# Appellants Brief — Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appellants Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 430 U.S. 141

## Text

_ so UC Ue

Ye eye
RILterp:

Supreme Court of ‘the net

October Term, 1975.

No. 75-1150

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE, LANDFILL
AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, MAC SANITARY
LANDFILL, INC., KINSLEYS LANDFILL, INC., and
DelLORENZO-INTERSTATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.
(Now INTERSTATE WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,

JERSEY cnd RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Commissioner of the
Department of Environmental Protection of the State of New

Jersey,
Appellees.

On Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS.

Jamazson, McCaRrpELL,
— pn ig Moore, PEsxin & SPICER,
3rd Floor, Lewis Tower Building, A, Feofeestonal Corporation,
pany oe 4 2a wm so. (600) 306-5511

Printing Co., 711 Go. 60th St., Phila. Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-6711

1976

INDEX.

Page
OPINIONS BELOW .............00ccccccceucceuceeees 1
nk esccccccces 2
STATUTE INVOLVED ................ccccceeeceeeeeee 3
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................00.cc0ceeee: 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............0...000e000: 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................00eee00e: 16
Neen cccncccccce 17

A. Solid and Liquid Waste, and the Process of Collect-

ing, Transporting, Treating and Disposing of Same,
Is a Recognized Subject of Interstate Commerce ... 17

B. P.L. 1973, c. 363, on Its Face Discriminates Against

and Directly Burdens Interstate Commerce ....... 27
1. Evenhandednness .............6. 00s cceeceeeeee 29
2. Legitimate Local Purpose .................... 50
3. Effect Upon Interstate Commerce ............. 68

C. Appellants Were Unconstitutionally Denied a Plenary
Hearing on the Merits of Their Claim ............ 73
TT het e eRe etab bse ceneccccccececccccccss 80

TABLE OF CITATIONS.

Cases: Page
Alexandria Scrap Corporation v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46
(Md. 1975), prob. jur. noted — U. S. — (1975) ........ 23
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 15
Ore. App. 618, 517 P. 2d 691 (Ct. App. Ore. 1973) ..... 38
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908) ................04. 25, 41
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935) .......... 50
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940) .............. 30, 35
Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937) ........... 25
Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A. 2d 679
CG GO, GE GD en cevcccuccuccocteuchauceschens 38
Bowman v. Chicago & c. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888)
17, 18, 41
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 (1891) ................. 32, 33
Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930) ......... 78
Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950) ..... 27
City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W. D.
We GHD becccsascsscsccond agecteséhededeseeeceds 49
Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439 (1939) .................. 25

Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001 (S. D. Tex. 1968) .. 38
Construction Ind. Ass’n., Sonoma Cty. v. City of Petaluma,

Se BB GEe Ce GE Be ccccccccnscoveccesccces 38
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189 (1904) ................ 25
Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921) .... 19
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951) .......... 25, 30
Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage

Ga, SD GD. Ge Ge GRD kceccbvccsccshiviceeadssetes 18
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 110 (1928)

18, 20

FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) .... 18

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 (1914) .................. 78
Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, — U. S. —, 47 L. Ed. 2d 55

EREUED cuceccccececcsesncceseuaseneansesmesiaamiiad 25, 29

Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 127 N. J.
Super. 160 (Ch. 1974), rev. 68 N. J. 451 (1975) ..2, 12, 22, 93,
24, 30, 39, 40, 50, 64, 70, 71

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Cases (Continued): Page
Hale v. Bimeo Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375 (1939) .......... 37
Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963) ......... 35
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 (1919) .............0006- 24
Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal, Inc., 186 Neb. 43, 180

N. W. 2d @O1 (Sup. Ct. 1970) ..........0ceceeeeeeees 65

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960) ....28, 35, 36,
37, 39

Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 (1925) ... 24

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972) ................ 18
Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 57
SEE evnidsdiubeomincenchecsdénenasétpscecececsse 73
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.
CIE vind oc nn nancnnscosneqensaceshens 21
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) ................ 33
Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346 (1933) ...........-..+005. 25

- Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950) .. 78

Myers v. City of Hagerstown, 214 Md. 312, 135 A. 2d 147
a og 66

Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1947) ............... 27
Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911) ....48, 68

Oreg.-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926) . .34, 35

Penna. v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) ............. 48
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970) .......... 28, 29
Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914) ...............0004. 18
Pluzaley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894) ........ 2A, 26, 32
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U. S. 361
CEE win cdnssasancdecncénesddsovesosecvesesqccoese 50

Portland Pipe Line Co. v. Environmental Imp. Com’n, 307
A. 2d 1 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973), app. dis. 414 U. S.

Be ED ddddidcndscddevncccbee ccessccqgndhesesed 38, 39
Price v. Indiana, 238 U. S. 446 (1915) ..................5. 25
Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1919) .... 18
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (1877) ......... 31, 32, 33, 35
Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901) ............. 33, 34, 35
Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. © 507 (1906) ............. 18

Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902) ................05. 58

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).
Cases (Continued): Page

Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624 (D. Neb. 1962), affd
309 F. 2d 959 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 372 U. S. 909

(1963), 383 U. S. 971 (1966) ........ ccc cee eee ee eeees 78
Rocchi v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Town of Glastonbury, 157

Conn. 106, 248 A. 2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ............. 66
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912) ..............5005e- 25, 26
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 131 U. S. 1 (1898) ........ 25
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897) ...............eeeeee 33
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (1925) ..... ...-18, 29
Sligh v. Kirkland, 237 U. S. 52 (1915) ............ snesaved 25
Smith v. St. Louis and Southwestern Ry. Co., 181 U. S. 248

CREED 0 ccdcccccvcbecodedduccdbdsédecdcsenbucedisds 58

Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicago, 357 F.
Supp. 44 (N. D. Ill. 1973), rev. Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
City of Chicago, 509 F. 2d 69 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. den.

Ge Gu. Ga GOED co cdwsnv ccccidtendbusebasscicsc< 38
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S.

Tee GHD cecsdéncudasccececonsadacsensdscowicssies 29
Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1882) ............. 18
Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414 (1926) ........... 18
United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624

[it DE MED addndenévvetadeenemetndetebinedd sees 18
U. S. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293 (1945) ........ 21

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass’n, 242 F.
Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965), affd 357 F. 2d 806 (3rd

Cir. 1966), cert. den. 384 U. S. 961 (1966) ......... 19, 20, 21
U. S. v. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944) .......... 21
Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court., 262 U. S. 522 (1923) ........ 22

Wood v. Town of Wilton, 156 Conn. 304, 240 A. 2d 904 (Sup.

Te MEET « . ccdacsuaatbiadbmctauhianesiuenice can 66
Statutes:

United States
CO Rae ut app tie Dy Een am ae 20
OG BS GID isis kccidedncnctcercevsbcounetie 2
iP a es Ge ED Scoedvcnccecudedeceseue 2
a | Rrra as ek 69

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Statutes (Continued): Page
GD BE SEIOD). 2. ccccccccvccsccccccccecsvcesods 69
a MEE 6 coscvcnccedcccnuacccccdulbissoeiods 69
Sh ccc cue cen adasedaccendetesdhescndode 69
ee A ins cit dnbucetdésnneccs Peubus Ube peqacds 69
New Jersey
I dccccspécctyvcevaghadu Deis cbinds 51
TE OD A TED ce vcccccccccscvcscesedcctdcecctode 51
ET. BA, TRS) cc cc cvcccccccccedvcccccesccceds 19
IN. J.B. A. UBsNBe 2... nc cccccccccevss See eeweeeseeees 19, 63
re Oe os. one bouudinsawtuetesncatede 19
Be ee Os ED vocpocccccccccopeccoenet¥uctessees 51
8g 8 | PPPPPTTTTITITIITT TTL Tie ie 43
Pe By Es EN ce vcccccccccceueevcecdesevecesceses 1, 3, 60
Be, Be Be Bh, THARIPED cc ccccccccccccccccscccbeccccsccecs 1, 3, 60
eM PE Se ccccccccccccccecosdecdstectecioss 19
hy i ED cco cececccccceddcdetececete bs 19
Be Be B, Be Coccvccccccccscccusccevetcénccsscte 50, 51
th SI cd, ciueieddaccscencesduvbuscehts 22
eb - EA EE Wa ces cccccccadececocccsedilvrceesees 58
Pe SE ED nv cccdeccascccéosvensvuecdeoccuecte 22
Be De Oe By Ge ~ 0 cc vccccccccccccsstWebedbvsrcncets 22
ee EL oda sccneasnidecbounthosusents 29
Bs WE Se - ce cccecscccccccccn cesses tuveses sie 22
te AEE (is 5s cou nuchsduudteebot@aumeryess 64
Se A SEED cvveccccccenvocdvsyeisceceseeds 64
his SE betevecrsaes ocevesretekboetettéeuts 1, et seq.
pO RE GEE vo cecvcccavessusenesecteeedcetes cxceeu 20, 63
Pennsylvania
EE Said ndeieus wescuvensvenecOduudiipes cuceee 49, 71
Constitutional Provisions:
U. S$. Constitution

Og SAAS errr errr ey 10, 11, 12, 21, 74
I rc oie Oe oa oe et sedestee votenad 78, 80
IIE cones 6 cokkadgaedabdssedeesbetbecatece 27

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Administrative Regulations: Page
Be DB &. Ge Pe Sher bacccddncasasccccsseneun 6, 8, 61, 62, 63, 64
Bee i By Ge Ce Kh vcd séccveseccsececncouetbenenaie 7, 61
ee > Gy Ge PD 0'0 6 Uracddectecccanavcxens 9, 23, 52, 60, 63
Bee Be Bs Gi FHS vvcccnccccccncudééeccccnbbensas 60
See > Ele We IE 6.0.6. 600005.)040000ccenceskuseasens 60
Sa we te Ge HE 0:0.50:5.0.0:500060006és0eusbodschaek 63
Pa: iy A Ge PE hen decccncndscccsccedeacineeal 67
OD Be PE i ivi cccccnsdesctcaaae ee 60
Bee Bo Ay GS, Fee CUI noon cccccccdscoccccescce 45
WD th, OS vv iiinddncncdncsccccavdhaddeetee’ 53, 67
eee 5 Breet ers un 53
ae > A PEE Snddcdcctdvsdondccessdcuwenneenl 53
is i Se Se ED 66006 Ckedeekedeaduaaeieeael 2A, 53, 65
oe ey ir Gs Pe 66 bb dee sesevisacdssseciea ee 24, 53
Bee Be Gs Ge SUE kinds odd c0dcdccvnbedensedbdeasaal 54
Se Be Ge Gi CE Scene vcnsccccdicdcqcnics deddisenees 56
ae i Oy Ge. SE . dcdapudcnddcedcnsaeasadsndsoasen 56
Sh des Gh PE . 005 0 csccccksendededesuwabsanuices 56
> > Gee Ws WE 060k 0000dsnendnconedceusasedas 56
ie Ge CE Se ass adéddducdesiscadeuseaueea 55
> ie Ge EEE 0.0500006nneabeccadacdieaskesnans 54
Wi i th Oe SE as ecco dkasecducd teens ea. 58
be Oe SEE cn kbcnacuciucuussauiaastedecaue 57
Sh ab Se EE Ke dcounbandeesaedscbudiuudsannal 57
eet Ee We EE Gad. cncundccncaceansdsitebiciad 57
Oe PEE enscanstnaonnsnedecieddieesasdnu 57
eb Oe Ss EE EE - Bbicnecdeueedencusseacbeueanaeee 57
ie A ee POD Sc aeWedenmeddnncdcendedccedeccua 58
Be ee Se ED. Sd dcdvdenecoddedveceveccdesscnes Be |
i> > Ge WP PEE ws 60d0ccccdntucccanebusienies 24
ie ip Gs Ge ED K0bnbbd856s déndbdeccccccesedadcus 57
be Ae ee EE db n.bn 5 bd6 dd 0 cdecadkdhecibasicnns 57
ae Se CPD b0ecwnssntecsececdéensdetuciats 57

TABLE OF CITATIONS (Continued).

Administrative Regulations (Continued): Page
ey Ee EEE: chedvcucesdbelcbdccveccedsouase 56
Sea HE. cee debe ecdedeéncccccs vesetoessses 56
i EEE * couadesddcdosesdcececssavcpvccects 57
Se St EEE | po vecccdvedccvocs vesptovescensens 56, 57
ey EE iv 0nd 5 dpe coedpeeesececeaceccecs 59
Other Authorities:
Annotation, “Public Dump as Nuisance”, 52 ALR 2d 1134... 66
1965 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News .................. 69
1970 U. S. Code, Cong. and Adm. News ... .............. 69
Municipal Refuse Disposal, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Public Admin-
SE Sn 2d0s ccntposessocceceassetace 66
New Jersey State Sanity Code ..............ceeeeeees 50, 51, 52
New Jersey State Solid Waste Management Plan (Newark:
Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) .................. 24, 52, 59

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper Term, 1975.

