# Petition — Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd.-'72 v. Sibley

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 429 U.S. 826

## Text

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 197 _

no. €5-1714

HARPER SIBLEY, JR.
vs.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY

CARLSBERG MOBILE HOME
PROPERTIES, LTD. -'72,

(real party in
interest), Petitioner

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD L. STONE
JOSEPH BESNAH

Suite 900

1801 Century Park West
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (213) 277-4658

Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE TOPICAL INDEX

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Page
October Term 197 _
an Table of Authorities i-ii
OPINION BELOW 2
JURISDICTION 2
HARPER SIBLEY, JR.
QUESTION PRESENTED 2-3
vs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3-5
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 5-11

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
OF CERTIORARI
CARLSBERG MOBILE HOME

PROPERTIES, LTD. -'72, CONCLUSION 11

(real party in APPENDIX A, B, § C

interest), Petitioner

rTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitution

United States Constitution

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Fourteenth Amendment 3
TO THE SUPREME COURT Article IV, Section l
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Cases
Hansen v. Denckla 7

357 U.S. 255, 78 S.Ct.
1228, 2 L.ed.2d 1283 (1958)

DONALD L. STONE International Shoe Co. v. 6,7
JOSEPH BESNAH Washington
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct.
Suite 900 154, 90 L.ed. 95 (1945)

1801 Century Park West
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (213) 277-4658

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(Continued)

Cases cont.

McGee v. International Life

Insurance Co.
355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199

2 L.ed.2d 223 (1957)

Milliken v. Meyer
311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339

85 L.ed. 278 (1940)
Pennoyer v. Neff

95 U.S. 714, 24 L.ed. 565

(1877)

Sibley v. Superior Court
16 Cal.3d 442 (1976)

Statutes

California Code of Civil Procedure,

§410.10
United States Code

28 U.S.C. §1257(3)

Text

Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d,

§37

-jii-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 197_
No.

HARPER SIBLEY, JR.
vs.

THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

CARLSBERG MOBILE HOME
PROPERTIES, LTD. -'72,

(real party in
interest), Petitioner

Name ee ae ta a a

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

The Petitioner, Carlsberg Mobile Home
Properties, Ltd. -'72, prays that a Writ
of Certiorari issue to review the opinion
and judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of California rendered (by a 5 to 2
majority) on March 8, 1976.

The issue is: "can a non-resident of
California, who signs an agreement out of
the state which causes the formation of a
California Limited Partnership, constitu-
tionally with impunity avoid the

-l]-

_.Califoermia was entered on March 8, 1976 (See

jurisdiction of the California courts?"
OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Supreme Court of
California is reported at 16 Cal.3d 442,
and is attached hereto as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Supreme Court of

Appendix A, page 1 infra). A petition for
rehearing was denied on April 7, 1976 (See
Appendix B infra). This Petition for
Certiorari was filed less thaft 90 days from
the date of the judgment aforesaid. The
jurisdiction of this court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. §1257(3).
QUESTION PRESENTED

Real party in interest, Petitioner
herein, brought suit against Harper Sibley,
Jr. (hereinafter "Sibley") on his personal
guarantee of certain obligations of a
California Limited Partnership. Sibley
brought a Motion to Quash Service of Summons
and Complaint upon him on the basis that the
courts of the State of California lacked
jurisdiction over him. This contention was
overruled by the trial court and by the
California District Court of Appeal; however,

-2-

their rulings were overturned by the Supreme
Court of the State of California (the Court
dividing S Justices to 2). The question
presented is:

Whether California courts may constitu-
tionally assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident individual solely by reason of his
execution and alleged breach of a guaranty
agreement of the obligations of a California
Limited Partnership, which guaranty was a
condition precedent to the formation of such
partnership, and whether the non-resident
guarantor, by executing such guaranty and
causing it to be delivered to the real party
in interest in California, thereby had
sufficient contacts with the State of
California so that the rendition of a
judgment against him would not violate the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment
to the U.S. Conetitution, Article IV,
Section l.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The real party in interest, Petitioner,
Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd. -'72,
(hereinafter "Carlsberg") is a Limited
Partnership having its principal place of
business in California. In December, 1973,
MTA-CMHPL, Ltd. (hereinafter "MTA"), a
California Limited Partnership, was formed

