# Petition — Pappageorge v. California

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 430 U.S. 932

## Text

7 Sup ime Go, U. S,
FILE Dp

JAN 26 1977

IN THE a:
SUPREME COURT #20"
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No. 76710381

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner,

APPEAL FROM
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

16133 Ventura Boulevard
Penthouse

Encino, California 91315
(213) 783-0222 or 783-0225

Attorney for Petitioner
GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977
No.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner.

APPEAL FROM
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

16133 Ventura Boulevard
Penthouse

Encino, California 91316
(213) 783-0222 or 783-0225

Attorney for Petitioner
GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

TOPICAL INDEX

Table of Authorities
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
ARGUMENT

I, THERE CAN BE NO FAIR TRIAL
WHERE THERE IS TENUOUS CIR-
CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, A
COMPLETELY SUSPICIOUS EYE
WITNESS ACCOUNT, TAINTED BY
FAVORS, GLARINGLY IRRELEV-
ANT AND HIGHLY DAMAGING
EVIDENCE ADMITTED, AND
THERE IS A DEFENSE COUNSEL
WHO 1S OVER EXTENDED IN HIS
WORKLOAD, AND WHO REJECTS
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO PUT ON
FOUR OR MORE WITNESSES WITH
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TESTI-
MONY AND FAILED TO RAISE,
(ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL),
AN ISSUE OF RELEVANCY CON-
CERNING DYNAMITE; ALTHOUGH
NONE OF THESE FACTORS OR
EVEN ANY TWO OR THREE OF
THESE FACTORS STANDING
ALONE WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
GROUNDS FOR ORDERING A NEW

i,

Il,

Ill,

IV.

TRIAL, NONETHELESS, WHEN
WEIGHTED TOGETHER, THEIR

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OUTWEIGHS
THEIR INDIVIDUALLY JUSTIFIED
ALLOWANCE BY A TRIAL COURT.

THE DECISION OF THE CALIFOR-

NIA COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
THE DECISION OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN

THE CASE OF DOYLE v. OHIO,
96 S.CT. 2240 (1976) AND WHICH

IS CONTROLLING ON IMPORTANT

ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

THERE IS ADDITIONAL POST-
TRIAL EVIDENCE WHICH CASTS

STRONG DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY

CF RONALD HAYWARD, THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.

ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO
EXPLOSIVES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN EXCLUDED AND FAILURE
TO DO SO RESULTED IN PRE-

JUDICIAL ERROR BY THE TRIAL

COURT.

A.

The Prejudicial Effect of
the Evidence Far Outweighs
Whatever Probative Value
It May Have Had, and Under
Evidence Code §1101, All
References to Appellant's
Involvement with Explosives
Should Have Been Excluded,

ii,

6

16

18

18

18

The Objection to Ad-
mission of This Evidence
Was Properly Raised at
Trial and the Issue Has
Thus Been Preserved
for Appellate Review.

THERE IS INADEQUATE COR-
ROBORATION OF RONALD
HAYWARD'S TESTIMONY AS
REQUIRED BY PENAL CODE
SECTION 1111.

A.

Appellant's Purchase of the
Handcuffs May Not Serve as
Corroboration Because It Is
an Activity Equally Consis-
tent with Innocence as with

Guilt.

There Is No Evidence to
Establish Appellant's
Possession of the Hand-
cuffs Used in the Carson's
Bar Robbery, But Even if
Possession Is Shown, There
Is No Evidence to Establish
Appellant's Exclusive
Dominion and Control Over
Them,

iii.

24

28

30

31

Others Had Access to
Handcuffs, Whatever
Their Serial Number
Was. There Was No
Exclusive Possession
and Control By Mr.

Pappageorge.

No Evidence Established
Appellant's Possession of
the Candelabra, Therefore,
They Cannot Corroborate
Hayward's Testimony.

Alvin Timmons Testified
That Appellant's Wife,
Deceased at the Time of
Trial, Delivered Candel-
abra to Timmon's Residence,
The Photographs of These
Candelabra Were Taken At
Timmon's House. No Evi-
dence Adduced at Trial Ever
Placed the Candelabra In
Appellant's Possession or

in Appellant's Home. The
Only Alleged Link to Mr.
Pappageorge Is the Alleged
Delivery by Mrs. Pappa-
george,

iv.

32

34

Vi.

E.

Appellant's Knowledge of

Part of the Contents

Located in the Back Seat

of a Car Not Owned By

Him Does Not Establish

His Knowledge of the

Contents of a Closed and

Covered Suitcase Found

Inside the Trunk of That

Car. 36

The Paper Stamped

"Carson's" Cannot Cor-

roborate Ronald Hayward's
Testimony Because It Was
Observed in a Public Access
Area and Appellant's Ex-

clusive Possession of the

Paper Was Not Established. 39

There Exists No Other
Independent Testimony

Which Connects Appellant

to the Crimes Committed

By Hayward and Moran, 40

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL

ERROR IN COMMENTING ON
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO

PRODUCE CERTAIN WITNESSES

AND RAISE CERTAIN DEFENSES,
GIVEN THE SLIGHT WEIGHT OF

THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
APPELLANT. 45

Ve

Vi, APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED
BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO PURSUE CERTAIN
DEFENSES, PRESERVE OBJEC-
TIONS FOR APPEAL, AND, IN
GENERAL, RENDER EFFECTIVE

REPRESENTATION, 49
CONCLUSION 53
APPENDICES

EXHIBITS "A" "B" and "C"

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Doyle v. Ohio (1976)
96 S.Ct. 2240 7, 16, 17, 45, 49

Griffin v. California (1964)
380 U.S. 609 45, 46

People v. Allums (1975)
47 Cal. App. 3d 654 19

People v. Bisogne (1971)
4 Cal. 3d 582 22

People v. Cannady (1972)
8 Cal. 3d 379 24

People v. Carter (1973)
46 Cal. App. 3d 260 19

vi.

People v. Delgado (1973)
32 Cal. App. 3d 242 19, 20

People v. Edwards (1969)
71 Cal. 2d 1096 39, 40

People v. Enos (1973)
34 Cal, App. 3d 25 19

People v. Gordon (1973)
10 Cal. 3d 460 42

People v. Hathcock (1973)
8 Cal. 3d 599 40

People v. Ronald Frederick Hayward,
Case No. A131866, June 20, 1975 10

People v. Ibarra (1963)
60 Cal, 2d 460 50

People v. Jenkins (1973)
34 Cal. App. 3d 893 35, 43, 44

People v. Kageler (1973)
32 Cal. App. 3d 738 42

People v. Krivda (1971)
5 Cal. 3d 357, vacated, 409 U.S. 33,
aff'd 8 Cal, 3d 623 (1972) 39

People v. Mardian (1975)
47 Cal. App. 3d 16 29, 30, 43, 44

People v. Martin (1972)
28 Cal. App. 3d 956 24

vii.

People v. Martinez (1975)
14 Cal. 2d 533

People v. Medina (1974)

41 Cal. App. 3d 438 16, 40, 46,

People v. Norwood (1972)
26 Cal. App. 3d 148

People v. Perry (1972)

7 Cal. 3d 756
People v. Randono (1973)

32 Cal. App. 3d 164 41,
People v. Ruscoe (1976)

54 Cal. App. 3d 1005 36, 41,

People v. Rvthford (1975)
14 Cal. 3d 399, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261,
534 P.2d 1341

People v. Stanworth (1974)
11 Cal. 3d 588

People v. Stephenson (1974)
10 Cal. 3d 652

People v. Talley (1967)
65 Cal. 2d 830

People v. Tewksbury (1976)
15 Cal. 3d 953

People v. Thurman (1972)
28 Cal. App. 3d 725

viii.

42,

42,

43,

14,

41,

49

47

25

43

43

44

15

49

49

22

42

42

a ar

People v. Vargas (1973)

9 Cal. 3d 470 45
United States v. Kahan
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) 350 F.Supp. 784 39
Winkie v, Turlock Irrigation District
(1938) 24 Cal. App. 2d 1 16, 48
Statutes

California Evidence Code,

Section 352 20, 52
Section 353 24
Section 353(a) 24
Section 403 25, 51, 52
Section 1101 18
California Penal Code,
Sections 182(1), 209, 211, 1538.5 2
Section 245-A 10, 11
Section 459 2, 10
Section 1111 28
Section 12021 11

ix.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977

No.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE,

Defendant and Petitioner.

PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The Honorable Warren E. Berger,
Chief Justice and to The Honorable Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America:

Appellant hereby petitions for a hearing
to consider the decision of the Court of Appeal
of the State of California, Second Appellate
District, Division Four, filed in this action on
August 30, 1976, affirming the conviction of
Defendant - Appellant in the Trial Court; and

1,

the decision of the Supreme Court of California,
rendered October 28, 1976.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Five-count amended information charging
defendant with (count I) the kidnapping of Donovan
Hargens for the purpose of robbery, in violation
of Pen. Code §209, a felony, committed on 4
April 1972; (count II) burgiary of an inhabited
dwelling house, occupied by Donovan Hargens,
in violation of Pen. Code §459, a felony, com-
mitted on 4 April 1972; (count III) robbery on
4 April 1972 of Donovan Hargens, in violation
of Pen. Code §211, a felony; (count IV) robbery
on 10 April 1972 of Robert Laske and Robert
Baumgartner, in violation of Pen. Code §211,

a felony; and (count V) conspiracy to violate

Pen, Code §§ 211, 209 and 459, in violation of
Pen. Code §182, subd. (1). Defendant pled not
guilty, and a jury trial resulted in a hung verdict,
9-3. Defendant was tried again before a jury,
which resulted in his being found guilty on all
ccunts, with a finding of first degree as to count
Il, IlandIV, Defendant was given concurring
sentences on all counts, with a stay of execution
being granted as to count V, until completion of
sentences on counts I and IV, following which

the stay was to become permanent, Defendant
appealed from the judgment, from the denial of
his motion for a new trial, and from denial of

his Pen, Code §1538.5 motion. However, since
defendant's brief on appeal did not mention either

2.

motion, the Appellate Court considered each
matter abandoned on appeal.

Appellant filed a petition for rehearing
by the Court of Appeal, on the same issues set
forth in this petition, on September 10, 1976.
Such petition for rehearing was denied on
September 15, 1976. A Petition for Hearing
filed October 7, 1976 was denied by the Supreme
Court of California on October 28, 1976,

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In the first jury trial, a co-defendant,
one Kenneth M. Moran in Department 118 before
the Hon, Leslie W. Light, was found guilty of
the substantive counts, and another co-defendant,
one Sidney Bartolatta, was acquitted.

The following in substance is the recita-
tion of facts by the Court of Appeal: According
to the evidence, Donovan Hargens owned ''Don's

Market" located in Pasadena. On April 4, 1972,

at approximately 1:45 P,M., he took the store's
receipts and drove to a bank to deposit them.
(The evidence indicated that this was his usual
procedure which he had followed for many years
ona daily basis.) Inthe bank parking lot he
was held up by a man who was about 5'11"' tall,
well-built and fairly strong looking, a "hippie"
sort of person with "'tattletale gray'' hair.
Hargens could not say whether the man was, or
was not, Ronald Hayward.

3.

Hargens wore glasses and had poor
vision without them. Somehow, his glasses
were knocked off of his nose when Hargens was
placed face down in his own car and driven to
his house, where another car and male driver
quickly appeared. Thereafter, the two men
handcuffed Hargens to his car's steering wheel,
placed a gag in his mouth, and removed the
cable from his car's battery. The newest
arrival entered Hargens' house and removed a
number of items from it, putting them into the
second automobile. The man who could have
been Hayward remained with Hargens most of
the time. Later Hargens freed himself and
found that many things were missing from his
house, including his wife's fur.

On April 10, 1972, Baumgartner was
employed as a bartender at Carson's Cocktail
Lounge in Pasadena. On that date, he arrived
at the bar at 7:00 a.m. and opened the rear door
to be met by a man with a pistol. Inside the
premises was the robber's "accomplice" and
Mr. Laske, the clean-up man employed by the
bar. The two robbers took money from the
bar's safe and from Baumgartner. The man
with the gun was about 5'-9"' or 5'-10"' tall,
weighed approximately 160 pounds, had dark
skin, and hair down to about his collar. After
the hold-up, the robbers hand-cuffed Laske and
Baumgartner to the bar rail, using what might
be ''Detective Special Romo” handcuffs.

Additional facts are: Mr. Harold Borek,
owner of a Pasadena pawnshop, which had two
or more employees in 1972, had dealt with

4,

Mr. Pappageorge for about twenty (20) years
and sold items to him at cost. He apparently
knew Mr. Pappageorge as a constant familiar
customer (R.T. 615 et seq. - "R.T." herein
referring to the Reporter's Transcript on
Appeal),

The two witnesses, Ronald Hayward and
Alvin Timmons, were both convicted felons
(R.T. 678 and R.T. 690-691, respectively).

The alleged crimes occurred on April
4 and 10, 1972; the co-conspirator Ronald
Hayward told the police about these crimes about
one year later (R,T. 645-649) and no criminal
charges were filed until one year and two months
thereafter. Inthe meantime Mrs. Pappageorge
died. (See our referenced hereinbelow, )
Another witness, Mr. Kodie, died (R.T. 604-
605).

ARGUMENT

I,

THERE CAN BE NO FAIR TRIAL
WHERE THERE IS TENUOUS CIR-
CUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, A
COMPLETELY SUSPICIOUS EYE
WITNESS ACCOUNT, TAINTED BY
FAVORS, GLARINGLY IRRELEV-
ANT AND HIGHLY DAMAGING
EVIDENCE ADMITTED, AND
THERE IS A DEFENSE COUNSEL
WHO IS OVER EXTENDED IN HIS
WORKLOAD, AND WHO REJECTS
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO PUT ON
FOUR OR MORE WITNESSES WITH
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TESTI-
MONY AND FAILED TO RAISE,
(ACCORDING TO THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL),
AN ISSUE OF RELEVANCY CON-
CERNING DYNAMITE; ALTHOUGH
NONE OF THESE FACTORS OR
EVEN ANY TWO OR THREE OF
THESE FACTORS STANDING
ALONE WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
GROUNDS FOR ORDERING A NEW
TRIAL, NONETHELESS, WHEN
WEIGHTED TOGETHER, THEIR
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OUTWEIGHS
THEIR INDIVIDUALLY JUSTIFIED
ALLOWANCE BY A TRIAL COURT,

In the following statement, there is ex-
amined the question of whether all the points
raised inthis Brief, with a few new ones in this
section, do not constitute such an overwhelming
abuse of defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial as to undermine the adversarial nature of
a criminal proceeding so as to leave the form,
but excising the substance, thereby producing a
sham trial.

Mr. Henry Poyet died November 17, 1976,
at the age of 78; he was the attorney in the first
jury trial, wherein the dynamite evidence was
excluded, upon his objection. He was associated
as trial counsel in the second case, and Mr, John
Marshall, of approximately the same age, was
made co-counsel, because of the health of Mr.
Poyet. Atthat time, Mr. Marshall claimed he
had over 45 criminal cases pending, going to
trial, etc., inthe Criminal Courts Building in
downtowu Los Angeles. Several times prior to,
and during the second trial, George Pappageorge
requested that certain individuals, named here-
after, be called as witnesses, because they had
information concerning the critical issues in the
case: one John Weigel, one Larry Johnson, one
Sam Carbone, one Percy Lanestry. As is
pointed out hereinbelow, under Doyle v. Ohio,

96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), if it is improper for a
prosecuting attorney to comment on the failure
of defendant to take the stand, then it should be
improper and prejudicial for him to comment on
the failure of witnesses to be called, where
defense counsel is at fault for them not being
called and not the defendant. (This may be
highly unusual, but how else does a trusting

7.

defendant protect himself from a sophisticated,
overwhelmingly charming defense attorney who
wants to get through the case as quickly as
possible ?)

I am informed and believe and on this
information and belief allege that if Larry
Johnson were called he would testify that on the
day that George Pappageorge, Kenneth Moran,
and Ronald Hayward drove to the New York Loan
Company, it was a hot day, and the car air
conditioner was on. Mr. Pappageorge rented
out a limousine, sometimes for as high as $500
a day, to various movie or picture companies,
and they rode in this car to the pawn shop. The
parking space was very small, and everyone
kidded Mr. Pappageorge that he could not park
the car in that small space, but he did. Mr.
Johnson will testify that this occurred after he
moved his shop into the gas station of George
Pappageorge, which was May 5, 1972. Mr.
Johnson shall further testify that on that trip to
that store, Mr. Pappageorge purchased hand-
cuffs. (End of statement under information and
belief. )

In the testimony of the owner of the New
York Loan Company, he stated that he remem-
bered Mr. Pappageorge coming in and buying a
set of handcuffs. He did not say that he re-
membered Mr. Pappageorge coming in several
times, or even more than onetime. For some
reason counsel did not cross-examine and elicit
this information. Upon retrial, Mr. Borak's
memory may be a little clearer than it was at
the trial; he may recall that there was only one

8.

purchase in the late spring and early summer
of 1972.

