# Motion to Dismiss — United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion to Dismiss
- **Published:** January 1, 1977
- **Citation:** 431 U.S. 1

## Text

er iaremesctn’ |S
Ms FILED

JUN 7 1976

i
IN THE 5 |
Supreme Court of the Anite, State K, JR., nate

Ocroper Term, 1975

No. 75-1687

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
as Trustee for The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-
First Series, on its own behalf and on behalf of all
holders of Consolidated Bonds of The Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly

situated
Appellant,
v.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T.
BYRNE, Governor of the State of New Jersey, and
WILLIAM F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State
of New Jersey,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

——————_—_— SSS

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR WANT OF A
SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION

——_—_—_— en

Wuium F. Hyianp,
Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey,
Attorney for Appellees,
State House Annex,
Trenton, New Jersey. 08625
By Special Counsel:

Mronazt I. Sovery,
Murray J. Lav.icut,
Harzotp 8. H. Epaas.

Dated: June 7, 1976
SSS ese tenner NY oan) eae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Motion To Dismiss For Want oF a SUBSTANTIAL
FEDERAL QUESTION

STATEMENT

A. The lower courts found that repeal had no
adverse effect upon bondholders .

B. The lower courts found that repeal of the
covenant was a proper exercise of the States’
police power

THe THree Questions PreseNTeD Are Nor Susstan-
TAIL FEDERAL QUESTIONS

Tue Svuacestion THat THE Court Notre PRoBABLE
JURISDICTION AND DererR FurRTHER CONSIDERATION IS
WitrnHovut Merit

CONCLUSION .........

Cases Cited

Albigese v. City of Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101,
316 A.2d 483 (Law Div.), modified on other grounds,
129 N.J. Super. 567, 324 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1974)

Arizona State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson, 105 Ariz.
76, 549 P.2d 509 (1969)

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) ....

Beaumont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801, 394 S.W.2d 478
(1965)

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)

PAGE

10

13

S 8

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Calif. Teachers Ass’n v. Newport Unified School
District, 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 200000... 20

City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) ..17, 19, 20
Delaware River Port Authority v. Tiemann, 403 F.

Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975) 12
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,

316 U.S. 502 (1942) 22
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) ........ 15
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497 (2d Cir.

April 26, 1976) 26
Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

et al., No. 75-1712 10

Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941) .... 29
Home Building & Loan Ass’n vy. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.

398 (1934) . 17-19
Jacksonville Port Auth. v. State, 161 So.2d 825 (Fla.
1964) 21

Lyon v. Flournoy, 271 Cal. App.2d 774, 76 Cal. Rptr.
869 (1969) appeal dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, 396 U.S. 274 (1970) ........ 20

Massachusetts Port Authority v. Treasurer & Re-
ceiver General, 352 Mass. 755, 227 N.E.2d 902

(1967) | 20
Matter of Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 281 N.Y.S.
2d 1, 227 N.E.2d 824 (1967) 20, 29

Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 41 Mich.
App. 654, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), leave to appeal
denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973) 20

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PAGE

New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s
Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 336 Mass. 691,
148 N.E.2d 637, appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 358 U.S. 53 (1958) .... 21

N.J. Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super. 313, 268
A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff’d, 58 N.J. 432, 278
A.2d 489 (1971) . 13, 14

N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. MeCrane, 61 N.J.
1, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943

(1972) . 13, 20
Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D.C. Colo.

1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 317 (1970) 20
Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d

223 (1956) 21

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. 1974) 20
Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298

N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 275 (1969) 28
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) 15
Twentieth Century Association, Inc. v. Waldman, 294
N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945) 29
Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n of New-
ark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) 29
New York Constitution Cited
Article 1:
Sec. 6 29
See. 7 29

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGH
Statutes Cited
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 ...... sasiasndiaaiiiincailidads 26
Compact Clause, Art. 1, $10, cl. 3 ...22.22.......cseceeceeeeeee 10
Emergency Energy Fair Practices Act of 1974 ........ 11

National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 12
New Jersey Laws, 1974, Chapter 25 -........: Sicntieusimiaiiie
Se
New York Laws, 1974 Chapter 993

Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 -................. 11
28 U.S.C.:
RE ree 28
50 U.S.C.—Energy Supply and Environmental Co-
ordination Act of 1974:
Be We Se CI; venirsinitrniaeriatitensttinsoinitiatieiiiatee 11,12
Regulation Cited
38 Fed. Reg. 31388 et seq. (November 13, 1973) ........ 11
Other Authorities Cited
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944) 0. 14
The Federalist Papers, Number 44 15
Wright, The Contract Clause and the Constitution
(1938) 14

ER EE Se ee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1975

No. 75-1687

—_——

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
as Trustee for The Port ew of New York and
New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, ortieth and Forty-
First Series, on its own behalf and .on behalf of all
holders of Consolidated Bonds of The Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly

— Appellant,
Vv.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T.
BYRNE, Governor of the State of New Jersey, and
WILLIAM F. HYLAND, Attorney General of the State

of New Jersey, Appellees

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

+—-

Motion To Dismiss For Want of a Substantial
Federal Question

Appellees, the State of New Jersey, Governor Brendan
T. Byrne and Attorney General William F. Hyland, move
the Court to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the

2

appeal does not present a substantial federal question re-
quiring plenary consideration, with briefs on the merits
and oral argument, for its resolution.

