# Petition — Jack Sanders Corp. v. United States

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 904

## Text

‘
—

FILED
DEC 29 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Supreme Court, U.S, |

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

no. ZG = j j 25

JACK SANDERS CORPORATIOI.,
Petitioner

VERSUS

TEE UNITED STATES,
Defendant

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW
DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

EDWARD H. KEILER

ATTORNEY OF RECORD

SAM O.BUCKLEY

KEILER & BUCKLEY

OF COUNSEL

9017 Jefferson Highway

River Ridge Louisiana 70123
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

INDEX
Page
1. Table of Authorities ii
2. Petition for certiorari 1
ae Opinion of Court of Claims
to be reviewed 1
bd. Jurisdiction for Review 3
c.Questions presented for
Review 7 3
d.Statutes and Regulations
Involved 1h.
e. Statement of case 14
f. Jurisdiction of Court
of Claims 16
g. Argument 18
3. APPENDIX
| h. Decision of Corps of Engineer
oe Board of Contract Appeals 22
i. Court of Claims Opinion 39

j. Court of Claims Opinion on
Motion to Amend and
Rehearing 42

(ii)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT
REGULATION 7.603.27, _?
227

THE SAME AS 32 CFR 7.603 4
CASES

VICTORY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.

VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 510

F2d 1379 (1975) §,11,19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO.

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION,
Petitioner

VERSUS

TH& UNITED STATES,
Defendant

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW
DECISION OF UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

TO THE KONORABLE THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMES NOW Jack Sanders Corporation
and petitions this Hcnorable Court for a
writ of Certiorari to review the final

judgment of the Court of Claims in the

2. 3.

cause entitled Jack Sanders Corporation The Final Judgment of The Court of Claims.

versus The United States, being Number - ; The Board's decision is attached as

75 on the Docket of that Court. Appendix I. The Court of Claims Order dated
This case came to the Court of Claims . Penge June 25, 1976, is attached as Appendix 2, and

on appeal under Rule 163 (b) (2) for review The Court of Claims Order dated September 30,

under The Wunderlich Act of a decision of 1976, is attached as Appendix 3.

the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract JURISDICTION FOR REVIEW

Appeals dated July 31, 1974 being ENG. BCA A writ of certiorari to review The Final

NO. 3363 styled Appeal of Jack Sanders Order of fhe Court of Claims dated September

Corporation, Contracts DACW 64-71-C-0022 30, 1976, is sought pursuant to jurisdiction

— DACW 64-71-0023 and DACW 61,-71-002i,, conferred by 28 U.S.C.A. 1255 (1) which reads

The Court of Claims first entered en as follows:

ambiguous order dated ‘une 25 1976, aifirming 1255. Coury of Slaine; certiorari:
! t

the Engineer Board's decision (which was in
Cases in the Court of Claims may be

favor of the Defendant) and remanding for reviewed by The Supreme Court by tie
entry of Judgment in favor of plaintifi. iat te css af onreketeadl granted on
On Rehearing and Motion to Amend Judgment, - , 4 he “oie one Centos States ey the
Tne Court of Claims<«entered its Order dated , QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
September 30, 1976, affirming the Engineer The principal dietion presented for
Board's decision, which, in éffect, is now review is the correct interpretation of the

Armed Services Procurement Regulations clause

Le

designated ASPR 7-603.27 Variations in
Estimated Quantities, which is required
to be included in Government procurement |
contracts where payment is made based on
estimated quantity items. This clause,
which is also codified as 32 CFR 7.603.
27 (1968), reads as follows:

Where the quantity of a pay item in
this contract is an estimated quantity
and where the actual quantity of such
pay item varies more than fifteen per-
cent (15%) above or below the estimat-
ed quantity stated in this contract, an
cuntbeble adjustment in the contract
price shall be made upon demand of
either party. The equitable adjustment
shall be dased upon any increase or
decrease in costs due solely to the
variation above one hundred fifteen
percent (115%) or below eighty-five
percent (85%) of the estimated quanti-
ty. If the quantity variation is such
as to cguse an increase in the time
necessary for completion, the Contract-
ing Officer shall, upon receipt of a
tten request for an extension of
time within ten (10) days from the
beginning of such delay, or within
such further period of time which may
be granted by the Contracting Officer
prior to the date of final settlement of
the contract ascertain the facts and
make such adjustment for extending
the completion date as in his judgment
the findings justify.

The interpretation of this clause has
been presented to the Court of Claims twice;

5.
once in the case at bar and earlier in

1975 in the case of Victory Construction
Co.,inc. vs. United States. 510 F 2d

1379 (1975).
One panel of the Court of Claims

construed the clause one way and another
panel gives it an entirely different
interpretation. This is an important
provision of Government procurement law
and we request that this Court accept
the case to resolve the conflict between
the two panels of the Court of Claims
so that Government procurement people
and the contractors dealing with them
will know how a contractor will be paid
when he bids on estimated quantities
and experiences adjustable overruns within
the meaning of the Variation in Estimated
Quantities clause. ies