Ronald Hayward was the only direct
evidence that linked George Pappageorge to the
alleged crimes. Inthe Probation and Sentence
Hearing Reporter's Transcript, dated 4/2/75,
People v. Hayward, Case No. A550 968, which
hearing was held in Pasadena Branch of the
Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, it
is stated therein that Hayward's testimony was
given with the expectation for leniency: Cf,

RT 27, lines 12-22 and 24-28; RT 31, line 14;
RT 32, lines 1-13; RT 34, lines 3-13, 16-18

and; page 35; page 36, 37 and 38. Furthermore,
testimony given by Deputy District Attorney John
Watson, who was the trial prosecutor in both
trials of George Pappageorge, stated that Ronald
Hayward was the principal witness. Cf. Proba-
tion and Sentence Reporter's Transcript (here-
after referred to as P & § RT for convenience)
24, line 17.

At this hearing, Deputy District Attorney
John Watson testified in behalf of Ronald Hayward,
for the purpose of obtaining probation for Mr.
Hayward,

(The first trial of George Pappageorge
commenced November 14, 1974, and was de-
clared a mistrial on December 17, 1974. On
June 5, 1975, the second trial commenced, and
the jury rendered its verdict on June 17, 1975.)
For some reason, although Mr. Marshall was
made aware of this transcript, no attempt was
made on his part to obtain it prior to the start of

9.

the second trial on June 5, 1975. Iam informed
and believe and on this information and belief
allege that: In fact, George Pappageorge offered
to obtain the transcript, but Mr. Marshall
represented unequivocally that it was not needed.

It is interesting to note that the Probation
and Sentence Hearing in Pasadena concerned a
judgment of that Court which was announced on
January 7, 1974, finding defendant guilty for
assault with a deadly weapon upon the person of
Mr. Pudinsky, the Chief of the California High-
way Patrol. Pen. Code §245-A, and first degree
burglary, Pen. Code §459. Sentence at that
time was imposed, but appeal was taken and Mr.
Hayward was allowed to be free on bail.

While Mr. Hayward was on bail, he con-
tinued a life of crime, including the ingesting of
three different kinds of drugs on over 35 differ-
ent occasions: Cf. P & § RT 27, 28, 29, 35, 39,
30: lines 23-24; P & S RT 40: lines 17-28;
P&S RT 28,

It is interesting to note that Mr. Henry
Poyet was present in Court during the Probation
and Sentence Hearing. Cf. P & S RT 3-4.

On June 20, 1975, in Case No, A131866,
Department NW'"'R", before the Hon. Harry V.
Peetris, Judge presiding, Superior Court,
County of Los Angeles, People v. Ronald
Frederick Hayward, Mr. Hayward appeared for

a plea with Mr. John Watson, Deputy District
Attorney, appearing as the prosecutor for the
County of Los Angeles! Needless to say, a plea

10.

was entered of guilty to a violation of §12021
Pen. Code (Possession of Firearms by Previ-
ously Convicted Felon, (Pen. Code §245A,
January 7, 1974)). (Possession of firearms
was alleged to have taken place on February 5,
1975).

The Court then sentenced defendant to
one year in the County Jail to run concurrent
with time served in State Prison.

The plea was taken in the Van Nuys
Superior Court, which is 17 miles from down-
town Los Angeles, where Mr. Watson had his
office. The plea was taken three days after
the jury convicted George Pappageorge, and it
is common knowledge that a plea may be ad-
vanced, or may be continued, for the purposes
of bargaining. Apparently this pleas was
entered as a result of a bargain, three days
after George Pappageorge was convicted,

As aconclusion, the testimony of Ron
Hayward should be given little or no weight.
It appears to have been purchased.

An interesting question to ask is why did
not Mr. Poyet, or Mr. Marshall, obtain a
transcript of that Probation and Sentence Hearing
on April 2, 1975, and use it to impeach both the
credibility of Ronald Hayward and the motivation
of the Deputy District Attorney, Mr. John Watson.

In the first jury trial of George Pappa-
george, a co-defendant, Mr. Bartolatta, was
acquitted; it was Ronald Hayward's testimony

11.

which the jury weighed, in determining Mr.
Bartolatta's guilt. There was no evidence of
dynamite concerning Mr. Bartolatta. Appar-
ently the jury disbelieved Ronald Hayward con-
cerning Mr. Bartolatta.

The Court of Appeal in its decision
missed the most important point: There were
two trials; the first trial ended in a 9-3 decision
and in the first trial, there was no evidence con-
cerning dynamite. The deputy district attorney
erred when he stated all the evidence to be intro-
duced at the second trial was introduced at the
first trial. Please reference Reporter's Tran-
script, 646. (Reporter's Transcript is here-
after referred to as RT for convenience). Cf.
footnote 1, infra, p. 21.

Granted the tenuous nature of the evidence
against George Pappageorge -- questionable
evidence whether the handcuffs used were those
purchased by George Pappageorge; a piece of
paper observed at a distance of several feet
behind the shop of George Pappageorge, which
could have been a check stolen from Carson's;
the candelabra stolen from Hargens, which was
not of a unique design but could have come from
the Hargens home; the fur from the Hargens
home found in a suitcase, in the trunk of a car
owned by Mr. Ken Moran!: to allow in such
evidence concerning the dynamite was tantamount
to shutting the door of the jury's mind before the
facts so described were testified. A strong
argument can be made that the jury would have
acquitted George Pappageorge, because Mr.
Bartolatta was acquitted. If no dynamite evi-
dence had come in, and if Mr. Marshall, the

12.

overstretched, overworked lawyer who predom-
inated the second trial and who claimed to have
45 cases going at the same time in the Superior
Court of downtown Los Angeles, had taken the
trouble to put on the defense witnesses recom-
mended by George Pappageorge, a jury could
conceivably have returned an acquittal 6f George
Pappagerorge.

In a letter dated June 1, 1976, from John
H. Marshall to George Pappageorge, he stated
as follows: "I say Judge Dibbs today who told
me he had just been reversed by the District
Court of Appeals on the very same grounds we
have raised on your appeal in another case. He
offered to bet me that your case would be re-
versed. He commented that the Brief we had
filed was exceptionally well written and raised
the issues very clearly and feels as I have said
that the District Court of Appeals will probably
reverse,"' Later on in the letter, he reminds
Mr. Pappageorge that certain legal fees had not
been paid. Needless to say, within the next
60 days, Mr. Marshall did not utilize the oppor-
tunity for oral argument before the Court of
Appeal. This even though, in the same letter,
of June 1, 1976, he states:

"Before you get your hopes to (sic)
high, I do want to tell you that the
case which is the Morriss case is
causing the District Attorney all
kinds of problems and they are on
the Attorney General's nec! to seek
a review of that case in the Supreme
Court. If that happens we might be

13.

back where we started, but only
time will tell. "

This case of George Pappageorge re-
presents an extreme example of a strange chain
of circumstances locking unexpectedly into their
bazarre places, culminating in a conviction,
where the jury more probably than not, would
have acquitted of the crime charged and convicted
of the crime that was not charged: an alleged
possession of dynamite. (The Moran automobile
was drivento Mr. Pappageorge's station for new
brakes. No evidence was introduced that Mr.
Pappageorge knew the dynamite was in the car
when the car was driven to the station. )

The failure of Deputy District Attorney
John Watson to advise either the Court or the
defense that a plea bargain had been reached
with the unnamed co-defendant Ronald Hayward
in the matter pending before the Criminal Court
in Van Nuys, California, which plea bargain was
performed June 20, 1975, was tantamount to that
error proscribed by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d
399, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341 (1975).
In that case, the Court stated:

".he intends that the prosecutor
engaged in prejudicial misconduct
by failing to disclose to defense
counsel the principal motivation
for the adverse testimony of a

key prosecution witness and by
forestalling defense counsel's
awareness of such motivation

14,

through misrepresentation made to
the Court. We conclude that
prosecutor was guilty of prejudicial
misconduct which denied defendant
a fair trial and accordingly reverse
the judgment, "

George Pappageorge respectfully submits
to this Honorable Court that if the jury had known
that three days after the jury verdict was to come
in Ronald Hayward and Deputy District Attorney
John Watson would be entering into a plea bargain
in a courthouse 17 miles from the courthouse that
John Watson usually operated in, it is respectfully
submitted that the jury would have acquitted
George Pappageorge. For the failure to reveal
this to defense counsel during the presentation
of the defense case, may have prejudiced defend-
ant inthis regard: Attorney John Marshall may
have then believed it was necessary to obtain
those witnesses, and put the same on the stand,
as requested by George Pappageorge, in order to
reveal facts about Ronald Hayward's character,
which would have shown that he was lying. It
certainly would have helped, and the failure to
present this knowledge to counsel, concerning
these alleged crimes, the subject of the plea
bargain on June 20, 1975, was tantamount to
that error found grievous in People v. Ruthford,

supra.

15.

Il.

THE DECISION OF THIS COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED THE DECI-
SION OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE
OF DOYLE v. OHIO, 96S8.CT.
2240 (1976) AND WHICH IS CON-
TROLLING ON IMPORTANT
ISSUES IN THIS CASE.