Appellant’s claim that the challenged legislation was
an arbitrary exercise of the States’ police power is re-
futed by a massive record, both stipulated and litigated
that makes clear the contrary proposition. Significantly,
none of the eight judges who have reviewed it to date, in
a forum of appellant’s choosing, has thought otherwise.
Their unanimous conclusion is reflected in the trial court’s
finding that “the claim that bondholder security has been
materially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is simply
not supported by the record.” A108*

The essence of appellant’s remaining claims, here as be-
low, is that the Contract Clause provides absolute protec-
tion to every undertaking contained in or applicable to
municipal bonds, regardless of how peripheral it is to
securing the underlying obligation or how seriously it
impedes accomplishment of vital governmental purposes.
Courts have uniformly rejected that position. To adopt
it would create a specially privileged class enjoying a

unique immunity denied to everyone else who enters into
contracts.

Statement

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, unanimously affirming a judgment
of the Superior Court of New Jersey, upholding the con-

* “A” and “B” refer to the Appendix to Appellant’s Jurisdictional
Statement. “j.S.” refers to Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement.
we refers to the trial transcript. “Stip.” refers to the Stipulation.

C” refers to a trial court exhibit. “S” refers to a State exhibit.

a

3

stitutionality of Chapter 25 of the New Jersey Laws of
1974. B5-6. The challenged 1974 statute, together with
concurrent and identical legislation of the State of New
York, Chapter 993 of the New York Laws of 1974, re-
pealed legislation enacted in 1962 and hereinafter referred
to as the 1962 covenant, whereby the States of New York
and New Jersey and the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey were precluded from applying any of the
Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger railroad
purposes other than the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
(now known as PATH) unless permitted by the extra-
ordinarily complicated criteria set forth in the 1962 legis-
lation, N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55. B1-4.

This action was commenced by appellant on April 30,
1974. In December 1974, the parties signed and filed a
366-page stipulation of facts with respect to the estab-
lishment and facilities of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey; New Jersey’s public transportation re-
quirements, including analyses of demographic and trans-
portation factors, the energy crisis and health and envir-
onmental factors; a history of rapid transit passenger
rail operations in the Port District and the Metropolitan
New York area from 1921 to late 1974; federal mass
transportation policy as reflected in federal legislation
and federal administrative determinations; the financial
position of the Port Authority; a description of Port
Authority bonds and bond resolutions, including the com-
ments of the two principal bond rating agencies, Moody’s
and Standard & Poor’s; and additional materials with
respect to the enactment of the 1962 covenant and the
1974 repeal legislation. The stipulation was accompanied
by 8 lengthy exhibits, including the then most recent plan
of the New Jersey Department of Transportation and
the latest Official Statement (or prospectus) and Annual
Report of the Port Authority; a detailed analysis pre-

4

pared in 1961—and thus prior to the 1962 covenant—by
the then General Solicitor of the Port Authority of its
financial and bonding structure; a 1971 consultant’s re-
port on the Port Authority’s participation in a new pas-
senger railroad operation; and materials from 1971 and
1972 State legislative hearings with respect to the Port
Authority’s participation in rail mass transit.

The stipulation and its accompanying exhibits demon-
strated that although the 1962 covenant did little or noth-
ing to enhance bondholder security, it had a profoundly
deleterious effect on the coordination of transportation
in the Port District. It impeded rational solution of the
pressing problems of increasing highway congestion, de-
teriorating mass transit, poisonous air pollution and un-
certain petroleum supplies. Appellees were, accordingly,
prepared to rest their defense of the repeal legislation on
the stipulated materials.

Appellant, however, requested and was granted an op-
portunity to present tesiimony on two additional factual
questions tendered by its complaint: whether Port Au-
thority bondholders relied in any meaningful sense upon
the 1962 covenant and whether the repeal of the 1962
covenant had an adverse effect on the secondary market
for Port Authority bonds. The trial court also indi-
cated that it would be desirable to present the testi-
mony of an expert witness with respect to the financial
structure of the Port Authority and the interrelationships
of the 1962 covenant and the other requirements set forth
in the Port Authority statutes and bond resolutions. T. 8-
10, 458-59; C-2. Five days of testimony and dozens of
additional exhibits were introduced with respect to these
matters at the trial conducted in February 1975.

ee

———

5

A. The lower courts found that repeal had
no adverse effect upon bondholders.

On May 14, 1975, the trial court issued its comprehen-
sive opinion sustaining the validity of New J ersey’s re-
peal of the 1962 covenant.’ With respect to the disputed
issue of bondholder reliance upon the 1962 covenant, the
trial court found that “few, if any, members of the in-
vestment community ever analyzed closely the actual effect
of the 1962 covenant upon bondholder security,” A90,
that “the covenant cannot be said to have been the ‘pri-
mary consideration’ for the purchases having been made,”
A91, and that neither the interest rates on Port Authority
bonds nor the ratings assigned to these bonds by the
principal rating services were affected by the presence
or absence of the 1962 covenant, A89-92. With respect to
the disputed question whether the repeal of the 1962 cove-
nant had an adverse effect upon the secondary market in
Port Authority bonds, the trial court, on the basis of ex-
tensive trial testimony and exhibits comparing prices of
Port Authority bonds and bonds issued by other tax-
exempt agencies, found that: “The bottom line of the
plaintiff's proofs on this issue is simply that the evidence
fails to demonstrate that the secondary market price of
Authority bonds was adversely affected by the repeal of
the covenant, except for a short-term fall-off in price the
effect of which has now been dissipated insofar as it can
be related to the enactment of the repeal.” A93-94.

The trial court carefully analyzed the _humerous and
powerful statutory and contractual provisions other than

1The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, with one Justice
partially dissenting, “substantially for the reasons set forth in the
opinion of” the trial court. A4. Justice Pashman s partially dissent-
ing opinion complimented the trial court’s “very enlightened and
comprehensive opinion.” A9.