No. 75-1150.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, CITY OF GLEN COVE,
LANDFILL AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
MAC SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., KINSLEY’S
LANDFILL, INC, anp DELORENZO-INTERSTATE
WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC. (Now INTERSTATE
WASTE REMOVAL CO., INC.),

Appellants,

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY ann RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Appellees.

On APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF New JERSEY.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, declaring P. L. 1973, c. 363 (N. J. 8. A. 13:11-9,
10) unconstitutional is not reported. The opinion of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, in the

2 Brief of Appellants

companion case Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Land-
fill Auth. is reported in the official reports at 127 N. J.
Super. 160 (Ch. 1974), and in the unofficial reports at 316
A. 2d 711. The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
reversing the trial court’s decisions in each of the aforesaid
cases, is published in the official reports as Hackensack
Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J. 451 (1975),
and in the unofficial reports as Hackensack Mead. Dev.
Com'n v. Municipal L. A., 348 A, 2d 505 (N. J. Sup. Ct.
1975). Said opinion is cited as Hackensack Meadowlands

v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J. 451 (1975) in the within
Brief.

JURISDICTION.

This matter is brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(2) and in the alternative, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3) to
set aside the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court
which upheld the constitutionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363.
Said judgment was rendered on November 18, 1975, and
entered on the same date. Thereafter, on December 11,
1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the matter
to the Superior Court, Law Division, “for such further
proceedings, if any, that that Court may deem appropriate
. . . (A340). On December 19, 1975, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Law Division, issued its order stating, in
pertinent part, that “. . . no further proceedings are
deemed appropriate by this Court . . .” (A343). A
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
was thereafter filed in the New Jersey Supreme Court on
January 9, 1976. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States to review this suit (a) by direct appeal
is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, Section
1257(2), and alternatively (b) by certiorari is conferred by
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257(3).

Brief of Appellants 3

STATUTE INVOLVED.

The text of P. L. 1973, c. 363, the constitutional valid-
ity of which is involved in the present suit, reads as follows:

“The legislature finds and determines that since
the enactment of P. L. 1973, c. 39 (C 13:11-1
et seq.) the volume of solid and liquid waste
continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment
and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an
even greater threat to the quality of the environ-
ment of New Jersey, that the available and ap-
propriate land fill sites within the State are being
diminished, that the environment continues to be
threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste
which originated or was collected outside the
State, and that the public, health, safety and wel-
fare require that the treatment and disposal
within this State of all wastes generated outside
of the State be prohibited.

“No person shall bring into this State any solid
or liquid waste which originated or was collected
outside the territorial limits of the State, except
garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New
Jersey, until the commissioner shall determine
that such action can be permitted without en-
dangering the public health, safety and welfare
and has promulgated regulations permitting and
regulating the treatment and disposal of such
waste in this State. Any person violating this
provision shall be subject to the penalty and en-
forcement provisions of the “Waste Control Act,’
P. L. 1973, c. 39.”

Said statute is published in the pocket part of Title 13,
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Section 11-9 and 11-10 at
pp. 85-86.

4 Brief of Appellants

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

1. Is solid and liquid waste, or the process of collect-

ing, transporting, treating and disposing of same, a recog-
nized subject of interstate commerce?

2. Does a state statute which prohibits the entry into
the state of any solid or liquid waste (except garbage to be
fed to swine in the state) collected in another state, dis-
criminate against or place an undue burden upon interstate
commerce?

3. In reversing an order granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment, may an appellate court constitutionally
decide the case on its merits without offering the moving
parties an opportunity to be heard, prior to the final deter-
mination, on the material issues of fact raised by their
complaint?

Brief of Appellants 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On January 2, 1974, P. L. 1973, c. 363, being
“An Act to prohibit any person from bringing
into this State any solid and liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the State

was approved by the Governor of the State of New Jersey,
to become effective on February 1, 1974.

On January 21, 1974, appellants filed a complaint
attacking the constitutionality of said statute on federal
and state constitutional grounds (A7). Their simultaneous
application for a temporary restraining order was sup-
ported by an affidavit of a licensed professional engineer
(A37) which averred that the transportation, treatment or
disposal of solid waste in New Jersey in accordance with
applicable Federal and New Jersey state and administra-
tive laws, rules and regulations would not pose a threat to
the health, welfare and safety of the residents of said state:

“3. The transportation in New Jersey of solid
waste in accordance with the terms and provi-
sions of applicable Federal and New Jersey state
and administrative laws, rules and regulations is
not hazardous to the public health and does not
constitute a threat to the health, welfare or safety
of the residents of the State of New Jersey.

“4. The treatment and disposal in New Jersey of
domestic or foreign solid waste in accordance
with the terms and provisions of applicable Fed-
eral and New Jersey state and administrative
laws, rules and regulations is not hazardous to
the public health and does not constitute a threat

6 Brief of Appellants

to the health, welfare or safety of the residents of
the State of New Jersey.” '

It was further supported by a copy of a letter dated De-
cember 26, 1973 from Richard W. DeKorte, Esq:, Counsel
to Governor William T. Cahill, to David Quient, Esq., city
attorney of appellant City of Glen Cove (A47), in which
the Counsel to the Governor stated:

“Also, I might add that Senate Bill No. 2367
(OCR) [P. L. 1973, c. 363] would not have been
introduced had the sister states of New Jersey
permitted solid wastes originating in their states
to be disposed of at or near the point of orig-
ination.”

Based upon the aforesaid documents, and additional affi-
davits which documented that immediate and irreparable
harm would be suffered by appellants if temporary injunc-
tive relief was not granted, the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division issued an Order to Show Cause with
Temporary Restraints on January 21, 1974, which, inter
alia, restrained the State from enforcing the provisions of
P. L. 1973, c. 363 (A5). On the return date of the Order
to Show Cause, February 1, 1974, the trial court issued an
interlocutory injunction continuing the restraints thereto-
fore issued, and further specifically enjoining the enforce-
ment of N. J. A. C. 7:1-4, until its further order * (A105).

1. The conclusions expressed in said paragraphs 3 and 4 have
never been attacked or rebutted. Quite the contrary, they have
been confirmed by appellees. See p. 9 infra.

2. N. J. A. C. 7:1-4, a rule governing the importation of solid
and liquid waste from outside New Jersey, was adopted by the
Com oner of the gt ie: Department of Environmental

Protecti 18, 1 to authority conferred
P. L. 1973, c. 463. Seid rule, wah aap adopted — p aie

Brief of Appellants 7

In granting interlocutory injunctive relief, the trial court
considered among others, an affidavit of the Deputy As-
sistant Administrator for Solid Waste Management Pro-
grams, United States Environmental Protection Agency

(A55), which averred, in pertinent part, as follows:

“It has not been established to the satisfaction
of EPA that the continuation of disposal, in an
environmentally sound manner, of solid waste
generated outside New Jersey poses any greater
immediate health threat to its citizens than the
continued disposal of domestically generated
solid waste. Therefore, there appears to be no

2. (Cont'd. )
measure to become effective February 1, 1974, provides, in perti-
nent part, as follows:

j (1) Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New
ersey;

2) ed waste material, inclu news-
we. paper, gas and metals, that is free et pee Thee
materials not mixed with other solid or liquid waste
that is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;

Baserstepe dei:

per cent t of any su is
Seen & ppsens tt a ° mate-
rials;

Brief of Appellants

immediate health threat to justify the precipitous
passage and implementation of this statute
[P. L. 1973, c. 363] and these regulations.
[N. J. A. C. 7:14]
. . . a State importation ban such as that enacted
by New Jersey is in conflict with the national
policy set forth in Section 206 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act. . . . Moreover, the continuation
of such a restriction would establish an unfavor-
able precedent which, if followed by a substan-
tial number of other States, would render re-
gional and interstate solutions to solid waste
disposal problems impossible to attain.

The foregoing is not to say that appropriate
standards should not be applied in the areas of
treatment and disposal of solid wastes and of
land use planning. We strongly favor the adop-
tion of standards applicable to domestic and
imported solid wastes so that they apply on an
equal basis with out-of-state waste subject to
the same statutory and regulatory treatment as
domestic waste.

. . A single thrust to ban out-of-state wastes
impedes rather than enhances environmental
quality.

In conclusion, it is EPA policy that no munici-
pality or State should take action to prevent the
free flow of waste across municipal or state
boundaries provided the transport, processing,
and disposition of the waste is in accordance
with the provisions of applicable federal and

Brief of Appellants 9

state environmental and land use laws, guide-

lines, regulations, and recognizéd engineering
practices.”

A plenary hearing on the merits of appellants’ complaint
was scheduled by the Court for March 25, 1974 (A118).

On February 11, 1974, John P. Fazzio, Inc., t/a John
P. Fazzio Landfill Co. and Continental Vanguard, Inc.
were granted leave to intervene.

Thereafter on February 13, 1974, appellees filed their
answer to the complaint in this matter, wherein they spe-
cifically admitted that the principal concern of the New
Jersey Legislature in adopting P. L. 1973, c. 363 was to
preserve landfill acres in New Jersey for solid waste gen-
erated in said State. They further admitted that there
is no qualitative difference between the solid waste which
originates or is collected outside the State of New Jersey
and that which originates or is collected within the State,
and there is no difference with respect to the disposal of
same (A97).

On March 13, 1974, appellants deposed the Principal
Environmental Engineer of the Bureau of Solid Waste
Management, New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection. During the course of said deposition, the
engineer admitted that the proposed Rules of the Bureau
of Solid Waste Management, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1 et seq.
(effective July 1, 1974) (A107, 109), were entirely ade-
quate to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
people of the State of New Jersey and the quality of its
environment.’ He also revealed that no effort had been

2. Sel suite wee dost . eee Sates we te eines
hensi regulate waste es. Par-
ren np Lg ty LF Ss ig dey = a
had ent dey oh g (a) dust, (b

— d) insects, rodents, . oe
a beh | mama ta} gas generation, ng surface and

10 Brief of Appellants

made by the Department of Environmental Protection to
calculate the total acreage available for sanitary landfill
purposes in the State of New Jersey or to identify the
location and availability of facilities which presently exist
or may hereafter be developed outside the State of New
Jersey (A115).

Appellants thereafter moved for summary judgment
on two federal constitutional grounds which, in their
opinion, raised solely questions of law: (a) P. L. 1973,
c. 363, on its face, discriminates against interstate com-
merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Consti-
tution of the United States, and (b) the Congress of the
United States has preempted the narrow field preventing
the adoption of laws, ordinances and regulations which
prohibit the interstate movement of solid waste for pur-
poses of treatment or disposal (A116).* Appellees cross-
moved for summary judgment on the same issues, and
urged in a portion of their brief filed with the trial court
(A121-122), that summary judgment not be granted to
appellants pending a hearing on the merits:

“At this stage of the litigation sub judice the
Court has not had an opportunity to consider any
of the relevant facts and circumstances except
for affidavits submitted in favor of and in opposi-
tion to the issuance of ad interim restraints.

“Among those proofs which the court must con-
sider are: the nature and extent of the dangers

3. (Cont'd. )
ground water quality, (i) collection and haulage, (j) open burning,
and other related problems.

4. The motion did not seek summary judgment with
to the many remaining federal constitutional questions
the complaint since those 5 ee involved genuine issues of
material fact (A7 et seq., )

Brief of Appellants 11

to the health, safety, welfare and environment of
New Jersey presented by the disposal of wastes
in New Jersey; the nature and extent of the solid
waste crisis in New Jersey; the rapid exhaustion
of landfill life in New Jersey; the volume of out-
of-state waste being disposed of in New Jersey;
the severe limiting effects on the future develop-
ment of property which has been used for sani-
tary landfill purposes; the extent of the effect on
interstate commerce.”

Pending a determination of the motions, the hearing date
was rescheduled to April 15, 1974, if necessary.

On March 25, 1974, the trial court heard oral argu-
ment on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and
delivered its opinion (A206) granting summary judgment
to appellants and striking down P. L. 1973, c. 363 on the
ground that same discriminated against interstate com-
merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States:

“... I find that the statute in question here is
attempting to control material that is properly
the subject of interstate commerce, that the
method of attempting is discriminatory and,
therefore, unconstitutional.”

On April 23, 1974, appellees filed a notice of appeal
(A216), by which they appealed from the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to appellants.

