# Petitioners Brief — United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 432 U.S. 385

## Text

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OctTosEer TERM, 1976.

No. 76-645

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.

LIANE BUIX McDONALD,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

i I oo. 0:06.08 bunts cee ee eee eee 1
IN ei oi ARR seep itiee i

_ Statutes Involved ............. gdeees Woebseerevecs 2
Questions Presented ........... PS Pere r reas 2
I 6 odie uid ded ¥0b cede ¥eeKes nes 3
PE onset 60460066 Wadi mevedeseaeees 3

The Decision of the Court of Appeals ............ 7
RI os oc da ite 0 Snide Coed Heepencsdcoccues ges 8
EE 6 od cee dectdedodusadvcccedeedescees 8

I. This Court’s Decision in American Pipe Man-
dates Reversal of the Decision in the Court of

RIED. 6.0 0. 6060.05.90 00 68 0.000 tmapcceevess 10
II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Denying Intervention ................++- 19
PL. \ cducnvdudvedeutetenedenrsascandcondus 25
Appendix:
Pay ees DO, EOE 6 6b 6Widiw s 6.6 0500 Cee Ns Al
ee See OE SS kv k's co rtsind cecoddundees A4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). .12, 22

Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. granted 381 U. S. 933, cert. dismissed as improv-

idently granted, 384 U. S. 28 (1966) .............. 24
ALSSA v. American Airlines, 455 F. 2d 101 (7th Cir.
SD Avecocdewdebuuneseu cae ecceceteduscens 16
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538
PD. <iviudndabemenieekisunkass 60%e% 3, 7-14, 24-25
Black v. Central Motor Lines, 500 F. 2d 407 (4th Cir.
SE Coda a cen behew ba 4h de bbae Cavan oneeenees 23
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir
DD cadguadiues ueasdewkasnkaeksonaeere 12, 22
Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Civ. No. 71-731-LTL
Sy es EE ecu e bende bebe desee Vane wehuees 3,19
Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir.
RE. ¢an'vk 605065606 aea KOREA Reon eReREbeeees 3,19
EEOC v. United Air Lines, 515 F. 2d 946 (7th Cir
SD. sntadbotcevdwesdsedensbasaud cdecoensaees 6, 23
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 495 F. 2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1974)
cert. denied 419 U. S. 884 (1974) .............4.. 23
Inda v. United Air Lines, 405 F. Supp. 426 (N. D. Cal.
DE - 60deabecdddccanavenessceesscaceuinssan 3
IUE v. Robbins & Myers 45 U. S. L. W. 4068 (U. S.
Se, Gs Es SE: TED wove acinecudesesecanss 20

Lansdale v. United Air Lines, 437 F. 2d 454 (Sth Cir.
| BPPTTTTIPTTT LETT TT CLT TTT ete 3

iii

McDonnell Douglas Comp. v. Green, 411-U. S. 792

SUE, Haden ndedenscdcivbedctsdededvesacese 12, 18 -
Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F. 2d

Bee CHE EE SOPED ccerccccseceececenesecese 15
NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345 (1973) ......... es
Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F. 2d 718 (4th Cir.

ED 6006465 0b 00d GE b ES He Re 860400000605 068 17
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496 (Sth Cir.

BPE PE CT eT Tre TT eee CT ET ET UTT Te 16, 17, 21
Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth

Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976)........ 13-16
SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F. 2d 315 (2d Cir. 1962) ...... 23

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 309 F. Supp. 950 (N. D. Ill.
1970), 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied

GST Gi Ge GSE 0 Shh pee eh e tisk cowecscce 3, 4, 22
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. I.
SOU Sad b hed een be edencdéeends iiss dvctwnsde 3,4
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387 (7th Cir.
SPEED incdessducemdende aieiekesd coviess 3, 5, 20, 21
United Air Lines v. Evans, No. 76-333, U. S. Supreme
< PPPPPPTT TTT eT TT TTT IT iT TTeTrTe TTT 3
Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F. 2d 239
CPG, GND oh cde i rbwewes Vececs toe ceieseses 17

Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058 (8th

GE FFE oes cccccecccsesconccsevscscesesdess 17

iv
Statutes

Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.:

PEED 8-6 6.44 00640000 bap ees 68-0080 setae 17

PEE nn dba nd h6p ethos de eeerbuddienee 2, 18

§ 2000e-5 (f) TL SA he ene gy ne ye ee SA 2,18
Pe Ue, es ED no canes aneepeccesctececesas 2
SOE, Se, BO 6. 6.0 0 5.4.9: 6.050600 6.006sn00eun® 6
Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 23, 28 U.S.C. ......... 2, 9, 10, 17, 24
Fed. Civ. Proc. Rule 24, 28 U.S.C. ............ 2, 9-11, 23

_ Other |

3B Moore’s Federal Practice (1975 Supp.)............ 11

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976.

No. 76-545.

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.

LIANE BUIX McDONALD,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER UNITED AIR LINES, INC.

a OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinions and orders of the district court striking the class
action allegations (December 6, 1972), dismissing the action
after settlement with named plaintiffs and intervenors (October
3, 1975), and denying intervention to respondent (October 21,
1975), are unreported and appear in Appendix at 55, 90, and
102, respectively. The opinion of the court of appeals is reported
at 537 F. 2d 915 (7th Cir. 1976) (Appendix 104).

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 1,
1976. A timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for in banc
rehearing was denied on September 1, 1976. A timely petition

2

for writ of certiorari was filed on October 19, 1976. The Court
granted the writ of certiorari on December 6, 1976. Jurisdic-
tion is conferred on this Court by 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The relevant portions of Section 706(e) and (f) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C.
§ 2000e-5(e), (f), are set forth below.

