# Opposition — West Penn Power Co. v. Train

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 429 U.S. 1091

## Text

Supreme Court, U, $
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No. 76-567

MICHACL RODAK, Jr CL
» IK, ERK |

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

West PENN PowER COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.

RUSSELL TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,
Acting Solicitor General,

PeTer R. TAFT,
Assistant Attorney General,

ALFRED T. GHIORZI,
RAYMOND N., ZAGONE,
JOHN E, VARNUM,
Attorneys,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-567
West PENN Power COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.

RUSSELL TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF*APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. | 10a-1 14a)
is reported at 538 F. 2d 1020.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July
30, 1976 (Pet. App. I15a), and a timely petition for
rehearing was denied on September 15, 1976 (Pet. App.
117a). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
October 22, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Clean Air Act violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment by permitting federal
enforcement of a state implementation plan that was not

(1)

2

subject to challenge on grounds of economic and techno-

logical infeasibility at the plan approval stage under
Section 307 of the Act.

2. Whether the Clean Air Act requires that federal
enforcement of a legally adopted state implementation
plan be suspended while petitioner challenges the condi-
tions of a variance granted by the State under state
administrative review procedures.

STATEMENT

On September 13, 1973, pursuant to Section | 13(a) (1) of
the Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1686, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
1857c-8(a)(1), the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency sent petitioner a notice that Boiler No. .

33 at petitioner’s Mitchell Power Station was in violation of
the regulations of the Pennsylvania air quality
implementation plan limiting emissions of sulfur dioxide
and particulates. Petitioner filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against this notice
of violation. Petitioner argued that the Pennsylvania
implementation plan should have permitted the use of tall
stacks as a method of meeting the sulfur dioxide restrictions
in the plan. It also contended that federal enforcement of the
Pennsylvania implementation plan should be barred
because the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources had granted petitioner a temporary variance.

'On September 19, 1973, the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources granted petitioner a temporary variance, extending
the compliance deadline for emission of sulfur compounds from Boiler
No. 33 to June 30, 1976, while requiring the installation of flue gas
desulfurization equipment (a scrubber) or conversion to low-sulfur fuel.
This variance has not been approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency, because the variance extended beyond July 31, 1975, the final
date for attainment of the primary ambient air quality standard for
sulfur oxides (Pet. App. Sa). See 40 C.F.R.51.15(b)(1); Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60.

3

The district court dismissed the action for lack of juris-
diction. The court held that, insofar as petitioner was
attacking the Pennsylvania plan, it had waived its right to
review in the federal courts by not filing a timely petition to
review the Environmental Protection Agency's approval of
the plan. The court also held that the variance granted by the
State was ineffective to bar federal enforcement of the
implementation plan because Section | 10(a) (3) of the Act,
84 Stat. 1680, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(3),
provides that variances must be submitted by the Governor
of the State to, and approved by, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (Pet. App. 46a-62a).

A divided court of appeals, relying on different grounds,
affirmed (Pet. App. 66a-107a). The court concluded that
petitioner was not attacking the implementation plan itself,
and that review was not affirmatively precluded. On the
other hand, the court held that no jurisdictional basis
existed for petitioner’s suit against issuance of a notice of

- violation by the Administrator. Petitioner could raise its

argument, the court stated, as a defense to any judicial
proceedings that the Administrator might commence to ob-
tain compliance with the implementation plan. On June 21,
1976, this Court denied West Penn Power Company's
petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 76-567).

On March 20, 1975, prior to the court of appeals’ de-
cision, petitioner filed a petition for review of the
Pennsylvania implementation plan insofar as it related to
control of the emissions of sulfur dioxide at its Mitchell
Power Station (Pet. App. 32a-45a). On May 19, 1975, the
court of appeals entered a stay of federal enforcement
pending its resolution of the issues raised in the petition for
review.

On July 30, 1976, the court of appeals dismissed the peti-
tion for review on the ground that the action was indis-
tinguishable from Union Electric Co. vy. Environmental

4

Protection Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976
(Pet. App. 110a-115a). Under the terms of a stipulated order
extending the original stay of federal enforcement, the order
staying federal enforcement of the Pennsylvania
implementation plan expired thirty days after the court of
appeals’ decision, or on August 30, 1976. On August 12,
1976, petitioner filed with the court of appeals a petition for
rehearing en banc and request for an extension of a stay of
enforcement. On September 15, 1976, the court of appeals
denied petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc and
request for an extension of a stay of enforcement (Pet. App.
117a).

On September 23, 1976, petitioner filed in the court of
appeals a motion for stay of mandate and stay of enforce-
ment pending review by this Court. Ori September 29, 1976,
the court of appeals granted the motion for a stay of
mandate but denied the request for a stay of enforcement.

On October 12, 1976, petitioner filed with this Court an
application for a stay of enforcement pending disposition of
petition for writ of certiorari. Mr. Justice Brennan denied
the application on October 20, 1976.

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 15-21) that the threat of
federal enforcement of the terms of a state implementation
plan submitted pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
1857 et seq., violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the extent that the target source is denied an
opportunity to raise claims of economic and technological
infeasibility at the plan approval stage under Section 307 of
the Act, 84 Stat. 1707, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-5.

In Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 74-1542, decided June 25, 1976, this Court held
that, under the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, the
EPA Administrator lacked authority to consider claims of

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economic and technological infeasibility in reviewing state
submitted implementation plans and that such claims were
therefore not a proper subject for consideration on judicial
review of the Administrator’s decision. The Court agreed
with the Administrator “that Congress intended claims of
economic and technological infeasibility to be wholly
foreign to the Administrator’s consideration of a state
implementation plan” (slip op. 8-9). Noting that the
language of the Amendments and the legislative history
showed Congress’ awareness that some sources of pollu-
tants might have to shut down (id. at 10-11), the Court
concluded that Congress nevertheless intended to require
that primary air quality standards be met.

The Court recognized, howevei, that claims of economic

and technological infeasibility might be raised at other

meaningful times. Indeed, the Court stated that “the
Amendments do allow claims of technological and econo-
mic infeasibility to be raised in situations where consider-
ation of such claims will not substantially interfere with the
primary congressional purpose of prompt attainment of the
national air quality standards” (id. at 18). For example, it
would not frustrate the congressional purpose to allow
presentation of infeasibility claims when necessary air
quality could be achieved by apportioning the control
burden in a different manner; in such a case, a source not
solely responsible for air pollution in its vicinity could
pursue its remedies under State law. Moreover, the Court
pointed out in Union Electric that sources of pollutants
could present their views before the State agency charged
with developing the implementation plan, could seek a
variance from the State agency for submission to the
Administrator as a revision of the implementation plan,
and, in some cases, could take their claims to the state courts
(id. at 18-19).

Claims of economic or technological infeasibility may al-
so be relevant to fashioning the terms of a compliance order

6

under Section | 13(a)(4) of the Clean Air Act or to the scope
of relief afforded in a civil suit under Sections | 13(b) or 304,
84 Stat. 1706, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2. While we do
not believe that petitioner would be entitled to raise its
infeasibility claim as a defense on the merits in an
enforcement proceeding or civil action,? we believe that
petitioner could present such arguments on the question of
remedies for the violation. Thus, petitioner has had, and
may again have, opportunities to present its infeasibility
claim.

Against this background petitioner's contention that the
Due Process Clause requires leave to raise infeasibility
claims in a Section 307 proceeding for judicial review is
unpersuasive. More than five years ago, petitioner had
the opportunity to object at the State level to the pro-
visions of the implementation plan requiring it to meet
certain standards for control of sulfur oxide emissions.
After approval of the plan by the Administrator, peti-
tioner sought a variance from the appropriate state
agency but declined to comply with the conditions of
the variance it received. While petitioner complains that
a hearing on its appeal of the variance was delayed to
its detriment, it does not appear that petitioner attempted
to expedite the proceedings by mandamus or other action
in state court. Nor has petitioner demonstrated that the
other opportunities to raise an infeasibility claim would
be inadequate to protect its rights.

To the extent, therefore, that the Clean Air Act permits
consideration of infeasibility claims, a Section 307 pro-
ceeding is not an appropriate time. The purpose of a
proceeding under Section 307 is to review the decision of the
Administrator in approving or disapproving a State

‘Compare Friends of the Earth vy. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419
F. Supp. 528 (D. D.C.) with West Penn Power Co. v. Train( West Penn
1) (Pet. App. 66a-107a).

7

implementation plan. Since the Administrator is not
authorized to reject a plan because of infeasibility, and since
no adverse consequences are visited on polluters by
approval of the plan itself, consideration of such claims
would not only be pointless but would create additional
delays and impediments for a task that Congress clearly
wished to be undertaken with dispatch.

2. Petitioner contends that the Court should grant review
in order to decide whether a state-granted variance,’
without federal approval of the variance, is sufficient to
suspend federal enforcement of the implementation plan
until petitioner exhausts its opportunities under state
administrative procedures to challenge the variance at the
state level.4 The Court already has resolved that question
adversely to petitioner's position in Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 92:

[A] polluter is subject to existing requirements until
such time as he obtains a variance, and variances
are not available under the revision authority until
they have been approved by both the State and the
Agency. Should either entity determine that granting
the variance would prevent attainment or maintenance

‘The conditional variance issued by the Commonwealth (with which
petitioner has not complied) and the compliance order issued to West
Penn Power by EPA are consistent in that each required the company to
install a scrubber on its Mitchell Power Station in accordance with
substantially similar timetables. Indeed, the Commonwealth's variance
is actually a compliance order requiring installation of a scrubber in
accordance with a strict timetable. EPA has withdrawn its compliance
order because the compliance dates for installation of the necessary
pollution control equipment have long since passed.

‘The court of appeals previously rejected petitioner's argument on
this issue in West Penn / (Pet. App. 66a), and this Court denied West
Penn Power Company’s petition for a writ of certiorari in that case. The
issue was not directly addressed by the court of appeals in its opinion of
July 30, 1976, of which petitioner now seeks review.

8

of national air standards, the polluter is presumably
within his rights in seeking judicial review. This
litigation, however, is carried out on the polluter’s
time, not the public’s, for during its pendency the
original regulations remain in effect, and the pol-
luter’s failure to comply may subject him to a variety
of enforcement procedures. [Emphasis added. ]}

No further review of this issue is warranted.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,
Acting Solicitor General.

PeTerR R. TAFT,
Assistant Attorney General.

ALFRED T. GHIORZI,

RAYMOND N. ZAGONE,

JOHN E. VARNUM,
Attorneys.

FEBRUARY 1977.

DOJ-1!977-02

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0787%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
