 1975 ........... 0.0000 ees 311
Notice of Appeal, filed August 11, 1975

il Index Continued
Page
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1: Letter dated August 26, 1967
from Kdward M. Penick, President of Worthen

Bank & Trust Company to 0. O. Wyrick, Vice
President of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.. 313

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2: Letter dated September 1, 1967

from Edward M. Penick to O. O. Wyrick ........ 322
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3: Letter dated September 12, 1967
from Edward M. Penick to 0. O. Wyrick ........ 324
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4: Letter dated September 13, 1967
from O. O. Wyrick to Edward M,. Penick ........ 326
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5: Letter dated September 1, 1967
from Edward M. Penick to H. C. Adams, Commis-
sioner of State Bank Department .............. 328
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 6: Letter dated September 5, 1967
from H. C. Adams to Edward M. Penick ........ 236
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7: Letter dated September 12, 1967
from Edward M. Penick to H. C. Adams ........ 338
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8: Letter dated September 13, 1967
from H. C. Adams to Edward M. Penick ........ 339

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9: Sale and Leaseback proposal
dated September 28, 1967 to Goldman, Sachs & Co. 340

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10: Revised Sale and Leaseback
proposal dated October 27, 1967 of Stephens, Inc. 344

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 11: Letter dated October 30, 1967
from Frank Lyon to Worthen ................0. 346

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12; Comparison of financing plans

of Frank Lyon, Stephens, Ine. and Goldman,
Bache & Oe. ..0sc0c0e0encs eeu su ueeeeeee 348

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 13: Specification for Sale-Lease-

—_ of Worthen Bank Building dated October 31,
ao

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 14: Letter dated November 1, 1967

from Frank Lyon to Worthen containing Lyon’s
proposal numer Bo. .o0sccsceeeusens eee 352

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 15: Comparison of financing plans
Gated November & 2660 2... sccccscccencbun 355

Index Continued ili
Page

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 16: Letter dated Noevinber 30, 1967
from Alan W. Peters, Vice President of First Na- _
tional City Bank to Edward M. Penick .......-- 356

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 17: Letter dated December 18, 1967
from Richard W. Baker, Jr., Vice President of
New York Life Insurance Company to Frank _
Lyon Company .......--.eeeeeeeeeeeeeerreeees 358

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 18: Ground Lease dated May 1,
1968 between Worthen Bank & Trust Company, as
Lessor, and Frank Lyon Company, as Lessee.... 366

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 19: Building Lease dated May 1,
1968 between Frank Lyon Company, as Lessor, _
and Worthen Bank & Trust Company, as Lessee. 376

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 20: Note Purchase Agreement dated
May 1, 1968 between Frank Lyon Company and
New York Life Insurance Company ........---- 443

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 21: Building Loan Agreement dated
May 14, 1968 between Frank Lyon Company and -
First National City Bank ........-..5-00seeees 462

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 22: Building Loan Mortgage Note
for $7,000,000 dated — 14, 1968 from Frank
Lyon Company to First National City Bank .... 488

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 23: Building Loan Mortgage dated
May 14, 1968 from Frank Lyon Company and
Worthen Bank & Trust Company to First Na-
tional City Bank ..........65-- ccc ceeeeeeeeeees 490

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 24: Assignment dated May 14, 1968
from Frank Lyon Company to First National City
en acc eee ees ccrccececccoces 503

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 25: Sales Agreement dated May 19,
1968 between Frank Lyon Company, as purchaser, :
and Worthen Bank & Trust Company, as seller .. 508

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 26: Secured Note dated December
1, 1969 for $7,140,000 from Frank Lyon Company
to New York Life Insurance Company ......... 523

iv Index Continued
Page

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 27: First Deed of Trust dated De-
cember 1, 1969 from Frank Lyon Company and
Worthen Bank & Trust Company to Darrell D.
Dover and New York Life Insurance Company... 527

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28: Assignment dated December 1,
1969 from Frank Lyon Company to New York Life
Insurance Company

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 29: Consent and Agreement dated
December 1, 1969 of Worthen Bank & Trust Com-
pany to New York Life Insurance Company .... 575

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 32: Specimen bank statement of
Frank Lyon’s account at First National City Bank
with specimen checks and credit ticket attached.. 584

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 33: Comparative consolidated bal-
ance sheets of Frank Lyon Company and subsidi-
aries as of December 31, 1969 and 1968 ......... 587

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 34: Comparative consolidated state-

ment of income years ended December 31, 1969
and 1968 of Frank Lyon Company and sub-
I ts RES 589

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 35: Guaranty dated May 14, 1968
from Edward M. Penick, President of Worthen

Bank & Trust Company to First National City
ee OF OE TE acc dcceseseusetéctcicee 591

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 36: Computation of tax loss on
Worthen Building of Frank Lyon Company for

years 1969 through 1993; years 2007 through 2019
and years 2033 through 2044 .................. 595

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 37: Letter dated August 22, 1967
from O. O. Wyrick, Vice President of Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis to Edward M. Penick,
President of Worthen Bank and Trust Company

of Little Rock, Arkansas ...................... 597
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 38: Summary of Conservation with
Mr. O. O. Wyrick dated September 6, 1967 ....... 599

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 39: Letter dated September 20,
1967 from Mr. Theodore M. Siouris, A General]
Partner to E. M. Penick, President of Worthen
Bank & Trust Company in reference to Sale-
Leaseback Financing of New Bank Headquarters 601

Index Continued v
Page

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 40: Letter dated April 16, 1968
from Edward Penick, President of Worthen Bank
and Trust Company to Mr. H. C. Adams, State
Bank Commissioner, Little Rock, Arkansas ...... 609

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 41: Letter dated April 16, 1968

— Edward Penick, President of Worthen Bank

and Trust Company to Mr. O. O. Wyrick, Vice
President of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.. 613

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 42: Letter dated April 19, 1968

oo O. O. Wyrick, Vice President of Federal Re-

serve Bank of St. Louis to Mr. Edward M. Penick,
President, Worthen Bank and Trust Company... 618

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 43: Letter dated April 22, 1968
from James Penick, Jr., Executive Vice President
of Worthen Bank and Trust Company to Mr. O. O.
Wyrick, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of
ME, BOD cccccccccsecccccceescessccesenasaces 620

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 44: Letter dated April 23, 1968
from ©. 0. Wyrick, Viee President, Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis to Mr. James Penick, Jr.,
Executive Vice President, Worthen Bank & Trust
COUMGET cc cccccccccccccccssccecece jeabewenes 622

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 45: Comparison of annual rent with
total of depreciation and interest for first 10 years

of Worthen Bank Building ..................-. 623
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 46: Worthen Bank & Trust Co.

"Rent Schedule on Worthen Building 1944 ...... 624
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 47: Safeway Lease .............. 625

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 48: Inter-office communication dated
May 13, 1969 from B. H. Dean, Jr. to James A.
Rowland for Mr. W. H. Dodge regarding Safe-
WEG TABI cc ccccccvcccccccsccccccccceccsecees 641

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 49: Letter dated July 28, 1971 from
James B. Bolen, Jr. to T. H. Mayer and Nicholas
M. Mayer enclosing Safeway Lease .............

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 50: Letter dated April 12, 1968
from Frank Lyon Company to Ed Penick, Presi-
dent, Worthen Bank and Trust Company ....... 686

vi Index Continued

Page

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51: Letter dated April 26, 1974 from
Rudy Landry, Investment Officer of Cabot, Cabot
& Forbes Equity Trust to Mr. Frank Lyon, Chair-
man of the Board, Frank Lyon Company ......

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 52: Explanation of Items of Frank
EI AE

Defendants’ Exhibit 1: Equity interest in land and
buildings of Worthen Bank & Trust Co. .........

Defendants’ Exhibit 2: Cash Flow, Frank Lyon Co.-
Worthen Building ............................

Defendants’ Exhibit 3: Loss from Renial Operation,
Frank Lyon Co.-Worthen Building .............

Defendants’ Exhibit 4: Gain on Sale 1980 if 1980 Op-
tion is Exercised, Frank Lyon (Co.-Worthen
I aie eS Le

Defendants’ Exhibit 5: Tax Consequences vs. Eco-
nomic Gain if 1980 Option is Exercised, Frank
Lyon Co.-Worthen Building

ee

Defendants’ Exhibit 6: Tax Benefit—if Option Exer-
cised November 30, 1980, Taking 1969 Tax Reform
Act into Account, Frank Lyon Co.-Worthen
Building

Defendants’ Exhibit 7: Schedule of Direct Reduction
Loan, Frank Lyon Company, Loan from New
York Life (Schedule December 16 1969)

Defendants’ Exhibit 11: Letter dated November 28,
1969 from Frank T. McGehee, Assistant Vice
President of Worthen Bank and Trust Company
to New York Life Insurance Company

"ereeceeeeeeeeeeeereeee eee eeeeeeee ee ese

“eee eevee

,

Defendants’ Exhibit 12: Letter dated November 25,
1969 from Members American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants of Gotham. Wyman &
Howland to New York Life Insurance Company. .

Defendants’ Exhibit 13: Letter dated September 2

a

1966 from Richard F. Gates, Vice President to Mr.
Harry E. Meek, Attorney, Little Rock

687

689

691

692

693

696

697

701

705

707

Index Continued

vil

Page

Defendants’ Exhibit 14: Letter dated October 13, 1966
with enclosures from Harry E. Meek, Attorney
to Worthen Bank & Trust Company .....-.....-

» 9 yw hihi y tte > September 8,
Defendants’ Exhibit 15: Letter dated : ;

1967 from C. J. Giroir, Jr., Attorney to Worthen
Bank and Trust Company ............-000e00e:

)xhibi ): , ication

Defendants’ Exhibit 16: Inter-office communicat
dated August 11, 1967 from Richard F. Gates to
Edward M. Penick regarding financing of bank

building (pp. 1 and 2, and 8-10) ..........-+-55:

708

734

Frank Lyon Company
Vv.

Tue Unitrep “.rates or AMERICA

Date Filings—Proceedings

9-27-73—Complaint filed. Summons issued and handed
marshal for service.

10-9-73—Mar. det. on service on summons, by serving Jane
Thompson, Secretary, on 10-1-73, and by certified
letter to the Attorney General’s Office, 9-27-73.

11-26-73—Answer filed. C/S.

8-13-74—Order setting pre-trial conference on Wed., Sept
18, 1974, 11:00 a.m.

9-16-74—Stipulation filed by both parties.

