# Opposition — American Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1360%3A3

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 915

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Trans WorLD AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners,

V.

Wort Airways, Inc., Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS CITY OF OAKLAND,
BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS, AND
OAKLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI

J. KERWIN Rooney
Port Attorney
Port of Oakland
66 Jack London Square
Oakland, California 94607

Crom A. BEASLEY, JR.
FREDERICK A. BALLARD
505 Commerce Bldg.
1700 K St., N.W.
March 31, 1977 Washington, D.C. 20006

Press or Brron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctoBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
TRANS WorLD AIRLINES, INnc., Petitioners,

V.

Woritp Airways, Inc., Respondent.

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS CITY OF OAKLAND,
BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS, AND
OAKLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI

The City of Oakland, Board of Port Commissioners,
and Oakland Chamber of Commerce, intervenors in
the court below, submit this brief in opposition to the
petition for certiorari filed herein by American Air-
lines, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners’ statement of the case is accurate in its
factual respects, but is somewhat confused by being
intertwined with argument. The sole issue in the case
is one of statutory construction, namely, whether the
1962 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958

2

(Pub. L. No. 87-528) should be construed to preclude
the Civil Aeronautics Board from issuing, under any
circumstances, a certificate for scheduled air transpor-
tation to an air carrier holding a certificate for ‘‘sup-
plemental’’ (popularly known as ‘“‘charter’’) air
transportation. The Board read the statute to tie its
hands in this respect, but the court below did not. These
intervenors submit that the court below was correct;
that, while by either construction the statute is not a
model of clarity, its improvement is appropriately for
the Congress to undertake; and that, in any event,
choice between the two constructions does not rise to
the dignity of an important question of federal law
which should be settled by this court.

This proceeding arises as follows: On April 2, 1975,
respondent World Airways, an air carrier certificated
to engage in ‘‘supplemental’’ service, filed an applica-
tion with the Civil Aeronautics Board seeking certifi-
cation to perform regularly scheduled transcontinental
service between Newark and Baltimore on the East
Coast and Ontario and Oakland, California on the
West. World contemplated a high volume service, uti-
lizing ‘‘satellite’’ airports, with a low fare. It stated
that it would not be willing to surrender its supple-
mental certificates if granted scheduled route author-
ity. On January 23, 1976, the Board dismissed World’s
application without reaching the merits, holding that
the 1962 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 preclude issuance of a certificate for scheduled
authority to a carrier holding ‘‘supplemental’’ au-
thority, C.A.B. docket 27693, Order 76-1-88 (Jan. 23,
1976).

— en ee ee

ee ee ne _

3

Sections 401(d)(1) and (2) of the Federal Aviation
Act govern the certification of scheduled route author-
ity, that is, authority to provide individually ticketed
service on a schedule.’ These sections provide that an |
applicant must be an ‘‘air carrier’’, ‘‘fit, willing, and
able’ to provide the service, and that the requested
service must be ‘‘required by the public convenience
and necessity.’’ ‘‘Air carrier’’ is defined as a ‘‘citizen
of the United States who undertakes * * * to engage in
air transportation * * *’’, section 101 of the Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).

The 1962 amendments to the Act added section 401
(d) (3), authorizing certification for ‘‘supplemental air
transportation,’’ defined to include charter but not in-
dividually ticketed authority, section 101(36) of the
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (36) (1970). This provision
(section 401(d)(3)) requires that an applicant must be
‘‘fit, willing, and able’’ to provide the service, and that
the service be ‘‘required by the public convenience and

1 Section 401(d)(1) controls the award of permanent authority,
while 401(d)(2) governs temporary authority. These sections pro-
vide in full:

(d)(1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the
whole or any part of the transportation covered by the ap-
plication, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and
able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform
to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations,
and requirements of the Board hereunder, and that such
transportation is required by the public convenience and
necessity; otherwise such application shal] be denied.

(2) In the case of an application for a certificate to engage
in temporary air transportation, the Board may issue a cer-
tificate authorizing the whole or any part thereof for such
limited periods as may be required by the publie convenience
and necessity, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing,
and able properly to perform such transportation and to con-
form to the provision of this chapter and the rules, regula-
tions, and requirements of the Board hereunder.