6

the 1962 covenant that fully protect the security of Port
Authority bondholders. A51-61. They include among other
protections: the General Reserve Fund, irrevocably
pledged as security for the payment of interest and prin-
cipal on all Port Authority bonds, which contained
$173,487,000 in 1974; the 1.3 test, which insists that net
revenues exceed prospective debt service by a healthy
margin before new Consolidated Bonds may be issued;
the Consolidated Bond Reserve Fund, pledged as addi-
tional security for Consolidated Bonds, which grew from
$7.1 million in 1972 to $21.9 million in 1973 to $46.8 mil-
lion in 1974; a pledge of the net revenues from each
facility financed by the issuance of Consolidated Bonds
to the payment of debt service on all Consolidated Bonds;
a contractual commitment to establish and collect “rents,
tolls and other charges in connection with facilities the
net revenues of which are pledged as security for Con-
solidated Bonds, to the end that at least sufficient net
revenues may be produced therefrom at all times to pro-
vide for the debt service upon all Consolidated Bonds”;
a prohibition on the application of any part of the Con-
solidated Bond Reserve Fund for the payment of operat-
ing deficits of a facility acquired without the issuance of
Consolidated Bonds; and yet another prohibition on the
issuance of Consolidated Bonds for a facility not previ-
ously financed by Port Authority bonds unless the Com-
missioners of the Port Authority certify that the issuance
of the Consolidated Bonds for the proposed additional
facility will not “materially impair the sound credit stand-
ing of the Authority or the investment status of Consoli-
dated Bonds or the ability of the Authority to fulfill its
commitments, whether statutory or contractual or reason-
ably incidental thereto, including its undertakings to the
holders of Consolidated Bonds.”

7

Thus, before the 1962 covenant was enacted and after
its repeal, the Port Authority could not give its revenues
to other agencies to subsidize mass transit, and it could
not itself undertake any mass transit projects that might
endanger the bondholders’ security. It could no more take
over the New York City subway system, whose irrelevant
deficits appellant regularly recounts, J.S. 8, 13, than it
could the national debt. A109. The trial court concluded,
accordingly, that the repeal of the 1962 covenant did not,
as a factual matter, materially affect the obligation of
appellant’s contract:

The repeal, of course, leaves intact the provisions
of the CBR [the Consolidated Bond Resolution
adopted by the Authority on October 9, 1952] and
the series resolutions which now constitute, together
with the General Reserve Fund Act, the same meas-
ure of the bondholders’ contractual security rights
as existed prior to the enactment of the covenant
in 1962. Presumably rational investors—including
the plaintiff—purchased hundreds of millions of
dollars of consolidated bonds prior to 1962, without
the additional security afforded by the covenant and
with full knowledge of the power of the States to
direct the Authority into mass transit operations.
The two principal bond rating services, upon whose
judgment the financial community places great reli-
ance, rated the consolidated bonds—minus the cove-
nant—as securities as to which no default was anti-

cipated.

The claim that bondholder security has been ma-
terially impaired or destroyed by the repeal is
simply not supported by the record. The pledge of
the Authority’s net revenues and reserves remains

8

intact; the Authority will still be barred from the
issuance of any new consolidated bonds unless the
1.3 test required by the CBR is met; and the Au-
thority will continue to be prohibited from the is-
suance of any consolidated bonds or other bonds
secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund
without the certification required by section 7 of
the series resolutions, to wit: that in the opinion
of the Authority the estimated expenditures in con-
nection with any additional facility for which such
bonds are to be issued would not, for the ensuing
ten years, impair the sound credit standing of the
Authority, the investment status of its consolidated
bonds, or the Authority’s obligations to its consoli-
dated bondholders. A108.

The soundness of the trial court’s conclusion that repeal
of the 1962 covenant had no material significance was
promptly confirmed by leading investment advisers. With-
in two weeks after the trial court’s opinion, Barr Brothers
& Co., one of the three largest dealers in Port Authority
bonds, issued a report specifically referring to the trial
court’s decision, summarizing the other bondholder pro-
tections and the great financial strength of the Port Au-
thority, and concluding:

Whether or not the Port Authority ever gets in-
volved in Mass Transit, we feel it continues to be
one of the finest revenue credits in the country,
amply protected by the basic bond resolution, ex-
cellent management and some highly profitable and
monopolistic facilities that can more than carry a
reasonable amount of Mass Transit, particularly
with the recent toll increases on the Hudson cross-
ings providing additional revenues.

ee

AS

9

This report is from a firm that is a member of the class
represented by appellant and from which it selected one
of its expert witnesses. See J.S. 14, fn.

In June 1975, the month after the trial court’s opinion,
the two principal bond rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s
and Moody’s, each confirmed the continuation of the Port
Authority’s “A” rating. Standard & Poor’s, while ex-
pressing a concern about the effect of future Port Au-
thority involvement in mass transit, says: “Despite this
concern, we are continuing our ‘A’ rating on the Port
Authority’s Consolidated Bonds and are also rating the
new Consolidated Notes ‘A’ based upon the Authority’s
strong operating, financial and management record and
the prospect for a continuation of this outstanding rec-
ord.” Moody’s, also referring to the trial court’s opinion,
continues its “A” rating on Port Authority obligations
because “earnings of the present facilities are good, re-
serves for debt service continue strong, and recent toll
increases have further strengthened its financial position
at this time.”

These conclusions are not surprising. It was not bond-
holders who sought the 1962 covenant, but the manage-
ment of the Port Authority. A89-90; Stip., p. 158; S-40.
Until 1962, that management had resolutely, and success-
fully, opposed meaningful Port Authority participation in
the carriage of persons by rail. See, e.g., A61-65. A com-
mitment to rail transit would have deflected them from
other missions to which they attached higher priorities.
See, e.g., 8-33. Forced at last to accept some responsi-
bility for rail transit, they conceived of the covenant and

2 The “A” rating signifies that the bonds are of investment qual-
ity and that no default in payment of interest or principal is antici-
pated. A9I1.