Appellant did not have to prove his inno-
cence by presenting the 5 witnesses (See P, 47-
48, infra) about whose absence the prosecutor
commented, See Winkie v. Turlock Irrigation
District, 24 Cal, App. 2d (1938) discussing im-
permissibility of comment where witnesses are
equally available to both parties. The District
Attorney is charged by statute to seek and
obtain justice, not convictions - the prosecutor
instead chose to rely on Appellant's failure to
produce non-material witnesses as a way to
"fill an evidentiary gap, '' which is forbidden
by the ruling in People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App.
3d 438 (1974),

In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme
Court disapproved use during trial of defendant's
silence maintained after Miranda warnings had
been given.

16.

In the instant case, defendant's exercise
of the right to be passive, to make the District
Attorney prove his case beyond a reasonable
doubt, proved too tempting to the zealous prose-
cutor. The closing argument of the prosecutor
made the exercise of this right appear to be a
cover-up, a sign of consciousness of guilt, and
prejudicially "filled the evidentiary gap" in this
razor-thin case with a bridgework of brick-bat
comments manifesting evasion, furtiveness and
stone-walling it by Mr. Pappageorge. It was a
neat trick -- but not a clean one. Without com-
ments about failure to produce witnesses, only
suggestion and innuendo was left in the prosecu-
tor's case in chief. |

Given the slight strength of the tenuous,
if at all, corroboration and use of accomplice
testimony and based upon the emphasis of
Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S,Ct, 2240 (1976) the use was
prohibited, highly prejudicial and the conviction
must be set aside.

III.

THERE IS ADDITIONAL POST-
TRIAL EVIDENCE WHICH CASTS
STRONG DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY
OF RONALD HAYWARD.

Ronald Hayward's testimony and the evi-
dence regarding someone else's dynamite (which
Mr. Pappageorge never, solely possessed) are

17.

the sine qua non for the conviction of Mr. Pappa-
george. Incorporated by reference as though
fully set forth herein are these statements con-
cerning Ronald Hayward and his plea bargain of
June 20, 1975, stated hereinabove in Section I.

IV.

ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO
EXPLOSIVES SHOULD HAVE
BEEN EXCLUDED AND FAILURE
TO DO SO RESULTED IN PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

A. The Prejudicial Effect of
the Evidence Far Outweighs
Whatever Probative Value
It May Have Had, and Under
Evidence Code §1101, All
References to Appellant's
Involvement with Explosives
Should Have Been Excluded,

Evidence Code §1101 provides, in part:

"(b) Nothing in this section prohibits
the admission of evidence that a per-
son committed a crime, civil wrong,
or other act when relevant to prove
some fact (such as motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan,

18.

knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident) other than his
disposition to commit such acts. . ."'

Where proffered evidence concerns other
crimes, it should be scrutinized with great care
in light of its inherently prejudicial effect, and
should be received only when its connection to
the crime charged is clearly perceived. People
v. Enos, 34 Cal. App. 3d 25 (1973),

Evidence of prior convictions or of prior
acts not resulting in a conviction is admissable
to prove a material fact such as motive, intent,
knowledge, or possession of means useful or
necessary for the commission of the crime
charged. People v. Carter, 46 Cal. App. 3d
260 (1973). People v. Enos, supra.

Probative value depends upon the extent
to which evidence tends to prove an issue by
logic and reasonable inference, the importance
of the issue to the case, and the necessity of
proving the issue by means of this particular
piece of evidence. People v. Delgado, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 242 (1973).

Prejudicial effect refers to the likelihood
that a jury will convict a person because of his
bad record, bad moral character, or disposition
to commit crimes. People v. Allums, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 654 (1975); People v. Delgado, supra.

Indeed, the duty to balance probative
value against the danger of undue prejudice is the
duty of the trial court, and the court must exclude

19,

the proffered evidence if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that
its admission will create substantial danger of
undue prejudice. People v. Delgado, supra,
32 Cal. App. 242 (1973); Evidence Code §352,

In the case at bar, evidence concerning
the explosives in Kenneth Moran's automobile
does not in any way provide evidence of a
material fact (such as motive, intent, or knowl-
edge) relevant to the crimes charged, The trial
court admitted this evidence solely to prove the
motivation and state of mind of Ronald Hayward.
(See RT 734-744). The court recognized that the
explosives could not establish a conspiracy for
the crimes charged, nor could they be used to
infer that Appellant knew of items in the car
other than the explosives (RT 742-744).

The Court's decision to admit was ex-
plained in terms of credibility:

"As to the issue of the state of

mind of Hayward, I think there

is a very real issue of credibility
involved. I think that it is neces-
sary that the jury have some
explanation as to whay Mr. Hayward
is talking about when he's talking
about the deal he made with the
police to get an OR release, for
whatever value it might have.

"It may well react against him as
well as for him, but I think the jury

is entitled to that explanation, and

20.

I feel that limited relevancy out-
weighs the prejudicial effect that
it might have if given with the
proper limiting instruction. "'
(RT 743).

Thus, this "limited relevancy" establishes
limited probative value. The real issue becomes
the extent of the prejudicial effect of the evidence.

The substantial prejudicial effect seems
apparent. At Appellant's first trial, no evidence
of the explosives was admitted (RT 736). 1/
Kenneth Moran, the co-defendant in the first trial
was convicted; the jury was unable to decide
upon Mr. Pappageorg's guilt or innocence. In
the second trial, after a recognition of its limited
relevancy, the evidence was admitted, and
Appellant was convicted. The prejudicial effect

1/
~ Contrary to the assertion of the attorney
general (RB 29), the reference in the record on
page 646 to the fact that ''in the last trial we
went into every excruciating detail, and the
reason was at the defense insistence," this
statement does not refer to admitting evidence
of the explosives. A careful reading in context
reveals that this refers to admitting evidence
about Hayward's assault on Walter Pudinski, the
California Highway Patrol Commissioner (RT
646 and 647; in lines 1-10 and especially lines
11-12). It does not refer to introduction of
evidence of dynamite. (See especially RT 646;
lines 7-10). No evidence of dynamite was intro-
duced at the first trial. .

21.

ae a

occurred notwithstanding the trial judge's limit
ing instructions.

The California Supreme Court in People
v. Bisogne, 4 Cal. 3d 582 (1971), disapproved the
admission of evidence against defendant of an
unrelated criminal act involving a deceased
co-defendant. The evidence was admitted
pursuant to the prosecution's desire to add
credibility to certain witnesses of the robbery
with which defendant was charged. The Court
acknowledged that the prejudicial effect out-
weighed any provative value:

" . . relevance [of the evidence of
the shootout] to defendant's partici-
pation in the robbery is entirely too
attenuated to justify its admission
against him. The prejudicial effect
of associating defendant with a per-
son who engaged in violent conduct
on a totally unrelated occasion far
outweighed its probative value to
show that Borrell and, by inference,
defendant, perpetrated the Long
Beach robbery together. (See
Evidence Code §352,)'' (First
bracketed matter added for clarity. )

In People v. Talley, 65 Cal. 2d 830 (1967),
two defendant's were tried on burglary counts.
Each defendant made statements which implic-
ated the other, thus these statements were
prejudicial. However, as to defendant Elwood,
the error was held harmless because he had
been found in possession of the stolen items.

22.

As to defendant Curtis, the court stated:

'(Curtis') extrajudicial
confession to the burglary at the
dress shop had some tendency to
incriminate him with respect to
the burglary at Giljohann's store
since loot from both was
together at Elwood's house.

The evidence of Curtis' guilt of
the burglary at Giljohann's store
is not strong, and in our opinion
the beneficiary of the error in
admitting Curtis' statements has
not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not con-
tribute to the verdict against him
on the count charging the burglary
at Giljohann's store (citation
omitted)."' 65 Cal.2d 830 at 841.

In the instant case, the Court need not
even speculate as to the prejudicial effect re-
sulting from the trial judge admitting the
evidence of explosives: Appellant's conviction
effectively confirms the prejudice. Moreover,
because the rest of the evidence against
Appellant is circumstantial, proof of Appellant's
guilt "is not strong.'' The People have failed
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error has not contributed to Appellant's
conviction, thus his conviction should be set
aside,

23.

B. The Objection to Ad-
mission of This Evidence
Was Properly Raised at
Trial and the Issue Has
Thus Been Preserved
for Appellate Review.

It is well settled that objections not
raised at trial cannot be made for the first time
in appeal. People v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379
(1972). People v. Martin, 28 Cal.App. 3d 956
(1972); Evidence Code §353(a).