In the case at bar the plaintiff

contraetor bid on advertised procurements

for the removal of debris from specified

geographical areas following Hurricane

Celia. He was required to base his

bids on Government estimates of the quantities

of debris to be removed from each geo-

graphical area. He was a successful bidder

on three contracts; San Patricio County,

Texas, Contract DACW 64-71-C-0022; City

of Portland, Texas, Contract DACW 64-71-

C-0023; and City of Rockport, Texas,

Contract DACW 64-71-C-0024,; all awarded

August 7, 1970. All contracts had the

same bidding instructions, terms and

conditions, including a variation in

estimated quantities clause which appears

as a note at the botton of the page cor-

taining pay items (standard form 36

continuation sheet), reading as follows:
Variations in Quantities: The quantities

shown in the schedule of the bid form
will serve as a basis for completion

7°

of bids for the purpose of determining
the low bidder. Payment will be made

at the unit price for the actual quantity
of work performed under each item be

it more or less than the quantity
estimated. However, if the actual
quantity 1302 S more than one hundred
percent (1 above or thirty percent
below the estimated mm Pe | stated

in this contract, an equitable adjstment
in the contract unit price shall be

made upon demand of either party.

The contractor experienced substantial
Overruns Over and above estimated quantities
plus one hundred percent (100%) above
estimated quantities on the three contracts
as well as increased costs in removing

the debris represented by these overruns,

'and has attempted to recover these increased

costs pursuant to the Variation in Estimated
Quantities clause.

It became immediately apparent that
the Variation in Estimated Quantities
clause appearing in the contracts wes a
deviant clause not found in the Armed

Service Procurement Regulations and

differing in two important particulars
from the standard clause therein contained
(ASPR 7-603.27 (1968) above set forth).

First, the contract clause increased
the permissable variation above estimated
quantities to 100% as:against 15% in the
standard clause.

Second, the contract clause omitted
that part of the standard clause which
prevdes the manner in which an equitable
. adjustment is to be determined which reads:

"..eeeThe equitable adjustment shall

be based upon.any increase or decrease

in costs due solely to the variation
above....percent or below....percent
of the estimated quantity....
The increase in the permissable variation
did not become an issue. The contractor

understood that if, as in the San Patricio

contract, the estimated quantity was 35, 000

cubic yards, and he bid $3.70 per cubic yard,

9. -

he would be paid $3.70 per cubic yard
for the first 70,000 cubic yards and
only the yardage above 70,000 cubic
yards would be subject to a possible
price adjustment under the variation
in estimated quantities clause.
The Government representatives,
from the Contracting Officer to the
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division, have all taken the same position.
The question of how to arrive at
an equitable adjustment of the contract
price, however, was a horse of a different
color, where no one agreed with anyone |
else.
he Contracting Officer paid the
contractor the contract unit price which
was bid on the Estimated Quantities for
all actual quantities delivered on all
three contracts; and in his Contracting
Officers decision, he left the parties

at that status quo.

10.

The contractor appealed to the Corps
of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals
asking that the contract unit prices
be increased on quantities in excess of
100% above Estimated Quantities to the
extent that his unit costs increased on
these quantities as compared with the unit
costs on the Estimated Quantities plus
100% above Estimated Quantities.

The Government filed a counterclaim
before the Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appeals contending that the
contract unit prices should be reduced
by determining the average unit costs
for all yardage, to which should be
added -10% of such unit costs for profit,
and thatthis figure would be the equitably
adjusted price for the quantities in
excess of 100% above Estimated Quantities.

The Corps of Engineers Board of

Sounwact Appeals decision, which is now

the decision of The Court of Claims is

to reprice the unit price of quantities

in excess of 100% above Estimated Quantities

so as to convert that part of thecontract

to a cost plus a percentage of cost contract.
The same legal question was presented

to another panel of the Court of Claims

in Victory Construction Co., Inc. versus

The United State 10 F. 2d 1379

Tiere the Government sought reduction of

the unit prices on five pay items bid

on estimated quantities where the contract

contained the 1967 standard variation in

estimated quantities clause (32 CFR 7.603.

27 (1967), which also contained no language

indicating how to go about arriving at

an equitable adjustment. That panel

of the Court looked to the 1968 revision

of the standard variation in quantities

12.

clause, above quoted, for guidance ir
interpretation and said that it was

clear from the language used tl.at the

clause does not contemplate a repricins

of the contract price merely tecsuse

tuere is a variation in quantities by

more t.an 15% and that any repricings

would be confined to the cost differentiels
directly attributable to the volune deviation
greater than 15%. Thus this panel of

‘the Court of Cleims reversed Tie Corps

of Enginners Board Contract A»peals and
refused to reduce the contract unit rrices
on any of the overrun items which were

bid on estimated quantities on tue basis

that the Government failed to show any
decrease in costs due solely to the variation
in quantities in excess of 15% above

estimated qantities.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The contractor in the Victory case
was not seeking an increase in the contract
prices so the court was not called upon
to determine whether he would have been
entitled to an increase in the contract
price if he had shown an increase in
his costs attributable to overrun exceeding
15% of estimated quantities.

Comparing the Victory case to the
case at bar. the Government failed to
show a decrease in costs attributable
to the volume overrun in both cases,

but got a price reduction in the case

at bar. Further, the contractor in

the case at bar affirmatively proved
a cost increase directly attributable
to the volume overrun in excess of 100%
above estimated quantities precisely
in accordance with the criteria laid
down in the Victory case.

