# Brief for Appellee — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Brief for Appellee
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 1

## Text

Supreme Court, U: 8.
FILED

SEP 10 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR..CLERK |
IN THE 7 - ed

Supreme Court of the Unitet States

Octosper Term, 1975

No. 75-1687

Unitep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee
for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on
its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consolidated
Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
and all others similarly situated,

Appellant,

v.

Tue State or New Jersey, Brenpan T. Byrne, Governor
of the State of New Jersey, and Wiiu1mMm F. Hywanp,
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

WuuumM F. Hyrtanp
Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey.
Attorney for Appellees.

By Special Counsel:
MicwHackEt I, Sovern
Murray J. LavLicut
Harotp 8S. H. Enear
435 West 116th Street,
New York, New York 10027.

Dated: September 11, 1976

Ore ene -~

INDEX

Counter-Statement of the Case .....

Introductory Statement

A. The Early Years: A Port Authority That Was
Not Self-Sustaining, the Arrangements That
Enabled It to Carry Deficits and the Failure of
Legislative Efforts to Have the Authority
Assume Responsibility for Passenger Railroads

Bb. The Port Authority Seeks Immunity From the
“Disease” of Commuter Railroads

1. The Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commis-
sion Study

2. The new bond provision—Section 7 certifica-
STINE deiisinteaticieniiithanatihiibinaciptniniamiiedmainiieimmesidisiinies

3. The New York commuter car episode ..........

4. Opposing New Jersey legislation in 1958 ....

C. Legislative History of the 1962 Covenant ..........
D. The 1962 Covenant

E. The Unimportance of the 1962 Covenant to
Bondholder Security .. om

1. Bondholders are fully protecte

a. The objective protections .......................-..

b. Appellant’s analysis of the objective pro-
ARE MELAS SE Ac ee a ae OO OO

ce. The subjective fears

2. The Authority’s consistently high credit
rating demonstrates the unimportance of
the covenant and repeal

3. The unimportance of the covenant and
repeal in the secondary market

PAGE

il

F. Legislative History of the Repeal of the 1962
Covenant ....

1. The energy crisis ...... cocnnsiociiauamnsaaaal

2. Health and environmental factors ................

3. The Port District’s public transportation
requirements

Summary of Argument

PEGE cccircciniititenn

I. The 1962 Covenant Is Subject to the Reasonable
Exercise of the States’ Never Abdicated Police
POWCE cecccnccessenssnmsemmemne

A. The History of Contract Clause Jurispru-
dence Shows That All Contracts, Especially
State’ Contracts, Are Subject to the State’s
Police Power

B. Bondholders Could Not Reasonably Have
Assumed That the 1962 Covenant Was
Immune From Action Pursuant to the Police
Power .....

C. Though Municipal Bonds Are Subject to the
Police Power, They are Readily Marketable

D. ithe 1974 Repeal Legislation Constituted an
Exercise of the States’ Police Power ..............

E. Repeal Constituted a Reasonable Exercise
of the States’ Police Power

1. The Blaisdell case ......
2. The Het POSS CRBD cece

3. Appellant’s claim that the price pur-
chasers were willing to pay for bonds was
affected by the covenant is unsupported
by the record and immaterial as a matter
of law

PAGE

45
46
50

53
62

77

81

4. Repeal deprived bondholders of an inter-
est of little or no value to further ends of

large importance 92
a. The bondholders’ interest - 92
b. The public ends 95
e. The insufficiency of other means ........ 96

II. Repeal of the 1962 Covenant Did Not Constitute
a l'aking of Property in Violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution . 101

11I. The 1962 Covenant Was Voidable Under the
Interstate Compact Clause ....... . 102

A. Federal Law Governs the Interpretation of
a Congressionally Approved Interstate Com-
I itil ceiansciceenesenaitanpsailtensnnsidincencesnassenseses 104

B. The 1962 Covenant Is Not Authorized by
The Port Authority Compact or Comprehen-

sive Plan Legislation ..........................-...-.sse0-«-+- 106
IV. The Covenant Became Inconsistent With Super-
AT 112
ce ccrnenradncacintiapengnationssenneagnennatace 119
Cases Cited:

Albigese v. City of Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101
(Law Div.), aff’d, 129 N.J. Super. 567 (App. Div.

EE a eT 88, 93
American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 307

a ian insaeeeneaeinmeeeeneremmtinnensemanceameasee 103
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) ....... 66
Beaumont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801, 394 S.W.2d 478

ETE EEE eee TEE 93

Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Co., 419 U.S. 102
(1974) ... _ ieieiiieseniaeiiibites 55

iv

Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1848) —...... 83
Bucsi v. Longworth Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 119 N.J.L.
120 (KE. & A. 1937), appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 665

SUUUUETEED sccalecsinstiilinnudshabinndaiacaiasstiiedeinieiianadaaiiecamamasientiielduaalanbaamaaaite 82
Burbank y. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624

ETUDE | ‘ccinsuscntsinnnatesnisaninidindinaiiaiaiailmeadeimateeiaieimabimiaieaaiiaaddls 115
Buichers Union Co. vy. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746

UDEIETEED xin cesiesntchbiadeeleiehh lenient al leak iaeail 69, 73, 82, 92
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) ~.....0............ 66

California Teachers Ass’n v. Newport Mesa Unified
School District, 333 F. Supp. 486 (C. D. Cal. 1971) ..88, 93
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) -...............-.-- 115
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 101
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148
EUDITIUE _ ‘comsssieassiiesiamatiesaeniinnetionapennnasetitinbiiatiddibclaesdatabhieladiiiede: 115
Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York
Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1973) -..............c.-ccec-es-ecenceeees 111, 112

DeCanas y. Bica, 424 U.S. , 86 S.Ct. 933 (1976) -..... 116
Delaware River Port Auth. vy. Tiemann, 531 F.2d 699

Ge Spel SEP. eainvenetinnicenenetceidiiisnnanadsiltdeaticasialahinnsiaiiaesis 53
DeV eau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) 0. 118
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230

ERIEETED - coceneseubevsnsninieniundteisiuciiaaditineiisiietanalinbasdelaaniiaaialatalaatnats 84

El Paso vy. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ....73, 79, 82, 84, 85-
88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 95, 102

Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316

Rai TE IED eunsedenidesitulsicicecinneeisinicicahuacditions 72, 75, 74, 85, 92, 93
First Nat'l Bank v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 156 Me.

hs, See Gs ee ET ITED ceicivdiientinatenntenchancietnessenbnadeses 94
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) -.......... 65
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373

SEPIA. MIU CIPI sosscsssecenpetdeneitdineshasiesitbicnnmmnniaiibidbeaasiastiiigiied 115, 116

Flushing Nat’l Bank vy. Municipal Assistance Corp.,
A.D.2d =, 882 N. Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep’t 1976) ........ 73

v

PAGE

Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) ...................-s-cces-eeeees 114
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir.

TD antcveniann 51

Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941) ......82, 83
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590

(1962) .......... easianauienntiniitaieinesneneteta 101
Ham v. Maine New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Auth.,
8 104

Henderson vy. Delaware River Joint Bridge Comm’n,
362 Pa. 475, 66 A.2d 843, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 850

SUITE icisinicexiiacnnesitenniiadancibaiasintniietenneeintiniteiaieaundumniiiiinieiate 104
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) ............----.---0---+- 111
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) -.0222..2.----eeeeeeeees 117, 118
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) -................ 115, 116
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398

i aie ..65, 70, 71, 79, 81, 83,

84, 86, 93, 95, 102
— v. North Bergen Township, 113 N.J.L. 143

CER, GD Bis TER cerctceenscitincceensernscenesnteisiectnninaninhiinapniitiiniihanes 74, 75
Huddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. — 186

N.W. 2d 904 (Neb. 1971) ..... 93

Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)... 103
Indiana ex rel. Anderson vy. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) 74

Jacksonville Port Auth. v. State, 661 So.2d 825 (Fla.

1964) 93
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) ....000002.... 119
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153

(1962) 116, 117

Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 331 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971), aff’d on other grounds, 457 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972) 77

League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975) 104

PAGE
Levine v. Long Island R.R., 38 A.D.2d 936, 331, N.Y.S.
2d 451 (2d Dep’t), aff’d, 30 N.Y.2d 906, 335 N.Y.S.

2d 565, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) -.222.. 73
Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272

EIT — capintonesteiedanmennntinesnesnampiniensiemasiaapennsiiine 103
Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881) .................... 72
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) -............. 8+
Massachusetts Port Authority v. Txeasurer & Receiver

General, 352 Mass. 755, 227 N.E.2d 902 (1967) .......... 78

Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 41 Mich.
App. 654, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), leave to appeal

denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973) -...........-.-.....-c.-csecseceereoreee 8S
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 277 (1928) 20.22... eeeneeenee 101
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) .......................... 101
Municipal Investors Ass'n vy. City of Birmingham, 316

SEA SD CHIIIED .ceectniiesrnensnticisinneniinenrenimaciesitienmainsspamannnanie 103

New Bedford vy. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's
Vinyard & Nantucket SS. Auth., 336 Mass. 651, 148
N.E.2d 687, appeal dismissed for want of substan-
tial federal question, 358 U.S. 53 (1958) -............ —

New Hampshire v. Maine, US. (1976) ........ 104

New Jersey Highway Auth. vy. Sills, 111 N.J. Super.

313 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 59 N.J. 432 (1971) ....79, 84, 85

New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61
N.J. 1, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) -........ 73, 80

Newton v. Board of County Commissioners, 100 U.S.

Pe CD cccsnbicninisecnsnnstenencidpuncamienamemniananmintininminaiiniins 68
N.Y. Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
STN cictinntesinesniontanlinniaianii ‘ 114
Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223
PITTED cncsevisiossvismbisdnahiedaitininiadithepeansiidieannasteintiigiaetnates 73, 75, 78
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass.
a dienpiopmiemiinentt Resnininne 78, 79, 93

Patterson vy. Carey, App. Div. 2d , 383 N.Y.S.2d
FF, Sk ___, RENEE TOUTE NO aa 79

~~

vii
PAGE
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) .......... 114, 115
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54
U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) ~... iaasiaunniaiieeies 104
Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20
(1917) ....... 68, 73
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. | fo) =e 116, 117
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1934) 73, 74
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S.
275 (1959) 104, 105, 106, 109
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Pro-
prietors of the Warren ae 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
| nT EE 66, 74
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) .. 117
Rhode Island vy. Massachusetts, 37 U. Ss. (12 Pet.) 464
ne 105

lice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) 115
Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 (1991) 74
Ruano vy. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 505 P.2d 447

(1973) ..... 94
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 84 (1880) 68, 69
Train vy. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 US.

60 (1975) ..... 114

Treigle vy. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) 84
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) 65, 66
United States v. American went Express Co., 265

U.S. 425 (1924) eccccccsseeesees 1038
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.