-3-

in California. The General Partner of MTA is
Sunrise Lakes, Inc. (hereinafter "Sunrise"),
a Georgia corporation, the limited partner
was Carlsberg. MTA was to operate two
mobile home parks in Georgia. Under the
MTA California Limited Partnership
Agreement, Sunrise promised to make certain
monthly payments to Carlsberg in California.
Sibley, a Florida resident, was one of three
guarantors of Sunrise's performance of the
California MTA's Limited Partnership
Agreement. It can be demonstrated that, but
for the execution of the Agreement by Sibley,
and the delivery of that guaranty to
Carlsberg in California, the California
Limited Partnership would never have been
formed. Sibley was not a party to the MTA
California Limited Partnership negotiations.
His only connection with the transaction
apparent from the record was that he was a
guarantor of the performance of the General
Partner to the California Limited Partner-
ship which would have not been formed but
for his guaranty. Petitioner signed the
Guaranty Agreement in Florida and delivered
it to another Defendant, Peter Thun, to

take it to California to deliver to
Carlsberg so that the transaction would
close. The MTA Agreement was negotiated

oGe

and executed in California. Sibley is not
a resident of California, does not own any
real or personal property in California,
and does not have any business interests

in California.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This case raises questions important not
only to California, but to all other states
which have similar laws regarding jurisdiction
(so-called "long arm statutes"). The true
question is, are there sufficient contacts
with California so it can constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident
who has caused an effect in this state by an
act done elsewhere. The sufficiency of such
contacts is a matter of Constitutional Law on
which the Supreme Court of the United States
has the final voice.

California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 410.10 provides: "A court of the
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
non inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States." One of
the bases of jurisdiction under this statute
is that an individual may subject himself to
jurisdiction of the State of California by
causing an effect in the state by an act or
omission done elsewhere (See Appendix C
infra). It is submitted that, but for the

-5-

act of Sibley signing the guaranty and
causing it to be delivered to Carlsberg
in California, the California Limited
Partnership would never have been formed.
Judicial jurisdiction in its broadest
sense is the power of a state through any
of its courts or, on occasion, through its
legislative, executive or administrative
bodies, to create legal interests which
will be recognized and enforced in all the
states. Within a state's boundaries, this
power is plenary, except as may be delegated
to the Federal Government by the Constitution
of the United States. Pennoyer v. Nef;,
(1877) 95 U.S. 714, 722, 24 L.ed. 565. Out-
side the state, such power is limited to
instances in which a Defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend trad-
itional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.ed. 95. Each state has its
own requirements in this regard. These re-
quirements are usually set forth in each
state's service of process statutes, and
are often more stringent than those imposed
by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. Milliken v. Mever,
(1940) 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.ed.

-6-

278. In Internattonal Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra, the Court decided that
due process requires only that, in order
to subject a Defendant to a Judgment In
Personam if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he has had
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state so that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Jc. at 316.
A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction over an individual who causes
effects in the state by an omission or an
act done elsewhere, with respect to causes
of actions arising from these effects, un-
less the nature of the effects and of the
individual's relationship to the state make
the exercise of such jurisdiction unreason-
able. Hansen v. Denckla, (1958) 357 U.S.
235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.ed.2d 1283° “eGee rv.
International Life Insurance Co.,(1957) 335
U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.ed.2d 223. When
jurisdiction over an individual is based
solely upon such act or omission, only a
claim for relief arising from such act or
omission may be asserted against the
individual. bid. As stated in Restatement
of Conflict of Laws 2d, Section 37 Comment

a:

"A state has a natural
interest in the effects of an
act within its territory even
though the act itself was done
elsewhere. The state may
exercise judicial jurisdiction
on the basis of such effects
over the individual who did
the act, or who caused the act
to be done, provided that the
nature of these effects and of
the individual's relationship
to the state are such as to
make the exercise of jurisdic-
tion fair to the individual
and reasonable from the stand-
point of the international and
interstate systems

"There are three possible
situations: (1) the act was
done with the intention of
causing effects in the state;
(2) the act, although not done
with the intention of causing
effects in the state, could
reasonably have been expected
to do so; and (3) the act was
not done with the intention of
causing effects in the state
and could not reasonably have
been expected to do so. These
three situations will be dis-
cussed in the order stated.