4

necessity”’; it also provides that the applicant must not
be holding ‘‘a certificate under paragraph (1) or (2)
of this subsection [section 401(d)].’’* In other words,
an air carrier holding scheduled route authority may
not also acquire supplemental authority; but the sec-
tion does not by its terms bar supplemental carriers
from acquiring scheduled authority. As stated by the
court below, ‘“‘The issue in this case thus becomes
whether the general purposes of the 1962 amendments
would be furthered by reading this converse limitation
into the Act.’’ (slip. op. 5)

L. Petitioners’ Contention That The Court Below Has Failed To
Accord Proper Deference To The Administrative Interpretation
Is Misplaced.

The primary thrust of the petition is that the court
below failed to show proper deference to the interpre-
tation adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board of ‘‘its
own statute’. This contention would be appealing in
the context of a course of discretionary action within
the confines of the statute, but it is inapplicable to an

? Section 401(d) (3) provides in full:

(d)(3) In the case of an application for a certificate to en-
gage in supplemental air transportation, the Board may issue
a certificate, to any applicant not holding a certificate under
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, authorizing the
whole or any part thereof, and for such periods, as may be
required by the public convenience and necessity, if it finds
that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform
the transportation covered by the application and to conform
to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and
requirements of the Board hereunder. Any certificate issued
pursuant to this paragraph shall contain such limitations as
the Board shall find necessary to assure that the service ren-
dered pursuant thereto will be limited to supplemental] air
transportation as defined in this chapter.

5

interpretation of the statute itself. That is a pure ques-
tion of law, as to which the courts owe no deference
to anybody. Professor Jaffe, a leading commentator on
the subject of judicial review, states:

‘The distinction between fact and law is vital to a
correct appreciation of the respective roles of the
administrative and the judiciary. The administra-
tive is the sole fact finder. * * * On the other hand,
the administrative and the judiciary share the role
of law pronouncing and law making. They are in

rtnership. The court may supersede the admin-
istrative and itself determine the a eg of law;
it is the senior partner.’’ (Emphasis supplied)
Louis L. Jaffe: Judicial Review: Question of Law,
69 Harv. L, Rev. 239 (1955).

Mr. Justice Jackson expressed this concept to sim-
ilar effect:

‘*f Administrative experience is of weight in judi-
cial review only to this point—it is a persuasive
reason for deference to the Commission in the
exercise of its discretionary powers under and
within the law. It cannot be invoked to support
action outside of the law. And what action is, and
what is not, within the law must be determined by
courts ...’’ (Emphasis supplied) (Dissenting Op.
in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215 (1947).

It is not true, however, that the court did fail to
show ‘‘deference’’ to the Board’s interpretation. The
eare and depth with which the court considered the
problem is itself the highest form of deference. The
court simply could not reach the same conclusion. Thus,
with respect to the crucial question of the construction
of the 1962 amendments, the Board relied in part on

6

the fact that its policy prior to 1962 had been to pro-
hibit an air carrier from simultaneously holding both
scheduled and supplemental authority. The court be-
low states as to this

“With all respect, we do not find the Board’s
pre-1962 interpretation of the Act persuasive sup-
port for its reading of the 1962 amendments. It
seems reasonable to suppose that a policy formu-
lated at the time the Board was attempting to
justify an exemption of supplemental carriers
from the provisions of the Act would not survive
the establishment of a clear statutory basis for
awarding supplemental certificates. Certainly
Congress did not think the prior Board policy was
incorporated as such in the 1962 amendments: the
express prohibition in section 401(d)(3) against
acquisition of supplemental authority by a regular
carrier would not have been necessary had Con-
gress thought the Board’s policy against dual cer-
tification was being carried forward by the legis-
lation. We note, moreover, that until the instant
litigation the Board had not formally determined
the effect of the 1962 amendments upon its prior
policy.”’ (slip. op. 7, n. 5)

Throughout the court’s opinion we find the same
thoughtful and closely reasoned consideration of the
Board’s views. These intervenors submit that peti-
tioners’ argument as to lack of deference is without
substance.

II. The Question Involved Is Not An Important Question Of
Federal Law Which Should Be Settled By This Court.

Clearly it was important that the supplemental car-
riers know whether they were to be forever foreclosed
from seeking scheduled carrier status, and it was im-
portant to the Board to know the answer to that ques-

7

tion, in its administration of the Act. But the question
itself is not one of major importance, even to the
Board ; * much less is it of the degree of jurisprudential
importance justifying the attention of this court. Jus-
tice Brandeis said
‘‘The supremacy of law demands that there shall
be opportunity to have some court decide whether
an erroneous rule of law was applied .. .’’. (Con-

curring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936).

