# Petition — Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S.E.P.A. > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1670%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1977 - **Citation:** 430 U.S. 953 ## Text Bupreme Court, U. A FILED NOV 1 976 MICHAEL RODAK, JR, CLERK | IN THE Supreme Court ot the Anited States Ocroper TERM, 1976 No. 76*619 Utan Power & Licut Company, Er AL., Petitioners v. Untrep States ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [List of Counsel on Inside Cover] — — — bP . !„!łl4∘7ö FE Due c. Wasuuworom, D. C. COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS Uran Pow & Ligut Company CoMPANY Gerry Levenberg Utan Power & Licut Company Thomas A. Kerol , Sidney G. Baucom Leonard, Cohen and Gettings Verl R. Topham 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20006 P.O. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 Pusiic Service ComPaNny oF COLORADO CHEYENNE Licut, FugL anp Power CoMPANY Bryant O’Donnell Piatre River Pow AvTHoriry Kelly, Stansfield & O’Donnell Moses, Wittemyer and Harrison, P.C. 550 Fifteenth Street 250 Arapahoe Avenue Denver, Colorado 80202 Boulder, Colorado 80302 228 ELxcr ICG ASSOCIATION NC. Girts Krumins P.O. Box 1149 Montrose, Colorado 81401 INDEX Page EE EE ES LE 2 ET EL eee 2 er = eee eee 2 Srarurz Ax Db Recutations Invonvep ................ 3 r . eee 4 Reasons ror Grantine THe WIr 4 A. The Clean Air Act and recent decisions of this Court firmly establish that the States have pri- mary responsibility for controlling air quality throughout their entire geographic area ..... 5 B. Contrary to the explicit provisions of the Act and this Court’s holdings, the Administrator has abrogated the States’ responsibilities to assure air quality throughout their entire geo- D cubékendadsoasseeedaccacetcese 6 C. Whether EPA is authorized to grant reclassi- fication powers to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies is a matter ripe for review under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as mende! 9 EE ̃ ...e 14 Aprenpix F—Petitioners in the Consolidated Proceed- ings Below APPENDICEs: The following documents are incorporated by reference from the petition for a writ of certiorari of petitioner Montana Power Co., No. 76-529: A—Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit B—EPA Regulations for prevention of significant air quality deterioration C—Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit E—Relevant excerpts from the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857, et seq. ii CITATIONS Page Cases: Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F.2d 827 (C.A. 9, 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3681 US 11,12 Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F. 349 (C. A. 3, 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) .............. 10, 12 Hancock v. Train, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 2006 (1976) . . 5,6 Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (C. A. 7, 1975), cert denied, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 1141 (1976) 10 Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associates, 501 F.2d 390 (C.A. 9), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974) ..... 10 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, cert. granted, 409 U.S. 1124, fd by an equally divided Court, sub nom. Fri. v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) 4,5 Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (BREED 00000005 2000600 45 be nue ieee eee 12 Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60 een 5, 8, 9 Union Electric Company v. E. P. A., — U.S. —, 96 S. Ot. TTT Ä 6,11 STATUTES AND REGuLATIONS: Clean Air Act, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, 84 Stat. 1676, 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq.: Yo Ree ee 5 . c 5 Ir au 9, 10 eee. see eee 6 ieee, passim III.. 4 @ C.F ae § GRE CHOP ccoccccdcesencacancdudcu 4,6 39 Fed. Reg. 42509 et seq. (Dec. 5, 1974) .......... 2, 7, 14 40 Fed. Reg. 2802 (Jan. 16, 1975) ))))) 2 40 Fed. Reg. 25004 (June 12, 1970)))7¼::n 2 40 Fed. Reg. 42011 (Sept. 10, 1975 2 MISCELLANEOUS: Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics, rer 8 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States Ocroser Term, 1976 — — No. Uran Power & Licut Company, Er AL, Petitioners v. Unrrep States ENviRonMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents — — PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to re- view the judgment of the United States Court of Ap- peals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in this proceeding on August 2, 1976. The opinion of the Court of Appeals has not yet been officially reported, but is unofficially reported at 9 ERC 1129 (Appendix A).“ That opinion reviewed regula- tions promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency as amendments to state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act, which were published in the Federal Register, together with an explanatory pre- amble on December 5, 1974 (39 Fed. Reg. 42509), and were revised on January 16, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 2802), June 12, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 25004) and September 10, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 42011). The regulations thus pro- mulgated amended Part 52 of 40 C.F.R. (Appendix B). The judgment of the Court of Appeals ( Appendix C) was entered on August 2, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). J. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency has authority, under the Clean Air Act, to promulgate regulations amending state plans for implementation of the established national ambient air quality stand- ards so as to include provisions for prevention of sig- nifieant deterioration in areas where the air quality is already better than is required to comply with those A petition for certiorari was recently filed in this proceeding on behalf of sev -ral other petitioners below and been assigned © No. 76-529. This petition adopts as its own the following appen- (lices to the petition in No. 76-529: Appendices A, R. C. ‘lereinafter, unless otherwise indieated, all references to the Ap- pendices will be to those appended to No. 76-529. W 3 2. Assuming that the Environmental Protection Agency does have such authority, whether the signifi- eant deterioration regulations which it has promul- gated violate the Clean Air Act, because they grant to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies the power to reclassify federal and Indian lands, which may impose more stringent air quality limitations upon adjoining state and private lands 60 or more miles from federal or Indian lands in derogation of the states’ primary responsibility under the Clean Air Act. 3. Whether the issue of the Environmental Pro- | tection Agency's statutory authority to grant such re- classification powers to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies by promulgation of regula- tions amending state implementation plans is ripe for review under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. — — — STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b), of the Clean Air Act, as amended, provides, in pertinent part: (1) ...A petition for review of the Administra- tor’s action in .. promulgating any implementa- tion plan under section 110 of this title... may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation, ... or after such date if such peti- tion is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day. (2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under ey Ty 4 paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial re- view in civil or criminal proceedings for enforce- ment. Other relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., are set forth in Ap- | pendix E to the petition for writ of certiorari in No. 76-529. The regulations being reviewed, 40 C. F. R. §§ 52.01(d), (f), and 52.21 (1975), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 42011 (September 10, 1975) are set forth in Appendix B to the petition in No. 76-529. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioners adopt as their own the Statement of the Case set forth in No. 76-529. Petitioners adopt as their own the reasons advanced in the petition in No. 76-529, which focuses on the basic issue of EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, as amended, to promulgate regulations amending state im- plementation plans so as to include provisions for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality that is better than national ambient air quality stand- ards. This Court previously granted certiorari on that fundamental statutory issue in Sierra Club v. Ruckels- haus, 409 U.S. 1124 (1973), which resulted in affirmance by an equally divided court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). Should this Court conclude that EPA is authorized to promulgate regulations amending state implementation plans so as to require the prevention of significant de- terioration, another issue must be resolved. That is- sue is whether such regulations may empower federal land managers and Indian governing bodies to reclas- 5 sify federal and Indian lands, which has the operative effect of impinging upon the sovereign states’ primary responsibility under the Clean Air Act for controlling air quality throughout their entire geographie areas. The lower court declined to review this important is- sue believing it is not ripe for review. The lower court’s interpretation of the review provisions of the Clean Air Act is clearly contrary to the express pro- visions of the Act and, if permitted to stand, will fore- close petitioners from obtaining a decision on the merits of an important and far-reaching delegation of au- thority by EPA to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies. A. The Clean Air Act and Recent Decisions of This Court Firmly Establish that the States Have Primary Responsi- bility for Controlling Air Quality Throughout Their Entire Geographic Areas. The Clean Air Act declares in Section 101(a) (3), 42 U.S.C., § 1857 (a) (3) that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsi- bility of States and local governments. Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-2(a), provides that Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assur- ing air quality within the entire geographic area com- prising such State On three occasions since its equally divided affirm- ance of Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), this Court has noted that Congress, in passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, explicitly preserved the principle that, ‘Each State shall have the primary re- sponsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State ...’.’’ Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) ; Hancock v. Train, — US. —, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2008 6 (1976) ; accord, Union Electric Company v. E.P.A., — U.S. —, 96 8. Ot. 2518, 2525 (1976). Although this Court held (Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissenting, 96 S.Ct. at 2022), that Section 118 does not require existing federal installations to ob- tain state permits in order to continue operations, it acknowledged that Section 118 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C, § 1857f, ‘‘mekes it the duty of federal facili- ties to comply with state-established air quality and emission standards.