9.20-74—Pre-Trial Order by J. Eisele ordering this case
set for trial to the Court at 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, No-
vember 26, 1974; Deft. USA filed a demand for jury
trial; it now desires to waive trial by jurv; the case
is therefore transferred to the non-jury docket; Pitf.
has filed a pretrial brief with the Court. Deft. should
provide the Court with citations of authority upon
which it is relying; All discovery must be completed
not later than November 8, 1974; No discovery will
be permitted thereafter except to prevent mauifest
injustice; The Court will read the stipulation and all
exhibits before trial, with reference to deft’s exhibits
there is no agreement that they are accurate or that
they would represent the tax advantage to the Pltf.
if his position were adopted, however, deft. will not
be required to present the testimony of an agent who
prepared them.

10-22-74—Deposition of Edward M. Penick filed by Court
Reporter, taken Tuesday, September 17, 1974.

10-24-74——Deposition of Frank Lyon taken Sept. 12, 1974,
Little Rock.

2

10-24-74— Deposition of E. Ralph Cotham taken 9-12-74,
Little Rock.

11-15-74—Deposition of C. V. Barnes taken 11-4-74, Little
Rock.

11-26-74—Trial to Court before Judge Eisele, 9:32 a.m.-
6:00 p.m. continued.

11-27-74—Trial resumed 9:00 a.m.-5:07 p.m. After comple-
tion of testimony, Court stated some findings from
bench: Frank Lyon is owner of building; it is highly
improbable that Worthen will exercise option at end
of 11th year or any other option period; there is no
loan here, even if finally should determine Worthen
owns the building. Simultaneous briefs due December
20; each party may respord by January 7, 1975.

12-3-74—Marshal’s Return of Service on Frank Lyon,
personally 11-26-74.

12-6-74—Marshal’s Return of Service on Edward M.
Penick, personally 11-22-74.

12-20-74—Deft’s. Supplemental Memorandum of Fact and
Law.

12.23-74—Supplemental Stipulation by parties.
1-7-75—Reply Brief—Deft.
5-21-75—Memorandum Letter Opinion, J. Eisele.

5-27-75—Excerpted Testimony file’ by Reporter Fant (fr
11-27-74).

5-27-75—Excerpted Remarks filed by Reporrer Fant (fr
11-27-74)

6-3-75—Original transcript of remarks made by the Court

at close of trial led by Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty.
Gen’l.

6-11-75—Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law filed by Judge Eisele.

3

6-11-75—Judgment pursuant to findings of fact and con-
clusions of law filed by Judge Eisele, entering judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff in the following amounts
with interest from dates indicated:

$32,624.32 with interest thereon from March 15,

1969;

$231,871.26 with interest thereon from March 15,
1970;

$43,790.84 with interest thereon from April 19,
1973.

8-5-75--Orig. & 1 copy of Vols. I & IT of transcript of
trial filed by Reporter Fanr.

8-11-75—Notice of Appeal for judgment of 6-11-75 by U.S.
Dist. Court to U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir-
cuit: Certified copy of N/A & 2 cert. copies of docket
entries to 8th Cir.; copies to U.S. Atty., appellant—

J. Gaston Williamson, atty. for appellee—& to Caro-
lyn Fant, Court Reporter.

GENERAL DOCKET
Unrrep Srates Covert or AppraLs
For tHe Eicutn Crrcvir

Appeal from Eastern District of Arkansas

Case No. 75-1615
Frank Lyon Compaxy, Appellee,
Vs.
Tue Unrrep States or Amenica, Appellant.

Date Filings—Proceedings Filed
1975

Aug. 13—Docketed appeal
Aug. 13—Cert. copies Notice of Appeal, Docket Entries of

D.Ct. (1)

4

)
Aug. 18—-Appearance appellee 2)
9
Aug. 19—Appearance appellant (3)
Aug. 25—Appearance appellant (4)

Sept. 19—Motion appellant for extension of time to file

appendix and brief (5)

Sept. 19—Order: Appellant may have thru October 22 to

serve and file appendix and opening brief (6)
Oct. 24—Appendix (vol. 1 & 2) w/service (7)
Oct. 24—Brief appellant w/service (8)

Oct. 24—F our copies exhibit volume
Oct. 23—Appearance appellant (9)

Nov. 25—Order: Appellee may have thru December 4 to

serve and file brief (10)
Dee. 3—Brief appellee (11)
Dee. 3—Affidavit of service w/brief appellee (12)

Dec. 8—Submitted to screening panel

Dee. 19—Mo applnt for ext to file reply brief (13)

Dee. 23—Order: Appellant granted to January 2 to serve
and file reply brief (14)

1976

Jan. 5—Reply brief appellant w/ser (15)

Jan. 21—Transferred to February session

Feb. 13—Appearance for appellee (16)

Feb. 13—Argued and submitted to Judges Bricht. Henley,
Regan. Gary Allen, Dept. of Justice for appellant; C. J.

Giroir, Jr. for appellee; concluded by Mr. Allen.
Reeorded

May 26—Opinion by Judge Bright (Published) (17)

J

May 26—Judgment: Judgment of district court is reversed
and remanded to district court for proceedings con

sistent with opinion (18)
June 4—Appellee’s bill of costs (19)
June 4—Appearance for appellee (20)

June 4—Mo appellee for ext to file pet for reh/reh en
bane (21)

June 4—Order: Appellee may have thru June 18 to file
petition for rehearing (22)

June 17—Petition of appellee for rehearing en bane and

rehearing (23)

Aug. 6—Order: Petition of appellee for rehearing en bane

is denied (24)
Aug. 6—Order: This court directs that our opinion be modi

hed; petition for rehearing of Frank Lyon Co. is denied

(Printed, Published) (25)
Aug. 16—Mandate issued

Aug. 19—-Receipt for mandate 26)
Nov. 8—Notice of filing of petition for writ of certiorari
in Supreme Court as Case No. 76-624 (as of 11/3 76)
27)

1977
Mar. 3—Order of Supreme Court in Case No. 76-624 grant
ing certiorari 25)

6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Complaint
(Filed September 27, 1973)

The plaintiff, Frank Lyon Company, for its cause of
action against the defendant, United States of America,
states:

1. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned in this com-
plaint was, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Arkansas with its principal place of
business in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

2. This is an action for the recovery of internal revenue
taxes, with interest thereon, erroneously and illegaily as-
sessed and collected. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court by Title 28, United States Code, Sec. 1346(a)(1), as
amended.

3. Plaintiff filed its income tax return for the calendar
year 1969 with the Internal Revenue Service Center, in
Austin, Texas, and paid the tax reported due thereon.
Following an examination of said return, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue assessed an income tax defi-
ciency against plaintiff for 1969 as follows:

Tax Deficiency Interest Total Assessment

$261,063.34 $48,339.63 $309,402.37

Plaintiff paid said deficiency assessment to the Internal
Revenue Service Center, in Austin, Texas, on April 19,
1973.

7

4. Of the total deficiency assessment for 1969, $24,466.98,
together with interest in the amount of $4,548.79, was at-
tributable to adjustments not contested by the taxpayer.
The remaining deficiency assessment was attributable to
the Commissioner’s erroneous determinations that plain-
tiff was not the owner of the Worthen Bank Building in
Little Rock, Arkansas, and was not entitled to deduct cer-
tain expenses attributable to said building as set forth in
plaintiff’s claim for refund, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit ‘‘A’’ and incorporated herein by
reference.

9. On July 20, 1973, plaintiff filed with the Internal
Revenue Service Center, in Austin, Texas, a claim for
refund (Exhibit ‘*A’’) of income tax for 1969 in the
amount of $236,596.36, plus interest paid thereon in the
amount of $43,790.84, no part of which has been repaid
to plaintiff. As grounds for recovery, some of which are
stated in the alternative, plaintiff incorporates herein by
reference the averments contained in its claim for refund
for 1969,

6. By certified letter dated August 22, 1973 from the

Internal Revenue Service Center in Ausiia, Texas, plain-
tiff received statutory notice that its claim for refund for

‘1969 had been disallowed in fuil. A copy of said letter

is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘‘B’’.

Wiererore, plaintiff prays for judgment against de-
fendant for income taxes overpaid for 1969 in the amount
of $236,596.36, plus interest assessed thereon in the amount
of $43,790.84, for a total of $280,387.20, together with its
costs and interest as provided by law, and for all other
relief to which plaintiff is entitled.

/s/ J. Gastoxn WititamMson
J. Gaston Williamson
720 West Third Street
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATFS DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)

Answer
[Filed November 26, 1973]

The defendant, United States of America, by its attorney,
W. H. Dillahunty, United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, for its answer to the complaint here-

in admits, denies, and alleges as follows:

1. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1.

2. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2, ex-

—

cept denies that any tax or interest was erroneously and

illegally assessed and collected.

3. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3, ex-
cept alleges that the total deficiency assessment was $509,-
102.97, rather than the amount alleged in the complaint
and further alleges that the Internal Revenue Service re-
ceived payment of this amount on April 20, 1973, rather
than the date alleged.

4. Is presently without knowledge or information suffi-
cient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
contained in paragraph 4, except denies that any deter-
mination of the Commissioner was erroneous and further
denies each and every allegation contained in the claim
for refund unless specifically admitted herein, except ad-
mits that a copy of the claim for refund was attached to
the complaint as E:xhioit A.

». Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 5, ex-
cept alleges that plaintiff’s claim for refund was received
on July 24, 1973, rather than the date alleged in the com-
plaint and denies each and every allegation contained in
the claim for refund unless specifically admitted herein.

6. Admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6

Whererore, defendant pravs for judgment in

allowing the defendant its costs, and for such othe
lef as this Court may deem just and proper
W. H. Dirtamuyry
United States Attorney
By:
Assistant United States Att
Demanpd For Jury Trial
Defendant demands a trial by jury of all issues of!
arising out of this action
IN THE UNITED STA RICT Ct
EASTERN DISTRICT « ANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION
(Caption Omitted in Printing)
Stipulation
[ Filed September 16, 1974]
; |
if . hereby stipulated my and hHerween ait part OS
that for the purpose of this case the follow act
he taken As true, subject tr Tiive ric ; ot ‘ ti) Dat}

ob pen

grounds ot materiality O] relevance: prov

that either party may intro luce other and fu

net inconsistent with the facts herein st pula
|. This is an action for the recovery of
nue taxes, with interest thereon. .Juriscdiet

upon this Court by Title s, Lnited States

lj46(a)(1) as amended

’ cy

to the admission of such facts in evidences

hae,
irtie evi
ted
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217

By that, just what did you mean! A. Well, we would be
paying it indirectly in the form of rent over the term of
the loan.