Sec. 706. (ce) A charge under this section shall be filed
within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred... .’

Sec. 706. (f)(1) .. . If a charge filed with the Commis-
sion . . . is dismissed by the Commission . . . or if within
one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such
charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action
under this section . . . the Commission . . . shall so notify
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving
- of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming
to be aggrieved... . ;

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23, Class Actions, and Rule 24,
Interventions, are set out in an appendix to this brief, infra.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

A class action was filed in May 1970, claiming violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In December 1972
the class allegations were stricken on the motion of defendant—
petitioner here. A number of the purported class members then
intervened. Respondent McDonald, although a member of the
claimed class, did not seek to intervene. In October 1975, a
final order of dismissal with prejudice was entered after settle-
ment with named plaintiffs and intervenors. Thereafter respond-

ent attempted to intervene for the purpose of appealing the
December 1972 denial of class status.

3

1. Did the statute of limitations, tolled upon filing of the class
action, commence running upon denial of class status in Decem-
ber 1972 under the doctrine of American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah, 414 U. &°538 (1974)?

2. Did the district court err in denying respondent’s motion
to intervene, as the majority of the court of appeals held?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Background.

This case comes before the Court as the most recent manifes-
tation of a series of cases which have been weaving their way
through the federal courts since November 1968, arising out of
petitioner United’s long-abandoned “no-marriage” rule for female
flight attendants.’

Until November 7, 1968, it was United’s policy to terminate
stewardesses (now called “flight attendants”) upon marriage
(although transfer to an available non-flying position was per-
mitted). On that day, "Jnited entered into a formal agreement .
with the Air Line Pilots Association (“ALPA”), the collective
bargaining agent for the flight attendants, ending the “no-
marriage” rule. The agreement also provided that any flight
attendant whose employment had been terminated because of the
rule and who had registered some form of complaint about the
termination—either through the contractual grievance procedure
or through a federal or state agency—would be entitled to rein-
statement without less of seniority but without back pay. A. 20.

1. United Air Lines v. Evans, No. 76-333, now before this
Court, relates to the “no-marriage” rule. Other cases include
Lansdale v. United Air Lines, 437 F. 2d 454 (Sth Cir. 1971);
Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F. 2d 594 (9th Cir. 1975);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 308 F. Supp. 959 (N. D. Til. 1970),

444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U. S. 991
(1971), 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. Ill. 1972), 517 F. 2d 387 (7th

’ Cir. 1975); Inda v. United Air Lines, 405 F. Supp. 426 (N. D.

Cal. 1975); Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Civ. No. 71-731-
LTL (C. D. Cal. 1975).

4:

Several of the eligible flight attendants accepted the reinstate-
ment offer; others were not heard from; some instituted civil
actions, seeking back pay as well as reinstatement.

The first action was filed by Mary Burke Sprogis on November
27, 1968 in the Northern District of Illinois, claiming the no-
marriage rule violated the sex discrimination provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F. 2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. den. 404 U. S. 991 (1971), the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s holding that the no-marriage policy did
violate Title VII as discrimination in employment based on sex.
The court of appeals remanded to the district court the reserved
question whether the action—commenced as an individual suit—
could be converted to a class action after judgment.

In May 1970, while the Sprogis case was pending on appeal,
this action—filed as Romasanta v. United Air Lines*—was
commenced as a class action by another former flight attendant
apparently as a hedge against a possible adverse determination
in the court of appeals in Sprogis on the class action question.
The claimed class was the flight attendants terminated pursuant
to the no-marriage policy. A. 11. Both the Romasanta and
Sprogis cases were financed by ALPA, and plaintiffs in both
suits were represented by the same counsel. Both cases were
assigned to the same district judge.

The Romasanta case was held on the passed case calendar
pending the decision on appeal in Sprogis. A. 1. After the
court of appeals remanded Sprogis, plaintiffs moved to certify a
class in Sprogis and to consolidate the two cases. A. 23.

In June 1972, the trial court ruled that class action was not
appropriate in Sprogis and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to con-
solidate. 56 F. R. D. 420 (N. D. Ill. 1972). A. 25. No appeal

2. Carole Anderson Romasanta was plaintiff in the trial court.
The suit was ultimately settled and dismissed as to her and she was
not a party to the a below, although her name appeared in
the caption as plaintiff. Liane Buix McDonald, respondent here,
was petitioning intervenor in the trial court and appellant in the
court of appeals. See A. 104.

5

was taken by plaintiff Sprogis or any purported class member,
including respondent here, from this decision.®

After the district court refused to consolidate the two cases,

United moved to strike the class allegations in Romasanta, and
‘on December 6, 1972 this motion was granted. A. 55.

The trial court believed that the class should be limited to
those who had manifested an interest in retaining their jobs by

‘filing some protest. The legal issues had been settled in Sprogis;

four years had elapsed since the no-marriage rule had been
abrogated; and therefore the district court was concerned that
former flight attendants who had had no real interest in con-
tinued employment would now join the action solely to recover
back pay. The court stated A. 60:
In considering the equities, it does not seem fair and
reasonable to this court that it should allow a stewardess
terminated prior to November 7, 1968 to intervene here
unless she indicated in a timely manner her desire to con-
tinue working by taking some affirmative action to protest
United’s policy or seek reinstatement.*

3. The district court referred to a special master the issue
of a back pay award for Ms. Sprogis. The Court approved the
master’s award of $10,408 but denied an award of attorney fees.
After final judgment the denial of attorney fees was a ed, but
not the refusal to certify a class. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517
F. 2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).