Appellant's trial counsel interposed
objections before Alvin Timmons began to
testify (RT 522-525). Admittedly, the exact
scope and emphasis of counsel's objections is
clouded; nonetheless there was express dis-
agreement with the admission of certain state-
ments declared "hearsay to this defendant. "'
(RT 524). The objection was reaffirmed during
Timmon's testimony (RT 539-542). The issue
having been brought to the attention of the trial
court, it may be reviewed upon appeal.
Evidence Code §353.

Nor may any objection be deemed waived
simply because Appellant's counsel chose to
refer to the explosives during his cross-examina-
tion of Timmons. Once atrial Court has
admitted certain evidence, it would constitute
unwise trial tactics indeed to simply ignore it.
Appellant's counsel did not withdraw his motion
to strike, thus the objection remained.

24,

Moreover, even if this issue was waived
or not properly raised, this Court may note any
errors where the interest of justice required it.
See, People v. Norwood, 26 Cal. App. 3d 148
(1972). Giventhe highly prejudicial nature of
this evidence, and given the adverse effect it in
all likelihood had upon Appellant's case, the
Court should at least examine the contention of
error.

In any event, Appellant's counsel argued
for exclusion under Evidence Code Section 403.
Both defense counsel and the district attorney
argued with reference to both Hayward's and
Timmons' testimony and the apparent purpose
of defense counsel was to exclude all references
to explosives (RT 733-741). The issue has thus
been preserved for appellate review,

The numbing effect produced by the
revelation of the farce involving the dynamite
and Mr. Pappageorge effectively blinded the
trial court concerning the quantum of evidence,
or lack of it, produced by the Prosecutor: At
page 16, lines 11-14 inclusive, Transcript of
Probation and Sentence hearing entitled:
"Advisement of Right to Appeal, '' on Friday,
November 14, 1975, the trial judge states, in
part:

"The court must also recog-
nize that the other individuals that
Mr. Pappageorge masterminded in
this conspiracy are doing their time

25.

on substantially the same evidence
upon which Pappageorge was con-
victed. . ."

With all due respect to the Court, how can the
Court make this statement when in the first trial,
a hung-jury regarding Mr. Pappageorge, the
dynamite was never mentioned to the trier of
fact? EXHIBIT ‘A’.

If the alleged facts concerning the
dynamite farce had no effect on the jury, note
the Court's depiction of the effect of the knowl-
edge on the Probation Department and Evaluation
Committee at Chino State Prison for 90 day
study, at page 9, (Ibid. ):

"To some extent, I believe
both the probation officer and the
Department of Corrections may
have been swayed by the contents
of the report of the prior conduct
concerning the explosives. . ."’

The cumulative effect of 1) the alleged
facts regarding the dynamite and 2) the
accomplice's testimony, together form the
"substantial evidence" upon which Mr. Pappa-
george was convicted and the Court recognized
this, at page 9, lines 7 through 21, inclusive,
(Ibid. ):

"Tl recognize that the testi-
mony upon which you were convicted
in this case rested to a great extent
upon the testimony of those who were

26.

accomplices in the conspiracy, of
those that you aided and abetted in
the commission of the crime;.. ."'

With the utmost respect to the trial
Court, it is observed that the Court's next
statement is almost a tacit recognition of the
abased theory of guilt which went out with the
"Star Chamber" and "the rack and the screw" -
the theory of guilt by association, at page 9,
lines 21 through 24, inclusive, (Ibid. ):

"that perhaps to your dying
day you will regret that you ever
became involved with the individuals
who have been named as codefendants
in this case, some of whom have
been sentenced;...'

The Court then proceeds to discuss Mr.
Pappageorge's allegedly questionable testimony.
But let us stop here. Would Mr. Pappageorge
have needed to testify at all if the dynamite
farce had been excluded from the trier of fact?
The only difference between the first and second
trial was the introduction of the alleged facts of
the dynamite farce.

Additionally, Mr. Marshall protested
that the dynamite evidence was immaterial, and
thus objected to its relevancy. He further pro-
tested that it was prejudicial to Mr. Pappageorge
(RT 586, lines 1-5; RT 733; RT 740). Although
the objections thus raised were not articulated
as clearly as they might have been, nonetheless
the objections were thus raised. However, the

27.

oa il

Court, although taking these under advisement,
never did strike the dynamite testimony. Mr.
Pappageorge contends the court should not have
let it in, and at the least should have ordered it
stricken. Even this would not have eliminated
the overwhelming prejudice created by the
dynamite testimony. To refuse to strike such
testimony was error, and no limiting instruction
could reverse the prejudicial effect. This is
especially true where, as here, the alleged
corroborating evidence was so tenuous, it would
be a superhuman feat to be a juror and ignore
this dynamite testimony.

V.

THERE IS INADEQUATE COR-
ROBORATION OF RONALD
HAYWARD'S TESTIMONY AS
REQUIRED BY PENAL CODE
SECTION 1111.

Penal Code §1111 provides in relevant

part:

"A conviction can not be had upon
the testimony of an accomplice
unless it be corroborated by such
other evidence as shall tend to
connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and
the corroboration is not sufficient

28.

if it merely shows the commission
of the offense or the circumstances .
thereof, "'

A. Appellant's Purchase of the
Handcuffs May Not Serve as
Corroboration Because It Is
an Activity Equally Consis-
tent with Innocence as with
Guilt.

The prosecutor aileged that four items
served as corroboration of the existence of a
conspiracy and the connecting link between
Mr. Pappageorge and the conspiracy:

iaitaane oe eee Pepennee op The purchase of handcuffs is an entirely
legal activity. Regardless of Appellant's ex-
2. The candelabra stolen from the planation for doing so, he had every right to
Hargens; purchase the four pairs of Detective Special
Romo handcuffs from the New York Loan
3. The fur coat Timmons found in ‘ Company in Pasadena. No criminal purpose is

attached to this activity unless the testimony of
accomplice Ronald Hayward is used and this the
court cannot do. The purchase of handcuffs,
as a legal activity, cannot serve as corrobora-
tion of Hayward's testimony.

the suitcase; and

4, The "Carson's" imprint observed .
by Robert Hawkins.

It is submitted that none of these items
constitutes the ‘independent evidence which,
without aid or assistance from the testimony
of the accomplice, tends to connect the defend-
ant with the crime charged'' People v. Mardian,
47 Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975).

In People v. Mardian, supra, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 16 (1975), at page 42 the Court stated in
part:

'. ,.Corroborating evidence is in-
sufficient if it does no more than
cast a grave suspicion upon the
accused or merely connects him
with the crime's perpetrators...

1!

(In this case, with dope stored in a suit-
case at a friend's house, the contents were
observed by a babysitter, the woman of the house
and defendant's ex-wife. )

29. .
30.

(Here, the defendant was seen carrying
an attache case into the house. This activity
is equally consistent with innocent behavior,
therefore, it can't corroborate. To be valid,
it needs aid from the immunity witness to link
the defendant to the crime. But the other 2
witnesses who observed the contents will cor-
roborate because they saw the defendant in actual
possession of the contraband. )

B. There Is No Evidence to
Establish Appellant's
Possession of the Hand-
cuffs Used in the Carson's
Bar Robbery, But Even if
Possession Is Shown, There
Is No Evidence to Establish
Appellant's Exclusive
Dominion and Control Over
Them,

Harold Borek, proprietor of the Pasadena
pawn shop, testified that he sold 4 pairs of Romo
handcuffs to Appellant. Mr. Borek was unable
to say when the sale occurred. (See RT 618,
lines 16-19; R'R.617, lines 7-11; RT 621, lines
12-27; and Mr. Borek did not know when he had
to reorder, RT 624} lines 2-4). Mr. Borek did
not know what serial humbers were on the items
sold. He could only say that he gave Appellant
the top four boxes from his case, that these
probably were the first four boxes from the most
recent shipment of handcuffs, and that maybe the

31.

serial numbers had been packed in sequential
order. Furthermore, others in store sold
handcuffs (RT 621, lines 10-11), Either

Moran or Hayward could have bought other cuffs!
Thus, only by drawing inference upon inference
may one conclude that Appellant received the
pair of handcuffs which eventually were used in
the robbery at Carson's (serial number M8236).

C. Others Had Access to
Handcuffs, Whatever
Their Serial Number
Was. There Was No
Exclusive Possession
and Control By Mr.
Pappageor ge.

Assuming arguendo that Appelland did
receive the handcuffs numbered "M8236, " there
remains the serious problem of Appellant's
control over them. Appellant testified that he
kept the handcuffs on an open shelf at his gas
station. Furthermore, Appellant, Hayward,
Robert Hawkins, and Donald Hargens all testi-
fied to the presence of Hayward and/or Moran
at Appellant's business, and their occasional
assisting with the work in the Winter-Spring of
1972, If the handcuffs were on an open shelf,
then either Moran or Hayward could easily have
acquired a pair or two without Appellant's
knowledge; not through Mr. Pappageorge's
deliberate action, but through his inaction in
leaving them on open shelves. No evidence

32.

adduced at trial, other than accomplice Hayward's
testimony, renders this theory inherently implaus-
ible, which provides possession with a rational
explanation consistent with innocence,

Thus, the mere fact that Appellant may
have possessed a certain pair of handcuffs can-
not serve as corroboration of the accomplice.