10

insisted upon its enactment, as the price of their acquies-
cence.®

B. The lower courts found that repeal of

the covenant was a proper exercise
the States’ police power. - -

Though repeal of the 1962 covenant took little or noth-
ing from appellant, it did make possible rational planning
and administration of bi-State transportation efforts. The
trial court found that by early 1974, when the repeal legis-
lation was introduced, the public need for mass transpor-
tation facilities “became unprecedented as the result of
the promulgation of stringent federal air pollution regu-
lations designed to reduce automobile usage and the emer-
gence of an energy crisis which threatened the entire sys-
tem of private automobile transportation in the two
merce A107. This finding is amply supported by the
reco

In November 1973, the Administrator of the federal
Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regula-
tions designed to achieve a 67 percent reduction in hydro-

3 The State has argued from the outset that the 1962 covenant is
not a constitutionally protected contract both because the Compact
Clause, Art. 1, §10, cl. 3, and the Port Authority Compact itself
make it voidable, and because subsequent federal developments have
preempted it. The court below did not rule on these questions pre-
fering to assume arguendo that a contract was made and to hold the

repeal valid.

Should this Court note probable jurisdiction in the United States
Trust Company case, however, it ought to note probable jurisdiction
in Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey et al., No
75-1712 as well, so that these issues, which have not been passed
upon by the courts below, A110, may be considered fully.

11

carbon emissions and a 47 percent reduction in carbon
monoxide emissions in the northern part of New Jersey.
38 Fed. Reg. 31388 et seq. (November 13, 1973). In issu-
ing these regulations, the Administrator specifically em-
phasized the importance of the development of mass tran-
sit facilities to the improvement of New Jersey’s air
quality: “The development of large-scale mass transit
facilities and the expansion and modification of existing
mass transit facilities is essential to any effort to reduce
automotive pollution through reductions in vehicle use.”

A86.

Moreover, the repeal legislation was introduced on Feb-
ruary 15, 1974, Stip., p. 348 fn., at the very height of the
energy crisis. Eleven days earlier, the New Jersey Leg-
islature had enacted the Emergency Energy Fair Prac-
tices Act of 1974, which found that “an energy shortage
now exists and may continue for the foreseeable future”;
ten days earlier, Governor Byrne, in his first Executive
Order, had proclaimed that an energy emergency existed.
Stip., p. 43; A87.

In February 1974, the President of the United States
submitted a Message to Congress on the Energy Crisis,
which said that, “It is now widely recognized that the de-
velopment of better mass transit systems may be one of
the key solutions to both our energy and environmental
problems.” A87-88. Congress has repeatedly expressed
agreement with this viewpoint. For example, the Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, enacted on Janu-
ary 2, 1974, contains specific findings by Congress that
“rail service and rail transportation offer economic and
environmental advantages with respect to... energy effi-
ciency and conservation . . . to such extent that the preser-
vation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail serv-
ice is in the national interest.” A88. See also the Energy

12:

Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 50
U.S.C. sections 791 et seg.; and the National Mass Trans-
poration Assistance Act of 1974, ASO, fn. 29. During the
debate on the latter Act in late 1974, Congressman Joseph
Minish of New Jersey, one of its principal sponsors, re-
minded Congress:

With our present energy situation and the threat
of a renewed crisis in this area, the need for mass
transit aid has become ever more critical. Buses
and rail cars consume only a fraction of the energy
that a private automobile does, yet we cannot ex-
‘pect the commuting public to reduce significantly its
use of private cars if we do not provide suitable
alternative sources of transportation. Stip., p. 278.

In May 1975, as a direct result of the repeal of the
1962 covenant, the Port Authority increased its vehicular
bridge and tunnel tolls, which had remained constant since
1927, in order “to increase its ability to finance vital mass
transit improvements.” C-18. The toll increase revenues,
estimated at $40 million per year, will be used to finance
mass transit projects that remained dormant while the
covenant stood. See AS80-84.

It deserves emphasis that the $40 million annual in-
crease in revenues resulting from the toll increase would
not have been available unless substantially committed to
mass transit. The bridge toll increases are subject to
federal approval and that approval would probably be
withheld but for the intended application of the funds to
mass transit. See Delaware River Port Authority v. Tie-
mann, 403 F. Supp. 1117 (D.N.J. 1975); Stip., pp. 280-85.
In any event, the Governors would not have approved the
increase if its sole purpose were to add redundant funds
to already ample bond reserves in excess of $250 million.

13

Appellant’s assertion that bondholders have lost $240
million of “their” protection J.S. 24 fn., 18, 1s plainly
contrary to fact. All of that money, and much more, will
come from funds generated by the toll increase, not other-
wise available to bondholders.

The Three Questions Presented Are Not Substantial
Federal Questions.

Appellant asserts first that,

The judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court
presents the substantial question whether a State
can unilaterally and retroactively revoke a solemn
covenant it has made with holders of municipal
bonds, or whether such bondholders are protected
by the Contract and Due Process clauses of the
United States Constitution. J.S. 13.

Neither of the courts below has suggested that bond-
holders are not “protected by the Contract and Due Proc-
ess clauses of the United States Constitution.” On the
contrary, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has repeat-
edly and emphatically declared its solicitude for the rights
of bondholders. For example, in N.J. Sports & Exposi-
tion Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 26, 292 A.2d 545, 558,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972), the Court said that
when purchasers buy bonds “a solemn pact comes into
being between them and the State” that is “secure against
impairment by succeeding legislatures except for a proper
exercise of the State’s never abdicated police powers.”
And, in N.J. Highway Auth. v. Sills, 111 N.J. Super. 313,
968 A.2d 308 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff’d, 58 N.J. 432, 278 A.2d
489 (1971), the Court invalidated State legislation having
a trivial effect upon bondholders because the legislation

14

was “not addressed to any problem of state-wide impor-
tance as was the Texas legislation considered in City oj
El Paso.” 111 N.J. Super. at 329, 268 A.2d at 312.