BD CIID ceciccinteicersncishisemnnttnticndiniintenencemnintioninnannintetnemnne 63
Veia vy. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark,

310 U.S. 32 (1940) ..... - 83, 84, 93, 102
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365

RI ddiiiceanniepieiliteitemtialiais Maar Saeed ae raat 101
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1893) iinpenanseaiiniiahin 104

PAGE

Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535
COUP ccvesccnicinsinisnssinscistnenviiiteniiiaiesnensiniestnbniitisshlimanaissetutcuasinasitapas 72
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) = 85
Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573 (1904) -.0.002202... 104

West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507
ae satannsinnaininniinitianitbiasdiaeingaerindeiedddall 67. 68
Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880) ..... 72

Constitution Cited:

US. Comat. 086. 5 9D ncccccccsccsonsncnsessnsesessveessnenseconsuonsonse 105
8 ES Ree 102, 103
Federal Statutes Cited:
Bridge Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 84 22.0... ‘3
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 -......0022.222-2202...-. 113
ey I Or I eiiitiecidnitassicntnhitiihictinhineeanideantannasinidl 112, 116
National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of
SOUT. svseiaseinisidden ddaiapiteaiamed aaailipiciealaddiabenbeiiapeabiantiidiaiiiabeiamsaenii 48, 113
Ordinance for the Northwest Territory, 44 Stat. 1851
PORE STII sscciersicciiinsidnieiehiaieinithiabiieiesacacilasi statin ates 65

Port Authority Compact, Pub. Res. 17, 67th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 42 Stat. 174 (1921) 2,3, 95, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112

Port Authority of New York Comprehensive Plan .... 3, 109

Regional Rail Organization Act of 1973 (Jan. 2,
1974) 48,113

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970 113, 116
15 U.S.C. §§ 751 et seq. (Emergency Petroleum Allo-

ITE Te eT seentenetedinninbahaieiintititaiintniens 46, 116
15 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq. (Energy Supply and Envi-
ronmental Coordination Act of 1974) 00000... 48

PAGE

42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (Clean Air Act Amendments

>, 50, 95, 116
49 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1964) (Urban Mass Trans-

portation Act) iis 112, 113, 116, 117, 118
State Statutes Cited:
Ch. 25, Laws of New Jersey (1974) -.......2....2...-.220-0--0--- 1,2
Ch. 151, Laws of New Jersey (1921) ................---......--. 2
Ch. 208, Laws of New Jersey (1972) .............-.------------ 59
Ch. 245, Laws of New Jersey (1971) .............--.-----------. 57
Ch. 277, Laws of New Jersey (1927) -......202.2..2..22..----.-- 5
Ch. 154, Laws of New York (1921) , ~ 8
Ch. 318, Laws of New York (1973) -.....2..2.2222222.2..-----00+- 59
Ch. 993, Laws of New York (1974) ~...00..0220.20.0.2.2---0--- 2
New Jersey Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act of

2 caida taiaisabtadiadlidcia Ail iiea ical Sol eh coats 47
iB TeM, TRE GB BOG. cccrcccensnseccesenscssesscesansneensersncenscsnssounees 2
eas TINIE scnectuharcvenicecisiisenioteuienitnenienncnbindesasnaindsea inanainsans 3
I a eaiiennienaniaiiel 57
eee 57
is TaN ‘snicisisciespninniseisiesbissibindeupiaiepunnaiiatanbinneeans 17
N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.51 et seq. me siniicaiaibailpmaaasi 59
Ns: SEED -escechcsccesssncimculiiiinesiseteanidgsimaniaamcdaatpen 18, 29
I ea cian eoeniianalies 99
Ss: CTIIIIIIT -sccrisntncsesnnsinentesnicnnsthncninrtinesiaiiiaieminialimainaniin 6
N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 6401 et seq. -.............-------+-+-+---+- 3
Regulations Cited:
49 C.F.R. § 148(i) (1) . 53
38 Fed. Reg. 9645, 9657 (1973) ...............--c-ecccceec-eeeeseeees 46
I I I I as ecnnssiniieeeaieriacadteelanitinle 46
Se is, I: UIE UTED tcsenscctteeicnetentacistninnmmntommesinoniatee 51, 52

x
PAGE
Other Authorities Cited:
E. W. Bard, The Port of New York Authority
CHIE . vicheecissineensnestsitinenstaaehiiineiiniaaimadiaiiaudnaienin 3, 5, 6, 7, 107
OR Sth Gr OD erritititcerniencnccistrniesticctrcnnceiit 107 |

Farley Committee Report of 1963 (N.J. Senate) ......8, 26, 75
II M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Constitution

ETENETD weikditsittsiopeiiositchisadiailiniesatilialapaiiasiatemddiiiniebasitbats oncatidaaaaieal 65
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause,

2 Oe ee 102
New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 16 (1958) (not

RE I TOC STK oe Soa CONNER Te 9, 13, 14, 16
New Jersey 1959 Joint Assembly Committee Report

Oh HE Bs TU deechinclttnteiciisadarseitsiiatetone 16, 41
New Jersey Joint Legislative Committee Report of

ERE a eal 7 ERASE EO ey LOD 46
6 Seton Hall L. Rev. 48 (1974) 2.2.2... ccccccccccscseceeeeee 78
Wright, The Contract Clause and the Constitution

SED ernevutesunlsiniaindilacksiiasnaniiuabitelidiamabdaacn dead 65

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octrosper TERM, 1975

No. 75-1687

A a

Unrrep States Trust Company or New York, as Trustee
for The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-First Series, on
its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consolidated
Bonds of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
and all others similarly situated,

Appellant,

v.

Tue State or New Jersey, Brennan T. Byrne, Governor
of the State of New Jersey, and Wriiiiam F. Hy.anp,
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introductory Statement

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, unanimously affirming a judgment of the
Superior Court oi New Jersey (Hon. George B. Gelman,
J.S.C.), upholding the constitutionality of Chapter 25 of

2

the Laws of New Jersey, 1974.! The challenged 1974 sta-
tute, together with concurrent and identical New York
legislation, Chapter 993 of the Laws of New York, 1974,
repealed 1962 bi-State legislation purporting to limit by
covenant the application of the revenues and reserves of
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey for pas-
senger railroad purposes.

The trial court found that, “the claim that bondholder
security has been materiaily impaired or destroyed by the
repeal is simply not supported by the record.” A 127.
The trial court further held that repeal constituted a rea-
sonable exercise of the State’s police power. Judgment was
entered accordingly, dismissing appe!lant’s complaint and
declaring Chapter 25 valid and constitutional. On direct
appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey unanimously
affirmed, “substantially for the reasons set forth in the
opinion of Judge Gelman.” A 135.

Appellees respectfully submit that the judgments below
were correct and shoul? be affirmed.

A. The Early Years: A Port Authority That Was
Not Self-Sustaining, the Arrangements That
Enabled It to Carry Deficits and the Failure
of Legislative Efforts to Have the Authority
Assume Responsibility for Passenger Railroads

The Port Authority Compact was enacted by New Jersey
and New York and consented to by Congress in 1921. Ch.
151, Laws of N.J., 1921, N.J.S. A. 32:1-1 et seqg.; Ch. 154,

1. The statute appears at pages 5-6 of Appendix B to the Juris-
dictional Statement.

2. “A” refers tothe Appendix. “A.B.” refers to the brief for appel-
lant. “Stip.” refers to the Stipulation among counsel dated December
20, 1974, the entire text of which is contained in Volume IV of the
Joint Appendix (cited as “Ja”) submitted to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey.

3

Laws of N.Y, 1921, McKinney’s Unconsol. Laws $6401 et
seq.; Pub. Res. 17, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
Declaring that “a better coordination of the terminal, trans-
portation and other facilities in, about and through the
port of New York, will result in great economies, benefit-
ing the Nation, as well as the States of New York and New
Jersey,” the Compact created the Port of New York
Authority to pursue those elusive goals.’

The Compact granted the Port Authority enumerated
powers “and such other and additional powers as shall be
conferred upon it by the legislature of either State con-
curred in by the legislature of the other, or by Act or Acts
of Congress.” Compact Art. III; see also Art. VII. Among
the powers enumerated is “full power and authority to pur-
chase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or
transportation facility within the [Port] district.” Com-
pact Art. VI. “Transportation facility” is in turn defined
to include “railroads ... for use for the transportation or
carriage of persons or property.” Compact Art. XXII.

In 1922, the States, again with the consent of Congress,
adopted a Comprehensive Plan mainly concerned with rail-
road freight operations and facilities. A 69. But the Com-
prehensive Plan was never implemented, in part because
of the Port Authority’s refusal in 1922 to help solve the
problems of railroad passenger traffic. See E. W. Barn,
Tur Port or New York Avutnority 65-66, 128-130 (1942)
(hereinafter cited as Barp).

New Jersey quickly recognized that the Comprehensive
Plan was not sufficiently comprehensive: it enacted a law
in 1922 finding that the Comprehensive Plan “does not
include the problem of passenger traffic in the territory
covered by [the] port development plan” even though the

3. The name of the Authority was changed to the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey on July 1, 1972. N.J.S.A. 32:1-4.

4

“problem of passenger traffic should be considered in co-op-
eration with the port development commission.” A 569.4

The Port Authority also recognized that freight and
passenger service were not two problems but inseparable
parts of a single problem. Its 1924 Annual Report
observed :

“There is barely room during the rush hours for
the trains carrying freight because of the commuter
service, while passengers and freight must both nec-
essarily move during these hours.” A 156.

The point was repeated in the Port Authority’s 1928
Annual Report:

“The Commissioners of the Port Authority have
found in their studies that no adequate or effective
interstate transportation development can take place
without taking full account of transportation of

passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port
Distriet.” A 151, 575.

The Legislatures of both States agreed. In 1927, the
New Jersey Legislature, stating that it was acting “under
and pursuant to the provisions of the [Port Authority]
compact,” directed the Port Authority “to make such plans
for the development of said district supplementary to or
amendatory of the comprehensive plan heretofore adopted
by the Legislatures of the two States .. . as will provide
adequate interstate and suburban transportation facilities
for passengers. ...” A 57.5 This legislation, which became

4. The legislation established a study commission that worked
with the Port Authority in establishing a new agency, of which the
Authority was a member, to coordinate solutions to the problems of
commuter transportation. A 576.

5. In light of this early history, appellant obviously errs at the
very outset of its discussion of “Port Authority Involvement in
Mass Transit,” A.B. 8, when it says: “As early as 1922, the legis-
latures recognized that the Port Authority was not the appropriate

agency to develop a solution to the problems of railroad
traffic.” Id. . i ad

tetoen,
—_

atid, wees

5

Chapter 277 of the Laws of New Jersey, 1927, was signed
by Governor Moore and approved the following year by the
New York Legislature, but was vetoed by Governor Alfred
E. Smith. A 572-574. As the trial court found, Governor
Smith’s veto ended the Port Authority’s active involvement
in any solution of commuter transit problems for the next
30 years. A 80.

The Port Authority took a new tack and began its con-
struction program by building four bridges for motor
vehicles. A 71. These bridges, which still account for much
of the Port Authority’s financial strength, see A 737, were
made possible by advances from the States to pay 25 per-
cent of the costs of construction. The advances took the
form of loans subordinated to the bonds the Authority sold
to the public. A 71. A separate series of bonds was issued
for each bridge and the bondholders’ security was limited
to the revenue from that bridge. A 71. In their early years,
however, the bridges did not meet revenue expectations and
the Authority was not only not self-supporting, but faced
default on its bonds. A 70 n. 8, 72, 820.

The Legislatures’ response to the Port Authority’s pre-
dicament was two-fold. First, they transferred the control,
operation and revenues of the highly successful Holland
Tunnel to the Authority: its annual surpluses after debt
service were large enough to cover the bridge deficits.
BARD at 238; A 70 n. 8. Second, the States enacted stat-
utes creating the General Reserve Fund, in which surplus
revenues from all Authority facilities are pooled to create a
bondholders reserve fund in an amount equal to 10 percent

6. Appellant says, A.B. 8, that Governor Smith vetoed the bi-State
legislation “on the ground that the Port Authority was never intended
to become involved in rail mass transit.” The veto message, A 572-
574, contains no such statement and bases the veto on Governor
Smith’s unwillingness to divert the Authority from the solution of
the freight distribution problem. The Port Authority Commissioners
responded that the feared diversion of efforts would not take place,
A 151 n. 9, demonstrating that they too understood this to be the
basis of the veto.

6

of the par value of the Authority’s outstanding bonds. and the Governors would never have approved, any
increased tolls on Port Authority bridges and tunnels, as
suggested by the Environmental Protection Administra-
tor, unless some of the new revenue were applied to sup-
port rail mass transit. Yet the covenant, as interpreted by
Mr. Tobin to the Legislatures in 1971, precluded the use of
increased vehicular tolls for rail mass transit. A 689.

3. The Port District’s public transportetion
requirements

The pivotal importance of adequate passenger rail trans-
portation to the welfare and economy of the State of New
Jersey has never been denied by appellant. See A.B. 66,
where appellant finally admits:

35. The tolls charged on the Authority’s bridges are subject to the
Bridge Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 84, 33 U.S.C. §491 et seq., which pro-
vides that the tolls charged “shall be reasonable and just.” The Fed-
eral Highway Administrator is authorized to prescribe such tolls. 32
Fed. Reg. 5607, 49 C.F.R. §148(i) (1). In the Delaware River Port
Authority case discussed at A 724-726, the Administrator said that

“a reasonable and just toll schedule would be one sufficient to sup-
port” all of the Authority’s activities, including a rail mass transit
line, A725, and referred to “the urgent need to structure toll rates
for crossings in major metropolitan areas to encourage use of mass
transit and carpools,” A 726. The Administrator’s order reducing
tolls was subsequently vacated by the Court of Appeals for insuffi-
cient findings with respect to whether the reduced tolls would permit
the Authority to sustain its “total activities.” Delaware River Port
Auth. v. Tiemann, 531 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1976). J

ich

In July 1974, the federal Department of Transprtation, whi
includes the Federal Highway Administration, concluded in a report
to Congress that:

“in some areas (New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco),
bridge toll revenues provide significant support for transit
capital and/or operating costs, thereby providing transit serv-
ice improvements which promote decreased dependence on
automobile travel. Therefore, it would appear to be in the Fed-
eral interest to permit the imposition of tolls which would
promote a more efficient utilization of the urban transportation
system. Such a policy would not be unjustly discriminatory but
more appropriately reflect the total costs of using the facility
in peak demand periods.” A 726-727.

