# Petitioners Brief — Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dekalb County, Ga.

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 429 U.S. 1060

## Text

a. '

[~~ Supreme Court, US.
FILED

MAR 2 1977

——

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-700

FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v

DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

J. ARTHUR MozLey
Attorney for Petitioner

1515 Gas Light Tower

235 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Of Counsel:

Phillips, Hart & Mozley
1515 Light Tower
235 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 522-2010

March 2, 1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

a

Page
OPINTONS BELOW........----:seeeee rere: 1
JURISDICTION........--ceeee cece ceeeeeeeee: 2
STATUTES INVOLVED.........------++se0000> 2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED........------+++0+°> 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........------+++>: 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........----+-++++> 19
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF
AUTHORITIES. ........--seccceeeeeceeeeeees 21

I. The Decision Below Is Erroneous And In
Irreconcilable Conflict With Both Federal
Common Law And Relevant State Law...... 21

A. As an aeronautical user of the Airport,
petitioner’s insured was an intended and
direct beneficiary of the duties and
obligations imposed on DeKalb County... 22

B. The decision below conflicts with

Federal Common Law........-.--+++++> 25
C. The decision below Conflicts with relevant
Beate TOW... cece ccccceccccccccccsscess 33

II. The Paramount And Overriding Interest Of
The Federal Government In Regulating All
Phases of Aeronautical Commerce Preempts
At Least To A Limited Degree Local Laws
Concerning Sovereign Immunity........---- 37

III. The Decision Below Has Resulted In An
Unconstitutional Denial Of Equal
Protection And Due Process........---+++>: 43

CONCLIIGION «oo... cc ccc cc ccc ccccccccsccceeees 47
d CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.......-.-.---++++: 48

i

\@

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

EXHIBITS:
Exhibit A—Statutes Involved................... la

Exhibit B—Log of Bird Sightings or Bird Counts
Made By F.A.A. Tower Controllers At The

BN yeahh oedd cukerveudes dagaeddss inns’ lb
Exhibit C—Written Notice Of Prior Airplane-Bird
De ie er le

Exhibit D—Letters To and From The F.A.A. and
DeKalb County Concerning The Bird Hazard
SII, 5i.0'e (oo adencdes ceendeexe ld

Exhibit E—Series of Court Orders Entered In Suit
Filed By F.A.A. Against DeKalb County
Fourteen Days After The Crash In Question,
Seeking Enforcement Of The Grant Agreements
And Alleviation Of The Bird Hazard........... le

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park,
Kentucky, 297 F.Supp. 207 (W.D.Ky. 1968) aff'd

407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969)................... 37
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead,
908 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 10GB)... 0. cece ccc cccenss 37

Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).. 30
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,

Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)................ 32
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n 0.
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956)... 1.2... eee eee ee 34

ss

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). ............. 32
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)....... 41, 42
Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847

a Ce ge ee ee i Gk ae ag 30
Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.) cert.

denied 400 U.S. 829 (1970)............. 0. cee eee 39
Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,

ee a a. eas 44
Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973)........... 46
Brown v. Wichita State University, 547 P.2d 1015

(Kan. 1976) appeal dismissed, —. U.S. .

ee ee nn aban wacave 46
Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga.App. 792,

I es ce wencks 43
Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v.

Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968).......... 39
City and County of San Francisco v. Western Air

Lines, Inc. 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr.

NR a ad a ae a calla a dha aie we 29
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,

a ee a aie 37
City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,

451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).................. 26, 32
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363

nines «wise uushueual 66a ane be aeas ede 25
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)............... 32, 33, 40

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Cases—Continued :
Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 8.E.2d
I eee eds cae aay 35
DeKalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. DeKalb County,
372 F.Supp. 748 (N.D.Ga. 1973)................. 44
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)........... 34

Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 229 N.Y.8.2d

Be CS Is So o's ons k veep beens 606% 29
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972)............ 44
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)......... 3, 34
First National Bank, Henrietta, v. Small Business

Administration, 429 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1970)...... 25
Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612

eR EE 45 ns Sah be ae ie wks a ¥ oon a 25, 42
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability

Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) ................ 45
Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 3

417 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1060). .............cceees 42
Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, |

ee a sa aw dt eeea 36

Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334 (Ct.Cl.

REG RIOR. eS Ta ena Rae are eee 30
Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan. 1974)......... 46
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek

Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1988)... ...... cc cece 25, 26
Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga.App. 361, 94 8.E.2d 503

Dc cae isaae takes hie chee eerakenels 34

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Cases—Continued :
Humphreys v. Tann, 13 CCH Avi. 18, 229
i a ee 26
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)..... 41
In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.Supp. 732
RR RS a Ean 42

Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1975)..... 46

Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400
(7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied 421 U.S. 987 (1975).... 26

Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court,

Pe Fat, | 46
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)............... 45
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387

ee ee a 28
M. R. Thomason & Associates v. Wilson,

125 Ga.App. 658, 188 8.E.2d 805 (1972).......... 34
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)............. 38
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)......... 44
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1958)... ............. 44
Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).......... 46

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527
(D.C.Cir. 1975), rev’d on other grounds

US, —..., 96 Sup.Ct. 1078 (1076). .............. 42
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292

GS ees ee Cae Dene e eel se eas Geu's's 37
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks

is ee Ny PE Is wv dccuye ds oncdaesuns 37

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cases—Continued :
Pennsylvania Environmenial Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,

454 F.2d 613 (rd Cir. 1971)... 2.0... cece ween 39
Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,

259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)............. 28, 29
Primes v. Tyler, 331 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1975)........ 46
Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673

i hai ee ee bees die 13, 28
Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S. L. Week

gg 29, 41, 42
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)................... 44
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)...... 44
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia,

280 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1960) cert. denied,

ak. in bade came Kenvews 31, 36
Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 74 S.E.2d 245

i re ee 4G bee beaee es O48 34
Smith v. Ledbetter Brothers, Inc., 111 Ga.App. 238,

i es ck cnc enn cabs eave secene 34

Smith v. United States, 497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974).. 25
Southern Airways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App.

850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960)..... anon areunet 35, 43
State Construction Company v. Johnson, 88 Ga.App.

ks Cr ST III, hu. s-6 6 6 esate we eeevesn. 34
Town of East Haven v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,

282 F.Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968)................ 42

Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450
(2nd Cir. 1973) and 329 F.Supp. 1286
EY SI 5 os ba 0 ehh G¥aee Wi0 den 60.0046 28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Cases—Continued:
United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1948)... 30

United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970)....... 25
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)......... 34
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,

Ee I rn bso 6 wkewenveddedeeseckaves 34
Ward v. Hudnell, 366 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1966)....... 18

Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 S.E.2d 38 (1974).... 44

Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F.Supp. 1300
et heed aku Gaie cue tolieedene es 45

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)........... 44

Constitutional Provisions:
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution... 3
Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia

eee ee LON ve ees 6 ek 2
Statutes:
ees a ee el ed oa es 2
EE (Se sa eS a ae wee hey ee 41
Ge kee ey ee ee eee es 2
aes aki hivee kv ncdes 2,4, 5
ee eee ly aww eaes 2,17
eS eee oe en Peas 2
ee ee ade ee eee 2
Ne dsl eu a keen es bas 2, 22, 26, 27
Se ee nec aeeees 2, 17, 22, 26, 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Statutes—Continued :
i a RE ras wk ads Sneed 2,34
ae. 4a eae Teens sedate we’ 2,43
ee Pere ee eee 2
occa a doa vou taesuaca tes 2
ec uk ka pa kcepavesedanevnes 2
i se nec eeeceyies pa saee 3,35
Ga. Code § 23-1502...............0005. 3,5,21,35,43,47
a ean ES 3,43
Administrative Rules and Regulations:
wee Ce 0 23
RR ig ad Sa scaubuvievusdeatss exe 23

Legislative Materials:
H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).. 24

Treatises:
4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 776. ..............006- 33
4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 777... ........0 eee eee 33

Viil

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-700

FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,
v.
DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS

Petitioner Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company respect-
fully submits this brief on the merits in response to the
January 17, 1977 Order granting petitioner’s request for
a writ of certiorari and consolidating this case with Case
Nos. 76-607, 76-659 and 76-722.

OPINIONS BELOW

The en bane opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, entered after rehearing, is reported at 538 F.2d
643 and is reprinted at P.A. la-6a.! The original panel
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
order granting rehearing en banc, are reported at 526 F.2d

1 As used herein, “P.A. ___”’ refers to pages of the Appendix attached
to Petitioner’s November 19, 1976 Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
and “‘J.A. ” refers to pages of the separate Joint Appendix filed
in all four of the consolidated cases.

1

2

679 and are reprinted at P.A. 17a-34a. The opinions of
the District Court are not reported, but are reprinted at
P.A. 35a-54a.

JURISDICTION

The original panel decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals was entered on January 30, 1976 and respondent
DeKalb County’s timely petition for rehearing em banc
was granted on April 5y 1976. (P.A. 17a-34a.) The en banc
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was entered
on August 25, 1976. (P.A. la-16a.) The judgment on re-
hearing en banc of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was
entered on August 25, 1976 and is reprinted at P.A.
55a-56a. The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutes and laws involved in this case were set
forth verbatim on pages 5-11 of petitioner’s petition for
writ of certiorari. Because such provisions are lengthy
they are not set out in the body of this brief. For con-
venient reference, however, the involved statutes and
laws are set forth in Exhibit A to this brief, at the pages
specified below:

Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652....... la
Airport and Airway Development Act, 49 U.S.C.

§§ 1701, 1711, 1713, 1714, 1716, and 1718...... la
Georgia Uniform Airports Law, Georgia Code
Sections 11-201, 11-205, 11-402 and 11-403..... 4a
Georgia Code Section 3-108.................. 6a
Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia
Ss 0-4 oN ss bw dds ode wkeepepedsarees 7a

3

Georgia Code Section 23-1501................ 7a

Georgia Code Section 23-1502................ 7a

Georgia Code Section 69-301................. 74a

Fourteenth Amendment, United States

EE RR eee 7a
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Must a Federal Court in a diversity of citizenship
case ordinarily subject to the holding of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), be governed by federal
common law in determining whether private litigants
have standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue a county
for breach of safety covenants contained in Grant Agree-
ments entered into between the F.A.A. and the county
for improvement of the county airport, which safety
covenants ex facie are intended for the safety and benefit
of aeronautical users of the county airport, and, if federal
common law does apply to such issue, should not the
Federal Court in deciding such issue follow the federal
common law rulings of other Federal Courts (including
Circuit Courts of Appeals) on the question?

2. If a Federal Court in a diversity of citizenship case
should not apply federal common law in determining
whether private litigants have standing as third-party
beneficiaries to sue a county for breach of safety covenants
contained in Grant Agreements entered into between the
F.A.A. and the county for improvement of the county
airport, which safety covenants ex facie are intended for
the safety and benefit of aeronautical users of the county
airport, does not the holding of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), require, the Federal Court to follow
and apply the substantive law clearly and on several

4

occasions announced by the highest appellate courts of
the forum state with respect to the question at issue,
rather than the Federal Court’s concept of the law pre-
vailing in other jurisdictions, particularly when the sub-
stantive law of the forum state would have the effect of
enforcing the objectives of such safety covenants and
fostering the public policy inherent in such safety cove-
nants and in federal legislation concerning aviation and
aid to airports?

3. Is there an overriding federal interest in the regula-
tion of aeronautical interstate commerce that preempts
at least to a limited degree state laws concerning local
sovereign immunity, so that a county which has entered
into Grant Agreements with the F.A.A. under the aegis
of the Airport and Airway Development Act (49 U.S.C.
§§ 1701, et seq.) and has received significant federal fund-
ing of county airport improvements, is precluded from
asserting sovereign immunity as a bar to suits brought by
aeronautical users of the county airport, as third-party
beneficiaries, for negligent breach by the county of safety
covenants contained in the Grant Agreements, when such
safety covenants ex facie are intended for the benefit of
aeronautical users of the airport, and particularly when
the denial of sovereign immunity to the county under
such circumstances would have the effect of enforcing the
objectives of such safety covenants and fostering the
public policy inherent in the federal regulation of aviation
and would also result in*nationwide uniform interpreta-
tions of federal aviation legislation?