"The act may have been done
with the intention of causing
effects in the state. If so,
the state may exercise the same
judicial jurisdiction over the
actor, or over the one who
caused the act to be done, as
to causes of action arising
from these effects as it could
have exercised if these effects

-§-

had resulted from an act done

within its territory. ..."

Here the act in question is the
Signing by Sibley of the guaranty of the
performance of the Gener. 1 Partner to a
California Limited Partnership and the
transportation of that guaranty to
California. But for the signing of the
guaranty, and the delivery thereof to
Carlsberg in California, the California
Limited Partnership would not have been
formed. It is conceded that Sibley has
never been to California, and, other than
some isolated instances which have no re-
lation to the facts in the case at bar,
Sibley has no other contacts with
California.

The question then arises, is the fact
of Sibley's signing of the guaranty in
Florida and sending it to California --
which act caused the formation of the
California Limited Partnership to operate
two mobile home parks in Georgia -- suf-
ficient to give the California court
jurisdiction over Sibley. A trend is
Clearly discernable toward expanding
the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
Over non-residents. In part, this is
attributable to the fundamental

-9-

transformation of our national economy over
the years. Today, many commercial trans-
actions touch two or more states and may
involve parties separated by the full
continent. With this increasing nationali-
zation of commerce has come a great increase
in the amount of business conducted across
state lines. At the same time, modern
transportation and communication have made
it much less burdensome for a party sued

to defend himself in the state where he
either engages in economic activity or
affects the conduct of others. Although
Sibley has never been to California, this
is a classic case of an act which was done
outside the state of California with the
express purpose of causing an act within
the state and, therefore, comes within the
provisions of McGee v. Internationac Life
Insurance Company, supra. The California
Supreme Court erred when it substituted
economic activity and doing business tests
as the basis for jurisdiction, as the
nature of Sibley's action was merely as a
guarantor of the obligations of the
California Limited Partnership, MTA, and a
guarantor's relationship to a transaction
is essentially passive. Therefore, if the

principals are subject to the jurisdiction

-10-

of the California courts, as they are here,

and the only party to the transaction who
is not subject to California jurisdiction
is Sibley, a multiplicity of suits will
necessarily be incurred. This is so be-
Cause the principals are not amendable to
the jurisdiction of the Florida courts,
where Sibley must be sued if the California
courts do not have jurisdiction over him.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari
should issue so that the judgment of the
California Supreme Court may be reviewed and

determined by this court.

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD L. STONE
JOSEPH BESNAH

Counsel for Petitioner

SUPREME COURT

FILED
MARS 1976
G. E, BISHEL, Clor!-

GORY

Cspry

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HARPER SIBLEY, JR.,
Petitioner, —

v. L.A. 30496

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, (Super. Ct. No.

WEC 36291)
Respondent ;

CARLSBERG MOBILE HOME PROPERTIES
LTD. - ‘72,

Real Party in Interest.

ee le ea

This case presents the question whether
APPENDIX A California courts may constitutionally assert juris-

' diction over a nonresident individual solely by reason
of his execution and alleged breach of a guaranty agrce-
ment regarding payment of monies owing to a California
corporation. We have concluded that, under the circum-
stances in the present case, the guaranty transaction
was not a sufficient basis on which to sustain personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident guarantor, and that
accordingly his motion to quash service of summons

should have been granted.