More than 4 months later, on July 26, 1974, appellees
moved before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, for a stay of judgment (A218). Said motion was
denied by the Court on August 14, 1974 (A220).

12 Brief of Appellants

Following the submission of briefs by all parties, and
prior to argument in the Appellate Division, the appeal
was certified directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court
and consolidated with Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun.
Landfill Auth.’ by order dated October 7; 1974 (A223).
The consolidated cases were argued before the New Jersey
Supreme Court on December 2, 1974.

Almost one year later, on November 18, 1975, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
trial court on the merits, and vacated the injunctive order
which had been in effect since the inception of the litiga-
tion. Although the Court agreed that certain solid and
liquid waste is merchantable and that the transportation
and disposal of solid and liquid waste represents a legiti-
mate subject of interstate commerce, Hackensack Meadow-
lands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra at 466-469,
it nevertheless upheld the constitutionality of P. L. 1973, c.
363 on the grounds that same represented a reasonable
exercise of the State’s police power and did not place an

undue burden upon or discriminate against interstate com-

merce in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. It also concluded that Congress
did not preempt the field of solid waste disposal (A225).

By its ruling, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted
a novel and unprecedented procedural approach: it dis-
posed, on its merits, of a case involving substantial dis-
puted issues of material fact which had never been heard

5. In Hackensack Meadowlands, suit was brought by the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission and the De-
artment of Environmental Protection to enjoin the Municipal
Sanitary Landfill Authority from a i ng for disposal in its land-
fill site located within the Hackensack Meadowlands District any
solid waste > coagy, Sogo or collected outside the territorial
limits of New Jersey. The Superior Court, Chancery Division, held
that the exclusion of out-of-state solid waste from deposit in landfill
sites within the state was unconstitutional as representing a dis-
crimination against interstate commerce.

Brief of Appellants 13

by the trial court.* Since a hearing was not held, there
was no testimony from which to make findings of fact
with respect to either (a) the legitimacy of the exercise
of the State’s police power and the nature and degree
of the burden imposed upon interstate commerce, or (b)
the numerous issues of material fact raised by the remain-
ing counts contained in appellants complaint. Curiously,
such remaining counts were never mentioned by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in its opinion.

On November 18, 1975, the same date upon which
the case was decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court
granted appellants emergent motion for a stay of judgment
and interim injunctive relief pending its further order
(A257).

In an effort to abate the extreme prejudice visited
upon them, appellants moved the New Jersey Supreme
Court to retain jurisdiction pending a remand of the fac-
tual issues to the trial court on an expedited basis (A259).
The trial court reported that it could hold a plenary hear-
ing within two weeks. In the alternative, appellants sought
a stay pending an application for injunctive relief to the
Supreme Court of the United States.

On December 11, 1975, the New Jersey Supreme
Court denied appellants’ motion for a stay, vacated the

6. The trial court granted, as a matter of law, appellants’
motion for summary judgment prior to the scheduled hearing date.
The only facts presented to the trial court were contained in affi-
davits in favor of and in tion to the issuance of interim in-
junctive relief, and these vits, with one exception (A70), were
not part of the appendix presented to the New Jersey Supreme |
Court at the time it deci the case. There was no reason to
present said affidavits to the New Jersey Supreme Court since their
purpose was solely to support an application for interim injunctive
relief and not to prove a case involving disputed issues of material
fact. Based upon the Rules of Court, ts understood that
the case w be remanded for a g on the merits if an
appellate court reversed the order of the trial court granting sum-

mary

14 Brief of Appellants

emergency stay that it had previously issued, effective
December 31, 1975, and further

“OrnverED that the motion for a remand to the
Superior Court, Law Division, for such further
proceedings, if any, that that court may deem
appropriate is granted; provided, however, that
any relief granted by the Law Division shall not
include the issuance or continuation of a stay;
and it is further

Orperep that this Court does not retain juris-
diction.”
(A340).

Based upon this order, appellants and intervenors
were compelled, as a practical matter, to dismiss with
prejudice every count in their respective complaints which
had not been specifically resolved by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in its decision of November 18, 1975, so
that there would unquestionably be a final judgment from
which a direct appeal could be taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the order pursuant to
which the unresolved issues raised by appellants and
intervenors complaints were dismissed (A342), the trial
court

“FurTHER Onverep, that, in light of the dismissal
of the above counts, and the decision by the
New Jersey Supreme Court upholding the con-
stitutionality of P. L. 1973, c. 363 as representing
a valid exercise of the State’s police power which
does not unreasonably burden interstate com-
merce and said Court thereby having finally
determined Counts I, VII and XIX of plaintiffs’
complaint and Count One of plaintiffs-inter-
venors complaint, no further proceedings are

Brief of Appellants 15

deemed appropriate by this Court in connection
with the above captioned matter.”

On December 22, 1975, appellants filed an applica-
tion for a stay of judgment with Mr. Justice Brennan.
Said application was granted on December 31, 1975.
Thereafter, probable jurisdiction was noted on April 5,
1976,

16 Brief of Appellants

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

Solid and liquid waste, and the service of collecting,
transporting, treating and disposing of same, are recognized
subjects of interstate commerce.

A statute which prohibits the entry of a subject of
commerce, irrespective of condition or potential for harm,
is directed against commerce and may not stand.

If a threat is caused to the public health and en-
vironmental quality by solid and liquid waste, or the proc-
ess of treating, transporting and disposing of same, it is
based upon the nature of the substance being regulated
and not its place of origin. Regulation of such commerce
must be accomplished in an evenhanded, nondiscrimina-
tory manner.

The Court will decide for itself whether a statute
represents a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power,
or whether it really amounts to a discriminatory regulation
of interstate commerce and a direct burden thereon.

A police regulation which affects interstate commerce
must not go beyond the necessities of the particular case.
If the legislative purpose is to preserve acreage from use
as a disposal site, there is no reason to prohibit entry or
forms of treatment and disposal other than sanitary land-
filling.

In light of the many genuine issues of material fact,
the New Jersey Supreme Court erred in upholding the
constitutionality of P. L. 1973 c. 363 as not violative of
the Commerce Clause absent a hearing, on the merits,
before the trial court. Appellants were thereby denied
due process of the law.

Brief of Appellants 17
ARGUMENT.

A.
© and Liquid Waste, and the Process of Collecting,

Transporting, Treating and Disposing of Same, is a
Recognized Subject of Interstate Commerce.

In the proceedings before the New Jersey Courts,
Appellees argued that solid and liquid waste are not legiti-
mate subjects of interstate commerce, and therefore not
within the purview of the commerce clause. This con-
tention was rejected below, and is wholly unsupportable
in law and in fact.

The meaning of the clause “legitimate subject of
commerce” was explained by Mr. Justice Matthews in
Bowman v. Chicago &c Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888).
Holding that a state cannot, for the purpose of protecting
its people against the evils of intemperance, enact laws
which regulate interstate commerce, the court stated:

“ . . It has never been regarded as within the
legitimate scope of inspection laws to forbid
trade in respect to any known article of com-
merce, irrespective of its condition and quality,
merely on account of its intrinsic nature and the
injurious consequences of its use or abuse.

. . » Doubtless the States have power to provide
by law suitable measures to prevent the introduc-
tion into the States of articles of trade, which, on
account of their existing condition, would bring
in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such
as rags or other substances infected with the
germs of yellow fever or the virus of small-pox,
or cattle or meat or other provisions that are
diseased or decayed, or otherwise, from their

18 Brief of Appellants

condition and quality, unfit for human use or con-
sumption. Such articles are not merchantable;
they are not legitimate subjects of trade and
commerce. They may be rightly outlawed as
intrinsically and directly the immediate sources
and causes of destruction to human health and
life.

Bowman v, Chicago &c Railway Co., 125
U. S. supra, at 488-489. (Emphasis added. )

Pursuant to the decision in Bowman, if solid or
liquid waste or some identifiable portion thereof is a
“known article of commerce”, or if the service of collecting
and disposing of solid or liquid waste is a “subject of trade
or commerce”, then a prohibition against importation can-
not be imposed merely on account of intrinsic nature, with-
out regard to condition and quality.

Subjects of interstate commerce are determined by
“. . . practical consideration and the established course of
business”. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U. S. 110 (1928), Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S.
189, 198 (1925), Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249
U. S. 236, 245 (1919); cf. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203
U. S. 507, 523 (1906). Commerce is not confined to
transportation alone, but comprehends all commercial
intercourse, including the component parts therecf."

1p ay a state line, Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414

4 . 8, 548, 560 Lg telegraphic communication wire,
Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. §. 460, 464 (1985) and tants
in ambient air, United States v. Bishop P.

624, 629 (D. Md. 1968). With

respect to
and water, see also Illinois v. Milwaukee, U. S, 91, 103 (1972).

Brief of Appellants 19

Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 290
(1921).

Appellants’ solid waste collection and disposal com-
panies are lawful business entities existing under the
laws of the State of New Jersey (A7), N. J. S. A. 14A:1-1
et seq., and generally empowered by same

“to conduct its business, carry on its operations,
and have offices and exercise the powers granted
by this act anywhere in the universe”,

N. J. S.A. 14A:3-1(1) (i)

Appellees admit that solid waste collected outside New
Jersey has been disposed of at sanitary facilities within the
State * (A83, 97), and that certain communities in New
Jersey dispose of all or a portion of their solid waste out-
side the State of New Jersey (A114). Such practice has
been carried on for years. United States v. Pennsylvania
Refuse Removal Ass'n., 242 F. Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965).

The legislature has recently acknowledged the solid
waste industry as an integral part of “the free enterprise
system” in New Jersey. P. L. 1975, c. 326, N. J. S. A.
13:1E-2b(5). It has also specifically recognized the need
to assure an adequate volume of solid waste at solid waste
facilities: °

“The Legislature recognizes that solid waste
and recycling facilities will be financed through
long term borrowing which requires the negotia-
tion of long term contracts with municipalities

. According to Departmental estimates, 1.5 million tons of
osha wacee outside of the State was disposed of in New

Jersey in 1971 ( ).
9. The term “solid waste facilities” is defined in the Act to

ag » aan gu inghude »_- g ipciparaten . . . [and] sanitary land-
a cuitary meaner” P-L, 1005, ¢, O06 N. fsa wat hi

20 Brief of Appellants

and other solid waste collectors to guarantee the
flow of solid waste to such facilities.”

P. L. 1975, c. 326, N. J. S. A. 13: 1E-2c.
(Emphasis added. )

Appellant City of Philadelphia has entered into long
term contracts with sanitary landfill facilities located in
New Jersey (A31, 41, 271). Expenditures for environ-
mental controls approximating $500,000 were made at Ap-
pellant Kinsley’s Landfill, Inc. sanitary landfill site upon
the direction of the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (A270). The improvements would not have been
made but for a ten year contract with Philadelphia (A271).
A sanitary landfill must receive a sufficient quantity of solid
waste to be economically feasible (A271, 281-282). If pre-
vented from obtaining solid waste, the business of Kinsley's
and of other Appellant sanitary landfill owners will be
greatly diminished or destroyed (A44, 254, 271, 281).
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. supra,
at 8.

The proposition that the disposal in one state of solid
waste collected in another state constitutes an activity in
interstate commerce is too well established to be seriously
questioned. In United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse
Removal Assn., 242 F. Supp. 794 (E. D. Pa. 1965) certain
defendants were indicted and convicted for price fixing,
allocating customers and rigging bids in connection with a
refuse removal business in the Greater Philadelphia area
in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. That Act pro-
vides, in pertinent part, “Every . . . conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, . .
is declared to be illegal”. 15 U. S. C. $1.

The Court held that the disposal in New Jersey of
substantial quantities of refuse collected in Pennsylvania
constituted an activity within the flow of interstate com-

merce. In responding to defendants’ arguments that a

Brief of Appellants 21

worthless commodity like trash cannot be the subject of
“trade or commerce” as those terms are used in the
Sherman Act, the Court observed:

“That argument misses the point. Here, the
real subject of ‘trade or commerce’ was not worth-
less debris, but the valuable service of removing
and disposing of it. Since services are encom-
passed within the meaning of the words ‘trade or
commerce’ as used in the Act, United States v.
Nat'l Assn. of Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485,
488-492, 70 S. Ct. 711, $4 L. Ed. 1007 (1950),
the defendants position has no merit.”