4. As both municipalities and counties in Georgia have
the identical authority to engage in the same proprietary
function of owning and operating public airports, and as
both municipalities and counties are eligible on an equal

5

basis for Grant Agreements and federal funds under the
Airport and Airway Development Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 1701,
et seq.), and as under Georgia law a governmental entity
in the form of a municipality has no sovereign immunity
from suits arising from municipal ownership and operation
of public airports, and as there are no rational or legiti-
mate distinctions and differences between the proprietary
function of a municipality in owning and operating a
public airport and the proprietary function of a county in
owning and operating a public airport, do the decisions
below, which provide a county with absolute sovereign
immunity, serve to create an irrational, arbitrary and
unreasonable judicial classification of the types of local
governmental entities that can’ be sued for wrongs com-
mitted during the course of operating an airport, in viola-
tion of petitioner’s equal protection and due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, or alternatively, under the facts of
and as applied to this case, does Georgia Code Section
23-1502 in and of itself constitute an irrational, arbitrary
and unreasonable legislative classification of the types of
local governmental entities that can be sued for wrongs
committed during the course of operating an airport, in
violation of petitioner’s equal protection and due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 26, 1973, after receiving clearances from
the F.A.A.-operated control tower, a Learjet Model 24 air-
plane, F.A.A. Registration No. N-454RN, owned by
Southeast Machinery, Inc. and operated by Machinery
Buyers Corp., made an IFR takeoff from Runway 20L at
DeKalb-Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. The desti-

6

nation of the interstate flight was Miami, Florida. Im-
mediately after becoming airborne, and while within the
boundaries of the airport and at an altitude of approxi-
mately 400 feet, the jet engines of the airplane ingested a
large number of starlings or similar birds, resulting in
sudden loss of power in both engines, the crash and total
destruction of the airplane, and the death of all seven

persons aboard. (J.A. 139.)

The transcript of the radio communications between
the airplane and the F.A.A. ground and tower control
facilities describe best the events that occurred. (Time
references are to Greenwich Mean Time; “PDK GC”
refers to the Ground Control facility; and “PDK TWR”

refers to the Tower Control facility.)

TIME : 1451
N454RN : Ground Learjet four five four Romeo
November

PDK GC _: Lear four five four Romeo November
Peachtree Ground

N454RN : Put us on request I F R to ah Miami
Beach and we’re ready to taxi in about
five minutes

PDK GC : Lear four five four R N Roger

TIME : 1453
N454RN : Lear four fifty four R N’s I F R to Miami
TIME : 1453

PDK GC _: Lear four five four R N Peachtree Ground
taxi to runway two zero left wind zero
six zero degrees at five altimeter three
zero two zero follow the Bonanza ap-
proaching from your right front

N454RN : Roger

TIME
PDK GC

N454RN
PDK GC

N454RN

PDK GC

N454RN

TIME
N454RN

PDK TWR :

N454RN

PDK TWR :

N454RN
TIME

PDK TWR :

N454RN
TIME

PDK TWR :

N454RN

1457

Lear four five four Romeo November
clearance

Go ahead

Lear four five four Romeo November
cleared as filed maintain three thousand
expect flight Jevel four one zero within
three five miles squawk two zero four one
just before departure

Roger we’re cleared as filed to maintain
three expect four one oh in three five
miles squawk two zero four one departure
nineteen three

Lear four five four Romeo November
departure control frequency one one
niner point three contact tower one two
zero point niner when ready for de-
parture

(unintelligible, sounds like er and is
probably the last part of the word roger)

1459

How much a delay for Romeo November
sir

Well your number four for departure
Ok how much a delay for all of us

I don’t know we gonna get the first one

out right away
OK

1510
Lear ah four five four Romeo November
taxi into position and hold

Roger

1511

Lear four five four Romeo November
turn ah right heading two five zero for
vectors cleared for takeoff

Roger

TIME : 1512

PDK TWR : Lear four five four Romeo November it
appeared the ah left engine laid a pretty
good layer of smoke out of the left side
there for approximately ah three or four

hundred feet ah over
N454RN : We just hit some birds
PDK TWR : Ah roger ah you return turning to land
N454RN : Don’t believe we gonna make it

PDK TWR : Can you tell us where your going down
(J.A. 141-143.)

After the crash the remains of many dead birds were
found at or near the departure end of Runway 20L, and
bird remains and particles of protein matter were found on
the airplane windshield and center post and in the airplane
engines. Also, immediately prior to and after the crash
large flocks of birds were located in and about the Airport
boundaries and the adjacent garbage dump operated by
DeKalb County. The sole physical cause of the crash was
loss of engine power in both jet engines, resulting directly
and solely from the ingestion of birds in the engines.
(J.A. 143.)

Petitioner Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, which
provided hull insurance to Southeast Machinery with
respect to Learjet N-454RN, paid its insured for the hull
loss and then filed this suit against respondent DeKalb
County and the United States of America to recover for
the $549,432.00 hull subrogation interest. (J.A. 144.)
Jurisdiction over DeKalb County was based on diversity
of citizenship and jurisdiction over the U.S.A. was based
on the Federal Tort Claims Act. (J.A. 138.)

As amended, the complaint against DeKalb County
alleged three principal claims: negligence; maintenance of

9

public and private nuisance; and breach of certain grant
agreements entered into between DeKalb County and the
F.A.A. concerning development of the county-owned and
operated airport. (J.A. 136-175.)

In this case and in four other cases resulting from the
catastrophe the District Court granted motions to dismiss
filed by DeKalb County, on the theory that the concept
of sovereign immunity barred any claims against DeKalb
County. (P.A. 35a-53a.)

Petitioner (and plaintiffs in the other four cases) ap-
pealed to the Fifth Cireuit Court of Appeals from the
order dismissing respondent DeKalb County, and on
January 30, 1976 the initial Fifth Cireuit panel of Circuit
Judges Godbold, Dyer and Morgan issued a decision re-
versing the District Court dismissal order. 526 F.2d 679.
This initial Fifth Cireuit decision held that DeKalb
County was entitled to sovereign immunity as to peti-
tioner’s negligence and nuisance claims, but that under
Georgia law sovereign immunity did not bar the breach of
contract claim based upon petitioner’s status as a third-
party beneficiary of the safety covenants imposed upon
DeKalb County by the F.A.A. in certain Grant Agree-
ments. Circuit Judge Dyer dissented from the portion of
the decision holding that petitioner could sue for breach
of contract. The basis for his dissent was that federal
common law applied to the breach of contract claim and
that under federal common law petitioner lacked standing
to sue as a third-party beneficiary.

Thereafter, respondent DeKalb County moved for
rehearing en bane and on April 5, 1976 rehearing en banc
was granted. 526 F.2d 688. On August 25, 1976, the Fifth
Circuit sitting en banc, in an eight to five decision, adopted
Circuit Judge Dyer’s earlier dissent and in effect ruled

2 md
SS

10

that DeKalb County was entitled to sovereign immunity
as to all of petitioner’s claims, including the breach of
contract claim. 538 F.2d 643. The five dissenting members
of the en bane Court were Chief Judge Brown and Circuit
Judges Goldberg, Ainsworth, Godbold and Morgan, and
they urged that petitioner did have standing as a third-
party beneficiary to sue for DeKalb County’s breach of
the Grant Agreements. Four of the dissenting judges of
the en bane court also argued that federal common law
did not apply to the case.

On November 19, 1976 Fireman’s Fund filed its timely
petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted by this
Court’s January 17, 1977 Order. Such Order also consoli-
dated this case (No. 76-700) with three other cases (Nos.
76-607, 76-659 and 76-722) involved in the decision below.

As the decision in question was entered with respect to
respondent DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss, it is
necessary for this Court generally to be aware of the
relevant allegations of petitioner’s complaint, which
allegations are set forth below.

Prior to the crash, DeKalb County had actual knowl-
edge that birds could be ingested into jet engines, and that
jet engine bird ingestion could cause an engine failure and
crash. DeKalb County also had actual knowledge that a
dangerous bird hazard and bird-attracting garbage dump
existed at the Airport immediately adjacent to the jet
runway, and that huge flocks of starlings and other birds
had been attracted to the open garbage dump maintained
by the County on the Airport premises. (J.A. 147.)

Pursuant to the authority and directions of Congress,
the F.A.A. prior to the crash in question had issued
Advisory Circular No. 150/522-3A, dated March 2, 1972,

11

entitled “Sird Hazards to Aircraft,” in which the F.A.A.
stated in part as follows:
“Migratory birds, particularly waterfowl, are a
hazard to aircraft due to their size and weight. In
recognition of this potential hazard, F.A.A. Air
Traffie Control and Flight Service Station facilities
issue advisory information on bird activities when
they are reported or when they have knowledge of
such activities. Information given to pilots ineludes
the position, species or size of bird if known, and their
course and altitude.’’ (J.A. 152.)
To cope with such bird hazards, the Advisory Circular
stated that the F.A.A. operates as follows:
“A.A, Air Traffie Control and Flight Service Sta-
tion facilities coordinate with airport management
for either appropriate alerting action by a Notice to
Airmen when flocks of birds are noted to remain in
the airport vicinity or for possible closing by a Notice
to Airmen when flocks roost on runways.” (J.A. 152.)
The duties of the I’.A.A. tower personnel at the Airport
are in part set forth in the Terminal Air Traffie Control
Manual, 7110.8, one of the air traffie control manuals
referred to in Part 65 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,
in which Manual the following responsibilities of air
traffic control personnel are listed:

“If you observe or are informed of any condition
which affects the safe use of a landing area:

(a) Relay the information to the airport manager
concerned,

(b) Issue a Notice to Airmen publicizing an unsafe
condition if you are unable to contact the airport
manager (of if there is no airport manager desig-
nated) and then inform the manager as soon as
practicable. . .

”?

12

“122. BIRD ACTIVITY
ADDNL S8VC

“a. Issue advisory information on the position
and, if known, species or size of birds, and their
course of flight and altitude if you believe that the
safety of flight in that area may be affected. Do this
for at least 15 minutes after receipt of such informa-
tion from pilots or from adjacent facilities unless
visual observation or subsequent reports reveal the
activity is no longer a factor.”

“1552. BIRD ACTIVITY INFORMATION

“a. Issue advisory information on pilot-reported
or radar-observed and_ pilot-verified bird activity.
Include position, species or size of birds, if known,
course of flight and altitude. (1¢)

Phraseology :

FLOCK OF (Species, if known)/(size, if known)
BIRDS, (number) O’CLOCK (number of miles)
MILES (direction) BOUND:

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined
from pilot report).

or
ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

FLOCK OF (species, if known)/(size, if known)
BIRDS (direction) BOUND ALONG (flyway or
geographical route) :

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined
from pilot report).

or
ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

FLOCK OF/NUMEROUS FLOCKS (species, if
known)/(size, if known) BIRDS, VICINITY
(location):

13

LAST REPORTED AT (altitude, as determined
from pilot report).

or

ALTITUDE UNKNOWN.

b. Relay bird activity information to adjacent
facilities and to F'SS’s whenever it appears it will
became a factor in their areas.”’ (J.A. 153.)

Public knowledge of the hazards of birds to aircraft
has existed at least since the 1940’s, when the F.A.A. pub-
lished a report containing detailed statistics on the col-
lision of aircraft with birds, which report was admitted
into evidence in Rapp v. Kastern Air Lines, Inc., U.S.A.,
et al., 264 F.Supp. 673 (1.D.Pa. 1967), and which report
included 1946 statistics on bird strikes by aircraft, there
being more than one such strike per day during this early
aviation period. (J.A. 155.)

DeKalb-Peachtree Airport is located in DeKalb County
on land owned by the County, and the Airport is owned,
operated, managed and maintained by the County. The
Airport has paved runways, hangars, servicing and park-
ing facilities, a control tower with radio facilities, an in-
strument landing system control center, and access to
other radio and navigational aids. The Airport is operated
by the County for the public welfare and benefit of all
citizens and 1s subject to the jurisdiction of the F.A.A.

(J.A. 156.)

DeKalb County acquired the Airport by way of quit-
claim deed from the United States General Services Ad-
ministration in 1960. Since 1966 DeKalb County has
utilized the Airport site for dumping raw garbage. Km-
ployees of DeKalb County at the Airport have observed
and reported a significant increase in the number of birds
at the Airport following the utilization of the Airport site
for raw garbage disposal. (J.A. 156.)