The question of law here involved has now been de-
cided by a unanimous panel of the federal court most
experienced in reviewing the actions of the Civil Aero-
nauties Board, including the judicial history of this
very area, see American Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 235
F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied 353 U.S. 905
(1957), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 278 F.2d
446 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 364 U.S. 297 (1960). We sub-
mit that this narrow question, of first impression, has
received considerate and fully adequate attention.

Ill. The Decision Below Is Clearly Correct.

The Oakland parties submit that the decision below
is clearly correct. We do not presume to repeat, or
elaborate upon, the court’s careful analysis and lucid
opinion. We do wish, however, briefly to suggest that
the result could also have rested upon a point of con-
struction which Judge McGowan noted but did not
rely upon. He states:

‘‘The Board cited three sections which deny bene-
fits or impose additional requirements on ‘‘sup-

* The Board did not petition for certiorari.

8

plemental air carriers,’’ and found an anomaly in
the fact that a carrier holding both route and sup-
plemental authority would be, at one and the same
time, ‘‘covered and not covered’’ by these sections.
The intervening Oakland parties (the City of
Oakland, the Board of Port Commissioners, and
the Oakland Chamber of Commerce) urge us to
eliminate this ‘‘anomaly’’ by construing these pro-
visions to apply only to supplemental operations
rather than to all services performed by an air car-
rier hoiding supplemental authority. The Oakland
parties support their position by analogy to Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commis-
stoners v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in
which this court held that a cable television op-
erator can be a common carrier with respect to
some activities, but a non-common carrier with
respect to others.

We find it unnecessary to pass on the validity of
the Oakland parties’ interpretation, since we fail
to see why the provisions in question raise an
anomaly at all.”’ (Slip Op. 12-13)

We add only that the Board’s refusal here to even
consider this contention is on all fours with the posi-
tion espoused by the Federal Communications Com-
mission in National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hereinafter
Naruc). As the court there expressed it:

‘‘The Commission argues that the two-way, non-
video communications via cable, over which it has
pre-empted state and local regulation, are not com-
mon carrier communications because they are car-
ried on by entities (cable operators) previously

9
adjntignl to be non-common carriers.” 533 F.2d

**26. 49 F.C.C, 2d at 1082.
“*It has been held several times that cable systems, operating
in the characteristic broadcast retransmission mode, are not

common carriers. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 169, n. 29 (1968) ....’’

The court below there rejected the Commission’s ‘‘ho-
listic view”’ of cable systems:

“However, it has long been held that ‘a common
carrier is such by virtue of his occupation’; that is,
by the actual activities he carries on. Since it is
clearly pa for a given entity to carry on many
types of activities, it is at least logical to conclude
that one can be a common carrier with regard to
some activities but not others.’’ Ibid.

The Commission in Naruc had argued that to treat
cable systems, at one and the same time, as common
carriers and ‘‘noncarriers”’

**would lead to the absurd and illogical conclusion
that the Commission has the authority to require
the capacity for access cablecasting, including non-
voice return communication, but is without au-
=" to regulate the activity.’”’ 533 F.2d 614,
n. 78.

Similarly here, the Board finds that it would be ‘‘un-
reasonable, let alone absurd”’ to allow, for example, the
same entity to be eligible for subsidy with respect to
route operations and ineligible with respect to supple-
mental operations. The remarks of the court below
with respect to the Commission’s ‘‘holistic view’’ in
Naruc are equally applicable to the Board’s theory
here:

10

**Yet the Commission offers no reason, save its
own bruised sense of symmetry, in support of this
conclusion.’’ 533 F.2d 614.

We submit that the Board’s reliance here on its ‘‘en-
tity’’ construction to sustain its conclusion is as un-
founded as was the Commission’s view of the perva-
siveness of the ‘‘noncarrier”’ entity status of TV cable
systems in Naruce.

CONCLUSION

The Oakland parties accordingly submit that the
petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

J. KERWIN ROONEY
Port Attorney
Port of Oakland
66 Jack London Square
Oakland, California 94607

Ceci, A. BEASLEY, JR.

FREDERICK A, BALLARD
505 Commerce Bldg.
1700 K St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

March 31, 1977

BALLARD, BEASLEY AND NELSON
505 Commerce Bldg.

1700 K St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1360%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