United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse
Ass'n., 242 F. Supp., supra, at 700.
(Emphasis added. )

The decision of the Federal District Court was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which
succinctly stated: “. . . refuse transported from Penn-
sylvania to New Jersey and disposed of in the latter state
. . . was plainly a proper subject of interstate commerce”.
United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass’n., 357
F. 2d 806, 808 (3rd Cir. 1966). Certiorari was denied by
this Court, 384 U. S. 961 ( 1966).’°

Established business practice leads inescapably to the
cenclusion that the collection and disposal of solid waste

in the Sherman Act. U.S. 0. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293,
298 Ee OE nts ay Se ge a 533, 558 ( ~~

Ly Thecfore, if U:
7, a8 (ot Ci. 108 ee Ro dey 8

fa
a
a

constitute
U. S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3.

22 Brief of Appellants

recognized solid waste collection and disposal as a legiti-
mate subject of commerce. In adopting the Solid Waste
Utility Control Act of 1970, N. J. S. A. 48:13A-1 et seq., the
Legislature found that the service of solid waste collection
and disposal “. . . is a matter of grave concern to all citi-
zens and is an activity thoroughly affected with the public
interest, . . .” N. J. S. A. 48:13A-2, and that the “. . .
rates and public utility aspects of the solid waste collection
industry and the solid waste disposal industry . . .” should
be regulated by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners,
N. J. S. A. 48:13A-4. The entire solid waste industry was
afforded public utility status by N. J. S. A. 48:2-13, which
states, in pertinent part:

“The term ‘public utility’ shall include every

. solid waste collection, [or] solid waste dis-
posal . . . system, plant or equipment for public
use, under privileges granted or hereafter to be
granted by this State... .”

In Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court., 262 U. S, 522, 535
(1923), Mr. Chief Justice Taft observed that a public
utility has“. . . the affirmative duty of rendering a public
service demanded by any member of the public”, Ter-
mination or discontinuance of such service can be effected
only with the express approval of the Public Utilities Com-
mission, N, J, S. A. 48:2-24. One is hard-pressed to con-
ceive how a legislatively-regulated industry engaged in the
performance of an “activity thoroughly affected with the
public interest, . . .” N. J. S$. A. 48:13A-2, could be any-
thing other than a legitimate, indeed a vital, subject of both
intrastate and interstate commerce.

While it is thus clear that the valuable service of col-
lecting and disposing of solid waste is an activity in inter-
state commerce, it is also clear that solid waste itself is

Brief of Appellants 23

often a merchantable commodity." In Hackensack
Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 127 N. J. Super. 160,
170 (Ch. 1974), rev. other grnds. 68 N. J. 451 (1975), the
companion case to the within matter, the trial court re-
jected appellee’s argument that solid and liquid waste is
neither merchantable nor a legitimate subject of interstate
commerce: “. . . refuse may be utilized for construction,
landfill, recycling of paper, bottles and metal and produc-
tion of electricity”. The New Jersey Supreme Court
agreed, saying:

“We readily recognize that modern technol-
ogy is such that certain types of solid waste may
have legitimate market value for recycling or
other purposes. We therefore agree with the
decision below, insofar as the HMDC regula-
tions are concerned, that they cannot be sustained
on the theory that no item of interstate com-
merce is involved, as these regulations do clearly
attempt to exclude from the HMD even those
types of wastes which may have some potentiality
of useful renewal.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.
Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 467-

468.
Sanitary landfilling is itself a method of recycling and
resource recovery. Solid waste can be accepted for dis-
posal at a sanitary landfill facility and used in a cost effici-

ent and environmentally sound manner to recover severely
mined or devastated lands and to produce gas for com-

1l. A United States District Court has recently held that the
movement of automobile hulks across state lines constitutes inter-

state commerce. Alexandria Scrap Corporation v. 4
. Md. 1975); ‘ 96 S. Ct. 31 (1975), A
SN IOe pantry SEER

in the Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management. N. J. A. C.
7:26-1.4.3. (A147).

24 Brief of Appellants

mercial purposes (A275-279). It can also be utilized to
create power generation by incineration.

Land recovered through sanitary landfilling is fre-
quently devoted to public recreational use and green
acres (A277). It may also be used for residential, com-
mercial and industrial development. Problems previously
encountered at former sanitary landfill sites with respect to
support of heavy structures can be avoided by merely leav-
ing certain land areas untouched in the landfilling process
(A276). The key, in every situation, is responsible pro-
fessional planning before sanitary landfill operations com-
mence. Since New Jersey sanitary landfills must be de-
veloped in accordance with plans and designs prepared by
licensed professional engineers, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.2.3;
7:26-2-4, the purpose to which the site will be devoted
upon completion of the sanitary landfill process may be
known before any operations begin, N. J. A. C. 7:26-

- 2.12.2.22.

Significantly, the New Jersey State Solid Waste Man-
agement Plan, approved by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency as the official State plan for
New Jersey, Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill
Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 463, frankly states:

“It is not unusual for a properly designed and con-

structed sanitary landfill to become an asset to
the local area.” ”

On occasion, the free flow of commerce has been the
subject of state regulatory action. In the absence of
controlling federal legislation or implied federal preemp-
tion, a state may exercise its police power to prevent
deception or fraud upon the public, Plumley v, Massa-
chusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894), Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248
U. S. 297 (1919), Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266

12. New Jersey Solid Waste Management Plan (Newark:
Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) at p. 71. -*

Brief of Appellants 25

U. S. 497 (1925), the prompt disposal of large animals not
slaughtered for food, Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439
(1939), and the importation of unhealthy swine or cattle,
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251 (1908); Mintz v. Baldwin,
289 U. S. 346 (1933), decayed, noxious or adulterated
foods, Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189 (1904); Savage
v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912), Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S.
446 (1915), or immature citrus —_ Me ho ge

v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. . How-
pin pe espe not, even in these situations, exclude
articles of commerce with impunity.’

A regulation designed to protect the public health
must be reasonable in its requirements, promote its ob-
jective without discrimination, and not go beyond the
necessities of the particular case: “*

“The evident purpose of the statute is to pre-
vent fraud and imposition in the sale of food for
domestic animals,—a matter of great importance

held that a statute the sale in Pennsylvania of
a substance, other than that produced from unedulter-
ated or cream, 1d the Commerce Clause:
absolute i as aut
article has never been permitted as a rem
mete th ion of that which was
unhealthy or impure :

ae be admitted that oleomargarine in the course
of its manufacture may sometimes be adulterated by dis-

26 Brief of Appellants

to the people of the state. Its requirements were
directed to that end, and they were not unreason-
able. It was not aimed at interstate commerce,
but, without discrimination, sought to promote
fair dealing in the described articles of food.”

Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S., supra, at
525.

An identical sentiment was expressed in Plumley v.
Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 471 (1894), where this
Court, in upholding a statute prohibiting the manufacture
or sale of oleomargarine colored in imitation of yellow but-
ter, said: “If the Statute of Massachusetts had been so
framed as to be applicable only to oleomargarine manu-
factured in other states, . . . the case would have been
wholly different”.

Although countless opportunities were presented, Ap-
pellees never contended by any affidavit that (a) the trans-
portation, treatment or disposal of solid or liquid waste in
accordance with applicable federal and state laws and
regulations poses any material threat to the health, wel-
fare and safety of the people of New Jersey or to the
quality of its environment; (b) an unsuspecting public will
be deceived or defrauded by the transportation, treatment
or disposal of solid or liquid waste collected in another
state; or (c) the inherent condition of solid waste is such
that it will always spread pestilence and disease. Quite
to the contrary, interstate disposal of solid waste has been
carried on, without interruption, for many years. During
that period, state regulations have applied equally to all
solid waste regardless of the place of its collection.

The interstate transportation of solid and liquid waste
for treatment and disposal represents a legitimate, indeed
a necessary and vital, activity in interstate commerce.

Brief of Appellants 27

P. L. 1973, c. 363, on Its Face Discriminates Against and
Directly Burdens Interstate Commerce.

The plain and unambiguous language of P. L. 1973, c.
363, entitled:

“An Act to prohibit any person from bringing
into this State any solid and liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside the State... ,”

reveals that its sole iritent and purpose is to impose an im-
mediate, absolute, and complete ban upon the movement
into or through New Jersey of any solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside the State. Treat-
ment of liquid waste, processing of solid waste, and dis-
posal or interstate movement of all waste collected outside
New Jersey is equally prohibited. Conversely, no at-
tempt whatsoever has been made in the statute to control,
regulate or prohibit the movement, treatment, processing
or disposal of solid or liquid waste which originates or is
collected within the State of New Jersey.

Activities in interstate commerce are not, by that fact
alone, immune from reasonable regulations adopted by a
state or local government pursuant to the exercise of its
reserved police power. U. S. Const., Amend. 10. As
reiterated by Mr. Justice Rutledge in Nippert v. Richmond,
327 U. S. 416, 425 (1947), “. . . not all burdens upon com-
merce, but only undue or discriminatory ones, are forbid-
den”; and in Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U. S.
179, 186-187 (1950), Mr. Justice Clark observed:

“The only requirements consistently recog-
nized have been that the regulation not discrim-
inate against or place an embargo on interstate
commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state

28 Brief of Appellants

interest and that the local interest at stake out-
weigh whatever national interest there might be
in the prevention of state restrictions.”

Absent controlling federal legislation, the commerce
clause does not deprive the states of the power to regulate
matters of local public concern in those areas where uni-
formity of regulation is not necessary, as long as the ex-
ercise of the police power serves a real and legitimate
purpose and does not place an undue or excessive burden
on or discriminate against interstate commerce.

The test has been stated most recently by this Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970);

“Although the criteria for determining the
validity of state statutes affecting interstate com-
merce have been variously stated, the general
rule that emerges can be phrased as follows:

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only in-
cidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 372 U. S. 440, 443. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of
the burden that will be tolerated will, of course,
depend on the nature of the local interest in-
volved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Occasionally, the Court has candidly undertaken
a balancing approach in resolving these issues,
Southern Pacific Co. v, Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,
but more frequently it has spoken in terms of

Brief of Appellants 29

‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects and burdens. See
e.g. Schafer v. Farmers Grain Co., supra.” (Em-
phasis added) ©

See also Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, — U. 8. — , 47
L. Ed. 2d 55 (1976).

Pursuant to the test announced in Pike, a balance will
not be made between the burden imposed on interstate
commerce, on the one hand, and the putative local bene-
fits, on the other hand, unless it is first determined that the
regulation (a) is evenhanded, (b) is based upon a legiti-
mate local purpose, and (c) only incidentally affects inter-
state commerce. If it is defective on any of these grounds,
then the regulation must fall.

1, Evenhandedness.

A prohibition directed solely against solid or liquid
waste which originates or is collected outside the State,
and against the movement of such waste through New
Jersey, is not evenhanded, and constitutes a direct burden
and discriminatory regulation of interstate commerce. Dis-
crimination against interstate commerce in any form or
method is prohibited by the Commerce Clause. South
Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
185 (1938).

In the single paragraph of its opinion devoted to the
discrimination issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court com-
mented:

“Nor has there been discrimination, at least
in the economic sense. In examining this point
we must look to the ends sought to be achieved.
Here the purpose of the legislation is to protect
the inhabitants and vital resources of New Jersey,
not to impose economic barriers or create com-
mercial restrictions. Nor is there any real or

30 Brief of Appellants

significant discrimination in favor of local col-
lectors. Refuse amassed by them outside the
State may not be brought into New Jersey. Con-
versely, residenis of other states are free to col-
lect and dump within the state.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.
Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 475.

In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354
(1951), this Court struck down an ordinance of the City
of Madison, Wisconsin, which prohibited the sale of milk
as pasteurized unless it was processed and bottled at an
approved pasteurization plant within a five mile radius
from the central square of Madison. In response to Madi-
son's argument that the ordinance was aimed simply at
protecting the health of the community, Mr. Justice Clark
wisely noted that to sustain an ordinance simply because
it denominates itself

“, .. @ health measure, would mean that the
Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations
on state action other than those laid down by the
Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance,
where a state artlessly discloses an avowed pur-
pose to discriminate against interstate goods.”

The Court's responsibility in this area has been em-
phasized by Mr. Justice Reed in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311
U. S. 454, 455-456 (1940) where he commented:

“The commerce clause forbids discrimina-
tion, whether forthright or ingenious. In each
case it is our duty to determine whether the
statute under attack, whatever its name may be,
will in its practical operation work discrimination
against interstate commerce.”

Brief of Appellants 31

This responsibility has been undertaken conscien-
tiously and with great care by the Court. In Railroad Co.
vo. Husen, 95 U. 8. 465 (1877), the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Missouri statute which prohibited the
entry of Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into any county
in the State between the first day of March and the first
day of December of each year.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Strong
announced the general rule governing sanitary and health
laws as follows:

“While we unhesitatingly admit that a State
may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the pro-
tection of life, liberty, health, or property within
its borders; while it say prevent persons and
animals suffering under contagious or infectious
diseases, or convicts, &c., from entering the State;
while for the purpose of self-protection it may
establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection
laws, it may not interfere with transportation into
or through the State, beyond what is absolutely
necessary for its self-protection.

