# Opposition — Gene Slagle, Inc. v. General Telephone Co.

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0551%3A2

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 429 U.S. 922

## Text

"T MICHAEL RODAK, JR.,CL val |
—

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1976

No. 76-322

GENE SLAGLE, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

vs.

GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF OHIO
and
THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF OHIO,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF OHIO
IN OPPOSITION

JOHN ROBERT JONES

ANDREW T. JONES

POWER, JONES & SCHNEIDER

100 East Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 221-7863

Attorneys for Respondent,

General Telephone Company of Ohio

MIDWEST LAW PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS, INC., Columbus, Ohio 43216

>

INDEX

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
QUESTION PRESENTED
ARGUMENT

l. The Petition Does Not Comply With
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 23 (f)

Il. The Decision Of The Court Below Is
Not A Final Judgment

III. Petitioner Seeks Review Of A
Decision Of The Court Below In
Another Case

IV. Petitioner Has Not Been Deprived
Of Any Property Without Due
Process Of Law

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State of Florida,
295 U.S. 301 (1935)

Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell
(1900) 179 U.S. 395

Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util
Comm. (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 105,
346 N.E. 2d 778

6

or

Gene Slagle, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm.
(1975), 41 Ohio St. 2d 44, 322 N.E. | IN THE

2d 641 cert. den. 423 U.S. 877 (1975) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | Supreme Court of the United States
General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. October Term 1976

(1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 271, 285 N.E. 2d 34

to

General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. | . an9

(1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 124, 346 N.E. 2d 790 3 No. 76-322
Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., GENE SLAGLE, INC., ET AL., ;

318 U.S. 80 (1943) 5 Petitioners,
United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers sc

Corp., 315 U.S. 475 (1942) a ee GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF OHIO

and
Other Authority:
THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 23 (f), 28 U.S.C.A. 3 OF OHIO,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF OHIO
IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 9, 1970, General Telephone Company of

Ohio (General Telephone) filed an application with the

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (the “PUC”) for

authority to increase its rates. On August 17, 1971, the

PUC issued an order authorizing a rate increase, hav-

ing found that the existing rates were insufficient to

provide General Telephone with a reasonable compen-

ij sation and return. This finding was not challenged by

2

any of the parties and intervenors. However, Genera!
Telephone appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio on
the ground that the rate of return fixed by the PUC was
unlawfully low and resulted in confiscatory rates. On
June 21, 1972, that court reversed the order of the
PUC and remanded the case for compliance with its
decision. General Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Pub. Util. Comm.
(1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 271, 285 N.E. 2d 34 (Petitioner’s
Appendix, page la). The rates appealed from remained
in effect pending the PUC’s decision on remand, on
September 29, 1972, which authorized the same rates
as the August 17, 1971, order.

On September 5, 1975, petitioner Gene Slagle, Inc.,
purporting to represent all subscribers of General Tele-
phone, filed a complaint with the PUC against General
Telephone, alleging that the reversal of the PUC’s order
of August 17, 1971, voided that rate increase autho-
rized therein, and that General Telephone violated the
law of Ohio by continuing to charge such rates. The
complaint sought damages in the amount of more than
$6 million, trebled. The PUC granted a motion to dis-
miss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, but on appeal the Su-
preme Court of Ohio reversed. Gene Slagle, Inc. v. Pub.
Util. Comm. (1975), 41 Ohio St. 2d 44, 322 N.E. 2d
641, cert. den. 423 U.S. 877 (1975) (Petitioner's
Appendix, page 9a).

When the complaint was returned to the PUC, Gen-
eral Telephone filed an answer asserting numerous
defenses. The PUC, however, by entry of June 10, 1975
( Petitioner’s Appendix, page 40a) refused to consider
these defenses and issued an entry adverse to General
Telephone terminating the proceeding, from which
entry General Telephone appealed. While that appeal

|

3

was pending, the Supreme Court of Ohio was asked, in
another case, to reconsider its holding in Gene Slagle,
Inc., supra, and on May 5, 1976, overruled that deci-
sion. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm. (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 105, 346 N.E. 2d 778
(Petitioner’s Appendix, page 13a). On the same day
the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the June 10, 1975,
entry of the PUC in the instant case, and remanded
the cause to the PUC for futher proceedings in con-
formity with its decision in Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating, supra. General Telephone Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm. (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 124, 346 N.E. 2d 790
(Petitioner’s Appendix, page 35a). The petition for a
writ of certiorari asks this Court to review the decision
of the Supreme Court of Ohio in General Telephone Co.
(1976).
QUESTION PRESENTED

Does an order of the Supreme Court of Ohio that a
pending PUC complaint proceeding be governed by
Ohio law as currently construed by the Ohio Supreme
Court, rather than by an interpretation of Ohio law
favorable to petitioner which has been subsequently
overruled, violate due process of law?