4. The record disclosed that after the no-marriage rule was
abrogated a substantial number of flight attendants continued to
terminate employment on marriage. Thus, between November 7,
1968, when the rule was abrogated, and December 31, 1971, 455
flight attendants resigned assigning marriage as the reason. Another
363 went on leave of absence because of marriage and did not
return upon termination of the leave. A. 54. In court of ap-
peals, Ms. McDonald cited a stipulation between United and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in another case
to the effect that between 1969 and 1973 (during which period the
no-marriage rule was not in effect) 913 out of 3,599 flight attend-
ant terminations were because of marriage, Pet. Br. Ct. App. 10n.
It was thus reasonable for the district judge to require some evi-
dence of interest in continuing in the job before admitting a flight
attendant discharged four years earlier to a class where the only
issue would be the amount of back pay recovery.

J

6

The appropriate class being limited to those flight attendants
who had made some timely protest against the no-marriage
policy, the class allegations were stricken since the numerosity
requirements of Rule 23 were not met. Those who had pro-
tested the policy, and had not already settled their claims or
initiated actions elsewhere, were permitted to intervene.

Twenty-five former flight attendants sought intervention.
Respondent McDonald was not among them. Intervention was
allowed as to thirteen; eight were denied because they had
accepted reinstatement under the November 1968 agreement;
four who had instituted actions elsewhere were also denied
intervention. A. 58-60.

The named plaintiffs Romasanta and Altman® unsuccessfully

petitioned for permission to appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b)
the trial: court order of December 6, 1972. None of the indi-

viduals denied intervention made any attempt to appeal, although

the order was clearly final and appealable as to them.®

Discovery and settlement discussions followed and the initial
and intervening plaintiffs were able to settle their back pay
claims by application of the principles worked out in Sprogis.
A. 91. On October 3, 1975—almost three years after class
action status was denied—a final order dismissing the suit with
prejudice was entered, all “matters in controversy . . . having
been settled and resolved.” A. 90, 92.

Three weeks later, on October 21, 1975, respondent McDon- ©

ald first entered the scene. Ms. McDonald is a former United
flight attendant who was terminated in September 1968 under
the then existing no-marriage policy. She filed no grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement, no charge with any
state or federal agency, participated in no litigation, and had
in no manner previously made known her belated claim against

5. In October 1970 Brenda Altman, another former flight
attendant, was added as a party plaintiff.

6. An order denying intervention is final and appealable.
EEOC vy. United Air Lines, 515 F. 2d 946, 948-49 (7th Cir.
1975).

7

United. She was fully aware of the Romasanta and Sprogis
litigation and of the denial of class status in December 1972
(A. 95), but took no action of any kind until October 21, 1975.

On that day Ms. McDonald filed a motion to intervene for
purposes of appealing from the December 1972 order denying
class action status. A. 93. Submitted with the motion was an
affidavit of Ms. McDonald stating, inter alia, that she “had
previously been informed that during the course of this lawsuit,
the Court had struck the class action allegations and so excluded
me and others like me from this action. . . .” A. 95.

The trial judge denied the motion to intervene as untimely.
During hearing on the motion he expressed concern that
respondent McDonald had not sought intervention at the time
of his December 1972 order, or to appeal from or seek modi-
fication of that order. He concluded (A. 101):

Well, in my judgment, gentlemen, this is five years now
this ‘has been in litigation, and this lady has not seen fit
to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any
way during that period of time, and litigation must end.
I must deny this motion.

Ms. McDonald then filed two notices of appeal, one appeal-
ing the denial of intervention and the other appealing the
order of December 6, 1972, denying class action status. A. 103.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals reversed in a two-one decision. The
majority held the motion to intervene was timely under Federal
Rule 24(b) since it was filed soon after respondent McDonald
was advised by the named plaintiffs that they would not appeal
the order of December 1972 denying class status. The majority
rejected United’s contention that under American Pipe & Con-
struction Co. Vv. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), the limita-
tions period started to run against Ms. McDonald in Decem-
ber 1972 when the trial court denied class status and this
limitation period had long since expired. The majority dis-

tinguished American Pipe in a footnote, on the ground that
in Title VII actions the statute was tolled upon the filing of a
charge with the Equal Employment. Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”)—a non sequitur since the issue on appeal was
not the commencement of the tolling period, but rather when
the statute started to run again. A. 108 n.6.

Having concluded that Ms. McDonald was entitled to be an
intervenor, the majority held it had “power to examine the
adverse class ruling.” In a one paragraph examination of the
class issue (with which the district judge had wrestled through
numerous hearings and briefings), the majority decided the
order denying class action status “must be reversed.” A. 109.

Judge Pell, in dissenting, stated that under American Pipe the
statute of limitations began to run again in December 1972
upon denial of class action status, and that Ms. McDonald
had to act promptly thereafter’“if she wanted to take advantage
of this lawsuit as a forum for her claims.” A. 110. He con-
cluded by stating that since the timeliness issue was dispositive,
“I have not deemed it necessary to advert to the other issues
raised on this appeal.” A. 115.

The eight active members of the court of appeals divided
four-four on the suggestion of a rehearing in banc. A. 117.

ARGUMENT.

Summary.

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
561 (1974), holds that the applicable statute of limitations is
tolled upon the filing of a class action but “only during the
pendency of a motion to strip the suit of its class action char-
acter.”

The district court here denied class action status in December
1972. The attempted intervention by respondent was properly
denied in October 1975 since the attempt came more than

9

two years after the expiration of any conceivable applicable
limitation period.

The majority of the court of appeals erroneously assumed,
contrary to American Pipe, that tolling of the limitations period
continued after class action denial and at least until the final
order of dismissal by the district court in October 1975.

- Intervention was considered timely because it was attempted

soon after respondent McDonald learned that the named plain-
tiffs and intervenors did not intend to appeal class denial after
entry of the final order.

