# Amicus Brief — United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 553

## Text

mas No. 76-333

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL,
AIRLINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE,
AND AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

PEYTON H. Moss
POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER
FELDMAN & GARTNER
1185 Avenue of the Americas
Of Counsel: New York, New York 10036

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

WILGON -. EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON. D. C. 20001

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-333

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT BRIEF AS
AMICI CURIAE

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the United States Supreme Court

Pursuant to Rule 42(3) of the Rules of this Court,
the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the Airline
Industrial Relations Conference, and the Air Trans-
port Association respectfully move this Court for
leave to file the accompanying brief as Amici Curiae
in support of the position of the petitioner, United
Air Lines, in this case. In support of this motion
the above-named associations show as follows:

2

1. This motion for leave to file is necessary under
Rule 42(3) because counsel for the respondent has
advised that consent for the filing of this brief would
not be granted. Counsel for the petitioner has given
his written consent, which has been filed with the
Clerk of the Court.

2. The questions presented for review in this case
raise issues of substantial importance to the Amici
Curiae. The first question concerns the proper ap-
plication of a neutral date-of-hire seniority system
under the terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq). In this case
the Court must consider whether the reemployment
of a former employee with new date-of-hire seniority
under a neutral seniority system permits the resur-
rection of that employee’s time-barred claim for loss
of seniority and pay arising from termination of
that employee’s prior employment. The petitioner
also raises the question whether the collateral or
lingering effects of a prior act of discrimination are,
in themselves, acts of discrimination against an em-
ployee, permitting the filing of a charge at any time
in the future regardless of how long ago the prior
act of discrimination occurred.

3. The Equal Employment Advisory Council
(“EEAC”) is a voluntary, non-profit association, or-
ganized as a corporation under the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Its membership includes a broad
spectrum of employers from throughout the United
States, including both individual employers and trade
and industry associations. The principal goal of
EEAC is to represent and promote the common in-
terest of employers and the general public in the de-
velopment and implementation of sound government

3

policies, procedures and requirements pertaining to
nondiscriminatory employment practices.

Because of this interest, the EEAC sought and was
granted permission to file a brief as Amicus Curiae
in Electrical Workers, IUE, Local 790 v. Robbins &
Meyers, Inc., (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 75-1264), which also
involved issues concerning Title VII’s statute of limi-
tations. Similarly, the EEAC has filed amicus curiae
briefs in other cases now pending before this court.
See 7'.1.M.E.-D.C., Inc. v. Rodriquez (Docket No. 75-
672); Hast Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v.
Jesse Rodriquez, et al (No. 75-718).

4. The Air Industrial Relations Conference (“AIR
Conference”) is an unincorporated voluntary associa-
tion of air carriers formed to facilitate the exchange
of ideas and information among air carriers concern-
ing industrial relations matters, to provide support
and information services to air carriers in the in-
dustrial relations area, and to represent the member
carriers with respect to legislative, judicial and ad-
ministrative matters related to or affecting labor re-
lations in the airline industry. The airlines’ agree-
ments establishing AIR Conference have been ap-
proved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to
Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act,’ and, upon
review, by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.’ AIR Conference presently has 21

* CAB Orders 73-6-96 (June 22, 1973), 73-9-15 (September
6, 1973), and 76-5-12 (May 5, 1976).

* Air Line Dispatchers Assn. Vv. Civil Aeronautics Board,
506 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988
(1975).

4

members, including most of the U.S. trunk and local
service air carriers.’

5. The Air Transport Association (“ATA”) is an
organization of major domestic and international U.S.
airlines employing hundreds of thousands of em-
ployees in the airline industry throughout their route
systems.* Various constituent members of the ATA
have been parties defendant in litigation in lower
federal courts throughout the country in cases which
have raised new and important questions concerning

* Present members of AIR Conference include: Air New
England, Inc., Alaska Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc.,
American Airlines, Inc., Continental Air Lines, Inc., Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Frontier Airlines,
Inc., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Hughes Airwest, National Air-
lines, Inc., North Central Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines,
Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Piedmont Airlines, Reeve Aleutian
Airways, Inc., Texas International Airlines, Inc., United Air-
lines, Inc., Western Airlines, Inc. and Wein Air Alaska, Inc.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. also is a member of AIR Confer-
ence but is filing a separate motion and brief amicus curiae
on its own behalf.