This steadfast record of concern for bondholders may
well explain why appellant, a New York based bank, and
its New York counsel chose to litigate first in New Jersey,
though it had its choice of federal and state courts in
New York as well.

All the courts below did was: (1) find that appellant
had failed to establish the facts necessary to support its
claim of an infringement upon its constitutional rights;
and (2) decide as a matter of law that appellant was
wrong in urging that any change in a contract with bond-
holders violates the Constitution.

The trial court’s assessment of appellant’s legal theories
is as applicable to its jurisdictional statement as to ap-
pellant’s presentation below:

The thrust of plaintiff’s argument is that any
impairment of the security provisions of a contract
violates the Contract Clause. It seeks to recreate
a theory of the Contract Clause which, if ever im-
bedded in our constitutional law, no longer exists.
As reflected in the course of more than 150 years
of its judicial interpretation, the Contract Clause
must be construed in harmony with the power of
the States to alter or modify their contractual ob-

ligations where an important public interest re-
quires. A109.

The trial court’s legal analysis is unquestionably right.
The history of the Contract Clause is an oft-told tale.‘

*See, ¢.g., Wright, The Contract Clause and the Constitution
(1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944).

16

The Clause was construed expansively in the early nine-
teenth century at a time when it was the sole source of fed-
eral authority to restrain unreasonable State legislation.®
Despite the Framers’ probable concern with State laws
releasing private debts, see Federalist Papers No. 44, the
Clause was held applicable to government contracts. The
leading cases are Fletcher v. Peck, 10 US. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Even these earliest cases,
however, expressed concern for unduly hampering State
governments in the organization of their internal affairs.
In Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall observed:
“that the framers of the constitution did not intend to
restrain the states in the regulation of their civil insti-
tutions, adopted for internal government, and that the
instrument they have given us is not to be so construed,
may be admitted.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629.

The earliest Contract Clause standards were refash-
ioned, and in the process liberalized, under the weight of
government’s increasing responsibilities. In a series of
eases this Court held that all contracts are made subject
to implied conditions, among them the fair exercise of
the State’s police power in the interests of public health,
safety and welfare. No legislature can bargain that power
away. The trial court accurately summarized these cases
as follows:

First in dictum, Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650,
94 L.Ed. 302 (1877), and then by direct application
of the doctrine, the court held that a lottery fran-
chise granted for a definite term of years could be

5 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held the
Bill of Rights inapplicable to the States; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386 (1798), held the ex post facto clause inapplicable to
civil legislation.

16

repealed. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25
L.Ed. 1079 (1880); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S.
448, 18 S.Ct. 199, 42 L.Ed. 553 (1897). In North-
western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,
24 L.Ed. 1036 (1878), it was held that a franchise
to operate a fertilizer factory at a given location
could be negated by the exercise of the police power
to abate a nuisance. Similarly, the power to con-
trol the use of the public streets may not be bar-
gained away, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Golds-
boro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721 (1914) ;
Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Denver, 250 US.
241, 39 S.Ct. 450, 63 L.Ed. 958 (1919), nor can the
state contractually bind itself not to exercise its
power of eminent domain, West River Bridge Co.
v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848);
Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S.
20, 38 S.Ct. 35, 62 L.Ed. 124 (1917), or to change
the location of its governmental subdivisions, New-
ton v. Mahoning County, 100 U.S. 548, 25 L.Ed.
710 (1880). The broadest expression of this view
of the police power during this period is to be found
in Chicago ¢@ Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S.
67, 35 S.Ct. 678, 59 L.Ed. 1204 (1915), where Jus-
tice Pitney said:

“Tt is established by repeated decisions of this
court that neither of these provisions of the Fed-
eral Constitution [the Contract and Due Process
Clauses] has the effect of overriding the power of
the state to establish all regulations reasonably nec-
essary to secure the health, safety, or general wel-
fare of the community; that this power can neither
be abdicated nor bargained away and is inalienable
even by express grant; and that all contract and
property rights are held subject to its fair exer-

17,

cise * * *, And it is also settled that the police
power embraces regulations designed to promote
the public convenience or the general welfare and
prosperity, as well as those in the interest of public
health, morals or safety. [238 U.S. at 76-77, 35
S.Ct. at 682].” A100-101.

The path of Contract Clause doctrine from 1915 to now
has led to progressive recognition that State police powers
cannot be limited to discrete categories of State activity:
eminent domain, government institutions, morals, health,
key industries. Rather the police power is a general one;
what counts is whether it is fairly exercised. That assess-
ment calls for harmonizing use of the reserved power with
the constitutionally mandated policy of contract protec-
tion. That is the central meaning of Home Building ¢
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), in which this
Court upheld emergency debtor relief laws, and its pro-
geny, particularly City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497 (1965). There this Court, by an 8-1 majority, rejected
Justice Black’s arguments for a formalistic approach and
held squarely that “it is not every modification of a con-
tractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract
under federal law” (379 U.S. at 506-507). In a key pas-
sage, Justice White wrote:

The decisions “put it beyond question that the
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be
read with literal exactness like a mathematical for-
mula,” as Chief Justice Hughes said in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398. The
Blaisdell opinion, which amounted to a comprehen-

® We note that this case falls clearly within two of the classic
pigeonholes, promotion of health and regulation of government in-
stitutions.