Plaintiffs and intervenors had ne “bligation to appeal class
denial after final judgment and couid not appeal since they
had settled their claims and their complaints were dismissed
with prejudice. Respondent acquired no derivative right from
them.

The decision below, if it prevails, would frustrate settlement
after class denial since parties will be required to await
exhaustion of appellate review of class denial after final order
before knowing the limits of potential liability. The capacity
of the district court to manage suits after class denial will be
impaired.

Class actions under Title VII are subject to the requirements
of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23, as are all class actions,
and American Pipe is not distinguishable because it involved an
anti-trust class action.

Respondent’s claimed reasons for waiting seven years after

termination of her employment, five years after commencement
of this suit and three years after denial of class action are not
plausible. Had she been interested in continued employment
with United she could have been reinstated within weeks after
her termination in September 1968.

The statute of limitations aside, the district court did not
abuse its discretion under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 24(b)
in concluding that respondent’s attempt to intervene after the
entry of the final order was not timely.

Js fom

10

I,

This Court’s Decision in American Pipe Mandates Reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,
540 (1974), “involve[d} an aspect of the relationship between
a statute of limitations and the provisions of Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23 regulating class actions in the federal courts.”

There an anti-trust class action had been commenced 11 days
before the applicable one-year statutory period expired. Seven
months later the trial court issued its order denying class action
Status, basing it upon lack of numerosity. Eight days thereafter
a number of potential class members sought to intervene.
Intervention was denied by the trial court on the theory that
denial of class status had the effect of “untolling” the statute
of limitations as though the class suit had not been filed. Since
the remaining 11 days statutory period had long expired, the
intervenors were too late.

The court of appeals disagreed and held that permissive inter-
vention was timely under Rule 24(b)(2) since, for limitations
purposes, the rights of intervenors related back to the com-
mencement of the suit. Utah v. American Pipe & Construction
Co., 473 F. 2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973). Certiorari was
granted to “consider a seemingly important question affecting
the admirustration of justice.” 414 U. S. at 545.

After examining the development of Rule 23 both before
and after the 1966 amendments, this Court concluded that “at
least where class action status has been denied solely because
of failure to demonstrate that ‘the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable,’ the commencement of
the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all
purported members of the class who make timely motions to
intervene.” 414 U. S. at 553. (Emphasis added.)

11

In its conclusion, the Court fleshed out the concept of “timely”
and the duration of tolling (414 U. S. at 561):

[T]he commencement of the class action in this case sus-
pended the running of the limitation period only during the
pendency of the motion to strip the suit of its class action
character. The class suit brought by Utah was filed with 11
days yet to run in the period as tolled by § 5(b) [of the
Clayton Act], and the intervenors thus had 11 days after
the entry of the order denying them participation in the
suit as class members in which to move for permission to
intervene. Since their motions were filed only eight days
after the entry of Judge Pence’s order, it follows that the
motions were timely. [Emphasis added.]

Justice Blackmun’s concurrence expressed some concern lest
the decision be construed as an open invitation to revival of stale
claims.’ The concurring opinion cautioned (414 U. S. at 561):

Our decision, however, must not be regarded as encourage-
ment to lawyers in a case of this kind to frame their
pleadings as a class action, intentionally, to attract and
save members of the purported class who have slept on
their rights. Nor does it necessarily guarantee intervention
for all members of the purported class.

Referring to Rule 24(b), Justice Blackmun observed (Jd.
at 562):

Permissive intervenors may be barred, however, if the
district judge, in his discretion, concludes that the interven-
tion will “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b).
The proper exercise of this discretion will prevent the type
of abuse mentioned above and might preserve a defendant
whole against prejudice arising from claims for which he
has received no prior notice.

It appeared to petitioner United that this decision had critical
relevance to a consideration of the propriety of the district
judge’s ruling denying Ms. McDonald’s motion to intervene

7. So described in 3B Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 23.90 at
23-1653 n.11 (1975 Supp.).

12:

five years after the suit commenced, three years after denial of
class status, and after final dismissal of the action with prejudice
upon settlement of the claims of named plaintiffs and inter-
venors. Accordingly, its importance was stressed to the court
of appeals.

The court of appeals majority opinion disposed of American
Pipe in a footnote (A. 108):.

6. See also American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
414 U. S. 538, 551. The specific holding in American Pipe
that the statute of limitations is tolled only during the
pendency of the motion to certify a class and begins to run
anew if the motion is denied is not applicable here. The
statute of limitations in Title VII actions is suspended once
one member of the class initiates the grievance mechanism.
See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., [416 F. 2d 711, at
720 (7th Cir. 1969)].

The reference to Bowe was irrelevant: the holding of Bowe
and other cases, including Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U. S. 405, 414 (1975), that unnamed class members need
not exhaust administrative procedures is not in issue here.
Certainly at least one named plaintiff must pursue the admin-
istrative remedy and file a suit within the statutory period to
meet the “jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action.”®
The issue here is not the initial tolling, but rather when the
limitations period begins running again. With respect to this
issue, the majority opinion of the court of appeals did not
explain why the tolling was not lifted in December 1972 with the
order of denial of class action status, as American Pipe appears
to require.

In concluding that the petition to intervene was timely under
Federal Rule 24(b)—permissive intervention—the majority
stated (A. 109):

8. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. §. 792, 798
(1973). Named plaintiff Romasanta did in fact meet the time re-

quirements of Title VII, both as to filing a charge with the EEOC.

within the then applicable 90 day period and initiating the suit within
the then applicable 30 day period after receipt of notice of right to
sue. Complaint. 2, 10. A. 12, 13.