ARGUMENT

I.
The Petition Does Not Comply With
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 23 (f)

U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 23 (f), 28 U.S.C.A., requires peti-
tioner to specify the stage in the proceedings and the
manner in which the federal questions sought to be
reviewed were raised. The petition does not comply
with this rule. Petitioner did not timely and properly
raise any federal question in the proceedings below.

4

Il.

The Decision Of The Court Below Is Not
A Final Judgment

The decision of the Court below in the instant case
was that “the order of the commission is reversed,
and the cause is remanded to the commission for fur-
ther proceedings in conformity with this court’s de-
cision in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, supra.” (Peti-
tioner’s Appendix, page 38a). A judgment of reversal
with directions for further proceedings lacks the requi-
site finality necessary for review by the United States
Supreme Court. Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell
(1900) 179 U.S. 395.

III.

Petitioner Seeks Review Of A Decision
Of The Court Below In Another Case

Petitioner claims on page 6:

“In overruling its initial decision in the instant
case, the Ohio Supreme Court would give effect to
the PUCO’s unlawful order despite the express
requirements of the applicable Ohio statute * * *.”
The “initial decision” referred to by Petitioner is
Gene Slagle, Inc., supra, which was overruled by Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating, supra, not by the decision
appealed from. The entire thrust of Petitioner’s argu-
ment is its disagreement with Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating, supra, which is not before this Court.

IV

Petitioner Has Not Been Deprived Of Any
Property Without Due Process Of Law

Petitioner bases its argument first on the fact that
the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the August 17,

5

1971 rate order of the PUC for the reason that the
PUC did “not set forth in its order the reasons prompt-
ing its decision in sufficient detail,” as that Court
interpreted the requirements of Ohio Revised Code
$4903.09. Petitioner then asserts, on page 6, that the
statute was not followed “in a manner which nullified
the entire rate-making process”. This is simply in-
correct. The question of the consequences of the re-
versal of a PUC rate order was specifically ruled on
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cleveland Elec. Illum-
inating Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 46 Ohio St.
2d 105.

In overruling Gene Slagle, Inc., supra, and in Part II
of its opinion (Petitioner’s Appendix, pages 28a and
29a) in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., supra, the
Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the contention that its
reversal of a PUC rate order for failing to comply
with the statutory requirements as to the form of an
order nullifies the rates filed pursuant to that order.
Accord, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State of Florida,
295 U.S. 301 (1935). Securities & Exchange Comm. v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) and United States
v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475
(1942), cited by Petitioner, are neither in point nor to
the contrary. Petitioner’s statement that it and other
subscribers had to pay “unlawful” charges is not true.
It is contrary to the law of Ohio as stated by the Su-
preme Court of Ohio in Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., supra.

There is nothing to Petitioner’s argument that it and
other utility customers have been deprived of property
without due process of law. Petitioner’s legal theory
that the reversal of a rate order by operation of law

6

nullifies rate tariffs on file with the PUC and rein-
states prior rates by operation of law was initially
accepted by the Court below in Gene Slagle, Inc., supra,
which was a year later overruled. No “arbitrary or
unlawful administrative action’ (Petitioner’s Brief,
page 6) is involved. It is not a violation of due process
of law for a State Court to order that a pending pro-
ceeding be governed by its latest pronouncement of
state law, rather than by a decision which has been
overruled.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

\ , |
ee \

Wie Ny,
Maal e\\ :

JOHN ROBERT JONES

ANDREW T. JONES

POWER, JONES & SCHNEIDER

100 East Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

(614) 221-7863

Attorneys for Respondent,

General Telephone Company of Ohio

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0551%3A2. Public record. Not legal advice.
