# Opposition — American Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 915

## Text

— Curt vu. S
~ELLED

MAR 31 3977

CORRECTED bX ir, am |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Trans WoriLp AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners

We

WorLb Airways, INc., Respondent

BRIEF OF WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JERROLD ScouTt, JR.
FRANK J. CosTELLO
ZUCKERT, ScoutTT &
RASEN BERGER
888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

March 31, 1977

ST NE A 8 AS
Press or Byron S. ADAMS Parintine, Inc., Wasurncton, D.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
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GOUUIURNES TUGBIINMD onc cc ccccccccccccsccccccccees 2
ROSIE GP GU GAN oo ccc sccccscccesecccesccece 2
Reasons Way THE Warr SHoutp Nor Be Grantep .. 5

I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Decide an Impor-
tant Issue of Federal Law. It Decided a Narrow
Statutory Issue, the Resolution of Which Was
Critical for World Airways and a Handful of
Other Companies But a Resolution With a Rela-
tively Minor Impact on the Overall Scheme of
Federal Air Transportation Regulation .......

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict
With the Principle That Judicial Deference Is
Owed an Administrative Construction of a Stat-
ute. That Principle Is Simply Inapplicable in
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Air Line Pilots Association International v. CAB, 502
F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
tn: «asx wih viet thd ipesekednadieceekss

American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir.
Ee

American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines,
ee SEs EE bc Addn cencnonkccesr onsen

American Airlines, inc. v. North American Airlines,
Fel, Ee es GF CHE nin 6.0 cbs eb eesaccccdicccs

13
la

ii Table of Authorities Continued

Page
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) .......... 11
CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961) .... 9
CAB v. Siate Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950) .......... 8
Cameron v. CAB, 323 U.S. 716 (1944) .............. 9
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC., 420 U.S. 395,
D498 CIDE. oon vic kes cuisktnta eee 11
Chicago € Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) ..........-+0ee 9
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) ........... 11
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976) ..... 9

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summer field, 347 U.S. 74 (1954) 9
Diggs v. CAB, 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) .............-e00ee- 9
Eastern Atr Lines v. CAB, 341 U.S. 901 (1951) ...... 9
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers and Co.,

y Rie Fe eee 9
Miami-London Route Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 100, 106,

m. BB URE. oxcccescsdcdedcakssueeeaeeenes 3
Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-

ated, 436 UD. G68 (RUG) ccese casevccthbdusese 9
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, et al., 45 U.S.L.W.

4182, 4193, n. 27 (U.S. February 23, 1977) ...... 11

Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 367
UB. SBG, GOB CHPUED oo vcdectucnccuneeiaeeeees 11
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 11
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 262, n.11 (1974) .... 11
Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding (Docket

SOURS) nnd ivicccassccscnavessseetaganeeeeee 2,4,7
Volkswagenwork Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S.

SE, SES CE vc cenicdensecéaccvteaeneeee 13
Western Air Lines v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67, reh. denied,

S00 UD. GRE CURRED ade ctbicakdeteas cane 9
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973) .......... 12

World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 391 U.S. 461, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968),
aff’g. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB,

SOD WOE Tee Cae Cis; Bed cacccescasccbdcadins

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) ................ 12

Table of Authorities Continued iii
P

CAB Onrpers: il
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Federal Aviation Act of 1958:
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EE Sncescccccecsescccscceces 2, 7,10, 11, 12
ES i)
FEperaL Statute:
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MISCELLANEOUS:
Civil Aeronautics Board, Interim Financial Report,

(Washington, D. C., December, 1976) ............ 5

IN THE |
Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBEeR TERM, 1976

No. 76-1205

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
TRANS WoRLD AIRLINES, INc., Petitioners

Vv.

Wor Arways, Inc., Respondent

BRIEF OF WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

World Airways, Inc. (World) submits this brief in
opposition to the petition of American Airlines, Inc.
and Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Petitioners) for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Ap-
peals, for the District of Columbia Circuit for review
of that Court’s decision and judgment in World Air-
ways, Inc. vy. Civil Aeronautics Board, Case No 76-1072,
entered on December 8, 1976.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, review of which
petitioners seek, is printed in Appendix I accompany-
ing their petition and has not yet been officially report-
ed.' The statement of the Civil Aeronautics Board fol-
lowing the issuance of that opinion, and Order 77-1-94
instituting the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Pro-
ceeding (Docket 30356) in response to World’s appli-
cation are printed in Appendices I and II hereof, re-
spectively.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Petition accurately sets forth the single, narrow
question of statutory interpretation presented to the

Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is unusual in one regard and one regard
only—there has rarely been a Civil Aeronautics Board
order that decided such a narrow legal issue. There
are no questions of fact involved, and the policy ques-
tions are limited to those in the legislative history, i.e.
it does not involve a statutery provision such as the
‘‘public interest”’ that necessarily puts the agency in a
policy making role.