Mr. Williamson: No further questions.

Recross ExaMINATION
By Mr. Sayre:

Q. With regard to that last question I asked you to
[340] at Defendant’s Exhibit No. 11 and 12. Defendant’s
Exhibit No. 11 is a copy of a letter written on the station-
ery of the bank and signed by Mr. Frank T. McGehoe.

Who is he, please, sir? A. He was the building ccordi-
nator.

@. It is dated November 28, 1969 to the New York Life
Insurance Company. It says: ‘‘ Attention Vice President,
Real Estate and Mortgage Loans’’ and it refers, of course,
to this building transaction.

‘This is to certify to New York Life Insurance Com-
pany that as of October 31, 1969 the records of Worthen
Bank and Trust Company show that it has paid in connec-
tion with the total cost of the mortgage property as de-
iined in paragraph 2E of the consent and agreement dated
May 1, 1968 between Worthen Bank and Trust Company
aud the New York Life Insurance Company as follows:’’

There is a breakdown of the payment to Matson Bel-
lows, architectural fees, construction consulting fees, in-
terior design consulting fees, so forth. Under ‘‘other ma-
terial’’—on the last page it’s got ‘‘legal and accounting
fees and interim interest on construction funds borrowed’’.

Do those construction funds of $399,000.00 pertain to
traoney borrowed on the building itself? A. I would as-
sume that they do. I’m not exactly familiar with it.

[341] Q. If the testimony has been that Frank Lyon
Company has paid—drawn the money down and paid it.

218

why would the bank certify in this letter to New York Life
in accord with the agreement and—consent and agreement
which is an exhibit here—that it had paid this interim
interest? A. Well, I think this letter dealt with the re-
quirement of the New York Life Insurance Company in
the final closing and certification from us as to exactly the
total cost that had gone into the building.

Q. Then what you are saying is that—— A. I think it
is a mistake in the way it is written because the total cost
in the building and these—the interim construction loan
ran to the Frank Lyon Company.

Q. Now we talked about the interest was arranged, or
the terms of the loans were arranged by Worthen Bank
prior to the time that even Frank Lyon Company, had got
into this arrangement. Because you said the bank would be
paying the interest indirectly through the rent; is that cor-
rect’ A. Right.

Q. What about the same agreement was made with re-
card to the interim interest, the interest on the interim
loan? A. I’m not sure whether we paid the interest on the
interim loans or not. We did not. I’m——

Q. Then the total amount of miscellaneous expenses
claimed with regard to the building: this is fees of the
[342] accountant and attorneys under the various agree-
ments and the claim for interim interest to Frank Lyon,
approximates $500,000.00.

Was it contemplated that the $500,000.00 that Frank
Lyon was going to put into the venture would cover ex-
penses? A. No. There was no inter-relation between those
two at all.

Q. It’s just coincidence? A. If it turned out that way it
is coincidence.

Q. And on Exhibit No. 12, which is the independent
certified accounting firm of Cotham, Wyman and Howland
also certifying to New York Life that the interim interest
on the construction loans were paid, that was, again—it was

:
|
|
:

219

not paid by Worthen Bank and that is a mistake in the
certification? A. Well, I don’t know exactly how the books
were handled on that. These certificates were not so much
how they were paid but what the total cost went into the
building.

Q. You stated that the Worthen Bank had covered its
risk, ultimate risk with regard to damage or repair or any-
thing to do with the operation of the building is borne by
Worthen Bank rather than Frank Lyon Company; is that
correct? A. Through the insurance.

[343] Q. Then the insurance premiums that go into this
are paid for by Worthen Bank; is that correct? A. That's
correct.

Q. Now you stated that the bank had contested the treat-
ment made by the Internal Revenue Service. Before lunch
you said you didn’t know what treatment had been made.
Have you checked since that time? A. Yes.

Q. The Internal Revenue Service has allowed the bank
a depreciation deduction and an interest deduction for the
New York Life loan; is that correct? A. I checked on
whether or not we had contested it and I have the comp-
troller of the bank who would speak to that better than I
could.

The Court: It is immaterial whether the IRS is being
consistent with another taxpayer or not. I am assuming

that it is.
Mr. Sayre: I have no further questions, Your Honor.

Mr. Williamson: Mav I just ask one further question?

Furtner Repirect Examrxation
By Mr. Williamson:

Q. Referring again to Defendant's Exhibit 12, prepared
by the certified public accountant firm of Cotham, Wyman
and Howland, as stated in the letter itself pursuant to
paragraph 2™ of the consent and agreement, under that

particular [344] agreement, consent and agreement be-
tween Worthen Bank and New York Life, that paragraph
2E required the accounting firm to certify as to the total
cost of the building, not who paid for it. A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this certificate is being made pursuant to that.
A. Total dollar amount that went into the building.

Q. And in showing that the interim interest on construc-
tion funds borrowed were paid in the amount of three
ninety-nine and legal and accounting fees paid in the
amount of $53,000.00, is not a certification that Worthen
Bank paid them is it? A. It is not intended to be.

The Court: Did Worthen pay them?

The Witness: Sir?

The Court: Did Worthen pay them?

The Witness: No. Frank Lyon Company paid.

The Court: All you paid Frank Lyon so far is a rent—
you call a rent, and the government calls interest. At least
it equals the amount of the obligation to the New York
Life?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: And if anything else was paid it was not
paid by Worthen?

The Witness: That’s right. Yes, sir.
{345} The Court: I am just talking about dollars. I as-
sume these bills were paid by somebody: the interim in-
terest and the legal expenses and the bills, I think it is un-
disputed they came out of the bank account of the plaintiff,
is it not?

Mr. Williamson: That’s correct.

The Court: And they weren’t indirectly paid in the
sense that nothing in excess of the rental payments were
paid by Worthen Bank to the plaintiff.

221

The Witness: This is a requirement by the New York
Life Insurance Company as to the total cost of the build-
ing. We had to certify as to the total cost of the building,
not who paid it.

By Mr. Williamson:

Q. And, of course, Mr. Cotham has already testified that
Frank Lyon Company paid for the interim interest
monthly out of its own fund? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Consequently, in Defendant's Exhibit No. 11, in which
Frank McGhee—would you explain who Frank McGhee
was in connection with this project? A. Frank McGhee
was the Worthen Bank staff member who carried tim re-
sponsibility as building coordinator, who coordinated all
aspects of the building and to be in charge of renting the
building.

Q. As I understand it, the loan agreement also required
[346] Worthen Bank to certify as to the cost of the build-
ing. A. Yes, sir.

(). So in this DX 11 in which Frank McGhee is certifying
that Worthen paid these costs to the extent that he is
certifying that Worthen paid the interim interest and the
legal and accounting fees, it is simply an error, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Really what he should have said is that the total
cost of the building was this, not that Worthen paid this
amount; is that correct? A. That’s correct.

Q. And only to that extent is this certification of Me-
Ghee in error? A. Yes.

Mr. Williamson: No further questions.

The Court: All right, Mr. Penick, I think they are going
to let you go.

(Witness excused.)
The Court: Call your next witness.
Mr. Williamson: Mr. Cotton Barnes.

The Court: Mr. Barnes, come forward, raise your right
hand and be sworn.

Thereupon,

C. V. Barnes
[347] having been called as a witness by and on behalf of
plaintiff, and having been first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:

Direct ExaMInaTION
By Mr. Williamson:

Q. Would you please state your name and address? A.
C. V. Barnes, 22 Wingate Drive, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Q. How old are you, Mr. Barnes? A. How old am I?

Q. Yes. A. Fifty-seven.

Q. Fifty’? A. Seven.

Q. What is your occupation and present employment?
A. I’m a realtor, real estate counselor.

Q. How long have you been engaged in the real estate
business? A. About 25 years.

Q. With what firm are you presently associated? A.
Barnes, Quinn, Flake and Anderson.

Q. What is your position with that firm? A. President.

Q. What higher education did you have after high school
years, Mr. Barnes? [348] A. I attended Little Rock
Junior College and Oklahoma State College.

Q. How long have you been a real estate appraiser? A.
About 20 years.

Q. Of what professional associations are you a member?
A. Well, a member of the American Society of Real Estate
Counselors. I’m a senior member of the National Associ-
ation of Independent Fee Appraisers. I belong to the local,
state and national association of realtors.

Q. Incidentally, how many members are there in this
American Society of Real Estate Counselors? A. There
are about 430 members, I believe, nationwide.

Q. How many in Arkansas? A. Four.

Q. Have you in your professional career served as an
official appraiser or designated appraiser for any govern-
ment agencies? A. Veterans Administration, General
Services Administration at the federal level. At the state
level almost any state—well, that’s not literally true—but
a whole lot of the state agencies. City of Little Rock, hous-
ing authorities of both Little Rock and North Little Rock.

Q. Have you been appointed in any official position as a
member of a federal land commission appointed by Judge
Henley? [349] A. Yes, sir, I served as a member of a
federal land commission on properties on the Cadron Creek
under appointment by Judge Henley several years ago.

Q. Mr. Barnes, without going into any great detail, would
you simply explain the more common methods of financing
real estate need for someone who wants a building? How
would he go about the various methods he would use to
meet those needs. A. By financing—I’m assuming you
are speaking in the broad generic sense of how you would
go about arranging for all of the money necessary, whether
by a loan or by other methods.

Q. That is correct. That’s what I mean when I talk about
financing arrangements. A. Of course, the simplest ar-
rangement would be for an owner to just make a direct
mortgage for a part of the money with a balance of the
money being equity put up on the part of the owner. That’s
the simplest form I presume.

But today, particularly on larger type developments, it’s
unusual to find a development that’s done on that simple
premise. Generally, they use a multiple of different meth-
ods. They will probably start off with a ground lease and
then it could—the leasehold could be mortgaged and
lessor’s interest could be mortgaged. You can just take it
about as many steps as you want to take it.

[350] Q. What generally dictates the particular form in
which a financing of a real estate venture occurs? A. The
form that’s most favorable to the developer.

224

Q. Is it unique in real estate investment that a potential
tenant would want to build himself a facility and then sell
it and lease it back? A. No, sir. Particularly among na-
tional concerns this is probably more nearly the pattern
than the other way around. People like Safeway stores,
IBM and other national concerns will get the control of the
property, build the property, may or may not arrange for
the financing—some do and some don’t—and then when
it’s all said and done sell it and lease it back or have a pre-
arranged agreement before they do it to sell it and lease
it back.

