# Petition — Snyder v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1325%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1977 - **Citation:** 433 U.S. 908 ## Text —we | Pare Om 88, FER 22 1077 | MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK IN THE Supreme Court of the United States No. 76-1164 Term, 1977 JEFFREY PETER SNYDER, Petitioner, US. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT VINCENT C. MUROVICH, Attorney for Petitioner, Jeffrey Peter Snyder, i103 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222, 412-281-7222. _——— ——-— -—-— oS — err ——__ BATAVIA TIMES, APPELLATE COURT PRINTERS -e- EDWARD W. SHANNON, SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE HAROL DL. BERKOBEN, REPR* SENTATIVE 170! PARKLINE OF PITTSBURGH, PA. 18227 412-861-7463 INDEX TO BRIEF. PET cndocchcvenccegpesecencesscncsccess OEE GE TUUTIEEIIIOD 0 ccc cedccccccscccsccscccces Sy Id ck debWecddndndbicecccccscesess ey i iccarecncesvadccdccecceeceses Reasons for Granting the Writ...................... 1. The Court erred in instructing the jury, as to all four counts of the indictment, that it was im- material whether or not the petitioner had knowledge, at the time the federal agents presented themselves before him, that such persons were of- ficers of the United States .................505- 2. The Court erred in failing to dismiss Count Four of the indictment, when the Government’s evi- dence as to Count Four did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant violated Section 1501 of Title 18, United States Code, but merely demonstrated that petitioner fled from certain BD Cn 0 bck ee debececebecdeddcccucdosess 3. The Court erred in failing to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment or in refusing to render directed verdicts in favor of petitioner where both counts involved conduct of the petitioner constituting a single act or transaction upon which petitioner’s conviction for the First Count of the indictment rested, in violation of petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to be protected ee ED na vecccsvcvccteneeséceces Dd s dcendan een II. Page Appendix: Judgment Order Dated January 11, 1977........... 12 Judgment Order Dated January 24, 1977........... 14 TABLE OF CITATIONS. Cases: District of Columbia vs. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 70 S.Ct. 468, 94 ey SEE 6 acucbedectsocaans MAseedassebens 8 Long vs. U.S., 199 F.2d 717 (C.A. 4, 1952) .......... 8,10 Miller vs. U.S., 230 F.2d 486 (C.A. 5, 1956).......... 8 Pettibone vs. U.S., 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed. EE 6.04.40 sWkedthn need etnned Ceennsnecuecs 5 Sparks vs. U.S., 90 F.2d 61 (C.A. 6, 1937) ........... 5 U.S. vs. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961 (C.A.D.C., 1975).. 8 U.S. vs. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d Pe Gs bdbich hha nnandesceins Ginn eetdedcehck. 6,7 U.S. vs. Glover, 321 F.Supp. 591 (E.D. Ark. 1970).... 8 U.S. vs. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152 (C.A. 3, 1971)...... 6,7 U.S. vs. Johnson, 462 F.2d 423 (C.A. 3, 1972) ....5,6,10,11 U.S. vs. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (C.A.N.Y., 1974) ...... 10 U.S. vs. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F.2d 552 (C.A. 3, 1940) 9 U.S. vs. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652 (C.A. 1, 1973) ........ 6 U.S. vs. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599 (C.A. 6, 1968) ........ 5 Statutes: i i ka ia ie a is de 3,6,7,8,9,10 FE ee Ey ee mee 6 ee ad ccc keeeunnaseus 2,3,4,5,6, 7,8, 10 ee ck ccd ois cecutdbeeaseasabed 3,5,9,10 Be a nec cnbeccedednapesdececssacansiata 4 Miscellaneous: 44 A.L.R.24 1018........ Sa Ren oa Re OR Ee 67 C.J.S. 52 *eeeeteeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee i IN THE Supreme Court of the United States No. ..... Term, 1977 JEFFREY PETER SNYDER, Petitioner, vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Opinions Below The decision of the Court of Appeals is not yet reported. It is set out in the Appendix, infra, at pages 12-15. There was no written opinion given in the District Court. The Third Cir- cuit Court of Appeal Judgment Order dated January 11, 1977, affirming the District Court’s judgment and its Order dated January 24, 1977, denying a reargument and reaffirming the District Court’s judgment. Statement of Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C.A. 1254(1) confers jurisdiction on this Court. Jurisdiction is further based on United States Court of Ap- 2 peals for the Third Circuit has“. . . decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this court. . .” Questions Presented 1. Whether the Court erred in instructing the jury, as to all four counts of the indictment, that it was immaterial whether or not the petitioner had knowledge, at the time the federal agents presented themselves before him, that such persons were officers of the United States. 2. Whether the Court erred in failing to dismiss Count Four of the indictment, when the Government’s evidence as to Count Four did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner violated Section 1501 of Title 18, United States Code, but merely demonstrated that petitioner fled from cer- tain federal agents. 