The ‘‘dual certification’ question in a nutshell is
this: supplemental, i.e. charter-only, air carriers hold
their authority pursuant to Section 401(d)(3) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended; scheduled
air carriers hold their authority (which includes the
right to conduct both scheduled and charter services) *

1 References to the Court of Appeals opinion will be to the slip
opinion, cited as ‘‘Slip Op.’’
2 See Slip Op., p. 7, n. 4

pursuant to Sections 401(d) (1) or (2) ; Section 401(d)
(3) expressly precludes the holder of a scheduled (See-
tion 401(d) (1) or (2)) certificate from being granted a
supplemental certificate; absent any express prohibi-
tion, may a supplemental carrier be granted a sched-
uled certificate? A unanimous Court of Appeals panel,
finding that the legislative history confirmed the plain
meaning of the statute, answered this question in the
affirmative.

For the convenience of the Court, and to give some
balance to petitioners’ rather one-sided statement of the
case, World has set forth below a brief summary of the
history of this proceeding.

World first filed an application for transcontinental
low-fare scheduled authority in April, 1967. This was
the first time that the dual certification question had
ever been raised. Although it engendered a great deal
of support, as well as opposition, the Civil Aeronautics
Board never took any formal action and finally dismis-
sed the application as ‘‘stale’’ some six and one-half
years later. CAB Order 73-11-101 (1973). On April 2,
1975 World refiled the application together with a mo-
tion for an expedited hearing. On July 1, 1975 the
Civil Aeronautics Board, stating that World’s applica-
tion merited expedition but noting that the dual certi-
fication question had not yet been resolved, * asked for

=

* The question was raised in 1969 in the context of the appli-
cation of another supplemental carrier for an international sched-
uled route, but the Board declined to rule on the question choosing,
instead, to deny the application on substantive grounds. Miami-
London Route Investigation, 51 C.A.B. 100, 106, n. 22 (1969).
Although a number of bills were introduced that would have clari-
fied Section 401(d)(3) to clearly permit dual certification, prior
to 1976 these bills never reached the floor of Congress. The

4

briefs and oral argument on that question. CAB Order
75-T-2 (1975).

The order at issue in this case, handed down on Jan-
uary 23, 1976, found as a matter of law that a scheduled
certificate could not be issued to a supplemental air
carrier. World immediately petitioned for review in
the D.C. Circuit and that court issued its opinion on
December 8, 1976, unanimously reversing the Civil
Aeronautics Board. Nine days later the Civil Aero-
nautics Board issued a statement that ‘‘it would not
seek further review”’ and ‘“‘that its objective is to hear
as speedily as possible World’s application for author-
ity to provide scheduled transcontinental service.’’ See
Appendix I hereof.

On January 14, 1977 the Civil Aeronautics Board by
Order 77-1-94 (Appendix I1 hereof), formally insti-
tuted the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceed-
ing, Docket 30356, placed World’s application at issue
in that ease and invited all other prospective applicants
to seek consolidation. Motions to consolidate transcon-
tinental applications have been filed by a number of
companies, including two other supplemental air car-
riers and three scheduled air carriers. Both petition-
ers have moved to intervene‘ (as well as a score of

1972 Congressional testimony of the then Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board cited by petitioners (Petition, pp. 8-9) was
delivered in the context of one of those bills and began with the
predicate that the Board had not ruled on the question. Indeed,
as the petitioners themselves point out (Petition, p. 9), the pres-
ent Chairman testified in favor of dual certification at hearings
last year. For the disposition of the bills introduced in the 94th
Congress, see note 14, infra.

4 Technically, the petitioners are also applicants in the case
since they are seeking to put at issue certain existing restrictions
on their use of satellite airports.

5

private and public parties). The next procedural
step is an order dealing with the motions and starting
the formal hearing process.