But the main thing is that anyone like that wants to
keep control of the development all the way through.

Q. Why does he want to keep control of the development?
A. Well, he wants to keep control of the development be-
cause he’s going to be the user of the property and he wants
to be assured that what—the end result meets his needs.

Q. But then when he sells the property, does this mean
that he hasn’t really disposed of the ownership even though
he may lease it back?

[351] Mr. Sayre: I object to that. It is a legal determina-
tion.

The Court: I think the objection is proper.
By Mr. Williamson:

Q. Mr. Barnes, you mentioned Safeway as a national
concern that frequently uses a sale leaseback. Are you fa-
miliar with the Safeway sale leaseback forms? A. Yes,
sir.

Q. Have you ever been involved in any sale leaseback
transaction representing the property owner in your own
experience? A. Yes, sir.

Q. The plaintiff has already introduced as exhibits in
this case a particular transaction involving a T. M. Mayer
and Safeway. Is that his name? A. It’s Teddy Mayer and
Nick Mayer.

— ee

225

Q. Without going into any great detail in that transac-
tion, would you explain who the Mayers were and just how
the transaction developed and what the terms were? A.
Well, the Mayers are—well, I should say, I guess, were
local residents of Little Rock. One of them has since moved
outside the city. They owned property at Markham and
Rodney Parham Road. They retained me as their agent to
see about leasing the property. I made a ground lease with
Safeway Stores and with Magie Mart. Safeway Stores,
after [352] executing a ground lease

Q. Just briefly, what were the terms of the ground
lease?

Mr. Sayre: Again, I’m going to object as I did at the
start to the introduction of the specific document into evi-
dence and the testimony about the specific transactions
which has nothing to do with our transaction under the
sale and leaseback. He obviously is a realtor and an ex-
pert as a realtor. If he has knowledge generally, he can
testify, but I don’t think as to specific transactions that
they have anything to do with the specific terms that we
have here and, therefore, it is immaterial to this action.

Mr. Williamson: Your Honor, [ think it is material for
this reason: Safeway is one of the pioneers in this whole
field of sale leaseback. This arrangement he has is a typical
Safeway—they call their program buy, build, sale and lease
program. They had a whole setup for this. It parallels this
situation almost exactly and I would like to show that this
is a very widely used device and wel] known to ail realtors
of a type of financing which is recognized by the govern-
ment as a true sale leaseback.

The government allows Safeway the rental deduction. It
allows the investor the depreciation and the deduction for
the depreciation. It is just simply a typical sale leasehack
transaction in the general real estate trade and then draw
[353] parallels between that situation and this, which are

almost identical on the face of it except for the dollars
involved.

Mr. Sayre: Your Honor, we have not had any evidence
or testimony of whether or not Safeway leases have been
challenged by the Internal Revenue Service. We’d be more
than willing to stipulate that sales and leasebacks are ways
of financing construction and in the letier I believe of East-
man Dillon which is in evidence, they have stated they
have placed ‘‘X”’ million dollars in sale and leaseback
financing, but I don’t think any particular transaction with
regard to a Safeway store here in Little Rock has anything
to do with the issue in the suit with regard to this partic-
ular taxpayer as the cases have shown which both plaintiff
and defendant have cited. The facts in each one vary and
are slightly different.

I don’t think this Safeway transaction, which to my
understanding was never even culminated——

Mr. Williamson: It was culminated, Your Honor, and
the testimony will bring this out.

The Court: Of course, I think the objection really is weil
taken. Whether or not this type of transaction has been
used by others, whether or not the government has ac-
cepted it would not prevent them from challenging it. Of
course, the Court is very much interested in what there is
in the usual situation that satisfies the government and how
this [354] one differs-and makes it unsatisfactory.

I am going to receive it subject to the objection because
I want to inquire of him as an expert as to certain elements,
see if I can find out the critical elements that are involved

for tax purposes. So I will receive it subject to the objec-
tion.

By Mr. Williamson:

Q. New you say Mr. Mayer first entered into a ground
lease with Safeway? A. Yes, sir.

Sean Tee ee ee

227

Q. Did Safeway first try to buy the land? A. Yes, sir.
It was not for sale.

Q. So Safeway leased it and for what period of time?
A. I’d have to refer to the lease. As I recall, the lease
option covers 65 years.

Q. You can give him Plaintiff’s Exhibit 47. A. The
original term was for 20 years.

Q. And how many renewal options were there?

{) \V; rthe 1} Wis esse ni al \ a shel]

Mr. Giroir: With all the mechanical. electric 27 4
eters iral components, but not the interiol!
Mr Sayre: Since there is li

Mr. Penick to clear that up?

rhe Court: If it does turn out there is any dispute. | w:
trying to make it with relation to Mr. Barnes’ testimony

as to what a reasonable rental would be on the local maz

Ket. I wanted to know what he was renting, what he was
thinking about

Let me ask: Mr. Penick has been under oath. Just stand
right there and tell me now. I know you put over a million
dollars in terms of improvements in this. Are those im-
provements not only improvements of the facilities that the
bank uses and the floors and lease space the bank uses, but
also facilities that you have made for your own tenants

at their requests and as part of your arrangements with
them?

Mr. Penick: Yes, sir, which would be recaptured in the
rent from the tenant. If a tenant was going to lease a whole
floor, he had certain tenant allowances. He could have a
certain quality of carpet, certain type of paneling. We
would pay for so many lineal feet of partitions. Anything
over that, he would have to pay for. For example, one
tenant wanted a floor and a half and wanted to join the
floors by an interior stairwell. They paid for that by an
increase in rent and that went onto our books as leasehold
improvements, which we will recapture in the rent to the
particular tenants.

[371] The Court: What did you rent from the Frank
Lyon Company? Before you spent any of the million plus
money on the building, what did you have?

Mr. Pennick: Certified in that list about a total in our
building of $7.6 million, which was a functional building:
exterior walls, lights, heating and airconditioning, but not
detailed tenant improvements except in some of the areas
we were occupying. Basically, it was $7.6 million bank
building and high-rise building.

Mr. Sayre: Mr. Penick, with regard—you said at the
time you got to move in, ready to move in, it was 90 per-
cent leased or committed; is that correct?

Mr. Penick: Letters of intent.

Mr. Sayre: At that time did people start moving into
the building about the time you did?

Mr. Penick: No. I would say they started moving in two
or three months after.

Mr. Sayre: This would have been in January or Feb-
ruary?

Mr. Penick: Of 1970.

Mr. Sayre: At that time their spaces were starting to
become available. In other words, partitions had been put
in, their rug, and this type of thing?

Mr. Penick: Yes.
Mr. Sayre: A short delay before——

[372] Mr. Penick: Two to six months.

Mr. Sayre: How long was it before your building was

_ rented to the point you are talking about, the 90 percent

or the initial rent period? How long did it take to get the
tenants in?

Mr. Penick: By mid-1970.
Mr. Sayre: Six months?
Mr. Penick: Yes.

The Court: I think my contention was right in the
beginning as to what the Lyon Company is leasing to
Worthen.

Do you understand what it is that they are leasing when
you are calculating these rents, Mr. Barnes?

The Witness: I think I do, yes, but, Judge, let me say
this: Again, this is a general practice in the industry.
When you make a lease or sale leaseback you have to have
some number on which the negotiations take place over.
It’s very common in build-to-suit property for the parties
to agree on a dollar figure and then for the lessee to pick
up any additional expense in the form of leasehold im-
provements.

The Court: All right.

240

By Mr. Williamson:

Q. And in the light of those facts that have just been
disclosed through the question and answer period, is it still
your opinion that the rent being paid by Worthen Bank to
Frank [373] Lyon Company for the property they were
renting was a reasonable rent? A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the light of the then market? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Some discussion has come up with respect to the
ground lease only $50.00 a year for the first 25 years. Do
you consider this unusual? A. Well, if the ground rent
had been a fair market rental it would just have meant they
would have had to increase the rental on the leaseback.

Q. Turning now to the option prices, would you com-
ment on what percentage the various option prices were at
the various option periods, what percentage of total cost,
and whether or not in your opinion these were unusual in
these types of transactions? A. Well, the 1980 option was
at 82.79 percent.

Q. Of the cost? A. Of the original acquisition cost.

The Court: What transaction are you talking about?

The Witness: We are talking about the option price at
which Worthen may repurchase the property.

The Court: All right.

The Witness: In 1980 they have the option to repurchase
at 82.;9 percent of the purchase price. In 1984 [374] it’s
71.11 percent; in 1989 at 54.81 percent and in 1994 at 28.09

percent. Those periods are 11, 15, 20 and 25 years after
the inception date of the transaction.

By Mr. Williamson:

Q. Would you comment as to whether or not there is
anything unusual about those particular option prices?
A. I don’t believe there are.

Q. Is this type of way in estimating option prices usual
in transactions of this sort? Are these out of line with the

241

usual sale and leaseback transaction’? A. Not in my
opinion, no, sir.

Q. Is there any way to accurately estimate the fair mar-
ket value of just the building now, not counting the land
which is not involved here, 25 years from now? A. Well,
of course, presumably that’s possibly what they were try-
ing to do when they set these option prices I'm sure. Of
course, when you get to talking about what something is
going to be worth 25 years from now, are you going tuo be
talking in 1968 dollars or are you talking in 1974 dollars or
are you talking in 1994 dollars?

I mean, you know, how do you define it?

Q. What would be the various considerations that would
go into considering what might be the value of that
Worthen Building 25 years from now vis-a-vis obsoles-
eence? A. Well, I think the principal thing that would go
into [375] determining its value at that time, 1994, 20
years from now, is its functional obsolescence, not its physi-
cal situation.

I know in my lifetime I have seen three of the down-
town hanks move three times, all three of them—well, will
be when First National moves. And also in my lifetime
observing the office buildings in the community, surely the
Boyle Building down here at Fifth and Main was /uilt
right after the turn of the century, but by the same tuken
those buildings that were built about that time after they
were some 25 or 30 years old they had to have extensive
money spent on them to cure a physical problem, and cer-
tain functional problems you couldn't cure. So the result is
that that type of age building rents for less money, which
results in the value being less than it would if you could
rent it for what a class A building would rent for.

Q. Is there anything unusual in your experience that
the parking facility next to an office building would be
under a different ownership than the office building itself?
A. Some are and some aren't. In fact, I'd say there is

242

only one in Little Rock, I guess, where it is the same owner-
ship and that’s the Union Bank Building. The old Worthen
Bank property, they did not own the parking deck behind
it. The parking deck that was built next to the Tower Build-
ing. Of course, in this particular case there is an actual
difference in ownership [376] although the property is
under the control of the same owner.