* Present members of the ATA include: Air Canada, Alaska
Airlines, Inc., Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Aloha Airlines, Inc.,
American Airlines, Inc., Braniff International, CP Air, Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., The Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., Frontier Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian Air,
Hughes Airwest, National Airlines, Inc., North Central
Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Ozark Air Lines, Inc.,
Piedmont Airlines, Southern Airways, Inc., Texas Interna-
tional Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., Western Air Lines,
Inc., Wein Air Alaska, Inc. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc. and Trans World Airlines, Inc. also
are ATA members but are filing separate motions and briefs
amicus curiae on their own behalf.

5

the statute of limitations of Title VII and neutral
seniority systems.

The views of certain members of ATA have been
accepted previously by this Court in. another Title
VII case. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wetzel, et al., (No. 75-1245).

6. The Amici Curiae and their constituent mem-
bers have hundreds of thousand of employees who are
covered by the provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Most of these employees—and
particularly airline flight personnel—also are covered
by neutral date-of-hire seniority systems similar to
that involved in these proceedings. Seniority systems
such as these govern many aspects of such employees’
professional careers with their employers. The Court’s
decision in this case could have a major impact on
these companies, their employees, and their relations
with their employees’ collective bargaining representa-
tive. Accordingly, the Amici Curiae have a direct
interest in the issue presented here for the Court’s
consideration.

7. The associations joining this motion have a
broad knowledge of issues concerning the application
of Title VII and its limitations period to seniority
systems such as that involved in this case. Because of
this background, the associations joining herein are
uniquely situated to brief this Court on the practical,
as well as the legal, aspects of the issues presented
here.

6

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully moved that the
above-named associations be granted leave to submit
the accompanying brief as Amici Curiae in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

PEYTON H. Moss
' POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER
FELDMAN & GARTNER
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Of Counsel:

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

INDEX

I. EVANS I CORRECTLY APPLIED TITLE
VIl’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR
EVANS’S PRESENT CLAIM AND FRANKS
v. BOWMAN DOES NOT REQUIRE OR
COUNTENANCE THE DECISION REACHED
Fe PINE IT sectcstensenieinscitasitinnsesceiiitiisicenstiathiiansilésanes

Il. THE PURPOSES DESIGNED TO BE SERVED
BY THE TITLE VII STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS AND OTHER PRACTICAL AND
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE
REVERSAL OF EVANS II _0

I. Sccchivtiasiniensnsiisiteatintuaiibiseaiitasiliseaidinaiiaidaiuis

10

11

11

16

21

Il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases: Page

Bowe Vv. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th

aril: III scicsceentenetieiiiemuieieiemshetieetaaliaaiiiaitaceatibladenstiaiaas 17
Collins v. United Air Lines, 514 F.2d 594 (9th Cir.

SD Neeteaneditistaeccceiasiaticdiaeecaiaatnieaal 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18
Evans Vv. United Air Lines, Inc., F.2d ——,

12 FEP 288 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Evans I”; af-

firming district court) .....4, 6, 7,9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21
Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247

(1976) (“Evans II”; reconsidering Evans I and

reversing district court) —..........00000...... 3, 8-11, 13, 15-21
Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) ....8-11, 13-16, 21
Hecht v. Cooperative for American Relief Every-

where, 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ......... 17
Johnson V. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.

I een ooe 17
Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. Vv. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S.

I I cect diehard taideniaitmamieananatiaiiale 17,18
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

ER ae aed ES a EPS = aE TS 17

Waters Vv. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, U.S. ——, 44
USLW 3670 (1976) ................00... saseaieasiaiiasenicastanieiatiale 6,11

National Labor Relations Board Decisions:
Bowen Products Corporation, 113 NLRB 731

Ee Soe eae een Sane 18, 20
Statutes:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

2000 (e), et seq.
TE ae eee ae me 16
I 8,9, 10, 13, 14
es 17
EEE RS een mene Serre 17

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

—_— No. 76-333

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
V.

CAROLYN J. EVANS,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL,
AIRLINE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE,
AND AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

This brief is submitted pursuant to Rule 42(2)
and (3) of this Court. The Equal Employment Ad-
visory Council (“EEAC”), the Airline Industrial Re-
lations Conference (“AIR Conference’), and the Air
Transport Association (“ATA”), the Amici Curiae

1

2

herein, have a substantial interest in the outcome of
this case. As indicated more fully in the accompany-
ing motion to file this brief, the Amici and their
members or constituents, have hundreds of thousands
of employees throughout the country who are covered
by the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Most of these employees—and particu-
larly airline flight personnel—are also covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements containing neutral
(late-of-hire seniority systems which govern many as-
pects of such employees’ professional careers with
their employers. As such, the Amici Curiae have a
direct interest in the basic issue here presented for
the Court’s consideration, to wit:

