# Petition — Thompson v. Supreme Court > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0122%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1976 - **Citation:** 429 U.S. 812 ## Text ee Je JT. ~~ a*4 In the Supreme Court of the United States Octoser Term, 1975 RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON, Petitioners, No. 48236 Vs. THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., etc. Respondents. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS and PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS RALPH B. THOMPSON, and MARGARET E. THOMPSON, Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 (312) 323-3381 Petitioners, Pro Se SSIS SCT SS LS ESS UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581 Supreme Court. U INDEX PAGE Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus 1 Petition for writ of mandamus ............0............sc2:--e000000+- 2 ITD Ur TIO... stteocceastnestindetpsabendnanaemagalaniens 2 Reasons for granting the writ: The Llinois Supreme Court is ultra vires its au- thority in refusing to rule on a petition as a matter of right and thus deprived petitioners of a right to a direct appeal to this court ~...000.0000......2.....---- 21 The Lilinois Supreme Court is also depriving peti- tioners of the right to be heard by the federal dis- trict court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by denying the records for a removal to that court under 28 Gi eeeitie SUID. sssantsssacectnesralieissiemnsiaeeieesaeaasinadansenseianianadaaiioos 21 The Illinois Supreme Court is further ultra vires its authority in refusing to determine its jursdic- tion and ignoring Section 718 and deprives the petitioner of a right to a summary judgment in their favor granting the damages and injunctive IE GN © wiccneteccinconseschebevnncdcuetiacientoneetiapeeiensaintilanioniabies 21 The Illinois Supreme Court decision ignores the absolute right of petitioners to a decision as to freedom of speech, due process and equal protec- tion, to remove the ineumbrances from their prop- erty and terminate the litigation 000.0... 23 I a ae ee 25 a ae cated . | ii P PAGE PAGE A ix A— pendix _ Letter from Appellate Clerk, dated May 17, 1976, Record in Illinois Supreme Court .............2.2...-2...0+-. App. 1 attempting explanation of Illinois Supreme Petition as a Matter of Right ....2.0..c.ccccesesseeeeeeeeeee App. 1 Court second issuance of mandate in 73-1890 Appendix to Petition, Opinion of Appellate Court App. 13 Om JULY 28, ITS a.neneneneeeneeeneeeenerensernnereneenne App. 44 } Letter from Illinois Supreme Court that mandate . Oe IE cen steatencmainene-aiiadad App. 22 aes of Aggate _— PP of 73-1890 had issued to the Appellate Court Final Order of Appellate Court, undated .............. App. 23 of Illinois, Sccond District on December 30, Certificate of Appellate Clerk on Final Order ....App. 25 VOTE .nn-nnnnnessovereneencssonerenseenseevsenossccsunecenssnocsesssnsconseens App. 50 Letter from Appellate Clerk refusing to prepare Order of Illinois Supreme Court recalling its man- Sp OSS ET AT IT App. 25 date issued on February 22, 1974 for appeal ici: Miceneeiiin detsme Witaseilhe | to this court in 73-1890, wherein the order is *P stamped, assigned to Third Distriet —............. App. 45 Order of the Cireuit Court denying consolidation ; op ere ee , ‘th P ne Wien | Board C dal Final order of Ilinois Supreme Court in record he: Ee ee ee ee rene eee prepared for this petition, unsigned ................ App. 47 denying appointment of Special Prosecutor .App. 27 Certificate of Supreme Court Clerk on record sub- NES II setcciernstnntitciscnviinnsniiiipaanaaa App. 49 Certiticate of Circuit Clerk on records prepared for appeal on 73-1890, as taken from Excerpts Order of Cireuit Court appealed ........00..00...222........-- App. 28 Notice to Illinois Supreme Court of intimidation by Cireuit Court dated March 2, 1976 regarding CASE M0. 73-1890... -nenanenseeeeeesennnneeceesennssceeeeeenes App. 31 from Record in Lllinois Supreme Court, cer- Letter addressed to Cireuit judge, attached to . tified as ‘‘a certain cause lately in said court’’ App. 51 above notice dated February 19, 1976 ............ App. 33 Letter from State’s Attorney sent by certified a > mail with return receipt requested and Circuit | Record in Du Page Circuit Court uncertified and Court Order dated February 13, 1976 .............. App. 30 ‘fas is’’ from petitioners records... App. 52 Threatening letter from {Illinois Supreme Court Complaint, filed September 26, 1975 _........... App. 52 Clerk over petitioners insistence on a certified Notice of Motion to set a date for the case to copy of that courts final judgment. .................... App. 37 continue, dated September 22, 1975 ...00000000....... App. 65 Printed copy of the Original Mandate of the LIli- Motion to set a date for case to continue pursuant nois Supreme Court, dated April 30, 1976, tv i TIN cccccetocnc ee App. 66 (petitioners have original) ......0..0..00.0..0.....0+ App. 38 iv Order of October 2, 1975, giving State’s Attorney to October 23, 1975 to respond .............2.......-- App. 71 Answer to the Chief Judge’s ex parte pleadings, allegations, arguments, evidence and proposi- tion to change the venue in the above numbered ease (omitted) Proposed court order _............ App. 72 Cireuit Court Order entered on October 16, 1975, on above answer wherein the Chief Judge recuses himself and transferred the case to Senior Circuit Judge, Philip Locke ................ App. 74 Order entered October 16, 1975 by judge Locke, leaving the October 2, 1975 order standing, (the case now is before two judges, two court rooms for 9:30 October 23, 1975) . ..............-...cecsereceereees App. 75 State’s Attorney’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss is omitted Order entered by Chief Judge on October 23, 1975, Judge Locke was removed from the bench on October 22, 1975 for six months for ruling in a ease that he had once disqualified himself in, again assigning the case to Judge Norgle ....App. 76 Order of Judge Norgle on October 23, 1975, find- ing that petitioner was not present before the EE REREE SES rts a ae ne App. 77 Petitioners ‘tion to Transfer to Federal Dis- trict Cou:., dled instanter on October 30, 1975 omitted, Order entered by Judge Norgle on October 30, 1975, granting time for response App. 78 ‘*Response to Petitioner’s Motion for a transfer to the Federal District Court or in the Alter- native to Notify the United States Attorney General’’, filed on December 15, 1975, is omitted v PAGE Order entered December 19, 1975 giving petition- ers time to respond to above response ............ App. 79 Motion to Strike and Dismiss ‘‘above response’’ with prejudice and bar the defendants from further pleading, filed January 22, 1976, is also omitted, Order, January 26, 1976 continuing the case until January 30, 1976 for plaintiff to supply list of records and documents @2.0.....2......--.2-:ceceeceeee-e- App. 80 Order of January 30, 1976 continuing the case until February 13, 1976, (missing from file on ET TE CEUNEED duiisashSiininsitententsinstionsnisitinienmatinionionial App. 81 Order of February 13, 1976, Appendix A above ...App. 30 Letter of February 19, 1976, Appendix A ............ App. 33 IIIT sicusttessnnetininsnlenteiantsiceenictibiinitinamanteead App. 82 AUTHORITIES CITED Cases Butz v. City of Muscatine, 19 L. Ed. 490 000. 22 Dambrowski v. Pfister, 38 U.S. 479 ooo 23 Faretta v. California, —— U.S. —— none 9 Hill v. Gautreaux, —— U.S. —— on neeecececcccceeeeeeeeeeeeee 15 Hill v. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d 731, 739, 740 000 .. 23 Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 0.2... cece ceeeeee 22 Thermtron Products Inc. v. Hermandorfer —— U.S. STITT. carci lieniisilbhinabaneieiailalaciadebinieiniaiaialdsian 22 OG RS 23 vi PAGE Reference A Special Interest, Leonard Greenbaum, Ann Arbor, U. of Michigan Press, 1971, Library of Congress Tae, FO ceccesescreserncessnneneennenmnnintnnmneemmmmnsssematain 14 Statutes Ill.Rev.Stat. Chapter 120, Sections 592.1, 592.4, 675, 675a, 716, 718 and 804; Chapter 53, Sections 28 and 31; Chapter 110A, Sections 315, 317, 368, 381 and 382; Chapter 127, Sections 46.1, et seq.. and 47.2 fT 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 20 15 U.S.C. Section 1351, et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 1446, 1257- VOSTE £3 2 21, 23, 25 Constitutions First Amendment, U.S. Constitution (Freedom of OT ccceccccrnecsssvecenssesenssnennaienemianasenannanrmnenmsnntiastsannienete 9 Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .................. 23 1970 Constitution of Illinois, Article VI, Sections GO Gok, GOR GR GRD ereccetetccrectiscintinctntennintianinniinion 11 Iu the Supreme Court of the United States Octower Term, 1975 No. RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON, Petitioners, No. 48236 vs. THE SUPREMz COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., etc. Respondents. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS The petitioners move the court for leave to file the peti- tion for writ of mandamus, hereto annexed, under Section 1651 of Title 28 of the United States Code, and further move that an order and rule be eatered and issued direct- ing the Honorable Lilinois Supreme Court to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued against such Supreme Court in accordance with the prayer of said petition and why the petitioners should not have such other and further relief in the premises that may be just and meet. Ratew B. Tompson and Marcaret E. THompson, Petitioners. Iu the Supreme Court of the United States Octoser TERM, 1975 No. RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON, Petitioners, No. 48236 vs THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al. etc. Respondents. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS STATEMENT OF CASE Petitioners, Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson, his wife, pray that a writ of mandamus issue, to the Supreme Court for the State of Illinois, to show cause on a day to be fixed by this court, directing the aforesaid Illinois Supreme Court to vacate an order deny- ing leave to appeal, on a petition as a matter of right to review the judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Second Division, affirming the judgment of the Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, 'llinois, against petitioners’ property in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for taxes due and un- paid thereon, in Illinois Supreme Court case number 48236, PT Ge ee 3 People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., Petitioners vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete., Respondents, entered on March 25, 1976, as furnished to petitioners by the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court, Appendix, Infra, PP. 38, 47. The Appellate Court opinion is published ....... App. 3rd, and is in the Appendix, infra, P. 13, entered on December 3, 1975, as corrected December 17, 1975. There was no petition for a rehearing in the Illinois Supreme Court. The final judgment of the Cireuit Court appealed, Ap- pendix, infra, P. 28 was entered as of September 10, 1973, nune pro tune March 2, 1973, (the order is mis-dated; it was entered on September 11). As shown by the Petition as a Matter of Right, filed on January 28, 1976, in the Illinois Supreme Court, and ap- pended, the effect of the Llinois Supreme Court denial of leave to appeal on a petition as a matter of right taken pursuant to Article VI, Section 4 (c), 1970 Illinois Con- stitution, and Chapter 110A, Section 317, Ill. Rev. Stat. (Rule 317) being to deny the petitioners the right to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine the constitutional questions raised as a result of the Appellate Court action as to the violation of petitioners’ civil rights under the color of state law, affirming judgment against petitioners’ property for an undetermined amount of unpaid taxes when the taxes are fully paid; and the discrimination against petitioners’ right to due process and equal pro- tection of the law guaranteed by state and federal con- stitutions, splintering the cause, denying a termination of the litigation, confiscation of petitioner’s property, the right to relief in any state court, and as shown below, the 4 right to remove the case to a federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 1446 or appeal to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2) or (3), also denying the petitioners the right to a summary judgment in their favor for the damages and injunctive relief sought to which they are entitled. As asserted in the petition, the case came forth on peti- tioners’ complaint pursuant to Ch, 120, Sec. 804, Ill. Rev. Stat. wherein the consent of the sovereign is given to any person right to complain in any court of competent juris- diction in the name of the People of the State of Illinois against any officer who connives at any evasion of the provisions of the Revenue Act, the penalty is for double damages or losses and a possible removal from office. For the Circuit Court to enter judgment against peti- tioners’ property in favor of the People of the State of Illinois on petitioner’s complaint wherein they were the relators for the People is in itself an obstruction of jus- tice. But for the Appellate Court to twist the facts and say that these petitioners are ignorant, that the cause did not come forth on their complaint, making an already malicious judgment operative, making the judgment one that came forth on the application of the collector for taxes due and unpaid when the collector has never at any time filed an application, not only confiscates petitioners’ property, but, subjects the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, to the penalties of Section 804, supra. The Petitioners have the right to a determination by the Illinois Supreme Court, or in the alternative, by a federal district court. al Ee FR Te Be 5 The petition also states, that the same court order, rul- ing on consolidation of the case at bar with 74-1347,’ and appointment of a special prosecutor, was entered in both eases on July 30, 1973. App., infra, p. 27. As stated in the petition, the complaint in 74-1347, which is appended to the jurisdictional statement in this court, was completely incorporated in the case at bar by refer- ence, both cases were filed on October 13, 1972 in the trial court, both are on 1971 taxes, the issues were finally de- termined by the Circuit Court in this case on March 2, 1973, 74-1347 was determined on April 12, 1973. The trial court could not hear both cases. The trial court transcript shows, March 2, 1973, (Ree. Doe. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 59, 60): 1RELATED CASES 1. Thompson, ct ux. v. Clark, etc., et al., No. 73-1890 in the United States Supreme Court, judgment issued December 23, 1974, to Illinois Supreme Court. Notice that Illinois Supreme Court man- date issued to A»pellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Decem- ber 30, 1974. Mandate of Illinois Supreme Court issued July 28, 1975. 