“ Hancock v. Train, supra, 96 8. Ct. at 2014 (emphasis supplied). B. Contrary to the Explicit Provisions of the Act and This Court's Holdings, the Administrator Has Abrogated the States’ Responsibilities To Assure Air Quality Throughout Their Entire Geographic Areas. Federal land managers and Indian governing bodies are permitted by the regulations to redesignate their lands independently of state control and in a manner inconsistent with surrounding state designations 40 C. F. R. 5 52.21 (e) (3) (ir) and (v) (1975) (App. B, 80a). Federal land managers may only redesignate to a more restrictive classification ; that is, from a Class II to a Class I designation § 52.21(¢)(3)(iv). Indian governing bodies may redesignate to either Class I or Class III § 52.21(¢)(3)(v). The Administrator has recognized that the power to reclassify to a Class I designation means the power to control land use ‘‘60 or more miles“ outside the Class I area: [Because of the small air quality increments specified for Class I areas, these — can be vio- lated by a source many miles inside an adjacent Class II or III area. For example, a power plant which just meets the Class II increment for SO: 7 could under some conditions violate the Class I in- crement for SOz 60 or more miles away. Under the regulations promulgated below, a source could not be allowed to construct if it would violate an air quality increment either in the area where the source is to be located or in any neighboring area in the State. Therefore, wherever a Class [ area adjoins a Class II or III area, the potential growth restrictions, especially for power plant de- velopment, extends well beyond the Class I bound- aries into the adjacent areas... . [I]t should be clear that the Class II or III inerement could only be fully utilized toward the center of the area and that at the periphery, allowable deterioration will be dictated by the adjoining Class I area rather than the Class IT or III increment. 39 Fed. Reg. 42512 (Dee. 5, 1974) (emphasis supplied) (App. B. 66a-67a). There is nothing in the Act or its legislative history to support granting either federal land managers or Indian governing bodies power to “dictate” the use of state and private lands in this fashion. EPA’s only justification for this extraordinary grant of authority is that [tjhere is nothing in the Clean Air Act or the legislative history of that Act that indicates the Con- gress intended to preclude the Federal Government from meeting more restrictive standards than are im- posed by the States” 39 Fed. Reg. 42513 (Dee. 5, 1974) (App. B, 70a). That argument does not answer, it begs, the issue whether the Act authorizes EPA to grant federal land managers and Indian governing bodies effective veto power over the air pollution con- trol strategies chosen by the respective states. The differences are not semantical—they are quite real, es- pecially in the Western states where federal land own- ership is extensive. As shown by Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics, Table 7, 1975, the total federal acreage and percentage of federal land within the four states comprising petitioners’ service area is as follows: Federal Federal Lands as State Acreage Percentage of State Utah 34,882,460 66 % Colorado 23,973,450 36% Wyoming 29,927,861 48% Idaho 33,732,820 64% Moreover, with federal land scattered throughout a state, federal land managers’ power to ‘‘dictate’’ large portions of state and private lands usage intensifies; indeed, in Utah, there is no point on private or state land that is farther than 20 miles from an adjoining federal or Indian border. The practical effect is that states such as Utah, Colorado, Wyoming and Idaho are divested to a large extent of their responsibility to control air quality within their borders. At best, their control is coneur- rent with federal land managers and Indian governing bodies. At worst, they are now relegated to a second- ary role in controlling air quality. There is no statutory or judicial support for such an abrogation of state responsibility under the Clean Air Act. The Act is explicit in expressing Congress’ intent that states maintain control of their land uses in achieving national air quality standards. Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, supra at 86-87. The Administrator’s grant of power to federal land mana- gers and Indian governing bodies contravenes that Congressional intent. e C. Whether EPA Is Authorized To Grant Reclassification Powers to Federal Land Managers and Indian Governing Bodies Is a Matter Ripe for Review Under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as Amended. Congress created for the Clean Air Act its own judicial review procedures. In § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1857h-5(b)(1), Congress established a 30-day statu- tory limitation period for the filing of a petition to review the Administrator’s action in promulgating any impiementation plan. This is in keeping with Congress’ intent under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, which “‘imposed upon the Agency and states a comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude which was to be accomplished in a relatively short time.“ Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, supra at 68. The court below disregarded § 307 (b) (1), refusing to decide whether the Administrator had exceeded his statutory authority in granting federal land managers and Indian governing bodies the power to redesignate their lands, finding this issue ‘‘not yet ripe for re- view.“ (App. A, 47a). Review by this Court is necessary in order to affirm the intent of Congress and to resolve promptly all questions raised concerning the Adminis- trator’s authority to promulgate the regulations. As the lower court correctly recognized, the chal- lenged regulations were promulgated by the Adminis- trator pursuant to section 110(¢) (1), 42 U.S.C. §1857e- 50e) (I), as amendments to the state implementation plans (App. A, lla). Each state implementation plan was amended to incorporate by reference the new regulations (/d.). Judicial review of the promulga- 10 tion of any state implementation plan is provided in section 307 (b) (1): A petition for review of the Administrator’s action in. . . promulgating any implementation — under section 110 of this title . . . may be ed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation, ... or after such date if such peti- tion is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (1) (emphasis supplied). And 5 307 (b) (1) is the exclusive means for obtain- ing judicial review of the promulgation of any state implementation plan. Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (C. A. 7, 1975), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 96 S.Ct. 1141 (1976); Plan for Arcadia v. Anita Associ- ates, 501 F.2d 390, 392 (C.A.9), cert. denied, 419 US. 1034 (1974); Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (C. A. 3, 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Failing to realize the exclusivity of judicial review of implementation plans under § 307 (b) (1), the lower court declined to decide whether the Administrator possesses authority to delegate reclassification powers to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies, finding it not yet ripe for review (App. A, 47a). This conclusion is based on the errone us assumption that judicial review of the Administrator’s power to amend state implementation plans could be obtained at some later date. But, as this Court recently pointed out, under § 307(b)(1), petitions for review of an imple- mentation plan may be filed more than 30 days after promulgation of such implementation plan only if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after 11 such 30th day Union Electric Co. v. K. P. A., — US. —, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1976) (emphasis supplied). Petitioners’ failure to seek judicial review of the reg- ulations within 30 days of their promulgation would have precluded them from challenging the Adminis- trator’s statutory authority to promulgate the regula- tions. Land reclassification at some future date by a federal land manager or Indian governing body— the more concrete context“ the lower court referred to (App. A, 48a )—would not enable petitioners to obtain review of the Administrator’s authority to delegate those powers, since a challenge to that authority would not be based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day,“ as required by § 307(b)(1). In Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 521 F. 2d 827 (C.A.9, 1975), cert granted, 44 U.S. L. W. 3681 (June 1, 1976), EPA made an argument similar to that which it advanced in the court below in this case. The State of California challenged the Administrator’s authority under the Clean Air Act to impose any sanc- tions or penalties against California for its failure to administer and enforce transportation controls set out in the State’s implementation plan. EPA there argued that a determination regarding the Administrator’s authority was not yet ripe because the Administrator had yet to institute procedures necessary to invoke the sanctions. The court rejected that argument stat- ing: We do not believe any doctrine of ripeness or exhaustion of administrative remedies should pre- clude our determination of the issues raised in this proceeding by the State of California and others regarding the authority to impose the regu- 12 lations with res to which these petitions for review were filed. Such issues must be determined in this proceeding for it is unlikely they could be raised ‘in a civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.’ Moreover, the orderly admimstra- tion of the Clean Air Act requires that the serious questions to which the parties have addressed themselves be resolved as expeditiously as pos- sible.“ (Id. at 831, emphasis supplied). Similarly, the court below should not have refrained from deciding whether the Administrator exceeded his statutory authority. Section 307(b)(1) left no disere- tion to either petitioners or the court. Petitioners were required to file their petition for review within 30 days of the regulations’ promulgation, and the court, having correctly concluded that the validity of EPA- promulgated state implementation plans was at issue (App. A, lla), was required to grant judicial review. The lower court’s reliance on Toilet Goods Ass’n, Ine. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), is misplaced (App. A, 47a). This Court found the particular issue in Toilet Goods not yet ripe for review only after hav- ing satisfied itself that, under the Administrative Pro- cedure Act, petitioners would be afforded at a later date effective judicial review with respect to the issue of the underlying statutory authority to promulgate the challenged regulations (Id. at 165-66). But, as Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (C. A. 3, 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), made clear, “The Declaratory Judgment Act and APA could not afford a basis for jurisdiction“ of a challenge to the SEPA did not seek certiorari on this issue. Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 75-909. — 13 promulgation of an implementation plan because Con- gress in § 307 (b) (1) of the Clean Air Act provided an exclusive method for judicial review of state imple- mentation plans. Moreover, the lower court’s inability to ‘‘foresee any irreparable injury which may arise from deferral’’ of the question whether the Administrator exceeded his authority in granting the classification powers to fed- eral land managers and Indian governing bodies is quite beside the point (App. A, 48a). Congress no- where provided in the Clean Air Act of 1970 that peti- tions for review of the Administrator’s promulgation of implementation plans must demonstrate ‘‘irrepa- rable injury.“ Indeed, since petitioners can not later mount a challenge to the Adm.nistrator’s lack of statu- tory authority to promulgate the amended state imple- mentation plans, it is the refusal of the lower court to decide the issue that will inflict irreparable injury“ on petitioners by forever foreclosing judicial review on this issue. Finally, the lower court further justified its refusal to review the issue with the following hypothesis: if the Administrator were to approve, as re- placements for these regulations, individual state plans which did not include the powers granted to federal land managers and Indian governing bod— ies, the problems foreseen by petitioners might never arise. (App. A, 48a). At no time has the Administrator suggested that he might approve state plans which did not include the reclassification powers which he granted to federal land managers and Indian governing bodies. Quite to the 14 contrary, the Administrator declared in the preamble to the regulations: EPA did not intend to preclude State redesigna- tions provided that the Federal Land Manager can elect to keep the air quality over Federal lands in a more pristine condition than the State might designate, Therefore, the regulations. . . reserve to the Federal Land Manager the authority to sub- ject such lands to a more stringent designation. St revised regulations make it clear that the Federal Government can protect air quality over all Federal lands. 39 Fed. Reg. 42513 (Dee. 5, 1974) (emphasis supplied) (App. B, 69a-70a). The lower court has thus refused to decide an im- portant issue, and has as well erroneously decided other significant issues concerning the Administrator’s au- thority under the Clean Air Act, which this Court should review and decide. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this petition for writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted, [List of Counsel on next page] Dated: November 1, 1976 Uran Power & Liont Company Pune Service Company or CoLorapo — — : Piarre River Power AvuTHoriry Cuevenne Licnt, Fue. ann Power COMPANY Gerry Levenberg Uran Power & Liout Company Thomas A. Karol ; Sidney G. Baucom Leonard, Cohen and Gettings Verl R. Topham 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20006 P.O. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 Pusiic Service Company or CoLoRapo Cueyvenne Lieut, Fue. ann Power CoMPANY Bryant O'Donnell Parr River Power AvuTHoriry Kelly, Stansfield & O'Donnell Moses, Wittemyer and Harrison, P.C. 550 Fifteenth Street 250 Arapahoe Avenue Denver, Colorado 80202 Boulder, Colorado 80302 38 Evectric AssociaTIONn NC. Girts Krumins P.O. Box 1149 Montrose, Colorado 81401 The following parties were other petitioners in the con- solidated proceedings below : Montana Power Company, Pacific Power and Light Com- pany, Portland General Electric Company, Puget Sound Power & Light Company, Washington Water Power Com- pany, Pacific Coal Gasification Company, Transwestern Coal Gasification Company, The Dayton Power and Light Co., Kentucky Power Company, Ohio Edison Company, Ohio Power Company, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company, Sierra Club, The Washington Metropolitan Coalition for “lean Air, New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water, Oregon Environ- mental Council, Sally Rodgers, John Tanton, Susan L. Moore, Stephen Winter, the State of New Mexico, the State of Nevada, Buckeye Power, Inc., Ohio Valley Electric Cor- poration, Indiana Kentucky Electric Corporation, Indiana & Michigan Electric Corporation, Indiana Statewide Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., Indianapolis Power and Light Company, Northern Indiana Public Service Company, Pub- lie Service Company of Indiana, Inc., Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company, Utah International, Inc., Ala- bama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, Western Energy Supply and Transmission Associates, Arizona Pub- lie Service Company, Arizona Power Cooperative, Inc., Nevada Power Company, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, San Diego Gas & Elec- trie Company, Southern California Edison Company, Edi- son Electric Institute, the Kentucky Utilities Company, American Petroleum Institute, Standard Oil Company, Atlantic-Richfield Company, Continental Oil Company, Exxon Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Cor- poration, Shell Oil Corporation, Texaco, Inc., Tucson Gas & Electric Company, and Union Oil Company of California. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1670%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.