54

“Tf it can be said in the case at bar that the ends
to be accomplished are improvement in mass transit,
decrease in air pollution and conservation of energy,
it must be granted that they are legitimate.”

Kven a brief review of the massive record demonstrates
that these were precisely the ends to be served by repeal.

Prior to 1962, public concern with rail mass transit in
the Port District produced little more than a stream of
studies and ‘reports. A 79-80, 605. While these reports
portrayed in graphic terms the continuing deterioration of
rail mass transit in the Port District—a condition to which
the vehicular facilities developed by the Port Authority
directly contributed, A 604, see Stip., pp. 96, 100, 108, 134-
135, 139, 140-141, 154; ix. VII, pp. 125A-126A, 130A-133A
—no significant steps were taken to improve the situation
until the early 1960’s. A 80. Thus, when the 1962 cove-
nant was enacted, no one knew what could actually, rather
than theoretically, be accomplished by coordinated support
of rail mass transit in the Port District.

Since 1962, the public attitude and policy has changed
dramatically from “Why Worry?” A 601. By September
1973, the State of New Jersey had committed more than
$350 million to its program, modestly begun in 1960, to
maintain and improve commuter rail services. Stip., pp.
15, 144.

In New York, it was found, contrary to the 1958 report of
the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Cominission, Stip., pp. 109-
110, upon which appellant relies at A.B. 8-9, that financial
support could be obtained from existing public authorities.
Tn addition to the Port Authority’s modernization and oper-
ation of the Hudson & Manhattan (now PATH), surplus
revenues of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority,
including additional surpluses created by the doubling of
tolls on vehicular bridges and tunnels, were applied to the
deficits of subways and passenger railroads. During the

59

seven years prior to the end of 1974, the Triborough turned
over approximately $305 million to the New York Metro-
politan Transportation Authority to help support rail mass
transit. A 732.

Despite this substantial infusion of funds in the years
since 1962, the plight of the commuter railroads within the
Port District remains critical, as the Court knows. See
Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Co., 419 U.S. 102, 108,
156, 159 (1974). Beginning in 1967, each of the four private
companies operating commuter rail services in New Jersey
has been involved in reorganization proceedings under the
federal bankruptcy laws. A 81 n.21. The express policy
of the State of New Jersey has been to impress upon the
federal courts supervising the reorganization proceedings
the necessity of continuing most of these rail services. A
546. The most recent comprehensive program of the New
Jersey Department of Transportation, published in Sep-
tember 1973, explained the reasons for this policy:

“Cessation of mass transportation services in these
urban areas would produce intolerable conditions on
the personal lives of the residents of the areas. The
State is now directed by the federal government to
reduce the levels of air pollution in these areas to a
significant degree within the next five years. It has
been determined that the existing basic rail and bus
systems will fail within the next few years unless a
major investment in capital facilities, equipment, and
operating subsidies is provided by the public.” A
546-547.

By 1970, it had become apparent that although it had re-
vitalized the Hudson & Manhattan, the Port Authority had
not kept pace either with its ability or with the need to
increase its participation in rail mass transportation. Thus,
in April 1970, Governors Cahill and Rockefeller announced
a joint program to expand the Authority’s role in rail mass
transit by having it build a rail link to Kennedy Airport and

56

extend PATH to Newark Airport and other parts of New
Jersey. A 99-100, 686.

In March 1971, legislative committees of both New York
and New Jersey held joint hearings on the relationship of
the Port Authority to mass transportation. The commit-
tees heard testimony, summarized at A 687-690, see further
Stip. pp. 223-233, and Stip., Ex. VII, from numerous wit-
nesses, including several recognized experts, to the follow-
ing effect: the Port Authority had substantial funds avail-
able in excess of required interest and principal payments;
the Port Authority’s revenues could be increased substan-
tially by doubling the tolls on its bridges and tunnels ;*° the
largest commercial bank in the Port District had released a
report calling for the imposition of higher and economically
more reasonable charges for the use of highways and river
crossings in order to transfer badly needed revenues to rail
mass transit; the covenant did not add to the security of
Port Authority bondholders and was simply a condition that
the Port Authority made to its assumption of responsibility
for the Hudson & Manhattan; passenger rail ridership
within the Port District had increased substantially as a
result of massive highway congestion, which was also ad-
versely affecting air quality and intelligent land planning
and use; and the Port Authority had “subverted” the ef-
forts of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission as
part of its long-range effort to avoid rail mass transit in
favor of the lucrative development of vehicular facilities.

During the March 1971 joint legislative hearings, Mr.
Tobin stated that even if vehicular tolls were doubled, the
tens of millions in increased revenues “could not go under
the law [to] mass transit anyway ... we could use them for
other facilities supported by the General Reserve Fund, but

36. Executive Director Tobin predicted that doubling the Author-
ity’s vehicular tolls would raise “holy political hell,” A 688, a
prophecy borne out by the reactions to the 1975 toll increase dis-
cussed at A.B. 37-38. The fact remains that despite these reactions
the toll increase is in effect. A 528.

57

you could not, under the law and the constitution, use them
for mass transit facilities.” A 689. The obvious barrier
was the 1962 covenant.

In the light of this evidence, there was extensive discus-
sion during the 1971 joint legislative hearings concern-
ing possible repeal of the 1962 covenant. Assemblyman
Koppell of New York asked whether the covenant could be
repealed “not only for the future, but for the past” on the
basis of the legislative finding “that in the exercise of our
right to protect the people of the two states, we find that
this covenant stands in the way of the proper development
of mass transportation facilities, which is essential to the
people’s good and welfare.” <A 689.

The covenant was not repealed in 1971. Instead, after
the hearings, the Legislatures tried a different course. In
June 1971, they enacte | bi-State legislation authorizing the
Port Authority to extend passenger rail transportation to
Kennedy Airport and to Newark Airport and Cranford.
A 100, 692. In enacting these statutes, see Chapter 245 of
the Laws of New Jersey, 1971, N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.20 et seq.,
the Legislatures made detailed findings concerning the
importance of rail access to the airports. They declared
that, “Additional highway construction to serve these great
airports is not feasible and creates severe problems in
terms of increased air pollution . . .,” that rail access “must
be” provided if the Port Authority airports are “to con-
tinue to serve the economic well-being” of the area, and that
“such an undertaking is found and determined to be in the
public interest.”

The June 1971 legislation sought to avoid the limitations
of the covenant by characterizing the proposed rail links
“as constituting a part of each air terminal.” A 100,
N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.3. However, while this legislation was
pending, the Port Authority obtained opinion letters from
two New York firms, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood and Davis,

58

Polk & Wardwell, both of which concluded that the legisla-
tion would be “ineffective to remove the facilities of the
Project from the ambit of the Covenant.” A 100, 692.

In December 1971, the First Boston Corporation sub-
mitted a report to the Port Authority concerning the
financing of the airport rail links authorized by the June
1971 legislation. A 692-702. The report noted that “the
essential problem” confronting the airport rail links “is
created in the statutes and resolutions by which the Port
Authority is bound; and particularly the joint State cove-
nants of 1962, which in effect prohibit the Port Authority’s
involvement in additional passenger rail transportation
projects unless they are self-supporting.” A 692. The
study stated flatly that the 1962 covenant “precludes gen-
eral credit financing of any passenger transportation
project, no matter how desirable, for which projections
show an operating profit below debt service require-
ments.” Id.

In June 1972, the New York Legislature adopted, and
Governor Rockefeller signed, a bill repealing the 1962 cove-
nant. New Jersey did not adopt similar legislation at that
time. A 101-102.

In November 1972, Governors Cahill and Rockefeller
announced agreement on a major plan of rail mass trans-
portation development for the Port District. A 102, 705.
The Governors proposed the extension of PATH via
Newark Airport to Plainfield, direct rajl service from Ken-
nedy Airport to New York City and direct rail service to
Pennsylvania Station in New York City for riders of the
Erie Lackawanna Railroad.

Commenting on the environmental, energy and traffic
effects of the PATH-Plainfield project, the Port Authority
stated:

“Based on 1985 traffic estimates, the PATH exten-
sion to Plainfield will generate about 9 million auto-

59

mobile and bus miles in travel to and from Corridor
stations. By contrast, if rail service is abandoned
in the Corridor, an estimated 46.5 million auto and
bus miles would be required yearly on the roads lead-
ing to Newark and New York City. The saving of
37.5 million vehicle miles per year will result in less
highway congestion and less air pollution. In addi-
tion, it will be far more efficient in terms of the
utilization of scarce energy resources.” <A 715-716.

The plan was incorporated in bi-State legislation that
also repealed the covenant prospectively. A 102-103; Ch.
208 of the Laws of N.J., 1972, N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.51 et seq.;
Ch. 318 of the Laws of N.Y., 1973.

The estimated cost of the plan was $650 million, and it
was said that the Port Authority would invest between $250
and $300 million for these vital projects. A 102-103; see
also A 385. It was alse said that these projects would be
self-supporting, but if any deficits were to materialize, they
would be the Port Authority’s responsibility. The 1972 An-
nual Report of the Port Authority stated that the necessary
steps were being taken “so that construction might begin as
soon as possible in 1973 on one or more of the projects. The
program is expected to be completed by the end of 1977.”
A 386°387. Nevertheless, the covenant prevented the Port
Authority from proceeding to construction of these legisla-
tively authorized projects. The Port Authority could not
participate in the financing of a passenger rail project
unless that project’s estimated net revenues were them-
selves sufficient to carry its debt service. The condition
proved to be an insuperable obstacle.

As appellant states, A.B. 17 n. 14, in 1972 it was said that
the PATH-Plainfield part of the package might be financed
within the terms of the 1962 covenant through a federal
grant of $150 million, Port Authority participation of $50
million and an advance of up to $40 million by the State of

60

New Jersey, to be repaid by the Port Authority. But it
soon became apparent that this plan was not feasible.*’
The Authority’s application for federal funds, filed in April
1974 just before repeal of the covenant, was rejected by
the federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration
because it failed to include the necessary certification of
how the local financial share would be obtained. A 717.
See also A 393-394.

G. Post-repeal Plans for Financing Mass Transit

With the covenant repealed, the Port Authority could
plan and act to finance PATH-Plainfield sensibly and with-
out any impairment of bondholder security. On April 10,
1975, the Authority announced a proposed increase in its
basie bridge and tunnel tolls (which had remained constant
sinee 1927) to raise an estimated $40 million per year to be
used to help finance the PATH-Plainfield project, the Ken-
nedy rail link, the Erie Lackawanna direct access plan and
an expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal. See
A 405-407, 419-421, 528.

The “historic revision” of Port Authority bridge and
tunnel tolls, A 439, 503, expressly effected “to increase its
ability to finance vital mass transit improvements,” A 405,
went into effect on May 5, 1975. The trial court’s decision
sustaining the repeal of the covenant issued on May 14,

37. In December 1972, the Director of the Port Authority’s
Department of Rail Transportation told an Information Session of
the New Jersey Senate that PATH-Plainfield was “barely doable on
a self-sustaining basis,” even if the most optimistic assumptions were
made. A 708-709. By 1975, after a sharp increase in the estimated
cost of the project from $252 million to $347 million, A 398-399,
it was clear that $40 million from the State would not do the job.
New Jersey’s Transportation Commissioner said so and proposed
that the State assume responsibility for operating deficits. A 477.
This is the position appellant characterizes as a unilateral election to
renege. A.B. 18, 36.