Whether or not the rehiring of a formerly ter-
minated employee and the assignment to her of
her new date-of-hire place in her employer’s neu-
tral date-of-hire seniority system (instead of
awarding her seniority based upon her original
date-of-hire) constitutes a new discriminatory
act in violation of Title VII or perpetuates the
effect of her prior allegedly unlawful termina-
tion so as to revive her right to litigate the legal
propriety of that termination otherwise long
since barred by Title VII’s applicable statute of
limitations.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

An employee’s place in a date-of-hire seniority sys-
tem will generally govern, among other things, each
employee’s job assignments, compensation, eligibility
for transfer or promotion, liability to layoff, and or-
der of recall throughout his or her employment. Thus
the correctness of an employee’s place in that seniority

system is of great importance not only to the in-
dividual employee involved but also to his or her
fellow employees whose relative seniority positions
and future opportunities will be affected by any al-
teration in the seniority order. It is equally impor-
tant to the employer who may, under the decision
below,’ be held liable to an employee because of any
damages suffered from the employee’s allegedly
wrongful placement in the seniority system. Like-
wise, the employees’ collective bargaining representa-
tive also has a stake in the integrity of the seniority
system contained in its contract with the employer.

The Evans II decision below treats as a litigable
claiin an entirely discrete, non-discriminatory sen-
iority assignment upon rehire as the perpetuation of
a claimed prior unlawful termination long since
barred by the statute of limitations. In so doing,
the decision destroys Title VII’s statute of limita-
tions in rehire and similar situations; promotes un-
certainty in one of the most sensitive areas of em-
ployee relations—seniority; abrogates the Congres-
sional policy of prompt resolution of discrimination
claims; and subjects employers to liability of un-
known extent resulting from future claims for dam-
ages caused by allegedly unlawful placement in sen-
iority systems which, under Evans II, may remain
latent but alive throughout the claimant’s employ-
ment, subject to assertion or non-assertion at the
claimant’s whim.

For these reasons, employers and their employees
have a vital interest in the reversal of this case

1 Evans Vv. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.
1976) (“Evans II”).

4

and in a decision from this Court which—while pre-
serving each employee’s right to challenge an al-
legedly discriminatory act (including the propriety
of his or her place in a neutral seniority system)
within the statutory time fixed by Congress—effectu-
ates the time limits within which Congress has re-
quired such challenges to be made. Such a decision
would uphold the Congressional policies described
above and protect the legitimate interest of em-
ployers and fellow employees in the correctness and
reliability of the seniority systems which govern their
relationships and opportunities.

THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A) The Facts
As set forth in detail in Evans v. United Air Lines,
Ine., F.2d ——, 12 FEP 288 (7th Cir. 1976)

(“Evans I’), between November 1966 and February
1968 Evans was a stewardess for United Air Lines
(“UAL”). At that time UAL required married
stewardesses to resign their employment, and in
February 1968 Evans was involuntarily terminated
by UAL, because of her marriage. On November 7,
1968, UAL discontinued its policy of requiring stew-
ardesses to remain unmarried. After her termination
in February 1968 Evans had no employment relation-
ship of any kind with UAL until February 1972.

On February 16, 1972, four years after her termi-
nation, Evans—never having filed any charge of dis-
crimination against UAL—was again hired by UAL
as a stewardess. She was given the regular training
for newly hired stewardesses which she completed on
March 16, 1972. Evans was then assigned seniority

in UAL’s admittedly non-discriminatory date-of-hire
seniority system as of her 1972 date of hire, as were
all the other new hires who completed the training
with her. In accordance with its policy of giving both
men and women seniority credit only for “continuous
time in service,” UAL did not give Evans seniority
credit for her prior employment as a stewardess.

On February 21, 1973—five years after her origi-
nal termination, four years after UAL had eliminated
its no-marriage-for-stewardesses policy, and at least
eleven months after Evans had been re-employed and
received her new seniority place in a sexually neutral
and non-diseriminatory seniority system (see above)
—Evans filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming that
her 1968 termination was an unlawful discriminatory
practice based on sex and demanding the “seniority
and back pay” that she lost by reason of that termi-
nation [Appenuix (hereinafter “App.’’) 21]. Follow-
ing receipt of an EEOC “right to sue” letter, Evans
filed suit against UAL to obtain seniority credit for
her pre-termination employment and other requested

relief.
B) Evans I

UAL moved to dismiss that suit on the ground that
Evans’s 1973 EEOC charge was untimely by many
years since, before 1972, Title VII then required such
a charge to be filed within 90 days of the alleged
discriminatory practice, viz., the 1968 termination; *
that Evans had lost both employment and seniority