This history demonstrates in particular the dangers
of regulatory lag, but it hardly reflects petitioners’
image of ‘‘some 15 years of history, during which no
carrier has been permitted simultaneously to hold
scheduled-carrier and supplemental-carrier certifi-
cates.’’ (Petition, p. 3) True, the statutory distinction
between scheduled and supplemental air carriers has
been in existence for fifteen years, but the dual certifi-
cation question was not even raised until the sixth year
and the Civil Aeronautics Board spent the next eight
years avoiding a resolution of that question. Similar
distortions or exaggerations are dealt with in the course
of World’s argument herein.”

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

There are no important reasons for this Court to re-
view the instant case on writ of certiorari and the writ
should not be granted. The decision of the Court of

* One point not dealt with in the argument proper concerns
petitioners’ gratuitous remarks concerning the size of World
(Petition, p. 5), remarks not made to the court below. The
petitioners’ assertions to the contrary, revenue passenger miles
are not a relevant standard for comparing scheduled and charter
operations for a variety of reasons which this Court should not
be burdened with. Suffice it to say that for the twelve months
ended September 30, 1976, World had operating revenues of
$69.9 million and the entire certificated supplemental air car-
rier industry had operating revenues of $417 million. The com-
parable figures for American and TWA were, respectively, $2.1
and $2 billion in operating revenues and the smallest of the
‘‘ government-subsidized scheduled carriers’’ referenced by peti-
Pag ne —- a of $121.5 million. Civil Aeronau-

cs , Interim Financial Re » (Washi
cuban mah, port, (Washington, D.C., De-

6

Appeals does not raise an important issue of Federal
Law and does not conflict with any decisions of this
Court.

I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Decide an Important Issue
of Federal Law. It Decided a Narrow Statutory Issue, the
Resolution of Which Was Critical for World Airways and a
Handful of Other Companies But a Resolution With a Rela-
tively Minor Impact on the Overall Scheme of Federal Air

Transportation Regulation.

Petitioners do not run the risk of understatement in
their argument that the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court should be invoked because there is an important

issue of Federal law ya

**.. regardless of whether the lower court’s inter-
pretation is correct, there can be no question that it
alters a basic element of the statutory scheme for
regulating air transportation, far transcends the
particular facts of the present case, and involves
continuing problems in the administration of a key
federal statute.’’ °

Contrast petitioners’ hyperbole with the calm analysis
of an unanimous Court of Appeals panel:

‘*At the outset, it is important to note the var-
rowness of the question before us. We are asked
merely to decide whether the Board is statutorily
foreclosed from considering a supplemental car-
rier’s application for scheduled authority. The
absence of a statutory bar does not mean, of course,
that a supplemental carrier is entitled to scheduled
authority. It does mean that its application for
such authority is to be evaluated on its merits, with
due consideration to be given to all relevant aspects
of the public interest, including the applicant’s
responsibilities as a supplemental carrier.’’ (Slip.

Op. pp. 5-6).
* Petition, at 12.

ee I Se ee

7

The question decided by the court below was not only
narrow in a legal sense, i.e., the court found that the
legislative history supported the plain meaning of Sec-
tion 401(d) (3), it was also very narrow in terms of its
policy and factual implications. At most, the court’s
ruling means that World and the seven other certifi-
cated supplemental air carriers can now apply for
scheduled certificates—and prior to the court’s ruling,
they were the only persons in the United States to
whom that privilege was denied.’ The immediate re-
sult of the ruling is that the Civil Aeronautics Board is
free to proceed with World’s application for transcon-
tinental authority, and it has done just that by choosing
not to seek further review of that ruling and by insti-
tuting the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceed-
ing in Docket 30356. See Appendices I and IT hereof.
That proceeding is of considerable significance to
World, of course, and it will (hopefully) expand the
availability of transcontinental air transportation, but
it does not alter the basic scheme of Federal air trans-
portation regulation one whit.