61

1975. On May 23, 1975, the Port Authority submitted a re-
vised application to the Urban Mass Transportation Admin-
istration for $277.6 million in federal funds for the PATH-
Plainfield project, certifyiag that the 20 per cent local share
of the capital cost of the project, $69.4 million, would be
obtained from the proceeds of Port Authority bond sales
with the State agreeing to finance any operating deficit. A
527. The covenant would have blocked this plan because
the net revenues of the project are unlikely to equal debt
service. The difference between the two will be made up by
increased tolls on auto traffic. The speed with which the
Port Authority was able to act in April and May 1975 con-
trasts sharply with its inability to certify the financing of
the local share of the PATH-Plainfield project so long as
the 1962 covenant remained in effect. A 717.

qn December 1975, the Urban Mass Transportation Ad-
ministration initially rejected the PATH-Plainfield applica-
tion. A 527-528, 1132-1135. The State then submitted a
revised and more comprehensive financing plan, still pend-
ing before UMTA, pursuant to which the Port Authority’s
capital share of the PATH-Plainfield application was in-
creased to $120 million. A 1139. Appellant agrees that
this plan too would have bee» blocked by the covenant
A. B. 36. Since the Port Authority calculates that the ~
creased toll revenues can support debt service on $400 mil-
lion in new bonds, without any threat to bondholder
security, the Authority is also planning a $160 million
expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal and up to
$120 million for mass transportation improvements in New
York. A 528.

The foregoing package will actually enhance bondholder
security while freeing many millions of dollars for mass
transit. The toll rise has been generating over $40 million
in new revenue for more than a year. See A 528. Though
the Port Authority has begun work on the bus terminal ex-
pansion, several years will pass before the Authority will

| |

62

be spending anything like $40 million per year on debt serv-
ice for these projects. Since bridge toll hikes are subject
to federal approval and federal policy strongly supports the
application of revenues from interstate vehicular bridges
to rail mass transit, see pp. 52-53, supra, and since the Gov-
ernors would not otherwise have approved the toll increase,
the extra bond reserves provided by the immediate increase
in tolls could only have been obtained by linkage to a rail
project.

Thus, repeal permitted a coordinated transportation pro-
gram. The fare rise has an automobile-discouraging poten-
tial. The increased revenues support mass transit. Air
quality will he improved, energy conserved. And bond-
holders are not harmed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the courts below, eight judges reviewed appellant’s
claim that the States acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
repealing the 1962 covenant. Not one found merit in it.
As the Counter-Statement above shows, repeal permitted
the States to respond rationally to their critical need
for more mass transit, a need that was dramatically
emphasized in 1974 when gasoline shortages produced
economic chaos and vast disruptions of life in com-
munities without mass transit alternatives. Moreover,
the best scientific data available revealed that pollution
caused by automobiles in the densely populated New York-
New Jersey Metropolitan area has a corrosive effect on
human health. As appellant now recognizes, A.B. 66,
“These problems can only be atta eked by reducing vehicular
traffic partially through the improvement of mass transit.”

Legislation responsive to an existing public health men-
ace and to an unprecedented energy shortage that threat-
ened the economic foundation of the State comes before the
Court entitled to a maximum of respect. These are clearly

63

ees State interests, United States v. Little Lake
isere Co., 412 U.S. 580, 606 n.2
pe , n.2 (1973) Stewart, J.,
Since appellant now admits that those paramount inter-
ests can be advanced only “by reducing vehicular traffic
partially through the improvement of mass transit,” and.
since the covenant was a serious obstacle to precisely that
course, it follows that repeal of the covenant would have
veo constitutional even if it inflicted substantial harm on
renee Yet, as the Counter-Statement also shows,
e private loss in this case is trivial at most. The States’
repeal of the covenant in no way impairs the central
oe that principal and interest be paid when due.
or does repeal materially affect the security that supports
me = repayment ; indeed, appellant does not allege
ere is any likelihood that the bo i
cuanaes e bonds will not be
The immateriality of the covenant to bondholders’ eco-
nomic interesta is evidenced by every objective measure—
whether it he the test of the market place, analysis of the
ae Moo bondholder protections discussed above, or
e Po uthority’s huge reserves f ri
stan s fed by ever-growing
Faced with a record that fully supports these assertions
appellant chooses to deny here a proposition it conceded
helow : that State contracts are subject to legislative
action under the State’s police power.* In reversing

38. See, ¢.g., appellant’s reply brief i
1 £9. reply brief in the Supreme
pe 38: “Defendants’ dissertation on the 0 dg at a
a moo a om By by oy - Clause is superfluous since plaintiff
never tate may modi isi
contract under the color of the police rg TOG
ome (anstaste added); appellant’s trial brief 14-15: “in rare
stances a State's contract may be constitutionally abrogated by a
ee exercise of the State’s never abdicated police powers” and
ee Me sara say of the State’s action is then to be determined b
ncing the interests to be served against the harm done ‘

64

itself, appellant misstates the history of the contract
clause, misreads this Court’s relevant precedents and
advances arguments that are wrong in fact and untenable
in law.

The law is clear that all contracts are subject to State
police power. And the incontrovertible facts of this case
establish that New Jersey’s police power was reasonably
exercised.

The State also maintains that the covenant is voidable,
an alternative ground the courts below found it unneces-
sary to address.*? This Court’s precedents make it clear
that the modification of a voidable contract does not violate
the contract clause. The covenant was voidable because it
improperly amended the Port Authority Compact without
Congressional consent. Finally, the State contends that
the covenant was invalid when repealed because of its
inconsistency with supreme federal law in the transporta-
tion, environmental and energy fields. Acceptance of
either of the State’s alternative arguments requires affirm-
ance of the judgment below.

ARGUMENT

THE 1962 COVENANT IS SUBJECT TO THE REASON-
ABLE EXERCISE OF THE STATES’ NEVER ABDICATED
POLICE POWER.

Appellant’s theory that State contracts, unlike private
ones, are immune from legislative alteration pursuant to
the police power, A.B. 48-54, or subject to special rules
because the State benefits, A.B. 64, turns logic and constitu-
tional history upside down.

39. The argument was advanced at every stage of the proceedings
below, A28-29, 129, 143, but the lower courts preferred to rest their
decisions on the ground that repeal was a proper exercise of the

State’s police power.

65

A. The History of Contract Clause Jurisprudence
Shows That All Contracts, Especially State
Contracts, Are Subject to the State’s Police
Power.

The precise scope the contract clause was intended to
have by the Constitution’s framers is murky, if indeed a
group so disparate shared any common intent. As Chief
Justice Hughes noted in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934), “[T]he debates in the
Constitutional Convention are of little aid.” Moreover,
unlike much of the Constitution’s language, the phrase
“impair the obligation of contract” has no common law
antecedents to give it shape.

In any event, it is clear that the focus of the contract
clause was private contracts, not public ones. As initially
proposed to the Convention by Rufus King of Massachu-
setts, the clause was limited to them.* He took his language
from the recently enacted Ordinance for the Northwest Ter-
ritory, which precluded laws “that shall, in any manner
whatsoever interfere with or affect private contracts, or
engagements without fraud previously formed.”*! The
broader language of the modern clause originated in the
Convention’s Committee on Style, and no debate informs us
as to the reasons for the change. However, as Wright notes
in THe Contract CLause AND THE ConsTITUTION 15-16
(1938), there is virtually no evidence that the clause was
understood by the framers to apply to public contracts.

Despite the drafters’ preoccupation with private con-
tracts, the clause was held applicable to government obliga-
tions. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4

(1911 4 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Constitution 439

41. 44 Stat. 1851 (1926 Comp.).

66

Wheat.) 518 (1819). But contrary to appellant’s presenta-
tion, the Court has always been more receptive to alterations
of State contracts than private ones, because of the manifest
public necessity that each succeeding legislature be em-
powered to respond to changing public needs. In time, the
Marshall Court’s rigid view of the contract clause as a
barrier to nearly all retroactive legislation* had to yield to
the expanding responsibilities of government.

The seeds of later views were sown early. First, in Dart-
mouth College, Marshall recognized that the clause was
inapplicable to regulation by the States of their civil insti-
tutions ;** second, in that same case Marshall and Story both
noted that States could limit contract rights by express
reservation; third, the Court ruled in Proprietors of the
Charies River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), that public grants were to be
strictly construed against the grantee.

Fourth, and finally, there developed the doctrine of State
police power—that the State must retain power to deal
with certain public exigencies. As noted, the States could
limit contract rights by express reservation, but even with-
out such a reservation all contracts contain implied condi-
tions intrinsic to the “obligation.” For example, government
must have continuing power to protect the morals and
publie health of its citizens. Such powers cannot be frozen

42. A view taken, it might be added, when no other basis for
federal intervention against unreasonable State legislation existed.
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held the Bill
of Rights inapplicable to the States; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386 (1798), held the ex post facto clause inapplicable to civil
legislation.

43. He observed, “That the framers of the constitution did not
intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions,
adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have
given us is not to be so construed, may be admitted.” 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) at 629. The Port Authority is, of course, a “civil institu-
tion” of the States of New York and New Jersey.

67

by contract, particularly not by contracts made by one
legislature that may be corrupt, misled or misinformed.“
People who contract either know or ought to know that
circumstances may eventuate during the life of a contract
that require its alteration by the State. When such cir-
cumstances occur, exercise of the sovereign’s power, while
it may disappoint expectations, does not impermissibly im-
pair any “obligation” of contract.

In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507,
032 (1848), upholding the condemnation by eminent domain
of a franchise granted for a term of years, the Court set
forth this theory of implied conditions:

“But into all contracts, whether made between
States and individuals or between individuals only,
there enter conditions which arise not out of the
literal terms of the contract itself; they are super-
induced by the pre-existing and higher authority of
the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community
to which the parties belong; they are always pre-
sumed, and must be presumed, to be known and rec-
ognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never,
therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this
could add nothing to their force. Every contract is
made in subordination to them and must yield to
their control, as conditions inherent and paramount,
wherever a necessity for their execution shall oceur.”

There is, however, an important difference between im-
plied conditions in private law and the implied conditions
of sovereignty. Private parties can by the phrasing of
their bargains control the scope of implied conditions, but
one legislature, elected for a fixed term, has no power to
hargain away central elements of State sovereignty so as to

44. The wisdom underlying the doctrine is revealed by this case.
We do not question that in 1962 the Port Authority’s management
sincerely believed in its vision of the Authority’s role. It is equally
clear, however, that the Authority imposed on the Legislatures in
order to further that vision. See pp. 15-16, 20, 26 n.15, supra.

68

preclude their exercise by a future legislature. This is not
to say that one legislature can never bind the next, for
plainly it can to some extent despite the general presump-
tion against such a construction. The point is rather that
one legislature, holding the basic attributes of sovereignty
in temporary trust, cannot deny them to the future.

The point was given early expression in Newton v. Board
of County Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548 (1880). There an
1846 Ohio law purported to contract, for good considera-
tion, that a particular county seat would be located per-
manently in Canfield, Ohio. The law was held amenable to
repeal. Justice Swayne said that on many matters the
States were not competent to enter into binding contracts.
These matters:

“involve public interests and legislative Acts con-
cerning them are, necessarily, public laws. LKvery
succeeding Legislature possesses the same jurisdic-
tion and power with respect to- them as its prede-
cessors. The latter have the same power of repeal
and modification which the former had of enactment,
neither more nor less.” 100 U.S. at 559.

Soon after, the Court wrote in Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814, 819 (1880), upholding the repeal of a lottery
franchise:

“The question is therefore, directly presented,
whether, in view of these facts, the Legislature of a
State can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat
the will of the people, authoritatively expressed, in
relation to the further continuance of such business
in their midst. We think it cannot. No Legislature
can bargain away the public health or the public
morals. The People themselves cannot do it, much

45. In West River Bridge Co., supra, the contract did not ex-
pressly preclude subsequent use of the State eminent domain power.
In Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917), the
contract was express and the Court held it invalid.

69

less their servants. The supervision of both these
subjects of governmental power is continuing in its
nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special
exigencies of the moment may require. Government
is organized with a view to their preservation, aud
cannot devest itself of the power to provide for them.
For this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is
allowed, and the discretion cannot be parted with
any more than the power itself.”

The Court expressed the same principle, that on certain
matters one legislature cannot bind another, in approving
repeal of the New Orleans Butchers Monopoly in the sec-
ond Slaughterhouse Case, Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent
City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 750-751 (1884) :

“The denial of this power, in the present instance,
rests upon the ground that the power of the Legis-
lature intended to be suspended is one so indispen-
sable to the public welfare that it cannot be bargained
away by contract. It is that well known but unde-
fined power called the ‘police power’... .