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S., supra,
at 472.

Applying this rule to the statute of Missouri, Mr.
Justice Strong found a clear attempt to regulate interstate
commerce:

“It is not a quarantine law. It is not an in-
spection law. It says to all natural persons and
to all transportation companies, ‘You shall not
bring into the State any Texas cattle or any Mexi-
can cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and
December 1 in any year, no matter whether they

32 Brief of Appellants

are free from disease or not, no matter whether
they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the
State or not; and if you do bring them in even
for the purpose of carrying them through the
State without unloading them, you shall be sub-
ject to extraordinary liabilities.’ Such a statute,
we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of a
State to enact. To hold otherwise would be to
ignore one of the leading objects which the Con-
stitution of the United States was designed to
secure.

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. supra,
at 473.

In Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S., supra, at 469,
Mr. Justice Harlan had occasion to discuss the holding in
the Railroad Co. case. He noted that the object and effect
of said statute “. . . was to meet at the borders of Missouri
a large and common subject of commerce and prohibit its
crossing the state line during the larger part of each year.

.” (Emphasis added. )

A statute enacted to prevent the sale of unwholesome
meat was considered and struck down in Brimmer v. Reb-
man, 138 U. S. 78 (1891). The statute declared it to be
unlawful to offer for sale within Virginia any beef, veal or
mutton, from animals slaughtered one hundred miles or
more from the place at which it is offered for sale unless
previously inspected and approved by local inspectors. In-
spection was not required of fresh meats from animals
slaughtered within one hundred miles from place of sale.

Rejecting the state's contention that the statute repre-
sented a valid police regulation reasonably designed to
protect the public health, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:

EO a

Brief of Appellants 33

“Whether there shall be inspection or no,
. . . is made to depend entirely upon the place
where the animals from which the beef, veal or
mutton is taken, were slaughtered. . . . [A state]
may not, under the guise of exerting its police
powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make dis-
criminations against the products and industries
of some of the States in favor of the products and
industries of its own or of other States.

Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S., supra,
at 82.

See also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) and
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897).

In Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901), this
Court upheld an Idaho statute which empowered the Gov-
ernor of Idaho to regulate or prohibit the importation into
the state of sheep from localities outside the state where
scab or other infectious disease has become epidemic.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brewer dis-
tinguished the Railroad Co. case upon which the plaintiff
in error in Rasmussen largely relied:

“It will be perceived that the act in Rail-
road Co. v. Husen was an absolute prohibition

operative during eight months of the year. It
was an act continuous in its force; provided for

no inspection, and was predicated on the assump-
tion that the State had the right to exclude for
two-thirds of each year the introduction of all
those kinds of cattle, sick or well, and whether
likely to distribute disease or not.

In the case before us the statute makes no
absolute prohibition of the introduction of sheep,

34 Brief of Appellants

but authorizes the Governor to investigate the
condition of sheep in any locality, and, if found
to be subject to scab or any epidemic disease lia-
ble to be communicated to other sheep, to make
such restriction on their introduction into the
State as shall seem to him, after conference with

the State sheep inspector, to be necessary.”

Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. supra, at
201. (emphasis added )

A similar quarantine act was considered in Oreg.-
Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926). The
Washington Director of Agriculture, with the approval of
the Governor, forbade the importation into the state of
alfalfa hay or meal (except in sealed containers) from
designated counties outside the state in which, upon in-
spection, a weevil injurious to the alfalfa plant was found.
After reciting the general rule that, absent arbitrariness or
discriminatory motive, a state may prevent the introduc-
tion within its borders of human beings, animals or plants
which may cause disease, injury or destruction to the
State's inhabitants and resources, this Court upheld the
statute commenting:

“We think that here the investigation re-
quired by the Washington law and the investiga-
tion actually made into the existence of this pest
and its geographical location makes the law a
real quarantine law, and not a mere inhibition
against importation of alfalfa from a large part
of the country without regard to the conditions
which might make its importation dangerous.”

Oreg.-Washington Co. v. Washington
270 U. S., supra, at 96.

Brief of Appellants 35

The New Jersey Statute in question imposes an un-
limited prohibition without regard to condition. It is an
embargo. There is no provision for inspection or for any
other deliberative process prior to exclusion. The statute
is erroneously predicated on the assumption that a state
has the right to exclude the introduction of all kinds of
solid and liquid waste, whether likely to impair public
health and environmental quality or not. Rasmussen v.
Idaho, 181 U. S., sispru, at 201.

As in the Railroad Co. case, P. L. 1973, c. 363, is
neither a quarantine law nor an inspection law; and like
the statute in that case, P. L. 1973, c. 363 says to all natural
persons and to all transportation companies: “You shall not
bring into the State solid or liquid waste of any nature or
description, for any purpose whatsoever, no matter whether
it does an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not; no
matter whether it does an injury to the quality of the
environment or not; and if you do bring it in even for
the purpose of carrying it through the State without un-
loading it you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities.”

The fact that Railroad Co. v. Husen dealt with cattle
and not with solid waste is neither material nor distinguish-
able. The principle is identical in each case; once an ac-
tivity is legitimately in interstate commerce there can be
no discrimination. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454
(1940); Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424, 429

1963 ).
; . the leading environmental case Huron Cement Co.
v. Detroit; 362 U. S. 440 (1960), an action was instituted
by a corporation engaged in operating federally licensed
steam vessels in interstate commerce to enjoin the enforce-
ment of certain provisions of the Smoke Abatement Code
of the City of Detroit. Finding that the ordinance applied

‘

36 Brief of Appellants

equally to all ships and did not destroy the right of free
passage, this Court held that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of the state’s police power:

“, . . State regulation based on the police
power, which does not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce or operate to disrupt its re-
quired uniformity, may. constitutionally stand.

“It has not been suggested that the local ordi-
nance, applicable alike to ‘any person, firm or
corporation’ within the city, discriminates against
interstate commerce as such. It is a regulation of
general application, designed to better the health
and welfare of the community. . . .” Huron Ce-
ment Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S., supra, at 448
(Citations omitted, emphasis added. )

Although a smoke abatement ordinance enacted to
promote the health and welfare of a city’s inhabitants will
generally support an exercise of the police power, the
power to adopt such ordinances is not unlimited.

“The basic limitations upon local legislative
power in this area are clear enough. The con-
trolling principles have been reiterated over the
years in a host of this Court’s decisions. Even-
handed local regulation to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest is valid unless preempted by
federal action . . ., or unduly burdensome on
maritime activities or interstate commerce... .”

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S.

supra, at 443 (Citations omitted, emphasis
added ).

Brief of Appellants

37

The Court, in Huron, stressed the fact that the local
ordinance there in question was applicable alike to all
persons, firms and corporations. Had the ordinance been

For example, if the City of Detroit had attempted to
reduce air pollution and thereby promote the health and
welfare of the city’s inhabitants by prohibiting the dis-

of in the Port of Detroit by any steam-

:

tion against interstate commerce.

Similarly, if the State of New Jersey had attempted
to reduce air pollution by prohibiting any person from
driving a motor vehicle upon the roads of this state unless
the vehicle was registered in New Jersey, there would be
an unmistakable and intolerable discrimination against
interstate commerce.

If there is a threat posed to the health, welfare and
safety of the people of New Jersey or to the quality of
its environment by the treatment or disposal of solid and
liquid waste in accordance with regulations administered
by the Department of Environmental Protection (a posi-
tion which appellants do not believe can be factually sup-
ported), then it is a threat attributable to the nature of
the substance being regulated, and not to its place of
origin. Remedial measures based upon the exercise of
the State’s police power must be undertaken in an even-
handed manner. There can be no discrimination in favor
of intrastate commerce and against interstate commerce.
Hale v. Bimeo Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375, 380 (1939).

During the last few years, state and federal courts
have been called upon with increasing regularity to review
legislation dealing with the maintenance of environmental

38 Brief of Appellants

values: American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Com-
mission, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P. 2d 691, 703 (Ct. App.
Ore. 1973) (ban on non-returnable beverage containers );
Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicago, 357
F. Supp. 44 (N. D. Ill. 1973), rev. Proctor & Gamble Co.
v. City of Chicago, 509 F. 2d 69, 78 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
den. 421 U. S. 978 (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents );
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Imp. Com’n.,
307 A. 2d 1, 40 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973); app. dis., 414
U. S. 1035 (1973) (prevention and control of marine oil
spillage ); Construction Ind. Ass'n., Sonoma Cty. v. City
of Petaluma, 522 F. 2d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) (ban on
further building); Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274
Md. 230, 335 A. 2d 679, 688 (Ct. App. Md. 1975) (return
deposit requirement )."*

While the statutes and ordinances in the aforesaid
cases were upheld against attacks based upon alleged vio-
lations to the Commerce clause, each court was careful to
note the absence of discriminatory treatment. Intrastate
commerce was treated equally with interstate commerce.

Thus, in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental
Imp. Com’n., 307 A. 2d 1 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1973), app.
dis., 414 U. S. 1035 (1973), the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine was called upon to review the constitutionality of
an act relative to overwater transfers of petroleum. Plain-
tiffs challenge of the act was based, in part, upon an
alleged impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
The Court rejected this argument, saying:

15. See also Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001, ~s
(S. D. Tex. 1968) where, in upholding a munici
hibiting fireworks within the city, the court said: “The ordinance
treats all fireworks distributors, whether local or foreign, y
and its affect on interstate commerce is incidental to its
purpose of protecting the public.”

——— -
= — -

— =~

Brief of Appellants 39

“The issue of whether regulations promul-
gated under the state’s police power seeking to
protect the state’s inhabitants from environmental
pollution may be applied to those engaged in
interstate commerce was before the Supreme
Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 80 S. Ct. 813, 4 L. Ed. 2d
852 (1960). The City had adopted a smoke
abatement ordinance and sought to enforce the
penal provisions of that ordinance against ship-
pers admittedly engaged in interstate commerce.

The Detroit ordinance did not discriminate
against interstate commerce and there was no
showing that national uniformity was required to
prevent inconsistent local regulations.

The Maine Act does not discriminate in
favor of intrastate commerce... .”

Portland Pipe Line Corp v. Environ-
mental Imp. Com’n., 307 A. 2d, supra,
at 40. (Emphasis added ) *

In Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun. Landfill Auth.,
127 N. J. Super. 160 (Ch. 1974) the companion case to
the case at bar, Judge (now Justice) Sidney Schreiber **

16. Subsequent to his decision in the Hackensack Meadow-
eaeeline Fy, Rag ened Base ee SE Rather ew!
Supreme Court. The Hackensack Meadowlands case was appealed
catoned mater. Both cues were dap fn the same pinion.

Justice Schreiber di at in the
not
coh ge | ee ng gg ating ke is
saresteenst n Fackensack. MA Meadowlands v. Mun.
ey oi: «wall Hae

40 Brief of Appellants
struck down regulations adopted by the New Jersey De-

partment of Environmental Protection and the Hacken-.

sack Meadowlands Development Commission which pro-
hibited persons engaged in the collection of solid or liquid
wastes which originated or were collected outside the
State from disposing of same in the Hackensack Meadow-
lands District. In language equally pertinent to the pres-
ent matter, Judge Schreiber observed:

“DEP and HMDC rationalize that discrim-
ination is absent because the regulations do not
prefer New Jersey over out-of-state landfill op-
erators or garbage haulers. The difficulty with
that rationale is that it is the discrimination based
on the origin of the refuse, not the residence of
the owner or carrier, which is invidious. Trans-
portation of the refuse, whether carried by New
Jerseyans or nonresidents, in interstate commerce

is directly affected by the ban.

Although the State’s objective in attempting
to conserve a local natural resource for local
needs is a proper police power purpose, that can-
not be accomplished by discrimination based on
the source of the refuse.”

Hackensack Meadowlands wv. Mun.
Landfill Auth., 127 N. J. Super., supra,
at 174. (Emphasis added. )

A state cannot discriminate against interstate com-
merce under the guise of protecting the health of its citi-
zens or its natural resources. The Court has a duty to
determine for itself whether the regulation represents a
valid exercise of the State’s police power, or whether it is
really and substantially a regulation of interstate com-

Brief of Appellants 41

merce. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 256 (1908). The
independent exercise of that duty is especially important
because the power to determine the articles which may be
the subject of commerce is, in effect, the controlling one.
Bowman v. Chicago & Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888).