The core of petitioners’ argument is that since this
Court granted certiorari twenty-seven years ago in a

7 Petitioners point out that while the court’s ruling permits
supplemental air carriers to hold dual certificates, scheduled air
carriers are still barred from holding supplemental certificates by
Section 401(d)(3). As correctly noted by the court below, this
is nothing more than a question of semantics since scheduled air
carriers are actually ‘‘hybrid’’ carriers, i.e. scheduled certificates
convey both scheduled and charter authority. (Slip Op. p. 7,
n. 4). In briefing the case to the court below, World cited Civil
Aeronautics Board statistics which show that more than one-half
of all U.S. air charter revenues are generated by scheduled air
carriers, and the largest domestic and international charter op-
erators are, respectively, United Airlines, and Pan American
World Airways.

8

case involving an interpretation of Section 401(d),
CAB v. State Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950), it should do
so here. The State Airlines case is distinguishable for a
number of reasons: it was decided when Federal air
transportation regulation was still in its infancy; the
issue presented—namely, whether the Civil Aeronautics
Board could award routes to a carrier other than those
described in the carrier’s application—was of genuine
long-term significance to Federal regulation; the de-
cision of the court below, reversing the route award,
severely restricted the Civil Aeronautics Board’s de-
cisional flexibility; and the Civil Aeronautics Board
was the petitioner. Not one of those circumstances is
present in this case.

Petitioners’ reliance on the State Airlines case in
support of its certiorari argument is particularly ironic
since the substantative teaching of that case, namely,
that ‘‘rigid constraints on the Board’s ability to consid-
er applications on their merits are generally dis-
favored’’ (Slip Op. p. 6), is a central part of the lower
court’s decision in this case. In truth, petitioners had
nowhere else to look for support.

The last time this Court granted certiorari in a case
involving an appeal from a Civil Aeronautics Board
decision was in 1968, and that was occasioned by a
direct conflict among the circuits.* Indeed, excluding
that case and State Airlines, this Court has granted
certiorari on only seven other occasions in the thirty-

® World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
391 U.S. 461, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968), aff’g. Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2nd Cir. 1967).
The D.C. Cireuit had reached precisely the opposite result in
American Airlines, Inc. vy. CAB, 365 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

— a aS a

oo

9

nine year history of the Civil Aeronautics Board.’
Even more instructive are the cases in which this Court
has denied certiorari.” In the last two years alone, this
Court has denied certiorari in cases involving: the
right of passengers to recover fares that were raised
unlawfully ; the meaning of ‘‘competition to the extent
necessary’’ in Section 102, which is the basic Congres-
sional mandate; the reviewability under Section 1006
of a Presidentially approved order that, arguably, was
issued illegally ; and approval under Section 412 of the
Mutual Aid Pact and its consistency with national
labor policy and the Railway Labor Act." These cases

put petitioners’ argument in perspective.

°CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961), deter-
mining the Board’s statutory authority to modify a certificate
after its effective date and without notice and hearing; American
Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 355 U.S. 465
(1958) and American Airlines, Inc. vy. North American Airlines,
Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956), interpreting the meaning of ‘‘ public
interest’’ in Section 411; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield,
347 U.S. 74 (1954) and Western Air Lines vy. CAB, 347 U.S. 67,
reh. denied 347 U.S. 924 (1954), determining the boundaries of
the Board’s subsidy authority under Section 406(b); Fastern
Air Lines v. C.A.B., 341 U.S. 901 (1951), a per curiam decision
granting certiorari and vacating the case as moot; and Chicago
& Southern Aw Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103 (1948), determining the scope of the President’s powers
under Section 801 and establishing that all Presidentially ap-
proved orders are immune from judicial review.

1° This Court has denied certiorari in sixty-one cases involving
an appeal from a Civil Aeronautics Board order, beginning with
Cameron vy. CAB, 223 U.S. 716 (1944).

™ Moss v. CAB, 521 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 966 (1976); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519
F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 958 (1976);
Diggs v. CAB, 516 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424
U.S. 910 (1976) ; Air Line Pilots Association International vy. CAB,
502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 972 (1975).

10

In the final analysis, petitioners are asking this Court

make an exception to the general principle that certi-
orari jurisdiction will ‘“‘be exercised sparingly, and
only in cases of peculiar gravity and general import-
ance, or in order to secure uniformity of decision.”’
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers and Co.,
240 U.S. 251, 258 (1915) (citations omitted). This is
simply not such a case.

II. The Court of Appeals Decision Does Not Conflict With the
Principle That Judicial Deference Is Owed an Adminis-
trative Construction of a Statute. That Principle Is Simply
Inapplicable in This Case.