18

sive restatement of the principles underlying the
application of the Contract Clause, makes it quite
clear that “[n]ot only is the constitutional provi-
sion qualified by the measure of control which the
State retains over remedial processes, but the State
also continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. It does not matter
that legislation appropriate to that end ‘had the
result of modifying or abrogating contracts already
in effect.’ Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 276.
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order. ... This principle of harmonizing
the constitutional prohibition with the necessary
residuum of state power has had progressive recog-
nition in the decisions of this Court.” 290 U.S. at
434. Moreover, the “economic interests of the State
may justify the exercise of its continuing and domi-
nant protective power notwithstanding interference
with contracts.” Jd. 290 U.S. at 437. The State has
the “sovereign right . . . to protect the ... general
welfare of the people. . . . Once we are in this
domain of the reserve power of a State we must
respect the ‘wide discretion on the part of the legis-
lature in determining what is and what is not ne-
cessary.’” East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230, 232-233. As Mr. Justice Johnson said
in Ogden v. Saunders, “[i]t is the motive, the policy,
the object, that must characterize the legislative
act, to affect it with the imputation of violating the
obligation of contracts.” 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L.Ed.
606, 633.

19

Of course, the power of a state to modify or
affect the obligation of contract is not without limit.
“(Whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional
limitation of that power. The reserved power can-
nct be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor
is the limitation to be construed to destroy the re-
served power in its essential aspect. They must
be construed in harmony with each other. This
principle precludes a construction which would per-
mit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation
of debts or the destruction of contracts or the de-
nial of means to enforce them.” Blaisdell, swpra,
290 U.S. at 439."

As the last sentence quoted makes clear, the State may
not have a policy of repudiating debts, destroying con-
tracts or denying the means to enforce them. In specific
instances, however, it may modify contracts where the
end is legitimate and the measures taken are reasonable.
And in determining whether the measures are reasonable,
the legislature has “wide discretion.” ®

7 Appellant errs by trying to make the specific facts that supported
a finding of reasonableness in E/ Paso into a doctrinal litmus. J.S.
22-24. It compounds the error in several ways: among them, it
ignores that fact that Simmons lost his land while appellant has lost
nothing.

® This would suffice to dispose of appellant’s claim that the legis-
latures should have adopted the “obvious alternatives” to repeal,
see J.S. 23 fn., even if those alternatives were available. In fact,
they were not and appellant’s suggestion is quite misleading. For
example, appellant says that the States should “refund outstanding
bonds protected by the Covenant and secure bondholder consent un-

(Footnote continued on following page)

20

These principles have provided State and federal courts
with workable guidelines. See, e.g., Calif. Teachers Ass’n
v. Newport Unified School District, 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D.
Cal. 1971); Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152, 1156
(D.C. Colo. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 317 (1970); Lyon v.
Flournoy, 271 Cal. App.2d 774, 76 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1969),
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion, 396 U.S. 274 (1970); Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secre-
tary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972),
leave to appeal denied, 389 Mich. 767 (1973); Albigese v.
City of Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101, 112-13, 316 A.2d
483, 488-89 (Law Div.), modified on other grounds, 129
N. J. Super. 567, 324 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1974); Matter
of Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1, 227
N.E.2d 824 (1967).

These guidelines are as applicable to municipal bonds
as to any other form of contract and the courts of many
states have so held. Leading cases include: Opinion of
the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. 1974); Massachusetts
Port Authority v. Treaswrer & Receiver General, 352
Mass. 755, 227 N.E. 2d 902 (1967); N.J. Sports & Exposi-
tion Auth. v. McCrane, supra, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972). And see, e.g.,
Arizona State Highway Comm’n v. Nelson, 105 Ariz. 76,
549 P.2d 509 (1969); Beawmont v. Faubus, 239 Ark. 801,
394 S.W.2d 478 (1965). Even before El Paso, courts held
bonds, like other contracts, subject to the police power.

(Footnote continued from preceding page)

der those issues not yet refundable.” Appellant proffers this sug-
gestion although its counsel has sworn that the owners of more than
$1.5 billion of the $1.6 billion in outstanding Port Authority bonds
are unknown to the Port Authority or its paying agents, and although
it knows that all of those bonds were issued during a period when
interest rates were far lower than those currently prevailing.

21

E.g., New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s
Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 336 Mass. 651, 148 N.E.
2d 637, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 358 U.S. 53 (1958); Opinion of the Justices, 334
Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); Jacksonville Port Auth.
v. State, 161 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1964).

The central issue in this case is not the legal rules but
rather their application to this massive record, and it is
with that application that this statement is mainly con-
cerned. One key point warrants repeated emphasis. Noth-
ing has happened to appellant. It does not allege that
the probability of repayment of the bonds has been mate-
rially affected; nor was it, at trial, able to show any dimu-
nition of the bonds’ value in the secondary market. In-
deed, an investment company from whom appellant se-
cured an expert witness affirmed that truth immediately
following the trial court’s opinion.

The now repealed law provided bondholders with no
security at all. It did not create a lien against specific
funds; it imposed no restrictions on deficit spending gen-
erally. It stated only that the purposes be other than
passenger rail transit. For example, large deficits for
buses were permitted. Yet what could be more absurd,
and destructive of sound governmental policy, than that
the choice of transit mode in the Port District be deter-
mired by the availability of Port Authority financing for
one mode rather than the other—no matter what the rela-
tive balance of energy, public health and ecology consid-
erations. The absurdity is heightened when, as here, toll
increases that are permissible only because of their in-
tended diversion to mass transit uses have substantially
increased the Port Authority’s revenues, making the whole
program one with no net effect on bondholders.

22

It would be an abdication of tie “overnment’r respon-
sibility to allow bondholders so tangentially involved to
determine regional transpoiiation pelicy. Aft r all, “the
Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and sub-
stantial rights, not to maintain theories.’” Faitoute Iron
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514
(1942).