Q. From the point of view of a real estate investment
counselor and looking at these documents and knowing the
transaction as you do, in advising an investor, who would
you consider to be the owner of the building?

Mr. Sayre: I renew my objection.
The Court: I will sustain the objection.
By Mr. Williamson:

Q. Let me ask you this question: If this property had
been offered to you to find an investor who would enter into
this transaction, do you think you would have any difficulty
in finding a group of investors who would have bought the
building on the same terms? A. I think in 1968 I could
have sold the building on the same terms and conditions to
a group of investors.

Mr. Wittiamson: No further questions, Your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Sayre, you may cross examine.

Cross ExaMINaTION
By Mr. Sayre:

Q. Mr. Barnes, you said you were familiar generally with
the financing methods and sale and leasebacks. Have you
ever been in on a transaction where sale and leaseback was
consummated? A. A consummated deal?

Q. Yes. [377] A. No, sir.

Q. And what were the reasons that you advised the peo-
ple on the Safeway deal not to get into the transaction?

mei

243

You said they should not buy it except on a constant of 10.5,
something like that, and it was offered on 9.34. A. Rate of
return.

Q. Their rate of return would not have been sufficient?
A. The rate of return at that time. It ultimately sold at a
rate of return that was higher than ten zero four.

Q. And, again, you advised the client not to invest in it
at that price because of the rate of return? A. Well, that’s
right. Now wait a minute. I don’t think that’s quite right.
I think the second time around the client is the one who
decided he didn’t want to get involved.

Q. The rate of return on the Worthen Building was six
and three-quarters; is that correct? A. No, sir. That was
the mortgage interest rate.

Q. And the payment of rental which would cover that was
exactly the same; is that correct? A. No, sir.

\). The rental was not equal to the mortgage’? A. The
rental payments start out less than the mortgage payment.
if I remember correctly.

Q. I don’t believe you remember correctly.

The Court: The first, five years, I guess you could [378]
say that.

The Witness: That’s what I had reference to, Judee.
By Mr. Savre:

Q. What are you referring to? A. As I understand it,
the first five years there was $21,000.00 a vear less annual
rental than the annual debt service on the mortgage.

Q. Have you checked the instrument to see if that was
the case’? A. Sir? That’s the way I read it.

Q. You read the building lease, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1%.
| heheve.

The Court: Mr. Sayre, there is no sense in pursuing it.
We know what the situation is. The amount is paid, but I
don’t know it is incorrect for him to so testify. Even at that
stage of the record it would not support such a view. The

244

bank and the representative of the Lyon Company have
indicated they acknowledge this obligation as a part of the
original transaction so I suppose that is one way of looking
at it: that it has the effect of reducing the amounts below
the actual amount necessary during the first five years.

By Mr. Sayre:

Q. Mr. Barnes, the original offer of Frank Lyon Com-
pany called for a payment of $21,000.00 less than the mort-
gage [379] payment for the first five years. The New York
Life Insurance Company requested and required that the
payment be equal to the debt service. The rentals that have
been paid are equal to the debt service. On that basis there
is no before tax cash flow is that correct?) A. On that basis
there would be no before tax cash flow; that’s correct.

Q. And you said a higher bracket taxpayer would have
incentive to get into an investment such as this but not a
lower bracket taxpayer; is that correct? A. The higher
the bracket the more incentive.

Q. And that being that the main purpose or the main in-
centive there would be the ability to write off other income
from other sources that that individual or company or in-
vestor had against those deductions that come from the
interest and accelerated depreciation; is that correct? A.
I presume so, ves, sir.

Q. In your examination is that the way you would look
at is’ A. Any higher bracket real estate investor then or
now is looking at what he gets to keep after taxes.

Q. And since there’s no before tax cash flow, what he’s
buying then is the shelter; is that correct, of other income?
A. He may or may not be depending on the property. ves,
[380] sir. It’s not at all unusual then or now for an investor
to buy ‘‘tax shelter’’.

Q. In this instance the Frank Lyon Company would not
receive any before tax cash flow for the first 25 years of this
transaction; is that correct? A. I have not made a projec.
tion to find out where the point is that it breaks over.

~~ wt

245

Q. Well, it’s quite simple. If the mortgage payment and
rental payment are equal for 25 years, there is not going
to be any before tax cash flow. A. You are talking about
before taxes?

Q. Yes. A. That’s correct.

Q. So you are talking about a break-over point is what?
A. Before tax cash flow?

Q. You are talking about an after tax cash flow, I pre-
sume, when you say you haven’t computed the break-over
point. A. That’s correct; after tax cash flow.

Q. Would that take into consideration using the double
declining balance method of depreciation? A. Using any
method of depreciation? A. Using any method of depre-
ciation permitted under the regulations and statutes.

Q. Under this type of deal it is normal to use an [381]
accelerated amount of depreciation and, therefore, to create
the shelter in the earlier vears? A. Some investors cdo
and some don’t.

Q. In this particular transaction, that was done; is that
correct? A. I’m not familiar with what accounting meth-
ods they have used to handle this transaction at all. If I
were analyzing this or a similar facility for a client, I would
probably present my analysis on both an accelerated and a
straight line basis.

Q. You just testified that vou had examined it and the
matter Was reasonable and that you would have been able
to sell it to anybody else. Did you make your computations
based upon the accelerated depreciation’? we +8 = ii fi sl]
money back from Worthen, the borrower? whether it would be effective or not

on . . 4 : (>) Doesn ’t 5 SBinnada. , , sae

The Witness: By Worthen exercising the option. : veou A uustrate the ridiculousness of vo a

. crual? A. No.

The Court: In other words, there is no way legally he Q. Let me ask you one question. One of vou: _—
can get it back. It takes Worthen to make a decision for it the down payment and the return of the dow nar f
. . — .* . . ai ‘ : ie

to get any money Dack. Did you discover any evidence that indicated that F
e sical lids aa | iA rrea
rr \ . rrr " . ' ’ OT ha ’ : -} . . +¢
The W ifness: lo tne best of my knowledge. Ly = had aA li gal, written or unWritten, express or imt ed
. right to de mand repayment of that 500. + lus intereet? \

The Court: And iT = the Saline thing in terms ol making No. Nothing W ritten that | saw . a
any income in terms of what you call interest. It takes a O. Let nals :

° i .* ¢- ary me ask one other question now at is ft do wit
decision by Worthen to exercise the option. 438) interim interest. =

The Witness: Right. Did vou observe the interim interest was, in f;

a . the | «yt +
720 West Third Street intention the parties, as

ey denced hy their writte ‘ : ‘3
" ae ss : *N agreements "ges » ? » | —: :
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 cements, read in the light of

the attending facts and cireumst:

inces xisting r Ting ‘
Mr. Eugene G. Sayre the acreement was executed, that the trans ction he
. 1 } ‘ + .
Department ot Justice What he lancuage and form of the transact , .
1100 Commerce Street that is, a sale leaseback with option to rennrel ’
rr , —-. ‘ ‘ , } . ae pee : ss j a .
Dallas, Texas (o202 Vas both the subjective intent of the par? ee. iT ’ +
j : : tiene =
. uso the ‘‘objeetive’’ intent ac evn: ,
Mr. W. TH. Dillathunty wee : intent as expressed by the clear. wr
" att cr IoOus angis . + ] . 4s ‘
Ll nited States Attorney T) (: as ine { I tne Wri . n ins ru? ents n\ 7
, ie urt aiso finds and , 7 ly } + |
0) s0 . 229) . le CUCL UGes nat, oOnieecetiws
: ne me 7 oOwy transaction was in substance, a well ; f
Little Rock, Arkansas 722053 er ance, as well as in for
ensenars n WITH option th rep ire} ase A one »
. ‘ ’ . . "rise ‘ nl r > . - ‘ ’
Re: Frank Lyon Company v. United States of America te: vas oO! bring strange and untenabl .
° . yy »! }
No | R.73.C'.247 nut vould ne hoth uniust and eontraryv to the inten —
purpose of our tax laws a
Gentlemen:
, : ; r) d fend int concede ~ t} t VV Ney rned
Circumstances will not permit the Court to file an elah leasehack arrangement }
‘ ail ‘ ivemne } PCATI se of the y + _ ‘ "
*«€ " " " .
M repaid its down payment plus interest” is through
the exercise of the option. :

A. I made a computation

A. Made a computa-

A. I

5 Now if that’s the only way that Frank Lyon Company
. going to be repaid, I have got to think that you as-
sumed that the option was going to be exercised ;

Rlhenaton, aah» you assume the option was going to
sod | ; Much don’t think I’m following you. I don’t
: tow | can say that I assumed that. What I meant to
say was at the time I wrote my report | determined th:
Frank Lyon was not the owner of the building. "
me Would yous report have been the same had there
no option? A. Well, I don’t know how to answ
that right now since it was there. I ean’t say for tian tag
Q. If you had known all the facts that you nn
and the option was there but vou were told by Fr “ar
l.yon and confirmed by Ed Penick that w & tees

j ‘as legally j S.
sible for the [442] option to have been ee

exercised, would

your report have been the s ? ,
same? é 7 : a
arth. 09 \. I’d have to study it
Q. In other words, the likelihood of the exercise of the
. cr bo ang date was not of material importance to vou
‘ting your report? A. It was a factor. I sure was

option

286

Q. But not a major factor? A. Well, it was—I — t
say it was the major factor re bade _ 24 was a factor.
, you how much weight right now. .
wae bee me ask you one final question: If, in want,
Worthen Bank was a lessee of the building Frank Ly 7
was the owner of the building, would all of the a
adjustments which you made in your RAR be incorrec
All of them related to the building? A. If now—— -_
Q. If you assume there was open to Frank Lyon’s
nershi building? A. All right. ;
*"O. gre he poser it was truly leased to W orthen
Bank and that the ownership of the building was in ap
Lvon and all the economic risks and gain were in me
Lyon, that Lyon borrowed money from First Nationa
City, Lyon borrowed money from New York Life, owns
the building subject to a lease, [443] then if that was your
determination, would all of your adjustments as they re-
late to the building be wrong? A. Yes.

The Court: Certainly.

By Mr. Giroir: .