-.
Ss =

13

[ijn court . . . the members may rely on the champion of
the class until he or she abdicates. In this case we believe
that abdication occurred when plaintiffs decided not to
appeal the adverse class action determination. To hold
otherwise would permit one member of the class to obtain
benefits greater than other members.

The “abdication,” held the majority, came two weeks after
the final order of dismissal of October 3, 1975, when the
individual plaintiffs who had settled their claims allegedly ad-
vised Ms. McDonald they had decided not to appeal the class
action denial of December 1972.

The vice in the majority decision is its assumption that the
class action continued after class status was denied. This is
inconsistent with American Pipe, which holds that tolling con-
tinues only until that point. If this Court’s view was that class
status would continue after denial by the district court on the
possibility that there might eventually be a successful appea! of
the denial, then its comment that interventions were timely
because they came within 11 days of the denial order is
inexplicable.

Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth
Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976), followed American
Pipe in a decision which considered a number of issues relating
to the duty of the parties remaining after class denial to the
purported members excluded by the class denial. One claim was
that after class denial notice of a subsequent settlement between
the named plaintiffs and intervenors and defendant should have
been given to the proposed, but denied, class. To this the court
responded (522 F. 2d at 176-77):

The arguments of the appellants and the S.E.C. [amicus]
ignore the difference between a class action and a non-
class action. They place undeserved emphasis upon mere
allegations of class action status by individual plaint ffs,
rather than upon a judicial determination that a cause of
action does not meet the requirements of subdivisions (a)
and (b) of Rule 23 and, therefore, may not be maintained
as a Class action.
* * s e «

14

Appellants and the S.E.C. ask this court to extend the
judicial gloss on subdivision (e) of Rule 23 to encompass
the situation where as here the trial court has determined
prior to the execution of a settlement agreement that the
action may not be maintained as a class action under Rule
23. This we decline to do. As stated by the Advisory Com-
mittee’s Notes to Rule 23, “a negative determination [of
class action status] means that the action should be stripped
of its character as a class action.” Advisory Committee
Notes, supra, 39 F. R. D. at 104 [Emphasis in original.]

When here the majority of the court below spoke of the
“abdication of the champion of the class” in October 1975 to
justify respondent’s belated intervention, it clearly ignored the
fact that once the class was denied in December 1972, there
was no longer a class to champion. The named plaintiffs did not
abdicate as champions in October 1975; they were dethroned
in December 1972.

Judge Pell in dissent put the issue succinctly (A. 115):

When a class action is denied, former putative class mem-
bers may not ignore this fact and continue on the assump-
tion the suit is a class action. . . . The denial of class status
is a critical point which puts putative class members on
notice that they must act to protect their rights. The tolling
procedure established by the Supreme Court in American
Pipe . . . would have no meaning without its corollary
requirement that as soon as the class is decertified, former
class members who want relief must make “timely motions
to intervene.” (414 U. S. at 553.)°

In our view, American Pipe permits of no other reading than
that given it by the dissent. If the intervenors there had not
moved within the 11 days remaining of the suspended period,

9. Judge Pell pointed out that had Ms. McDonald acted
promptly after denial of class action and had been denied inter-
vention at that time because of her failure to protest the no-marriage
rule—the requirement which was the basis of the district court’s
holding that the action lacked the requisite numerosity—‘then that
issue would have been before this court and decided three years
ago.” A. 114.

15

their efforts would not have been “timely.” No other reading is
possible.*®

It is the fact, of course, that instead of entering into settle-
ment discussions with defendant, the named plaintiffs and inter-
venors could have persisted through full trial to judgment and
after final judgment could have appealed the denial of the class
action of December 1972. But they chose not to do so and
instead did enter into a settlement and agreed to a final order
dismissing the actions with prejudice. As a result of this they
could no longer appeal the denial of class.’ They had no duty
or obligation to respondent McDonald not to settle their claims,
and Ms. McDonald could gain no derivative rights of appeal
from them. The most she could do was hope tney might appeal,
but she had no legal right to expect it. If the limitations period
had already run against her, it could not be revived because the
individual claimants remaining after class den.al chose to settle
rather than continue the litigation.

10. Two courts of appeal have considered this corollary of
American Pipe. In Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F. 2d
171, 178 (Sth Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425 U. S. 912 (1976), the
court concluded that any party who failed to seek intervention
after class action status denial and entry of a settlement stipulation
“can blame no one but himself if his action is now barred.” In Mon-
arch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F. 2d 1073 (10th
Cir. 1975), a class was certified narrower than the claimed class.
Excluded members attempted intervention but were held to be time-
barred. The argument was made that this differed from the American
Pipe situation because here a class had been certified and there
intervention had been allowed. In rejecting these contentions the
court held (511 F. 2d at 1078):

In the instant case 26 days of the suspension period
remained when class status was denied the private contractors.
The first petitions in intervention were presented 40 days there-
after. American Pipe may not be distinguished on the differ-
ences between the two cases for denial of class status, or on
the fact that there intervention was permitted and here it was
denied. The holding in American Pipe cuts both ways.

11. Counsel for named plaintiffs and intervenors stated in
open court after the final order had been entered: “They have
settled their individual claims, and consequently the original class
ae are not in a position to take the appeal.”
A. 1 :

16

- This issue was also confronted in Pearson v. Ecological
Science Corp., 522 F. 2d 171 (Sth Cir. 1975), cert. den. 425
U. S. 912 (1976). There—as here—class had been denied,
timely intervention had been allowed, an interlocutory appeal
of denial of class was attempted, and then settlement was
reached. An effort was then made to block the settlement by,
among others, a late-comer who was denied intervention as
untimely sought. Argument was made that the settlement—
which included an agreement to voluntarily withdraw a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to review the refusal of the court of
appeals to consider the denial of class—breached the obligation
the named plaintiffs'and intervenors had to the purported class
members. The court demurred (522 F. 2d at 177):
The rule which appellants ask this court to adopt would
require that in every action in which class action certifica-
tion is denied by a district court, the named plaintiffs would
be precluded from executing a settlement of their individ-
ual claims, and would be required to litigate through ap-
pellate review of the interlocutory order denying class
action certification after a final judgment in the trial court.