3. Whether the Court erred in failing to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment, or in refusing to render directed verdicts in favor of petitioner, where both counts in- volved conduct of the petitioner constituting a single act or transaction upon which petitioner’s conviction for the First Count of the indictment rested, in violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to be protected from double jeopardy. Statement of the Case Petitioner, Jeffrey Peter Snyder, was charged in a four count indictment with forcibly assaulting an officer of the United States, forcibly resisting, opposing, impeding, in- timidating and interfering with an officer of the United States, using force and threats of force to intimidate and im- pede officers of the Internal Revenue Service, and knowingly 3 and willfully obstructing, resisting, or opposing officers of the United States while the officers were attempting to execute a warrant of arrest, in violation of Sections 111 and 1501 of Title 18 and of Section 7212 (a) of Title 26, United States Code. Petitioner’s motions to dismiss counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment, and motions for directed verdicts as to counts 2 and 3 were denied. Petitioner was found guilty on all four counts, and was sentenced. Petitioner’s motion for a new trial was also denied. This appeal is taken from the final sen- tence entered July 23, 1976. A summary of the relevant facts shows that on the morning of April 22, 1976, Jeffrey Snyder responded to two persons knocking at the door of his residence located at 6521 Darlington Road, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. According to Snyder the individuals did not identify themselves to him in any manner, and thus he was unaware that the individuals were agents of the Internal Revenue Service. Snyder went up- stairs to summon a friend whom Snyder thought was to travel to school with the two persons who had come to the house. Snyder’s friend, Keith Miller, went downstairs, and Snyder followed shortly thereafter and observed one of the in- dividuals handing a piece of paper to Miller. Snyder as*~" the two persons to leave the residence, they proceedec o leave, and Snyder apparently placed his hand on the bac! of the neck of Special Agent Parks and escorted her to the door believing these individuals were not privileged to remain on the premises (Tr. Pg. 7-16, 20-21, 31-32, 43-48, 286-292, 307- 312). On the evening of April 22, 1976, Snyder was driving by 6521 Darlington Road when he observed three individuals standing near an automobile parked in front of the residence. Snyder proceeded in his car farther down the road, and short- 4 ly thereafter, a green automobile stopped next to his and the federal agents in the car apprehended him. Snyder asserts that at no time did any one of the three individuals identify him- self as a federal agent by displaying a badge or by any other manner (Tr. Pg. 104-114, 131-138, 315-319). Jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was in- voked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 1291, in that the appeal was from a final judgment of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT There are three issues which counsel seeks to assert in the appeal of this case: (1) that the Court erred in instructing the jury, as to all four counts of the indictment, that it was im- material whether or not the petitioner had knowledge, at the time the federal agents presented themselves before him, that such persons were officers of the United States; (2) that the Court erred failing to dismiss Count Four of the indictment, when the Government’s evidence as to Count Four did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner violated Sec- tion 1501 of Title 18, United States Code, but merely demon- strated that petitioner fled from certain federal agents; (3) that the Court erred in failing to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment, or in refusing to render directed ver- dicts in favor of petitioner, where both counts involved con- duct of the petitioner constituting a single act or transaction upon which petitioner’s conviction for the First Count of the indictment rested, in violation of petitioner's Fifth Amend- ment right to be protected from double jeopardy. a 5 1. The Court erred in instructing the jury, as to all four counts of the indictment, that it was immaterial whether or not the petitioner had knowledge, at the time the federal agents presented themselves before him, that such persons were officers of the United States. The trial judge erroneously stated in his charge to the jury that as to all four counts in the indictment it was immaterial whether or not the petitioner had knowledge, at the time the federal agents presented themselves before him, that such persons were officers of the United States. It has been a general rule since Pettibone vs. U. S., 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U. S. 197, 37 L.Ed 419 (1893) that the prosecution must allege and prove knowledge on the part of the petitioner that those per- sons whom he endeavored to improperly influence, in- timidate or impede were federal officers engaged in the per- formance