Appellant's investigator found an identical
set with the questioned serial number on it.
This raises some interesting questions, not the
least of which is the possibility of the inaccuracy
of the number-raising device employed by Det.
Warner, and the possibility of duplicated serial
numbers by the manufacturer (a not unheard of
occurrence),

33.

D. No Evidence Established
Appellant's Possession of
the Candelabra, Therefore,
They Cannot Corroborate
Hayward's Testimony.

Alvin Timmons Testified
That Appellant's Wife,
Deceased at the Time of
Trial, Delivered Candel-
abra to Timmon's Residence,
The Photographs of These
Candelabra Were Taken At
Timmon's House. No Evi-
dence Adduced at Trial Ever
Placed the Candelabra In
Appellant's Possession or
in Appellant's Home. The
Only Alleged Link to Mr.
Pappageorge Is the Alleged
Delivery by Mrs. Pappa-

george,

The Prosecutor made much of the absence
of witnesses called by the defense. Reversing
this argument, if the police knew about these
crimes one year after their commission, why
was prosecution delayed nearly one and 1/2 more
years; the result has been the loss of possible
witnesses' testimony through death, departure
from the State of California, etc. (The Court
may take judicial notice of the date of death of
Mrs. Anna Pappageorge of Monrovia, California,
on October 7, 1973 as listed in the official records
of the Registrar-Recorder of the County of

34.

Los Angeles. See Exhibit ''B"’ attached. )

It is doubtful that the candelabra, because
they were won in a horseshoe contest over 25
years ago, were terribly distinctive in any degree.
(Contest prizes tend to be less than expensive. )
It is no wonder that the witness was so hazy and
speculative in her attempt at identification.

In People v. Jenkins, 34 Cal. App. 3d 893
(1973), the Court of Appeal for the Second District,
the court reviewed the following:

A truckload of stolen suits were in defend-
ant's truck. The only items in the truck were
these stolen suits. When questioned by the police
at the scene, defendant said, ‘You didn't catch
me driving it did you?"' "No." ''Then I have
nothing to worry about.'' Accomplice testified
to defendant's participation. Because defendant
(1) had possession of (2) recently stolen property
this sufficed as corroboration. Mr. Pappageorge
was not shown to have possession, and the wedding
was eight months after the robbery - not a recent
event! The inference (it was Hargen's candelabra)
based on inference (Mrs. Pappageorge arrived with
the candelabra, ergo, Mr. Pappageorge possessed
them) based on inference (if Mr. Pappageorge
possessed them, it must have come from a non-
recent robbery) is too tenuous a thread to connect
Mr. Pappageorge to the robbery and the inferential
establishment of possession in Mr. Pappageorge.
Jenkins indicates possession must be recent,

There are many plausible explanations such
as Mr. Pappageorge traded auto parts for the

35.

candelabra, without knowing they were stolen,
or without having taken part in the burglary-
robbery.

In People v. Ruscoe, 54 Cal. App. 3d
1005 (1976) the Court of Appeal upheld conviction
of grand theft after a contest rigging "scheme"
based on recent possession of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000) and the cumulative effect of
defendants' testimony and the giving of false or
misleading statements to the police. But the
possession occurred within a short time after
the theft. This distinguishes the instant case

from Ruscoe, because Mr. Pappageorge's
alleged inferential possession occurred, if at
all, eight months after the crime. The candel-
abra cannot serve as evidence corroborative of

the accomplice testimony.

E. Appellant's Knowledge of
Part of the Contents
Located in the Back Seat
of a Car Not Owned By
Him Does Not Establish
His Knowledge of the
Contents of a Closed and
Covered Suitcase Found
Inside the Trunk of That
Car.

Alvin Timmons testified that: Appellant
requested Timmons to remove certain items
from a Simca car owned by Kenneth Moran.

36.

lll

Appellant specifically stated that these items Indeed, the trial court dismissed the

' were explosives. Timmons further testified . prosecuting attorney's contention that the suit-
that: Appellant made this request because: | case gave rise to an inference of Appellant's
Moran's wife had left the Simca at Appellant's | knowledge of it and the contents thereof. (See
station for brake repair work (an entirely | RT 736-738 and 743-744. )

innocent act).
Furthermore, even assuming Appe}lant

According to Timmon's testimony, knew of the suitcase and the coat therein, there
Appellant never mentioned the suitcase or its again is lacking the immediate possession of
contents; he spoke only of the dynamite and the recently stolen property required by the courts.
location of the car key. Timmons found the Appellant's possession, if any, was only by way
suitcase in the trunk, whereas much of the of bailment of the car to Appellant in his scope
contraband was located in the back seat. of business. Timmons, however, was unable
Furthermore, Timmons found the suitcase the | to state when Appellant approached him with the
next day and discovered the contents only be- request, stating it was some time in 1972.
: cause he believed the case might hold dynamite ° Such equivocation cannot establish that this coat
caps. was "recently" stolen. Thus, given the ques-
tionable possession and the indefinite time
. The only person to question Timmons ; frame, and the accidental nature of the place-
about the suitcase was Moran after he was re- menc allegedly at the station, Appellant cannot
leased from jail, some time after the dynamite be charged with knowledge of the suitcase and
was dumped. According to Timmons, Moran the fur coat. Consequently, the fur coat can-
specifically asked about the suitcase and ex- not serve as corroboration of the accomplice
pressed concern for its contents, —a valuable testimony.

fur coat’ (RT 539). Apparently Appellant had
inquired only of the location of the dynamite.
(See Reporter's Transcript 533-534),

Nothing in either Hayward's or Timmon's
testimony establishes or suggests that Appellant
knew of the suitcase or the fur coat inside.
Merely because Appellant knew of obvious con-
tents of Moran's car, on bailment to Appellant
for a legitimate purpose, cannot even by infer-

. ence establish that Appellant knew of the suitcase
in the trunk and its contents.

. 37. : 38.

F, The Paper Stamped
"Carson's" Cannot Cor-
roborate Ronald Hayward's
Testimony Because It Was
Observed in a Public Access
Area and Appellant's Ex-
clusive Possession of the
Paper Was Not Established.

Robert Hawkins testified that he observed
a pale green piece of paper in the large trash bin
behind Appellant's business. He also saw a rub-
ber stamp imprint bearing the name "'Carson's"
and possibly the words ''For Deposit Only. "
He was approximately one foot away from the
paper when he observed it. He did not pick it
up and examine it and could not say that the
piece of paper was, infact, acheck, Hawkins
further testified that Ronald Hayward was
present at Appellant's business at this time,
helping him (Appellant) move.

One's trash remains within one's posses-
sion until it has been mingled with other trash
and has lost its identity and meaning. People v.
Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096 (1969).

However, such rationale applies only
where the trash has been within defendant's con-
trol and subject to defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. See, e.g.: United States
v. Kahan, 350 F.Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (1971); vacated,
409 U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd 8 Cal. 3d 623 (1972);

39.

People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 3d 1096 (1969).

Neither situation exists here. The trash bin
Hawkins spoke of was a large commercial-type
bin, in back of Appellant's business, and with-
in easy and unrestricted access to anyone. It
was the type which may be changed to other
locations. This free access automatically
negatives any assumption that the contents of the

trash bin are impliedly in Appellant's possession,

Without a showing of this piece of paper in
Appellant's possession, it may not be used to
corroborate the accomplice testimony. See,
People v. Hathcock, 8 Cal. 3d 599 (1973);

People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438 (1974)

(discussion of defendant's actual possession of
the murder weapon as corroboration).

G. There Exists no Other
Independent Testimony
Which Connects Appellant
to the Crimes Committed
By Hayward and Moran.

In the absence of specific factors such as
possession of an instrumentality of the crime,
possession of recently stolen goods, or evidence
of flight by the defendants, courts will look to
any other independent testimony to corroborate
an accomplice.

For example, in People v. Hathcock, 8
Cal. 3d 599 (1973), the court found adequate
corroboration based, inter alia, upon a coroner's

40.

report which verified the accomplice's descrip-
tion of the murder. In People v. Tewksbury,
15 Cal. 3d 972 (1976) adequate corroboration
was found in witnesses whose "testimony of the
corpus delicti and the time, place and manner
of the commission" of the cgime was consistent
with the accomplice's testimony. 15 Cal. 3d at
972. The court also noted that a possible
murder weapon was found in defendant's former
residence six days after the crime, and a sur-
viving victim of the robberies testified that one
of the assailants was armed with a similar gun.