"SEE DISSENTING OPINION"

The real party in interest herein, Carlsberg
Mohile Home Properties, Ltd. - '72 (hereafter Carlsberg)
is » iimited partnership having its principal place of
business in California. In December 1973, Carlsberg
formed MTA-CMHPL, LTD. (hereafter MTA), a limited
partnership, in California. The general partner of
MTA is Sunrise Lakes, Inc. (hereafter Sunrise), a
Georgia corporation. The purpose of MTA was to
Operate two mobile home parks in Georgia. Under the
MTA partnership agreement, Sunrise promised
‘to make certain monthly payments to Carlsberg. Peti-
tioner Harper Sibley, a Florida resident, was one of
three guarantors of Sunrise's performance of the MTA
partnership agreement.

In December 1974, Carlsberg brought an action
in California against petitioner and others alleging breach
of the partnership agreement by Sunrise and breach of the
guaranty by petitioner ond others. Petitioner was served by
certified mail in Florida, made a special appearance in
California, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
418.10, subdivision (a)(1), moved for an order to quash
service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
trial court denied the motion and petitioner seeks

mandate to revicw and set aside the trial court's order.

(See Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (c).)

Petitioner contends that Carlsberg has failed
to meet its initial burden of shoving that petitioner
has the requisite minimum contacts with the State
of California to justify California's assertion of
jurisdiction over him. (See Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 905, fn. 9;
Arneson v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc. (1973) 31
Cal.App.3d 991, 995.) We agree.

Petitioner was not a party to the MTA part-

. nership agreement and took no part in its negotiation.

His only connection with the transaction apparent from
the record was as guarantor of the performance of a
Georgia corporation. Petitioner signed the guaranty
agreement in Florida and delivered it to another defend-
ant, Peter Thun, who then tock it to California. As indicated,
petitioner is a resident of Florida; he has never been

a resident of California, does not owm any real or

personal property in this state, and does not have any
business interests or relations with California except

as trustee of a testamentary trust owning property in Cambria,
California. Sibley has not been physically present in this
state since January 1973, when he was here in connection

with a matter unrelated to the transactions before us.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10,
a California court may exercise jurisdiction over non-
residents on any basis not inconsistent with the United
States or California Constitutions. This section mani-
fests an intent to exercise the broadest possible
jurisdiction, limited only by constitutional consider-
ations. (Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, supra,
71 Cal.2d 893 at p. 898; Quattrone v. Superior Court
(1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 296, 302.) As a general consti-
tutional principle, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident individual so long as
he has such minimal contacts with the state that .
". , . the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S.
310, 316-317, citations omitted; Cornelison v. Chaney,
ante, p. 143.)

One of the recognized bases for jurisdiction
in California arises when the defendant has caused an
“effect" in the state by an act or omission which occurs
elsewhere. (Quattrone v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.
App.3d 296 at p. 303; see also McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 220.) This ground for assertion
of jurisdiction is discussed by the Judicial Council in

its comment to section 410.10 of the Code of Civil

tt

Procedure reprinted in West's Annotated California Codes,
page 472, in the following language: “A state has power
‘to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual

who causes effects in the state by an omission or act
done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising

from these effects, unless the nature of the effects and

of the individual's relationship to the state make the

exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. (Citations. ]

When jurisdiction over an individual is dased solely

upon such act or omission, only a claim for relief arisinr
from such act or omission may be asserted against the
individual, [Citation.]" (Italics added.)

; Evidence was presented at the hearing on peti-
tioner's motion to quash that the Guaranty which petitioner
executed induced Carlsberg, a California corporation, to

enter into MTA, a new California limited partnership, and

that Carlsberg would not have’ performed the MTA agreement

without petitioner's guaranty. On this basis, despite
petitioner's contrary assertions, the trial court could
reasonably infer that the Signing of the @uaranty in Flecrida
both was intended to cause and did cause an effect in
California. In addition, it appears that the performance
guaranteed by petitioner was the payment of certain moneys
to a partnership located in California; thus, petitioner
could have anticipated that the failure of this performance

would have a further effect in Califoria.

The mere causing of an "effect" in California,
however, as ackrtowledged in the Judicial Council comment
quoted above, is not necessarily sufficient to afford a con-

stitutional basis for jurisdiction; notwithstanding this

“effect,” the imposition of jurisdiction may be "unreasonable."