14

The untreated raw garbage, refuse, trash, offal, filth
and other waste material deposited by DeKalb County
on the Airport created a large area constituting an attrac-
tion to birds and causing huge flocks of birds to congre-
gate about the Airport, the runways, ends of runways
and other areas within the Airport boundaries. The attrac-
tiveness of the open garbage dump to birds was increased
by the failure of DeKalb County to remove trees, under-
growth and high grass from the area of the open garbage
dump and along the runways, which foliage provided
roosting, nesting and basking areas for the large flocks of
birds attracted to the garbage dump. The birds at times
remained, walked and ran upon said runways and ad-
jacent grass areas at the sides and ends of the runways,
and congregated in the numerous trees on and about the
Airport area. The birds when located upon the Airport
grounds often flew aloft in large flocks many times each
day as aircraft would take off, approach, land or fly near
said Airport. The flocks of birds at the Airport constituted
a continuous hazard to the safety of aircraft and to the
safety and lives of the crews and passengers therein and to
persons residing and located upon the ground in the
vicinity of the Airport. (J.A. 157-158.)

Beginning in June, 1962, the Federal Government
entered into six Grant Agreements with DeKalb County,
pursuant to which at least $1,025,224.06 was paid to the
County for the purpose of assisting the County in the
improvement and development of DeKalb-Peachtree
Airport. Associated with the various Grant Agreements
is an airport layout plan developed by DeKalb County
and approved by the F.A.A. graphically illustrating the
development and proposed development of the airport
facilities and the use of the land included within the air-
port boundaries. Such use does not include an open gar-

15

bage dump or any other dumping ground for garbage.
(J.A. 159.)

Prior to the crash in question, the F.A.A. recognized
that the existence of the open garbage dump at the Air-
port constituted an attraction to huge flocks of birds, and
that such birds constituted a definite hazard for aircraft
taking off and landing at the Airport. From March 9,
1970, to February 14, 1972, the F.A.A. communicated
with DeKalb County, both by letter and by conference,
relative to alleviation of the bird hazard caused by the
existence of the open garbage dump on the Airport site.
In February 1971, the F.A.A. was advised by DeKalb
County that the dump would be closed by August, 1972,
but DeKalb County did not close the dump and the
hazard continued. (J.A. 160.)

The Grant Agreements entered into between the F.A.A.
and DeKalb County under the Airport and Airway
Development Act imposed the following obligations on
DeKalb County:

‘The Sponsor [DeKalb County] will keep up to date
at all times an airport layout plan . . . Such airport
layout plan, and each amendment, revision, or modifi-
cation thereof, shall be subject to approval of the
I’.A.A., which approval shall be evidenced by the signa-
ture of a duly authorized representative of the F.A.A.
on the face of the airport layout plan. The Sponsor will
not make or permit the making of any changes or
alterations in the Airport or any of its facilities other
than in conformity with the airport layout plan as so
approved by the F.A.A., if such changes or alterations
might adversely affect the safety, utility, or efficiency
of the Airport.” (J.A. 161.)

As previously noted, the airport layout plan made no
mention of an open garbage dump on the Airport. The

eee

16

Grant Agreements also imposed the following specific
covenants on the County:

“The covenants shall remain in full force and effect
throughout the useful life of the facilities developed
under this Project, .. .”

“The Sponsor will operate the Airport as such for the
use and benefit of the public. . . . The Sponsor may pro-
hibit or limit any given type, kind or class of aeronauti-
cal use of the Airport if such action is necessary for the
safe operation of the Airport or necessary to serve the
civil aviation’ needs of the public.”

“The Sponsor will operate and maintain in a safe and
serviceable condition the Airport and all facilities
thereon and connected therewith which are necessary
to serve the aeronautical users of the Airport other
than facilities owned or controlled by the United States,
and will not permit any activity thereon which would
interfere with its use for airport purposes.’

“In addition, the Sponsor will not erect or permit the
erection of any permanent structure or facility which
would interfere materially with the use, operation, or
future development of the Airport, in any portion of a
runway approach area in which the Sponsor has ac-
quired, or may hereafter acquire, property interests
permitting it to so control the use made of the surface
of the land.”

. The Sponsor will not make or permit the making
of any changes or alterations in the Airport or any of its
facilities other than in conformity with the airport lay-
out plan as so approved by the F.A.A., if such changes
or alterations might adversely affect the safety, utility,
or efficiency of the Airport.”

“Insofar as is within its power and to the extent
reasonable, the Sponsor will take action to restrict the
use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of
the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with

17

normal airport operations including landing and takeoff
of aircraft.”’ (J.A. 161-163.)

DeKalb County violated the Grant Agreement cove-
nants by willfully permitting the existence of an open
garbage dump and bird hazard on the Airport site and
adjacent to Runway 20L. The covenants ex facie were
intended for the benefit and safety of aeronautical users
of the Airport, and petitioner’s insured was a third-party
beneficiary of said Grant Agreement covenants. Accord-
ingly, DeKalb County is liable for breach of such Grant
Agreement covenants. (J.A. 163.)

By reason of the existence of the open garbage dump
prior to and on February 26, 1973, the operation of the
Airport by DeKalb County constituted a public and
private nuisance and a hazard to public safety, and the
maintenance of the open garbage dump at the Airport
constituted an airport hazard as defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1711, and was a violation of the 49 U.S.C. § 1718(3).
(J.A. 163.)

The reckless nature of the negligence and dereliction of
duties of DeKalb — ounty is exemplified by the fact that
prior to the fatal crash in question, DeKalb County had
received notices of several airplane bird-strike and near
bird-strike incidents within the airport boundaries, but
despite this knowledge of prior incidents DeKalb County
failed to take any action at all to prevent a recurrence of
such incidents. (J.A. 170.)

The Airport is not owned, operated, managed and
maintained by DeKalb County as a governmental func-
tion or enterprise, but, instead, is owned, operated,
maintained and managed by DeKalb County as a pro-
prietary or ministerial function or enterprise. DeKalb

18

County leases substantial portions of the Airport to
private companies engaged in commercial operations for
profit; some of such leases are for fixed rental amounts
plus a percentage of the revenues or income derived by the
tenants from their commercial operations; the revenues
thus obtained by DeKalb County are not insignificant,
but are substantial; and the Airport is owned, operated,
managed and maintained by DeKalb County primarily as
a source of revenue for the County. In effect, with respect
to the ownership, operation, management and main-
tenance of the Airport, DeKalb County acts as a private
landlard and not as a governmental entity. (J.A. 170-171.)

Prior to the accident, DeKalb County purchased a
liability insurance policy providing bodily injury liability
insurance and $1,000,000.00 property damage liability
insurance with respect to the ownership, operation, man-
agement and maintenance of the Airport, and petitioner’s
claim falls within the limits of such policy. Such insurance
contains a “Waiver of Governmental Immunity” rider
which provides as follows:

“It is agreed that the Company waives any right to
deny liability under the policy or to refuse payment
within the limits thereof by reason of the non-liability
of the insured political subdivision for the wrongful or
negligent acts of its agents and employees and its im-
muni y from suit as an agency of the State performing
governmental functions.” (J.A. 171-172.)

As the rulings in question were entered on the County’s
motion to dismiss, it is axiomatic that for purposes of
decision herein the above-summarized allegations of the
complaint must be accepted as true. Ward v. Hudnell,
366 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1966).

So that the Court will be aware that such allegations

19

are founded upon real facts, however, and so that the Court
may be made aware of the enormity of the bird hazard
that existed at the Airport as a result of the County’s
insistence upon maintaining an open garbage dump on
the Airport premises, petitioner has attached as Exhibits
to this brief some of the documentary evidence adduced
in the trial court during the process of discovery deposi-
tions, as follows:

Exhibit B—log of bird sightings or bird counts made
by F.A.A. tower controllers at the Airport.

Exhibit C—written notices of prior airplane-bird
strikes at the Airport.

Exhibit D—letters to and from the F.A.A. and
DeKalb County concerning the bird hazard
and garbage dump.

Exhibit E—series of court orders entered in suit filed
° by F.A.A. against DeKalb County fourteen days
after the crash in question, seeking enforcement

of the Grant Agreements and alleviation of the
bird hazard.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The statutory and contractual covenants in question ex
facie are intended to prot. ct and provide for the safety of
aeronautical users of the Airport, and such covenants im-
posed on DeKalb County the duty to alleviate airport
hazards, to use airport premises only for purposes com-
patible with normal airport operations, and to operate
and maintain the airport in a safe and serviceable con-
dition.

Such statutory and contractual covenants were in-
tended solely and exclusively for the benefit of aeronauti-

20

cal users of the airport, such as petitioner’s insured, and
petitioner’s insured clearly falls within the class of per-
sons intended to be protected by such covenants. More-
over, petitioner’s injury is not imaginary, but is real and
immediate. And neither the Grant Agreements nor the
Airport and Airway Development Act nor the legislative
history of such Act evince any intent that petitioner’s
claims be precluded from review.

Under both Federal Common law and the law of
Georgia petitioner has standing as a third-party benefi-
ciary to sue the County for breach of the statutory and
contractual covenants in question, and the decision below
is clearly erroneous.

Il.

Aviation or aeronautical commerce is extensively and
pervasively regulated by the Federal Government, and
such federal regulation extends to and completely en-
compasses the activity of local governmental entities and
agencies in operating and maintaining public, federally
funded airports. Such federal regulation of necessity pre-
empts any local laws that would burden or conflict with
the purposes of and policies explicit in the federal regu-
lation.

By voluntarily seeking and obtaining ownership of and
operating rights to the Airport in question from the
General Services Administration, and by voluntarily
seeking and obtaining in excess of a million dollars in
federal aid under the Airport and Airway Development
Act, and by voluntarily executing Grant Agreements
with the F.A.A., DeKalb County entered a federally
regulated area of interstate commerce and subjected it-
self to federal regulation of airport activities. As a matter
of federal law DeKalb County thereby waived its sover-

21

eign immunity to the extent of private claims involving
rights and remedies implicit in the federal regulation.

To rule otherwise would impede substantially the
federally expressed concern for aviation safety (and elimi-
nation of airport hazards) explicit in the Act and Grant
Agreements, and would impose an _ unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce and the rights of inter-
state aeronautical travellers.

Il.

Under Georgia law the statutory authority for a city or
a county to own and operate an airport is the same, and
under Georgia law the operation of an airport by either a
city or county is a proprietary—not governmental—
function. Georgia law also provides that a city has no
sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising from
the operation of an airport.

Georgia Code Section 23-1502 cannot constitutionally
be interpreted to bar petitioner’s claims against DeKalb
County, as the result of such an interpretation would be
the creation of a scheme of classification that would allow
suits against some local governmental entities for the
negligent proprietary operation of airports but would
prohibit identical suits against other local governmental
entities for the identical negligent proprietary operation
of identical airports, in violation of petitioner’s rights to
equal protection of the laws and due process.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES

I. The Decision Below Is Erroneous And In Irreconcilable
ee EE IE
State Law.

The cornerstone of the ruling below is the conclusion
. that petitioner is a mere “incidental beneficiary”’ of the

a

22

statutory and contractual duties imposed on DeKalb
County by the Grant Agreements, federal legislation, and
regulations in question, and that as an “incidental’’
rather than “intended” beneficiary petitioner has no
standing to sue for breach of contract. 526 F.2d 686-687.
In this connection, a majority of the Court below con-
cluded that the “only purpose” of the statutory and con-
tractual covenants relied upon by petitioner ‘‘was to make
sure that federal funds were effectively employed and not
wasted.”’ 526 F.2d 687.

While petitioner concedes that certain provisions of the
Federal Act and Grant Agreements in question are ob-
viously designed to guard against waste or misuse of
federal funds [see 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(1) (B) and (C),
§ 1718(7), (8), (9) and (10), § 1720, § 1721, §1725 and
§ 1726, and paragraph 9 of the Grant Agreement appear-
ing at page 202 of the Joint Appendix], petitioner con-
tends that the particular statutory and contractual
covenants and regulations involved in this case are quite
clearly intended solely and directly for the benefit of
aeronautical users of the Airport.

A. As an aeronautical user of the Airport, petitioner’s

insured was an intended and direct beneficiary of

the duties and obligations imposed on DeKalb
County.