Q. One final question. How can you impute interest if
vou don’t assume the exercise of the option? A. Well,
IT don’t think I put it that way in my report. Could I

+ e just a second there?

or ray ALI think in my—well, following this through,
it would be the equivalent of the interest. This $500,000.00
that Lyon Company had loaned would be——

(). You would have predicated it on a theory of a loan:
a loan from Lyon Company to Worthen Bank? A. Rather
“2. Let ’s stav to the $500,000.00. You would have assumed
that Frank Lyon loaned Worthen $500,000.00; is that cor-
rect? Is that the basis on which you imputed interest?
A. That would be the basis, right.

287

Q. Now when there is a loan there must be a repayment
or else it is not a loan; it’s a gift. Is that correct? A.
That’s right.

Q. When, under your theory, was the payment to occur?
A. Well, under this theory, under the government’s theory,
since Worthen owned it all, the contract was-——-

Q. I’m sorry. I missed that answer. [444] A. It would
be—under the government’s theory, Worthen actually
owned the building and all Frank Lyon would get out of

it would be a return on his investment of $500,000.00—re-
turn on his loan of $500,000.00.

Mr. Sayre: Excuse me, Your Honor. We are belaboring
this. We have agreed that the interest factor would come

in only when the option was exercised. We wil] stipulate to
that.

Mr. Giroir: What’s bothering me is that the agent who
wrote the report assumed a loan and a repayment and he’s

now unable to explain how it is going to be repaid. 'That’s
my question.

Mr. Sayre: We will be glad to stipulate we assumed the

exercise of the option to create the interest factor of six
percent.

Mr. Giroir: Your witness who wrote this report is not

stating that was in his mind, and that’s what I’m trying
to ask.

Mr. Sayre: As far as that goes, the acts of the agent do
not bind the commissioner and as far as the government
is concerned in the matter we would agree that the assump-

tion was made that the option would be exercised to come
up with the interest factor.

To belabor the point, whatever Mr. Richardson’s atti-
tude is on it at the present time is not material.

(445] Mr. Giroir: Mr. Richardson’s analysis of the en-
tire transaction is what precipitated this lengthy and ex-

288

pensive trial. I think we are entitled to have his analyisis
of how he got from there to here.

ttting down to the
The Court: I think we are almost ge
iden just arguing. He stated how he arrived = _
idea that it was a loan and how he understood it wou
the interest su-called—would be paid.

The Witness: I think I misunderstood you, too. It —
be on that same basis as I have written there, based on
11 year period, payable—then,

By Mr. Giroir:

Q. What is the 11 year period? A. The time period
when the option—when Worthen’s option would come up
to repurchase. .

"Q. ‘So you assumed that would be an exercise at the end
fll years? A. Yes. ;
° Q. Why did you pick 11 rather than 15 or 20 or 257
A. That was the first option period. » ne

Q. Why did you make the assumption at all? A. ¢
that was the first option period and that was the logica

riod for it to be exercised. . .

"OQ. Why did you make the assumption that it —
[446] exercised. On what basis did you make it? A. On
the basis that it was a loan. ;

Q. Can you allow interest as an expense or require -
recognition of interest as a gain if the likelihood of real.
izing that interest is uncertain? A. If the likelihood is
uncertain? ae .

Q. If there is no certainty that it will be paid. A. ns
there is no certainty that it will repay, I wouldn’t thin
so, no.

Reprrect EXaMINATION

By Mr. Sayre:

:; -
. Mr. Richardson, with regard to the issue of whet
ous the party to this transaction who would bear the

ease turned out to be very much as I anti
walked into the courtroom yesterday n
heard the parties at pretrial conference

289

economic loss or who would bear the economic burden of
the wear and tear on the building, it was your testimony

that—or your determination it was Worthen Bank rather

than the Frank Lyon Company; is that correct? <A. Yes,
sir.

Q. In the substance of the transaction between these
two, instead of the form; is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You disregard the form of the transaction? A,
That’s right, disregard the form.

Q. Was it your testimony that the some eight or ten
factors that you considered at the time, that no one of those

[447] factors was the key determining factor, but all of

them taken together? A. All of them taken together, yes,
sir.

Mr. Sayre: No further questions,
The Court: You may stand down.
(Witness excused. )

The Court: All right, Mr. Sayre.

Mr. Sayre: Your Honor, the government
cept for cross examination of the taxpaye

The Court: Anything else?

will close ex-
r’s witness.

Mr. Williamson: Nothing further from the plaintiff.

(Certificate Omitted in Printing)
[3] PROCEEDINGS

[Filed June 3, 1975]

The Court: What is your preference, gentlemen? This

cipated when we
1orning. Having
and having read

290

the pretrial memoranda, it was obvious there really were
very few, if any, issues of fact, although there were ques-
tions as to the inferences that could be drawn.

I think the Court has benefited very much from the testi-
mony. I don’t mean the trial wasn’t helpful or necessary;
I simply mean as it turns out there were, as anticipated by
everyone, very few factual issues. The trial has been used
as a vehicle to educate the Court and for the parties to
argue their position, for which I thank you.

Now what do you want to do? Do you want me to take
the whole matter under submission, or do you want me
simply ‘to rule at the earliest possible time with or without
additional argument?

Mr. Williamson: Your Honor, plaintiff, I think, has ade-
quately stated its position through the pretrial brief and
the evidence introduced here. We see no further reason for
delay in the decision, and if the Court feels inclined to
rule from the bench, it’s satisfactory with us.

Mr. Sayre: Your Honor, as requested in the pretrial
[4] memorandum, I would like the opportunity, once the
facts and inferences the Court mentioned had been estab-
lished at the trial, to highlight those in written argument
by way of a post-trial brief.

I believe that the factors requested by the Court with
regard to—as highlighted in the cases that I cited to the
Court the other morning could more appropriately have
been made in a written argument than they were in the
oral statement. I would request the opportunity to argue
those to the Court in a post-trial brief. I believe that while
the case is fresh on my mind that within a period of 20
days I can file a memorandum, The reason being that the
holiday delay here at the present time will necessitate a
short delay in getting back to my typist in the office.

Mr. Williamson: Your Honor, I might point out that the .

Government itself admitted in the pretrial conference he

291

thought the facts were—there would be no substantial dis-
pute as to the facts. The Court solicited from the Gov-
ernment a further pretrial brief to fully state his position
and the cases on which he relied and the facts on which he
relied. The Government didn’t elect to do so, and I see no
reason in further briefing the thing again.

The Court: Well, I indicated when I started that I do
not consider myself an expert in the tax field, and I am
going to give the Government an opportunity to submit
a brief [5] based upon now a fully developed record. but
with some limitation in this respect: I am going to make
one or two findings and conclusions simply to avoid the
necessity of anyone wasting time on certain ‘matters.

I think the heart of the matter here is whether, as the
Government states it, Frank Lyon is, for tax purposes
the owner of the building. I say that because there isn t
any question in my mind that under Arkansas law and

all the law we are used to a , ,
pplying that F .
the owner of the buil en, plying rank Lyon is

. So the only real question is: Is there a different result
in the application of the tax laws or the manner in which
you apply the tax laws. This gets back to the substance
versus form argument, and I am going to give the parties
an opportunity to get into that.

I do want to say this: One of the fact s
speak, that has been tendered has been nt st de
any question from what I have hearé here. There is no
basis from which anyone could find ov this record that
Worthen will exercise the option at the en’ of the 11 vears
or at any swbsequent option period. The ev.dence makes it
quite clear that it is highly improbably that it will exer-
cise that option at the eleventh year and very unlikely

i. wi agg?
4 exercise it thereafter, but it has the legal right to

292

I am simply making this determination that there is
[6] no factual basis for the Commissioner to determine or
for this Court to determine or for any tryer of fact to de-
termine, upon the basis of what we have heard here, that
Worthen will do it.

I think all we have is the admission and the conceded
position that they have the legal right to. The evidence
would indicate that it is highly unlikely that they will
because it will probably not be in their best interest to do
so. The farther down the line you look the less concrete
can be your prediction, but that, I think, is quite clear.

Now there is another thing from a legal point of view
in terms of the substance, if you will, that I don’t think
the parties need to worry about: I am going to look very
hard at the question of who owns that building in the
terms of the legal realities and the arguments that you
present to me,

If it turns out you are able to convince me—and I think
I am looking at you because I really feel that at this junc-
ture the Government needs to convince me that Frank
Lyon Company is not the owner, for tax purposes, of this
building. If it turns out that it is not, though, and you can
show me the indices by which the courts have decided this
should be considered to be Worthen’s building, there is
one other conclusion and factual determination that is
quite obvious—that is, that if the relationship is not what
it says it is, it is also not a loan. There is no loan here.
There is no obligation or agreement to repay the $500,-
000.00, and there is [7] no agreement enforceable by the
lender to obtain repayment of his loan or to obtain the so-
called ‘‘interest’’. So you will have to tell me what it is
if it’s not a loan and if, in fact it is that Worthen does
own the building.

Those two determinations are all that I am going to
make. They are facts and they are tied together very closely

293

because the whole concept or idea of the loan really is tied
to the Government’s theory that they will exercise the op-
tion and unless the mere right to exercise it is enough to
create the irrebuttable presumption that they will, there

is certain no evidence to indicate that the option will be
exercised.

With those limited comments, I want to hear and see
particularly ( would like to see the Government analyze
the sale-’ease: back transaction and show me the ones where
the arrangement is satisfactory for tax purposes and then
how this deviates and those eases which indicate that these

other circumstances which we have here would make it
not be the true owner.

if it turns out the agent did not make much of or anv-
thing of the fact Mr. Lyon was on the board of Worthen
and was also on the board of the other company—the close
relationship apparently did not in anv wav affect it nor
do I know of any law which makes a transaction between
those closely connected businesswise unacceptable.

He emphasized the fact Worthen pledged other asset
[8] to assist in obtaining the interim and permanent finane-
ing. lle emphasized the option to repurchase. He empha-
sized the fact that the agreement rentals were exactly
equal to the loan payment on the permanent financing and
that, therefore, the plaintiff was, as he put it, a conduit
So I would like to know this: Does it become less ahice.
tionable if the amounts are below or above the exact amount
that is required to discharge that?

The ground lease thing impressed the agent. I know
that what the agent determines is not binding upon the
Government, but these are the factors that resulted in
this case being here. Frankly, having listened to all the
testimony, I would need you to point out how that is im-
portant because it occurs to the Court, as testified by
every witness that testified, that if you put it at a rea-

294

sonable sum instead of $50.00 they simply raise the rent
by that much.

So there is nothing that the Court can see, on the basis
of the testimony in the record, that would change the trans-
action if you have it a reasonable rent, as you put it, for
the ground instead of a nominal rent because it could be
passed on and would just simply be a circuitous transac-
tion. If it were $100,000.00 instead of $50.00, it would come
right back by way of increased rent.