Fight judges have already weighed this record in re-
sponse to appellant’s claims that their interests are vitally
affected. None has been persuaded.

Appellant goes on to argue that:

It is of great importance to Port Authority bond-
holders that this Court decide that the repealer is
unconstitutional, thus returning the security pro-
vided by the Covenant and restoring the market for
the bonds. J.S. 15.

But, as was made clear above, this Court’s decision is
of little or no importance to bondholders. Neither the
“security provided by the Covenant” nor the “market for
the bonds” was impaired by repeal. Appellant’s selective
presentation of the facts cannot mask the reality—the
courts below found against it on these facts after exten-
sive consideration. And the record fully supports those
findings.

The trial court’s conclusion that “few, if any, members
of the investment community ever analyzed closely the
actual effect of the 1962 covenant upon bondholder se-
curity,” A90, is amply supported by the litigated record.
Despite that finding, however, appellant continues its
practice of asserting as true propositions for which there
is no evidentiary support, such as that the covenant was
“absolutely neeessary to induce the investing public into

23

continuing to buy Consolidated Bonds,” J.S. 13, or that
the limitation was “an absolute sine qua non” of future
Port Authority financing, J.S. 17. Appellant asserés that
it stopped buying Port Authority bonds in 1961. J.S. 9,
fn. Appellant had ample opportunity to offer evidence
of its own actions but chose not to expose this assertion
to cross-examination at trial. As a result, the record is
wholly barren of evidence to support it.

If, contrary to the trial court’s findings, investors really
needed the reassurance of the covenant, investor concern
should have been at its height in January 1962. At its
previous session, the New York Legislature had adopted
legislation containing no covenant and requiring the Au-
thority to take over the Hudson & Manhattan. A71. Dun
and Bradstreet, taking note of this, nonetheless rated the
Port Authority’s prospects as “Superior,” P-1, and the
Nineteenth series was sold on January 4, 1962 without
difficulty at an interest rate of 34% percent. A89.

Between 1962 and May 1973, the Port Authority issued
20 series of Consolidated Bonds at interest rates ranging
from 344 percent to 65 percent. A91. Though the Port
Authority was now operating a passenger railroad with
substantial deficits and the covenant might or might not
endure,’ bondholder enthusiasm for Port bonds continued
unabated.

In 1973, New Jersey and New York enacted legislation
repealing the covenant with respect to bonds issued after
May 10, 1973. A83-84. In June 1973, the Port Authority

® Appellant’s chief witness from the investment community, John
Thompson, testified that he was aware at all relevant times that under
certain circumstances a State may constitutionally abrogate its con-
tracts and that other pledges had been repudiated. T. 315-6 to 316-
10, 319-11 to 13.

24

issued its 40th series of Consolidated Bonds at an inter-
est rate of 6 percent. Though the covenant did not apply,
appellant exercised its discretion to buy $2,570,000 of 40th
series bonds for its fiduciary accounts. T. 850-13 to
853-17.

In October 1973, as the gubernatorial race between
Brendan Byrne and Charles Sandman was nearing reso-
lution, the Port Authority issued $100 million of its 41st
series of Consolidated Bonds. Stip., Ex. IJ. Though the
covenant did not apply to these bonds and candidate
Byrne had, as appellant claims, called for greater partici-
pation by the Authority in mass transportation, the bonds
were sold at an interest rate of 5% percent. In light of
these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded:

it is clear that the interest rates which the Au-
thority has had to pay on non-affected bonds [the
40th and 4ist series] was not materially affected
by the absence of direct covenant protection. A92.

At the trial, appellant attempted to show that the re-
peal of the covenant adversely affected the secondary
market for Port Authority bonds. After a careful evalu-
ation of the live testimony and comprehensive documen-
tary evidence submitted to him, the trial court concluded:

The bottom line of plaintiff’s proofs on this issue
is simply that the evidence fails to demonstrate that
the secondary market price of Authority bonds was
adversely affected by the repeal of the covenant,
except for a short-term fall-off in price the effect
of which has now been dissipated insofar as it can
be related to the enactment of the repeal. A93-94.

Notwithstanding this finding, appellant persists in claim-
ing, J.S. 17, that there was a significant decline in the

25

market value of its bonds. But appellant neglects to ad-
vise the Court of the fact that at the time of trial (Febru-
ary 1975) the prices for bonds of the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey and of the Massachusetts Port
Authority (an agency selected for comparison by appel-
lant) bore exactly the same relationship to each other that
they did when appellant’s exhibits began (July 1973) and
immediately prior to the repeal of the covenant (April
1974). A92-93.?°

For its final argument, appellant maintains:

The court below erroneously justified the viola-
tion of the impairment provisions of the Constitu-
tion by terming the retroactive repeal of the 1962
Covenant an exercise of the police power. J.S. 18.

The repeal legislation questioned in this case is of vital
regional importance." The dependence of the New York
Metropolitan area, largely embraced by the Port District,
on effective mass transportation is unique in the nation.
The Port of New York and New Jersey is the nation’s

10 Appellant’s claim of market disruption is similarly unfounded.
J.S. 17. The trial court specifically considered the opinion testi-
mony offered by plaintiff with respect to the alleged “thinness” of
the market for Port Authority bonds. A92 and fn. 33. But ap-
pellant’s evidence on this point was contradictory and internally in-
consistent. See T. 93, 407, 728-29, 744-46.

11 Appellant’s suggestions, J.S. 6, 11, that the Legislatures acted
precipitously in repealing the covenant is belied by the record. The
1971 legislative hearings are summarized at Stip., pp. 223-232, and
some of the material presented at those hearings appears in Stip.,
Ex. VII. Relevant legislation was enacted in both States in 1971,
in New York in 1972, in both States in 1973 and again in 1974.
The New Jersey Senate held an information session on Port Auth-
ority mass transit bills in December 1972. Stip., pp. 253a-255.