49 U.S.C. § 1718 expressly provides that prior to the
grant of federal funds the recipient of such funds shall
make the following written promises, among others:

(1) The airport will be suitably operated and main-

tained ;

(2) Aerial approaches will be cleared and protected;
(3) Existing airport hazards will be mitigated, and

' : 23

! the establishment or creation of future airport hazards
z£ will be prevented; and

(4) The use of land adjacent to or in the immediate
vicinity of the airport will be restricted to activities
compatible with normal airport operations, including
landing and takeoff of aircraft.

These statutory duties on their face are related to
aviation safety, and not to the subject of possible waste
or misuse of federal funds.

The federal regulations issued to ‘flesh out” the Act
confirm that the fostering of aviation safety is one of the
primary purposes of the Act. For example, 14 CFR
§ 151.5(b)(1) specifies that an airport development proj-
ect must provide for the planning or development of an
airport that is “safe, useful, and usable.” See also 14 CFR
§ 152.5(b).

In the Grant Agreements executed pursuant to the
requirements of the Act and the regulations issued there-
under, DeKalb County specifically agreed:

(1) To operate the Airport “for the use and benefit
of the public” (J.A. 217);

(2) That it would “operate and maintain in a safe
and serviceable condition the Airport and all facilities
... which are necessary to serve the aeronautical users

of the Airport . . . and wili not permit any use thereon
which would interfere with its use for airport purposes.”’
(J.A. 218.)

(3) That it would not erect or permit the erection of
any structure or facility which would interfere material-
ly with the use or operation of the Airport (J.A. 218.);
and

(4) That it would restrict the use of land to purposes
and activities compatible with normal airport opera-

en

24

tions, including landing and takeoff of airplanes.
(J.A. 210.)

The legislative history of the Act confirms that the pur-
pose of the above-summarized statutory and contractual
duties is to provide for the safety of airport users. For
example, H.R. Rep. No. 91-601, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1970), provides:

“The problem of congestion in terms of cost and in-
convenience, as serious as it is, is secondary to the
problem of maintaining the safety of aircraft and air
travelers.”

* * *

“The basic elements of the aviation system are the
airman (pilot), vehicle (aircraft), and the airport. In
order to provide for safety, the Congress has legislated
that the airman and vehicle shall meet standards con-
sidered necessary to safety of flight and that each be
certificated by the Federal Government. However,
airports are also essential to the conduct of flight opera-
tions and conditions at an airport can seriously influence
the safety of flight.”

* * *

“Section 18 of the reported bill requires that the
Secretary receive a number of assurances prior to his
approving a project for airport development. They are
designed to assure, among other things, that airports to
which a project relates will be . . . suitably operated
and maintained. Also, requirements are included re-
specting . . . the removal or mitigation of airport
hazards, .. .” 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News,
pp. 3051, 3058 and 3071.

The particular statutory and contractual covenants at
issue here are not intended simply to prevent a wasting
of Federal funds, but, instead, have as their primary
objective the safety of aeronautical users of public,

. 25

federally funded airports. There can be no doubt at all
that aeronautical users of the Airport were the primary
and intended beneficiaries of the contractual and statutory
covenants at issue, and that Airport aeronautical users
fall well within the class of persons intended by Congress
to be protected and benefitted by such covenants.’

B. decision below conflicts with Federal Common
Ww.

The contracts in question are “Federal” contracts, in
that the Federal Government is one of the contracting
parties and in that the contracts themselves, together
with almost all of their specific terms, are expressly au-
thorized by Federal legislation and regulations. Moreover,
the contract terms are uniform and standard nationwide,
regardless of the identity or geographical location of the
non-lederal contracting party. Last, the contracts affect
and deal with a particular area—aeronautical commerce
—that is the subject of pervasive and preemptive regula-
tion by the Federal Government.

Petitioner therefore acknowledges that there may be

cogent reasons for the application of Federal common law

‘ to the question of whether petitioner has standing as a
third-party beneficiary to sue for the County’s breach of

the Grant Agreement covenants. See United States v.

Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970); Clearfield Trust Co. »v.

United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Smith v. United States,

497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974); First National Bank,

Henrietta v. Small Business Administration, 429 F.2d 280

(5th Cir. 1970); Cf., Hinderlider v. La Pluta River &

’ “adeed, it would seem that the primary purpose of all federal regu-

lation of aviation is protection of the safety of aeronautical travellers.

See the discussion of similar federal regulation of aviation, set forth
° in Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612 (C.D.Cal. 1972).

Se a

26

Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). [On occasion
the lower Federal courts have found it especially appro-
priate to fashion Federal common law in cases involving
aviation or aeronautical commerce. See Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied
421 U.S. 987 (1975); and Humphreys v. Tann, 13 CCH
Avi. 18, 229 (E.D. Mich. 1976).]

Assuming, therefore, that Federal common law is
determinative of the issue at hand, the decision below
conflicts with the applicable Federal common law and is
for such reason erroneous.

In the leading case of City of Inglewood v. City of Los
Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit
focused on the precise question involved here, namely,
whether non-contracting parties have standing as third-
party beneficiaries to sue for breach of Grant Agreements
identical to those sub judice. 451 F.2d 954.

After reviewing the grant agreement covenants, statu-
tory provisions and legislative history, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the
particular Grant Agreement covenants involved in that
case:

“There is a further issue for this Court to resolve—
whether or not Inglewood has standing to enforce the
Federal Aviation Administration grant agreements
with Los Angeles under the provisions of 49 U.S.C.A.
section 1716(c) (3) and 1718(4). The district court
found that sec. 1718(4) [then sec. 1110(4)] was only
intended to deal with the safety of airplanes on takeoff
or landing; that the plantiffs were not the intended
beneficiaries of the grant agreements; and that the
statutes imposed no duty on the defendant City of Los
Angeles to give ‘fair consideration’ to neighboring
residents. [C.R., pp. 372-373] Both parties on appeal

et ne Se eber

. 27

have treated the question as being whether or not the
plantiffs have standing to sue under the grant agree-
ments.

“We turn first to the question of the purpose of
sections 1716(c) (3) and 1718(4). The legislative history
is silent regarding the intention of Congress in enacting
sec. 1716(c) (3). However, the legislative history of see.
1718(4) [sec. 1110(4)] supports the theory that flight
safety was not the sole purpose of the section. Rapp v.
Kastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa. 1967)
cited by the district court and the appellee only deals
with sec. 1718(3) [then sec. 1110(3)|. We conclude,
contrary to the District Court, from the language of
sec. 1716(c) (3) and the legislative history of sec.
1718(4) that each were intended by the Congress to
insure that the welfare of persons living close by air-
ports which were to receive government funds to engage
in development projects would receive ‘fair considera-
tion’ by the Secretary o° Transportation.” 451 F.2d
954-955. (Footnotes omitted.)

After ruling that plaintiffs possessed the requisite

‘ standing to sue (451 F.2d 955), the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished and refused to follow the third-party beneficiary

cases relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in the opinion below:

‘Los Angeles attempts to find support for its position
in a series of cases holding that third parties cannot sue
on grant agreements between airports and the Federal
Aviation Administration based upon third-party bene-
ficiary contract doctrines. Port of New York Authority
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y.
1966); City and County of San Francisco v. Western
Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr. 216
(1962). We note that in both cases the plaintiffs were
airline companies and the provisions of the Federal
Airport Act they were attempting to enforce were not
the provisions plaintiffs are attempting to enforce in

\° this case.

28

“While we express no opinion as to the merits of
those cases, we do not find them controlling in this case.
If Los Angeles made the assurances required by sec.
1716(c) (3) and sec. 1718(4) in applying for various
grant agreements, then Inglewood must certainly be
included within the category of intended beneficiaries of
those assurances. Congress had some purpose in enact-
ing these two sections of Title 49. It is not to Los
Angeles’ benefit to be required to give the Secretary
those assurances; nor are the assurances of any inde-
pendent benefit to the Secretary. The Secretary merely
receives them for the benefit of, and in the place of, the
surrounding communities and residents of the area.
Any other interpretation of sec. 1716(c) (3) and sec.
1718(4) deprives them of any meaning or effect.”
451 F.2d 955-956. (Emphasis added.)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also indicated
that private, non-contracting parties ‘“‘may qualify as
intended beneficiaries” under the particular Act and type
of F.A.A. Grant Agreements involved here. Luedtke v.
County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975).
Cf., the District Court and Circuit Court decisions in
Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 481 F.2d 450 (2nd Cir.
1973), and 329 F.Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

And in the landmark airplane-bird ingestion case,
Rapp v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.Pa.
1967), the District Court’s judgment of tort liability in
favor of private, non-contracting parties and against the
defendant (who was a party to Grant Agreements) was
based in large part upon the defendant’s breach of duties
and obligations imposed by F.A.A. Grant Agreements
identical to the ones involved here.

The only other cases petitioner has been able to locate
dealing with the type of F.A.A. Grant Agreements in- -
volved here are Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air

29

. Lines, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 229 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y.
Sup.Ct. 1962); and City and County of San Francisco v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., 204 Cal.App.2d 105, 22 Cal.Rptr.
216 (1962). Although all three of these cases denied third-
party beneficiary status to the plaintiffs there involved,
such cases are easily distinguishable from the case at bar.

The Port of New York Authority and Western Airlines
cases involved Grant Agreement covenants totally dif-
ferent from the ones involved here, and the plaintiffs in
those two cases were certificated air carriers who quite
obviously were not benefitted in the least by the particular
covenants they sought to enforce.

.
= «obi
.

on Cae

—: The Town of Islip case was a decision by a single state
-court trial judge who applied New York law, not Federal
. common law. Moreover, the trial judge’s ruling was

obviously influenced by his positive finding that the real
cause of the accident was plaintiff’s own negligence. See
“% 229 N.Y.S.2d 119 and 120.

Although it did not involve an F.A.A. Grant Agree-
ment, the recent decision of the Third Circuit in Rauch v.
United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S. L. Week 2333 (3rd Cir.
1976), sheds light on the question of whether parties in
the category of petitioner’s insured are intended benefi-
caries of Federal aviation statutes and regulations. As
reported at 45 U.S. L. Week 2333, the Third Circuit held:

“In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 43 LW 4733 (1975), the

U.S. Supreme Court set forth guidelines for deciding

whether a private individual who has been injured by

a violation of a federal statute can sue under that

statute even though it does not expressly provide for a

private remedy. The first question to be considered

4 under the Cort analysis is whether the prospective

ee

Renee

30

plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted. The congressional objective of
safety permeates the Federal Aviation Act, and the
fostering of safe air travel was the congressional motive
for giving the administrator the authority to prescribe
minimum safety standards governing aircraft appli-
cances. In a broad sense, Congress was seeking to assure
the personal safety of all persons who are potential
passengers or crew members of aircraft as well as those
on the ground whose lives and property might be
endangered by accidents resulting from unsafe aircraft.
These are persons who constitute the class for whose
especial benefit the safety provisions of the statute were
enacted.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Cf., Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir.
1973).

Petitioner also points out that in Hebah v. United States,
428 F.2d 1334, 1339 (Ct.Cl. 1970), the Court ruled: “It is
settled, moreover, that an intended third-party benefi-
ciary of a government contract can sue under § 1491.”
Likewise, in United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.
1948), third-party beneficiaries of a government lease
were allowed to sue the government for breach of the
lease.

The decision below is in direct conflict with the Federal
common law expressed in the above-cited cases. Such
decision also conflicts with other, better-reasoned decisions
of the Fifth Circuit itself.

In Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847
(5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit held that black children
were third-party beneficiaries of anti-discrimination cove-
nants contained in federal aid grant agreements between
the local school board and H.E.W., and that such children
had standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue the local ’*
school board for breach of such covenants. In so ruling,

31

the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the District Court
holding that ‘“‘Defendants by their contractual assurances
have afforded rights to these federal children as third-

party beneficiaries concerning the availability of public
schools.” 370 F.2d 847.

And in Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia,
280 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942
(1961), the Fifth Circuit held that a private party should
be allowed to maintain a tort-damage action against a
Georgia county because the Federal Power Act and a
license granted to the County under such Act imposed a
duty on the County to protect the property of private
third parties.