He was impressed by the fact the tenant had all the in-
stances, in effect, of ownership in the sense of [9] control
of the building, responsibility for the loss or damage,
maintenance, upkeep, and so forth.

He, I think, was impressed by the fact if you took the
amount of the down payment, $500,000.00, and you as-
sumed Worthen would exercise the option and read the
record that indicated they were looking at a six percent
return, that, in effect, would return six percent at the end
of 11 years if Worthen exercised that option.

That, of course, is clear to the Court from the evidence,
is the least that the Lyon Company could make out of this
transaction—that is, the tax benefits and the economic
benefits if Worthen exercised the option at the end of 11
years.

In any other posture it gets better in terms of the bene-
fits to Frank Lyon Company. Even on the so-called least
picture they make substantial returns as evidenced by the
agent’s figures, based upon either the pre-1969 or the
post-1969 Code: approximately $600,000.00 plus in tax
benefits under the pre and about $300,000.00 under the
post, and in either case approximately the same amount,
three hundred something thousand dollars, in clear eco-
nomic benefit upon his investment of $500,000.00.

I will give you until—this is the 27th. I will ask the
parties to file simultaneous briefs by the 20th of December,

295

and then you will be gi
’ given until the 27th to re
your adversary’s memorandum. ecseinedns

Mr. Williamson: That’s December 27th, Your Honor?
The Court: That is bad, isn’t it?

Mr. Sayre: Your Ho .
_Sayre: nor, m going to be out of t}
— from the 20th until about the 30th of the patio
plan to take a vacation to Mexico. If we could have |

until the 7th of January, whi
. ) ch woul
period, that would give pipccsac uld be after the holli

say,

day

The Court: All right. You will have until the 20th to file

your original memorand :
a and un
ary to reply, til, say, the 7th of Janu-

Mr. Williamson: Thank you, Your Honor.

On other point. Is there any

Pol serious question—with

nee to what points need to be briefed, is there any

serious question in the Court’s mind as to the deductibility

of interim | . ;
teri interest—the interest on the interim financing?

The Court:
benefit I ge

Mr. Savre: ’
ayre: Excuse me, Your Honor. You made the find-

ing there was no loan of 5
— the $500,000
eliminate the acerual of interest issue: ae Cone

The Court: We —_—
simply pi it jtey hy am not eliminating any issue. | am
ese nthe de iat if T know what a loan is, which is where
ap tA es to another party certain money to use
time, [11] us — of time and expects it back at some
, {11} usually in return for a certain so-called interest

or money j j j
a .. in consideration for the use thereof there is nc
Kal obligation for either of those inci.

pal or any interest, as such.
All right.

Court will be in recess.

I am leaving all iss
ssues open and see w
t from the work of the attorneys, what

is that correct ’

items: to repay princi-

298

at the end of any subsequent option period.’ Absent action
by Worthen, there is no way that plaintiff can obtain re-
payment of the so-called **loan’”’.

Plaintiff holds the legal title to the building under Ar-
kansas law and is for tax purposes, too, the owner thereof.
It bears the burden of depreciation and obsolescence.

The defendant does not contest the unreasonableness of
the rental charge for the building. The Court has already
indicated in open court that the reasonableness of the an-
nual rent under the ground lease was really immaterial
because under the arrangement it was essentially a wash-
out item.

The plaintiff had mixed motivations for wanting to enter
into the transaction, in addition to receiving the benefits
of the tax shelter involved: in addition to the good after-
tax rate, the plaintiff had a need to diversify its holdings
and a need to use its accumulated earnings. There was also
the long-term return on the investment which could be ex-
pected when the mortgage indebtedness was retired.

At this time I direct the attorney for the plaintitf to
prepare and submit to the defendant, for its approval as to
form, a precedent judgment in conformity with this letter-
memorandum and the factual findings and legal conclu-
sions stated in open court at the conclusion of the case.
The Court will also consider making additional factual
findings and conclusions of law upon the request of either
party if requests therefor are received by May 30, 1975.
The precedent judgment shall be submitted by June 4,
1975.

Yours very truly,

/s/ G. Tuomas Ersece
G. Thomas Eisele

2 Worthen's future capital requirements and the option prices stipulated «om
the one hand and the reasonable rentals stipulated on the other make this quite
clear. Keeause of the unlikelihood, the improbability, that the option wil! be
exercised, there is no basis to the Government's contention that it is acquiring
an equity in the property through its payment of rent.

299

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT *
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)

Supplementary Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law

(Filed June 11, 1975)

In open court at the end of the trial and by Letter Memo-
randum of May 16, 1975, the Court made certain findings
of fact and conclusions of law in this proceeding. In the
Letter Memorandum of May 16, the Court indicated to the
attorneys for the parties that it would ““eonsider making
additional factual findings and conclusions of law upon the
request of either party if requests therefor are received
by May 30, 1975." The plaintiff submitted ‘‘ Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law’? prior to May
30, 1975. Defendant has submitted none. oe,

Although the Court usually does not make findings with
respect to uncontested or noncontroverted facts such
those contained in the ** Proposed Findings of Fact”’ 1
through ‘ and 10 through 13, it will supplement its findings
of fact in this case by adopting said proposed findings since
the facts stated are true and were never really at iesue in
the case. The Court has already made findings of fact in
the matters referred to in ‘Proposed Findings’? numbered
Sand 9. The proposed findings are accurate, but are simply
& restatement of the facts previously found by the :

as

Court.

The **Proposed Conclusions of Law’’ submitted by the

plaintiff are accurate Statements insofar as thev refer to

the law involved, but most of the proposed additional eon-
clusions are unnecessary in the light of the Court’s rulings.
The Court will, however, adopt ‘Proposed Conclusions”

300

numbered 4, 6, 8, and 9 as supplements to, or a further
statement of, its prior conclusions.

For the purpose of identifying the supplementary find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law proposed by the plain-
tiff, the Court attaches hereto, and makes a part hereof,
the submission by the plaintiff entitled ‘‘ Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law’’.

Judgment will be entered this date pursuant to the rul-
ings in open court, the Letter Memorandum of May 16,
1975, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law
adopted herein.

Dated this 11 day of June, 1975.
/s/ Garxetr THomas Eiseie

Garnett Thomas Eisele
United States District Judge

301

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

(Caption Omitted in Printing)

Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Finxpincs or Facr.

1. During 1965, Worthen Bank & Trust Company
(‘*‘Worthen’’) began to plan the construction of a new
multistory bank and office building to replace its old bank
building in Little Rock, Arkansas. About the same time
Union National Bank of Little Rock (**Union’’) also began
to plan the construction of a new hank and office building.
Adjacent sites were acquired by both banks on Capitol
Avenue, separated only by Spring Street. It became a mat-
ter of competition and prestige hetween the two banks as
to which bank would start and complete its building first.

2. Worthen initially planned to finance the estimated
$9,000.000 cost of its site, new building and parking facility
by selling $4,000,000 of debentures and using the proceeds
to purchase $4,000,000 of capital stock of a wholly owned
real estate subsidiary, which would then raise the remain-
ing $5.000,000 through [-2-] a conventional mortgage loan
on the new premises. This plan was abandoned for two
reasons. As a bank chartered under the laws of Arkansas,
Worth«n could not pay more than the then statutory limit
of 6% on any debentures it might issue, and Worthen was
unable to locate a purchaser of the proposed $4,000,000 of
debentures at an interest rate of 6% or less. Further,
under the provisions of Section 24A of the Federal Re-
serve Act, prior approval of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System was required if the total in-
vestment in bank premises (including any investment in a
real estate company holding title to the premises) exceeded

302

Worthen’s capital stock of $4,000,000, and Worthen was
inforined by staff employees of the Federal Reserve System
that they would not recommend approval of the plan by
the Board of Governors.

3. Worthen then proposed a new plan involving a sale
and leaseback. Both the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and the State Bank Department approved the new plan
after required modifications, including a requirement by
the State Bank Department that Worthen have an option
to repurchase the building after 15 years. Thereafter Wor-
then conducted detailed negotiations with several investors,
including Goldman, Sachs & Co., Eastman Dillon, Union
Securities & Co., Stephens, Inc. and plaintiff, resulting in
the preparation by Worthen of a ‘*Specification For Sale-—
Leaseback of Worthen Bank and Office Building’’, which
incorporated the best features from Worthen’s point of
view of the proposals made by the various investors. These
specifications were submitted to Stephens, Inc. and plain-
tiff was accepted when plaintiff improved its bid hy re-
ducing the [-3-] proposed rent $21,000 per year for the
first 5 vears.

4. Because of its race with Union to complete construe-
tion first and prior to the selection of the investor, Wor.
then obtained a verbal commitment from First National
City Bank for interim financing and from New York Life
Insurance Company for permanent financing, subject to the
lenders’ approval of the investors to be selected. Worthen
also negotiated a cost-plus construction contract with the
general contractors prior to the final selection of the in-
vestor. After plaintiff was selected as the investor, plain-
tiff, Worthen, New York Life and First National City
Bank spent five months in hard arm’s length negotiations
and drafting before finalizing the documents reflecting the
agreements between the parties.

5. Worthen leased to plaintiff for 76 years and 7 months
the ground under the bank building, sold the building

303

piecemeal to plaintiff for $7,640,000 as it was being con-
structed| (to meet the requirement of the Federal Reserve
Bank that the building not appear on Worthen’s hooks ),
and then leased back from plaintiff the completed build-
ing for a primary term of 25 years, with options to extent
the lease for 8 additional terms of 5 vears. Plaintiff in-
vested in the building $500,000 from its own working cap-
ital and $7,140,000 it borrowed from New York Life Insur-
ance Company on the permanent loan.

6. The annual rent of $582,224 for the first 11 vears of
the building lease and $613,156 for the next 14 years is
the exact amount required to amortize the New York Life
loan «luring the 25-year primary term of the lease. The
rent on the building during the option periods totaling
4) years is [ -4-] $3000 000 per Vear. The evidence refleeted
and the Court finds, that the rent to be paid by Worthen
during the term of the lease is reasonable, a fact not eon
tested by the defendant.

7. Worthen was given the option to purchase the Wor-
then Building on the following dates at the following pur-
chase prices:

11-30-80 (after 11 vears) $6,325, 1600.85
11-50-84 (after 15 vears) 5.432.607 .32
11-30-89 (after 20 vears) 4.187.328 .04
11-30-94 (after 25 vears) 2 .145,.935.00
The option price at each date represents the unpaid bhal-

ance of the New York Life note plus plaintiff's $500,000
plus 6°? compounded interest. It also represents the nego-
tiated estimate of plaintiff and Worthen as to the fair
market value of the building on the option dates, which
the Court finds to be reasonable. The defendant produced
no witnesses to contest the reasonaliieness of the option
prices.