26

greatest harbor because of its many navigable waterways;
yet transporting people conveniently across and under
those waterways into highly concentrated business dis-
tricts is both necessary to the economic vitality of the
region and difficult to accomplish. For decades, federal
policies and outright subsidies have spurred private auto-
mobile ownership and use at the expense of public trans-
portation systems that move people much more effici-
ently, particularly at peak hours. The consequent decline
of the region’s mass transportation network is now, and
has long been, among its major economic problems.

Two developments of the 1970’s, however, have given
that problem entirely new dimensions. Automotive pol-
lutants are now known to be principally responsible for
the area’s inferior air quality. The best available scientific
evidence is that our citizens’ health is being impaired by
the presence of levels of earbon monoxide and other auto-
related pollutants far in excess of federally-mandated
levels established pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970." Both states are under federal pressure
to reduce pollution by imposing restrictions on driving;
the restrictions, such as limits on daytime delivery of
goods, are so serious that they would cause major eco-
nomic dislocation. Everyone who has studied the prob-
lems agrees that more effective mass transportation must
be part of the solution. Second, the Arab oil embargo,
causing long lines at gas stations and restricted travel and
economic activity within the States, and outright gun bat-
tles over fuel prices and allocations elsewhere, showed that

12% Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497 (2d Cir. April
26, 1976), the Court of Appeals noted that “the public of New York
City is exposed to carbon monoxide pollution that has . . . climbed
to over five times the federal health standards.” Slip opinion at
3440.

27

the region’s economy in the absence of mass transit al-
ternatives could be shut down by persons and policies over
whom the States have no control. Avoiding such energy
dependence has become a major national policy; energy
conservation is a central feature of that policy.

The great problems to which this legislation is addressed
—public health, economic vitality, security in the event of
emergency—are thus those central concerns of people that
governments are primarily organized to address. Appel-
lant’s representation that the legislation was not enacted
in pursuit of police power objectives is frivolous. More-
over, the basic goal of the two states, to permit a bil-
lion dollar bi-State transportation agency with a monopoly
on regional interstate automotive crossings to utilize in-
ereased revenues derived from that traffic to support
energy-conserving, less polluting alternatives, is an emi-
nently sensible one. Appellant’s principal witness has pub-
licly urged the same policy of subsidizing mass transit at
the expense of automobiles. S-4.

The narrow question on which the case turned below was
whether the legislation was reasonable in view of the
policy of contract protection mandated by both State and
Federal Constitutions. And every judge that addressed
the question concluded that the ends sought by repeal
were vitally important and that bondholder interests were
not materially affected.

28

The Suggestion That the Court Note Probable
Jurisdiction and Defer Further Consideration
is Without Merit.

This Court’s jurisdiction turns only on whether the
issues presented are substantial. A state statute was up-
held by the highest court of the State in the face of a
properly raised federal claim. 28 U.S.C. §1257(2).

Appellant suggests that this Court might note probable
jurisdiction, and hold disposition until the conclusion of
related New York litigation. That would cause further
delay in the State’s ability to meet the urgent problems
that animated repeal more than two years ago. The
vital importance of freeing the Port Authority to per-
form its proper role in transportation as quickly as pos-
sible has been recognized both by the political branches
of State government and by the State judicial branch,
which granted this case expedited treatment.

Moreover, this delay would serve no useful purpose.
Appellant’s New York action has no independent vitality
and has in fact lain dormant since its commencement by
appellant in 1974. Its resolution turns entirely on the
federal issues that have been fully litigated in this case.
To suggest that the New York litigation will provide an
additional record or might resolve the lawsuit fully on an
adequate state ground is mistaken.

New York follows the modern rule that estops a party
from relitigating issues when (a) the issues are identical
and decisive and (b) a full and fair opportunity to con-
test the decision was provided. Schwartz v. Public Ad-
ministrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d
275 (1969). The federal issues have, of course, been fully
litigated in this case. All bondholders were included in
the class before the New Jersey court. There will be no
independent construction of federal law.

29

With the federal issues resolved, the New York law
suit is meritless unless there is some nonfederal basis
for declaring the repeal invalid under the New York State
Constitution. The contention that any such basis exists
is frivolous and appellant cites no case in support of its
position. Unlike the New Jersey Constitution, the New
York Constitution has no provision explicitly protecting
contract rights. New York jurisprudence on issues of con-
tract protection turns entirely on the meaning of the fed-
eral Constitution. See, e.g., Gelfert v. National City Bank,
313 U.S. 221 (1941); Matter of Farrell v. Drew, supra,
19 N.Y. 2d 486, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 227 N.E. 2d 824 (1967).

It is a hopeless task for appellant to conjecture some
basis for believing that a New York state court might
find the covenant’s repeal a State constitutional violation,
even though it is acting on the assumption that the fed-
eral mandates have been complied with. To be sure, New
York has due process clauses, New York Const., Article 1,
sections 6 and 7. But, research discloses no New York
cases remotely suggesting that a modification of contract
rights permissible under the federal Constitution would
violate these provisions of the New York Constitution.
A legislative alteration of contract rights that survives
analysis under the federal contract clause does not war-
rant independent analysis under the federal due process
clause. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n
of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). New York law holds
precisely the same thing. See Twentieth Century Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 582, 63 N.E.2d 177,
180 (1945).

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, appellees respectfully
request the Court to dismiss this appeal for want of a
substantial federal question.

Respectiully submitted,

Wuisam F. Hytanp,
Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey,
Attorney for Appellees,

By Special Counsel:

Micnas.t |, Sovearn,
Murnay J. Laviicnat,
Haroip 8. H. Epaan.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2399%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.