“It cannot be permitted that, when the Constitu-
tion of a State, the fundamental law of the land, has
imposed upon its Legislature the duty of guarding,
by suitable laws, the health of its citizens, especially
in crowded cities, and the protection of their person
and property by suppressing and preventing crime,
that the power which enables it to perform this duty
ean be sold, bargained away, under any circum-
stances, as if it were a mere privilege which the leg-
islator could dispose of at his pleasure.”

The issue is: what are these basic police powers inherent
in sovereignty that cannot be bargained away? The early
cases tended to answer with categories of State activity,
e.g., eminent domain, government institutions, protection
of morals, protection of health, and regulation of key indus-

70

tries ;*° the later cases responded with an understanding
that powers of government cannot be thus pigeonholed.*’

46. The present case falls clearly within three of these, protection
of health, change in civil institutions of government and regulation
of key industries.

47. The trial court’s opinion concisely summarizes the main cases
before Blaisdell, A 119-120:

“During the span of more than a century between Ogden v.
Saunders [1827] and Blaisdell [1933] the court had held on
numerous occasions that the states retained the power to im-
pair contractual obligations—including those to which the state
was a party—in the exercise of their always reserved police
powers to act in the interest of the public health, safety and
general welfare. First in dictum, Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S.
645, 650, 24 L. Ed. 302 (1877), and then by direct application
of the doctrine, the court held that a lottery franchise granted
for a definite term of years could be repealed. Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L. Ed. 1079 (1880); Douglas v.
Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 18 S. Ct. 199, 42 L. Ed. 553 (1897).
In Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,
24 L. Ed. 1036 (1878), it was held that a franchise to operate
a fertilizer factory at a given location could be negated by the
exercise of the police power to abate a nuisance. Similarly,
the power to control the use of the public streets may not be
bargained away, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232
U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721 (1914) ; Denver & Rio
Grande R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241, 39 S. Ct. 450, 63 L. Ed.
958 (1919), nor can the state contractually bind itself not to
exercise its power of eminent domain, West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 12 L. Ed. 535 (1848); Penn-
sylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 38 S. Ct. 35,
62 L. Ed. 124 (1917), or to change the location of its govern-
mental subdivisions, Newton v. Mahoning County, 100 U.S.
548, 25 L. Ed. 710 (1880). The broadest expression of this
view of the police power during this period is to be found in
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranberger, 238 U.S. 67, 35 S. Ct.
678, 59 L. Ed. 1204 (1915), where Justice Pitney said:

‘It is established by repeated decisions of this court that
neither of these provisions of the Federal Constitution [the
Contract and Due Process Clauses] has the effect of over-
riding the power of the state to establish all regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, or general
welfare of the community, that this power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away and is inalienable even by
express grant; and that all contract and property rights are
held subject to its fair exercise***. And it is also settled
that the police power embraces regulations designed to pro-
mote the public convenience or the general welfare and
prosperity, as well as those in the interest of public health,
morals or safety.’ (238 U.S. at 76-77, 35 S. Ct. at 682)”

71

The State necessarily retains residual sovereign power to
meet the needs of the people. What counts is whether the
power is reasonably exercised.

The leading case in the transition is Home Building &
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). At issue there
was the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, a statute
that stopped creditors from exercising their time-honored,
bargained-for rights to take possession of and sell the mort-
gaged property. Quite clearly, as the dissent asserted, the
legislation did just what the contract clause was originally
designed to prevent-—provide emergency debtor relief. Nor
could the law be thought a regulation of health or morals.
These categories were not stretched but abandoned. Find-
ing that the contract clause “is not an absolute one and is
not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula,” the Court wrote: |

“Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order.” 290 U.S. at 435.

In trying to limit Blaisdell, appellant emphasizes that
the Minnesota law relieved private parties, not the State,
of contractual duties. The difference was indeed note-
worthy: in the past, States had frequently been allowed to
repudiate their own promises; Blaisdell held that they
could also interfere with private contracts when private
distress rose to the level of public concern. Acceptable jus-
tification for legislation affecting contract rights was no
longer limited to a handful of categories. Rather the re-
served power of sovereignty had to be seen as a general
principle, its exercise limited only by reasonableness and by
a need to harmonize its exercise with the policy of contract
protection.

72

In asserting that State contracts are immune from rea-
sonable exercise of the State’s police power, appellant
simply ignores the ample authority to the contrary. More-
over, the cases it does cite, A. B. 50-53, have little bearing
here. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535
(1867), was a mandamus action to compel the levying of
taxes to pay interest on bonds in default. Wolff v. City of
New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880), and Louisiana v. Pils-
bury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881), were also mandamus actions. In
all three cases, the challenged legislation was invoked to
evade the primary obligation—payment of interest or prin-
cipal. Moreover, in Quincy, the Court recognized that
remedies for enforcing bonds can be changed if no sub-
stantial right is lost:

“It is competent for the States to change the form
of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they
may see fit, provided no substantial right secured

by the covenant is thereby impaired.” 71 U.S. at
553.

The remedies to enforce a general obligation bond are in
effect the bondholder’s only legal protection: thus, in
Quincy, the Court accepted the proposition that bondholder
protections may be modified “provided no substantial right”
is impaired. ~

While the venerability of Wolff v. City of New Orleans,
supra, and Louisiana v. Pilsbury, supra, is not in question,
their viability is another matter.“* The Court’s unanimous
decision in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,
316 U.S. 502 (1942), upheld legislation that permitted a
municipality to change the interest rate on its obligations
and to extend their maturities over the objection of credit-
ors. Whether the precise statutes at issue in Wolff or Pils-
bury would today be upheld in light of Faitoute is imma-
terial. Appellant is just plain wrong when it claims, A. B.

48. Neither case was cited in any of appellant’s numerous briefs
to the courts below.

73

60-61, “It is settled, however, that a state may not .mpair its
own contract with its citizens. The only exception to this
rule is City of El Paso v. Simmons... .” See, e.g., Butchers
Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., swpra, 111 U.S. 746 (1884) ;
Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, supra, 245 U.S. 20
(1917) ; Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,
supra; Levine vy. Long Island R.R., 38 A.D.2d 936, 331
N.Y.S.2d 451 (2d Dep’t), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 906, 335 N.Y.S.2d
565, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). Leading State de-
cisions include New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v.
McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) ;
Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223
(1956). And see Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Municipal Assist-
ance Corp., A.D.2d , 082 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep’t
1976).

Nor is appellant’s argument that State and private con-
tracts are treated differently supported by Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1934), as the Court’s rejection of the
very same argument in El Paso v. Simmons indicates.*? In
Perry, Chief Justice Hughes opined that the United States
could not alter the gold clauses in its own contracts. First,
his opinion, joined by only three other Justices, is not
properly characterized as an opinion of the Court on the
very point disputed by Justice Stone, the fifth Justice con-
curring in the judgment. More importantly, the case has
nothing to do with State police powers: appellant to the
contrary notwithstanding, A.B. 54, there is no general
federal police power.

The federal government is limited to the necessary and
proper use of its delegated powers. The power to regulate
the value of money and determine the value of currency,
Chief Justice Hughes stated, did not include the power
to repudiate obligations. His conclusion on that point was
buttressed by a specific constitutional provision, the fourth

49. Mr. Justice Black urged the distinction in his dissent. 379
U.S. at 528.

74

section of the 14th amendment, which states that “the valid-
ity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law ... shall not be questioned.” 294 U.S. at 354.

Finally, the Court rejected Perry’s challenge to govern-
ment action, for even if ais contract was breached, he could
show no damage, and this was the only ground on which
a majority of the Court agreed.

B. Bondholders Could Not Reasonably Have Assumed
That the 1962 Covenant Was Immune From Action
Pursuant to the Police Power.

The covenant did not state that it was immune from the
police power and its silence on this point should itself be
dispositive. See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge
Co. v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge Co., 36 US. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837); Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180
U.S. 624 (1901).

By the time of the covenant’s enactment in 1962, the
Court had left no doubt that “every contract is made sub-
ject to the implied condition that its fulfillment may be
frustrated by a proper exercise of the police power.”
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 108 (1938).
A host of prior cases, cited above, establishes that this
formulation included public contracts; Faitoute Iron &
Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), made
clear that it extended to municipal bond contracts.

New Jersey law was equally clear. In Hourigan v. North
Bergen Township, 113 N.J.L. 148, 149 (EK. & A. 1934), a case
involving municipal bonds, New Jersey’s highest court
declared:

“Tt as a well established doctrine that the interdic-
tion of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts
does not prevent the state from exercising such
powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal, or are necessary for the general good
of the public, though contracts entered into between
individuals may thereby be affected. This power,

which in its various ramifications is known as the
police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right

75

of the government to protect the lives, health,
morals, comfort and general welfare of the people,
and is paramount to any rights under contracts
between individuals. While this power is subject
to limitations in certain cases, there is a wide discre-
tion on the part of the legislature in determining
what is and what is not necessary—a discretion
which courts ordinarily will not interfere with.”

The applicability of these principles to the covenant
itself is obvious. Article VII of the Port Authority Com-
pact permits the States to add to the duties of the Port
Authority if and when they choose to do so. All bond-
holders purchasing bonds knew or should have known of
that basic aspect of the Authority’s legal structure. See
Section 12(a) of the Consolidated Bond Resolution, A 797.
Moreover, Senator Farley, on whose Committee Report
appellant puts such stress, speaking specifically of the
covenant, warned that “one Legislature cannot bind a sub-
sequent Legislature involving policy.” See A 88-90.%°

The leading opinion as of 1962 on the nature of port
authority revenue bonds said the same thing. Opinion of
the Justices, 334 Mass. 271, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956). The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, under its pro-
cedure for issuing advisory opinions, was asked by the
Legislature to review the constitutionality of the proposed
Massachusetts Port Authority’s enabling act. The court,
although it declared the bill constitutional, declared that:

“the features of [the bill] purporting to grant
exclusive privileges as long as any bonds are out-
standing would be subject to revocation and amend-
ment by succeeding legislatures.

“The power of revocation is not, however, with-
out limits.” 136 N.E.2d 232-233.

50. Appellant emphasizes that in its 1963 report, the Farley Com-
mittee characterized the 1962 covenant as “constitutionally protected.”
A.B. 12, 18, 75. But that characterization provides an analytic start-
oS aS All contracts are constituti
protected; it is o constitutional ion that
pellant fundamentally misunderstands. Pree

76

Appellant chose the bonds of this Authority, bonds that
clearly could be affected by subsequent legislation, as the
standard for comparison with the bonds of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Thus, the covenant was always vulnerable to an exercise
of the police power and its vulnerability was apparent from
the moment the covenant was conceived. And appellant’s
chief witness testified that he was aware at all relevant
times that under certain circumstances a State may con-
stitutionally abrogate its contracts, and that other pledges
had heen repudiated. A 950-951, 952.

Appellant’s claim that bondholders relied on the cove-
nant is untenable.®!' Even if the Court were disposed to
give no weight to the fact that testimony concerning
reliance is inevitably self-serving, the claim of reliance is
circular in this context. What was allegedly relied on was
the continuation of a statute known to be vulnerable to
future change if circumstances warranted. When such
circumstances eventuate, a claim of reliance obviously can-
not block a responsive change. Appellant cannot escape
the trial court’s holding that:

“Those who enter into contractual relations with the
sovereign, including the bondholders of the Port

Authority, are chargeable with the knowledge that it
is a sovereign entity with which they are dealing and

51. Although the trial court found that bondholders had relied on
the covenant in the sense that it “in some manner furnished security
for the bondholders and it protected the diversion of the earnings
of the Port Authority into deficit rail mass transit,” A 110, he noted
that few if any members of the investment community ever analyzed
closely the actual effect it had on bondholder security. A 108. More-
over, appellant’s chief witness understood neither the covenant, nor
the other provisions of the Port Authority resolutions. What was
relied on was not specifics but a vague sense that the covenant was
necessary, as Mr. Thompson mistakenly put it, to prevent “the pos-
sibility of massive deficit operations getting into the Port structure”
and “that if the Port Authority were given a white elephant that all
of the revenues of the Port operations, operating revenue, would
be pooled in order to support that before debt service would be paid.”

See p. 35 supra.