2. Thompson, et ux. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, State of Illinois, etc., et al., United States Supreme Court No. 74-1437, judgment issued July 15, 1975, to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District. Illinois Supreme Court mandate issued, July 28, 1975. Peti- tioners, upon information and belief, think the United States Su- preme Court judgment issued to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, is in the Illinois Supreme Court, having been credi- bly so informed by the Appellate Clerk by telephone, as is the like judgment in the case below. 3. Thompson v. County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County, Illinois, et al., No. 74-1526, judgment issued by the United States Supreme Court to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, November 4, 1975. illinois Supreme Court mandate issued November 18, 1975 as well as 71-234 and 71-398 on petitions for Writs for Certiorari. ‘*Ms. Thompson: . . . Now, number four I would like to hold over because of the Property Tax Ap- peal Board case... . The Court: Well, we are not going \. hold four over, or paragraph four. If you want to discuss it or testify to it or make some proof on that point, do it, because today is the day we are concluding this case. Ms. Thompson: All right. I have evidence that my property is the same as the abutting property. It is all grown up in shrubs. It is vacant because [ am in two and a half acre zoning—I mean, two acre zoning, and I own four acres of land; that the abut- ting property was assessed at 314% of the value es- tablished in the Fairfield-Miller case. Actually, it is worth a great deal more than that in 1971 because that was established in 1969. That the Board of Review lowered the assessments on the abutting property on the basis that it was classified as farm land. Part of this property was rezoned to commercial in 1970, and it is still being taxed at $500.00 an acre, and the Board of Review, on their publications on what they do, left this—omitted it from the publica- tion and they didn’t have a public hearing denying anybody from going in and contesting it. They say if valuations are not satisfactory call for a hearing within ten days. (These documents are in 74-1347 in the mvtion to appoint a special prosecutor.) This was not done in the public, and taxes are sup- posed to be 50% of the actual value, and when some- body else can be taxed at 314% of actual value, then | deserve the same treatment. You know that that is not what I asked, but that is all you said you can give me. J think it should be re-assessed. Now, in the Property Tax Appeal Board case are all of those figures. Now, am I going to be present- ing them again in the other case? The Court: I don’t know what you mean. SLE NII TR Se . — en a Te ee 7 Ms. Thompson: Well, are you going to hear both cases? The Court: The case you just had the order en- tered on before this case, hasn’t the hearing com- menced? Ms. Thompson: Yes, it is on assessments. The Court: Certainly. Ms. Thompson: You are going to hear it? Well then, that is all I am going to say here, because I am giving my arguments away for the other case.’’? The law providing access to the courts from the board of review Ch. 120, Sec. 592.1, Ill. Rev. Stat., has since been amended. If appeal is taken to the Property Tax Appeal Board only administrative review may be had and relief may not be sought in the court against the Board of Re- view. If no such appeal is taken relief may be sought in the court against the Board of Review. Assessments in Illinois are considered legislative action. The above statute is not only contrary to the doctrine of exhausting administrative remedies before access can be 1The Property Tax Appeal Board case was in no way heard. The defendants made no denials or even oral arguments, the judge announced from the bench that he had read the case and that the evidence did not support petitioners’ contentions. Not one allegation was heard. The law establishing the rate of actual market value has since been amended to 3314% of market value and the total assess- ments of the counties has been frozen at the prior level. The effect of this in Du Page County has been enormous. For example a house that was assessed in 1971 at $18,000 was selling in 1975 for around $50,000, based on the assessor’s figure that it was worth $36,000. None of the residential assessments went down on the 1975 re- assessment based on the lower percent, so now the house has the market value of $54,000 and prices on these houses has jumped to $60,000, or 20% in the last six months. had in the courts, it sets up conflicting court decisions in other respects, in that in direct court action against the Board of Review the courts have held that it is necessary to prove constructive fraud; in Section 592.4 ‘‘such deci- sion shall be based upon equity and the weight of evidence and not upon constructive fraud.’’ The assessments are either administrative decisions or they are legislative, they cannot be legislative for the Board of Review and administrative for the property tax appeal board and petitioners have the right to have the Illinois Supreme Court hear and determine their rights. As asserted in the petition, the Illinois Supreme Court mandate issued to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District on December 30, 1974, in 73-1890, supra, and as also asserted, the case is in the Cireuit Court with a com- plaint filed, where jurisdiction has not been taken and probably could not be taken because of the Appellate Court mandate. On May 8, 1976 the petitioners learned what the courts already knew, that there was something wrong with the mandate issued on December 30, 1974; as shown on the court order recalling the mandate from the Second District for appeal to this court in Febru- ary of 1974, Appendix, infra, P. 45, the case was assigned to the Third District, Petitioners can only guess that the original mandate went to the Third District; petitioners have the constitutional right to appeal to the Appellate Court in their own district. Petitioners submit that if the Second District could not give a fair hearing on 73-1890, the reason given for as- signing the case to the Third District, that it was estopped from hearing the next three cases, being 74-1347, 74-1526 and the present case at bar. | | 3 The title of 73-1890 (it did not have a valid title before because the collector never filed an initial or other plead- ing) is now People ex rel. Margaret E. Thompson, Rela- tor, Petitioner-Plaintiff vs. The Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial Cireuit, et al., ete., Respondents-Defendants; the Complaint, appended hereto, was filed under the same Section 804, supra. Petitioners claim that the Appellate Court ruling that the case at bar did not come forth on petitioners’ com- plaint but on the collector’s application for judgment on (lelinquent lands, was deliberately intended to nullify peti- tioners’ complaint in the Cireuit Court. As shown by the Cireuit Court records appended, the records are evidence of outrageous discrimination, need little explanation except that the petitioner did tell the judge in court on the morning of February 13, 1976, that she was not coming back; the mixed up records were 71-234, 71-398 and 73-1890, (U.S. Supreme Court Nos.) The Complaint was filed September 26, 1975, and the filing fee paid; as alleged in the complaint prior practice of the Cireuit Clerk was not to collect fees on tax cases. Dates of entry are missing on some of the orders but are shown in the index; the trial judge Charles Norgle, Sr., would allow nothing to be corrected, he called it refusing to make any rulings, making a farce out of this court’s ruling in Faretta v. Calif,, ........ if a , 1975. Fora court of original jurisdiction to refuse to determine issues of law for non-lawyers is an effective denial of access to the courts, and freedom of speech, necessitating a lawyer for a mouthpiece, and for the Appellate Court to uphold this practice, treating the issues of law as unproven facts making original rulings from the cold record gives peti- tioners the guaranteed right of review by the L[llinois Su- preme Court. 10 As asserted in the petition and as stated by the appel- late court opinion appended, petitioner, plaintiff below, raised 24 issnes on appeal, claiming judgment appealed is invalid and void as denying plaintiffs due process rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and should be vacated. In substance petitioners sought to have sections of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, Sections of the Illinois Re- vised Statutes, especially Chapter 120, Sections 675 (194), 675a (194a) and 716 (235), a myriad of tax levy ordi- nances, budget and appropriation ordinances and the as- sessed value on their real estate declared in violation of fourteenth Amendment rights as to due process of law, equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimina- tion, in the court of first instance, which was the Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial Cireuit, DuPage County, IIli- nois, on a complaint filed on October 13, 1972, on 1971 real estate taxes. The Circuit Court did not rule on the issues of law except what evidence could be identified and ad- mitted. The appellate court ruled that the trial court was not in error, citing Section 716, supra, then proceeded to treat the issues as unproven facts instead of issues of law, arbi- trarily exercised original jurisdiction which raises con- stitutional questions giving the petitioners the constitu- tional right to a determination by the Illinois Supreme Court. The trial court record rebuttal as follows: (Excerpts PP. 187-80) (Ree. 2, Vol. II) ‘‘Ms. Thompson: Well, I don’t think any law is followed any place along the line in the Revenue Act, and when it causes my taxes to go up 90 percent in five years, and when the collector doesn’t follow any laws, the State’s Attorney doesn’t make him, and the court doesn’t make him and you can’t get the tax ob- POT URE RRO i ae) r 11 jections heard, that I think the entire tax is vitiated; that I should get one hundred percent back, that be- cause the collector has failed the law, and under sec- tion 5U4, 1 get back not only one hundred per cent of the tax, but I get double. Mr. McLaren: Your Honor, I believe the protest attached to the complaint only applies to 92 per cent. I believe that she paid 8 per cent not under protest. Ms. Thompson: Your Honor, we argued in here. He withheld one hundred per cent. Now, if he is going to withhold 100 per cent, he can give one hundred per cent back. If he has only withheld 92 per cent, I would agree with you, but you didn’t make him come back in here and withhold only 92 per cent. The Court: Well, that memorandum only relates to the excessive accumulation doesn’t it? Okay, anything else to be offered at this time? All right. Il am not going to take that memorandum, because I don’t believe excessive accumulation is the prob- lem.’’* ‘*Ms. Thompson: Well, they already did excessive accumulations. The Court: I don’t think it is proved by the evi- dence. In fact, the evidence in my view doesn’t sup- port your objection, Mrs. Thompson, and I rule against you on your objections to dismiss your ob- jection and complaint as to all defendants, and deny you any relief whatsover.’’ (emphasis added) In substance the petition secks to have a section of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 declared in violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights as to due process of law, equal protection of the law and freedom from discrimina- tion, such offending section of the 1970 Illinois Constitu- tion being Article VI, Sections 4(a) and 6 reading: 1 (Petitioner had given the judge a memorandum of cases, both pro and con, on accumulation of tax monies in relation to the Park District levies. The memorandum was not relevant to the rebuttal.) 12 ‘é ... exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination of any case on review.’ Also, in substance, seeking to have sections of the IIli- nois Revised Statutes ceclared in violation of state and federal constitutions protecting civil rights both personal and property, such offending sections being Chapter 53, sections 31 and 28, Chapter 120, Sections 675, 675a, and 716, Chapter 127, Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 110A, Sec- tions 381, 382 and 368, reading: Chapter 53, Section 28: ‘‘For making a complete record, copy of record, or other papers in his office, for each 100 words 15 cents, except that the clerk shall furnish without cost, par- ties in interest or their attorneys of record, with printed copies of opinions.’’ Section 31 (N): ‘*Preparation and certification of record on change of venue or when original documents only are for- warded on appeal, $5. When by court order copies of some or all of the docu- ments in the record are to be forwarded rather than the originals the clerk may charge $.50 per page of the origmal document copied for each of the first 25 pages of such authorized copies and $.25 per page of the original document copied for each additional page of authorized copies.’’ Section 31 (V) ‘‘For each paper containing one or more tax objec- tions, whenever filed, $5.’’ Section 31, last paragraph: ‘‘No fee provided herein shall be charged to any unit of local government or school district unless the court orders another party to pay such fee on its behalf.’’ See Se Wat Soe Le 13 As asserted in the petition the trial court did appoint a special prosecutor by agreement between the State’s Attorney and a DuPage group organized by a Saul Alin- sky organizer, on October 24, 1975, when petitioners’ oral motion in court on October 23, 1975 to appoint a special prosecutor was alse denied. Petitioners claim that this is extreme discrimination against them. Further on that subject, the collector has now been indicted for bribery, conspiracy and official misconduct in office. Further, petitioners notified Attorney General Scott in September of 1974, that they were concerned about a pos- sible leak in the Chicago Justice departments investiga- tions in these matters which was posing a threat to them, because of the Saul Alinsky organizers in DuPage County had information that could only have come from the jus- tice department. By appointing this special prosecutor petitioners allege that dissent is being controlled in Du- Page County. The collector cannot be investigated with- out also investigating the court. As asserted in the petition, all Illinois Courts are effec- tively estopped from appointing a special prosecvtor, un- less and until, the decision is vacated in 74-1347. As further asserted in the petition the result of the Appellate Court action raised the question ot the validity of the Business and Economic Development Act, Chapter 127. See. 46.1 et seq., 47.2 et seq., Ill. Rev. Stat. and pos- sibly the State Technical Services Act, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et seq., especially sections 46.28 and 47.2, which authorizes state, federal and local government cooperation with pri- vate special interest and vested interest parties to the damage of petitioners and their property wherein peti- tioners are not only paying an undue burden of taxes by 14 the practices of the Illinois Courts and other defendants below, petitioners’ property is encumbered by so many violations of the Illinois Revenue Act that it is confiscated. The evidence for this confiscation and the actions co- operatively taken against petitioners runs throughout all of petitioners’ cases that have come to this court, wherein none of petitioners’ allegations have ever been denied. Starting with a secret meeting, held in Hinsdale, IIli- nois, on the first er second of September, 1966, which peti- tioners believe was between Federal, State, local govern- ments, developers, and others, as shown in the records (71-235) plans were devised that would consume peti- tioners’ property. The gist seemed to be planning caused hy the National Laboratories in DuPage County, which were managed by a tri-partite agreement between the Uni- versity of Chicago, the now defunct Atomie Energy Com- mission and thirty or forty other universities. As foot- noted in A SPECIAL INTEREST, Leonard Greenbaum, Ann Arbor, U. of Michigan Press, 1971, Library of Con- gress No. 74-164042. P. 169, our present United States Attorney General, Edward H. Levi, was the author of the agreement. One of the alleged planners, the Hinsdale High School District, with the opinion in petitioners’ favor, that the two school districts could not join together, hired a new Superintendent who housed on land illegally subdivided without platting which used Petitioners’ land as access. In the case at bar, 74-1526 was objected to on the grounds that the school board was paying the private expenses of its members and also the private expenses of the State’s Attorney out of public funds, in a way that interfered with petitioners’ zoning and defeated Oak Brook’s master plan. 15 Petitioners submit that the United States Supreme Court ruling in Hill vy. Gautneaux also concerning housing and sehool discrimination, is useless, wherein this court contends that low income housing can be controlled to a degree in Chicago's suburbs because of our laws on mas- ter plans, unless, we can enforce these laws. The Appcllate Court ruling on the constitutionality of section 675a, supra, also turns an issue of law into one of fact. ‘‘Plaintiffs have failed, however, to off: r compe- tent evidence of any such agreements.’’ Ch. 110A, Section 133 (b), IL Rev. Stat. reads: ‘‘In pleading a judgment or order of any state or federal court ..., it is sufficient to state the date of its entry and describe its general nature and al- lege generally that the judgment or decision was duly given.’’ The allegation is in petitioners’ complaint with the case number given. ‘The allegation was admitted in open court by the assistant State’s Attorney, who had written the orders agreed on and the same trial judge had signed them. As shown in the last transcript, (Rec. 2, P. 63) peti- tioner was presenting evidence that the court had given money back to other taxpayers; and, had already ruled on the issues of law citing the County of DuPage, pub- lished Appropriation Ordinance and Tax levy Ordinances, and supporting her point with the court’s own records. As shown on Page 67 ‘‘Ms. Thompson: . . . Cireuit Court of DuPage County, Lllinois, on the Illinois Central Railroad tax objections for 1969, ... Mr. Murphy: (he never did file an appearance or give an address) Is that an order of this court, madam? 16 Ms. Thompson: There is an order of the court on that. Mr. Murphy: No, no, but I am saying, are you reading from an order of the court or are you read- ing from some other part of the document in the case? Ms. Thompson: I am reading from the document, but it shows that 50° was given back on that item. Mr. Murphy: Well, now, I would object to that, your Honor. I move to strike. The Court: In other words, what you are reading is what, a settlement of the prior year tax claim by another party? Is that the idea? Ms. Thompson: Yes, but I want to know who Mr. Murphy is representing. Is he representing the pub- lic or is he— Mr. Murphy: I am representing District 86. The Court: Let me see what you are reading from Mrs. Thompson. Ms. Thompson: This is the State’s Attorney’s copy, and I don’t have the court order, but it shows what the court did with it. Mr. MeLaren: Your Honor, I don’t believe there was a hearing on the merits insofar as that case is concerned.’’? The Court: Well, I am going to sustain Mr. Murphy’s objection to what, in fact, is Mrs. Thomp- son reading some other objector’s tax objection. Ms. Thompson: I am showing the court that I am being discriminated against that the tax levies have been extended; they have been signed by the State’s Attorney and the State’s Attorney has agreed with other taxpayers that these could not be extended without a referendum; I am being denied the right to vote in the referendum to establish the tax. If I don’t pay the tax, my property will be sold, and so, that is extortionate as far as I am concerned. 1And this is how the Illinois Courts justify the discrimination. If the State’s Attorney agrees with one tax payer it is not a ruling on the merit, is binding on the parties, but is not binding on the court. 17 The Court: I understand your position. You may proceed.’’ The document was the State’s Attorney’s copy as al- leged, showed that there was no conference held, that the court had ruled on the merit and had ruled on each objec- tion separately. Petitioners request that the United States Supreme Court take judicial notice of the Appendix in 73-1890, supra, for other such orders, the practice is no- torious, not only in DuPage County but in Cook. The practice was not only proven, it was admitted, the Appel- late Court could have judicially noticed its own record, and petitioners are entitled to have the constitutionality of the statute determined. Also, the Appellate court ruling ‘‘In a tax objection ease there is a presumption that the taxes assessed are correct.’’ is not relevent when the Circuit Court found the cause came forth on petitioners’ complaint, and, is in con- travention of the intent of the legislature, Ch. 116, See. 1 et seq., Ill. Rev. Stat. with reference to court record (and, the records were destroyed in this case) where in section 22, reads: ‘* . . it shall be necessary for the party relying on any such deed or sale to show, affirmatively, that each and all provisions of law, in respect to assessment, levy, sale and deed of the lands affected’ or to be affected by any such deed or sale as aforesaid, have been in all respects complied with—-and no presump- tion shall be indulged in favor of any such tax deed or sale: and it shall not be sufficient to show a collec- tor’s report, Notice, judgment, order of sale, sale no- tice, notice of sale, tax affidavit, and deed, (anything) in this law or any other law of this state to the con- trary notwithstanding ’’ ! Petitioners think this should read effected. 18 The Appellate Court also exercised original jurisdiction on a cold record, offending petitioners’ constitutional rights by its ruling: ‘*The plaintiffs intvoduced no evidence that the col- lector was acting in a manner other than according to the statute... .’’ Petitioners’ Exhibit 1 (1970) Final Distribution State- ment... Village of Oak Brook. Item 1... Total Tax... 56,077.39 . . . Item 10... Taxes in litigation 16,436.19. Petitioners’ exhibit 23 (1970) Final Distribution Statement, . . » High School District 86, Item 1 Total Tax... 4,- 710,800.94 Item 10... Taxes in litigation, 196,074.39. The above exhibits show that the collector is withholding more than 1°. The law, Section 675, supra has now been amended to read that the collector may withhold the amount paid under protest or ‘‘one half’’ of the total taxes collected. The exhibits show taxes in litigation, which is false. Never has the collector accounted for taxes to the court. It was petitioners’ contention that the collector is the same as a common carrier, that he can withhold no tax money without court order; that the stat- ute is unconstitutional and, that pursuant to Chapter 116, See. 27, Ill. Rev. Stat. the collector is subject to further damages and a fine for refusing to provide the transcript of the tax for our case. On page 11 of last transcript of Ree. Doc. 2, Vol. II, trial Court proceedings January 8, 1973: Ms. Thompson: ... But the point I am making is, the record does not show the amount of taxes paid under protest. I am going to give you an example. Mr. MeLaren: Your Honor, it is the position of the County Collector that the amount of taxes paid ander protest are 100° of the taxes paid under pro- oS ” ow & 19 test. When a person does come in to pay their taxes and they protest, although they might onl, protest d, 10, 15, 20 percent of what taxes are. The Court: In other words your position is that the tax bill is $100.00, the $100.00 is paid under pro- test. Mr. McLaren: Right. Page 12. Ms. Thompson: Let me tell you what happened. Look at the Illinois Central. In 1969 they paid $40,- 000.00 worth of tax. They protested 5% of it. The County Collector withheld $40,000.00, Ms. Thompson: . . . Now, how much is he with- holding? ... If he is withholding one per cent of the tax, that can be over one million dollars (interest). And if he is withholding one per cent of the tax for three years, that can be four million dollars (inter- est). And on page 22: Ms. Thompson: He is collecting interest—at least we hope he is collecting interest—on all this tax money that has been paid under protest since Sep- tember. ... and the argument continues on P. 25 and 26, the judge did not rule.’ Petitioners have the right and the LIlinois Supreme Court is mandated to enter judgment for the correct amount of taxes pursuant to Ch. 120, See. 718, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 120, See. 781, Ill. Rev. Stat. provides that taxes paid under protest be distributed as provided in Section 1It was after the above January 8, 1973 ar uments that the County Collector obtained an opinion from the Illinois Attorney General permitting him to deposit tax funds in interest-beari ig bank accounts pending distribution to the county’s taxing bodies. As asserted in the petition after three years the amount of interest gained was $4,000,000.00. 20 675, supra (194), and that they not be held more than three years. Section 782, of Ch. 120, Ill. Rev. Stat. pro- vides that the Department of Local Government Affairs take necessary action for any failure to settle, and that the action be pursued by the Attorney General. Further the Illinois Supreme Court is violating peti- tioners’ federal constitutional rights under the color of state law by making decisions that effect private rights and privileges outside the arena of the formal court pro- ceedings and allowing the lower courts to also make such decisions; the decision on the availability of records; that there would not be any records for the appeal in 73-1890; violating petitioners’ constitutional right to appeal a final judgment of the trial court to the appellate court in their district by transferring 73-1890, supra to the Third Dis- trict in Ottawa; by making two divisions of three judges each out of four elected judges by calling back retired judges who were not elected from their district; by send- ing the court administrator to the cireuit court to advise the chief judge to hire an administrator to clean up more than 2000 tax objection cases instead of ruling on this ease; in issuing its mandate a second time on July 28, 1975, in 73-1890 supra. As asserted in the petition the Illinois Supreme Court has the statutory mandate to enter judgment for the cor- rect amount of money, Chapter 120, Section 718, Ill. Rev. Stat. and that original jurisdiction is needed, Ch. 110A Sections 381 and 382, Ill. Rev. Stat. are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment in that original juris- diction established in the Illinois Supreme Court in a revenue related matter by the Illinois Constitution, is by these statutes limited to questions of law. How much money the collector is withholding is a question of fact. The Solicitor General is being served pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403, Acts of Congress are involved. 21 Reasons for Granting the Writ The Illinois Supreme Court is ultra vires its authority in refusing to rule on a petition as a matter of right and deprived petitioners of a right to a determination by it of constitutional issues raised by action of the Appellate Court or to a direct appeal to this Court. Section 1257(2) requires that a notice of appeal be filed in the court pos- sessed of the record and that the entire record be avail- able for the appeal, but the court has refused to give a construction to the statutes on preparation and certifica- tion and transfer of the records, Ch. 53, See. 28, supra, cud has gone even further than this, in 73-1890, in saying there would be no records, and the posture of the four eases is such that an appeal would not terminate the litigation. As shown by the record submitted herewith, some of the transeript of this case are in 74-1347, supra, the tran- scripts having been deliberately filed in the wrong case by the trial judge. Chapter 1IOA, Section 317, Ill. Rev. Stat. is jurisdie- tional and mandatory, and in no way discretionary, and a denial is tantamount to an affirmance of the appellate court decision, giving the Illinois Supreme Court the statutory mandate under Chapter 120, Section 718, II. Rev. Stat. (1971) to enter judgment for the amount of taxes and damages and terminate the litigation. The Illinois Supreme Court is also depriving petitioners of the right to be heard by the federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by denying the records for a removal to that court under 28 U.S.C. 1446, wherein these petitioners have already paid for the preparation of the records. Under rule 322(b) of the Illinois Supreme Court, that court can administratively order the entire original rec- 22 ord transmitted without a praecipe being filed. And, by Rule 329, if the record is insufficient to present fully and fairly the questions involved, the requisite portions may be supplied at the cost of the appellant. Which cost under Illinois law could not be more than five dollars plus post- age on any one case. And, as the records show, they are in such a condition in the Cireuit Court that the cireuit clerk will only certify the records document by document. It would be far more economical, whether the Illinois Supreme Court ends up determining this case or whether it is finally removed to a federal court, for the Illinois Supreme Court to call up Appellate Court and Circuit Court records and rule on its jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court cannot dismiss an appeal for a want of jurisdiction if there is a court of competent jurisdiction to hear it. Ch. 110, See. 8 (1), Ill. Rev. Stat. Should the Illinois Supreme Court refuse jurisdiction, which it has, then the case would go to the federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Petitioners are supported in their contention that man- damus is the appropriate relief to compel the Illinois Su- preme Court to rule on its jurisdiction by Butz v. City of Muscatine, 19 L.Ed. 490; Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, ........ U.S. ........ PP. B582 and Bd83 of 1975 Supreme Court Bulletin. ‘*\ traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal court has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’’ That the United States Supreme Court wants the state courts to determine state matters is shown in Huff- 23 man v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37; Dambrowski v. Pfister, 38 U.S. 479. The Illinois Supreme Court is further ultra vires its authority in refusing to determine its jurisdiction and ignoring Section 718 wherein it is mandatory to enter judgment for correct amount, and deprives the Petitioners of a right to a summary judgment in their favor granting the damages and injunctive relief asked. None of peti- tioners’ allegations has ever been denied or answered; petitioners’ civil rights have been violated repeatedly; that they are entitled to a summary judgment is supported by Hill v. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d 731, 739, 740. The Illinois Supreme Court ignored the absolute right to have it declare Chapter 120, Sections 675, 675a and 716, Ill. Rev. Stat. violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments as to freedom of speech, due process and equal protection, to remove the encumbrances from their property and terminate the litigation. By the action of the court not only are the Petitioners deprived of the right to have the unconstitutional assess- ments, rates and related laws determined, all of the resi- dential taxpayers of DuPage County are deprived of the right to have the matter determined, so that the citizens of Illinois would know what their rights were as to the excessive burden of taxation caused by DuPage County underassessing vacant and developing land to encourage economic development and eliminate the single family resident, pirating business and industry from other coun- ties, under the State Technical Services Act of 1965, Pub- lie Law 89-182, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et seq., which cannot stand when if Ch. 127, Section 47.2, Ill. Rev. Stat. is declared 24 invalid, Congress has no authority to delegate any such legislative authority to the State of Illinois. If this court does not issue its writ of mandamus, the petitioners will be denied their right te the Lllinois Su- preme Court, or to a direct appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari, because 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2) requires that the Notice of Appeal be filed in the court possessed of the record; the records are in more than one court; peti- tioners have the original mandate of the Illinois Supreme Court; without the records there can be no direct appeal nor even a removal to a federal district court and as the appendix shows, petitioners have tendered the money for these records, Petitioner in the Appendix reproduces the Record in the Illinois Supreme Court excepting the Excerpts from Record which is a reproduction of Cireuit Court Records as filed in the Appellate Court, and the record shows the Petition as a matter of right with the Appellate Court opinion, final judgment and letter of denial of records by Appellate Clerk appended. And both final orders of the court together with what it took to get that order. Petitioner in the Appendix also reproduces the record in the Cireuit Court of DuPage County from her own records insofar as the Complaint and Motion that was filed to reinstate the case (73-1890) and the court orders that were entered, which is prima facie evidence of dis- crimination, and also shows why the Cireuit Clerk cannot certify the records which have been altered and re-altered. The Clerk’s certificate for the appeal on 73-1890 is also in the appendix. 25 CONCLU.iON Wherefore, petitioners pray. 1. That a writ of mandamus issue from this court directing the Honorable Supreme Court for the State of illinois to show cause why mandamus should not issue from this court directing it to vacate its judgments deny- ing leave to appeal on petitions as a matter of right, and remand the cause to said Illinois Supreme Court, with directions to forthwith determine its jurisdiction; hear and determine the cause or in the alternative to commence the procedure of administratively calling up the records for a removal to the federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1993, and 28 U.S.C. 1446, and 2. That Petitioners have such additional relief and process as may be necessary and appropriate in the premises. Respectfully submitted, Ratpw B. Tompson Marcaret EK. THompson, Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 Petitioners APPENDIX APPENDIX A No. 48236 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL. RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMP- SON AND RALPH B. THOMPSON AND MARGARET E. THOMPSON, individually, Petitioners (Plaintiffs-Appellants) v. JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY COLLECTOR, JOHN BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY, RAY MACDON- ALD, COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY BOARD OF TAX REVIEW, ALL IN DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN THE MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR LOTS AND LANDS D'UINQUENT IN PAYMENT OF TAXKS, Respondents (Defendants-A ppellees) Appeal from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Second Division, No. 73-435 (T.C. No. C72-1074 Sub 112 PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OR RIGHT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS on the relation of Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson individually, Petitioners Box 133 Hinsdale, [llinois 60521 323-3381 App. 2 PETITION FOR APPEAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT The petitioners, pursuant to Chapter 110A, Section 317, Ill. Rev. Stat. and Article VI, Sec. 4(c), Illinois Constitu- tion of 1970, file this their petition for appeal as a matter of right as the basis upon which it is contended that the Supreme Court of Illinois has jurisdiction to review the final order of judgment for unpaid taxes against certain property in question, and should exercise such jurisdiction in this case. OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW The opinion of the Appellate Court filed on December 3, 1975, Appendix, infra, Page 1. The fiual order of the Appellate Court entered on De- cember 3, 1975, Appendix, infra, Page 11. Corrections ordered December 17, 1975, Appendix, Page 12. Appellate Clerk’s refusal to prepare and certify record, Appendix, P. 13. There was no petition for a rehearing. POINTS RELIED UPON FOR A REVERSAL Whether the trial court and the appellate court could enter judgment against property for taxes when the taxes were fully paid under protest and objections filed. Whether the trial court and appellate court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to appoint a special prosecu- tor to prosecute the violations in the penalties of the Reve- nue Act when none of the violations alleged was denied. Whether judgment was entered against petitioner’s property to confiscate it when defendants could not obtain App. 3 the property any other way calling into question the va- lidity of Chapter 127, Sec. 46 & 47, Ill. Rev. Stat. as deny- ing due process and equal protection to petitioners as guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. Whether the appellate court erred in the trial courts being required to hear and determine the questions of law. Whether the appellate court erred in the application of 716 to petitioners’ tax objections. That petitioners’ complaint under Section 804 of the Revenue Act demanded an answer. Il Whether the Appellate Court Opinion and Final Order is null and void for declaring that the cause came forth on the application of the Collector when the Trial Court Order appealed declares that the cause came forth on the Complaint of the Petitioners herein, and constitutes an obstruction of justice as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1623. Ill Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to a Summary Judg- ment in their favor where the cause came on upon their Complaint, the allegations not being denied were admitted. IV Whether Sections 675, 675a and 716 of the Illinois Reve- nue Act are unconstitutional because they preclude an ad- versary proceeding denying the plaintiffs the right to sue. V Whether the Collector could withhold 100% of Plain- tiff’s taxes when only 92% was objected to and paid under protest. App. 4 VI Whether the Final Order of the Appellate Court is null and void as being in contravention of Section 718, of the Illinois Revenue Act, wherein the Clerk is required to cer- tify the correct amount to the Collector, which is an ab- surdity since the Trial Court did not take jurisdiction of the money nor determine the correct amount. vil Whether a judgment against Petitioners’ property is valid where the Collector did not file an application and there are no unpaid taxes. Vill Whether the Appellate Court opinion is contrary to and in conflict with its prior decisions and opinions on the same issues between the same parties, is repugnant to the doc- trines of stare decisis and res judicata and is null and void. Ix Whether Chapter 53, Section 28, Illinois Revised Stat- utes is unconstitutional as being repugnant to the man- dates of the Illinois Constitution, Section 16, Article VI, requiring the Illinois Supreme Court to provide inexpen- sive and efficient appeals. ».¢ Whether Article II, Section 2, of the 1970 Illinois Con- stitution is unconstitutional as denying the sovereignty to the people and preventing the Petitioners the right to sue in Illinois courts. XI Where the Appellate Court has the power to enter any order the Trial Court should have entered may that Court App. 5 rule that the Trial Court was not required to enter any but a Summary Order and then proceed to enter ruling de novo where the Trial Court did not; exercising original jurisdiction without due process calling into question the validity and constitutionality of Article VI, Sections 4(a) and 6, Illinois Constitution of 1970, may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination of any case on review. XII Whether People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Ap- peal Board, et al., 22 Lil. App. 3d 316 (1974) is null and void for the reason that the same issues were in the case at bar which was disposed of first and the Trial Court was estopped from ruling again. XIII Whether taxes can be levied and extended on rates that have been held illegal by the Circuit Court. XIV Whether the Appellate Court erred in not ruling on the excessive over assessment by the Board of Review as to the real estate in question, placing an undue burden on Petitioners. XV Whether the Appellate Court ruled correctly on any of the rates objected to by Petitioners. XVI Whether the trial court and the Appellate Court erred on the collector’s being required to distribute taxes paid under protest through the court. App. 6 XVIII The Appellate Court erred in not considering two cases to be consolidated at the same time. XIX Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court erred in the ruling that the judgment could be entered nunc pro tune. XX Whether the Appellate Court erred in there being a re- hearing in the Trial Court. XXI Whether both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court erred in that Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Section 804 of the Revenue Act had to be answered. STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts as set forth in the opinion are so inconsistent to the degree that some of them are false by definition constituting perjury on its face. As shown by the order appealed from the trial court decision declares that the cause came forth on the peti- tioners complaint and says nothing about the application of the collector. The collector has never filed an initial pleading or other pleading and is not a valid appellee or respondent in this case. There are no valid respondents, none having pleaded in the trial court. App. 7 ARGUMENTS Where the Revenue Act provides for procedures to be followed in assessing, levying taxes and for the taxpayer to protest and object to the same, and none of the pro cedures are followed; the collector failing in every year since 1967 to file an application to determine the correct amount of taxes paid under protest or for the sale of lots and lands delinquent in the payment of taxes, and the petitioners finally file a complaint as an action on the case under Section 804 of the Revenue Act, it is absolutely in- tolerable to have the Appellate Court of Illinois declare that the petitioners are stupid idiots, and assume the col- lector filed an application; Chapter 120, Section 675, 675a, and 716, Llline’s Revised Statutes are vague and unwork- able, are denying due process and equal protection of the laws as to petitioners and must be held invalid and unconstitutional. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of these statutes. Where the Revenue Act provides for a conference the State’s Attorney makes out of court settlements with some taxpayers. The agreements are never filed, only the amount of refund. The rates that are agreed to be invalid and void or extended again and again. As shown by the record the collector is withholding more than one per cent of the taxes and more than the amount paid under protest; petitioners paid 92% under protest; the state’s attorney argued that the collector was entitled to withhold 100% regardless of how much was protested in contravention of the provisions of the Revenue Act. The collector made around four million in interest off of withheld taxes in 1974, does not want to file a transcript of the tax from his warrant books into petitioner’s case App. 8 to the extent that judgment was obtained against peti- tioner’s property when taxes are fully paid, for the rea- son that if he accounted for petitioner’s money he would be required to account for all of the money being with- held. Even the Illinois Supreme Court cannot finally de- cide this case without the collector disclosing the amount of money being withheld. The judgment is required to be for the correct amount of taxes paid under protest. The Appellate Court decisions are so inconsistent that none of them is valid. In case number 70-220, 43928 in this court the Appellate Court dismissed petitioner’s ap- peal on the motion of the collector that the cases were numbers on his warrant books, in 72-73 the appellate court dismissed the appeal declaring that they did not dismiss petitioner’s appeal in case number 70-220, that the Illi- nois Supreme Court did. The appellate court also refused to rule on the judgment against delinquent lands appealed by petitioners on the arguments that petitioner’s taxes were fully paid; that therefore petitioners did not have standing that judgment would never be entered against the petitioner’s property. In the case at bar the appel- late court affirms judgment against petitioner’s property when the taxes are fully paid. In Thompson v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Ill. App. 2d 178, the motion of the defendant states the motion was by coulin couper individu- ally, and also declares that the attorney is representing the defendant which was the Park District. In 73-376, 47166 in this court the motion to dismiss declares in one place that it is a motion to dismiss and in another that it is a motion to grant petitioner’s prayer for relief. In People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, the same order denies the appointment of a special prosecutor as in the case at bar, the original App. 9 is in the property tax appeal board case with only that trial court number, the duplicate is in this case with two trial court numbers; the appellate court ruled that peti- tioner’s motion was impertinent and slanderous and should have been denied on its merits whereas the trial court is now estopped from appointing a special prosecutor to investigate the collector while still denying the appoint- ment of a special prosecutor to these petitioners on case number 46352 wherein this court’s mandate issued on De- cember 30, 1974, and to date is still not reinstated in the trial court, the Chief Judge, presiding trial court judge in this case after disqualifying himself as chief judge signed an agreed on order that appointed a special prose- eutor to have the collector investigated. That all of the above actions constitute perjury and none of the appellate court opinions against these petitioners is valid. That the clerk of the appellate court’s grounds for de- nying the records calls into question the validity of Chap- ter 53, Section 28, Illinois Revised Statutes as being con- trary to the constitutional rights of petitioners. That the petitioners disagree with that clerk’s statement of a misunderstanding, in case number 70-220 in that court the clerk reproduced three copies of pleacigs filed in the appellate court, did not include an index, inter alia, which was willful malice against petitioners. Petitioners submit that the clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court at no time has made reproductions of pleadings but has prepared and certified either the original or a duplicate original as filed by petitioners. With tour copies of all pleadings filed in the appellate court it is unreasonable for the clerk to make reproductions. The statute needs to be given a construction. App. 10 The Illinois Supreme Court in case number 46352 did order the records not transferred which is a flagrant viola- tion of petitioner’s rights. That the last two appeals of of petitioners to the United States Supreme Court were denied in part because the records could not be obtained, and because this case precedes the other two. Petitioners submit that if the Lilinois Supreme Court is counting on the United States Supreme Court doing nothing, that the Illinois Supreme Court is on its own im that petitioners conceded before the last two appeals were denied that they would have come back down to the State Courts and back up again to get the records. For the Appellate Uourt to held the records and furnish only reproductions consti- tutes a form of embezzlement. That the petitioners are paying an undue burden of taxes, that the records show overwhelming evidence of violations of the Revenue Act wherein the defendants are conniving to take petitioner’s property without due pro- cess, calling into question the validity of Chapter 127, Sections 46 and 47 and, 15 U.S.C. 1351 et seq., wherein federal, state and local governments are cooperating but have not been able to confiscate petitioner’s property. That judgment against petitioner’s property when the taxes ar fully paid has been done with malice. Petitioners further submit that the appellate court should have ruled on the falsely certified transcripts, the destruction of transcripts, the filing by the trial judge of the transcripts for this case in the property tax anpeal. board case, so that the constitutional questions would not be answered. That the question of the Judicial Inquiry Board’s interference should have been ruled upon. There can be no doubt that this case should have been consolidated with the Property Tax Appeal Board case: they are both on 1971 tax year; the complaint from the App. 11 Property Tax case is fully incorporated in this case and when this case has not been finally determined and was ruled upon in the trial court before the Property Tax case, the trial court was estopped in that case. Petitioners submit that for this case to be finally deter- mined they will need to file motions for original action to compel the collector to account for the money being with- held, to compel the appellate clerk to prepare and certify and index the original records, to this court to the com- plete determination of the case on review or in the alter- native to transfer to a federal district court for violating petitioners’ rights under color of state law. Petitioners submit that case number 43928 and 46352 in this court precede this case. That neither case has a valid title in that the collector never filed an initial pleading. It being the practice of the circuit clerk to transfer tax objections to the collector’s office where they are tran- scribed into the collector’s warrant books. That none of these cases has been finally determined and are back in the trial court on Petitioners’ complaint. That the trial court to date has refused to take jurisdiction; that there is every possibility that the trial court cannot take juris- diction of a perjured appellate court mandate, compelling the Illinois Supreme Court to recall its mandate. The above cases are now working through motions to transfer to the federal district court. Petitioners submit that they now have exhausted any possibility of relief in the Illinois Courts even this court and cite ease numbers 43613, wherein petitioner’s tax case was treated as a protest number and overruled, number 43928, same thing, number 44360 same cases dismissed while on appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 46352 mandate issued December 30, 1974, same thing the coilector never filed a pleading and refused to account for the money. App. 12 CONCLUSION Wherefore it is respectfully submitted that the Illinois Supreme Court has Jurisdiction of this appeal. Respectfully submitted, Ralph B. Thompson and, Margaret E. Thompson Petitioners Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 323-3381 App. 13 73-435 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois ) Appellate Court ) ss. Second District ) At a session of the Appellate Court, begun and held at Elgin, on the lst day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventy five, within and for the Second District of Illinois: SECOND DIVISION Present—Honorable Thomas J. Moran, Presiding Justice Honorable Walter Dixon, Justice Honorable Albert E. Hallett, Justice Loren J. Strotz, Clerk William A. Klusak, Sheriff BE IT REMEMBERED, that afterward, to wit: On December 3, 1975 the Opinions of the Court was filed in the Clerk’s office of said Court, in the words and figures fol- lowing, viz: No. 73 - 435 Filed 2nd Division, Dee. 3, 1975 Loren J. Strotz, Clerk Appellate Court, 2nd District (Publ. In Full) App. 14 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT — SECOND DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RALPH B. THOMPSON and MARGARET E. THOMP- SON and RALPH B. THOMPSON and MARGARET E. THOMPSON, individually, Plaintiffs-A ppellants, v. JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY COLLECTOR, JOHN BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY, RAY MAC DON- ALD, COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY BOARD OF TAX REVIEW, ALL OF DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN THE MATTER OF JUDGMENT FOR LOTS AND LANDS DELINQUENT IN PAYMENT OF TAXES, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Cireuit, Du Page County, Llinois. Justice THomas J. Moran delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendants against certain property owned by them. The judgment is founded upon 1971 real property taxes. In accordance with the statutory scheme, the plaintiffs paid their taxes under protest. Thereafter, the county collec- tor filed an application for judgment against their proper- ty, the application accompanied by the required statutory affidavit; in response, plaintiffs filed tax objections raising various issues. App. 15 The plaintiffs appeared pro se and, after a trial on the merits, judgment against the property was entered on March 13, 1973, nunc pro tunc as of March 2, 1973. On June 30, 1973, the judgment was vacated and, upon re- hearing, September 10, 1973, judgment was again entered nunc pro tunc as of March 2, 1973. Plaintiffs raise 24 issues on appeal; we have censolidated them into three categories. It is claimed that the judgment appealed is invalid and void as denying plaintiffs due process rights guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and therefore the judgment should be vacated. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the court erred: (a) in entering the judgment nunc pro tunc; (b) in not requiring written pleadings by the defendants; and (c) in its interpretation of certain laws. Plaintiffs claim the order entered September 10, nunc pro tunc as of March 2, was invalid because no order was rendered on March 2, 1973, and therefore a nunc pro tuuc order cannot be entered to supply such omission. The cita- tion which plaintiffs quote to support their contention be. lies its applicability to the case at hand. It states, ‘‘where there is no minute or memorial paper in the records to show that the order was, in fact, made, it cannot *** be so entered.” (People v. Rosenwald, 266 Ill. 548, 554 (1915).) Here, the record reveals a ruling in the form of a minute order dated March 2, 1973, indicating that a written order was to come. The written order was entered on March 13, nunc pro tunc as of March 2. At the time of rehearing, no new matters of substance were introduced to modify or alter the original order entered. Therefore, it was proper for the court, upon denial of rehearing relief, to enter its September 10, 1973 order munc pro tunc as of March 2, 1973. App. 16 To discuss plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants were re- quired to file written pleadings, we review the statutory procedures in a tax objection case. Under Section 229 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, §710) the county collector is directed to apply to the court, during the month of October, for judgment and order of sale for taxes on delinquent lands and for judgment fixing the correct amount of any tax paid under protest. Such application has been construed to be in the nature of a complaint. (People ex rel. Raid v. Adkins, 48 Ill. 2d 402, 405 (1971). The list of lands on which taxes are delinquent or paid under protest, together with the statutorily-re- quired supplemental certificate (which insures the currency of the list) and the collector’s affidavit, establishes the evidence to be presented to the court on application for judgment, and constitutes a prima facie case. (See People ex rel. Brenza v. Anderson, 411 Ill. 252, 255 (1952).) The court is instructed to examine the list, and if any specific objection in writing is offered in defense, then the court shall hear the matter in summary manner, without plead- ings, and render judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, §716.) Thus, tax objections are, in the language of the statute, defenses. Where no objections are filed, the tax- payer, in essence, is guilty of failing to file an answer to the collector’s complaint, and a tax judgment in this cir- cumstance is equivalent to a default judgment. Reid, supra, 405. (The procedure for paying one’s real estate taxes under protest, as provided in §716, is set out in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, $675,| ‘‘The procedure for paying one’s real estate taxes under protest, as provided in section 235 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, ch. 120, sec. 716) is set out in section 194 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, Sec. 716) which in turn provides that proceedings upon App. 17 objections filed under this section are subject to [$675a] 194a. Under [§675a] 194a, the court is instructed to hold a conference between the tax objector and the State’s At- torney within 90 days of the filing of the objection unless the matter is disposed of sooner. If a compromise agrece- ment is reached, the agreement must be filed with the clerk of the court. If no agreement is reached, the court must, upon demand of either party, set a hearing date within 90 days of the demand. When the plaintiffs’ objections, which they characterize as a ‘‘complaint’’, are viewed against this statutory pro- cedure, it becomes clear that their ‘‘complaint’’ was, in its true function, an answer to the collector’s complaint for tax judgment. Thus, under [$716] 235, no additional written pleadings on the part of defendants are required since issue has been joined by the collector’s application and the plaintiffs’ written tax objections. We have ex- amined the record in this case at length, and find that the proceedings herein did not deviate in any material way from the statutory scheme outlined above. Plaintiffs allege that ‘‘section 194a of the Revenue Act of 1939” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, §675a] is unconsti- tutional, it being a violation of equal protection. That sec- tion, as discussed above, provides for a pretrial conference wherein the tax objector and ‘lie State’s Attorney may work out a compromise agreement on tax objections. Any such agreement must be filed with the court. The plain- tiffs in this case allege that no such agreement was reached with the State’s Attorney, whereas compromise tax agree- ments were reached with other taxpayers on the same tax objections, and assert that this constitutes a violation of equal protection. Plaintiffs have failed, however, to offer competent evidence of any such agreements. Here, as App. 18 elsewhere in their trial court presentation and brief, plain- tiffs offer allegations, not proof. While we realize the difficulties of a pro se presentation, especially in matters as complex as taxation, and respect plaintiffs’ earnestness in this matter, the allegations, unsupported by proof, can- not form the basis for relief. In a tax objection case there is a presumption that the taxes assessed are correct. The burden is upon the objector to prove facts to sustain the objection. (People ex rel. Brenza v. Fleetwood, 413 Ill. 530, 545 (1952).) A close reading of the entire record re- veals that plaintiffs have not met this burden regarding any of the objections raised by their pleadings. Plaintiffs allege errors in the rulings of the trial court. Some have been discussed above; others which merit dis- cussion will be reviewed briefly. (1) Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by ruling that proper notice had been given to the taxing districts. The record reveals that the required statutory notice was given, therefore, no error occurred. (2) Plaintiffs claim that the court erred in failing to order the collector to make a full disclosure. While it is not altogether clear from their brief, it appears that plaintiffs are referring to disclosure of the amount of total taxes withheld from distribution. Section 194 of the Revenue Act of 1939’’ [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, $675} provides in part that ‘‘No protest shall prevent or be a cause [of] delay in the distribution of tax collections among the taxing bodies of any taxes collected which were not paid under protest. The collector may withhold from distribution the amounts paid under protest or 1% of the total taxes collected, whichever is less.’’ The plaintiffs in- troduced no evidence that the collector was acting in a App. 19 manner other than according to the statute, therefore fail- ure to order the collector to make such disclosure was not error. (3) Plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred in exclud- ing proper evidence offered to support their case. Some of the items to which plaintiffs apparently refer were never presented to the court for identification, are not present in the record on review, and are thus not reviewable. (See Grier v. Barkley, 182 Hl. App. 541, 545-46 (1913).) The plaintiffs did not adequately identify or ask the trial court to take judicial notice of orders claimed to have been en- tered in a previous case wherein plaintiffs were objecting to their 1970 taxes. The record reveals that other rejected items (to which plaintiffs refer generally) were clearly not competent evidence. The items were newspaper atti- cles, portions of other taxpayers’ tax objections, and docu: ments dealing with prior years’ taxes, the relevance of which was not adequately demonstrated. From our re- view, we conclude that the trial court did not err by ex- cluding evidence described by plaintiffs as proper. (4) Plaintiffs allege that there was no pretrial con- ference as provided for in section ‘‘194a of the Revenue Act of 1939’’ 675a, supra. Since plaintiffs’ statements in the record admit that a pretrial conference was held, the nub of plaintiffs’ complaint seems to be that there was no court reporter at the conference and, there being no record of what occurred, the proceedings did not constitute a pre- trial conference. This argument is without merit. The above cited section of the Revenue Act does not require a record of the proceedings to be made; neither is such ree- ord required in pretrial conferences of civil cases accord- ing to Supreme Court Rule. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 171, ch. 110A, App. 20 §218.) The responsibility for having the pretrial pro- ceedings recorded rests upon the party seeking the same. (5) Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in deny- ing a motion to amend their pleadings to include a count for mandamus or a count for declaratory judgment. It is argued that since the named defendants did not appear at the March 2, 1973, hearing (although present by their at- torneys) the court should have treated plaintiffs as the cumplaining witnesses and allowed them to amend the cause of action before the court. Plaintiffs cite no au- thority to support the proposition; they arrive at their conclusion through the misconceptjon that it was their objections, rather than the collector’s application for judgment, that initiated the action befure the court. (6) Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in giving summary decision in this case. They argue that because each of their objections raised different ques- tions of law and fact, the court was bound to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law on each objection raised rather than to summarily dispose of all matters as a group. Contrary to plaintiffs’ position, section [716 supra] *‘255 of the Revenue Act of 1939’’, provides that the court ‘‘shall hear and determine the matter [tax ob- jections] in a summary manner.”’ (7) A motion to consolidate this case with an earlier ease (involving plaintiffs’ 1970 taxes) was correctly de- nied on July 7, 1973, since plaintiffs had filed a notice of appeal from rulings in that case on April 12, 1973. See People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 22 Ill. App. 3d 316 (1974). (8) The trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to sustain their complaint against the Oak Brook Park District appropriation ordinance. The App. 21 plaintiffs introduced the Park District’s appropriation ordinances for the years 1967-1972 to show accumulation of funds. Such accumulations are alleged to be illegal by the plaintiffs. The only authority cited for that proposi- tion was an earlier case of plaintiffs’ wherein judgment was entered on the defendant Park District’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. See Thomp- son v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Ill. App. 2d 178 (1971). (9) Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred regard- ing the validity of the education fund rate for School District 53. It is argued that the rate increase was invalid because the proposition was not clearly stated on the bal- lot as required by statute. (lil. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, §9-13.) However, this section requires only that the ‘‘sub- stance’’ of such proposition appear. The sample ballot introduced by defendants reveals that the substance of the proposed rate increase did appear on the ballot. We find no error in this regard. (10) Plaintiffs claim that the court erred by not ruling on the question of whether, without referendum, two or more school districts may join together to form a single area vocational education district. Testimony of the busi- ness manager of the school district established that such referendum was held. The document offered by plain- tiffs (the sole support of their contention) revealed that School District 86 held a referendum to levy a tax to build a vocational school. Such document, however, does not establish that only that referendum was held. Clearly, another referendum could have been held which authorized the school district’s participation in the DuPage Area Vocational Association. App. 22 (11) On July 30, 1973, the court found plaintiffs were not notified of the date and time of entry of the March 13 order. It therefore vacated the order and set September 11 for a rehearing on the entry of a new order. Plaintiffs claim that the rehearing never occurred. The claim is con- tradicted by the record. An order entered on September 11 disposes of plaintiffs’ objections after first reciting the presence of the plaintiffs. Judgment affirmed Hautett, Dixon, J.J., concur UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois, ) Appellate Court, ) ss. Second District, ) I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second Judicial District of the State of Illi- nois, and the keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and com- plete copy of the Opinion of the said Appellate Court in the above entitled cause of record in my said office. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Appellate Court, in Elgin, in said State, this 3rd day of December, A.D. 1975. /s/ Loren J. Strotz Clerk Appellate Court, Second District. App. 23 State of Illinois ) Appellate Court ) ss. Second District ) Present—Hon. Tuomas J. Moran, Presiding Justice; Hon. Wa ter Dixon, Justice; Hon. Ausert E. Hauuett, Justice. Loren J. Srrorz, Clerk— Wititum A. Kuusak, Sheriff People of the State of Illinois, Ex Rel. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson, Individually, Appellant, 73-435 v. James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board of Tax Review, All of DuPage County, Illinois in the Mat- ter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in Pay- ment of Taxes, Appellees. Appeal from the Cireuit Court of DuPage County Trial Court No. C72-1074 Sub. 112 Copy MANDATE BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: On the 3rd day of December, A.D. 1975, an Opinion of the aforementioned Court was entered of record and in accordance with the views expressed in the attached opinion the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. In accordance with Supreme Court rule 368, this man- date is issued. App. 24 Costs to be taxed in accordance with the law. (Date) CERTIFICATE I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court, Second District of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order of the said Ap- pellate Court in the above entitled cause of record in my said office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this ........... ’ EE snus Clerk Appellate Court, Second District UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois, ) Appellate Court, ) ss. Second District, ) 73-435 I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate Court, in and for said Second Judicial District of the State of Illi- nons, and the keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and com- plete Copy of the unissued Mandate of this Court in Gen. No. 73-435—People, ete. ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al. v. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al. ete. of the said Appellate Court in the above-entitled cause of record in my said office. App. 25 IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Appellate Court, in Elgin, in said State, this 10th day of December, A.D. 1975. /s/ Loren J. Strotz Clerk Appellate Court, Second District. STATE OF ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT SECOND DISTRICT ELGIN (Seal) 60120 December 31, 1975 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, IL. 60521 Office of the Clerk 312-695-3750 Dear Mrs. Thompson: We have filed your Affidavit of Intent to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Lilinois in Gen. No. 73-435. We are also in receipt of your letter to ‘‘ Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Second Division’’, in which you relate many matters concerning the legal issues of your appeal in our case Gen. No. 73-435. We gather that in the body of this letter you are ordering the reprodue- tion of the complete Appellate Court record. However, because we have had a misunderstanding in the past con- cerning the cost of an Appellate Court record, I would like App. 26 to bring to your attention Chapter 37, Section 27; Chapter 53, Section 28 and Chapter 53, Section 31 of the Illinois Revised Statutes and point out that Chapter 53, Section 31, only applies to Cireuit Court Clerks. The Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court has informed this office that it is not desirable to send the Appellate Court record to the Supreme Court at the time a petition for leave to appeal is filed in that court, but the petitioner should wait until the appeal is acted upon. You might wish to verify this with the Hon. Clell Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court— (217-782-2035) Because the reproduction of the entire Appellate Court record would come to, perhaps, an unnecessary expense to you, I would suggest, in the event you wish the record, that you inform us as to what papers you feel are necessary to be reproduced so we can spare you any needless expense. We are, therefore, returning you tendered check #899 in th amount of $5. Very truly yours, /s/ Loren J. Strotz Loren J. Strotz, Clerk —_— SF =. App. 27 IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, et al. No. C72-1074 sub. 112 72-2952-G ORDER This cause coming on to be heard on Motion of Plain- tilfs, and Margaret Thompson appearing pro se and Rob- ert D. MeLaren, Assistant State’s Attorney, appearing on behalf of John J. Bowman, State’s Attorney, the Board of Review and the Supervisor of Assessments, and the Court having heard arguments and being fully advised in the premises doth find: 1. The issues of law and fact in case 72-2952-G and C-72-1074 sub. 112 are not proper subjects of consoiida- tion. 2. Notice of Appeal has been filed by Plaintiffs as of April 13th, 1973. 3. Judgment was entered on March 13, 1973 in Case C-72-1074- sub. 112. App. 28 WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered and decreed that Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of a special prosecutor be denied and further Plaintiff’s motion for consolidation of cases C-72-1074 sub. 112 and 72-2952-G be and is hereby denied. Dated: July 30, 1973. /s/ George Unverzagt Judge J. J. Bowman Tiled States Attorney fpr , 240 E. Willow Jul 30 315 PM ’73 J ge /s/ John W. Cockrell Wheaton, Illinois Clerk of 18th Judicial Cireuit 682-7050 VuPage County Wheaton, Lllinois IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS People ex rel. Margaret Thompson, et al. Plaintiffs, Objectors, v. James Clark, County Collector, et al., Defendants. No. C-72-1074 Sub. 112. ORDER This cause coming on to be heard this day on the Com- plaint of the Plaintiffs for trial on the merits and the Plaintiffs represented in open court by Margaret Thomp- son, pro se, and the Defendants represented in open court by William Murphy on behalf of School District +86, and ’ Robert D. McLaren, Assistant State’s Attorney on behalf App. 29 of James Clark, County Collector, John J. Bowman, State’s Attorney, Ray McDonald, County Clerk, and the DuPage County Board of Review, and the Court having heard sworn testimony, and having admitted exhibits and having heard arguments on behalf of all parties; and being fully advised in the premises: The Court doth find that it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, that due notice has been given to the parties herein, that no suflicient defense has been made, nor cause shown why judgment should not be entered against said property of Plaintiff for taxes due thereon; Therefore, it is ordered and decreed that judgment be and is hereby entered against Plaintiff’s property herein in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for the sums annexed, being the amount of taxes due thereon. Entered this tenth day of September, 1973, nunc pro tunc the second day of March, 1973. /3/ George Unverzagt Judge Book 726 Page 767 John Bowman State’s Atty. for DuPage County 240 E. Willow Wheaton, Ill. 682-7050 P&D Filed Sep 11 248 PM ’73 /s/ John W. Cockrell (jerk of the 18th Judicial Cireuit Du Page County, Wheaton, Illinois App. 30 Office of Joun J. Bowman State’s Attorney DuPage County 207 S. Reber Street Wheaton, Illinois 60187 General Number 312-682-7050 February 13, 1976 Margaret E. Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois . Re: People ex rel. Thompson vs. Circuit Court, et al., In the Matter of the Application of Taxes. Case No. C-71-604 Dear Mrs. Thompson: Enclosed herein is a xerox copy of an Order entered to- day by Judge Charles R. Norgle continuing the above cause for a further hearing on your Motion to February 20, 1976. Very truly yours, /s/ Robert D. McLaren Robert D. McLaren Assistant State’s Attorney RDMce:elp Ene. Via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested App. 31 IN THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON, ILLINOIS People ex rel. Thompson, Vv. Circuit Court et al. AKA In the Matter of the Application of Taxes No C-71-604 ORDER This cause coming on to be heard and the plaintiff Thompson having failed to appear pursuant to an order of court for a continuation until 2:00 p.m. of the 13th of Feb., 1976 this cause be and is hereby continued until 2-20-76 at 10:00 a.m. for further hearing on the motion of Ms. Thompson without further notice to the parties. Dated: Feb. 13, 1976. J. J. Bowman 207 S. Reber Wheaton, II. 682-7050 Box 133 Hinsdale, IL 60521 March 2, 1976 Hon. Clell Woods, Clerk Illinois Supreme Court Springfield, Dlinois 62706 Dear Mr. Woods: I would like to notify the court that I will be out of town until March 14, 1976. App. 32 Further for my own safety, I am sending to you a copy of my letter of February 19, 1976, to Associate Judge, Charles Norgle, giving him 10 days to put the records back to their Jaiuary 26, 1976 condition. This would be case number 46352, 44360, 43928 in the Illinois Supreme Court. Up until January 26, 1976, the circuit court records brought into court consisted of my motion to reinstate the case, my complaint for about nine million in partial damages and a perpetual injunction against further harassment and intimidation, the pleadings between me and Chief Judge George Unverzagt on his disqualifying himself as chief judge, a motion to dismiss my complaint, my motion for a transfer to the federal district court, the state’s attor- ney’s motion to deny my motion and my motion to strike and dismiss the state’s attorneys motion, with court orders, on January 26, 1976 I asked for the rest of the court rec- ords as evidence. On February 13, 1976 I tried to present a motion for the records, only to find that the records before the court now consisted of parts of the records in the above appeals and original actions including both appellate court mandates in Appellate Court numbers 70-220, and 72-73. It was a very ugly scene. The court has not taken jurisdic- tion nor reinstated the case, or so the judge claims. I con- sider the alteration of the record and the threat by the judge if I did specify individual documents that I would have to pay for reproductions an outrageous injury to me. To this date I have not heard from the judge. The mental strain is to great, I must get away for a few days to regain my perspective. I may file a motion for leave to file an original action in this court when I return, but, right now I just do not know. App. 33 I call to your attention that this is not the first time that the record has been altered, as shown in case number 48236 excerpts, R. C. 3, Par. 8, you might say that the question of alteration of the trial court records has already been adju- dicated. I am afraid to go back to the circuit court in Wheaton. All of these people are fighting with each other. The chief judge has disqualified himself as to me and there is no standing chief judge, the collector is sueing the state’s at- torney and members of the county board, there is a special prosecutor conducting a grand jury investigation of the collector, etcetra, etcetra. And, I am caught in the mid- dle. Thank you for listening. I feel better that someone knows besides the state’s attorney. Thank you, Margaret E. Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, IL 60521 February 19, 1976 Hon. Charles Norgle Sr., Associate Judge Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial District 201 Reber Street Wheaton, IL 60187 Dear Judge Norgle: IN RE: C 71-604 I received notice late on Feburary 18, 1976 that you had continued the above case to 10:00 A.M. Friday, February 20, 1976, having learned earlier in the day by telephoning the Circuit Clerk. App. 34 It seems to me that we have reached an impasse in the ease Judge. On January 26, 1976 when I alleged that I needed records for evidence, I did not consider it unreason- able that you should ask that the records be specified. But, I did consider it unreasonable that you intended to censor the documents bevore they came into Court. At that time my Motion to strike the State’s Attorney’s pleading was not in the record, or so the State’s Attor- ney testified and I gave you a copy. I did not look at the record but from a distance it appeared to be the same rec- ord that had been brought into court every time since October 2, 1975 and consisted of pleadings filed since Sep- tember 26, 1975. I do not know if the State’s Attorney’s Motion to deny my motion to transfer the case was in that record. On January 30, 1976 the record was in your chambers and I did not see it although I asked the Clerk. On February 13, 1976 the record was completely altered containing many of the documents that I had suggested on January 26, 1976 that 1 would need as evidence, now filed as though they were pleadings before the court. Fur- ther the Court refused to rule on the altered records; was very abusive to me about being affluent and purchasing reproductions, when the Cireuit Clerk has $18.00 of my money for reproductions that he refused to certify as true and correct; 31.00 of my money for other reproductions that are not certified as true and correct and $42.00 of my money for filing a tax objection that I asked to have filed as a complaint. The tax objection pursuant to my receipt from the circuit clerk is C 71 604 sub 191 it has no caption. Mr. Cockrell should have all of the reproductions that I have paid for. Now where are they? rr , App. 35 I do not intend to come back under the circumstances. The State’s Attorney filed his motion to deny my motion to transfer in a case that was not before the court. It was not fastened in the file on February 13, 1976. There is no People ex rel. Thompson v. Circuit Court, Sub 190. The record has been jazzed up to support the State’s Attorney’s motion. I will give you ten days judge to make the Circuit Clerk put the record back the way it was on January 26, 1976 and to send me, at his expense, a certified, itemized index of what the record contains. Date of entry, date of “filing, document title. And you must apologize to me for your behavior. Otherwise I will seek relief where I ean else- where. /s/ Margaret E. Thompson CC: States Atty. (Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court Springfield) April 9, 1976 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson P. O. Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., etc., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete., respondents. No. 48236 Dear Mrs. Thompson: This office has today received and filed your notice, mo- tion and order entered by Justice Howard C. Ryan, order- ing that the mandate of this Court be stayed pending final determination of an appeal to the United States Supreme Court concerning the above entitled cause. App. 36 Since the statutory fee for a certified cony of the final order is $1.00, we are returning your check No. 968 in the amount of $5.00 A certified copy of such final order will be forwarded to you on April 16, 1976, this being twenty- one days from the date the petition was demed. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court CLW :gn ec—Hon. John J. Bowman State’s Attorney DuPage County Your prompt attention is appreciated. Thank you, /s/ Margaret E. Thompson (Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court Springfield) April 22, 1976 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson P. O. Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., etc., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., etce., respondents. No. 48236 Dear Mrs. Thompson: Since the mandate of this Court has been stayed, upon your motion for stay of mandate pending final determina- tion of an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, le atm a a me es a ate App. 37 this office would be unable to furnish you with a certified copy of the final order. However, we enclose an uncerti- fied copy, for which there is no charge. We are returning your check No. 980, in the amount of $1.00. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court CLW :gn encs (Letterhead of Office of Clerk of the Supreme Court Springfield) April 30, 1976 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson P. O. Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., ete., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete., respondents. No. 48236 Dear Mrs. Thompson: Our reluctance to furnish you with a certified copy of the mandate follows the procedure in this office prior to Mr. Taft’s election as Clerk of the Supreme Court. Such procedure has been reinstated since I became Clerk and is designed to assure that, in those cases in which the mandate has been stayed, no certified mandate will acci- dentally or by design find its way into the lower court files. A certified copy of the mandate is enclosed. The charge is $1.00. The responsibility for this copy is wholly yours. rarer a } : App. 38 The balance of your charges and allegations do not merit reply. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court CLW :gn enc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois ) ) ss. Supreme Court ) AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and held in Springfield, on Monday, the eighth day of March in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six, within and for the State of Illinois. Present: DanteL P. Warp, Cuter JusTICE Justice WaLTER V. SCHAEFER Justice Tuomas E. Kiuczynsk1 Justice Howarp C. Ryan Justice Ropert C. UNpERwoop Justice JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH Justice Caswett J. Cress Wituiam J. Scort, Arrornry GENERAL Louvre F. Dean, MarsHau Artest: CLELL L. Woops, CLERK ee ey ee ears App. 39 BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 25th day of March 1976, the same being one of the days of the term of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said Court, had and entered of record, to-wit: People ex rel., Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson, individually, Petitioners, No. 48236 vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Lllinois, In The Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in Payment of Taxes, Respondents. Petition for Leave to Appeai from Appellate Court, Second District 73-435 C72-1074 And now on this day the Court having duiy considered the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth over- rule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal herein. I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the above entitled cause of record in my office. App. 40 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this 30th day of April, 1976. (The embossed seal of the Illinois Supreme Court ap- pears here) /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 May 8, 1976 Hon. Clell L. Woods, Clerk Illinois Supreme Court State of Illinois Springfield, Illinois 62706 In Re: Peopl> ex rel. Thompson, et al., ete., Petition- ers, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et. al., ete., Respondents. No. 48236 Dear Mr. Woods: In answer to your letter of April 30, 1976, the ‘‘certified mandate’’ is totally unacceptable. The letter is considered threatening, and I accept no re- sponsibility for the document being in my possession. If the final order of the court was not signed, sealed and dated before it was filed, the signature, seal and date can- not be supplied later, unless it were done nune pro tune, as of the correct date. App. 41 On its face tne document appears to be a mis-dated original, and again is substantially altered from what- ever you have in the file. Are you telling me that a certi- fied copy of a final judgment is an original mandate that could be filed below? .... .1 suggest that the document that you have in your iile is void; that what I have is an original; that if you ever do sign, seal and date the document in your file that there would be two originals, one of which would be a forgery. The court’s original documents cannot be sold; I refuse to become a party to the action by paying for it.... Should I not receive notice by May 12, 1976, that posi- tive action has been taken to give relief and comply with Ch. 120 Sec. 718, Lil. Rev. Stat., 1 will seek instructions from the United States Supreme Court as to the legality of my using and reproducing the document. It would give me a good feeling to know that the Lllinois Courts were not going to self destruct but this does not mean that I will accept any action that has any appearance of another procedural maneuver. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Margaret E. Thompson Margaret E. Thompson, Petitioner ec. Atty. Gen. Scott State’s Atty. Bowman — App. 42 . (Letterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court Springfield) May 10, 1976 Ms. Margaret KE. Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, [Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. Thompson, et al., ete., vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete. No. 48236 Dear Ms. Thompson: I regret the confusion which has arisen in connection with your requests in this case. I fear much has been caused by the terms ‘‘mandate,’’ ‘‘certified mandate’’ and ‘‘certitied copy of the Court’s final order.’’ Also by your unawareness of the procedure followed by this office in these matters. Whether 1 will ever be able to explain them fully to you appears questionable. Any order of this Court may, when appropriate, be stayed. If such act does occur the order is drafted by this office but it is not signed, sealed or dated at the bottum until it is issued. I tried in a previous letter to explain our reluctance to issue a certified copy of any order (mandate) which had been stayed. In this we were seeking to further protect your rights not to abuse them. May I assure you that the first uncertified copy of the order denying your petition for leave to appeal as well as the second certified copy we furnished you are accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States as evidencing the disposition of the case in this Court. We find no problem with duplicate originals but assure you the original is in our files, though admittedly un- signed, unsealed and undated. OE 0 PR te aD App. 43 The closing six paragraphs of your letter are matters more fittingly presented to the Supreme Court in an ap- propriate form and proceeding. We have complied with your requests exactly as we would anyone else. Whether any further extended corres- pondence would be of benefit appears doubtful. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court CLW/he Box 133 Hinsdale, [Illinois 60521 May 15, 1976 Hon. Clell L. Woods, Clerk Illinois Supreme Court Springfield, Illinois 62706 In re: No. 48236 Dear Mr. Woods: Any action of yours is an action of the Illinois Supreme Court. When-actions are taken outside formal court pro- ceedings that affect my private rights and privileges, J am denied equal protection and due process of law. A duplicate original is a carbon copy and is certainly not what I have... . Lastly, I am quite aware that you find no problem with duplicate originals, and enclose a copy of one such for an explanation from you. What happened to the mandate issued by Justin Taft on December 30, 1974? Thank you, /s/ Margaret Thompson ec. Scott & Bowman App. 44 (Letterhead of State Of Illinois Appellate Court Second District—Elgin) ° May 17, 1976 Ms. Margaret Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, IL. 60521 Re: Gen. No. 72-73—People, ex rel. James H. Clerk, ete. v. Ralph Thompson, et al. Gen. No. 72-376—People ex rel. Margaret E. Thompson v. County Board of School Trustees, ete., et al. ien. No. 73-377—People, ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, ete. et al. Dear Ms. Thompson: The mandates forwarded you under date of May 7, 1976 are the identical reproductions, by Xerox process, of the mandates received from the office of the Supreme Court in the respective cases and attested to by the Supreme Court Clerk’s certificate at the bottom of each such docu- ment. The documents in this office bear the Seal of the Supreme Court embossed thereon and so noted by the typewritten word ‘‘Seal’’ in lieu thereof on the copies sent you. It will be noted that in Gen. No. 72-73 (C71-604) that a mandate was issued by Justin Taft, the Clerk of the Su- preme Court, under date of February 22, 1974 on the order of Court entered on January 30, 1974. This mandate was later recalled, per copy of said order of Justice Charles H. Davis herewith enclosed. Mandate of the Supreme Court was later issued under date of July 28, 1975. The later mandate appears to be identical in effect to the previously recalled final order. Thereafter, the mandate of this court issued. | ts eet — App. 45 We have retained in our files copies of the Supreme Court mandates recently sent you and said copies all con- tain the clerk’s certificate on the face thereof, at the bot- tom of the page. Very truly yours, /s/ Loren J. Strotz Loren J. Strotz, Clerk cs No. 46352 PEOPLE EX REL. JAMES H. CLARK, COUNTY TREASURER, ETC., Respondent, vs. RALPH B. THOMPSON, et al., Petitioners. Appeal from the Appellate Court, Second District No. 72-73. Copy ORDER (Filed March 4, 1974) Motion has been filed to recall and stay the Mandate of this Court issued on February 22, 1974, and upon con- sideration of said motion, IT IS ORDERED that the Mandate of this Court be recalled and stayed until the pending motion for reconsid- eration of denial of Petition for Leave to Appeal is acted upon by this Court. /s/ Charles H. Davis Judge, Illinois Supreme Court Entered: March 1, 1974. Assigned to Third District.] App. 46 (Letterhead of Office of Clerk of The Supreme Court Springfield) May 17, 1976 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., ete., petitioners, vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, et al., ete., respondents No. 48236 Dear Mrs. Thompson: In accordance with your request the transcript of rec- ord of this Court concerning the above entitled cause is en- closed. I am returning your check No. 988 in the amount of $5.00, as the cost of preparing said record is $2.15. Will you please forward your check in the amount of $2.15. Very truly yours, /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk of the Supreme Court CLW :er Encs. Check No. 988 App. 47 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois ) ) ss. Supreme Court ) AT A TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT, begun and held in Springfield, on Monday, the eighth day of March in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six, within and for the State of Illinois. Present: Dante, P. Warp, Curer Justice Justice Water V. SCHAEFER Justice Tuomas EK. Kuvczynsx1 Justice Howarp C. Ryan Justice Rospert C. UnpeRwoop Justice JosepH H. GoLpENHERSH Justice CasweLtL J. Cress Wii J. Scott, Arrorney GENERAL Lovie F. Dean, MarsHau Attest: Cie, L. Woops, CLerK a a aa aia i iene em me a i App. 48 BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 25th day of March 1976, the same being one of the days of the term of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said Court, had and entered of record, to-wit: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson, individually, Petitioners, No. 48236 vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Illinois, In The Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in Payment of Taxes, Respondents. Petition for Leave to Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District 73-435 C72-1074 And now on this day the Court having duly considered the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth over- rule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal herein. I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the above entitled cause of record in my office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, f have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this ........ day _ nas > = Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. App. 49 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA State of Illinois ) ) ss. Supreme Court ) I, Clell L. Woods, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, and keeper of the records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the record of this Court in a certain cause entitled: People ex rel. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E. Thompson and Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret F. Thompson, individually, Petitioners, No. 48236 vs. James H. Clark, County Collector, John Bowman, State’s Attorney, Ray MacDonald, County Clerk, County Board of Tax Review, All In DuPage County, Illinois, In The Matter of Judgment for Lots and Lands Delinquent in Payment of Taxes, Respondents. Petition for Leave to Appeal from Appellate Court, Second District 73-435 C72-1074 filed in this office on the 28th day of January, A.D. 1976. In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said court this 17th day of May, 1976. /s/ Clell L. Woods Clerk, Supreme Court of the State of Illinois App. 50 (Leterhead of Office of Clerk Of The Supreme Court Springfield) December 30, 1974 Mrs. Margaret E. Thompson P. O. Box 133 Hinsdale, Illinois 60521 In re: People ex rel. James H. Clark, County Treas- urer and Ex-Officio County Coilector of Du- Page County, Lllinois, ete., respondent, vs. Ralph B. Thompson, et al., petitioners. No. 46352 Dear Mrs. Thompson: You are hereby notified that the mandate of this Court has today been issued to the Clerk of the Appellate Court, Second District, upon denial of a petition for rehearing in the Supreme Court of the United States on December 23, 1974, concerning the above entitled cause. Very truly yours, /s/ Justin Taft Clerk of the Supreme Court JT :gn ec—Hon. John J. Bowman State’s Attorney DuPage County App. 51 STATE OF ILLINOIS _) ) ss. COUNTY OF DU PAGE) I, Robert M. Haenisch, Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in the State aforesaid, do hereby certify the above and foregoing to be a true, perfect and complete transcript of the record according to a certain praecipe filed in this office on the 30th day of December A.D. 1971 and an addi- tional praecipe filed in this office on the 28th day of Feb- ruary A.D. 1972 in a certain cause lately in said court be- ing People of the State of Illinois Ex Rel. James H. Clark, County Treasurer and Ex Officio County Collector of DuPage County, Illinois, In the Matter of Application for Judgment against Delinquent Lands and Lots, ete. vs. Ralph B. Thompson and Margaret E .Thompson. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at Wheaton in said County this 8th day of March, A.D. 1972. /s/ Robert M. Haenisch Clerk of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, County Division DuPage County, Illinois App. 52 APPENDIX B STATE OF ILLINOIS ) ) SS. COUNTY OF DU PAGE ) IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ON THE RELATION OF MARGARET E. THOMPSON ON BEHALF OF HERSELF, CITIZEN, RESIDENT AND TAXPAYER OF DU PAGE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Relator-Petitioner and Plaintiff, vs. CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, JOHN COCKRELL CLERK, GEORGE UNVERZAuT, JUDGE, JOHN BOWMAN, STATE’S ATTORNEY, DU PAGE COUNTY, JAMES H. CLARK, COLLECTOR AND RAY MAC DONALD CLERK OF DU PAGE COUNTY, GEORGE RUDOLPH, RECORDER DU PAGE CUUNTY, BOARD OF REVIEW OF DU PAGE COUNTY, A BODY POLITIC, IN THE MATTER OF SALE OF LOTS AND LANDS DELINQUENT IN THE PAYMENT OF TAXES AFFECTING THE TAXES OF: THE COUNTY OF DU PAGE, DU PAGE FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT, TOWN OF YORK, VILLAGE OF OAK BROOK, OAK BROOK PARK DISTRICT, SCHOOL DISTRICTS 86, 53 and 502, and Parties Un- known, Respondents and Defendants. County Division No. C 71-604 (Nos. C-68-859-469; C-65-859-470; C-69-484-98 ; C-69-484-99 ; C-70-695-51; C-71-604-189) App. 53 COMPLAINT AND 1ST AMENDED OBJECTIONS COUNT I - The People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of Margaret E. Thompson, with the consent of the People pursuant to Ch. 12U, Sec. 804, Ill. Rev. Stat. and on behalf of herself, complaining of defendants and for a cause of action alleges as follows and objects: 1. This is an action brought with the consent of the People of the State of Illinois by Margaret E. 'Thomp- son, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and on her own behalf as citizen resident and taxapyer, who owns land in the County of DuPage and State of Illinois subject to assessment, equalization and taxation. 2. That the Plaintiff, together with her husband, who hold real property in joint tenancy have paid the taxes assessed against said real property under protest, and properly filed objections for the years 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 and subsequent years which have not been properly and finally adjudicated by the Cireuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit as shown by the records on file in the office of the Clerk. 3. That all cases have been appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois and been dismissed by that Court and mandates of the Appellate Court filed in the Cireuit Court wherein the cases should continue as if no appeal were taken. 4. That in all cases orders have been entered by the State's Attorney either on his own motion or on the motion of the collector, without due notice to Plaintiff. 5. That at all times pertinent hereto the Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Lllinois was the duly constituted Court of proper original jurisdiction App. 54 and Judge George Unverzagt or his predecessor the duly elected or appointed presiding Judge and John Cvuvkrell or his predecessor the duly elected or appointed Clerk; John Bowman or his predecessor was the duly appointed or elected State’s Attorney for DuPage County; James - H. Clark or his predecessor the duly elected or appointed Collector Ex-Officio for DuPage County; May MacDonald the duly elected Clerk for DuPage County; Board of Re- view duly appointed and acting as a body politic; George Rudolph or his predecessor the duly elected recorder for DuPage County; and the taxing districts whose taxes are affected were, Count of DuPage, DuPage Forest Preserve District, Town of York, Village of Oak Brook, Oak Brook Park District, School Districts 502, 86 and 53, and parties Unknown. 6. That the applicable Federal and Illinois Constitu- tions and the laws of the State of Illinois in effect for all, or any of the years in question established the principle of uniformity of taxation for all classes of real and per- sonal property and required the respondents, set forth in paragraph five (5) above to assess, equalize all property subject to taxation uniformly at 100% of its full fair cash value or in the alternative to assess and equalize all prop- erty subject to taxation in the County of DuPage and State of Illinois uniformally at the same per centum of full, fair cash value; to extend the taxes on said assess- ment uniformly as to rate; to collect and pay over said taxes in full to said taxing districts set forth in paragraph live (5) above; to apply for judgment for sale of delin- cuent lands and judgment to determine the correct amount of tax-paid under protest; uniformly ete., as proxided in the Revenue Act, Ch. 120, Section 482, et seq., Ill. Rev. Stat. Illinois Constitution of 1870, Art. 9 Section 1, Thli- nois Constitution of 1970, Art. 9, Sec. 4, and the Four- App. 55 teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution without discriminatory treatment of any person or property and that an intentional valuation and equalization of different classes of taxable property at different percentum of full, fair cash value; an intentional excessive deduction by the collector; an intentional evasion of the provision of the Revenue Act is unlawful and subjects the above cfficers and taxing districts and Parties Unknown to penalty. ¢. That Section 804 of the Revenue Act (Ch. 120, Sec. 804, lll. Rev. Stat.) provides that every county clerk, assessor, collector or other officer who shall in any case refuse or knowingly neglect to perform any duty enjoined upon him by the Revenue Act, or who shall consent to or connive at any evasion of its provisions whereby any pro- ceeding required by the Act shall be prevented or hindered or whereby any property is entered upon the tax rolls at less than its full, fair cash value shall be liable for double the amount of the loss or damage caused thereby and may be removed from their offices by any court having juris- diction on complaint of any person in the name of the People of the State of Illinois. 8. That the records of the Cireuit Court will show that from the 1967 tax year through the 1970 tax year, and subsequent years, it was, and st [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0122%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.