In People v. Randono, 32 Cal. App. 3d 164
(1973), corroboration was established by a
witness who received false information from
defendant. This corroboration was in addition
to the testimony of witnesses who actually
observed the liquor (obtained by false pretenses)
sitting in the storeroom of defendant's premises.
The witness also testified that the seventy (70)
cases he observed were gone when he came
back two weeks later and that they could not
have been "'used up" in that short time period.
The court held the possession coupled with the
unusual usage constituted corroboration.

A defendant's words, conduct, declara-
tions or testimony may corroborate the accom-
plice. People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal.3d 972
(1976); People v. Ruscoe, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1005
(1976), Inthe instant case, there is no evidence
of Appellant's words, or conduct, or declarations
which corroborate Hayward, nor does his testi-
mony establish his criminal proclivity. Cf.
People v. Ruscoe, supra. (Defendant's

41.

explanation for his threats and for his fraudulent
scheme did not have to be believed by the jury;
and that testimony combined with false statements

to the police constituted adequate corroboration. )

Thus, there exists no independent testi-
mony linking Appellant to the crime or establish-
ing in him exclusive possession of any instru-
mentality or fruits of the robberies. Accomplice
Hayward's testimony stands uncorroborated and
Appellant's conviction must be reversed.

The rational of the requirement of Penal
Code §1111 lies in the inherent lack of trust-
worthiness in testimony given with the expecta-
tion of leniency or immunity. People v.
Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 970 (1976); People v.
Gordon, 10 Cal. 3d 460 (1973). Thus, sufficiency
of the corroborating evidence is established if it
tends to connect the defendant with the crime in
a manner which reasonably satisfies the jury that
the testifying accomplice is telling the truth.
People v. Thurman, 28 Cal. App. 3d 725 (1972),

An "accomplice" includes anyone who may
be liable for prosecution for the same offense for
which the defendant is being tried. People v.
Kageler, 32 Cal. App. 3d 738 (1973). A grant of
immunity will not dissipate the requirement of
corroboration. See, People v. Perry, 7 Cal.
3d 756 (1972); People v. Randono, 32 Cal. App.
3d 164 (1973).

To corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice, the prosecution must produce
independent evidence which, without aid or

42.

assistance from the testimony of the accomplice,
tends to connect the defendant with the crime
charged. People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal. 3d
756 (1972).

The corroboration must do more than
raise conjecture or a suspicion of guilt. It
need not go to every element of an accomplice's
testimony; it may be circumstantial; and it may
be slight and entitled to little weight when stand-
ing alone. People v, Perry, supra; People v.
Randono, supra, 32 Cal. App. 3d 164 (1973).

Corroborating evidence is insufficient if
it does no more than cast a grave suspicion upon
the accused, or merely connect him with the
crime's perpetrators. People v. Mardian, 47
Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975),

Moreover, each item alone may be in-
sufficient, but the cumulative effect may be
sufficient to corroborate. People v. Ruscoe,
54 Cal. App. 3d 1005 (1976).

Certain specific facts have consistently
been held to be sufficient corroboration:

1. Defendant's possession of recently
stolen property (People v. Jenkins, 34 Cal. App.
3d 893 (1973))

2. Evidence of flight or attempts to
escape (People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756 (1972))

3. Attempts to conceal identity or
whereabouts (People v. Perry, supra. )

43.

Se +

eS —<—

In People v. Ruscoe, supra, 54 Cal. App.
3d 1005 (1976), defendant was convicted of grand
theft after "rigging" a radio contest. The disc
jockey was charged as as an accomplice to the
scheme, and testified as to the operation of their
plan. Corroboration was found in: defendant's
possession of a large amount of cash the same
week the contest prize money had been paid to
his girlfriend; defendant's giving false state-
ments concerning the origin of the cash when
he was arrested; defendant's signing to release
the money to his girlfriend knowing of its illegal-
ity; and defendant's own testimony of his involve-
ment inthe scheme. The court indicated that
the jury was not required to believe defendant's
explanation for his involvement.

In People v. Jenkins, supra, 34 Cal.App.
3d 893 (1973), defendant was apprehended with a
truckload of recently stolen suits. An accomplice
testified that defendant participated in the theft
and the court held that the defendant's possession
of the recently stolen property was adequate
corroboration.

Significantly, if the defendant's activity
is equally consistent with innocent behavior,
such activity cannot serve to corroborate an
accomplice's testimony. People v. Mardian,
47 Cal. App. 3d 16 (1975).

In the case at bar, the evidence may cast
suspicion upon Appellant, or it may connect him
with the crime's perpetrators, (Mardian, supra)
but it does not constitute independent evidence
sufficient to corroborate the accomplice

44,

Hayward's testimony.

Vi.

THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN COMMENTING ON
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
PRODUCE CERTAIN WITNESSES
AND RAISE CERTAIN DEFENSES,
GIVEN THE SLIGHT WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
APPELLANT.

The leading case of Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1964) established that a defendant's
failure to testify at trial could not consitutionally
be the subject of comment by the prosecutor,
California specifically incorporated the rule in
People v. Vargas, 9 Cal. 3d 470 (1973). Appell-
ant acknowledges that this rule does not extend
to comments on the state of the evidence or on
the defense's failure to introduce material
evidence or to call logical witnesses. People
v. Vargas, supra.

However, the United States Supreme
Court has recently expanded the scope of this
rule in Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
There the Court disapproved use during trial of
a defendant's silence maintained after Miranda
warnings had been given. In essence the
defendant's exercise of his rights was being used

45.

against him in the later criminal proceedings.
Thus the general rule is that a defendant's
exercise of his rights may not be used against
him for impeachment or as a basis upon which
to infer guilt.

Likewise, a defendant has the right to
have the prosecution bear the burden of estab-
lishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Knowing this, a defendant may choose not to
testify or may choose to put on a limited defense.
Comment on the former strategy is constitution-
ally proscribed. Griffin v. United States, supra.
Comment on the latter strategy, equally based
upon the same expectation of rights, ought not to
be allowed, at least where such comment is
shown to be prejudicial. For example, in
People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438 (1974), the

court discussed the extent to which a prosecutor's
comment may have been prejudicial. Two
guidelines were posited:

Re The seriousness of the error and

26 The impact of the error upon the
jury's consideration of the evidence in light of
the strength of the case against the defendant.

The Court suggested the primary question
to ask was, would the prosecutor's comment
serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecu-
tion's case? The Court further stated:

"Arguably, any case in which sub-
stantially all of the direct evidence
against the defendants is the

46.

testimony of accomplices, which
must be viewed with distrust, is
aclose case. This one was
especially close in view of the
many other factors which called
into question the credibility of
these witnesses.'' 41 Cal. App. 3d
at 463,

In the case at bar, Appellant had a right
to expect the prcsecutor to prove his case be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was not
required to produce any evidence or witnesses.
He chose to explain his defense, and to subject
himself to cross-examination. The prosecutor,
in turn, chose to rely on Appellant's failure to
produce non-material witnesses as a way to ''fill

an evidentiary gap’ in his owncase, [Note well -.

these are not the same witnesses Defendant
asked his Counsel to call to testify ! ]

Most of the evidence in this case came
from accomplices or other witnesses whose
credibility was in question. Thus, like People
v. Medina, supra, this is a close case, especi-
ally in view of the inadequate corroboration and
the prejudicial error in admitting evidence con-
cerning the explosives.

The prosecutor commented on at least
9 witnesses Appellant could have called: Ken
Moran, the original co-defendant; previous
customers of Appellant; merchants who sold
handcuffs to Appellant; the holder of a deposit
refund check issued by Appellant and cashed at

47.

Carson's Bar; and Appellant's daughter who
married in 1972 (RT 819, 860, 866, 867).2/

Comment upon one party's failure to
produce witnesses is permissible unless these
witnesses are equally available to both parties.
Winkie v. Turlock Irrigation District, 24 Cal.

App. 2d (1938).

Each of these witnesses was available to
the prosecution either by request or by subpoena.
The prosecution discovered at trial the loaction
of the merchants from whom Appellant purchased
handcuffs, and could have brought them into
Court. The prosecution could have recalled
the bartender from Carson's Bar to ask about
the deposit checks. The prosecution could have
obtained through discovery Appellant's business
records indicating the name of prior customers.
Appellant did not have to prove his innocence by
presenting these peopte. The prosecutor, how-
ever, chose to rely upon Appellant's exercise of
his right to not prove his innocence and to use
the exercise of that right to fill the gaps in his
own case.

2 /

~ Indeed, the prosecutor received excuipatory
information from Appellant during cross-ex-
amination but chose not to pursue it, even after
asking Appellant to produce certain paperwork
in court. RT 753-755.

