# Petition — GM Leasing Corp. v. United States > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2111%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition - **Published:** January 1, 1977 - **Citation:** 429 U.S. 338 ## Text Supreme Ceurt, U. $. FILED AUG 13 1975 In the Supreme Cord gdeetiges econ United States October Term 1974 G.M. LEASING CORP., and GEORGE I. NORMAN, III, Petitioners, V. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DE- PARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERN- AL REVENUE SERVICH, ROLAND V. WISE, District Director, JAMES M. LIVSEY, JOEIN W. HAACKE, GLENN S. HILTON, KEITH E. FINLEY, JR. CLARK BD. HOLFELTZ, JOS- KPH J. WHITE, CLESSE S. ITILTON, BURT C. APPLEGATE, ROLAND P. HARRINGTON, TIM W. ELISON, LAWNIE C. MAYHEW, THOMAS IL. HARKNESS and PHILIP J. CLAYTON, Respondents. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT RICHARD J. LEEDY 309 Newhouse Building Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Attorney for Petitioners TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Sn = a . 2 PERRIER ae nat a NRT er Reg Ne 2 QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............0.0.0000........ ay STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .... 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........0...00...........0 6 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .... 10 1 THE DECISION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS AS TO THE PRE- SUMPTIVE EFFECT OF AN IN- TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE JEOPARDY ASSESSMENT ....0000000...... 10 Lh THE DECISION BELOW REGARD- "5 ING THE CONDUCT OF THE RE- SPONDENTS IS CONTRARY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELEVANT DE- CISIONS OF THIS COURT ....... 14 11 Page 3. THE DECISION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ALTER EGO OF THE TARGET TAXPAYERS AND THE JUDGMENT RENDERED THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED WITH AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PRESENT ADDI- TIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE .. 17 IEE Picccanciciidmiinnsiniinrmaminice ssa 6% . 19 APPENDIX (Opinion of Court of Appeals, Findings of Fact, Corclusions of Law, and Judgment of the District Court) .........00.00..02.2.04 4-] CITATIONS CASES: Bar L. Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, GOO FOG GOB (OE Cir. WOO) nccenceccceccececccctccccscesess 13 Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, Se Ee eR es 14 United States v. Bischeglia, ........ od aS : I Us SU II saci cal ccscitsliectatiineeeepesilicaianaenalionel 16 Camara v. The Municipal Court of San Francisco, ik Sa ks patisenn eels etal sem mn 15 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, srs A le 15 Foster v. CIR, 391 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1968) .......... 11 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ou... 16 411 Page United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696 (2nd Cir. 1965) oo... cece ceeeeees 12, 13 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., ‘ciate US. 0... 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975) cceccecceeseeeseee 16 Phelps v. United States, ........ | Gea “yh eS eT eee 16 United States v. Rexach, Ue Eh , | eee 12 United States v. Rindskopf, ee eae 11 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) .............. 15 Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. B85 (1920) ...cecccecescceccecccsessoesncccecsesceeceseees 16 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., i WW a ceeaniaeeniiotrnnmenacsinaaioneen 16 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962) .... 16 STATUTORY MATERIAL Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ERI Sst YR SE I 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Saeco 18 United States Code, Title 26 7 oes peammsisaiesiantigniniatinasnansnsenenoens 3 ST GRE ern ee 3, 15, 16 NN as A 4, 10 iv Page $ 7403 (a) (b) { ) EERE 5 Ei) OM | | pe 6 United States Code, Title 28 $1254 (1) ceccece. deficiency where the items were separable. The Tenth Circuit Court's position seems to be an extension of the Foster case by no longer requiring that the erron- eous assessments be separable before a substantial error can override a jeopardy assessment. In, United States v. Rexach, 482 ¥'.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said that with reference to a deficiency assessment, the tax payer has the burden of showing the assessment is wrong and the burden remains upon the taxpayer and does not shift back to the United States. The Tenth Circuit cited to the Rexach case with approval. See, e.g., 514 F.2d 935, 941. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has appar- ently taken a different position. United States v. Lease, 346 F.2d 696 (2nd Cir. 1965). In the Lease case, the Second Circuit stated: Burden is therefore on the taxpayer in the first instance to disprove the computations by the commissioner by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence . . . Should vou find that the defendant has shown error, with respect to a particular item the pre- sumption of correctness of the computations by the commissioner and assessment with respect to that item disappears and then the burden shifts to the Government to prove whether any defici- ency exists and if so in what amount. (Emphasis added). 13 It is not incumbent . . . upon the taxpayer under these circumstances to prove that he owed no taxes or that the correct amount of the tax which he did owe or the correctness of the item con- cerned. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also adopted the Second Circuit's position. In Bar L. Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1970), the court stated : We therefore agree with the conclusion of the Inited States v. Lease, Supra, that a taxpayer defending a collection suit need only show that the Government assessment was arbitrary and that the burden is then on the Government to show whether any deficiency exists, and if so, in what amount. Consequently, it would appear that the Tenth Circuit and First Circuit's positions are not in harmony with those taken by the Fifth and Second Circuits and that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a posi- ton somewhat akin to that of the Second and Fifth Cir- cuits but with some modifications. It is therefore sub- mitted that with the Circuit Courts of Appeals taking differing positions and this Court having not articulated with specificity the burden that a taxpayer must meet in overcoming the presumption of validity of an assess- ment of the Internal Revenue Service that this Court should accept jurisdiction and establish a standard that would be of uniform application in the administration of the tax laws of the United States. 14 2. THE DECISION BELOW REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE RESPONDENTS IS CONTRARY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELE- VANT DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. The trial court found that on the 23rd day of March, 1973, respondents as employees of the Internal Revenue Service made forced entry into the premises of the petitioners in Salt Lake County, Utah, for the purpose of searching for books and records to be used as evidence against taxpayers George I. Norman, Jr. and Frances M. Norman. The court also found a sim- ilar entrance was made on the 25th day of March, 1973. No search warrant was obtained for entry into the premises and seizure of records. The records were duplicated and kept by the United States. The trial court further found the entry was intentional and with full knowledge of the respondents that they were violat- ing the rights of petitioners. Further, certain motor vehicles which were assets of the petitioner G. M. Leasing Corporation were seized as well as stock which was later determined to be the property of the inter- venor George I. Norman, III, petitioner. Petitioners relied for their damage cause of action against respond- ents for the illegal search and seizure on this Court's decision in Bevins v. Six Unknown Named A gents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it was clear from the record that appellants conducted a valid statutory levy rather than an illegal search and seizure even though records were duplicated and kept by the United States. 