77

that ‘the reservation of [the] essential attributes

of sovereign power’ is as much a part of their con-
tract as that which is expressly stated.” A 128.52

Cc. Though Municipal Bonds Are Subject to the
Police Power, They Are Readily Marketable.

Although the precedents holding all contracts, including
those of the State, subject to the police power are indelibly
clear, see pp. 65-75, supra, appellant, and amicus S8.1.A. even
more hysterically, claim that the consequences of applying
this rule will be catastrophic. See, e.g., Amicus Brief 4:
“A holding that the repeal legislation is valid would
severely limit, if not foreclose, the access of municipal
borrowers to the capital market. ...” The claim is over-
whelmingly refuted by the record.

The heart of appellant’s contention is the assertion that
the municipal bond market could not function if promises
underlying bonds are subject to the reasonable exercise of
the police power. The short answer is that it has always
functioned this way.

The Massachusetts Port Authority experience is telling
because it was appellant, not the State, who chose that
agency’s bonds as a high-quality municipal credit to be
used as a standard for comparison. The Massachusetts
Port Authority was born with an express judicial declara-

52. In the passage from Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 331
F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 457
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972), immediately
preceding the excerpt quoted at A. B. 14 n.11, Amicus Brief 20,
Judge Tyler said that the contention that the covenant’s “delegation
to the bondholders is irrevocable [is] a highly questionable one, see
Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-439
(1934), Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,
at 712 (concurring opinion of Justice Story (1819) ).”

53. The Amicus Brief nowhere claims objective damage to bond-
holders. Its many quotations merely assert that some people were
offended by the States’ exercise of their police power. Amicus’
selective quotations from the Moreland Act Commission Report, pp.
14-16, are misleading as the Commission concluded: “[T]he infer-
ences that may be drawn from the 1974 repealer are far from clear.
UDC officials have argued that the repealer closed the bond market

(Footnote continued )

78

tion that the provisions in its enabling act could be altered
by subsequent legislation. See Opinion of the Justices,
p. 75, supra,

On two subsequent occasions this reserved power was
used and its use sustained over the objection that the
changes would disadvantage bondholders. In Massa-
chusetts Port Authority v. Treasurer & Receiver General,
352 Mass. 755, 227 N.E.2d 902 (1967), the issue was
whether it was constitutional to increase the Authority’s
liability for retirement benefits payable to employees of a
project put under Authority management. The court held
it was, relying on the police power doctrine:

“Unquestionably the inerease in the prior creditable
service of former Mystic employees by the 1960 act
will tend to increase to some extent... the annual
operating expenses of M.P.A. over what they would
have been if the 1960 statute had not been enacted.
We think, however, that this increase does not effect
any substantial or unconstitutional impairment of
the security behind M.P.A.’s revenue bonds. The
contract underlying these bonds was necessarily
made subject to the possibility that subsequent
legislation, for proper purposes affecting the publie
interest, might in some degree affect M.P.A.’s
revenues.” 227 N.E.2d at 906.

Next, in Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass.,
1974), the court upheld an amendment of the Massachusetts

(Footnote continued )

to them, yet in September 1974, shortly after the Port Authority
covenant had been repealed, UDC was able to sell readily a large
issue of moral obligation bonds. HFA too was able to sell moral
obligation bonds until 1975. . . .” Report 163.

Amicus relies heavily on a partisan article by a bond attorney and
a student. Amicus Brief at 12, 16-17, 19-20. Written before trial,
it assumes the validity of the testimony before the Farley Committee
that without the covenant the Port Authority “could not sell a single
Port Authority bond,” 6 Seton Hall L. Rev. 48 at 78 (1974), and
contains no reference at all to the energy crisis and environmental
regulations. The cases discussed in this brief at 74-75, 78-81, 93,
show that it is plainly wrong in asserting that “legislative impairment
of bondholders’ rights because of the economic crisis [sic] has been

rmitted only when any other result would lead to total fiscal col-
apse of the bond issuer and the impossibility of payment of the
bonds.” Amicus Brief 20.

79

Port Authority enabling statute changing the provisions
that all property held by the Authority or its lessees was
immune from local property taxes. The Court realized that
the change might have a “substantial impact on the Au-
thority’s revenues.” Nonetheless it held that “the essential
obligations of the bondholders’ contract, i.e, that the
Authority make timely payment of the interest on and prin-
cipal of the bonds would be unaffected.” 313 N.E.2d at 887.

Despite this history of change and continuing vulner-
ability to change, Massachusetts Port Authority bonds are
held in high regard by the investment community.

The reactions of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and
Barr Brothers to repeal, see pp. 37-40, supra, leave no doubt
that the bonds of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey also continue to be an attractive investment though,
like all contracts, they remain subject to the State’s police
power.

Nor is this surprising. The Constitution and the courts
assure that the police power will not be exercised caprici-
ously. Affirmance here does not mean that the States can
do anything they choose. While this Court has had few
contract clause cases in recent years, the impairment pro-
hibition has been invoked more frequently in the State and
lower federal courts. They have found adequate guidelines
in Blaisdell and El Paso for weighing State interests against
private expectations. In fact, the courts of New Jersey and
New York have each rejected legislation having the most
trivial impact on bondholders precisely because no para-
mount State interests were involved. New Jersey Highway
Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super. 313 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff’d, 58
N.J. 432 (1971), invalidated legislation that entitled mem-
bers of the National Guard going to or from duty to drive
on the New Jersey Turnpike toll free. A clearer example
of de minimis effect on bondholders can hardly be imagined.
It was still deemed improper under the contract clause.
Patterson v. Carey, App. Div.2d , 383 N.Y.S.2d

80

414 (3d Dep’t 1976), struck down legislation mandating a
rollback of a toll increase for lack of a sufficient police
power justification.

The continuing need of States for borrowed capital im-
poses additional constraints upon State legislation threat-
ening a State’s own or its agencies’ obligations. Appellant’s
and amicus’ theory—that the State can be trusted to main-
tain a benevolent neutrality when mediating conflicting
private interests, but is surely greedy when dealing with its
own—has the political truth backwards. In many private
disputes, one side has far more political power than the
other: there are, for example, many more tenants than land-
lords. And that political power has been known to affect
legislative impartiality. But the heavy balance of pressure
is the other way when the State wishes to borrow money.
Nobody has to lend to the State; and yet its affairs cannot
be managed unless many do. As a consequence, investors
and their representatives have enormous political influence.
Amicus’ members have sold billions of dollars of so-called
moral obligation bonds, honds which are not even legally
binding obligations of the States, only because they, and
investors, realize this underlying reality.

In N. J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J.
1, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), the court upheld
the constitutionality of the legislation establishing the
Sports Authority. In separate opinions, Chief Justice
Weintraub and two of his colleagues expressly stated that
the State could abolish or curtail horse racing, though rev-
enues from that activity were the Authority’s primary
means of paying its bonds. 61 N.J. at 37-39, 58. The four-
member majority of the court believed the question “hypo-
thetical” and not properly before the court. 61 N.J. at 28.
The majority agreed, however, that bond covenants
were subject to “a proper exercise of the State’s never
abdicated police powers.” 61 N.J. at 26. If the protesta-
tions of appellant and amicus had any substance, the Sports
Authority bonds should not have been marketable. Yet the

81

bonds were sold in January 1974, just as the Port
Authority’s 42nd series was sold after the decisions below,
A 1123-1124.

The bond market does not need unique immunity from
the police power. To confer it would be to grant sophisti-
cated investors seeking a tax-free return a certitude in
arranging their affairs denied to everyone else.

D. The 1974 Repeal Legislation Constituted an Exer-
cise of the States’ Police Power.

The repeal of the covenant was obviously an exercise of
the police power of the States. As shown in the Counter-
Statement of the Case, pp. 56-59, supra, repeal had been
considered on three prior occasions in the immediate past.
It moved forward swiftly in 1974 because of an energy
crisis that was an everyday reality to anyone who needed
gasoline for an automobile. Federal orders that would re-
strict use of automobiles to reduce pollution hung over the
State. Even appellant’s chief witness, in a letter written to
The New York Times the day after Governor Bryne signed
the repeal, characterized government efforts to im,rove
mass transit as a proper use of State police power. A 246.

Thus, appellant’s assertion that the crises in mass transit,
energy and pollution were just a matter of coincidence is
unfounded.

Appellant’s complaint comes lown to the proposition that
the 1974 law contained no findings of fact or declarations
of emergency. Yet no authority of this Court holds that
such findings or declarations are constitutionally required.
In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), the Minnesota Supreme Court had supplemented
the legislative findings with its own findings concerning
economic conditions in the State, noting that “Courts must
be guided by what is common knowledge.” See 290 U.S. at
422-493. Chief Justice, Hughes’ opinion relied upon the
Minnesota Attorney General’s oral argument expounding
the conditions that had prompted the mortgage moratorium.

82

Similarly, in El ’aso vy. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), this
Court relied on »ooks and land office records in describing
Texas’ experience with its land policy, and the record was
silent as to what, if anything, had been said in the legisla-
ture. See also Butchers Union Co. vy. Crescent City Co.,
supra, 111 U.S. 746 (1884).

The courts below properly declined to declare that the
Constitution requires the Legislature to garnish its enact-
ments with ritual recitals of what everyone knows and
appellant coi °edes—that improving mass transit is respon-
sive to vital energy and environmental needs. New Jersey
too follows the rule that the “courts must be guided by what
is common knowledge.” Bucsi v. Longworth Building &
Loan Ass’n, 119 N.J.L. 120, 122 (BE. & A. 1937), appeal
dismissed, 305 U.S. 665 (1938).

This Court’s precedents also reject the contention that
use of the police power must be based on emergencies
or declarations thereof. In Gelfert vy. National City Bank,
313 U.S. 221 (1941), the Court reviewed the constitutional-
ity under the contract clause of a New York statute that
drastically diminished the protection enjoyed by mort-
gagees. Under the statutes applicable when the mortgage
was made, the mortgagee was entitled to a deficieney judg-
ment for the short-fall between the price received for the
property and the amount owed. The new statute authorized
a court to set a “fair and reasonable value on the property”
different from that for which it in fact sold.

The challenged statute, Chapter 510 of the Laws of New
York, 1938, included neither legislative findings nor a
declaration of emergency. The New York Court of Appeals
held it unconstitutional because it was “not addressed to a
declared public emergency,” and was “not designed for the
relief of urgent public needs,” 313 U.S. at 230. Despite this
deprecating characterization by the highest State court
concerning the product of its own Legislature, this Court
reversed the decision, holding:

82

“The fact that an emergency was not declared to
exist when this statute was passed does not bring
within the protective scope of the contract clause
rights which were denied such protection in Honey-
man v. Jacobs.” 313 U.S. at 235.%

Veix v. Sixth Ward Building € Loan Ass’n of Newark,
310 U.S. 32 (1940), also rejected the argument that a
declared emergency is necessary to legislative action under
the police power. The statute under attack in Veiz per-
manently modified the contractual right of depositors to
withdraw their money from savings and loan associations;
the statute contained no declaration of emergency. After
stating that “all contracts are made subject to the [State’s]
paramount authority,” 310 U.S. at 38, the Court responded
to appellant’s contention that Blaisdell was limited to
emergency legislation of a temporary character:

“The cases [including Blaisdell] cited in the preced-
ing paragraph make repeated reference to the
emergency existing at the time of enactment of the
questioned statutes. Many of the enactments were
temporary in character. We are here considering
a permanent piece of legislation. So far as the con-
tract clause is concerned, is this significant? We
think not.” 310 U.S. at 39.%°

E. Repeal Constituted a Reasonable Exercise of the
States’ Police Power.
1. The Blaisdell case
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), is the starting point of modern contract clause

54. Gelfert totally repudiates appellant’s arguments, A.B. 63-64,
that the decision in this case should turn on = the —_, be
temporary or long-lasting—a distinction appellant urges on th
pein er that vente v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843), is
controlling. Gelfert effectively overruled Bronson, noting it had by
Blaisdell, “been confined to the special circumstances there involved
.... We cannot permit the broad language those early decisions
employed to force legislatures to be blind to the lessons which an-
other century has taught.” 313 U.S. at 235. —_

55. If the existence of an emergency were significant, New
Jersey’s energy crisis and public health problems would clearly

qualify.