* Even if the 1972 extension of the limitation period to 180
days were applicable to this suit, Evans’s charge would still

have been untimely. See pp.-2-4, above.
A-S

6

as of that date; that she thereafter had no employ-
ment relationship of any kind with UAL until Feb-
ruary 1972; and that her 1972 rehire as a new em-
ployee did not alter those facts since the two employ-
ments were entirely separate. Evans claimed that
her charge was timely since UAL’s refusal to accord
her upon rehire in 1972 seniority credit for her pre-
termination service perpetuated up to the time of
suit the prior unlawful 1968 termination. The Dis-
trict Court agreed with UAL and dismissed the com-
plaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Evans I affirmed the District
Court (Cummings, J., dissenting) (see App. 20-30).

The majority in Evans I, citing Waters v. Wiscon-
sin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
den. U.S. , 44 USLW 3670 (1976), and
Collins v. United Air Lines, 4) F.2d 594 (9th Cir.
1975), held that, since UAL’s 1972 assignment of
seniority to Evans was itself a non-discriminatory
act based on UAL’s admittedly non-discriminatory
policy of allowing seniority only for “continuous serv-
ice,” that assignment did not perpetuate any alleged
past discrimination against Evans “in the sense re-
quired to constitute a violation of Title VII” (App.
27). It specifically adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rul-
ing in Collins, supra, that “the alleged unlawful
act or practice—not merely its effects—. . . must
have occurred within [the statutory period] preced-
ing the filing of charges before the EEOC” (App. 25-
26; emphasis supplied). Holding that Evans’s 1972
rehire did not alter the fact that the 1968 termina-
tion was a separate and completed act, the Court
concluded that since there was “no continuing dis-
criminatory practice with respect to Evans, her only

————

7

basis for charging discrimination as a result of
United’s no-marriage policy is the termination in
1968” and a suit based on that was barred by Title
VII’s statute of limitations (App. 27-28). Given the
discrete nature of the first and second Evans em-
ployments, Evans I appears clearly correct.*

* Judge Cummings’s dissent was based upon his view that
the application of UAL’s non-discriminatory policy of allow-
ing seniority credit only for “continuous service” gave “col-
lateral effect to [a] past act of discrimination,” which discrim-
ination was “the proximate cause of the disparity complained
of by plaintiff” (App. 27, 28). The dissent ignored the fact
that for the four years between her termination and her re-
hire Evans had failed to file any charge with respect to
her 1968 termination and the further fact that 90 days after
that termination Evans had lost any right to do so. Judge
Cummings concluded, howevers that her rehire (as a new
employee) in 1972 revived that theretofore expired right
simply because, upon rehire, UAL applied to Evans the same
“continuous service” seniority policy it applies to every
flight attendant, maie or female (App. 23-24, including ftnote
4).

Judge Cummings accepted with equanimity the holding of
Collins v. UAL, supra, that Mrs. Collins should lose her
“termination-for-marriage” suit against UAL because she
had failed to challenge her .-rmination within the 90-dzy
period and UAL had never rehired her. At the same time he
permitted Mrs. Evans to win her “termination-for-marriage”
suit against UAL (although she too had failed to challenge her
termination within the 90-day period) only because UAL
had been unwary enough to rehire her and thus—according
to Judge Cummings—to revive her obviously barred claim
(see App. 30). He dismissed as inconsequential the chilling
effect that success for his view would almost certainly have
on the rehire of former employees (see App. 25, 30, majority
ftnote 5 and dissent ftnote 2).

Judge Cummings also ignored the possibility UAL might
have been subject to serious challenges by other employees

rca vic\

8

C) Evans II

Thereafter, petitions for rehearing by the panel
and en banc were filed, during the consideration of
which this Court decided Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S.
747 (1976). “In view of [that] decision” (App. 35),
the panel which had decided Evans I reheard the
case and reversed its opinion (see Evans II, supra).

For all practical purposes, the statements of facts
and of the contentions of the parties in Evans I and
Evans II are identical. However, in describing UAL’s
contention that “the only legally cognizable injury to
Evans was her termination of employment and sen-
iority in 1968,” the court in Evans II added, gra-
tuitously and apparently with no support in the rec-
ord, that “[i]n this respect United’s argument would
appear to rest, sub silentio, on the protection afforded
bona fide seniority systems by section 2000e-2(h)”
(App. 36).‘ The Court then summarized UAL’s re-

if it had disregarded for Mrs. Evans the “continuous service”
seniority requirement which it applied to all other persons
with breaks in service.