Legislation designed to prohibit the treatment or dis-
posal in New Jersey of solid waste collected outside the
State was first proposed six years ago with the introduction
of S. 834 in the New Jersey Senate on May 4, 1970." Sec-
tion 2 of that bill, entitled “An Act to prevent the treatment
and disposal within this State of solid waste collected out-
side this State”, provided as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law to the contrary, no solid waste collected from
any location without the territorial limits of this
State shall be treated or disposed of in any solid
waste disposal facility located within this State.”

By written memorandum dated May 8, 1970," the
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection advised the Governor that the Depart-
ment supported “. . . the concept of prohibiting the im-
portation of out-of-state garbage” into New Jersey, and
recommended that the bill be signed, if passed by the

legislature. The reason for the Department's position was
explained by the Commissioner as follows:

“. . . The amount of land available in land-
fills is rapidly being depleted. It is in the inter-
ests of the State to reserve the available land for

17. of bills introduced in the N Legislature
uz arable a the New Janey State Library in Trenton New
ersey

18. Said memorandum is contained in the file of the Counsel to
the Governor, maintained in the State Archives at the New Jersey

State Library, Trenton, New Jersey.

42 Brief of Appellants

the disposal of solid wastes originating in the
State.”

No mention was made of public health or environmental
quality.

Although S. 834 passed the Senate, it did not move in
the Assembly and died at the end of the legislative
session.”

A bill almost identical to S. 834, A. 1019, was intro-
duced in the New Jersey Assembly on April 12, 1972 by
Assemblyman Dawes. -Like its predecessor, A. 1019 ex-
pressly prohibited the treatment or disposal in New Jersey
of any solid waste collected outside the State. ;

Less than one month later, on May 4, 1972, a second
bill, A. 1132, the Waste Control Act, was introduced by
the same Assemblyman. Unlike A. 1019 which con-
templated direct statutory prohibition, A. 1132 conferred
upon the Commissioner of the Department of Environ-
mental Protection the power to regulate and prohibit the
incineration and landfill in New Jersey of solid waste col-
lected outside the State. In his “statement” attached to
the bill, Assemblyman Dawes commented:

. . . This bill recognizes that the citizens
of New Jersey do not have the luxury of un-
limited resources and disposal sites. The bill
also reflects an awareness that the continuing use
of New Jersey lands for solid waste disposal
facilities . . . presents an unfortunate picture of
the State, particularly in the Hackensack
Meadowlands area.”

By memorandum dated October 3, 1972,” the Presi-
dent of the New Jersey Public Utilities Commission urged

19. Information with respect to bills introduced in the New

Jersey Legislature is available in the New Jersey Legislative Index.
20. See footnote 18, supra.

Brief of Appellants 43

the Governor to veto A. 1132, if passed, due to the potential
for retributive action:

“If New Jersey prohibits waste collected out-
side the State from being dumped within the
State, it may find that reciprocal action wiil be
taken by neighboring states wherein New Jersey
disposes of its solid wastes; e.g., Philadelphia
dumps in New Jersey and New Jersey dumps in
Pennsylvania.”

A. 1019 was never adopted, but A. 1132 passed the
legislature and was signed by the Governor on February
21, 1973. The adverse recommendation of the Public
Utilities Commission was not accepted. Upon signing the
bill, the Governor issued a press release™ in which he
stated that the Waste Control Act represented “. . . a
significant step in controlling the daily influx of trash and
garbage from adjoining states which threatens to engulf
New Jersey's remaining sanitary landfill sites”.

Although the Waste Control Act conferred upon the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection the power to-prohibit the incineration and landfill
in New Jersey of solid waste collected outside the state,
iv. J. 8, A. 13:11, no immediate regulatory action was
undertaken by him. Perhaps that was because no imme-
diate threat to the environment or public health was recog-
nized by the Department.

Almost 8 months passed without further activity.
Then, on October 19, 1973, Acting Governor Alfred N.
Beadleston published a tersely worded press release
(A53) saying:

“I have today directed Commissioner Rich-
ard J. Sullivan of the Department of Environ-

21. Press releases issued by the Governors of New J

now collected and maintained at the New Jersey State Library,
Trenton, New Jersey.

Brief of Appellants

mental Protection to initiate immediately the
legal process to ban all dumping of out-of-state
garbage in New Jersey. I have taken this action
after consultation by telephone with Governor
William T. Cahill and with his full support.

This ban will be accomplished either by
legislation or by regulation issued by Commis-
sioner Sullivan pursuant to the State Waste Con-
trol Act, Chapter 39 of the Public Laws of 1973.
The State will proceed under whichever of those
two legal methods is faster and more effective.

I have issued this directive after thorough
consultation with Commissioner Sullivan and At-
torney General Kugler. The ban against the
dumping of garbage from either New York or
Pennsylvania will be strictly enforced, when it
becomes effective, with the full resources of the
Department of Environmental Protection and the
State Department of Law and Public Safety.

New Jersey cannot continue to tolerate the
grave environmental dangers being created by
the dumping of garbage in New Jersey from New
York or any other state. This is a sovereign State,
not a dumping ground, and this State Govern-
ment will act decisively to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens. Not only does out-of-
state dumping pose immediate environmental
and health problems, but over the long run, the
people of New Jersey will be forced to pay much
higher costs for waste removal because available
landfill dumping areas are filled up.

Commissioner Sullivan will proceed immedi-
ately to draft the necessary regulation under the

Brief of Appellants 45

Administrative Procedures Act, which prescribes
a required timetable of public notice and public
hearings. The Legislature will return Nov. 12
and, if it appears that it would be the most ex-
peditious route, will be asked to approve the

necessary legislation, under emergency proce-
dures if possible.” b

Less than a month later, on November 8, 1973, the
Commissioner published proposed Rules Governing the
Bureau of Solid Waste Management. Section 7:26-1.8 of
the proposed Rules contained a provision unconditionally
prohibiting the disposal of out-of-state waste within New
Jersey.”

The rationale for the proposed prohibition is explained
in paragraph IV of the “Basis and Background for the
Proposed Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Manage-
ment” (A45-46). Curiously, references to public health
and environmental quality are virtually non-cxistent. If
“grave environmental dangers” were being created by the
“dumping of garbage in New Jersey from New York”, as
acting Governor Beadleston had rhetoricized, the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection didn’t know anything
about it. The reasons expressed by the Department for
the proposed administrative prohibition were: (1) to as-
22. The text of the proposed rule read as follows:
7:26-1.8 Out of State Waste

46 Brie; of Appellants

sure the availability of landfill acres in New Jersey for
solid waste generated in said State, and (2) to stabilize
the cost of solid waste collection and disposal for New
Jersey residents.”

Four days after the publication of the proposed
Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management, on No-
vember 12, 1973, S. 2367 was introduced in the New-Jersey
Senate. The stated purpose of the bill was to prohibit the
entry into New Jersey of any solid or liquid waste which
originated or was collected outside of the state, except
garbage to be fed to swine within New Jersey.”

The Department of Environmental Protection was re-
quested to submit its comment on the bill to the Office of
the Counsel to the Governor. The comment submitted by
the Department,” was surprisingly candid:

“A. Description of Bill's Effect—

Amends the existing Waste Control Act of
1973 by reversing the present burden of proof
so that out-of-state solid and liquid waste will be
banned unless the Department issues regulations
permitting same. No doubt this approach was
taken—as opposed to an absolute ban—so as not
blatantly to traverse the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution.”

23. This was admitted _ PRY
to the Complaint in this action ( Al AO,

24. When S. 2367 was originally introduced, the clause “
ey e to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey,” was

ri See footnote 18, supra.

Brief of Appellants 47

“E. Departmental Comments—
Out-of-state waste is clearly a problem but
it is not necessarily insurmountable. The Bureau
of Solid Waste reports that the major difficulty is
that New York ‘garbage’ competes with the land-
fill sites in heavily populated areas which will
tap out within a few years, in any case. Thus,
whereas such waste comprises no more than a
small percentage of the total waste collected in
the state, it is approximately 25% of the waste
disposed in the New Jersey portion of the New
York-New Jersey Metropolitan area. This is the
truly critical region for solid waste. However,
liquid waste from New York and Pennsylvania
may even be needed by New Jersey processing
plants, so as to reduce their per unit costs. The
bill will clearly permit the Department to issue
regulations allowing same where necessary or

(Emphasis added )

S. 2367 was passed by the Senate on November 19,
1973, and by the Assembly on November 26, 1973. While
the bill was pending before the Governor for his review,
Richard W. DeKorte, Counsel to the Governor, wrote ‘to
David Quient, Esquire, City Attorney for Appellant City
of Glen Cove (A47-48), saying:

“Also, I might add that Senate Bill No. 2367
(OCR) would not have been introduced had the
sister states of New Jersey permitted solid wastes
originating in their states to be disposed of at or
near the point of origination.”

48 Brief of Appellants

S. 2367 was signed by the Governor on January 2,
1974, P. L. 1973, c. 363.

Since the prohibitory legislation emanated from the
Governor's office, it can be reasonably expected that the
Governor's Counsel was well-versed in its raison detre.

_ The evidence, in its cumulative effect, overwhelmingly
demonstrates that P. L. 1973, c. 363 was not adopted as a
valid health measure, but was intentionally designed to
directly burden and discriminate against interstate com-
merce. Indeed, Appellees readily admit that a purpose
of the statute was to preserve landfill acres in New Jersey
for solid waste generated in said state (A21,100).

In Penna. v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 597-598
(1923), a West Virginia statute prohibited the exportation
of its natural gas unless an adequate supply was available
to meet the needs of its citizens. Although the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized that the gas supply
was a natural product of the State and would be insuf-
ficient to meet the needs of the State if exportation was
allowed, the statute had to fall because it represented “an
attempt to regulate the interstate business to the ad-
vantage of the local customers”.

Similarly, in Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221
U. S. 229, 255 (1911), this Court declared uncognstitu-
tional an Oklahoma “conservation” statute preventing a
pipeline company from transporting natural gas outside
the state:

“If the States have such power a singular
situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep
its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals. And why may not the
products of the field be brought within the prin-
cipal? Thus, enlarged, or without that enlarge-

ment, its influence on interstate commerce need

Brief of Appellants 49

not be pointed out. To what consequence does
such power tend? If one state has it, all States
have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo
and commerce will be halted at state lines. And
yet we have said that ‘in matters of foreign and
interstate commerce there are no state lines’. In
such commerce, instead of the States, a new
power appears and a new welfare, a welfare
which transcends that of any State. But rather
let us say it is constituted of the welfare of all
of the States and that of each State is made
greater by a division of its resources, natural and
created, with every State, and those of every
other State with it. This was the purpose, as it
is the result, of the interstate commerce clause
of the Constitution of the United States. If there
is to be a turning backward it must be done by
the authority of another instrumentality than a

court.” (Emphasis added)

See also City of Altus, Oklahoma v. Carr, 255 F. Supp.
828 (W. D. Tex. 1966).

The potential for retaliation is not a mere theoretical
possibility in the present case. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has already enacted legislation to prevent the
disposal in that Commonwealth of solid waste collected
from any location in another state that does not accept
solid waste from Pennsylvania. 35 P. S. § 6007 et seq. The
legislation was intended to be retaliatory in operation and
effect (A62). ;

Exclusionary and retaliatory legislation is destructive
to the achievement of national goals. Such enactment
places the well-being of a few over the well-being of the
whole, and can lead to the kind of isolationism that the
commerce clause was intended t» prevent.

50 Brief of Appellants

Mr. Justice Cardozo expressed the principle with great
eloquence. In declaring unconstitutional a statute which
prohibited the sale in New York of milk purchased in
another state at a price lower than the minimum prescribed
by the New York statute, he commented:

“The Constitution was framed under the
dominion of a political philosophy less parochial
in range. It was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division.”

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S.
511, 523 (1935).

A statute which facially prohibits entry without regard
to condition is “. . . hostile in conception as well as burden-
some in result”. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. An-
drews, 375 U. S. 361, 377 (1964). It represents discrim-
ination of the most basic kind, and cannot be tolerated to
stand.

2. Legitimate Local Purpose.

Despite the comprehensive regulation of the solid
waste collection and disposal process by various state ad-
ministrative agencies, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that P. L. 1973, c. 363 served a legitimate local pur-
pose. This conclusion is without reasonable basis.

In 1958, the New Jersey Public Health Council
adopted Chapter VIII-Refuse Disposal as part of the State
Sanitary Code pursuant to authority conferred by
N. J. S. A. 26:1A-7. Chapter VIII prohibited the opera-
tion of dumps and authorized the disposal of solid waste
only through use of

Brief of Appellants 51

“(a) sanitary landfills established, con-
ducted, operated and maintained in accordance
with standards set forth in Regulation 4, 5, and 6
of this Chapter

OR

(b) Incinerators constructed, operated and
maintained in accordance with Code or Regula-
tion of the New Jersey Air Pollution Control
Commission.

| (c) Other methods of disposal as may be
approved by the State Department of Health.”