Settlement is always preferred to litigation; Title VII suits
are certainly no exception to the principle. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has itself recognized this policy in an earlier
decision. “. . . As a general proposition the public interest may
indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side
gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation. This is espe-
cially true within the confines of Title VII where ‘there is great
emphasis . . . on private settlement and the elimination of un-
fair practices without litigation.” ALSSA v. American Airlines,
455 F. 2d 101, 109 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496, 498 (Sth Cir. 1968).

The majority decision here imposes the same inhibiting effect
on settlement noted in Pearson since the defendant will not know
the full breadth of the claims against it after class action denial
unless and until there is opportunity for appellate review after
final judgment. The capacity of the district court to manage suits

17

after class denial is also seriously imwaired. It is difficult to en-
courage settlement among litigants when the judge is faced with
the possibility of a renewal of the litigation even if settlement
is consummated. He will not be able to address the issues as
limited by him because he will be forced to look over his
shoulder to purported class members, unknown to the court,
who like respondent McDonald may someday appear.’* This
flies directly in the face of the express policy in favor of con-
ciliation and voluntary settlement stated in Title VII. 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-5(b).

There is, to our knowledge, no serious dispute with the
proposition that Federal Rule 23 applies to class actions under
Title VII. This has been repeatedly affirmed.’*

Further, we do not believe respondent McDonald would deny
that, if the limitations period began to run against her and others

12. Conceptually there is no end to the process. Ms. McDonald
claims a class broad enough to include not only flight attendants who
were terminated but also those who resigned without protest. If
this case is remanded to the trial court a class could be found
which includes those terminated, like Ms. McDonald, but excludes
those like Ms. Evans, respondent in No. 76-333, now pending
before this Court, who resigned. When that has run its cgarse and
a final order is entered, then Ms. Evans or someone in a similar
position could do just as Ms. McDonald did here and seek to start

_the whole process over again. The possibilities are limitless.

13. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F. 2d 239,
246 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. den. 421 U. S. 1011 (1975) (“The man-
datory uirements of Rule 23(a) must first be met.”); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F. 2d 496, 499 (Sth Cir. 1968) (“We
thus hold that a class action is permissible under Title VII . . . within
the following limits. First, the class action must . . . meet the require-
ments of Rule 23(a) and(b)(2).”) Wright v. Stone Container
Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1975) (“. . .[W]e cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretior in refusing to certify the
class under Rule 23(a).”); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.
2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1976) (“. . . [E]mployee discrimination suits
do not represent exemptions from the terms of the Rule [23(a)].”)

18

similarly situated upon denial of class action status in December
1972, any conceivable period has long since run out."*

Ms. Romasanta, the original plaintiff, received the required
statutory notice*® from the EEOC on April 17, 1970 (A. 13),
and she filed her class action on May 15, 1970—the 28th day
of the then allowable 30 day period for bringing suit under
Section 706(f). 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f). Thus there were
two days left to the limitations period at the time the suit was
filed. Assuming the 90 day period provided under the March
1972 amendments to Title VII would be applicable at the time
the suit was dismissed in December 1972, Ms. McDonald would
have had 62 days (90 less 28) in which to move to intervene,
and if unsuccessful, to then appeal that denial.

Even if it be assumed that Ms. McDonald would at that time
have been entitled to avail herself of the entire statutory period
for filing a charge with the EEOC on the theory her obligation
to file had been tolled by the filing of a charge by Ms. Roma-
santa prior to Ms. McDonald’s termination, that period would
have been 180 days from December 6, 1972. Section 706(e),
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-S(e).

In any event, whichever period is considered —62 days under
Section 706(f) or 180 under Section 706(e)—the last day on
which Ms. McDonald could possibly have made a motion in this
case not time barred would have been June 4, 1973, almost
two and one-half years before she did in fact file a motion
to intervene.

In summary, American Pipe holds that the limitations period,
tolled upon commencement of a class action, starts running again
upon denial of class status; class actions under Title VII are

14. The EEOC in an amicus brief. filed in the court below con-
ceded that the “statute of limitations in the Romasanta and Altman
[the additional named plaintiff] charges has since run.” EEOC
Br. Ct. App. 20.

15. The procedure is outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973).

Demet ncereenenseeere at

19

not unique and the American Pipe doctrine is applicable here
as in any other class action; the limitations period expired no
later than June 4, 1973; when Ms. McDonald attempted to
intervene on October 21, 1975, the statute of limitations had
run as to her claim and her motion was untimely under Rule
24(b) (2).

Il.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
in Denying Intervention.

There is an undertone to the majority opinion below which
suggests that an injustice would have been done respondent had
the court of anneals not reversed the district court’s ruling on
intervention. “To hold otherwise,” said the majority, “would
permit one member of the class to obtain benefits greater than
other members.” A. 108.