Another similarity in the cases

is that in both cases the Government

14.

seeks to penalize an efficient contractor
who keeps his costs down by repricing
his contract price to give him only «sis
eost plus an arbitrary proportion of
his costs as profit on overrun quantities.
STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

The only statute involved is 32
CFR 7.603.27 (1968) which is the same
as ASPR 7.603.27 as above set out in its
entirety.

STATEMENT OF CASE

The basic facts are set forth a bove.
The plaintiff proved, and the Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals
found, that the plaintiff contractor
had increased costs due solely to volume
overruns on quantities on his three contracts
as follows:
(a) San Patricio county - contract No.
DACW 0022, $1.70 per cu. y@. on 107,972

cu. yds.

15.

(b) City of Portland - contract No. DACW
0023, $3.05 per cu. yd. on 7,477 cu. yds.
(c) City of Rockport - contract No. DACW
0024, .21 per cu. yd. on 41,273 yds.
Consistent with the interpretation
of the variation in Estimated Quantity
Clause in The Victory Construction Case,
Supra, and by the plain unambiguous wording
of the Variation in Estimated Quantities
Clause, these increased costs due solely
to the variation in quantities above 100%
of estimated quantities, should be added

to. the contract price on the three contracts

resulting in the f¥llowing final contract

prices.

(a) San Patricio County - contract 0022;
$3.70 per cu. yd. on first 70,000 cu.
yds., $3.70 + $1.70 or $5.40 per cu. yd.
on the overrun of 107,972 cu. yds. Since
the contractor has already been paid
$3.70 per cu. yd. for this yardage, the

government owes the contractor $1.70

16.

17.

41 USCA 321,322.
per cu. yd. on 107,972 cu. yds. The facts with respect to the costs
(b) City 6f Portland - contract 0023; incurred by the plaintiff - contractor
$3.50 per cu. yd. on first 50.000 cu. were Stipulated after audit by the con-
yds., $3.50 + $3.05 or $6.55 per cu. yd. tractor's auditor. The C.P.A. also
on overrun 7,477 cu. yds. Since the allocated the costs attributable to
contractor has been paid $3.50 per cu. estimated quantities plus 100% above
yd. for this yardage, the government estimated quantities, often called first
owes. the contractor $3.05 per wi: ya. costs in the record; and costs attributable
on 7,477 cu. yds. to quantities in excess of 100% above

an - ° -
(c) City of “ockport - contract 0024; estimated quantities, often called second

0,000 cu. yds.;
$3.07 per cu. yd. on first 10, vows costs in the record. Since the plaintiff

dx $3.28 per cu. yd. on overrun
$3.07 + .21 or $3.26 Pe 4 corporation had no other contracts

; contractor has |
41,273 cu. yds. Since the a before or since these three contracts.

; ; . for this
been paid $3.07 per cu. yd ’ it was relatively easy to accurately

} “owes the contractor
yardage, the government ‘owe determine and allocate these costs. The

-21 per cus yd. for 41,273 cu. yds.
JURISDICTION OF TEE COURT OF CLAIMS

Engineer Board accepted the stipulated

costs and the allocation of costs and

This case arose from. contracts having found such other facts as were necessary

a disputes clause which is subject to i eeiiied: Ghimedits tne sens
judicial review under the Wunderlich Act,

18.

came to the Court of Claims on a question
of law only, namely, the application of
the Variation in Estimated Quantity clause
to the facts found by the Board.

the case came on for hearing before
The Court of Claims-on Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment under the Court of Claim
Rule 163 (b)(2).

: ARGUMENT

The argument in support of plaintiff
contractor's position is inherent in
the facts heretofore set forth. There
is. to our knowledge,no precedent except
The Victory Construction Company case

heretofore cited.
The Variation in Estimated Quantities

Clause states in plain language that the
adjustment shall be based upon any increase

or decrease in costs due solely to the

variation....-.

If there is an increase in costs

19.

due to the variation, the contractor

is entitled to have such increase in

costs added to the contract price he

bid for the work on the effected adjustable
quantities. If there is a decrease in
costs due to the variation, the Government
is entitled to have the decrease sub-
tracted from the contract price on such
eifected adjuw table quantities. If there
is neither an increase or a decrease.

the contract price stays the same.
That is the holding of Victory Con-

struction Company Inc ted Ver
United States, 510 F. 2d 1379 (1975).
RESPECTFULLY,

EDWARD ‘i. tSotom

ATTORNEY OF RECORD
SAM 0. BUCKLEY

KEILER & BUCKLEY

OF COUNSEL

9047 Jefferson Highway

a

20.

RIVER RIDGE, LOUISIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, EDWARD H. KEILER, Attorney of

Record for the petition,Jack Sanders
Corporation, hereby certify that I have
this day mailed, air mail postage prepaid,
3 true copies of the foregoing petition
for certiorari, to The Honorable Solicitor
General, Department of Justice, Washington.

D.C. 20530 and 3 true copies of this

foregoing petition for certiorari to

Hon. Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, Department of
Justice,Washington, D.C. 20530, and three
true copies of the foregoing petition
for certiorari to Honorable Gerald L.
Schrader, Attorney, Civil Division,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
20530 as service on the defendant, the

United State of America and its counsel

of record in:this case.