In concluding that petitioner lacked standing as a
third-party beneficiary to sue for breach of the Grant
Agreement covenants, the Court below not only failed to
recognize and follow the federal common law explicit in
the cases discussed above, but applied the wrong test to
determine whether plaintiff possessed standing as a third-
party beneficiary.

The Court below held that under federal common law
the test of standing as a third-party beneficiary was
whether the “federal” contract itself clearly manifested
an intent to compensate the third party in damages in the
event of a breach. 526 F.2d 686-687. This measure or test
of standing was not distilled from decisions of this Court or
from decisions of other Federal Courts. Instead, this test of
standing was derived from the forty-four year old First
Restatement of Contracts, and it is clearly an erroneous
and inapplicable test.

Under federal common law, the true measure of stand-
ing as a third-party beneficiary is a three-pronged test:

32

(1) does plaintiff’s personal stake in the case satisfy the
concrete adverseness required by Article III of the Con-
stitution? (2) does plaintiff fall within the class of persons
or zone of interests intended to be benefitted or protected
by the contractual or statutory provisions in question?
and, (3) does the contract or statute in question preclude
suit or judicial review? See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975);
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159, 164-165 (1970); and City of Inglewood v. City of
Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 1972).

Petitioner’s claims herein clearly measure up to these
three yardsticks. First, petitioner’s injury is not imagi-
nary, but is real and immediate. Second, petitioner falls
within the class of persons intended to be protected by
the statutory and contractual covenants in question, as
such covenants on their face are intended to protect, and
provide for the safety of, “aeronautical users of the Air-

port.”

And third, neither the Grant Agreements nor the Air-
port and Airway Development Act, nor the legislative
history of such Act, preclude petitioner’s claims against
DeKalb County. To the contrary, allowance of petitioner’s
claims can serve only to foster and enforce the United
States’ expressed concern for aviation safety and the
public policy considerations inherent in the Act and Grant
Agreements in question.

Last, petitioner wishes to remind this Court of two
principles of ‘“‘hornbook” law concerning third-party
beneficiaries:

(1) In determining whether a contract manifests an ~
intent to benefit-a third party, the intent of the prom-

oo Scere Cet aie comets HR des

33

isee (here, the F.A.A.) must be examined, and not the
intent of the promisor (here, DeKalb County). See 4
Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 776.

(2) It is not necessary that the promisee intended to
create a “right” in the third party. All that is required
is that the promisee intended for the promisor to render
a performance that would be beneficial to the third
party. See 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 777.

Under these traditional tests, and under the tests
enunciated by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
petitioner clearly has standing as a third-party beneficiary
to sue DeKalb County for breach of the statutory and
contractual covenants in question.

Cc. yo decision below Conflicts with relevant State
w.

Turning now to the relevant state law, we note initially
that the particular issues at hand here do not really
involve the Federal Government and do not really
touch upon the rights and duties of the Federal Govern-
ment. Moreover, the accident in question occurred in
Georgia and DeKalb County’s performance (and non-
performance) of the contract also occurred in Georgia.
Last, it would seem that the issues of breach vel non,
damages, and other similar issues would under any set of
circumstances be determined by local law.

Under these conditions, this Court on several occasions
has believed it appropriate to employ state law to deter-
mine the general type of issue here involved, particularly
(a) when there is no significant conflict between some
identifiaiiie federal policy and the relevant state law, and
(b) when the relevant state law would serve to foster or
enhance any federal policy implicit or explicit in the so-

34

called ‘‘Federal’”’ contract. See Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
Cf., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).

In any event, if federal common law does not govern
the question of whether petitioner has standing as a third-
party beneficiary to sue for breach of the Grant Agree-
ment covenants in question, then Hrie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), dictates that the substantive law of the
forum state must govern such question.

Georgia Code Section 3-108 provides: “The beneficiary
of a contract made between other parties for his benefit
may maintain an action against the promisor on said con-
tract.”

In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 74 S.E.2d 245
(1912), the Georgia Supreme Court held that “the great
weight of authority is to the effect that if the promise is
made for the purpose of conferring a benefit on a person,
though he be not a party to the contract, or furnish the
consideration for the promise, he can bring suit upon it.”’
To the same effect are Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga.App. 361,
94 S.E.2d 503 (1956); Smith v. Ledbetter Brothers, Inc.,
111 Ga.App. 238, 141 S.E.2d 322 (1965); M. R. Thomason
& Associates v. Wilson, 125 Ga.App. 658, 188 S8.E.2d 805
(1972); and State Construction Company v. Johnson, 88
Ga.App. 651, 656, 77 S.E.2d 240 (1953).

The Georgia law regarding third-party beneficiaries
of contracts also applies to suits against counties, and
counties are not immune from third-party beneficiary
suits. To demonstrate this point we need only refer to-
the full bench decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in

35

Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 65 148 S.E.2d 414
(1966):

“Counties are empowered to sue or be sued in any
court. Code § 23-1501, but ‘a county is not liable to
suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute.’
Code § 23-1502. However, an exception exists where a
county breaches a contract it was authorized by law to
undertake. . . . ‘Whenever a county is made liable by
statute for a demand, or is authorized by statute to
contract, and in pursuance of such power does contract,
then an action will lie against it to enforce such liability,
or to enforce any rights growing out of such contract, al-
though there is no statute expressly authorizing the
bringing of an action for such purpose. . . . In other
words, a county can always be sued upon any liability
against it created by statute, or for breach of any valid
contract which it is authorized by law to make.’

‘* ‘Liability to suit may be shown by indicating that
the claim arises . . . as an incident in the performance of
an undertaking by the county authorized by statute.’ ”
(Emphasis added.)

Petitioner also calls attention to Southern Airways Co.
v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App. 850, 118 S.E.2d 234 (1960)
(involving the very same airport and very same county
involved in the case at bar), where the Georgia Court of
Appeals held (102 Ga.App. 865):

“In its motion for rehearing, the county urges that
this court overlooked the decision in Purser v. Dodge
County, 188 Ga. 250 (3 8.E.2d 574), which held that a
county is not liable for a suit for any cause of action
unless made so by statute. As we construe the Uniform
Airports Act, Code Chapter 11-2, which expressly
extends its coverage to counties, as shown in the
original opinion, the county is authorized to contract
as it did here. The logical inverse inference of the act is
that, to the extent the county is authorized to contract, it

Se

36

also may be sued upon the contract for breach or for inter-
ference with performance.” (Emphasis added.)

See also Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 198
S.E.2d 659 (1973) (in which the Georgia Supreme Court
upheld a death claim against a county based upon a tort
arising out of breach of contractual commitments be-
tween the county and Georgia Power Company); and
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Crisp County, Georgia, 280
F.2d 873, 877-878 (5th Cir. 1960)cert. denied 375 U.S. 942
(1961) (in which the Fifth Circuit held: “Here the County
was under a duty imposed by the Federal Power Act to
protect the Seaboard’s property, and thus the Act created
a tort liability.’’)

From the foregoing, it cannot be denied that if federal
common law does not apply to the question at hand, then
the decision below is plainly erroneous and in irreconcil-
able conflict both with the mandate of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and with the decisions of the highest appellate
courts of Georgia.

Summarizing, the decision below should be reversed
because:

(a) If federal common law applies to the question
under consideration, then the decision below is in irre-
concilable conflict with federal common law, with the
decisions of other Federal Courts, and with the public
policy inherent in the Grant Agreements, the Act
itself, and the legislative history of the Act.

(b) If state law applies to the question under con-
sideration, then the decision below is in irreconcilable
conflict with the mandate of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
and with the law of Georgia.

37

Il. The Paramount And Overriding Interest Of The
Federal Government In Regulating All Phases of
Aeronautical Commerce Preempts At Least To A
Limited Degree Local Laws Concerning Sovereign
Immunity.

From even a cursory review of the aviation laws and
regulations promulgated by the various branches of the
Federal Government, it is clear that aviation or aeronauti-
cal commerce is an extensively and pervasively federally
regulated area of commerce, and that such federal regula-
tion of necessity preempts any iocal laws that would
burden or conflict with the purposes of and_ policies
explicit in the federal regulation. See City of Burbank ».
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302 (1944)
(concurring opinion of Justice Jackson); American Aitr-
lines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 ¥.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1968); American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park,
Kentucky, 297 F.Supp. 207, 212 (W.D.Ky. 1968), aff'd 407
F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969).

As is evident from the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act and the declaration of congressional policy
therein, and as is also evident from the regulations issued
under such Act and from the Grant Agreements them-
selves, the pervasive federal regulation of aeronautical
commerce extends to and encompasses the activity of
local governmental entities in operating and maintaining
federally funded public airports.

In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks
Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), this Court held that when the
States granted Congress the power to regulate commerce
the States surrendered any portion of their sovereignty
that would stand in the way of such regulation (377 U.S.

38

191-192), and that the States also waived their traditional
sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising from
voluntary activity by the States in the federally regulated
area of commerce. (377 U.S. 192-198.)

Specifically, in overruling the state agency’s sovereign
immunity defense to the F.E.L.A. tort suit brought by
plaintiffs in the Parden case, this Court ruled:

“Moreover, such a result {sustaining of the sovereign
immunity defense] would bear the seeds of a substantial
impediment to the efficient working of our federalism.
States have entered and are entering numerous forms
of activity which, if carried on by a private person or
corporation, would be subject to federal regulation . . .
In a significant and increasing number of instances,
such regulation takes the form of authorization of law-
suits by private parties. To preclude this form of regu-
lation in all cases of state activity would remove an
important weapon from the congressional arsenal with
respect to a substantial volume of regulable conduct.
Where, as here, Congress by the terms and purposes of
its enactment has given no indication that it desires to
be thus hindered in the exercise of its constitutional
power, we see nothing in the Constitution to obstruct
its will.” 377 U.S. 197-198.

See also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), where
this Court stated:
“Tn the first place, it is clear that the Federal Govern-
ment, when acting within a delegated power, may
override countervailing state interests whether these

be described as ‘governmental’ or ‘proprietary’ in
character.”’ 392 U.S. 183.

This Court in Wirtz also said:

“Tf a State is engaging in economic activities that are
validly regulated by the Federal Government when
engaged in by private persons, the State too may be

”

39

forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.”’

392 U.S. 197.

Subsequent to this Court’s ruling in Parden, supra, the
Cireuit Courts of Appeal have consistently overru'ed
sovereign immunity defenses relied upon by state agencies
engaged in various activities regulated by Congress.
Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
454 I'.2d 613 (8rd Cir. 1971) (by engaging in activity of
paramount federal interest a state may waive its sovereign
immunity, and whether such waiver has occurred is a
question of federal law); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130
(10th Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (in the realm
of interstate commerce congressional authority is supreme
and overrides any state interest in sovereign immunity
with respect to rights and remedies implicit in federal
regulation); Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v.
Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968) (by seeking and
obtaining admission into federally regulated area of inter-
state commerce, and by obtaining permission to build and
operate bridge and tunnel across bay, state agency waived
any sovereign immunity to federal court suit for damage to
ship which struck submerged light tower).

DeKalb County was not required to seek and obtain
ownership of and operating rights to the Airport in ques-
tion from the General Services Administration. DeKalb
County was not coerced into seeking and cbtaining
$1 025,224.06 in federal aid under the Airport and Airway
Development Act. And DeKalb County was not forced
into signing Grant Agreements with the F.A.A. and in
subjecting itself to federal regulation of airport and avia-
tion activities.

DeKalb County voluntarily sought and obtained admis-
sion into a federally regulated area of interstate commerce,

40

and thereby as a matter of federal law waived its sovereign
immunity to the extent of private claims involving rights
and remedies implicit in the federal regulation. To rule
otherwise would impede substantially the federally ex-
pressed concern for aviation safety (and elimination of
airport hazards) explicit in the Act and Grant Agreements
in question.

Petitioner concedes that the above-discussed cases
involved Federal regulatory statutes that specifically
created some sort of cause of action or right to relief on
the part of aggrieved persons, and that neither the Act
nor the Grant Agreements in question here provide ex-
pressly for a private ‘‘cause of action.” Petitioner believes,
however, that with respect to the damage caused to
petitioner by DeKalb County’s maintenance of a statu-
torily proscribed airport hazard, use of land for purposes
incompatible with airport operations, and breach of
statutory and contractual covenants, a ‘private remedy”’
is implicit in the Act and Grant Agreements in question.