304

8. There has never been any understanding or agree-
ment between Worthen and plaintiff that Worthen will
ever exercise any of its options to purchase. Because of
Worthen’s future capital requirements, the very substan-
tial amounts of the option prices, the reasonableness of
the net rents Worthen will be required to pay during the
original and extended terms of the building lease and the
economic return Worthen earns on its funds not invested
in real estate, it is most unlikely and improbable that Wor-
then will exercise its options to purchase at the end of
the first eleven vears of the lease or at the end of any of
the subsequent option periods.

9, The ground lease requires plaintiff to pay Worthen
$50.00 per year for the first 26 years, 7 months (the length
of the primary term of the building lease plus the con-
struction period). Thereafter the annual rental under the
ground lease [-5-] will be as follows:

12-1-94 thru 11-30-99 (5 vears) $100,000.00
12-1-99 thru 11-30-04 (Syears) 150,000.00
12-1-04 thru 11-30-09 (5 vears) 200,000.00
12-1-09 thru 11-30-34 (25 vears) 250,000.00
12-'-34 thru 11-30-44 (10 vears) 10,000.00

The covernment contends that the ground rent of $50.00
per year during the primary term of the building lease is
unreasonably low and indicates that Worthen owns the
building. The evidence clearly showed, and the Court finds,
that the amount of the ground rent during the first 25
years of the building lease is immaterial: had the ground
rent to be paid by plaintiff te Worthen been increased, the
building rent to be paid by Worthen to plaintiff would
have been increased by the same amount, resultng in a
washout.

10. On an audit of plaintiff’s income tax return for 1969,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined, without
further explanation, that plaintiff is ‘‘not the owner for

305

tax purposes of any portion of the Worthen Building.
Therefore, the income and expenses related to this build-
ing are not allowable to you for Federal income tax pur-
poses.’’ Based upon this determination the Commissioner
— the following adjustments to plaintiff’s reported in-

1. Accrued rental income for

1 month from Worthen $( 48,527.01)
2. Accrued interest for 1 month

owed to New York Life 40,162.50
3. Depreciation for 1 month on

Worthen Building 51,618.79

4. Expenses during construction:
(a) Interest paid to FNCB $403,899.54

(hb) Legal expense 33,351.05

(«) Title insurance 10,140.00

(1) Audit expense 3,475.00

(e) Telephone and travel 801.16 451,666.75
5. Accrued interest income 2,298.15

Total increase in reported income $497,219.18

; [-6-} 11. Based upon these determinations, the Commis-
sioner assessed an income tax deficiency against plaintiff
in the amount of $236,596.36, together with interest in the
amount of $43,790.84, making a total deficiency assessment
of $280,387.20. (This figure does not include other uncon-
tested adjustments which are not involved in this case).
Plaintiff paid the deficiency assessment and filed a claim
for refund of the $280,387.20, which claim the Commis-
sioner disallowed. Thereafter plaintiff filed this action to
recover the $280,387.20, with interest.

12. The Gevernment contends that, although the ‘‘form”’
of the transaction was a sale and leaseback arrangement.

306

in ‘‘substance’’ Worthen owned the building; that plain-
tiff was a mere ‘‘conduit”’ of the interim loan from First
National City Bank to Worthen and of the permanent loan
from New York Life Insurance Company to Worthen; and
thet plaintiff ‘‘loaned’’ to Worthen the $500,000 which
plaintiff invested in the building from its own working cap-
ital.

13. The plaintiff contends that for Federal tax purposes
the transaction was in ‘‘substance’’ exactly what it was in
‘‘form’’, ie., a true sale and leasehack transaction, with
the interim and permanent loans being in from and sub-
stance made to plaintiff rather than to Worthen.

Conxccvusions or Law

1. It was both the ‘‘subjective’’ and ‘‘objective’’ inten-
tion of the parties, as evidenced by their written agree-
ments when read in the light of the attending facts and
circumstances existing at the time the agreements were
executed, that the transaction [-7-] be a sale-leaseback
with options to repurchase, exactly in accordance with the
form and language of the documents evidencing the trans-
action=. Any other view of the case would not only produce
strange and untenable results but would be both unjust to
plaintiff and contrary to the intent and purposes of the
applicable federal tax laws. Western Contracting Corpora-
tion v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8 Cir. 1959); Arkansas
Bank and Trust Company v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
171 (D.C. Ark. 1963).

2. l’laintiff owns the Worthen Building, both under Ar-
kansas law and for federal income tax purposes. Because
of the improbability that plaintiff will exercise any of its
options to purchase, there is no basis for the defendant’s
contention that Worthen is acquiring an equity in the
property through the payment of rent. Since the parties
in good faith actually intended to enter into a sale-lcase-
back transaction, Worthen will acquire an equity in the

307

property only if and when it ever exercises any of its op-
tions to purchase. Until the option to purchase is exercised,
plaintiff bears the burden of the depreciation and obso-
lesence of the building. Defendant did not question the
method or rate of depreciation used by plaintiff. Plaintiff is
entitled to deduct the depreciation claimed on the building
in its 1969 return. Breece Veneer and Panel Company v.
Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7 Cir. 1956); Benton v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5 Cir. 1952); Kearney & Trecker
Company v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (ED Wise.
1961).

3. Plaintiff was not a mere *‘conduit’’ for loans to {-8-]
Worthen by First National City Bank and New York Life
Insurance Company, as contended by the defendant. Plain-
tiff was the borrower and sole &bligor on the loan and on
the permanent loan. The interim and permanent lenders
made independent investigations of plaintiff's financial sta-
bility, negotiated with plaintiff for almost six months over
the details of the loans and in all respect intended and
treated plaintiff as the borrower. The fact that Worthen
negotiated tentative commitments for the loans prior to
the selection of plaintiff as the investor does not indicate
that Worthen was the borrower; it simply enabled Wor-
then to attract more potential investors and to obtain a
lower rent. The fact that the rents were no less than the
amount required to amortize the permanent loan was a
requirement of New York Life Insurance Company; the
fact that the rents were no more is only a reflection of the
relatively small initial equity required of the investor and
of the intensity of the competition among the potential
investors for the investment. Plaintiff is entitled to deduct
the interest paid and acerued on the interim and perma-
nent loans.

4. Plaintiff is entitled to allocate and deduct its expenses
incurred in obtaining the interim loan and permanent loan
over the lives of the respective loans to which they relate.

308

Detroit Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133
F.2d 200 (6 Cir. 1943); Anover Realty Corp., 33 T.C. 671
(1960). Plaintiff is entitled to allocate and deduct over the
life of the building the expenses incurred in aequiring the
building. Plaintiff and defendant have stipulated the proper
allocation of such expenses.

{-9.] 5. Even if the Court had found that Worthen owned
the building for federal income tax purposes and was en-
titled to the depreciation deduction, plaintiff would still
have heen entitled to deduct the interest it paid on the in-
terim and permanent loans and to allocate and deduct the
expense it incurred in obtaining the interim and permanent
loans and title to the building. Rev. Rul. 72-543.

6. The theory of the defendant that plaintiff ‘‘loaned”’
$500,000 to Worthen is completely untenable, both in fact
and in law. There was no obligation or agreement by Wor-
then to repay the $500,000 and no way plaintiff could force
the repayment. The only way plaintiff could ever receive
the $500,000 from Worthen would be through the exercise
by Worthen of one of its options to repurchase, an event
entirely within the discretion of Worthen and highly im-
probable. Consequently, the Commissioner erred in assum-
ing that Worthen will exercise its option at the end of the
eleventh year of the building lease, and in determining that
plaintiff’s anticipated $303,356 gain on the assumed exer-
cise of the option is the equivalent of interest which plain-
tiff must acerue as income evenly over the first eleven years
of the lease. Regulations 1.446-1(¢) (ii).

7. The defendant placed considerable emphasis upon the
fact that, assuming plaintiff exercised its option to pur-
chase at the end of the first eleven years of the lease, plain-
tiff’s deduction for depreciation on the building would gen-
erate an operating loss deductible against other income of
plaintiff which would result in the net tax saving to plain-
tiff of $312,220.45 over the eleven year period. (Defend-

309

ant’s Exhibit 6). Defendant [-10-] argued that plaintiff’s
only reason for investing in the building was to obtain this
tax saving, and that a device to minimize tax liability, with
no additional business purpose, will be disregarded for tax
purposes. Defendant’s argument on this point is in error
for several reasons. First, the evidence clearly reflects, and
the Court finds, that plaintiff was motivated to enter into
the transaction, not only because of the good eurrent after-
tax return offered by the investment, but because of plain-
tiff’s need to diversify its holdings, the need to use its ac-
cumulated earnings to avoid a Section 531 tax, and the
anticipated long-term return on the investment after the
permanent loan was retired. Secondly, the form of the
transaction was determined by Worthen within guidelines
established by banking law restrictions having nothing to
(lo with tax tiotives; substantially the same terms had been
negotiated with other potential investors before plaintiff
entered the picture. The reality of the transaction for tax
purposes cannot be unilaterally determined solely hy plain-
tiff’s intent or motives. Breece Veneer and Panel Company
v. Commissioners, supra, at 323. Thirdly, it is highly un-
likely that the option will be exercised at the end of the
first «'-ven years of the lease, after which time the building
lease vill generate a substantial taxable income to plaintiff.
Finally, the fact that plaintiff will receive a tax benefit
during the early years of the investment is in keeping with
the intent of Congress to stimulate investments in depre-
ciable real estate through accelerated depreciation dedue-
tions; it does not suggest that [-11-] the substance of the
transaction was not in keeping with its form. Plaintiff has
the legal right to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes by means which the law permits.
Gregory ¥. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 at 469 (1935).

. 8. The agreement of Worthen, as lessee under the Build-
ing Lease, to pay all taxes, insurance and maintenance on
the building, to hold the lessor harmless from all claims

312

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION

Not.ce of Appeal
(Filed August 11, 1975)

Notice is hereby given that the United States of America,
defendant herein, appeals to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from the judgment entered
in favor of plaintiff on June 11, 1975,

Unrrep States or AMERICA
/s/ W. H. Dittanenry
By W. H. Dillahunty
United States Attorney

(Certificate of Service Omitted in Printing)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1672%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.