This the 28th day of December 1976

21.

| ae? ae
EDWARD H. KEILFR

22

la
APPENDIX 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Chief of Engineers
Washington, D.C. 20314

Before the Corps of Engineers Board of
Contract Appeals

Eng BCA No. 3363
Appeal of

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

Contract Nos. DACW: 4-71-C-0022.
0023 & 0024

APPEARANCES FOR APPELLANT:

Keiler & Buckley

Edward H. Keiler, Esq.

Sam O. Buckley, Esq.

New Orleans, Louisiana
APPEARANCES FOR GOVERNMENT:

Charles J. Sheridan, Esq.

_Chief Trial Attorney
Washington, D. C.

Cecil E. Reinke, Esq.
Richard J. Hoffman, Esq.
_ Galveston, Texas

<5

2a
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE JELLICO

The question in this appeal requires that we deter-
mine the unit price to be applied to quantities in ex-
cess of those provided for in the Variation in Es-
timated Quantities provision of the contract.

The three contracts from which the dispute arises
were for removal and disposal of debris caused by
Hurricane CELIA which struck the Gulf Coast of Tex-
as in the summer of 1970. The contract provisions per-
tinent to the dispute are identical in each of the three
contracts. The only differences in the contracts relate
to the geographical area to be cleaned up. the es-
timated quantity of material to be removed and dis-
posed of in each geographical area, and the price bid
under each of the three contracts. Contract No.
DACW64-71-C-0002 calls for cleanup of San Patricio
County, Texas, Contract No. DACW64-71-C-0023 of the
city of Portland, Texas, and Contract No. DACW64-71-
C-0024 of the city of Rockport, Texas. We shall
hereinafter refer to the three contracts simply as the
San Patricio, Portland and Rockport contracts.

The format of contract used was entitled “Contract
for Dismantling, Demolition or Removal", apparently
in an attempt to follow the format provided in the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations, para-
graph 16-404, which is entitled “Contracts for Dis- -
mantling, Demolition or Removal of Improvements”.
ASPR 16-404 and its implementing subparagraphs do
not prescribe inclusion of a “Variation in Estimated
Quantities” clause. However, on the face of the bid pay
schedule in the present contracts was printed the
following “Variation in Estimated Quantities” clause:

24

3a

Variations in Quantities: The quantities
shown in the schedule of the bid form will
serve as a basis for completion of bids for the
purpose of determining the low bidder. Pay-
ment will be made at the unit price for the ac-
tual quantity of work performed under each
item be it more or less than the quantity es-
timated. However, if the actual quantity
varies more than one hundred percent (100%)
above or thirty percent (30%) below the es-
timated quantity stated in this contract, an
equitable adjustment in the contract unit price
shall be made upon demand of either party.

Appellant strongly maintains that the “Variations
in Estimated Quantities” clause prescribed in ASPR
7-603.27 for construction contracts should have been
inserted in the contracts and that the contracts should
be read as if it had been inserted. If the ASPR construc-
tion clause is applicable it would contain a sentence
not present in the contracts in dispute which reads:

The equitable adjustment shall be based
upon any increase or decrease in costs due
solely to the variations above..... percent or
below .... percent of the estimated quantity.

We do not perceive any real difference, in the con-
text of the present dispute, between the Variation in
Estimated Quantities provision printed on the face of
the pay schedules and that prescribed by ASPR 7-
603.27. Whichever is applicable, the dispute is with
respect to which cubic yards of debris removed and
disposed of are adjustable as beyond the permissible

2S

4a

percentage (100%) of the clause. There is testimony in
the record that a government official at a pre-bid con-
ference informed bidders that unit prices would be ad-
justed only upwards, not downwards. We do not
believe that testimony credible. Even if believed. such
an assertion by a government official will not prevail
over the clear intent of the contract language that the
adjustment machinery may be invoked for the benefit
of either party.

Appellant contends that the basic contract units and
the non-adjustable overrun are those removed and dis-
posed of first. The government would treat all units re-
moved and disposed of as fungible, giving no iden-
tifiable status to any of them in frame of time. These
abstractly stated concepts should become clearer as
we deal with specific facts and figures relevant to each
of the three contracts. Before we turn to those facts and
figures, other ccnt. act provisions bearing on the dis-
pute will be mentioned.

The government places great emphasis upon the
fact that the Technical Provisions describes the Scope
of the work in the following broad terms:

The work covered by this section consists of
furnishing all labor, material and equipment
and performing all work necessary for
removal of all designated debris in or on all
city streets, including side walks or if no side
walk exists 15° back of curb on each side of the
street, and in or on all alleys within the boun-
daries indicated in the schedule and designat-

.

26

5a

ed on drawings and other areas including
private property that may bedesignated.....

All debris larger than six (6) inches max-
imum dimension will be removed. It may be
necessary for the contractor to return to any
given area several times to leave it in an
acceptable condition....

The area from which debris is to be removed
is the entire area within the corporate city
limits, as applicable.

Also, the SPECIAL CONDITIONS contain a provi-
sion which has some influence upon the decision
which we reach. It provides:

PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE: Work shall
commence within 24 hours after receipt of the
notice to proceed by the Contractor and shall
be completed within 15 calendar days after
work commences. This allowable perform-
ance time shall be extended on a proportional
basis for actual quantities in excess of es-
timated quantities stated in the schedules.

There was no “Changed Conditions” provision in
the contract.