48,

Appellant relied upon the prosecutor's Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 (1963).

burden to prove him guilty; that reliance was
used against him and, based upon the emphasis In the case at bar, Appellant has been

of Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), such prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to
use cannot be permitted. certain evidence, thus losing any appeal rights.

For example, People's exhibit 10 (Invoice from

Moreover, given the slight strength of Mitchell Mogol, Inc., RT 615) patently does not
the corroboration and the use of accomplice fall within the business exception to the hearsay
testimony, the prosecutor's error was highly J ule. Counsel made no objection to its intro-~
prejudicial and Appellant's conviction must be duction, nor did he cross-examine on the validity
reversed. of the invoice (RT 615 - 628), As this invoice

was the only way of establishing the probable
serial numbers on the handcuffs sold to Appellant,

VI. without such objection, Appellant is precluded
from seeking appellate review and thus a valu-

APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED J able defense was lost.
BY THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO PURSUE CERTAIN Secondly, Robert Hawkins' testimony
DEFENSES, PRESERVE OBJEC- : concerning the piece of paper stamped
TIONS FOR APPEAL, AND, IN | "Carson's'' which he observed in the trash also
GENERAL, RENDER EFFECTIVE was Clearly hearsay: the print on the paper was
REPRESENTATION. being offered to establish the truth of its con-

tents. This paper and the ''Carson's" imprint
was Offered as corroboration of Hayward's
testimony. Failure to object resulted in the
loss of another crucial defense in that Appellant
is precluded from attacking the evidence on

A defendant bears the burden of estab-
lishing his counsel's ineffectiveness. People
v. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588 (1974). Proof of appeal.
the ineffectiveness must be demonstrable ;
reality and not a speculative matter. People v. Next, counsel arguably did not properly

Stephenson, 10 Cal. 3d 652 (1974). Moreover, object to Timmon's testimony concerning the
inn seamed cemet enbabiteh: Chat coandal Gan explosives and Appellant's connection with them.

ignorant of the facts or the law, resulting in Arguably the objection was made not pursuant to
withdrawal of a crucial defense, reducing the Evidence Code Section 352 but on the grounds of
trial to a "farce anda sham." People v. . hearsay absent establishment of the conspiracy.

Martinez, 14 Cal. 3d 533 (1975); People v. Counsel made this argument only inferentially

49, : 50.

without articulating the correct law behind it

(RT 523-525, 539-543). This is not merely a
question of trial tactics, but of ignorance of the
elements of the case and the applicable law.
Counsel argued under section 403 of the Evidence
Code when the record clearly shows he was con-
cerned with the prejudicial effect versus the
probative value. See, e.g., RT 540, lines 26-
27; 740, lines 2-8.

In addition, counsel failed to object to
the myriad details elicited by the prosecutor
concerning the quantity, quality and attempted
destruction of the explosives in Moran's car
(RT 528-530; 532-533), Introduction of this
evidence patently was irrelevant and served
only to prejudice the jury, especially in light of
its having been excluded at the first trial.

As a fourth example, defense counsel
made no objections whatsoever to the prosecu-
tor's thinly veiled suggestion that the handcuffs
purchased by Appellant's witness bearing the
same serial numbers as the ones used in the
Carson's robbery were tampered with or altered.
Failure to object is particularly heinous in light
of there being no independent set of handcuffs
against which the jury could compare. The
prosecutor's inflammatory insinuations were
obviously out of line and required some comment
to reduce the prejudicial effect. Appellant can-
not appeal the prosecutor's misconduct because
no objection was given, thus still another valu-
able defense was lost.

51.

This is not a case where Appellant, a
layman, could be expected to object to the court
about the inadequacy of the legal representation.
First of all, Appellant cannot reasonably be
expected to know the workings of the hearsay
rule. Secondly, Appellant cannot reasonably
be expected to know the significance and implica-
tion of sections 352 and 403 of the Evidence Code,
In short, these errors were errors of law of
which Appellant would have no knowledge.

Significantly, however, one counsel was
a family friend of Appellant (RT 689, lines 9-
13) and as such reasonably occupied a position
of trust more extensive than usual in an attorney-
client relationship. Reference is hereby made
to Exhibit ''C'' attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as though fully set forth herein,
which is page 4 of ''Advisement of Right to
Appeal, " the transcript of the Probation and
Sentence hearing of Mr. Pappageorge, which
occurred on Friday, November 14, 1975. With
this greater trust, Appellant would be more
likely to refrain from criticism or questioning
of his friend-attorney and the co-counsel. Thus
Appellant was not able to freely object to
counsel's conduct, even assuming Appellant was
cognizant of the legal mistakes made.

Thus, the record abounds in instances of
counsel's failure to pursue vital issues of law
which patently were crucial to Appellant's de-
fense. This, coupled with this being an ex-
tremely close case where any error could be
prejudicial to Appellant, denied Appellant
effective representation of counsel.

52.

Finally, none of the witnesses (the few
who were still alive when this matter was
finally prosecuted (almost 2-1/2 years after the
robberies)) who could have exonerated or ex-
plained defendant's behavior as exculpatory were
called to testify. Assuming, arguendo, they
were available, why weren't they called?

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner
respectfully urges this court to reverse
Petitioner's conviction and to grant any other
relief this court may find just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,
JAMES JOSEPH LEWIS

Attorney for
GEORGE PAPPAGEORGE

53.

the past, although maybe I didn't know everything; but, on tho
other hand, he's entitled to that consideration, I respectfully
submit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What Mr. Watson says is substantially correct:
That other than a financial loss, should bail be set ona appeal
and the defendant escapes the jurisdiction of the court, there
is no further penalty other than that which has already been
imposed that could be imposed on the defendant for his failure
to appear at the time and place required by the court for furthe
proceedings on appeal.

The court must also recognize that the other
individuals that Mr. Pappageorge masterminded in this conspiracy
are doing their time on substantially the same evidence upon |
which Pappageorge was convicted. The court must also recognize
that Donovan Hargens had really no appeal or no bail on appeal
from the kidnap-robbery-burglary when Pappageorge's handcuffs
had him handcuffed to the steering wheel of that car and his
house was being burglarized. All of the appeals of Mr. Hargens
at that time went unheeded by those who actively participated
in the robbery. The law requires that these acts be irputod
to Mr. Pappageorce as the aider and abettor and co-conspirator
in this action.

Tne request for bail on appeal will be denied.

MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. POYET: Thank you, Your Honor.

o-2@0o"-=

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EXHIBIT “A.

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aco CENCE BEFORE

. mmennaihieatininpinctigniai ssitniaatile.~ sassitilitiaednadatie
: | May it please the court, it has been ry privilege
3 benf My i "k . . 2 in life to know a great many men, but I must say this in all
ae Nabi: i 7 i . i 3 | candor standing before Your Honor, and I want to express how
3 a} ah aS sisi 4 I fecl inwardly and outwardly and based upon my evaluation of
mmah ¥i a : $ Pappageorge over a period of many years. it is unfortunate
A | = |e : 6 that we find ourselves in this situation here, but this is the
; Py fe : : 3 way it is.
R 4 | ae ao | 8 I myself know that Pappageorge ‘s a good man,
t . | at |i bah ’ 9 personally, throughout the years. He's always been practical,
3 ye : 7 | : ; < ; 10 | punctual on everything that he has done. I know of no occasion
: ; 3 salt i ; st a4 2 1. | where he has taken unjust or unfair advantage of any living
Sis at - Is 3 E i | f @ 2 soul, to my personal knowledge. Also I know that he is a
3 be if : | ; , ; 13 tireless worxer. I knew his mother, his sister and his fanily
ie ie | se) : E | = ou personally, myself; and I know that from the days he left ;
Hf tae = a Ss ; ‘ z i 15 | back East and came out here to settle down in Pasadena that
ey + : F i amt 16 he has worked unceasingly as a man. |
“BLE ans se . s|5 ;|° i #? 17 Personally, I never have found him wanting. He
He ae : TH i ; - has been gracious and considerate with people that he worked
ath ae a : 1) | with. He has always aspired to do things in what I call a
aS (a3 ; bs. if , #! 20 noble and altruistic manner. And to see a aonentsen of this
eg ary “y is cars i “e ' Peal 21 kind is hard for me personally, myself. I personaliy like
age scat £85 23 43 9° Pappageorge. I know he's a good man and I know that no matter
esp |" * io. = =e ‘ 22 what Your Honor does that he will profit by this experience
24 that he finds hinself in. Ue's got his matters over there
25 that are being worked out. .
26, He needs to go ahead, and no matter what's done .
BEST COPY AVAILABLE | 4 o- hore -- I'll spvak now on the guestion of his keeping con- - ¢
‘ oR fieence with any order that Your Honor might placa upon him -- %
° : ° “a

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*

EXHIBIT. ‘C .

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---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1278%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