In Cor! v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), this Court set forth
four tests for determining whether a private remedy is
available for conduct in violation of a federal statute:

(1) Is plaintiff one of the class for whose special
benefit the statute was enacted?

(2) Is there any legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
to create or deny a private remedy?

(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purpose of
the statute to imply a private remedy for plaintiff?

(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the

* Petitioner wishes to point out that in paragraph No. 66 of its com-
plaint (J.A. 172), petitioner expressly, specifically and in detail,
pleaded the “waiver of immunity” discussed in this portion of
petitioner’s brief.

.
- Lebiat > inter test ec cual

41

States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on Federal law?

Petitioner’s claim passes all of these tests.

The statutory and contractual covenants at issue are
on their face intended for the direct benefit of persons in
the category of petitioner’s insured. See pages 22-25 of
this brief, supra, and Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc.,
45 U.S. L Week 2333 (3rd Cir. 1976).

There is no legislative intent behind the Act in question
to deny a private remedy to plaintiff. Moreover, in /llinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972), this Court
concluded that “federal question” jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 “will support claims founded upon federal
common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”” And
the Court went on to state, ‘When we deal with air and
water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a
federal common law... .”’ 406 U.S. 103. Surely the same
reasoning applies to rights related to aeronautical com-
merce and/or “Federal contracts,” such that petitioner’s
claim herein is a “‘federal’’ one falling within the Section
1331 grant of jurisdiction. See City of Milwaukee, supra,
406 U.S. 99-107.

Allowance of petitioner’s claim as an implied “private
cause of action’? would be wholly consistent with the
underlying purpose of the statutory and contractual cove-
nants at issue, which underlying purpose is the mitigation
of airport hazards and enhancement of the safety of aero-
nautical users of federally funded public airports.

And last, we are not dealing with an area of peculiar
concern only to the States. To the contrary, the issues
involved fall exclusively within the concern of Federal
legislation and Federal policy. Thus, it is not inappropriate
to infer a ‘‘Federal” cause of action. See Bivens v. Siz

42

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392, 396-397 (1971), and Gomez v. Florida
State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569, 575-581 (5th Cir.
1969).

Petitioner’s claim of an implied federal cause of action
is not without judicial precedents, as the lower Federal
courts have on several occasions ruled that “private’’
causes of action may be implied from various Federal
aviation statutes and regulations. Town of East Haven v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 282 F.Supp. 507 (D.Conn. 1968);
Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.Supp. 612 (C.D.Cal.
1972); In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F.Supp. 732 (C.D.Cal.
1975). See also Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 45 U.S.
Law Week 2333 (3rd Cir. 1976); Nader v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 5387 (D.C.Cir. 1975), rev’d on
other grounds, ____ U.S. , 96 Sup. Ct. 1978 (1976).

Summarizing, by voluntarily seeking admission into
the federally regulated area of aeronautical commerce and
by voluntarily subjecting itself to federal regulation in
such area of commerce, DeKalb County as a matter of
federal law has waived any immunity against petitioner’s
implied private cause of action based upon the County’s
breach of the statutory and contractual covenants in
question.

At this juncture, we wish to point out that the cases
discussed in this portion of our brief indicate that the
waiver of immunity applies to tort suits, as well as to
suits for breach of federally imposed duties (contractual
or otherwise).

The decision below fails to apply the federal law dis-
cussed above; is in head-on conflict with the rulings of

this Court and other Federal Courts concerning waiver °

of immunity and implied federal causes of action; and if

43

allowed to stand can serve only to burden interstate
commerce and to thwart the explicit objectives of the
Act and Grant Agreements in question.

! For these reasons alone, this Court should reverse the
decision below.

Ill. The Decision Below Has Resulted In An Uncon-
a Denial Of Equal Protection And Due
ess.

Any interpretation of Georgia Code Section 23-1502
that would result in the application of sovereign immunity
to bar petitioner’s claims arising from DeKalb County’s
proprietary activity in owning and operating the airport
would work a denial of equal protection and due process
of law.

? It is clear that under Georgia law a city can be sued in

vie tort for negligence resulting from the city’s proprietary

| activity in owning and operating an airport. Caroway v.

' City of Atlanta, 85 Ga.App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952);

? Georgia Code Section 69-301.

| It is also clear that under Georgia law DeKalb County’s
ownership and operation of the airport in question con-
stitutes a proprietary activity or function. Southern Air-
ways Co. v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga.App. 850, 118 8.E.2d
234 (1960).

And the statutory authority for either a city or a county
to engage in the proprietary activity of owning and operat-
ing an airport is the same: the Uniform Airport Law,
Georgia Code Sections 11-201, et seq.

Thus, if Code Section 23-1502 is construed to include
; proprietary activity as well as governmental activity, the
result would be a scheme of classification that would
\ allow suits against cities for negligent proprietary opera-

OP ln ate olan a

|

44

tion of airports but would prohibit identical suits against
counties for identical negligent proprietary operation of
identical airports. There is simply no legitimate or rational
basis or reason for a legislative or judicial scheme of
classification which has the effect of allowing prosecution
of the former type of suit but disallows prosecution of the
latter type of suit.

Any such legislative classification would be patently
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the
laws, and any judicial ruling creating such a classification
would be equally unconstitutional. [The constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection apply not
only to legislative enactments, but also to judicial in-
terpretation of such enactments. Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930).]

This Court has held that any legislative classification
by a State “. . . must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”’

Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See
also Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1958); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); DeKalb
Real Estate Board, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 372 F.Supp. 748
(N.D.Ga. 1973); Wilder v. State, 232 Ga. 404, 207 8.E.2d
38 (1974).

And in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374
(1886), this Court summarized the equal protection guar-
antee in these now-famous words:

“Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, °
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimi-

45

nations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”

More recently, in Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F.Supp.
1300, 1301 (N.D.Ga. 1974), a three-judge Federal Court
defined the equal protection test thusly:

“Courts normally subject legislation challenged under
the equal protection clause to a standard of rationality.
The state’s goal need only be reasonable, and the statute
need not be a perfect method to achieve the goal. If the
Court can conceive of a rational viewpoint that justifies
the statute, it will stand. When legislation affects
certain fundamental liberties and rights, however, it
is subjected to a stricter constitutional test—only a
compelling state interest will suffice.”

Obviously, the right to have a claim adjudicated by a
court and jury on a basis equal with others similarly
situated falls within the category of “fundamental rights
and liberties” referred to in the above quotation.

The arguments we are presenting here do not constitute
a departure from established case law, as there are several
analagous judicial decisions that support the contentions
we have outlined above.

In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), this Court
held unconstitutional the judicial construction given by
Louisiana courts to the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act,
to the effect that legitimate children, but not illegitimate
children, could sue for the wrongful death of their mother.
The ground of decision was that such a judicial construc-
tion of the statute created arbitrary and discriminatory
classes of people who could sue for wrongful deaths, in
violation of equal p~otection guarantees.

) For identical reasons, in Glona v. American Guarantee &
-|- Lnvability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), this Court

LS ee

46

held unconstitutional the judicial construction given by
Louisiana courts to the Louisiana Wrongful Death Act,
to the effect that a mother could not sue for the wrongful
death of her illegitimate child. In its decision the Court
noted that “‘A law which creates an open season on illegiti-
mates in the area of automobile accidents . . .” has abso-
lutely no relevancy to any legitimate State interest.

So, too, in the case at bar a scheme of classification
that allows suits against federally funded municipal air-
ports but prohibits identical suits against federally funded
county airports is totally irrational and unrelated to any
legitimate State interest or “‘public policy.”

In a similar vein, the highest courts of several states
have recently declared that automobile guest passenger
statutes or judicial rules, under which a guest passenger
may sue for the host driver’s gross negligence, but not
for his ordinary negligence, are unconstitutional and void,
in that they serve only to create arbitrary and discrimi-
natory classifications of causes of action in contravention
of the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and
due process. See Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District
Court, 538 P.2d 574 (Nev., 1975); Primes v. Tyler, 331
N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1975); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d
771 (N.D. 1975); Henry v. Bauder, 518 P.2d 362 (Kan.
1974); Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973).

Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that
provided that all causes of action survived the death of
either party, except for causes of action based on libel
and slander. Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).

Cf., the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fatzer in
Brown v. Wichita State University, 547 P.2d 1015, 1032-
1043 (Kan. 1976), appeal dismissed, ___. U.S. —__, 97
Sup.Ct. 41 (1976).

47

We believe the constitutional infirmity in the classifica-
tion scheme contended for by DeKalb County is revealed
clearly when it is realized that if the City of Decatur (the
county seat of DeKalb County), rather than DeKalb
‘County, was the owner and operator of the federally
funded airport the issue of sovereign immunity would
not be involved in this litigation.

Thus, Code Section 23-1502 cannot within the limits of
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process be construed to bar the claims involved in this
litigation, and the decision of the Court below is erroneous
for this reason alone.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated herein, petitioner respect-
fully prays that this Honorable Court reverse the decision
and judgment of the Court below.

Respectfully submitted,

. ARTHUR MozLey
Attorney for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

PHILLIPS, HART & MOZLEY
1515 Gas Light Tower

235 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

(404) 522-2010

48

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, J. ARTHUR MOZLEY, attorney for Petitioner
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company and a member of
the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby
certify that on the 2nd day of March, 1977, I served three
true copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner on the
Merits upon the respondents and all parties, by depositing
in a United States mailbox true copies of said petition,
with first class postage prepaid, correctly addressed to the
following, as required by Supreme Court Rule 33:

Mr. MEADE Burns

Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler
191 Lawrence

300 Cobb Federal Building
Marietta, Georgia 30060

Mr. WENDELL K. WILLARD
Harvey, Rhodes & Willard
125 Trinity Place

Decatur, Georgia 30030

Mr. Ronacp R. GLANCz

Appellate Section, Civil Division
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Mr. WitiiAM D. MALLARD, JR.
Assistant United States Attorney
P. O. Box 912

Atlanta, Georgia 30301

Solicitor General of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20530

Respectfully,

. ARTHUR MOZLEY
Attorney for Petitioner

EXHIBITS

Le Se

la

EXHIBIT A

STATUTES INVOLVED

The ‘Rules of Decision Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1652, is
relevant to the questions presented by this petition.
That Act provides:

“The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they

apply.”

The following portions of the Airport and Airway
Development Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq., are also
involved:

“$ 1701. Congressional declaration of policy.
“The Congress hereby finds and declares—

“That the Nation’s airport and airway system is
inadequate to meet the current and projected
growth in aviation.

“That substantial expansion and improvement of
the airport and airway system is required to meet the
demands of interstate commerce, the postal service,
and the national defense.

“That the annual obligational authority during
the period July 1, 1970, through June 30, 1980, for
the acquisition, establishment, and improvement of
air nav.gational facilities under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, should be no less than $250,000,000.

“That the obligational authority during the
period July 1, 1970, through June 30, 1980, for
airport assistance under this chapter should be
$2,500,000,000.”

2a

** *

“§ 1711. Definitions.
“As used in this subchapter—

* * *

(3) ‘Airport hazard’ means any structure or ob-
ject of natural growth located on or in the vicinity
of a public airport, or any use of land near such air-
port, which obstructs the airspace required for the
flight of aircraft in landing or taking off at such
airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing or
taking off of aircraft.”’

* * *

“§ 1713. Planning grants.

“‘(a) In order to promote the effective location and
development of airports and the development of an
adequate national airport system plan, the Secretary
may make grants of funds to planning agencies for
airport system planning, and to public agencies for
airport master planning.”

*x* * *
“§ 1714. Airport and airway development program.

“‘(a) In order to bring about, in conformity with the
national airport system plan, the establishment of a
nationwide system of public airports adequate to
meet the present and future needs of civil aero-
nautics, the Secretary is authorized to make grants
for airport development by grant agreements with
sponsors in _ ageregate amounts not less than the
following: . . .”

* * *
“§ 1716. Projection application for airport develop-
ment.

“(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of
this section, any public agency, or two or more

ublic agencies acting jointly, may submit to the
Recretary a project application, in a form and con-
taining such information, as the Secretary may pre-
scribe, setting forth the airport development pro-
posed to be undertaken. No project application shall

3a

propose airport development other than that in-
cluded in the then current revision of the national
airport system plan formulated by the Secretary
under this subchapter, and all proposed develop-
ment shall be in accordance with standards estab-
lished by the Secretary, including standards for site
location, airport layout, grading, drainage, seeding,
paving, lighting, and safety of approaches.”