The parties have agreed by stipulation to many of
the detailed facts and figures pertinent to the dispute.
Except as otherwise stated, the facts and figures
hereinafter recounted are embraced within the
stipulations of the parties.

ZT
6a

Each contract contained two bid items as follows:

i. Remove and Dispose of Debris within the [geo-
graphical location] as described in the Technical
Provisions.

2. Furnish equipment and operator at dump site.

Appellant originally claimed under both bid items.
but the parties have agreed that separate treatment of
Bid Item No. 2 is unnecessary because of its relative
insignificance and have merged it and its attendant
costs into the dispute under Bid Item No. 1. Such an ap-
proach simplified presentation and consideration of
the case and will make no appreciable difference in the
outcome.

San Patricio Contract

This contract, like the other two, was awarded on 7
August 1970. The contract unit price was $3.70 per
cubic yard, the estimated quantity 35,000. On 28 Au-
gust 1970, appellant had removed and disposed of 70.-
000 cubic yards of debris. However, the debris
generated from the hurricane had not been exhausted.
Appellant continued to remove and dispose of debris
through 10 October 1970. A total of 177,972 cubic yards
of debris was disposed of. Therefore, there are 107,972
cubic yards for which the contract unit price is subject
to adjustment.

Appellant’s total costs under this contract were
$362,079.30. A certified public accountant made an
analysis of these costs and allocation as between the

2g

7a

period prior and subsequent to 28 August 1970. He
determined the “prior” costs to be $70,498.58 and the
“subsequent” costs to be $291,580.72. The government
questions the allocation of certain items of cost as
between the two periods but, because of its position as
to the proper method to be used to compute the price
adjustment of the 107,972 cubic yards beyond the 70.-
000 provided for in the original estimate plus the 100°7
subject to the Variation in Estimated Quantities
clause, did not make its own allocation as between
costs prior and subsequent to 28 August 1970. The
items challenged are of no great consequence, relating
only to overhead type items, whereas practically all of
the costs incurred were direct in nature.

Using the CPA's allocation, appellant contends that
its costs for the first 70,000 cubic yards was $1.00 per
cubic yard ($70,498.98 ; 70,000) and that its costs for the
last 107,972 cubic yards was $2.70 ($291,580.12 + 107.-
972). Appellant contends that, since it made a profit of
$2.70 per cubic yard [the contract price ($3.70) less its
costs ($1.00)] on the first 70,000 cubic yards, that profit
should be continued for the last 107,972 cubic yards
and that the adjusted price for that yardage should be
$5.40 ($2.70 profit plus its cost of $2.70). This is the
basis for appellant's claim. Total contract earnings
would be:

70,000 cubic yards @ $3.70 259,000.00
107,972 cubic yards @ 5.40 983,048.80
842,048.80

The government challenges the claim on several
grounds. Its most vehement challenge is to the con-

24
8a

cept that the first 70,000 cubic yards of debris removed
and disposed of is identifiable as the 35.000 contract
quantity plus the 35,000 as to which price is not ad-
justable because of the Variation in Quantities clause.
In other words, the government contends that the con-
tracts do not contemplate price adjustments based
upon comparison of costs expended in removal and
disposal of the initial estimated quantities of debris
plus 100% thereof with the cost expended under the
contracts for removal of the remaining debris. The
government argues that the contracts contemplated
cleanup of an entire geographical area, and not merely
removal of a certain amount of debris. Under its con-
cept, it is not exclusively the cubic yards of debris
removed subsequent to the first estimated quantities
plus 100% that are subject to equitable adjustment.
Rather, the overrun quantities should be considered to
be distributed merely throughout the entire scope of
work under each contract. Because of the large over-
run quantities it became possible for appellant to
achieve the initial contract estimate plus 100% over-
run with use of large equipm x .:t at relatively low cost.
As the debris became smaller and less isolated near
the end of the job, its removal became more and more
difficult and costly.

According to the government, the way to arrive atan
equitable adjustment under this contract, and the
other two, is to determine the total costs incurred by
the appellant for material, labor and performance, in-
cluding overhead; to add to this an appropriate factor
for profit; and then divide the total contract cost plus
allowable profit by the number of cubic yards of debris
removed under the contract to arrive at what would be

Se’

9a.

an equitable price per cubic yard for the work. The es-
timated quantity of debris to be removed under each
contract plus 100% thereof should be paid at the
specified unit price. The remainder, i.e.. the number of
cubic yards subject to equitable adjustment, should be
paid at the determined adjusted equitable price. In
attempting to apply this formula, the government
makes the following calculation for the San Patricio
contract:

Start with total stipulated cost $362.079.30
Divide by total cubic yards 177.972
Equals the cost per cubic yard 2.03
Multiply by the yards of overrun | 107,972
Equals the cost of overrun 219,183.16
Add suggested 10% profit __ 21,918.32
Equals the total payment for overrun $241,101.48
Divide by yards in overrun 107,972
Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.23

The total contract earnings would be:

70,000 cubic yards @ $3.70 259,000.00
107,972 cubic yards @ $2.23 241,101.48
500,101.48

Portland Contract

This contract also was awarded on 7 August 1970.
The contract unit price was $3.50 per cubic yard and
the estimated quantity of debris 25.000 cubic yards. On
28 August 1970, appellant had removed and disposed
of 50.000 cubic yards. Performance continued and was

3/

10a

completed on 4 September 1970. A total of 57,477 cubic
yards was disposed of, making 7.477 cubic yards sub-
ject to adjustment.