* UAL had no need for the alleged “protection” of Section
703(h) since its whole position was unassailable without it:
(1) Evans was terminated in February 1968 and her employ-
ment and seniority then ceased; (2) it is well settled that
discriminatory termination is a coinpleted act at the time
thereof and must be complained about within the statutory
period; (3) Evans did not complain within that period; (4)
Evans was not an employee of UAL for the next four years
and had no employee rights or benefits of any kind; (5) when
Evans was rehired in 1972 it was as a new employee; (6)
all new employees, male and female, receive seniority as of
date of hire: therefore, Evans suffered no discrimination by

9

maining contentions as arguing that (1) since UAL’s
“continuous time-in-service” seniority policy is neu-
tral with regard to sex, that policy does not violate
Title VII and any actionable injury to Evans “stems
from her termination in February, 1968, whereby
she lost her initial seniority’; and that, (2) since
her time to complain against that termination and
loss began to run in 1968, any cOmplaint about that
loss was long since barred in 1973 (App. 37; em-
phasis supplied).

The court, having itself injected Section 703(h)
into the Evans II case, then proceeded to consider
the holding of Franks v. Bowman with respect to
that Section. It correctly paraphrased Franks as hold-
ing that Section 703(h) did not preclude the grant
of retroactive seniority under a facially neutral sen-
iority system “as a form of relief’ where the in-
dividual complainants “could prove” that they had
been the actual victims “of discriminatory hiring
practices” (App. 37; emphasis supplied). The re-
mainder of the court’s comments about Franks con-
sists of references to discrimination as a “complex
and pervasive phenomenon” and to the Title VII ob-
jective of “make whole” relief (App. 38).

Asserting that it was “in the context of” that
analysis of Franks that the court must consider
whether or not Evans’s complaint was filed “within
90 days of a violation of Title VII,” the court stated
that that depended upon whether Section 703(h) “may
be used to interpose a legal bar to Evans’s theory

the 1972 seniority award. No resort to Section 703(h) is
necessary to establish UAL’s case (see Evans I, supra,

passim).

10

that the perpetuation of past discrimination through
United’s current seniority policy constitutes a con-
tinuing violation of Evans’s Title VII rights” (App.
39).° The court recited the obvious facts that a
“seniority policy that credits only continuous time-
in-service” necessarily adversely affects rehired em-
ployees as against those continuously employed; that
thus a previously terminated employee who is later
rehired will encounter these adverse effects; and that
such rehired employees might include one previously
improperly terminated. The court then leapt to the
conclusion that the routine application to a rehired
employee of an unexceptionable seniority policy (ap-
plicable to every employee, male or female, long-term,
new hire, or rehire) constitutes unlawful “perpetua-
tion” of the previous unlawful termination. It cited
the “teaching of Franks” as confirming “these hold-
ings” and concluded that, therefore, Section 703 (h)
“cannot be used” to bar Evans’s claim (App. 40),
although UAL had never claimed it did (see page 9
above). Accordingly, the Circuit Court reversed its
earlier position and decided that Evans’s claim con-
cerning her 1968 termination could be maintained.

THE POSITION OF THE AMICI CURIAE

It is the position of the Amici Curiae that the
decision in Evans II is incorrect and must be re-
versed. In misconstruing this Court’s decision in
Franks v. Bowman, the Seventh Circuit effectively
repeals Title VII’s statute of limitations in cases
of barred claims of alleged discriminatory employ-

°> The significance of the court’s injection of Section 703 (h)
into the case now becomes apparent.

ei mem

11

ment termination followed by later rehire in contra-
vention of Congress’s obvious intent that charges of
discrimination be brought and resolved promptly (see
Point I, below). In addition, the decision, if allowed
to stand, necessarily leads to illogical and inequitable
differentiations in termination cases and is inconsist-
ent with important practical and equitable considera-
tions in matters of seniority in ways which will ad-

versely affect both employers and employees (see Point
II, below).

Evans’s suit is barred because she did not file a
timely charge with the FEOC concerning “the under-
lying legal wrong” about which she now complains—
her involuntary termination in 1968 for violation of
UAL’s no-marriage policy for stewardesses.’ Her re-
hire in 1972 did not revive her previously barred
claim and every logical, practical, and equitable con-
sideration, as well as proper principles of judicial
administration and economy, support the conclusion
that her present seniority is proper and legal, and
Franks v. Bowman does not require that it be dis-
turbed.

ARGUMENT

I. EVANS I CORRECTLY APPLIED TITLE VII’S
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BAR EVANS’S
PRESENT CLAIM AND FRANKS v. BOWMAN
DOES NOT REQUIRE OR COUNTENANCE THE
DECISION REACHED IN EVANS IL.