As was held in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
326 U.S. 310, a suit may not be maintained where jurisdiction
offends "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. '" (Id., at pp. 316-317, citations omitted.)

Subsequent to International Shoe, the federal Suprene

Court has amplified the standard by which to determine whethe>
imposition of jurisdiction is constitutionally “unreasonable."’
In Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, for example, the hi; h

court held that in those cases in which jurisdiction is soughr

on the basis of defendant's occasional activities, ". ——
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the

benefits and protections of its laws." (Id., at p. 253.) In

Buckeye Boiler, supra, we reaffirmed the necessity for such an

inquiry and asked the additional guestion whether, considering
defendant's activity, extension of jurisdiction over him would
be "fair."

In the present case, the record fails to dis-
close that petitioner purposefully availed himself

of the privilege of conducting business in California

or of the benefits and protections of California laws.
Likewise, the record does not indicate that petitioner
anticipated that he would derive any economic benefit
as a result of his guaranty. Although petitioner may
have reasonably foreseen that his execution or breach
of the guaranty agreement would have some impact in
this state, it does not appear that plaintiff Carlsberg
assumed any obligations to petitioner which he might
have sought to enforce in California. In this regard,
petitioner's contacts with California seem even more
minimal than those present in Belmont Industries, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 281 (hg. den.), in
which jurisdiction was found to be unreasonable; unlike
the present case, in Belmont, the nonresident defendant,
which had negotiated and contracted with a California
corporation for the purchase of certain drafting services,
could have sought to enforce its contract in the California
courts.

The present case is distinguishable from
those recent California cases upholding jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants who seek or obtain signifi-
cant benefits from this activity in California. For
example, in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,

Supra, substantial business was generated in this

state which benefited the party over which jurisdiction
was sought; in Michigan Nat. Bank v. Superior Court

* (1972) 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, goods purchased in California
were financed by the nonresident defendant; in

National Life of Florida Corp. v. Superior Court

(1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 281, contract negotiatons by the
parties occurred in California concerning the sale of

shares of stock to California residents by the non-
resident defendants; and in Quattrone v. Superior Court, supra

44 Cal.App.3d 296, it was alleged that the nonresident defend-
ant was involved in a conspiracy to defraud a California
corporation for his own profit by submitting falsified
financial records to this corporation. By contrast, in the
present case, while other Parties involved in this action

had considerable contacts with California, there is no indi-
cation that petitioner intended to conduct business or in any
other way directly or indirectly gain from dealings in this
State; the purpose of other parties cannot be imputed to peti-
tioner for the purpose of assuming personal jurisdiction

Over him.

The United States Supreme Court has given
further guidance in this area by indicating in McGee vy.
International Life Ins. Co., supra, 355 U.S. 220, that
whether or not a state has passed special legislation
relating to the subject matter of the action is signifi-
cant in determining the reasonableness of jurisdiction

Over an out-of-state defendant. In McGee, the court

BEST COPY AVAILABLE |

_ upheld the jurisdiction of a California court over an

out-of-state insurance company, justifying its ruling in
part on the fact that California had enacted special

legislation manifesting an exceptional interest in

_Tegulating activities by foreign insurance companies.

(Id. » at pp. 221-223.) Similarly in Quattrone v. Superior
Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 296, _ jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant was upheld by a Court of Appeal of this

State largely because the end result of defendant's alleged

conspiratorial conduct was the issuance of shares of stock, a

Subject of special California regulation. (Id., at pp. 306-307.)

In the matter before us a California limited
partnership, in reliance upon the personal guaranty by
& Florida resident, contributed its holdings of Georgia’
land to a new limited partnership for the purpose of
acquiring and operating mobile home parks in Georgia.
There are no aspects of this arms-iength transaction
which are subject to special regulation in California
or in which California has otherwise manifested
exceptional interest.

Thus, we conclude that petitioner's relation-
hte to California, and the effects thereby caused
in California, make the exercise of jurisdiction
unreasonable in the present case.