The regulations collected in Chapter VIII-Refuse Dis-
posal, were adopted, consistently with the mandate in
N. J. S. A. 26:1A-7, “. . . to preserve and improve the public
health in this State.” *

On April 13, 1970, the Public Health Council adopted
a revision of Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary Code which
substantially expanded the previously-existing regulations.
The authorized methods of disposal were not changed or
altered in any way, but additional operational require-
ments were imposed to further protect the public health.
On April 22, 1970, the functions, powers and duties of the
Public Health Council were transferred to and vested in
the Division of Environmental Quality and the Commis-
sioner of the Department of Environmental Protection,
N. J. S. A. 13:1D-7a. Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary
Code was not repealed by the administrative
tion; it remained in full force and effect, under the furis-
diction of the Department of Environmental Protection,
N. J. S. A. 13:1D-15, 13: 1E-66.

26. N State Trenton: N
Suse Denes G heth, on abe BO

52 Brief of Appellants

Approximately three months later, on July 31, 1970,
the New Jersey Solid Waste Management Plan was pub-
lished. Said Plan, approved by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency as the official State Plan for New
Jersey, reported with candor:

“There is no technological reason ‘ie we
cannot dispose of solid waste with minimal en-
vironmental harm.

“The Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, under Chapter 39, continues to enforce the
Public Health Council State Sanitary Code as it
pertains to refunse disposal. That is, the Bureau
of Solid Waste Management still has Chapter
VIII of the State Sanitary Code with which to
regulate and assure nuisance-free operation of
disposal sites in conformance with good practice
and health standards.” *

Chapter VIII of the State Sanitary Code continued in
effect until July 1, 1974, when it was superceded by the
Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management,
N. J. A. C. 7:26-1 et seq. in adopting said Rules, the
Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection commented: “No rule was altered in such a way as
to provide less protection to the public health, safety or
welfare than provided by the Chapter VIII regulations,”
(A126).

The principal environmental engineer of the Bureau
of Solid Waste management was more direct in his assess-
ment of the Rules. During a deposition conducted on
March 13, 1974, he grudgingly admitted that the Rules as

27. New Jersey State Solid Waste per ad Plan (Newark:
Planners Associates, Inc., 1970) at pp. 2 78.

Brief of Appellants 53

then proposed were entirely adequate to protect the health,
safety and welfare of the people of New Jersey and the
quality of its environment (A109).

The Rules, which are extremely comprehensive in
nature, provide that the exclusive methods by which solid
waste may be disposed in New Jersey are through use of:

“a. Sanitary landfills established, operated
and maintained in accordance with the regula-
tions set forth in this subchapter.

“b. Incinerators constructed, operated and
maintained in accordance with Regulations of the
New Jersey State Department of Environmental
Protection promulgated under authority of the
Air Pollution Control Act 1954 and regulations
set forth in this subchapter.

“c. Transfer station, composting facility, re-
source recovery or other processing facility, con-
structed and operated in accordance with regu-
lations set forth in this subchapter.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.1.2

Dumps are expressly prohibited. N. J. A. C.7:26-2.1.1.

No person may engage in the disposal of solid waste
in New Jersey without having first obtained approval of a
registration statement and engineering design from the
Department of Environmental Protection. N. J. A. C.
7:26-2.2.2; 7:26-2.2.3. Designs for sanitary landfills, in-
cinerators, and other methods of disposal must be prepared
by a New Jersey licensed professional engineer and sub-
mitted to the Bureau of Solid Waste Management for its
review, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.4. In addition to other require-
ments, each engineering design for a sanitary landfill must
include (a) a designation of the property or portion thereof

54 Brief of Appellants

for which approval is being sought; (b) contours and pro-
posed final elevations; (c) proposed sequence of develop-
ment; (d) soil borings; (e) soil classifications; (f) soil
profile and aquifer information; (g) geological and ground
water data; (h) identification of registered wells and pub-
lic buildings within a one-half mile radius; (i) surface and
subsurface drains; (j) leachate collection system, if ap-
plicable; (k) profile views for excavation, and grades and
elevations for dikes, berms or other pollution protection
devices or techniques; (1) proposed landscaping, beauti-
fication and screening techniques; (m) gas venting and
monitoring system; (n) ground water monitoring wells;
and (o) estimated capacity. N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.12.2.

Special emphasis is placed upon the control and elim-
ination of ground and surface water pollution at sanitary
landfill sites. To accomplish this objective N. J. A. C
7:26-2.5.4 provides, in pertinent part:

“No new sanitary landfill shall be conducted,
nor shall an existing landfill continue to be con-
ducted where the solid waste, in whole or in part,
or the leachate produced as a result of the sanitary
landfill, impairs the quality of the surface or
ground waters of this state to a degree that would
degrade the quality of either the surface or
ground waters of this state beyond the classifica-
tion established by the Department for the surface
water in question or the potable water standard
established by the Department in the case of
ground water.” (A247)

In addition, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.22 requires the in-
stallation of ground water monitoring systems as a condi-
tion precedent to the operation of a new sanitary landfill
or the expansion of an existing facility:

Brief of Appellants 55

“No new solid waste facility shall begin op-
erations without first installing a ground water
monitoring system constructed and located in
accordance with instructions furnished by the
Department. Further, no new facility shall be-
gin operations prior to obtaining ground water
samples, and analyses thereof, for the purpose of
establishing baseline information.” (A249)

The Department of Environmental Protection can re-
quire the installation of an impermeable liner (A282),
where necessary, to create a barrier between the
solid waste and exposed surfaces that would otherwise be
unsatisfactory for land disposal purposes.

Gas venting systems must be installed at every exist-
ing sanitary landfill site, and at every new facility, as a
condition of continued operation. In this connection,
N. J. A. C. 7.26-2.5.21 provides:

56 Brief of Appellants

structures on or adjacent to the facility be per-
mitted.” (A249) !

In addition to the aforesaid, a sanitary landfill must
effectively control scattering of papers and other light-
weight material, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.6, dust, N. J. A. C.
7:26-2.5.7, odor, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.8, and insects and
rodents, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.5.12. Other stringent and care-
fully conceived operational requirements, too numerous
to mention, are also imposed by the Rules.

The situation with respect to the regulation of in-
cineration is much the same. The construction and op-
eration of incinerators for solid waste disposal is governed
by both the Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Manage-
ment, and by the Rules of the Bureau of Air Pollution
Control, N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.1 et seq.

No person may construct a new incinerator, or use a
new or altered incinerator, unless a “Permit to Construct,
Install or Alter Control Apparatus or Equipment” and a
“Certificate to Operate Control Apparatus or Equipment”
have first been obtained from the Bureau of Air Pollution
Control, Department of Environmental Protection, N. J.
A. C. 7:27-11.4. In order to assure that incinerators and
control equipment will not pollute the air,

“The Department may require such details
regarding the equipment or control apparatus as
it considers necessary to determine that the equip-
ment or control apparatus is designed to operate
without causing a violation of any provisions of
the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act or aay
provisions of codes, rules or regulations promul-
gated hereunder... .”

N. J. A. C. 7:27-8.4(b)

Brief of Appellants 57

The Rules of the Bureau of Air Pollution Control con-
tain specific emission standards with respect to particles
emission, smoke emission, unburned waste or ash emis-
sion, and odor emission, N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.4. Most im-
portantly, an incinerator cannot be coiistructed or used
unless it is “. . . effective for the purpose of air pollution
control”. N. J. A. C. 7:27-11.2. See also N. J. A. C. 7:27-
5.2(a) being a regulation of general applicability which
prohibits the emission into the outdoor atmosphere of sub-
stances in quantities which shall result in air pollution.
es burning is specifically prohibited, N. J. A. C. 7:27-

An incinerator cannot be used for solid waste disposal
purposes until an engineering design prepared by a New
Jersey licensed professional engineer has been filed with
and approved by the Bureau of Solid Waste Management.
Such design must contain information with respect to (a)
rated capacity, (b) current and anticipated daily loadings,
(c) unloading and storage facilities, (d) emergency stor-
age facilities, (e) alternate unloading locations, (f) rodent
and odor control techniques, ‘{g) daily residue tonnage,
(h) disposal location of residue, and (i) accompanying re-
— or reclamation activity, if any. N. J. A. C. 7:26-

The Rules regulate the operation as well as the design
of incinerator facilities. Areas where putrescible waste is
stored or deposited must be cleaned within each twenty-
four hour period, and no such waste may be stored longer
than twenty-four hours without acceptable treatment to
prevent putrefaction. N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.1; 7:26-2.11.2.
A program to control the scattering of papers and other
lightweight material, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.3, dust,
N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.4, odors, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.5, and

58 Brief of Appellants

insects and rodents, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11.8 must be imple-
mented at each facility.” :

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection is not the only state administrative agency au-
thorized to supervise the operation of solid waste facilities.
Regulatory control is independently conferred upon, and
may be exercised by, the Board of Public Utility Com-
missioners. N. J. S. A. 48:2-23 provides as follows:

“The board may, after hearing, upon notice,
by order in writing, require any public utility to
furnish safe, adequate and proper service, includ-
ing furnishing and performance of service in a
manner that tends to conserve and preserve the
quality of the environment and prevent the pol-
lution of the waters, land and air of this State,
and to maintain its property and equipment in
such condition as to enable it to do so.”

It is within this regulatory framework that the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld P. L. 1973, c. 363, as
being a reasonable, non-discriminatory exercise of the
State’s police power which does not unduly burden inter-
state commerce.

Although a state has a responsibility to protect its
people and their property, it is well-established that a
police regulation which affects interstate commerce must
not go beyond the necessities of the particular case. Reid
v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 151 (1902); Smith v. St. Louis
and Southwestern Ry. Co. 181 U. S. 248, 256 (1901).

The prohibition imposed by P. L. 1973 c. 363, § 2, is
not directed against treatment or disposal at all: it is
specifically directed against entry. The effect of the statute

28. For other regulations, see N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.11 entitled:

General Operational Requirements for Incinerators, Transfer
Stations, Processing Facility, and Resource Recovery Facilities.

Brief of Appellants 59

is both to prohibit entry and to prevent every adminis-
tratively authorized and regulated form of disposal, whether
expected to do injury to the inhabitants of the state or not.

| Even if the New Jersey Supreme Court was correct
in finding that the preservation of land represented a legiti-
mate local purpose.”

“, . . extending the lifespan of existing land-
fills and thereby preserving further acreage from
use as disposal sites is a legitimate and valid ex-
ercise of the police power of the State.”

Hackensack Meadowlands v. Mun.
Landfill Auth., 68 N. J., supra, at 472.

then there was still no basis to prohibit (a) entry, and
(b) other authorized and regulated forms of disposal, in-
cluding resource recovery and incineration.

The statute went far beyond what was reasonable
and necessary in order to accomplish its purpose.

It is interesting that “garbage to be fed to swine in
the State of New Jersey” is statutorily excepted from the
otherwise unlimited embargo imposed by P. L. 1973, c.
363. The word “garbage” is not synonymous or co-exten-
sive with, but is narrower than, the term “solid waste”.
It is a word of art, separately defined in New Jersey as:

“, . » all putrescible animal and vegetable
wastes resulting from the handling, preparation,
cooking and consumption of . . . food. . . .”

N. J. A. C. 12:100-2.1 (Emphasis added )
29, Tr oui topes be haan nov the peste cet

pre n Aoie coll iat, ad Bak serena. cheyld not, be
to that purpose. There is no evi in the record
or among the competent authorities, to this view. Quite

60 Brief of Appellants

Putrescible waste ® has a greater potential for harm
to the public health than bulky waste,” construction
waste * or demolition waste.” Yet garbage to be fed to
swine can freely enter New Jersey, while non-putrescible
wastes and garbage intended for other purposes cannot.

Although P. L. 1973, c. 363 contains a Legislative
finding

“_ . that the public, health, safety, and wel-
fare require that the treatment and disposal
within this State of all wastes generated outside
of the State be prohibited”,

N. J. S. A. 13:1I-9. (Emphasis added)

the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Protection is specifically empowered to find that the entry
of solid and liquid waste collected in another state

“ .. can be permitted without endangering the
public health, safety and welfare. . . .”