Appellant's total costs were $111.413.79. This
amount was broken down by appellant's CPA as $77.-
039.00 incurred before and $34,374.79 after 28 August
1970. Under appellant's theory. its costs for the first
50,000 cubic yards was $1.54 per cubic yard ($77,039.00
+ 50,000) and for the last 7.477 cubic yards was $4.59
(34,374.79 + 7,477). Appellant contends that. since it
made a profit of $1.96 per cubic yard [the contract price
($3.50) less its cost ($1.54)] on the first 50,000 cubic
yards, that profit should be continued for the last 7.477
cubic yards and that the adjusted price for that yar-
dage should be $6.55 ($1.96 profit plus its cost of $4.59).
Total contract earnings would be:

50,000 cubic yards @ $3.50 $175,000.00
7,477 cubic yards @ 6.55 48,974.35
$223,974.35

Using reasoning similar to that for the San Patricio
contract, the government would calculate the adjusted
price for 7,477 cubic yards as follows:

Start with total stipulated cost $111,413.79
Divide by total cubic yards 57.477
Equals the cost per cubic yard 1.94
Multiply by yards in overrun 7,477
Equals cost of overrun 14,505.38
Add suggested 10% profit __1,450.54
Equals the total payment for overrun $ 15,955.92
Divide by yards in overrun 7,477

Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.13

lla
Total contract earnings would be:

50,000 cubic yards @ $3.50 $175.000.00
7.477 cubic yards @ 2.13 _15.955.92
190.955.92

Rockport Contract

This contract also was awarded on 7 August 1970.
The contract unit price was $3.07 per cubic yards and
the estimated quantity of debris 5,000 cubic yards. On
14 August 1970, appellant had removed and disposed
of 10,000 cubic yards. Performance continued and was
completed on 7 October 1970. A total of 51.273 cubic
yards was disposed of, making 41.273 subject to ad-
justment.

Appellant’s total costs were $109,627.06. This
amount was broken down by appellant's CPA as $19.-
100.07 incurred before and $90,527.99* after 14 August
1970. Under appellant's theory. its cost for the first 10.-
000 cubic yards was $1.91 per cubic yard ($19,100.07 :
10,000) and for the last 41,273 cubic yards was $2.12*
(90,527 : 41,273). Appellant contends that since it made
a profit of $1.16 on the first 10,000 cubic yards, that
profit should be continued for the last 41,273 cubic
yards and that the adjusted price for that yardage
should be $3.28 ($1.16 profit plus its costs of $2.12). The
total contract earnings would be:

10,000 cubic yards @ $3.07 $ 30,700.00
41,273 cubic yards @ 3.28 135,375.44
166,075.44

* There are mathematical errors in these computations made by
appellant. but since they do not affect the resuit of our F decision we
leave them as presented.

4s

i2a

Using reasoning similar to that for the other two
contracts. the government would calculate the ad-
justed price for 41.273 cubic yards as follows:

Start with total stipulated cost $109.627.06
Divide by total cubic yards 51,273

Equals the cost per cubic yards 2.14
Multiply by the yards in overrun 41,273

Equals the cost of overrun 88,324.22
Add suggested 10% profit _ 8,832.42
Equals the total payment for overrun $ 97,156.64
Equals suggested equitable price $ 2.35

The total contract earnings would be:

10,000 cubic yards @ $3.07 $30,700.00
41,273 cubic yards @ 2.35 _97.156.64
127,856.64

DECISION

While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, we
have come to the conclusion that appellant's, rather
than the government’s, theory better identifies the
yardage of debris which is subject to adjustment.

We start with the thought that, except for inclusion
of the Variation in Quantities clause in the contract.
appellant would have been entitled to be paid at the
contract unit price, no more and no less, for each of the
cubic yards disposed of. When a price adjustment
comes into play we find it a more logical concept to ap-
ply the adjustment after the basic contract concept has
been applied rather than to introduce an artificial con-

3¢
13a

cept of fungibility of all the material as the govern-
ment would have us do. Such an artificia] concept will
often be necessary because of difficulties in allocating
costs to units produced as to time of production. but
the difficulties of allocation in the present case are
very minor.

We are persuaded that appellant's reading of the
contract as to which units are adjustable is more com-
patible with the literal terms of the contract. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the fact that it is consistent
with the way time is to be adjusted for overrun quan-
tities. The contract provides that the time for per-
formance is to be extended on a proportional basis for
actual quantities in excess of estimated quantities
stated in the schedule. This approach is inconsistent
with the government's theory that the contract. as
written, gives recognition to the fact that the easy
quantities were to be achieved first and the harder
quantities later. If this theory prevailed in the writing
of the contract document, then it should have been con-
templated that the overrun quantities would have
taken more time than the original quantities for per-
formance. To be consistent more than a proportional
time extension would be provided for overruns.