Because petitioner's contacts with California

are insufficient to justify jurisdiction, it is not

‘

necessary to undertake the additional process of

balancing the inconvenience of defending the action in

7) ao

this state against the interests of plaintiff in suing ousnas SUPERIOR COURT OF 108 annnuzs
B v.

locally and of the state in assuming jurisdiction.

‘pend L.A. 30496
(See Cornelison v. Chaney, Supra, pp. 150-151; Buckeye |
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, upra, 71 Cal.2d 893 at .DISSENTING OPINION BY MOSK, J.
p. 899.) . :
I dissent.

We note, however, that the present litigation

The issue is whether petitioner has the requisite

involves the performance of a limited partnersh
4 — minimum contacts with the State of California to justify Cali-

agreement in Georgia, and of petitioner*s own agreement

fornia courts exercising jurisdiction over him. (Buckeye Boiler
tO guarantee the performance of a Georgia corporation.

- ve 1 Cal.2d 8 05, fn. 9.
Thus, Georgia would appear to have jurisdiction over oo. v. Superier Court (2909) 71 Ca 93, 905, 9.)

, In denying petitioner's motion to quash, the trial
the entire controversy; at the least, the action against

; court relied upon the following facts to justify retaining the
petitioner can be conveniently litigated there or in

. —— case in California, rather than to compel the litigants to
Florida where petitioner resides.

: travel across the continent to the eastern seaboard for an
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue.

adjudication of their rights. (Tiffany Records, Inc. v. HM. 8.
Krupp Distributors, Inc. (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 619, 615.)

RICHARDSON, J.
Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd.-'72 is a

limited partnership formed in California pursuant to the pro-

WE. CONCUR:
visions of the California Corporations Code,
WRIGHT, C.J.
McCOMB, J. The general partner of the limited partnership is
SULLIVAN, J.
CLARK, J. Carlsberg Resources Corporation, a California corporation.

Both the limited partnership and the corporate

general partner maintain their business and principal office

10.

in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Neither
entity maintains an office in any other state.

carisbers, pursuant. to an agreement, formed a
limited partnership with Sunrise Lakes, Inc., a Georgia
corporation as the general partner, to acquire and operate
two mobile home parks in Georgia. This entity, known in short
as MTA, was created in California, in accordance with pro-
visions of the California Corporations Code. .

The agreement upon which the lawsuit is based was
negotiated and executed in California.

The deeds transferring to MTA title to the Georgia
mobile home parks were executed in California.

The agreement contemplated that payments thereunder
were to be made in California.

The guarantee of petitioner was an essential con-
sideration without which the MTA agreement would not have been
executed in California.

Petitioner had knowledge that he was guaranteeinr an
obligation executed in California and payable in California,
for the written guarantee of petitioner was obtained by, an«
given to, codefendant Peter hun for delivery to plaintiffs
in California.

The guarantee was in fact delivered to plaintiffs in

California.

The transaction became effective only upon delivery

of the guarantee in California. This is precisely the type
of act, originally performed elsewhere but ceusing a specific
effect in California, contemplated by Quaterenn v. Superior
Court (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 296, 303.

This litigation results from the claim that the
general partner, and consequently its guarantor, has breached
the terms of the MTA limited partnership agreement executed
in California.

The foregoing facts--singly perhaps but in com-
bination certainly--constitute substantially more than the
minimum contacts required for jurisdiction over the enettte
by California courts. The trial court so found. A unanimous
Court of Appeal approved. I agree with their assessment of

the facts.

I would deny the writ.

MOSK, J.

I CONCUR:

TOBRINER, J.

APPENDIX 8B

CLERK'S OFFICE, SUPREME COURT
4250 STATE BUILDING

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102

APR 7 197

] have this day filed Order

In re: __N BOYP6

Ye
Respectfully, .

G. E. BISHEL
Clerk

98925.677 11-75 s™@ OSPF

APPENDIX C

EXCERPTS FROM
1969 REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA
JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE LEGISLATURE

Code of Civil‘Procedure $410.10 provides:

A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.