** *

“(e)(1) All airport development projects shall be
subject to the approval of the Secretary, which
approval may be given only if he is satisfied that—

(A) the project is reasonably consistent with
plans (existing at the time of approval of the proj-
ect) of planning agencies for the development of
the area in which the airport is located and will
contribute to the accomplishment of the purposes
of this subchapter;

** *

“(E) all project sponsorship requirements pre-
scribed by or under the authority of this sub-
chapter have been or will be met.”

** *

“$1718. Project sponsorship requirements; com-
pliance; contracts between Secretary and
public agencies; air traffic control activi-
ties; relief of sponsors.

“As a condition precedent to his approval of an
airport development project under this subchapter,
the Secretary shall receive assurances in writing,
satisfactory to him that—

“‘(1) the airport to which the project for airport
development relates will be available for public use
on fair and reasonable terms and without unjust
discrimination;

i oe

4a

(2) the airport and all facilities thereon or con-
nected therewith will be suitably operated and
maintained, with due regard to climatic and flood
conditions;

““(3) the ae pm eqeenarnes to the airport will be
adequately clea and protected by removing,
lowering, relocating, marking, or lighting or other-
wise mitigating existing airport hazards and by
preventing the establishment or creation of future
airport hazards;

(4) appropriate action, including the adoption
of zoning laws, has been or will be taken, to the
extent reasonable, to restrict the use of land ad-
jacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the air-
port to activities and purposes compatible with
normal airport operations, including landing and
takeoff of aircraft;

** *

(8) the airport operator or owner will maintain
a fee and rental structure for the facilities and ser-
vices being provided the airport users which will
make the airport as self-sustaining as possible
under the circumstances existing at that particular
airport, taking into account such factors as the
volume of traffic and economy of collection; . . .”

The following portions of the Georgia Uniform Air-
ports Law, Georgia Code Sections 11-201, et seq., are
relevant here:

“11-201. Municipalities, etc., may acquire airports.

“Municipalities, counties, and other political sub-
divisions are hereby authorized, separately or jointly,
to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease,
control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate
and police airports and landing fields for the use of

5a

aircraft, either within or without the geographical
limits of such municipalities, counties, and other
political subdivisions, and may use for such purpose
or purposes any available property that is now or
may at any time hereafter be owned or controlled by
such municipalities, counties or other political sub-
divisions. . . .”
* * *

“11-205. Authority to equip, improve, establish fees
and charges, lease, etc.

“Counties, municipalities, or other political sub-
divisions which have established or may hereafter
establish airports or landing fields, or which acquire,
lease, or set apart real property for such purpose or
purposes, are hereby authorized:

“(a) To construct, equip, improve, maintain,
and operate the same, or to vest authority for the
construction, equipment, improvement, mainte-
nance, and operation thereof, in an officer, board,
or body of such political subdivisions. The expense
of such construction, equipment, improvement,
maintenance, and operation shall be a responsi-
bility of said political subdivision.

“(b) Subject to existing contracts, to adopt
regulations and establish charges, fees, and tolls
for the use of such airports or landing fields, fix
penalties for the violation of said regulations, and
establish liens to enforce payment of said charges,
fees, and tolls.

“(e) To lease such airports or landing fields to
private parties for operation or to lease or assign
to private parties for operation, space, area, im-
provements, and equipment on such airports or
landing fields: Provided in each case that in so
doing the public is not deprived of its rightful,
equal, and uniform use thereof.”

6a

** *

“11-402. Definitions.

“As used in this Chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires:

** *

(2) ‘Airport hazard’ means any overhead power
line which interferes with radio communication be-
tween a publicly-owned aircraft approaching or
leaving same, or any structure or tree which ob-
structs the aerial approaches of such an airport or is
Tae hazardous to its use for landing or taking
Oo Saad

‘11-403. Airport hazards not in public interest.

“Tt is hereby found and declared that an airport
hazard endangers the lives and property of users of
the airport and of occupants of land in its vicinity,
and also, if of the obstruction type, in effect reduces
the size of the area available for the landing, taking-
off and maneuvering of aircraft, thus tending to
destroy or impair the utility of the airport and the
public investment therein, and is therefore not in the
—_ of the public health, public safety, or general
welfare.”

Georgia Code Section 3-108, which authorizes a
breach of contract suit by a third party beneficiary,
provides:

“3-108. Parties to actions on contracts.

“As a general rule, the action on a contract,
whether express or implied, or whether by parol or
under seal, or of record, shall be brought in the name
of the party in whom the legal interest in such con-
tract is vested, and against the party who made it in
person or by ‘agent. The beneficiary of a contract
made between other parties for his benefit may
maintain an action against the promisor on said
contract.”

7a

Article XI, Paragraph I of the 1945 Georgia Consti-
tution provides the following with respect to counties:

“Each county shall be a body corporate with such
powers and limitations as may be prescribed by law.
All suits by or against a county shall be in the name
thereof; and the metes and bounds of the several
counties shall remain as now prescribed by law,
unless changed as hereinafter provided.”’ Ga. Code
Ann. 2-7801.

Georgia Code Section 23-1501 provides counties
with the following powers:

23-1501. Every county as body corporate.—
“Every county is a body corporate, with power to
sue or be sued in any court.”

Georgia Code Section 23-1502, which the courts
below construed as supplying counties with carte
blanche sovereign immunity in all cases and under all
circumstances, provides:

“23-1502. When country liable to suit.—

“A county is not liable to suit for any cause of
action unless made so by statute.”

With respect to the immunity of municipalities,
Georgia Code Section 69-301 provides:

“69-301. Municipal corporations liable for what.

“Municipal corporations shall not be liable for
failure to perform, or for errors in performing, their
legislative or judicial powers. For neglect to perform,
or for improper or unskillful performance of their
ministerial duties, they shall be liable.”

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution in pertinent part provides:

8a

‘*’.. nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”

eR TE ee see

6 TE et eee ore ae nee ee

EXHIBIT B

Log of Bird Sightings or Bird Counts Made By
F.A.A. Tower Controllers At The Airport.

lb

vA

ee Lae ol

*

Bb zol
26 Vaveh 1971 at pier
geaon”

Status report cn birds

S0~5h0

Ga 10 Janay AZT, a Ceconr hOl MNEl9SK veperted a bird strike on departure
Leon DeseabePoscitres Adlrport and i= adhately returned for a lradtag. this
eSreraft sustained davize to both wing tip tenks, the lesding edge of both
whags, ond casage to the engine cowlingse Prior to this eccurrence no
records were kapt of tho bird activity at this aliport. From 11 Janvary
through 8 February a shagle entry vould be nade fn our Daily Pecord of
Facility Opovations (FAA Fora 7239-8) whenever birds vera presout on the
Aiiport cud Uhuie loetbion presented a potential baserd that scqutved
radio notiftestion to avviving aud departing airemtt. From 9 February to
the provest date, a lightly sore co.vrehensive report has boon palntainod.

From the Daily Recocd of Facility Operations forms

Jamary = 20 - Large flecks of birds ea alrevet ae a
oo "
13 "
1S sd
16 "
22 «
24 Ht)

February 5 "

From supplercatal Locos oa Vind eetivily aobiects

Feoruary = 9 I0OIF Abenk $9) or wore binds oa top of even, birds
apt to Le fne,essing in weber bub most are

Jeandiag oa tha deop level that cant te sean

Prom t' a teovew ante

3230) ‘VWhsouwwents of Sleek tbels of ced 2 oe the DawdPill

Wood Wovreaty ef bbets ov cw) pece tha lewif pl

A ceuple of ther and toes vty ing tute and cat of

swalase Cocp ava

hesends of binds 49 th: Vand@§1 sven

}
VI A New Goedel y PEAS ft wdvorert Look off on 22,
“6

oN YUL
os
Ne
oc

1! r, 5 | aoe rnds of ofavlh ae %:82.°9 ativberes fran ao * a
{x Sesh Aaety Geos of tas bhids alt sited on ths rns
Pia eae abt bo vnc oly a7, the round sabuvscd te

\W

8 SG es ? ¥
(hh,
1 VG Greups ef haces. a of bieds derieting anoe and evosalay
Sharh «bro Uy oft ce Elune th hte,
9) MDD a Os ot BE reracth Med @H01
100° WN3S Ssee rel Us seats of Uleds on beth cie-s of Bii352 08

2b

Toebvurry =

10
10

ns
M
M1

M1

12

(cont'd) theushold of rusinay 27, continued movesent

1615

1139
130)
1322

)337

W395
1695

1090

302

1239
160%

1239
69
10,0
1625

9730
Va nN
1490

Several thouiond bives near tho appresch of
runway 27 and dup sea cast of runway 205,

Thousends of birds svemd the dendfii1
Avoul YOO Lir's eiveltog tie wird sock
Phoustn’s of virds cep orted the dump areca
cast bowad from Vie duno
thousenats of birds arrived fvam the cast and
Janted at tha duup
fnall Meek of birds 2 to 309 flying ovor ¢urp
Soverval theovsand birds on Sopreach end of rumay
27 ond next to runway 20L near euap
Fow hundred otarlings observed in troecs near runiey
Oe OL,
About a thoucend sturliogs on gross trea cost of
remay 22-20), aud in teces on vost southwout port
of gairteaye duap
Tieusanda of birda sround runway!27 and land rh) “re
Plocks of birds 1099 or mre jn trees east of runiuy
20L cinco 1109 15?
Lives Slock of birds gathering at dunp
Hundecd bDives soon on yeaua near wind sock
lovee fleck of birds avovund mid-field intarscetion
Lave flock of virds « 1090 or move in dunp areca
and in tices ewt ef vunwvay 20L
A wocter of b'ves Jn troos adjsecnt to curp
Aw. Scr of bivds ta tho teeces adfsecat to aGucg ares
Tououssnds of Uirds in the trous along side of aes
ZOL
Thoussnda of birds In the trees alung side ruirisy el
they are not flying
Avent 300 sterlings on and nei runcay 20),
Live f1..% of bi ay at dus p end at 20-2 7 Lute:
Aleut $09 Divds nerr the wind seek area oad fnew
U9) Lateoen runinys 20 and 2L coath of rumay
Patinate 2000 birds on dung and Peck of bivds tu
gides of rvinvay 708, noor vind soak

|

‘
:
u

Sey al) thensond birds obcerved on tha ,round ia “oe

Cua nveay, silifaw hou eroged Ulin to tus? of f ood

fry tule {yeen on > st fda of th a Ve

Me wy Pow Aa Aset

A fou tw Cred beds fa tices of vast shee of Cunp

vical sal Bivt’s cee dp Gren

Several } a" Vi Aor rowr'sy ?, aur! +t
A 1 iy a”) ,1 crensy CL int © i

wip

j +o ods ui Sleds of ceound near rercay 20%, «t vif

‘ “%

Moses of tieds ever dung end ever runcay 200

3b

.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Fobrutcy 19 1137 ~Fow hundred birds in trees on vest sido of garbaye dunp
19 J245 Wonereds of birds near vind sock
W 1395 Plock of Dlads flew across rucay 16 vur active runvay
2 31520 2099 starlings over dump areca
Lb 1430 Ware Tip Eas? iy of vires en and Sround runvay 20L

i 3 of tivds on both sides of the oost ond of runny

%.27 ond on hill en seuth sido of garbsygo dunp

20 «©7200 Vesthow eofling core visibility 1/8 fog, no birds observed

20 3302 Srall Lweaehes of Lirds in tho trees along sido runway ei,
Heavy rein the rest of tho cay

2} Poin ajl day

22 2005 A fow hundred His in tyroos adjacont to yarbage dump and
a feu hundred tn evess aren couth of runway 27

°? 117%) A Sow hundred bivdsa in trees edfjeecnt to ysrbase dicip

ae 3300 A Sow hendved Mires Leticea rockpile and runway 16 cad
A Sow ivindred vere Eorbage Guap