We have determined that we accept appellant's
theory of the case. We do so only because we consider
ourselves bound by a literal construction of the con-
tract. We are well aware that the government's theory
of the case is the more equitable one because it was un-
doubtedly true that the first debris removed was the
easiest and that removal became more difficult near
the end for a number of reasons. However. we must

Am

14a

apply the contractas we find it since we have no power
of reformation. If an inequitable result prevails. it is
because the wrong contract was made to begin with.
Furthermore. the inequity was not mitigated by inclu-
sion of a Changed Conditions clause.

While we accept appellant's identification of the
units to be adjusted, we do not accept its suggest-
ed manner of repricing those adjustable units.
Appellant's suggested manner of adjusting the ad-
justable overrun would continue its profit per unit
earned during the early part of the work to the units
performed during the more difficult later stages of the
work. We do not accept such an obviously inequitable
approach. While we have indicated that we feel bound
to accept what may be an inequitable application of
the basic contract as written, we are not obliged to ex-
tend that interpretation in making the adjustment. In-
deed, we are precluded from doing so for the contract
itself calls for an equitable adjustment. Perhaps, the
inequitableness of appellant's contention as to how
the adjustment is to be made is best illustrated by en-
visioning the reverse of the situation which occurred
here. Suppose that a contractor were shown to have
suffered a loss on the original, unadjusted quantities.
It is inconceivable that the loss should be imposed on
repriced quantities. The unit price for the adjustable
quantities should be based upon the reasonable cost of
such quantities plus a fair profit.

We are not fully satisfied with our record as a basis
for repricing the price for the adjustable units. The
proof both of the reasonable cost and of a rate of fair
profit for performing this cleaning work is unsatisfac-

S56

15a

tory. Nevertheless, we make the best of the record that
we have by accepting the government's unrefuted
suggestion as to profit rate and appellants CPAs
“prior” and “subsequent” cost allocations. While the
government has cast some doubt upon these
allocations, it has not attempted to make similar
allocations of its own and, in any event, the items as to
which it raised questions are not substantia] in the
final figures.

We fix appellant's earnings on the adjustable units
under the three contracts as:

San Patricio cost $291.580.72
107.972 cubic yards profit + _ 29,158.07
earnings $320,738.79
first 70.000 cubic _259.000.00
yards
Total contract earnings $579,738.79
-ortland cost $ 34,374.79
7,477 cubic yards profit __3,437.48
earnings $ 37,812.27
first 50,000 cubic 175,000.00
yards
Total contract earnings $212,812.27
Rockport cost $ 90,527.99
41,273 cubic yards profit __ 9,052.80
earnings 99,580.79
first 10,000 cubic 30,700.00
yards

Total contract earnings ;, $130.280.79

27

16a

Recapitulating the total contract earnings are com-
puted as follows:
o
Appellant Government Board
San Patricio $ 842.048.80 $500.101.48 $579.738.79
Portland 223.974.35 190,955.92 212,812.27

Rockport 166,075.44 127,856.64 130,280.79
$1,232,098.59 $818,914.04 $922.831.85

The appeal is allowed in part and denied in part as
indicated above.

Date: 31 July 1974

/s/ JOHN P. JELLICO
JOHN P. JELLICO
Administrative Judge
Chairman of Board

/s/ JOHN H. RYAN /s/ HORACE C. REOSTI
JOHN H. RYAN HORACE C. REOSTI
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge
Member of Board Member of Board

3x

17a

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Corps
of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals Decision No.
3363, appeal of JACK SANDERS CORPORATION. un-
der Contract Nos. DACW64-71-C-0022, 0023 & 0024.

Date:

FRANCES H. ACETO
Recorder

37

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS
NO 79-75

JACK SANDERS CORPORATION

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES

Sam 0. Buckley, attorney of record.

for plaintiff, Keiler & Buckley. of counsel.

Gerald Schrader,with whom was Assistant
Attorney General, Rex E. Lee, for defendant.

Before COWEN, Chief Judge. DURFEE

Senior Judge. and SKELTON, Judge.
ORDER

This case comes before the court
on the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment under Rule 163 (b)(2) in a case
involving a review under the Wunderlick
Act of a decision rendered by the Corps
of Engineers Board of Yontract Appeals.
Plaintiff was awarded three contracts

for removal and disposal of debris caused

40

by hurricane "Celia"., which struck the Gulf
Coast in 1970. The actual quantities of
debris removed by plaintiff substantially
exceeded the quantities estimated in the cone
tracts. The sole issue’is the amount of
the equitable adjustment to which plaintiff
is entitled for removal of the excess.
and the answer requires only an interpreta-
tion of the "Variations in Quantities"
clause of the contracts. Thus, the case
involves a question of law with no factual
disputes.

Upon consideration of the Motions and
briefs and after hearing oral argument,
the court finds that the decision of the
Board is supported by substantial evidence
and is correct as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision
of the Board is affirmed in all respects;
plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment
is denied; defendant's cross motion for

4 |

summary judgment is also denied, and its
counterclaim is dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is
hereby remanded to the trial judge in order
to give the parties an opportunity to enter
into a stipulation for the entry of a
judgment in favor of plaintiff in accordance
with the deeision of the Board; provided,
howeyer, that if no such stipulation is
entered into within 30 days from the date
of this order, the trial judge shall
remand the case to the Board in order that
it may make an administrative determination
cf the amount of the equitable adjustment
due plaintiff on the contracts pursuant to

the Board's decision of July 31, 1974.
BY THE COURT

S/ WILSON COWEN
Chief Judge

June 25, 1976

42

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS

NO. 79-75
JACK SANDERS CORPORATION
VERSUS
THE UNITED STATES

SAM O.BUCKLEY,attorney of record, ior

plaintiif, Keiler & Buckley, of counsel.