of their duties. With regard to specific sections of the U. S. Code contained in the several counts of petitioner’s indictment, Title 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) definitel; requires knowledge of the federal agents’ identity as an officer as an element of the offense set forth in that section. U. S. vs. Rybicki, 403 F.2d 599 (C.A. 6, 1968) stated clearly that the district judge’s failure to instruct the jury that the petitioner, who was charged with obstructing the administration of internal revenue laws (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)), had to know that men who were seizing his property were internal revenue agents, was a failure con- stituting plain error and resulted in the reversal of petitioner's conviction. This position has been adopted in the 3rd Circuit in U.S. vs. Johnson, 462 F.2d 423 (C.A. 3, 1972) as to Section 7212(a). As to count four of the indictment, involving 18 U.S.C. § 1501, the case of Sparks vs. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (C.A. 6, 6 1937) held that the statutory predecessor of Section 1501—18 U.S.C. § 245—required that in a trial for resisting an officer of the United States it must be shown that the person resisted was an officer, and that the accused was aware of that fact. While U.S. vs. Johnson, supra, has decided for the 3rd Cir- cuit that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 111, (counts 1 and 2 of petitioner’s indictment) specific knowledge of the vic- tim’s status as a federal officer is not an essential element of the crime, the cases of U. S. vs. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, (C.A. 1, 1973), U. S. vs. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152 (C.A. 3, 1971), and even the recent U. S. Supreme Court case of U. S. vs. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) suggest that qualifications ought to be applied to this general position. The Feola case concurs with the Johnson decision that in general, scienter is not an element of this particular statutory offense, yet the Supreme Court has noted certain exceptional circumstances where knowledge of the federal agents’ status is determinative: “We are not to be understood as implying that the defendant’s state of knowledge is never a relevant con- sideration under § 111. The statute does require a criminal intent, and there may well be circumstances in which ignorance of the official status of the person assaulted or resisted negaies the very existence of mens rea. For example, where an officer fails to identify him- self or his purpose, his conduct in certain circumstances might reasonably be interpreted as the unlawful use of force directed either at the defendant or his property. In a situation of that kind, one might be justified in exerting an element of resistance, and an honest mistake of fact would not be consistent with criminal intent.” The petitioner, not having been made aware at the time that the persons inside his residence were in fact federal agents, 7 employed reasonable force to remove them from the premises. U.S. vs. Goodwin, supra, follows the Feola position, that in a Section 111 prosecution the defendant may cast doubt upon the existence of mens rea by showing that, under the cir- cumstances, he reasonably believed the facts to be other than they were and that his actions would have been innocent had his belief been correct, with the burden on the prosecution to remove such doubt by offering evidence to disprove the mistake of fact. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner submits that the in- structions to the jury to the effect that knowledge of the status of the federal agents was immaterial, is erroneous as to all four counts of the indictment. 2. The Court erred in failing to dismiss Count Four of the indictment, when the Government’s evidence as to Count Four did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant violated Section 1501 of Title 18, United States Code, but merely demonstrated that petitioner fled from certain federal agents. It is undisputed in the record that on the evening of April 22, 1976, petitioner did not assault, beat or wound any officer of the United States. Taking the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear that petitioner did not obstruct, resist or oppose any officer of the United States, but on that same evening merely fled in a vehicle from the federal agents involved. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove an essential element of the offense charged in Count Four of the indictment, that petitioner committed acts proscribed by Section 1501 of Title 18 of the United States Code. In Miller vs. U. S., 230 F.2d 486 (C.A. 5, 1956) it was held in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1501 for knowingly and wilfully obstructing, resisting and opposing a Deputy United States Marshall in his effort to serve a subpoena on a bank robbery witness, that where the defendant had harbored the witness for several days, had denied a deputy’s first request to be admitted to her home when informed that he had no search warrant, and had denied the presence of the wanted witness although the deputy knew her to be lying, the conduct of the defendant was insufficient to warrant her conviction. The Miller court stated: “. . . we are emphatic in our view that certainty in the nature of criminal offenses forbids . . . the use of this section [18 U.S.C. § 1501] as a catchall to make crimes out of actions which law-enforcing agents may feel to be undesireable, but which Congress has not seen fit to proscribe.” (page 488). The case of U.S. vs. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961 (C.A.D.C.., 1975), while concerned with a related offense (18 U.S.C. § 111), describes activities that fall outside the scope of illegal conduct in dealings with officers of the United States: “It is clear that all failures to cooperate with federal agents are within the statute’s prohibition, and that some measure of presently applied force is required. Threats of the future use of force are not enough, United States v. Glover, 321 F.Supp. 591 (E.D.Ark. 1970), nor is mere deception of a federal agent, Long vs. United States, 199 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1952), nor, presumably, would be the mere refusal to unlock a door through which federal agents sought entrance. Cf. District of Columbia vs. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 70 S.Ct. 468, 94 L.Ed. 599 (1950) (construing District of Columbia regulation outlawing the ‘interfer- ing with or preventing [of] any inspection’ by a health of- ficer.” 9 It has been the position of several state courts, including Pennsylvania's, that no offense of obstructing or interfering with an officer in the performance of his duty is committed by the act of a person in running away from an officer who is at- tempting to arrest that person (67 C.J.S. 52, 44 A.L.R.3d 1018). 3. The Court erred in failing to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment or in refusing to render directed verdicts in favor of petitioner where both counts involved conduct of the petitioner constituting a single act or transaction upon which petitioner’s conviction for the First Count of the indictment rested, in violation of petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to be protected from double jeopardy. Petitioner submits that his trial and conviction on the three counts concerning the events of the morning of April 22, 1976 (two counts involving 18 U.S.C. § 111, one count involving 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (a)) violates his Fifth Amendment right not to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. The above three counts involve the same transaction, and the convictions on all three counts were based on the same evidence presented at trial. U.S. vs. One Dodge Sedan, 113 F.2d 552 (C.A. 3, 1940). Taking the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the testimony given concerning the events of the morning of April 22, 1976 (Tr. Pg. 7-16, 20-21, 31-32, 43- 48) shows that at most petitioner on a single occasion applied physical force to Special Agent Parks by placing his hand on the back of her neck and escorting her to the door after the summons had been served by the Special Agents. The record reveals that petitioner did not forcibly assault Agent Parks at any other time, nor did he assault any other officer of the 10 United States, did not obstruct or impede these agents by pre- venting their entrance or exit from the building, nor did in any other way interfere with their official duties. Thus petitioner’s convictions on the first three counts in the indict- ment rest on a single physical act, which act was considered sufficient proof to return a conviction on each of the three in- dictments. Offenses are the same for the purposes of double jeopardy protection when evidence required to support con- viction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant conviction upon the other. U.S. vs. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (C.A. N.Y., 1974). Vile or obscene language which the evidence shows was em- ployed by petitioner during this morning incident does not constitute conduct of a nature serious enough to warrant a conviction for forcibly assaulting or for forcibly resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating or interfering with an of- ficer of the United States (18 U.S.C. §111), nor does such language constitute the offense of using force or threats of force to impede or intimidate any officer acting on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (26 U.S.C. § 7217 (a)). The word “forcibly” as used in Section III refers to the string of verbs following it and not merely to the first verb “assaults”; ob- scene language alone has no characteristics of force. Long vs. U.S., 199 F.2d 717 (C.A. 4, 1952). To convict under any por- tion of Section III requires proof of an ability to inflict harm, not merely proof of an interference with the performance of a duty. U.S. vs. Johnson, 462 F.2d 423 (C.A. 3, 1972). The Johnson case cited above involves a defendant whose convictions on two of three counts (identical to the first three counts brought against appeilant) were affirmed on appeal, and whose double jeopardy argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals. The instant appeal is distinguishable, however, on the basis that Johnson was found to have