But this is the effect of timeliness requirements and statutes
of limitations in all litigation, including class actions.’® If the

16. The ruling below creates the anomaly that parties who
unsuccessfully brought their own suits to protest United’s former
no-marriage rule are now barred by the statute of limitations and
res judicata from being granted relief while respondent and other
purported class members at this time unknown, who have done
nothing for at least eight years, may now seek recovery. Several
former United stewardesses who had been terminated because of
the no-marriage rule filed an action in 1971 in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. The trial court
denied relief because the plaintiffs, who had been terminated in
1966 and 1967, had not filed timely charges in accordance with the
provisions of Title VII. Buckingham v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
Civil No. 71-731-LTL. In addition, Doris Collins, who resigned in
May, 1967, filed a charge with the EEOC in November, 1971 and
instituted an action in the Western District of Washington in Novem-
ber, 1972. She was denied reiief by the trial court because her
charge was not timely filed. This action by the trial court was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
514 F. 2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1975). Because of the lawsuit pend-
ing at that time in the District Court, Collins was denied intervention
in this case below. And, in reliance on O75 by te — ey
j nt was ted on August 5, 197 e trial court below
or Lynn — Raymond, a purported class member who had
been allowed to intervene in 1972. This dismissal was not appealed.

20

‘intervenors in American Pipe had waited four more days the
named plaintiffs would also have “obtained greater benefits.”
Rights are created by the legislature subject to being exercised
within a proscribed period. When the period ends, the right
ends. The court majority described a consequence of limitations
periods—not a reason for ignoring them.*’

The other side of the coin is that a potential defendant has
the right to know that if claims are not asserted against it in an
expeditious manner, i.e., within the limitations period, then its
exposure is ended.**

The record here dramatically illustrates the real inequity in
this case. Respondent had no interest in further employment
with United after her termination in September 1968. If
she had she could have been back at work within a few weeks by
simply talking some action to protest the termination.

17. “In defining Title VII’s jurisdictional requirements ‘with
precision,’ . . . Congress did not leave to courts the decision as to
which delays might or might not be slight.” JUE v. Robbins & Myers,
45 U. S. L. W. 4068, 4070 (S. Ct., Dec. 20, 1976).

18. The majority opinion states that “until October 17th
[1975] defendant [United] could reasonably expect this liability
to be enforced through an appeal of the adverse class ruling.”
A. 108. This observation is completely without record support.
Once settlement discussions were started United had every reason
to believe there would be no appeal of the class issue.

One additional reason why United could assume there would be
no appeal of the class denial lies in a point made by respondent
McDonald in the lower court in justification of her assumption
named plaintiffs would appeal class denial: “. . . plaintiffs’ attorneys
are interested in obtaining a class treatment on appeal since it has
the prospect of a larger overall recovery and the resulting increased
potential for court awarded fees.” Pet. Reply Br. Ct. App., 17n.

The fact is the district court had denied attorney fees to plain-
tiff’s counsel in Sprogis on July 3, 1974, and the denial had been
affirmed by the court of appeals on June 4, 1975. Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975). The same counsel
represented the parties in this case under the same circumstances
which led to denial of fees in Sprogis. It was thus apparent that to
the extent pursuit of attorney fees could be considered an incentive
to appeal class denial, that incentive was certainly lacking here.
Attorney fees were in fact subsequently denied in this case on the
same grounds as in Sprogis.

.
Rees — ere ee eee

21

The November 7, 1968 agreement between United and ALPA
terminating the no-marriage policy provided for reinstatement
for those flight attendants who protested. At the time of that
agreement a protest by Ms. McDonald would have been timely.
But she did nothing. She waited from September 1968 to
October 1975 to come forward to claim reinstatement and back
pay for the seven year period. The majority opinion consoles
United with the observation that “This opinion does not preclude
the defendant from mitigating liability or rebutting the damage
claim of some members of petitioner’s [McDonald] class.”
A. 110 n.8. But assembling rebuttal evidence at this late date
is an awesome burden.’®

Respondent explains her seven years of inaction in an affidavit
submitted with the intervention petition (A. 95):

At the time of discharge or soon thereafter, I learned that
other former United Air Lines stewardesses who had been
discharged pursuant to the same policy were prosecuting
grievances under the collective bargaining machinery or
had filed charges of discrimination with state and federal
agencies. Since the legality of the no-marriage policy was
being challenged in proceedings that I thought would gov-
ern my situation, I did not myself file a discrimination
charge against United or grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement.

This reason—even if plausible—does not explain why she did
not act then to get her job back under the terms of the United-
ALPA Agreement.

But the reason is not plausible. In September 1968, it was not
settled law that an individual could rely on the charge of an-
other in pursuing a claim under Title VII. Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach, 398 F. 2d 496 (Sth Cir. 1968), had reversed a

19. The court of appeals had held in Sprogis that United had to
demonstrate that a claimant lacked reasonable diligence in seeking
other employment, and that “the burden of going forward to miti-
gate the liability, or, to rebut the damage claim, rests with the
defendant.” Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 517 F. 2d 387, 392 (7th
Cir. 1975).

22

lower court which held that class action would not lie under
Title VII where injunctive relief was sought. The appeals court
decision was issued on July 16, 1968, and was limited to
prospective relief. However unlikely, it is possible that Ms.
McDonald knew about Oatis when she was terminated in Sep-
tember 1968. But she would also have known it did not sanction
a class action for back pay—and as we have noted she could
have had prospective relief under the ALPA-United Agreement
of November 1968. It was not until October 1969 when the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive, 416 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969),
that there was a definitive holding that a class action would
lie under Title VII for “pecuniary” as well as injunctive relief.
416 F. 2d at 720. In fa *, this issue was not conclusively settled
until this Court’s decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 414 (1975).

The original case of Sprogis v. United Air Lines (see supra,
at p. 4), was not brought as a class action, no doubt, because
when filed in November 1968 prospective relief was unnecessary
since the no-marriage policy had already been abrogated, and
Bowe had not yet been decided. It was only after Bowe that an
attempt was made to convert Sprogis to a class action and that
this suit was filed as a class action.