Gerald Schrader, with whom was Assistant
Attorney General Rex E. Lee, for defendant.

BEFORE COWEN, Chief Judge, DURFEE, Senior
Judge, and SKELTON, Judge.

ORDER
This case comes before the court on Defen-
dant's Motion for an Order Amending the
court's order of June 25, 1976, and Plaintiff's
Motion for Re-hearing. The motions of both
parties state that in their briei and
argument to the court, they tailed to

properly explain or clarify the effect of

43

the decision of the Corps of Engineers
Board of Contract Appeals and consequently,
that no final judgment can be entered in
conformity with the court's order.

Upon consideration of the parties’
motions, the court finds that:

1. On the three contracts the total
contract price which the contracting
officer allowed and paid to plaintiff was
the sum of $1,017,074.01, less a discount
of $50,853.71 withheld by the contract-
ing officer because of prompt payment by
the government, or a total net payment
of $966,220.30.

2. In support of its counterclaim
in the hearing before the Board, the
government contended as follows:

Should the Board determine the

Appellant to be entitled to an

increase in contract price, under

any of the concerned contracts

then the United States believes

that it would upon payment of

such monies within the discount
period be entitled to a 5%

“4

prompt payment discount. On the

other hand, should the Board reach

an equitable adjustment decreasing
contract prices, the United States

would expect to allow Appellant a

credit equal to the prompt payment

discount and recover only 95% of

the determined reduction.

3. In the hearing before the court
and in its Motion to Amend the Order of
June 25, 1976, the Government took an
entirely different position regarding the
Claimed cash discount. Before the court
the government contends that if the Board's
determination of the adjusted contract
price is adopted, the amounts found by
the Board should be further reduced by
a discount of 5 percent. Even if it
should be decided that the contractual
provision covering cash discounts is
applicable to the adjusted contract
prices, the court finds that this conten-
tion is erroneous and rejects it, because

it fails to credit the contractor with

4S

the previously deducted discount and
would impose the discount for prompt
payment twice: once upon the original
payments made by the contracting officer,
and again upon the basis of the Board's

decision.

ie ‘Ls > The plaintiff admits that it

has been paid the contract price as
stated in- paragraph 1 above, but has
not admitted. that the government is
entitded: ten any discount on the "total. :
contract earnings"..as determined by the.
Poar@efceoyeih Sis Lsavomaz rot edscrtnos
$.-There ig.no,indi¢ggtion in the ;.
Board's: decision, that it. made- any
determination.as) to. the: applicability...
of the cash, discount. proyision;of the ,
contracts te the adjusted contract |
prices, found byothe. Board. .::: a
On. theibasiscof the foregoing. it

is'heveby «.) ositiciue sv

ve corms 6 ood BEST COPY AVAILABLE

46
ORDERED that the: courts order and
judgment of June 25, 1976 is hereby
amended in its entirety to read as

follows:

This case somes before the court
on the parties’ cress motions for summary
judgment under Rule 163 (b) (2) in a
case involving a review under the Wunder-
lich Act of a decision rendered by the
Corps of Engineers Board of Contract =
Appeals. Plaintiff was awarded three
contracts for removal and disposal of
debris caused by hurricane "Celia, *
which struck the Gulf Coast in 1970.
The actual quantities of debris removed
by plaintiff substantially exceeded the
quantities estimated in the contracts.
The sole issue is the amount of the
equitable adjustment to which plaintiff

and defendant are entitled for removal

of the excess, and the answer requires

47

only an interpretation of the "Varia-
tions in Quantities" clause of the contr-
acts. Thus, the case involves a question
oi law with no factual disrutes.

Upon consideration of the motions
and briefs of the parties and after hear-
ing oral argument, the court finds that
the decision of the Board as to the.
contractor's earnings on the adjustable
units under the three contracts is
Supported by substantial evidence and
is correct as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
decision of the Board is affirmed and
the case is remanded to the Corps of
Engineers Board of Contract Appeals
which is instructed to determine:

1. Whether the cash discount
provision of the contract has any
application to the adjusted contract
price of the three contracts, and if so.

how it is to be applied to each contract.

4&

2. The amount wf the equitable
adjustment to which the government is
entitled under the Board's decision on
the San Patricio and Rockport contracts.

3. The amount ot the equitable
adjustment to which plaintiff is entitled
under the Board's decision on the Portland
contract.

4. The net amount which the govern-
ment is entitled to recover on its
counterclaim.

Pursuant to Rule 149, court proceed-
ings shall be stayed for a period not to
exceed 6 months in order to enable the
Board to make the determinations stated
above. Defendant's attorney is designated
to advise the court, by letter to the
trial judge, with a copy to orposing
counsel, of the status of the proceedings
on remand at intervals of “O uays or less.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except as

4G

Stated above, the defendant's Motion to
Alter or Amend the Judgment of June 25,
1976, and Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing

are each hereby denied.

BY THE COURT
September 30, 1976 s/ wILSoN ‘COWEN

Chief Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_1250%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