84

analysis. As the Court observed in East New York Savings
Bank vy. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 231-232 (1945):

“The comprehensive opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in that case cut beneath the skin of words to
the core of meaning. After a full review of the
whole course of decisions expounding the Contract
Clause—covering almost the life of this Court—the
Chief Justice, drawing on the early insight of Mr.
Justice Johnson in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
213, 286, as reinforced by later decisions cast in more
modern terms, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S.
170, 198, put the Clause in its proper perspective in
our constitutional framework.”

Blaisdell declared that the validity of a contract modifi-
cation turns on “whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end,” 290 U.S. at 438, repeated in El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 507 n.9 (1965). The search
is for “a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare.” 290 U.S. at 442. |

The central question asks whether a valid public interest
is being served. Thus, legislation may not simply extin-
guish contract rights because it is inconvenient to pay
them. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). Com-
pare Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n of Newark,
supra, (public interest, law upheld), with Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (similar law, but
found to have been “directed merely toward a private right
and not deemed in the public interest.” 310 U.S. at 41).
Cf. New Jersey Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super.
313, 320 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 58 N.J. 482 (1971) (law
invalid where primary objective “conferring of personal
benefit upon Guardsmen and reservists” rather than “any

85

problem of state-wide importance” as in El Paso). In addi-
tion, the legislation must not reveal a “studied indiffer-
ence” to the interests of persons seeking to enforce con-
tractual obligations. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56 (1935).

While appellant tries at length to read error into the
trial court’s discussion of Worthen v. Kavanaugh, supra,
A.B. 58-59, that court’s treatment is perfectly consistent
with this Court’s analysis in Faitoute Iron ¢ Steel Co. v.
City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515 (1942), where the
Court inquired whether the legislature had been guilty of
“studied indifference” to private interests.

Thus, contrary to appellant’s analysis, El Paso v. Sim-
mons, which provides the most recent expression of the
standards controlling this case, did not set forth contract
clause principles applicable only to the most aberrant of
settings. It was part and parcel of a continuing search
for a fair accommodation between two principles that
frequently clash—contract rights are constitutionally
entitled to respect, and the States must retain their sover-
eign power to protect their people.

2. The El Paso case

Texas provided for the sale of public lands on very easy
credit terms when it was raising money for school funds
and seeking to encourage settlement. The statutes govern-
ing these sales provided that one who forfeited the land
back to the State for non-payment of interest had an
unlimited time in which to reinstate his rights by payment
of back interest, subject to the vesting of rights in third
persons. In 1941, after a history of land title disputes and
rampant speculation in such lands, Texas limited the right
of reinstatement to five years. Simmons was the owner
of a deed to land contracted for in 1910, for which the

86

timely payment of back interest had not been made. He
challenged the constitutionality of the 1941 law after Texas
transferred the property to the City of El Paso in 1957.
Despite the dissent of Justice Black, who urged reten-
tion of formal categories of impairment analysis in prefer-
ence to standards of reasonablness, all the other Justices
took the contrary view. The Court held squarely that “it is
not every modification of a contractual promise that im-
pairs the obligation of contract under federal law.” 379 U.S.
at 506-507. Quoting extensively from Chief Justice Hughes’
opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, supra,
Justice White wrote this key passage, 379 U.S. at 508-509:

“The decisions ‘put it beyond question that the
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula,’ as Chief Justice Hughes said in Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
The Blaisdell opinion, which amounted to a compre-
hensive restatement of the principles underlying the
application of the Contract Clause, makes it quite
clear that ‘{[nJot only is the constitutional provision
qualified by the measure of control which the State
retains over remedial processes, but the State also
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. It does not matter that
legislation appropriate to that end “has the result of
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.”
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276. Not only
are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reserva-
tion of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
_.. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional
prohibition with the necessary residuum of state
power has had progressive recognition in the deci-
sions of this Court.’ 290 U.S. at 434. Moreover, the

87

‘economic interests of the state may justify the exer-
cise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts.’ /d.,
290 U.S. at 437. The State has the ‘sovereign right
. .. to protect the ... general welfare of the people.
.. - Once we are in this domain of the reserve power
of a State we must respect the “wide discretion on
the part of the legislature in determining what is and
what is not necessary.”’ East New York Savings
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-233. As Mr. Justice
J ohnson said in Ogden v. Saunders, ‘{i]t is the
motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize
a ao = to affect it with the imputation of
violating the obligation of contracts.’ 2

6 L.Ed. 606, 633. neous we

“Of course, the power of a state to modify or affect
the obligation of contract is not without limit.
‘|W Jhatever is reserved of state power must be con-
sistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limi-
tation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the
limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved
power in its essential aspects. They must be con-
strued in harmony with each other. This principle
precludes a construction which would permit the
State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts
or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means
to enforce them.’ Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at 439.”

As the last sentence quoted makes clear, the State may
not have a policy of repudiating debts, destroying contracts
or denying the means to enforce them. In specific instances,
however, it may modify contracts where the end is legiti-
mate and the measures taken are reasonable. And in deter-
mining whether the measures are reasonable, the legislatu
has “wide discretion.” :

The Court proceeded to apply these principles, revealing
once again that a considerable loss may constitutionally be
inflicted on a party contracting with the State, in further-

88

ance of governmental ends far less important than those
New Jersey was serving here. The Court decided that the
Texas law modifying plaintiff’s contract served a “vital
interest” by promising to disentagle some land titles. 379
U.S. at 515. Obviously, neglect of this interest would not
have led to governmental collapse.

The contractual interest impaired, the Court said, was
not the seller’s “central undertaking” nor the “primary
consideration” for the purchaser’s undertaking, nor was it
the “substantial inducement” to enter the contract. 379
U.S. at 514. This was not, of course, to say that the con-
tractual interest impaired was trivial—its loss cost Sim-
mons title to land he could have owned if the contract
were carried out. Though not the “substantial induce-
ment,” Simmons’ interest was plainly substantial, as
indeed were the interests of other parties that have alleged
contract impairment, such as people denied money then
owed to them. E.g., Albigese v. City of Jersey City, 127
N.J. Super. 101, 112-113 (Law Div.), aff’d, 129 N.J. Super.
567 (App. Div. 1974); California Teachers Ass’n v. New-
port Mesa Unified School District, 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) ; Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 41
Mich. App. 654, 201 N.W. 2d 83 (1972), leave to appeal
denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973). Unlike appellant, which has
suffered no loss at all, those litigants were seriously
damaged.

56. Appellant attempts to sever El Paso from its legal back-
ground ages Pm Pe of factors. A.B. 70-78. One searches
El Paso in vain for any indication that the eight Justices who joined
that opinion regarded it as a “narrow exception,” A.B. 70, carved
out of otherwise firm rules. Nonetheless, appellant reads El Paso
not as a broad exposition of the police power doctrine but rather as
having erected a series of barriers to State action. The approach
is wrong. As was indicated above, the applicable principle is that
a State may modify a contract when “the legislation is addressed to
a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appro-
priate to that end.” The factors emphasized by appellant were the
elements present in that particular case that made it reasonable for

the State to take Simmons’ land without paying. |
(Footnote continued)

3. Appellant’s claim that the price purchasers
were willing to pay for bonds was affected
by the covenant is unsupported by the record
and immaterial as a matter of law.

Appellant places great weight on its claim that, sup-
posedly unlike El Paso, purchasers were so interested i:
the covenant that it affected the price they were willing to
pay for bonds. The claim is defective in two respects: the
record does not support the factual premise on which it
rests ; and, even if it did, the claim is immaterial as a matter
of law.

The weight of the evidence is overwhelmingly against the
proposition that the covenant and its repeal ever affected
bond prices or interest rates, save for the short-term fall-
off to be discussed presently. The record shows that Port

(Footnote continued)

In any event, appellant’s distinctions are ill-taken. First, El Paso
does not say that the five-year limit was the only way to solve the
problem; the State could have taken the contingent interest by
eminent domain. The Court merely indicated at the pages cited,
379 U.S. at 512-513, that less drastic measures had proved unwork-
able, precisely the situation here where efforts begun in 1970 to
involve the Port Authority in expanded rail mass transit had been
stymied. Second, the covenant was not a primary inducement to pur-
chase of Authority bonds; the trial court found few if any investors
knew what it did. By contrast, in El Paso, it was precisely because
purchasers knew of and relied upon the reinstatment possibility that
land prices soared. Third, appellant says that buyers co. ‘1 not have
relied too heavily on reinstatement in E/ Paso because tl = sht was
defeasible, though not in the way the State sought to defeai. Here,
too, the covenant provides no security that cannot be taken away
because, among other things, it leaves the States free to assign a
whole range of deficit-generating activities—e.g., habor waste disposal
—to the Port Authority. Fourth, as the trial court found, there have
been substantial changes since 1962, both in the Authority’s financial
picture and in the impact of the —- and environmental crises.
Fifth, the covenant does impose a difficult burden upon the State.
The reasonableness of its repeal is enhanced because, unlike E/ Paso,
where buyers were advantaged by reinstatement, bond investors are
not advantaged by the covenant and not harmed by repeal. In fact,
their security has been enhanced by increasing the flow of funds
against which they have a first lien.

90

Authority bond prices and interest rates were unaffected
in January 1962, even though a rail mass transit law was
on the books in one State and related legislation was pend-
ing in the other. See page 41, supra. In 1972, New York
repealed the covenant, an action that is not claimed to have
affected bond prices.

The 1973 prospective repeal of the Covenant is likewise
not claimed to have had any effect on Port Authority bond
prices. Here appellant’s explanation is that purchasers
—faced with an official statement that the covenant did not
apply—were confident that the covenant would nonetheless
be continued until 2007. A.B. 24-25. This claim is incon-
sistent with appellant’s assertion, e.g., A.B. 14, that further
mass transit could be accomplished by a compromise with
holders of covenant-protected bonds.

Next, bond prices were unaffected by the pendency of
repeal legislation in both States in 1974. A 210-211, 213-214.
Appellant offers no explanation for this.

Finally, since repeal in 1974, the prices at which Port
Authority bonds trade in the secondary market have not
been affected, save for a short-term decline from which the
bonds recovered long ago. At points, appellant seems to
argue that this short-term drop is to be treated as the
damage its case otherwise so desperately lacks. However,
for those who sold during the fall-off, A.B. 40n. 24, invalida-
tion of repeal would do no good; and for those who held
on, there is no damage. Moreover, if there was damage,
appellant caused it: on the very day New Jersey repealed
the covenant, appellant held a news conference in which
it announced the filing of this suit, characterized the repeal
of the covenant as a severe blow to bondholders, and de-

clared that it would no longer buy Port Authority bonds.
See A 44.45. The wire services carried the story. This
was the trustee and largest holder of Port Authority bonds

91

speaking. A course of conduct surer to drive down bond
prices, and obscure a true market reaction, can hardly be
imagined.

Thus, the only evidence suggesting that the covenant af-
fected bond prices is the hypothetical testimony of appel-
lant’s witnesses as to what they would have done on a state
of facts that never existed, and that never could have
existed.

Their opinion of the covenant’s importance rested not on
its merits, for they did not understand it, but on what they
had been told about it by Authority spokesmen. Thus, the
hypothesis on which they opined that they would have
sought a better price included not only the premise that
there was no covenant but also the premise that Port Auth-
ority spokesmen were advising them that the covenant was
vital to their interests and that the bonds could not be sold
without it. And this was explicity made a part of the hypo-
thesis on which Mr. Thompson’s opinion was given. A 858.
The Port Authority’s behavior since repeal, and its evident
self-interest at all times, demonstrate that the Port Auth-
ority would not have damned its own bonds merely because
they lacked the 1962 covenant. (The Port Authority’s
rhetoric in 1962 was part of its effort to obtain the
covenant.) When one of the premises of a hypothetical
question is unsupported by evidence in the record, the wit-
ness’ answer is, of course, to be disregarded as irrelevant.
In any event, the evidence of what actually happened to
Port Authority bond prices refutes the witnesses’ unsup-
ported speculations.”

The precedents are clear that even if those speculations
were taken as true, they would not make unreasonable an
otherwise permitted exercise of the reserved powers of sov-

57. mais t Gis untied od & caneaten bam On be outiy
given weight to the testimony of a contracting that he really
cared about what was taken away. Courts i analyze the
abrogated provisions on an objective basis.