Ms. McDonald simply could not have known in September,
1968 that she could rely on actions taken by others. Her ex-
planation for seven years of inaction is inadequate. She has,
indeed, slept on her rights.

Moreover, however inexplicable is her claimed reliance in
1968 on legal doctrines not definitely established in this Court
until 1975, it is clear that Ms. McDonald did know that after
December 1972 she was no longer in this case—and yet she
still failed to act.

Her affidavit is quite candid. She states she had “previously

been informed that during the course of this lawsuit, the Court
had struck the class action allegations and so excluded me and

ss

wens os et a

23

others like me from this action and that an attempt to appeal
this ruling had not been successful.” A. 95.

Certainly the exclusion of Ms. McDonald from this suit in
1972 was a critical point for her. In NAACP v. New York, 413
U. S. 345 (1974), this Court upheld a district court’s ruling
that an attempted intervention 17 days after the would-be inter-
venors first learned of the pendency of a suit then three months
old was untimely under Rule 24. The suit had then reached a
“critical stage” and it was “incumbent upon [them] at that stage
of the proceedings, to take immediate affirmative steps to protect
their interests . . . by way of an immediate motion to intervene.”
413 U. S. at 367.”

The Court spelled out the general criteria for review of the
district court’s determination of timeliness under Rule 24 (413
U. S. at 365-66):

Intervention in a federal court suit is governed by Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 24. Whether intervention be claimed of
right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial
words of both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the
application must be “timely”. If it is untimely, intervention
must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is
pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness. Although
the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor
in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely disposi-
tive. Timeliness is to be determined from all of the circum-
stances. And it is to be determined by the court in the
exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is
abused, the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on review.”

20. See also SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F. 2d 315, 320 (2d Cir.
1962) (court of appeals affirmed denial of the SEC’s motion to
intervene in a reorganization proceedings as untimely because the
SEC had waited 40 days after it was in a position to intervene); Hoots
v. Pennsylvania, 495 F. 2d 1095, 1097 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. den.
419 U. S. 884 (1974) (intervention denied because “petitioners
could not reasonably claim ignorance either of the proceedings or
the necessity for intervention at a much earlier date’).

21. The same siandards under Rule 24 apply in cases involving
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. E.g., EEOC vy. United Air Lines,
515 F. 2d 946 (7th Cir. 1975); Black v. Central Motor Lines,
500 F. 2d 407 (4th Cir. 1974).

24

As Judge Pell explained in dissenting below, where a class
action is involved the determination of when intervention “is
first appropriate relates to the question of adequacy of repre-
sentation;” for it becomes necessary for unnamed class members
to intervene at the point when their interests are no longer being
protected by the class representatives. A. 112. See Alleghany
Corp. Vv. Kirby, 344 F. 2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
granted 381 U. S. 933, cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 384 U. S. 28 (1966).

When class action was here denied in December 1972 and
the action was thus “stripped of its class character” under Rule
23, Ms. McDonald was required then to take “immediate
affirmative steps” to protect her interests. As the dissenting
judge below stated (A. 113):

When petitioner’s application for intervention is viewed
in the light of [the above] cases, it appears clear to me that
the motion was untimely. Petitioner admits knowledge of
the class action denial in Romasanta in 1972 and yet offers
no persuasive reason for her failure to petition to intervene
then. Once the class was denied, and the suit proceeded
as an individual action, she had no reason to believe her
interests were being represented or protected by others.
This was particularly true since the class action denial
had the effect of excluding from the case all those who,
like petitioner, had not protested the no-marriage rule.
There was no longer anyone similarly situated to petitioner
in the case.

Thus even if Ms. McDonald’s motion in October 1975 had
not been barred because of the expiration of the limitation
period, it is clear that the district judge did not abuse the
discretion vested in him under Rule 24 in finding that her
motion to intervene came too late.

The admonition of the concurrence in American Pipe is
singularly appropriate (414 U. S. at 561-62):

Our decision, however, must not be regarded as encourage-
ment to lawyers . . . to frame their pleadings as a class

eS A

25

action . . . to attract and save members of the purported
class who have slept on their rights. Nor does it necessar-
ily guarantee intervention for all members of the purported
class.

. . . The proper exercise of this discretion [by the district
judge under Rule 24(b)] will prevent the type of abuse
mentioned above and might preserve a defendant whole
against prejudice arising from claims for which he has
received no prior notice.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the
decision of the court of appeals be reversed and that the deci-
sion of the district court of October 21, 1975, denying the peti-
tion of respondent to intervene be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

STUART BERNSTEIN,
JAMES W. GLADDEN, JR.,
SusAN S. SHER,
231 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60604,
Counsel for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:
MayER, BROWN & PLATT,
231 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60604.

January 21, 1977.

RN LL TT :

Al

APPENDIX.

PARTIES.
Rule 23.

CLASS ACTIONS.

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a Class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-
tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individ-
ual members of the class would create a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incom-
patible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

A2

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be
Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as
Class Actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)
(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified
date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter
an appearance through his counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action

under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court

A3

finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether
or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or
(B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass
treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly.

(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions
to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescrib-
ing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the pro-
tection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in
the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fai and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on inter-
venors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and
that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be
desirable from time to time.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.

A4

Rule 24.

INTERVENTION.

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute
of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
tiie applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.

(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone
may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of
the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or
(2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an
action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental
officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or
agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive
order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be per-
mitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a
motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The
motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied
by a pleading setting torth the claim or defense for which inter-
vention is sought. The same procedure shall be followed when a
statute of the United States gives a right to intervene. When the
constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest
is drawn in question in any action to which the United States or
an Officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the court
shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as pro-
vided in Title 28, U. S.C. § 2403.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0767%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