When the Civil Aeronautics Board dismissed
World’s application on the grounds that Section 401
(d)(3), by implication rather than by its plain mean-
ing, prohibits a supplemental carrier from acquiring
scheduled authority, it was the first and only time that
the Board has ruled on this question. Petitioners’
argument that the court below failed to accord proper
deference to the Board’s construction of the statute is
tantamount to an argument that de novo statutory in-
terpretations by administrative agencies should be
immune from judicial review. The plain truth is that
deference is not owed to the Board’s interpretation,
either by the court below or by this Court.

The principle of judicial deference may well be
‘‘venerable”’ as petitioners contend, but it has far from
general applicability. This Court has clearly defined
the circumstances under which deference to an adminis-
trative construction of a statute is appropriate, and not
one of those circumstances is present in the instant
case.

First, the agency construction must involve an area
of its presumed expertise, an area of administrative

11

policy rather than a ‘‘narrow legal issue . . . peculiarly
reserved for judicial resolution’’. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, et al., 45 U.S.L.W. 4182, 4193, n 27
(U.S. February 23, 1977) ; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 166 (1970). The two cases chiefly relied upon
by petitioners, Red Lion and Columbia Broadcasting,”
provide an example of the type of situation in which
the broad scope of the question framed,” necessitated
the application of agency expertise and the principle
of judicial deference. The case presented to the court
below, however, involves a narrow question of statu-
tery construction that begins with the literal meaning
of Section 401(d) (3), a meaning that is both clear and
unambiguous. In such circumstances expertise rests
with the courts, not with the Civil Aeronautics Board,
and the principle of deference is inapplicable. See
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 262, n. 11 (1974).
The second circumstances giving rise to judicial
deference is when ‘‘an agency has rendered binding,
consistent, official interpretations of its statute over
a long period of time’’. Piper v. Chris-Craft, supra,
45 U.S.L.W. 4193, n. 27 (citations omitted); Cheme-
huevi Tribe of Indians vy F PC, 420 U.S. 395, 409-410
(1975) This is particularly true when the adminis-
trative interpretation is adopted soon after passage
of the legislation. See Power Reactor Development
Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961). The stat-

12 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

18 At issue in both of these cases was the meaning of the term
**public interest’’ as used in the Communications Act. (Tit. IIT,
48 Stat. 1081, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.)

12

utory provision at issue in the court below was enacted
in 1962. The one and only interpretation of that pro-
vision by the Civil Aeronautics Board was that con-
tained in Order 77-1-88, decided on January 23, 1976.

The only other circumstance appropriate for judi-
cial deference is when there is evidence of Congres-
sional acquiesence in the administrative construction.
See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, supra, 395 U.S.
at 381; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965). Although
the petitioners make a passing reference to the at-
tempts to resolve the so-called ‘‘dual certification’’
question in the last Congress, they do not, and could
not, seriously allege that Congress in any way ac-
quiesced in the Civil Aeronautics Board’s construction
of Section 401(d) (3).

In sum, no deference is owed the Civil Aeronautics
Board’s construction of Section 401(d)(3), and the
court below properly refused to give such deference.”
Indeed, if the court below had accorded deference to
that construction, the resulting ‘‘judicial inertia’’

14 The petitioners note that proposed dual certification legisla-
tion was not enacted, dying when the 94th Congress adjourned
sine die. (Petition, p. 9). They fail to point out that dual cer-
tification bills actually passed in both the Senate and House as
part of measures which included other unrelated legislative pro-
posals; and that when, on October 1, 1976, conference agreement
on these other proposals could not be reached, the Congress
adjourned without taking final action.

15 Petitioners also chide the court below for failing to even
diseuss the deference issue. Suffice it to say that the D.C. Circuit
has particularlized the factors underlying the doctrine of defer-
ence, and when, as here, those factors are not present, ‘‘the maxim
of deference must inevitably bow before the principle of judicial
supremacy in matters of statutory construction.’’ Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied
411 U.S. 917 (1973).

13

would have frustrated the entire review process. See
Volkswagenwork Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S.
261, 272 (1968), and cases cited therein.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing it is apparent that there are no
serious issues or conflicts posed by this case which
warrant this Court’s time and attention. None of the
important reasons traditionally required by this Court
for taking review on writ of certiorari is present.
This case is remarkable only for the narrowness of
the legal issue and the amount of uncertainty gen-
erated by a statutory provision which on its face has
not a shred of ambiguity. The unanimous decision
of the court below has dispelled the uncertainty and
the Civil Aeronautics Board has indicated its agree-
ment with that decision.

WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests the
writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JERROLD Scout, JR.
FRANK J. CosTELLo
ZucKERT, Scoutt &
RASENBERGER
888 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 298-8660
Counsel for Respondent

March 31, 1977

APPENDIX

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. c. 20428

For Revease :
Ow on AFTER
Contact: Alan M. Pollock Friday
202/673-5990 December 17, 1976
CAB 76-205
Statement of CAB Regarding World Airways

Pending Application

Wasurxeton, D. C. (December 17)—The Civil Aeronau-
tics Board today said it would not seek further review of
the December 8, 1976 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit in World Airways, Inc. v.C.A.B. The
Court held in that case that the Board is not foreclosed by
the Federal Aviation Act from considering applications by
supplemental carriers for regular scheduled route au-
thority.

The Board said that its objective is to hear as speedily
as possible World’s application for authoritv to provide
scheduled transcontinental service. In the event that other
parties to the litigation seek further review of the Court’s
decision, the Board will, if necessary, request leave of the
Court to proceed with a hearing on the merits of World’s
application while the legal issue is being finally resolved.

Order 77-1-94

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D. C. on
the 14th day of January, 1977

Docket 30356
Transcontinental Low-Fair Route Proceeding

Docket 27693

Application of Wortp Armways for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity

Order

By Order 75-7-2, July 1, 1975, the Board announced that
it would set the application of World Airways in Docket
27693 for expedited hearing, if it first found that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act does not prohibit supplemental air car-
riers from acquiring scheduled authority. After briefs and
oral argument on this threhold question, the Board in Order
76-1-88, January 23, 1976, determined that it did not have
the legal authority to issue a route certificate to a supple-
mental air carrier without requiring the surrender of the
carrier’s supplemental authority. Accordingly, World’s
application was dismissed. The applicant appealed and on
December 8, 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Order 76-1-88 and
remanded the case for hearing.

With the threshold impediment removed, the application
is hereby set for expedited hearing as announced in Order
75-7-2. Like the Chicago Midway Low-Fare Route Pro-

3a

ceeding recently set for hearing in Docket 30277,' this case
is also unique and complex but its implications are some-
what different from those of Chicago Midway. We have,
therefore, decided to follow similar procedures by issuing
a second order which will (a) define the scope of the pro-
ceeding, and (b) designate the route and rate issues to be
resolved, including the relationship of World’s fare pro-
posal to the requirements of the Domestic Passenger Fare
Investigation?

In order to expedite the case and eliminate any unneces-
sary procedural steps, all other applications, motions to
consolidate and comments regarding this order must be
filed within 30 days of the service date of this order. An-
swers to motions filed pursuant to this directive will be due
14 days thereafter. Environmental evaluations pursuant
to Part 312 of the Procedural Regulations shall be filed by
World and any other applicant for authority within 90 days
of the date of service of this order.

Accorpinc.y, It Is OrpErEp T Hart:

1. A proceeding to be known as the Transcontinental
Low-Fare Route Proceeding, Docket 30356, be and it hereby
is instituted and set for hearing before an administrative
law judge of the Board at a time and place to be designated
hereafter ;

2. The application of World Airways, Inc. in Docket
27693 be and it hereby is restored to its place on the Board’s

1 Order 76-12-149, December 28, 1976.

2 A staff evidence request will be appended to the order and the
parties will be directed to submit comments thereon prior to
the prehearing conference. All parties will be free to seek
modification or expansion of the request. Because of the need
in this case for further expert analysis of the facts and legal
issues, no staff component will become a party to the proceeding
until the second order has been issued.

4a

docket and consolidated for hearing with the proceeding
instituted by paragraph 1 above;

3. Applications, motions to consolidate and comments
regarding this order shall be filed within 30 days of the
service date of this order;

4. Answers in response to pleadings filed pursuant to
paragraph 3 above shall be filed within 14 days thereafter ;

5. World Airways and any other applicant for author-
ity shall file an environmental evaluation within 90 days of
the service date of this order; and

6. A copy of this order shall be served upon all parties
in Docket 27693.

This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Puyuuis T. Kayior
Secretary
(SEAL)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1360%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