APPROVED JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMENT
Superseded CCP Scctions: §§ 411-413, 417.

Section 410.10 permits California courts to exercise judicial juris.
diction on any basis not inconsistent with the state or federal Consti-
tutions. This authorization continues the California law on jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and reestablishes the prior law that once
governed nonresident individuals.

All the recognized bases of judicial jurisdiction are include’. In the
ease of natural persons, such bases currently include presence, domicil.
residence, citizenship, consent. appearance, doing business in a State,
doing an act in a state, causing an effect in a state by an act or omission
elsewhere, ownership. use or possession of a thing in a State, as well
as other relationships to a state.

In the case of corporations and unincorporated associations (inelud-
ing partnerships), such bases currently include incorporation or or-
ganization in a state. consent. appointment of an ageut, appearance,
doing business in a state. doine an act in a State, cuusing an effect in a
State by an act or omission elsewhere. ownership, use or possession of
a thing in a state. and other relationships to a state. Each of these
bases is discussed in detail below.

Other recognized bases inelude: (1) Judicial jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in things in this state, such as land, chattels, doeu-

ments, intangibles, shares in a corporation, and titles. (2) Judicial
jurisdiction to apply to the satisfaction of a claim interests in a thing
that is subject to the court’s judicial jurisdiction. (3) Judicial juris-
diction for divoree of persons one or both of whom are domiciled in
this state or have such other relationship to this state as would make
it reasonable for the state to dissolve their marriage. (4) Judicial juris-
diction over other proceedings relating to status, such as judicial sepa-
ration, annulment, support, adoption, or custody, of persons who are
domiciled or present in this state, or have such other relationship to
this state as would make it reasonable for the state to hear and deter.
mine such action, ...

BASES OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS

A state has power to exercise Judicial jurisdiction over an individual
on one or more of the following bases: (1) Presence; (2) Domieil;
(3) Residence; (4) Nationality or citizenship; (9) Consent; (6) Ap-
pearance im an action; (7) Doing business in the state; (3) An act
done in the state; (9) Causing an effect in the state by an act done
elsewhere; (10) Ownership, use or POSSessTon of a thing in the state;
(11) Other relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction reasonable. (RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 27; sve
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT $$ 1.02, 1.03 Chereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT); 44 Cal.b.
Rey. 737; 48 Cal. LRey. 295; Von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction
to cldyudicate: A Suggested Analysis (1966) 79 Harv dtev. 1121;
Developments in the Law—Ntate-Court Jurisdiction (1900) 72 lary.
LRev. GOO: is) LTastines i 191; 27 So.Cal. Levy. dition: l U.C.).A.
lhRev. 113.)...

(9) CAUSING EFFECT IN STATE BY ACT OR OMISSION ELSEWHERE

A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who causes effects in the state by an omission or act done elsewhere
with respect to causes of action arising from these effects. uniess the
nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state
make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. (JZanson v. Denekin
(1958) 357 U.S. 235; MeGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 399
US. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223; Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hear-
ing Aid Center, Lid. (1961) 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 331, cert. den.
866 U.S. 961; Stcphensen v. Duriron Co. (Alaska 1965) 401 P.2d 423,
cert. den. 382 U.S. 956; ef. Trarclers Health Assn. v. Virginia (1950)
339 U.S. 643, 705 S.Ct. 927; Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co. (1953)
122 Cal.App.2d 376. 381, 265 P.2d 130; sce RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), § 37; UNIFORM ACT § 1.63(4) (‘‘causinz tortious injury in
this state by an act or omission ontside this state if he regularly does
or solicits business. or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state’’), (6) (‘‘contracting to insure any person,
property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting );
Jurisdiction: Current Problems and Legislative Trends (1959) 44 lows
L.Rev. 247; Diverse Systems and Principles of Jurisdiction (1959) 53
Am.Soec.Int. L.Proc. 170; Transient Jurisdiction—Remnant of Pen-
noyer v. Neff (1960) 9 J.Pub.Law 281; Scott, Hanson v. Denckla (1959)
72 Harv.L.Rev. 695.) When jurisdiction over en individual is based
solely upon such act or omission. only a claim for relief arising from
such act or omission may be asserted against the individual. (Tbid.)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE |

As stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 37. Comment a:

A state has a-natural interest in the effects of on act
within its territory even though the act itself wrs done
elsewhere. The state may’ exercise judicial jurisdiction
on the basis of such effects over the individual who did the
act, or who caused the act to be done. provided that the
nature of these effects and of the individual's re'sticn-
ship to the state are such as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction fair te the individual and reasonable from
the standpoint of the international and interstate svs-
tems. ... ' :

There are three possible situations: (1) the act was
done with the intention of causing effects in the state;
(2) the act, although not dune with the intention of eaus-
ing effects in the state, could reasuenably have been
expected to do so; and (3) the act was not done with the
intention of ciusing effects in the state and could not
reasonably have been expected to dv so. These three situe-
tions will be discussed in the order stated.

The act may have been done with the intention of eaus-
ing effects in the state. If se, the state may exercise the
same judicial jurisdiction over the actor, or over the one

who caused the act to be done. as to eauses of action

arising from these effects as it could have exercised if
these effects had resulted from an act done within its
territory. . . . So one who intentionally shoots a bullet
into a state is as subject to the judicial jurisdiction of
the state as to causes of action arising from the effects of

the shot as if he had actually fired the bullet in the state,
Similarly, en insurance company which solicits through
the mails the purchase of an insurance policy and there-
after mails jie insured premium notices and the like is
as subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state as to
causes of action arising from the policy as if it had sent
an agent into the state to solicit the policy and to present
the premium notices to the insured. [WeGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., supra; cf. Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia, supra.}

The act may not have been done with the intention
of causing: effects in the state but could reasonably have
been expected to do so. Whether the state may exercise
judicial jurisdiction in such a situation depends upon a
varicty of factors. including the extent of the relationship
of the state to the defendant and to the plaintiff, the

‘nature and quality of the effects resulting from the act,
and the degree of inconvenience which would result to
the defendant from being foreed to stand suit in the state
on the particular cause of action. The greater the de-
fendant’s relationship to the state, the greater is the
likelihood that the state may exercise judicial juris-
diction over him as to causes of action arising from the
effects of the act in. the state. . . . So if the defendant
does business in the state, or solicits business extensively
in the state. or if a substantial quantity of goods manu-
factured by him are sold in the state, there is a greater
likelihood that the state may exercise judicial jurisdiction
over him as to causes of action arising from the effects
in the state of an act done by him outside the state than
if the defendant did not have this relationship to the
state. This is so even though the defendant's relationship
to the state is not related in any way to the act or to such
of its effects i. the state as are involved in the suit. The
plaintiff’s relationship to the state is also material. The
greater is the extent of this relationship, the greater is
the interest of the state in the plaintiff and consequently
the more appropriate it will be that the state should be in
the position to try the case in its courts. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff has little or no relationship to the
state, the defendant's relationship to the state must be
correspondingly greater to give the state a sufficient in-
terest to justify trial of the case in its courts. Another
factor of significance is the nature und quality of the
effects which occur in the state. The state may exercise
judicial jurisdiction over the defendant if- the effects
which could have been anticipated end which actually
occurred are of a sort highly dangerous to persons or
things. ...

Finally, there will be situations where the act was not
done with the intention of causing effects in the state and
where the defendant had no reason to suppose that his act
outside the state would result in effects within the state.
In these circumstances the state is unlikely to have ju-
dicial jurisdiction over the defendant unless both the
plaintiff and the defendant have an extensive relationship
to the state. [Citations supplied; cf. Hanson v. Denckla,
supra. ]}

Some actions, such as defamation. affect interests of a defendant
that are protected by the First .umendment of the United States
Constitution. For a state to have judicial jurisdiction over such actions,
it may be that the defendant must have a closer relationship to the
state, or have caused effects of a more substantial nature in the state,
than would otherwise be required....

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385004_0004%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.