As set forth at pages 6-7, above, Evans I, relying
upon Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, supra, and
Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, held that
Evans’s 1968 termination was a separate and dis-

* See, Franks v. Bowman, supra, 424 U.S. at 758.

12

tinct act, a complaint about the alleged discrimina-
tory nature of which had to be filed within the 90
day period then required by Title VII, Section 706(e),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). It further held that failure
so to file a charge within that statutory period ex-
tinguished Evans’s right thereafter to litigate any
claim she previously had had as to the propriety of
that termination.

Based upon that reasoning, the court rejected
Evans’ contention that UAL’s assignment of 1972
seniority to her on the occasion of her rehire in that
year constituted a current violation of Title VII be-
cause, by denying her the seniority lost upon her
prior termination, UAL continued into the present the
illegality of that termination. Evans I held, with
Collins, that the discriminatory act actually com-
plained of must have occurred within the statutory
period in order to support a suit based thereon and
that a non-discriminatory act which was merely an
“effect” of the prior barred violation could not bring
forward into the present the basic underlying legal
wrong of which she actually was complaining.’ Since
the rationale and basis for the conclusions reached
in Evans I are compellingly contained therein, it
seems unnecessary to elaborate upon them here.“

7 While Evans seeks to state her claim in terms of “a con-
tinuing violation,” it is logically impossible to conceive of
it in “continuing” terms. It can really only be stated as the
revival of an extinguished claim by virtue of the occurrence
of a discrete and separate circumstance (in this case rehire)
which happens to involve a nondiscriminatory act which is
different in its scope and consequences because of the prior
termination but is otherwise entirely unconnected with it.

*It is, however, interesting—and probably not without
significance—to note the similarity between the emphasis in

13

Franks v. Bowman not only does not require the
contrary conclusion to Evans I which the Seventh
Circuit, in Evans II, considered that it did, but, in
fact, supports that court’s original decision. In com-
pletely abandoning its first opinion, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that “[t]he teaching of Franks’ confirmed
its holdings in Evans II that, since the application
of a non-discriminatory continuous time-in-service
seniority policy to a rehired employee previously ter-
minated on time-barred discriminatory grounds ad-
versely affects that employee because of the prior
termination, application of that seniority policy “is
deemed to be discriminatory.” Thus, although “fac-
ially neutral,” the application of such a seniority
policy makes Evans “the victim of current discrimi-
nation” (App. 37, 39, 40). But Franks “teaches”
no such things.

First, Franks teaches that Section 703 (h)—[ which
the Evans II panel, not UAL, invoked (see pages 8-9,
above) ] provides that operation of a facially neutral
seniority system is not a violation of Title VII merely
because it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act dis-
crimination. This Court concluded that Section 703
(h) was “only a definitional provision” aimed at
“defining what is and what is not an illegal dis-
criminatory practice” if post-Act operation of a sen-
iority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects
of pre-Act discrimination (see 424 U.S. at 758, 761).
In other words, as described by Mr. Justice Powell

Collins and Evans I upon the centrality of the “alleged unlaw-
ful act or practice—not merely its effects” and the concept
of “the underlying legal wrong” subsequently relied on by this
Court in reaching its decision as to remedy in Franks v.
Bowman.

14

(concurring in at least this aspect of the decision),
this Court held that Section 703(h) insulates “an
otherwise bona fide seniority system from a challenge
that it amounts to a discriminatory practice because
it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination”
(id. at 781; emphasis supplied. )°

Second, it teaches that if an individual can prove
that he or she was a victim of a discriminatory re-
fusal to hire that individual may, if appropriate,
receive, among other things, an adjusted “rightful”
place in the seniority system as a remedy for the
proven discrimination. This Court held that, since
the “underlying legal wrong” about which the plain-
tiffs were complaining was the prior discriminatory
refusal to hire and not the “alleged operation of a
racially discriminatory seniority system,” Section 703
(h), as the Court had interpreted it, did not prohibit
seniority adjustments within the seniority system,
as a matter of remedy, “once an illegal discrimina-
tory practice occurring after the effective date of
the Act is proved—as in the instant case, a dis-
criminatory refusal to hire” (id. at 758, 762; all
emphasis supplied). Thus, under Franks, the critical
factor must be the ability to prove the prior dis-
criminatory practice. Nowhere does Franks “teach”,

*It is apparent throughout the Franks opinion that when
the Court is speaking of a bona fide seniority system or of
“the existing seniority system” it is speaking of a system,
like the UAL one in this case, which was non-discriminatory
in langauge and application, was not the result of an intention
to discriminate on any prohibited ground, and in which peti-
tioners sought, as Evans does here, the seniority they would
have enjoyed were it not for the discriminatory acts about
which they were complaining (see 428 U.S. at 758).