N. J. S. A. 13:11-10.

30. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.46—“Any waste liable to enter into a
state of putrefaction, the typically anaerobic splitting of proteins

31. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.3—“Large items of solid waste which
because of their size or weight requires handling other than nor-
mally used for municipal solid waste. Bulky waste includes but is
not Limited to such items as tree trunks, auto bodies, demolition or
construction material, appliances, furniture, and drums.”

32. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.14—“Waste building material and refuse
resulting from construction, remodeling, and repels operstions om
houses, commercial buildings, pavements, and structures.”

33. N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.17—“Waste generated from the razing
of buildings, factories, and other man-made structures, including
streets, roads, and fences.”

Brief of Appellants 61

This presents a paradox of the first order: if the pro-
hibition against treatment and disposal of out-of-state
wastes is actually required to protect the public health,
safety and welfare, as found by the legislature, then a
delegation of power to the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection to permit and regulate
the entry of wastes for treatment and disposal is incon-
sistent and unexercisable; conversely, if the Commissioner
determines, pursuant to the power delegated to him by the
legislature, that wastes generated in another state can
enter New Jersey without adversely affecting the public
health, safety and welfare, then the legislative finding is
erroneous.

Sixteen days after the enactment of P. L. 1973, c.
363, and in accordance with the authority granted to him
in said legislation, the Commissioner adopted N. J. A. C.
7:1-4 as an emergency regulation to become effective
on the same date as the statute, February 1, 1974. Al-
though said rule followed P. L. 1973, c. 363 in declaring
a general prohibition against the entry into New Jersey
of solid or liquid waste collected outside the State,

“No person shall bring into this State, or ac-
cept for disposal in this State, any solid or liquid
waste which originated or was collected outside
the territorial limits of this State,”

certain designated wastes including pesticides, hazardous
waste and chemical waste entering the State solely for
processing or treatment were excepted from the general-
ized entry ban. N. J. A. C. 7:14.2. This action by the
Commissioner was exceedingly significant for at least two
reasons: (a) contrary to a contemporaneous legislative
finding, it demonstrated that the public health, safety and

62 Brief of Appellants

welfare, in actuality, did not require that the entry of all
wastes generated outside the State be prohibited, and (b)
if substances noxiously designated “hazardous waste”
could be carried into New Jersey and treated therein
without further regulation of transportation, then it fol-
lows that the mere entry and treatment of any other less
hazardous waste does not endanger the public health,
safety and welfare.

The legitimacy of the legislative finding in P. L. 1973,
c. 363, § 1 was implicitly challenged by the Commissioner
by the adoption of N. J. A. C. 7:1-4. Said emergency
regulation was predicated upon an immediate serious
threat to the public health, safety and welfare if certain
solid and liquid wastes were excluded from New Jersey
(A93):

“Wuereas, the imminent ban upon the im-
portation into this State of wastes intended for re-
source recovery and recycling facilities, and of
those hazardous chemical, pesticide, bulk liquid
and bulk semi-liquid wastes intended for treat-
ment, processing or recovery facilities presents
both and immediate and long-term peril to pub-
lic health, safety and welfare ....” (Emphasis
added )

Part of the “peril” identified by the Commissioner
was the economic survival of certain solid waste facilities
(A93): .

“Wuereas, the proper treatment, processing
or recovery of hazardous, chemical, pesticide,
bulk liquid and bulk semi-liquid wastes fre-
quently requires the use of elaborate processes
and equipment; and

Brief of Appellants 63

“WHEREAS, it is apparent that the economic
survival of solid waste facilities utilizing such
elaborate processes and equipment for the proper
treatment, processing or recovery of . . . wastes
generated within the State is dependent upon
the acceptance of those wastes generated or col-
lected outside the territorial limits of this State;
..++ (Emphasis added )

The Commissioner’s remarks with respect to economic
survival are especially noteworthy and equally applicable
to sanitary landfill and incineration sites where the cost of
land, equipment and environmental controls is staggering
o 270 art wal a fact equally recognized by the

ew Jersey ture, P. L. 1975, c. , $3,

N. J. > 13: 1E-2c. weenie

inherent danger involved in adop a statute
which excludes all commerce, a tepeye Ue sub-
sequent, is that articles of commerce may, unintentionally
or otherwise, be unconstitutionally caught in the prohibi-
tion. That is precisely what has happened here. Of the
many examples which might be postulated, one will

Automobile bodies are included in the general cate-
gory of “bulky waste” as defined by the Rules of the
Bureau of Solid Waste Management, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.3.
The word “disposal” is not limited to final disposition, but
also contemplates storage, treatment, utilization and
processing, N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.20. Thus, the transporta-
tion of automobile bodies into New Jersey for storage pend-
ing subsequent shipment to an out-of-state site is pro-
hibited by P. L. 1973, c. 363 and by N. J. A. C. 7:1-4.

It is clear, therefore, that the power conferred upon
the Commissioner to permit the entry of solid and liquid
wastes which are otherwise prohibited by P. L. 1973, c.
363 does not save the statute from an attack on Commerce

64 Brief of Appellants

Clause grounds.” Rather, it illustrates the critical weak-
ness and manifest impropriety of the statute. All out-of-
state. wastes are excluded until the Commissioner
affirmatively acts. The Commissioner is neither compelled
to act nor to deal with solid and liquid wastes collected
within the state. And once adopted, regulations may be
amended or repealed, at will, with relative ease.”

On June 28, 1974, approximately six months after the
enactment of P. L. 1973, c. 363, the Commissioner of the
Department of Environmental Protection adopted the
Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Management. Ac-
cording to the principal environmental engineer of the
Bureau, the collection and disposal of solid waste in ac-
cordance with said rules does not pose any substantial or
material threat to the health, welfare and safety of the
people of New Jersey or to the quality of the environ-
ment (A109). That being the case, one is hard-pressed
to discern the reason why the Commissioner, by his in-
action, permits the exclusion of out-of-state waste to con-
tinue. Since there is no qualitative difference between
solid waste which originates or is collected outside the

34. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court to view
N.J. A. C. 7:1 op Raning © commas Cae ont . 1973, c. 363,
Hackensack Me v. Mun. Landfill Auth., 68 N. J.,
at 468, Appellants respectfully submit that cmmnet to ibe
quad to's date cdaiaiteaive quay ty os eneuatietient
statute. Even if they could, the ency regulations adopted by
the Commissioner continue to accepted subjects of com-
merce.

35. N. J. A. C. 7:1-4 was adopted t to that section of
the New J Administrative Procedure Act, N. J. S. A
to

Brief of Appellants 65

State of New Jersey and that which originates or is col-
lected within the State (A21, 100), the discriminatory
treatment against interstate commerce is inexplicable. For
example, if solid waste collected in New Jersey can be in-
cinerated in accordance with regulations adopted by the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
what harm can be done by permitting the incineration of
qualitatively identical wastes collected outside the State?
To ask the question is to answer it.

The disposal of solid waste in accordance with pres-
ently existing laws and regulations and in conformance
with sound engineering practices** does not present a
serious threat to health or environmental safety. Appellees
have never, by affidavit, disputed this conclusion, which is
generally accepted throughout the United States.

In Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal, Inc., 186
Neb. 43, 180 N. W. 2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1970), plaintiffs
brought an action to enjoin the establishment and opera-
tion of a sanitary landfill. The court denied the applica-
tion saying:

“The evidence is persuasive that it is pos-
sible to operate a sanitary landfill so that it will
not emit offensive odors, pollute ground waters,
or be attractive to rodents. The rules and regu-
lations adopted in 1969 enforcible by the State
Department of Health under statutory authority
are reasonably designed to produce that result.”

Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal,
180 N. W. 2d, supra, at 692.

The overwhelmingly accepted rule is that incinerators
and sanitary landfills which are properly maintained and

Management precedent
landfill or the of ee Bt
wa! or expansion of any existing facility. N. J

66 Brief of Appellants

operated are not public nuisances; Wood v. Town of Wil-
ton, 156 Conn. 304, 240 A. 2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Rocchi
v. Zoning Bd. of App. of Town of Glastonbury, 157 Conn.
106, 248 A. 2d 922 (Sup: Ct. 1968); Myers v. City of
Hagerstown, 214 Md. 312, 135 A. 2d. 147 (Ct. App. 1957)
(and cases therein cited); Annotation, “Public Dump as
Nuisance’, 52 ALR 2d 1134.

All too often, the words “sanitary landfill” and “dump”
are confused with one another.” They are very different
entities.** The Rules of the Bureau of Solid Waste Man-
agement define a sanitary landfill as:

37. See Municipal — Disposal, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Public
Administration Service, 1970), pg. 93, wherein it is stated:
Although the sanitary landfill as a method of refuse dis-
posal was given a clean bill of health many years ago, its
tance by the public is still far from unanimous. The
public has too often heard the terms “landfill”, “dump”,
and “sanitary landfill” used interchangeably and does not
understand the difference between a sanitary landfill and
a landfill or dump. ‘Unfortunately there are too many
disposal facilities labeled “sanitary landfills” which are
glaringly deficient in some of the essential elements. The
968 National Survey shows that 94 cent of all landfill
refuse disposal projects fall short o ee with all
criteria for fully acceptable operations. resulting
public image of sanitary landfills has been damaging.
A well-located, well-designed, and efficiently operated
sanitary landfill meets public health standards and re-
quirements for control of air and water pollution, fire,
and nuisances:
1. Vector breeding .or sustenance is prevented by
eliminating harborage and food supply for rats, flies, and

other vermin.

2. Air pollution by dust, smoke, and odor is controlled.
3. Fire hazards are controlled during tional
phases. (They are negligible in a completed all.)
4. Pollution of surface and ground waters is pre-

cluded.

5. All nuisance factors are effectively controlled; i.e.,
Se quan © ey aap bio and taize is hunt ts
a um.

38. Pictorial illustrations of a “sanitary landfill” and a “dump”
appear on the sheet facing this page.

Brief of Appellants 67

“The land disposal site employing an engi-
neered method of disposal of solid waste in a
manner that minimizes environmental hazards,
including, but not limited to the spreading of
the solid waste in thin layers, compacting the
waste to the smallest practical volume, and ap-
plying cover material on a daily or more fre-
quent basis.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.54 (Emphasis
added )

A dump, on the other hand, is separately defined as:

“A land site at which solid waste is disposed
of in a manner which does not protect the en-
vironment, is susceptible to open burning, or is
exposed to the elements, vectors, and scavengers.”

N. J. A. C. 7:26-1.4.23.

When dumps were determined to be hazardous to
human health, their operation was entirely prohibited in
the State of New Jersey, N. J. A. C. 7:26-2.1.1. No distinc-
tion was made between dumps which accepted for disposal
solid waste collected within New Jersey and those which
accepted waste collected outside the State. The regula-
tion acted in a non-discriminatory, even-handed manner
in addressing a legitimate public problem. It was the
method of disposal which posed a substantial threat to
public health and environmental quality, not the sub-
stances disposed of or the place of their origin.

Environmental hazards are minimized by the sanitary
landfill disposal method, and by incineration, due to the
emphasis placed upon design and sanitary operation.
Origin of wastes is not related to these criteria. The de-

68 Brief of Appellants

gree to which a disposal mode presents a threat to public
health and environmental quality is entirely within the
regulatory control of the State.

The legitimate local interests of the State have al-
ready been protected, without exclusion, by the adoption
of state administrative regulations applicable alike to in-
trastate commerce and interstate commerce.

3. Effect Upon Interstate Commerce.

The direct burden imposed upon interstate commerce
by the adoption of P. L. 1973, c. 363 is obvious and severe.
Prohibitory legislation affects interstate commerce in a
most basic and fundamental sense. As stated by Mr. Jus-
tice McKenna in Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221
U. S., supra, at 249, “. . . to prohibit interstate commerce
is more than to indirectly affect it.”

P. L. 1973, c. 363 directly prohibits the interstate dis-
posal of solid and liquid waste. It is not unique in that re-
spect. Since 1969, seven states have adopted laws which,
to varying degrees, prohibit the disposal of solid waste
collected in another state.** Three other states have fm-
posed various regulatory limitations.** The effect of these
enactments is to retard, if not to entirely obviate, the na-
tional goal of achieving interstate cooperation in confront-
ing the solid waste disposal problem (A57, 58). |

More than ten years ago, Congress identified solid
waste disposal as a problem of national concern. In 1965

39. Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont.

On December 30, 1974, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
enacted legislation to prevent the disposal in that Commonwealth
of solid waste collected from any location in another state that
does not accept solid waste from Pennsylvania. This legislation
was surely paren by, and retaliatorily directed against, the
prohibitory legislation adopted in New Jersey.

40. Delaware, Illinois and Louisiana.

Brief of Appellants 69

it enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2422%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