92

ereignty. In Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746 (1884), the Court noted that the slaughterhouse
monopoly had spent substantial sums in reliance upon its
grant from the State. Repeal of the monopoly was upheld.
Similarly, in Faitoute Iron d Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), the purchasers of municipal bonds
unquestionably relied on the interest and maturity dates in
their bonds, and the remedies for enforcing them, and
obviously would not have paid the same price for the bonds
without those features. Nonetheless, the changes were up-
held. In El Paso itself, purchasers of installment contracts
were using their reinstatement possibilities as a mechanisin
for speculating on subsequent discovery of minerals. They
would not have purchased and paid the inflated prices the
contracts commanded but for those possibilities.** The gen-
eral pom. ‘s worth stating: it will often be true that sub-
sequent legislation modifying some aspect of a contract
would have affected the initial bargain had the legislation
been anticipated. To make such effect dispositive would
emasculate the police power.

4. Repeal deprived bondholders of an interest of
little or no value to further ends of large im-
portance.

a. I'he bondholders’ interest. Bondholders contracted to
receive periodic payments of interest, and repayment of
principal when due. That is the performance owed them,

58. As Mr. Justice White observed :

“Hence the land Commissioner noted that the majority of
sales and resale . . . were to purchasers buying a ‘speculative
option,’ ‘taken for possible profits on the rights of the surface
owners to lease the land for oil and gas.’ ‘Under such con-
ditions lands were bid in at highly inflated prices such as no
one who expected to keep the land could afford to offer.’” 379
U.S. ‘at 512.

One can only imagine the statute’s catastrophic effect on the
“secondary market” for such contracts.

93

and neither the States nor the Port Authority have in
any way questioned that duty. Thus, unlike the great
majority of contract impairment cases where wage in-
creases are cancelled,*’ rents rolled back,” future interests
wiped out, or statutory restrictions on liquidity imposed,”
nothing of the performance contracted for has been with-
held here.

Undoubtedly, the obligation to repay principal and pay
interest is the “central undertaking” for purposes of El
Paso analysis. That was what the court deemed the
primary obligation of bonds in Beaumont v. Faubus, 239
Ark. 801, 394 S.W.2d 478 (1965). In Jacksonville Port
Auth. v. State, 161 So.2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1964), the court
held that “[t]he right of a bondholder is to have his
principal and interest paid when due; and it should be of
little interest to him from what fund his obligation is
currently being paid so long as he is being paid from some
source sufficient to discharge what is his due.” See also
New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s Vine-
yard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.2d
637, appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal ques-
tion, 358 U.S. 53 (1958); Opinion of the Justices, 313
N.E.2d 882 (Mass. 1974). All of these cases upheld

59. California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified School
Dist., 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971).

60. Albigese v. Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101 (Law Div.),
aff'd, 129 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1974).

61. Huddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Society, 186 N.W. 2d
904 (Neb. 1971).

62. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310
U.S. 32 (1940). One di to ignore the record and accept
appellant’s claim of damage at face value could still conclude at
most that repeal caused a decline in price in the secondary market
and a “thinness” in that market. Since timely payment of interest
and principal are not claimed to be in jeopardy, appellant is, in
effect, claiming only a loss in liquidity. The Court has frequently per-
mitted States to impose such a loss in pursuit of permissible ends.
E.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, supra;
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra; Veix, supra.

94

challenged legislation, treating the primary duty of pay-
ment as different from the permissibility of particular
expenditures.®?

Indeed, the Port Authority’s Consolidated Bond Resolu-
tion itself makes clear what is primary and what is second-
ary. Under Section 16 of the Resolution, A 802, the
obligation of the Port Authority is absolute and uncondi-
tional only with respect to payment of principal and
interest.

Did repeal of the covenant materially affect the prob-
ability that the Port Authority’s bonds would be paid? The
answer is no, and appellant has never alleged or offered
to prove otherwise. The covenant does not provide “secur-
ity” in the classic sense of a lien on a particular piece of
property that can be sold in the event a debt is not repaid;
the covenant does not effect a pledge of particular funds,
whether now in hand or after acquired; the covenant does
not even assure that the Port Authority’s net revenues will
be higher with it than without it.

It simply is not true that the cousequence of upholding
the covenant is that the sum of money available to pay
bonds will be greater than if the covenant is repealed. The
linkage of repeal to toll increases for mass transit support
has increased the total sums available for repayment of
bonds. Moreover, even with the covenant the States could
have required the Port Authority to run whatever deficit
facilities other than passenger railroads the Commissioners
could certify under the 1.3 and Section 7 tests. Deficit
operations ranging from the Staten Island ferries and all

63. In Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973),
which appellant cites at A.B. 54, the legislation called into question
the legality of performing the primary duty of repaying the bonds
as scheduled and no exercise of the police power was involved.
Similarly, First Nat'l. Bank v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 156 Me. 131
(1957), also cited at A.B. 54, involved no exercise of the police
power—-the legislation attempted to confer private benefits by mak-
ing the Authority pay utility costs.

95

bus lines in the area to handling harbor waste disposal fal]
within the scope of the Port Authority Compact given the
Compact’s allowance for additional duties. These duties
could be assigned to the Port Authority and the public tax
money now spent on them applied to railroad purposes. It
makes no difference to bondholders whether money goes to
buses or trains—but the covenant applied only to the latter.

: b. The public ends. On the other side of the balance, the
interests of the States are of a character and intensity far
surpassing any presented in the Blaisdell-El Paso line of
eases. Even in El Paso, the principal harm to the State
from its ill-advised land policy was that it had contracted
itself into a mess and sold its lands too cheaply when it
wanted to encourage settlement. The “imbroglio” over land
titles could obviously have been solved without resort to
breach of contract.

In this case, the States’ interests are those core problems
of health and public safety that led the courts to develop
the police power exception to impairment doctrine. hey
are “fundamental interests” falling well within the meaning
of the principle that, “[T]he Court has sought to prevent
the perversion of the [contract] clause through its use as
an instrument to throttle the capacity of the States to pro-
tect their fundamental interests,” Home Building ¢ Loan
Ass’n v. Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at 443-444.

In the fourteen years since the cc venant’s enactment, it
has become clear that the fumes that emanate from motor
vehicles are a deadly danger. They have left the air in the
region so polluted that it is far below the minima required
to protect the public health. 42 U.S.C. section 1857C-
4(b)(1). The import of that finding cannot be stressed too
strongly. People’s life expectancy and physical well-being
are being affected by the transit problems to which the
Port Authority’s bridges and tunnels have so heavily con-
tributed. Indeed, the State has been subjected to federal

96

pressure and plans, which would, in effect, shut down the
northern part of the State because of its inability to bring
pollution levels down to the level required to protect the
public health.

The State has openly opposed such plans. A 567. That
opposition reflects a dreadful reality. At some point even
serious encroachments on the health of our citizens must
be tolerated if the alternative is outright economic collapse.
But the State is surely privileged to see to it that the alter-
natives are not put that way. If government is not organ-
ized for carrying out purposes of that magnitude, then we
do not know what it is organized for.

Moreover, as was seen just two years ago and may be
seen again, the State can be thrown into total havoc at any
time by the actions of foreign oil suppliers. It is not hyper-
bole to claim that conserving this precious resource, and
providing for alternatives if its flow is shut off or its
expense made prohibitive, is a matter of political survival.
It should not be forgotten that the oil embargo led to near-
violent confrontations over access to gasoline in New
Jersey, and outright gun battles over truck fuel allocations
in other States.

One may argue about the gravity of our energy and
environmental difficulties. But reasonable people may
surely believe that they should be attended to, and that is
the test governing the Court. When physical, political or
economie survival is at stake, the power of the Legislature
is at its zenith.

ce. The insufficiency of other means. Appellant suggests
that the States should pursue their fundamental interests
without repeal because the covenant itself permits
increased Port Authority participation in rail mass transit.
A.B. 14. As a legal matter, this judgment about means is

97

precisely the sort that is within the wide ambit of legislative
discretion. But appellant’s argument should be analyzed
on its merits. At A.B. 14, it says:

“(T]he Covenant by its terms permits Port Au-
thority construction of rail facilities on its bridges;
it permits Port Authority involvement in freight rail
facilities; it permits any mass transit involvement
of the agency of which bondholders approve; it per-
mits the agency to undertake passenger rail mass
transit operations which, by federal or state financial
assistance or otherwise, together with user charges,
can be made self-supporting within the meaning of
the Covenant.”

Appellant goes on to claim that the States’ rail mass transit
plans could have been accomplished if the Authority “had
been permitted by the States to raise PATH fares to com-
petitive levels.” Appellant concludes:

“no one disputes that anything which the States wish
to accomplish through repeal of the Covenant can to
the same extent be accomplished within the Covenant
if either of the States are willing, through direct sub-
sidies, guarantees or otherwise, to stand behind the
necessary financing.” A.B. 14; emphasis added.

The argument shows the weakness of appellant’s case.
To build a passenger railroad that began at one end of the
George Washington Bridge and ended at the other would be
a very expensive joke: the covenant would prevent it from
going any further. That the covenant “permits Port
Authority involvement in freight rail facilities” is undis-
puted and irrelevant; the covenant does not permit further
involvement in passenger rail facilities, which is what this
case is about. Obtaining bondholder approval would be
impossibly burdensome: appellant’s counsel has sworn that
the owners of more than 95 percent of the Authority’s Con-
solidated Bonds are “unknown to the Port Authority or its

98

paying agents.” A 54. And appellant’s chief witness, Mr.
Thompson, concluded that an approach to bondholders for
their consent “would fail.” <A 192.

Appellant’s suggestion that a self-supporting rail mass
transit facility be established ignores the facts that even in
1972 PATH-Plainfield was “barely doable” on a self-sup-
porting basis, A 708-709, and that its costs have escalated
sharply sinee then. Because of its capital requirements,
the project will not be “self-supporting” within the mean-
ing of the covenant even though the State has agreed to
assume its operating deficits. See A 477, 527.

Nor would raising the fare “to competitive levels” help.
Appellant presumably regards the competitive level as a
dollar for a one-way trip, since it notes that AMTRAK
und Conrail charge that fare for a ride from Newark to
Manhattan, A.B. 16 n.12, even though neither AMTRAK
nor Conrail is a rapid transit facility like PATH. More
importantly, even if the basic PATH fare were increased
to a dollar per ride, the revenues would still be insufficient
to permit the financing of PATH-Plainfield within the
covenant. Statistics derived from Volume I of the Joint
Appendix below, pp. 255-70, 73 and 74, indicate that the
PATH fare would, at the very least, have to be quadrupled
to $1.20 per ride, with no loss of passengers, to enable the
Authority to spend the $12 million per year required for
debt service on PATH-Plainfield alone.“

Finally, appellant claims that “no one disputes” that any-
thing repeal can do the States can do “to the same extent”
by putting up their own money. The claim has two glaring
defects. First, the State has, of course, disputed this claim
repeatedly and emphatically, and both courts below have
agreed with the State. Second, the claim itself is equally
defective. Repeal of the covenant has made possible impo-

64. As long as the covenant remained in effect, to raise the PATH
fares to any level that would retain ridership would simply have
added to the Authority’s ample reserves.

sition of a 50 percent increase in vehicular tolls to finance
mass transit projects and increase the Port Authority’s
reserves. The States themselves could not have imposed
that toll increase, with its auto-inhibiting potential.® Nor,
in all probability, could the Port Authority have imposed it
without applying the surplus revenues to mass transit.

Thus, repeal permits a balanced, comprehensive approach
to the States’ transportation, air quality and energy goals,
an approach that is not available “to the same extent” with-
out repeal.

It is worth emphasizing that the plan to be implemented
as a result of repeal differs from that publicly and privately
urged by appellant’s chief witness, Mr. Thompson, A 189,
246, only in offering greater protection to bondholders.®
The plan would, however, have been impossible under Mr.
Tobin’s interpretation of the 1962 covenant, A 689, for the
simple, but indefensible, reason that it precluded any appli-
cation of Port Authority vehicular tolls, even increased
tolls, to any new rail mass transit project that did not cover
all of its operating expenses and debt service. The repeal
allows more rational and flexible financing, including the
increased vehicular tolls, reasonable appropriations and
subsidies by the federal government, the States and the
Port Authority, appropriate charges to the users of rail
mass transit facilities and enhanced security for bond-
holders.

Appellant also argues, A. B. 73, that the States can
achieve their ends without involving the great revenue-
producing facilities they helped the Port Aut

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2399%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