15

or even intimate, either that the routine assignment
of actual date of hire (or rehire) seniority in a fa-
cially neutral seniority system itself constitutes a
violation of Title VII or that such routine assignment
“perpetuates” an otherwise barred “underlying legal
wrong” so as to “unbar’”’ it.”

The clear implication of the Franks decision is
that the operation of any bona fide seniority system
is not itself a violation of Title VII, but that if a
prior substantive Title VII violation can be proven
(which Evans’s by reason of untimeliness cannot)
appropriate adjustments in the successful complain-
ant’s place within that system may be made to
remedy that prior violation. By reviving Evans’s
long-barred claim of prior illegal termination by
means of calling the routine operation of a bona
fide system Sf unlawful “perpetuation” of that pre-
vious discrimination, Evans II has converted the
availability of a remedy into the substance of a
wrong. By this reasoning, the court has perverted
Franks from a salutary vindicater of the Congres-
sional objective of providing “make whole” relief for

“Such results are particularly difficult to accept in the
Evans case where suit upon her termination was (like the
complainant’s in Collins v. UAL, supra) clearly barred 90
days after the termination. Thereafter, no employment rela-
tionship existed between Evans and UAL nor did any right to
complain to the EEOC about the former relationship. How
then can the routine act of conferring date-of-hire seniority
upon Evans, as upon any other rehire, itself become an unlaw-
ful employment practice as to her alone when she had long
since forfeited her right to complain about the prior termina-
tion? Or how can that routine non-discriminatory act “per-
petuate” as to Evans a prior discrimination as to which she
had long since lost her right to sue? That could be nothing
but “revival” and Franks v. Bowman permits no such thing.

16

still viable “underlying legal wrongs” into an instru-
ment for frustrating the Congressional provision that
discrimination charges should be brought and dis-
posed of promptly [see Title VII, § 703(g) ; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (h) ].

In Franks, this Court ordered events correctly:
if a plaintiff could prove the underlying legal wrong,
then a Court might order changes in plaintiff’s place
in a seniority system. But Evans II has turned
Franks vy. Bowman upside down. There, the Seventh
Circuit held that if a plaintiff seeks a change in her
place in a seniority system assigned pursuant to a
non-discriminatory policy but unsatisfactory to her
because of a prior but barred underlying legal wrong,
then the plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations
and litigate her case about that underlying wrong.
If the “rationale” of Evans II prevails, there is no
effective statute of limitations for cases of alleged
prior discriminatory acts followed by later hire or
rehire—a result never contemplated by this Court in
Franks v. Bowman.

For the above reasons, Evans Il—decided on a
ground not urged by UAL, entirely unsupported by
Franks v. Bowman, conducive to future reluctance to
hire or rehire, and impossible to reconcile with Title
VII’s statute of limitations—should be reversed by
this Court.

Il. THE PURPOSES DESIGNED TO BE SERVED BY
THE TITLE VII STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
OTHER PRACTICAL AND EQUITABLE CONSID-
ERATIONS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF EVANS IL.

It has long been recognized that the purpose of
Title VII’s relatively short statute of limitations is to

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17

require the prompt filing and resolution of charges
of discrimination in order to serve everyone’s valid
“interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
[claims]” [see, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975) ; Hecht v. Coopera-
tive for American Relief Everywhere, 351 F. Supp.
305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)]. Such prompt filing not
only facilitates effective investigation of the alleged
discrimination while memories are still fresh and
witnesses and evidence current and available but also
encourages prompt disposition of the same with con-
sequent stabilization of the employment situation in-
volved in the complaint to the advantage of the com-
plainant, the challenged employer, and his other em-
ployees [see Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. v. N.L.R.B..,
362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960)] That Congress intended
and still intends to put a sharp limit upon the period
within which an aggrieved person can prosecute a
discrimination claim or be forever barred therefrom
is established by the fact that when Congress re-
vised Title VII in 1972 it extended the period within
which discrimination charges must be filed from 90
to 180 days, but it did not abolish it [compare 78
Stat. 253 (1964) with 86 Stat. 103 (1972); see
Local Lodge No. 1424, 1.A.M. v. N.L.R.B., supra, at
428-429].

As noted above (see pages 11-12), Evans II ef-
fectively repeals Title VII’s statute of limitations for
filing charges with the EEOC ™ at least in cases of

"The timely filing requirement of Title VII are widely
held to be “jurisdictional” in nature [see, e.g. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1978); Bowe v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969);
Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 514 F.2d at 596].