2? 105) Sov eal hundred birds in trees near gaybago dump areca

220 1535) Soll fleek of bivds along rumway 16 and Jarge flock

wcval thonsamnt ca south side of runuay 27

22 NG Sead) Shock of Mees botucen yumvay 207 and 20L seuth of
ruasy O-27.

22 «= 1737) Levge fleck ef blids oa Approsch end of rumwy 27

i

23 «67390 Pecks of sev val tundreds of birds flying in tho land rill
frea

73 1309 Floc’ of birés in cunp area ond a few birds crossing rurm.ay
6 at iid fleld

23 1595 Pleek of birds along runiay 20%, ot dump

e3 1715 Fleck of several buudved siavl luca at end of rurray 201,

Yh = =C2390) Few sevll flocks ov birds Ply!tag around

Yh ey Sout 590 starllocs neur wind sock

a 16° % Nevge flock of strrJings in flight over dump

ah Ibo) fey ct) thensawd livds beblveen runvay 206 and duap area

25 eet l

26 thor bed atha cud feg cally a Pow hundred birds observed
Uh a of

27 I9C0) Aloub 809 Vless eu eum y 22 woew land £111 and avout 39) bi

I lot ' t

27 1635 : tr) “7 Loves the alenoct

cf tate) & « ) - } , vi ort

‘ / 144°) & ° ) , ¢ ‘ vi 1% i A, > 4 - - iT

af igh) i ) i ¢ itid id

ef er ew) to Jiivdsa oa prorst esat of ruanay 20L

3 ) : ery ) 2 x ay bi vel ( ° > rar
j | Wloc! ‘L. ; } : i \ Piad iy wOe on / 4
iv Ua uvor Thin « ) 14 ‘ tins in ¢ ’ 2 .
dowt «a } * hog y ta y 2/ ma this

‘ 19 ] ; 4 ‘3 A
j Go) selz 1 C } "5 } . i 4 ‘9

, } & 4 ) > ; 73) ca i

bives “are ve
i ; oF | 3s 0 north site of y 27 at} Lins

yal

7 ! t af var f, in |
f ! l + 0, } ; 1 { l of ) J /
, , i’ OL

. ] } " t 2, of remay zi tr 38

?
f ) a |
‘ } , ‘ —% 1 ‘ a f ’, i |
o

Tver

cS Lob

‘avch 10 19190 Approcch end of renvay 27 covered with starlings

10 109 sires still cover approach end of runvay 27

10 WIS Several thousand starlings at approach end of rum:ay 27

10 340 Several thousend starlings left side of tho Latersection of
runcy 27 and 20% ond Letiscen renrays 20R und 20% crass arca

10 1969) Several thousand birds near Runvay 27 beth sides

12 0.335) Several thoussnd birds on approach ond of runiay 27

ll Wh Geadl Plee%s of slavlings around airport

3200 1410 S91). fleck of starlings at tho dunp

LANL Large fleet of uterlings at tho Janding threstiold rummy 20L

il 1750) = Thouicards of Lirds on tho land £111 on piles of uncoverad
gerdtco

12 1995 = About 500 birds near runvay 202 southwest of rumay 9

32 1309 About 1009 birds betucon rua ay 202 cnd 20L southvest of runway

12 13:5 Laygo flecks of birds about 2920 to 2000 on both sidos of
rovay 27

12 WIS = ALeut 27000 Virds svound wind cock

12 UW0 9 Abou 2000 Diss sti)l wearin around the wind sock and runvay
20L end 202 in use

12 1820 About 7090 birds moar Landing threshold of runway 27

j2 1730) «= Yhourrads of blads en the Jand fill

43 1240) About 2000 bi ves on cud around tho appreach end of rumsay 27

13 C3) Alou ps blivds near eomay 27 ucot cond

13 1709) Alout 2090 birds arcund dup area

UY 1530 = About 100 birds over dunp area

1 2615 flout 2029 birds near toxiway to runway 2L

Wy 3209 ABeut 2050 birds arvund the du:p Area

A 1099) A fou Urersand birds just eat of 20L and in tha garbage dv. »
FRYCA

16 1253) A cnall Deck of sterlings, about 1000, cast of rumay 20L

16 ISeL A Cow thovesnd birds Just east of 22-20% snd in dump area

160 723) Jnvge fleck of birds about 2000 to 2000) in and around dup
erst of reieny 20,

17 1209) Savoral bendved binds obsorved right side of runvay 22 and

cay wind conk
17 W090 an SO) vives at crap near reicoy aR
YW 1732 tout 2OCO biae'’s note Gavechold of runuay 27

17 W209 May Vierceads of bires fn duo oven

13 Wed May teercats of bbavs Sa awl cvernd the deny area

i] Vw Pas tyees of Dioda aay sey 2Ol at vind cook

9 70.9 eee ts of bles juct 6 ot of sunray 20L and on uncevered
v tte Uw tn 2 Geng

tn]
ah (as trow- dhe teIsy jut aireraft) depariad on rumney 20M,

4 “Syexret& neal We Le wen 2 ow Oo reuy theveinds of bi.’s
Pte tc a8 of She oo steua oo >» ra°o slew oact, sore Sl

By te 3 Hel, Sid 2.00.9 ceath vith ethers eleoking fe “vent
Pode utently poteenatas: to ti: dep avea after a short Migs
i? 2299) alcara *s of beds Sa Lie porbage evap arca
2 3309) Ghonerots of bires La crip area
20 Mee2 Pocse'ts ef blets toto ca dup avea and rumzy 27
“) POD Thay s of Uivds 4 7.9 tren
2a 19) Sus cel iuatesd Dhs Lea Seecs erst of MR OY,

Maveh = 220 G00) Several huwhed bhids in trees ond dwap area cast of roncy
20L=2ik
. 23 UY late Meek of bres in conp area
M35 = Floctvs of bie’s on voth sides of runsuay 290, in wind sick ve2a
23. 2650) Phowsrn'’3 of Ueds to Liviice coup arent,

e have noted Uat curing porfeds of Sueleoornt vorller, rain, fo, high sired,
Sourlorstore st, Gi@e, tras the thirds Co not re..in ab the aivjort, Also, it
39 fe tud that we beve nvijucd thot isany, : cry, cry birds cre observed
to Jand ia the girbage ducp trea, but beeursce of tho terrain thoy renain out
of sight of eryonr locking cut of tio tovore Run cy 22-20L 13 cue long run isy
aad is used by most largo alrereft and jots, wo hove also noted that wien cone
of these pesa iho durp erea the birds cow out by tha thoustnes. then, whea
king pier

the Cuozting is

200 thy cash side of tha dvcp cal ov pecestriang,
tivebova are vo, tratlag mear tra woot side of Uo Oni, that most of
ta bivda whl sing La Une duap Arca, but Jet conccne como niar aud again tuy

cna oub by Lhe Uiouconds,

‘

Pilots ero cemwally eathor reluciont to report anything to tha poverneant that
Wy etn cet out of, Cunag ils because they do not tonb to Lecom luvoelved in
writing long Jettars vwl woltdeg oub Sue ite So, ve cca only report Uiab ve iwe

a

received infloscation feu Pield yowmMmeol of four siveraft tart lave had bir Js

—
strikes:

NAS9RC an Jevo Come miccy
OMS @ MeavhuresSidlsd.y Sot

. Pose = & Leokliee A Recreate
HW5O7S608 a Cessan 01,

In addition to the possible hazard tint Urose birds pres.nt to atireraft operating
at Une Potalb-Pocchivce Alvporty, ve have the protlen of consttatly issubog

‘

. tho infesortion to rosettes caw svelving Alceratt cogerding the size of tis
Mocha, the t.p2 of birds oad tiie Vee Liew on tha atrpowt, During our bi toe
vovdoes it is aloost Moo etble te re ble of 0 wen cy, vlad, scamenee auras, sol
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Written Notice Of Prior Airplane-Bird
Strikes At The Airport.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT®”: ~
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA Weis
ATLANTA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 17958

A. C. GUHL, et al
ORDER

Presently pending is the defendants’ motion of March
13, 1973, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, to strike
portions of the complaint, and for a more definite statement.

The motion to strike and the motion for more definite
statement are both directed at identical portions of the com-
plaint and both motions are lacking in merit.

A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) of the Feieral Rules
of Civil Procedure, is proper to delete those portions of the
complaint which are redundant, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous. None of the statements in the complaint fall into
these categories.

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a motion for a more definite statement is available
if the petition "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading". The
complaint here is not affected with such a defect Moreover,
two evidentiary hearings have beea held wherein the contentions
of the plaintiff have been clarified so as to place the issues
in proper perspective. Therefore, the motion for a more definite

tatement is moot and without merit.

One of the grounds on which the defeadagts move to .

dismiss is that the contract eatered into between DeKalb County

10e

and the United States in 1967 is unclear and could reasonably be

misunderstood by the parties, and, as such, is an insufficient

basis on which to base a claim for specific performance. The

court cannot agree with this contention,

inequitable nor indefinite.

The applicable portions of the contract are neither

incorporated into the contract, provides in pertinent part as

follows:

the airport in such a manner as to attract birds and thereby pose

a hazard to air navigation, is clearly inconsistent with these

The Sponsor (DeKalb County) will operate
and maintain in a safe and serviceable
condition the Airport and all facilities
thereon and connected therewith which are
necessary to serve the aeronautical users

of the Airport other than facilities owned
or controlled by the United States, and will
not permit any activity thereon which would
interfere with its use for airport purposes,
(Para, 6 - Project Application).

Insofar as is within its power and to the
extent reasonable, the Sponsor will take
action to restrict the use of the land
adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity
of the Airport to activities and purposes
compatible with normal airport operations
including lanaing and takeoff of aircraft.
(Para. 13 - Project Application).
(emphasis added).

The operation by the county of a landfill adjacent to

provisions of the contract.

set forth sufficient facts on which to base injunctive relief.
The complaint provides a detailed analysis of the operation of
the landfill which allegedly poses a threat to aircraft and human

life and is a sufficient basis for a claim for infunctive relief.

The defendants also urge that the complaint fails to

lle

Tae Project Application, which is

12e

td i GES Ets

_ STAg, CAO. Cher’:
ov
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Doom» Clerk

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
: CIVIL ACTION
Vv.
NO. 17968

A. C. GUHL, ET AL
CONSENT JUDGMENT

In this suit brought by the United States against the County
Commissioners of DeKalb County Georgia, in which plaintiff seeks
to enjoin the defendants from operating a garbage dump or landfill
adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport, the Court has been informed
that certain actions to increase the safety of air operations at
said airport have already been taken by defendants. These include;
1. The county has stopped using said landfill for the dumping of
putrescible wastes collected by the county.
2. Most of the landfill area has been covered with a layer of dirt
and has been seeded with grass.
3. County personnel police the area for the purpose of guarding
against other persons utilizing the landfill for the dumping of
putrescible wastes.
4. The county utilizes various sound mechanisms for the purpose
of frightening away birds.
5. A county employee patrols the airport runways whenever turbo
jet aircraft are to take off, checking the area for birds in order
to determine if it is safe for takeoff. If there are no birds in
proximity to the runway, the county employee notifies the FAA per-

sonnel] in the control tower that the airport is open for jet takeoff.

13e

.

The Court understands that defendants will continue such
of these activities as are deemed helpful in reducing the dangers
of bird flocks.

By consent of the parties and in order to further increase the
level of safety at DeKalb-Peachtree aivport, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
1. Defendants, their successors and agents, are permanently enjoined
from dumping raw or milled garbage or putrescible wastes on or
adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport; this is not intended to apply
to waste which is being temporarily held for processing by the
pulverizer or to pulverized waste being temporarily held for trans-
portation away from the premises for permanent disposal elsewhere.
2. Defendants, theiz successors and agents, wil) take all reasonable
precautions to insure that no dumping of raw or milled garbage or
putrescible wastes by any other person or entity takes place on or
adjacent to DeKalb-Peachtree Airport;
3. The county will operate the pulverizer so as to prevent any
accumulation of garbage and to prevent the pulverizer's being an
attraction for birds and take whatever other steps are necessary
to prevent said pulverizer and its operation from becoming an
attraction for birds;

4. Each party will bear his own costs.

Done this _}‘) day of Mah. 1976.

United States Distridt Judge

Consented to:

JOHN W. STOKES, JR.

United States Attorney

WILLIAM D. MALLARD, JR.
Assistant United States Attorney

ONT Aun ntiff

Attorney for Defendants

l4e

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0903%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