18

alleged discriminatory terminations followed by re-
hire after the expiration of the statutory period of
limitations. It does so by considering the formerly
aggrieved person’s new, but allegedly wrongful, place
in a neutral seniority system to constitute a continua-
tion of the previously barred unlawful termination as
long as that allegedly wrongful place is not altered
so as to remove any lingering effects from the prior
termination.” This not only abrogates the Congres-
sional intent embodied in the statute of limitations
but also has other illogical and undesirable effects.

First, it illogically—and ironically—accords to un-
lawfully terminated employees who are fortunate
enough to be rehired after the expiration of the
statutory period of limitations apparently unlimited
rights to litigate the legality of their previous ter-
mination. By sharp contrast, the filing rights of less
fortunate employees identically terminated but not
rehired are limited to the 180 days statute of limita-
tions period after which their rights to complain are
forever extinguished (compare Evans II with Col-
lins v. UAL, supra). This is not only grossly unfair

#2 According to Evans II it is the allegedly wrongful senior-
ity date which effectuates the “continued” discrimination. The
assignment of that date took place in March 1972 but the
Seventh Circuit held timely Evans’s complaint to the EEOC

which was not filed until five months more than the allowed

180 days after the alleged discriminatory seniority assignment
occurred. Therefore, it is apparent that under Evans II the
continued existence of the seniority place prevents the run-
ning of the limitations period on both the allegedly wrongful
seniority place and the underlying legal wrong. [but ef.
Bowen Products Corporation, 113 NLRB 731, 732-733 (1955),
cited with approval by this Court in Local Union 1424, 1.A.M.
v. N.L.R.B., supra, at 420, including ftnote 12].

X\\

19

and entirely unsupportable as a legal position. It is
also almost guaranteed to discourage employers from
rehiring formerly terminated employees more than
180 days after their termination where there is any
possibility that they may consider their prior ter-
mination to be tainted by unlawful discrimination
(see Evans I majority opinion, App. 25; but see
dissent, App. 30). Such a result is clearly not in
the interest of the employer, the employees, or the
general public.

Second, it leaves unsettled for an indefinite but
apparently unlimited period the correctness and re-
liability of the seniority order governing the most
essential aspects of the business lives of all employees
covered by neutral date-of-hire seniority systems. If
Evans II stands, any rehired employee, such as Evans,
given seniority from his or her actual rehire date may
at any time thereafter throughout his or her em-
ployment, challenge the propriety of that seniority on
the basis of a prior allegedly discriminatory, but time-
barred termination, and force a rearrangement of the
seniority order on which his or her fellow employees
had up to then reasonably relied for the future. No
appropriate public policy is served by permitting the
existence of such an open-ended disruptive right.

Third, the unlimited right of a rehired employee
to challenge at any time during his or her employ-
ment the alleged discriminatory nature of a remote
act which somehow adversely affected his or her
place in a neutral date-of-hire seniority system, sub-
jects the employer of any rehired employee to liability
of unknown, and indeed unknowable, extent result-
ing from future claims for damages caused by al-
legedly unlawful placement in seniority systems. Such

20

claims, under Evans II, may remain latent but alive
throughout the claimant’s employment, subject to as-
sertion or non-assertion at the claimant’s whim (see
Bowen Products Corporation, supra, 113 NLRB at
732). Here again, there is no rational] justification
for such a result and no appropriate public policy
is served thereby.

Finally, Evans Il1—(as distinguished from Evans
I, which also avoids all the above-described illogical
and undesirable results)—promotes the absence of
finality in cases of alleged discriminatory termina-
tions and encourages belated and dubious challenges
to the propriety of ostensibly non-discriminatory as-
signments of seniority in an admittedly neutral date-
of-hire seniority system. As a result, Evans II un-
dermines accepted principles of judicial administra-
tion and economy. It also needlessly directs judicial
attention to suits involving long barred claims of
prior discrimination somehow related to present non-
discriminatory acts, rather than to suits concerning
present discrimination not yet remedied.

a Owe

21
CONCLUSION

Evans I was correctly decided. Its replacement by
Evans II was improvidently effectuated by virtue of
a misconstruction of Franks v. Bowman. <Accord-
ingly, Evans II should be reversed with appropriate
directions to accomplish the dismissal of the com-
plaint herein.

Respectfully submitted,

PEYTON H. Moss
POLETTI FREIDIN PRASHKER
FELDMAN & GARTNER
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

Attorney for the Amici Curiae
Of Counsel:

RICHARD SCHOOLMAN
1185 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

DouGLas S. MCDOWELL

ROBERT E. WILLIAMS
1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0562%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