15 It is submitted that the Tenth Circuit Court's con- clusion that the statutory authority for levy and distraint contained in Title 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (a) and (b) does not satisfy Fourth Amendment standards. Assuming that there are valid reasons for the Internal Revenue Service having the authority to seize property, there is still the need even in administrative seizures for the warrant process. Camara v. The Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The interests of a citizen in having his property reasonably free from unwarranted seizure at the whim and caprice of tax officials can only be accomplished through the warrant process where the determination is made by some form of neutral official. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The decision of the Tenth Circuit in effect leaves the process of seizure of property to the judgment of inter- ested persons and provides no warrant process as re- quired by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. I'urther, the seizure of books and records can only be justified in aid of satisfying any tax liability. There would be no need to retain photocopies of the books and records of the petitioner, G. M. Leasing Corpora- tion, for purposes of the tax levy. It is apparent that items were seized for their potential use in a criminal proceeding. The trial court found that certain of the agents, respondents who conducted the search in the in- stant case, were members of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service seeking information for criminal prosecution. Books and records were dupli- cated and the duplicated records kept by the United 16 States. Such conduct flies in the face of this Court's decision in Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Nor can it be said that petitioners have an adequate remedy for suppression of the evidence if and when any criminal charges are brought. The fruit of the poisonous tree concept, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962), may, in some instances, provide a remedy to suppress evidence that the government has directly or indirectly obtained for the purposes of criminal prosecution. But because of the narrowness of the discovery process in criminal proceedings, it is often most difficult to determine the real source of evidence. Consequently, the suppression hearing provides incomplete protection for the petition- ers who have been the subject of an illegal search and seizure. Current process available to the Internal Rev- enue Service provides an adequate basis for the discov- ery of criminal! activity without sanctioning warrantless searches. United States v. Bischeglia, ........ + Se ; 95S. Ct. 915 (1975). In addition the levy and distraint process of 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (a) and (b) are contrary to standards this Court has imposed on state process in similar situ- ations. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Snia- dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) ; North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., ........ U.S........., 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975). Recently, in Phelps v. United States, ........ 1: , 95 S.Ct. 1728 (1975), this Court did discuss the levy process of 26 U.S.C. $ 6331 (a). However, the Court did not consider the matter in the context of the conduct involved in this 17 case. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court as to any claim of damages against the re- spondents or punitive damages and also rejected the trial court's order for the destruction of the books and records in the possession of the respondents and allowed the use of photostats of said books and records. The decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals if left to stand places the stamp of approval on conduct in a similar historical context which led to the American Revolution. This Court should accept jurisdiction to de- termine the correctness of the Tenth Circuit's conclu- sions. 3. THE DECISION OF THE TENTH CIR- CUIT COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ALTER EGO OF THE TARGET TAXPAYERS AND THE JUDGMENT RENDERED THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED WITH AN OP- PORTUNITY FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE. The District Court found that G. M. Leasing Corp- oration was not the alter ego of the taxpayers, George I. Norman, Jr. and Frances M. Norman. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the evidence to the contrary and held the trial court's findings to be clearly erroneous.| The court from its opinion apparently as- sumed the burden of showing non-alter ego status was on the petitioners. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial 18 court on this point without affording petitioners an op- portunity to present evidence as a part of its case in chief on the issue. In the pretrial order (R. 61), it was stipulated that the respondents, United States, etc., had the burden of proof to show that G. M. Leasing Corpor- ation was the alter ego of the named taxpayers. At the time of trial, the petitioner, G. M. Leasing Corporation, moved for a directed verdict or for a judgment of the evidence pursuant to Rule 41 (b) and (c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was made at the close of respondents’ evidence. The petitioners were prepared with additional witnesses and evidence to sup- port their contentions, but had no opportunity to do so because the District Court granted petitioners’ motions. Thus, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should not have reversed the case outright, but, if it was of the opin- ion that respondents had sustained their burden of proof, should have remanded the case for further evid- ence from the petitioners. By not allowing the petition- ers to present their side of the case, the Court of Ap- peals unilaterally determined the matter purely on the government's evidence as well as rejecting the trial court's findings. This Court should grant the petition for certiorari for the purposes of remanding the matter to the District Court with an opportunity for the peti- tioners to present evidence on the question of whether G. M. Leasing Corporation was, in fact, the alter ego of the taxpayers. 19 CONCLUSION For the three reasons presented, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Respectfully submitted, RICHARD J. LEEDY 309 Newhouse Building Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Attorney for Petitioners APPENDIX (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the District Court) A-l APPENDIX A G. M. LEASING CORP.., Plaintiff-Appellee, V. The UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants, George I. Norman, III, Intervenor. No. 74-1436. United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. Submitted Jan. 24, 1975. Decided May 1, 1975. HILL, Circuit Judge. This appeal results from an allegedly wrongful levy and seizure by Internal Revenue Service agents of a corporation's assets to satisfy the income tax liability of an individual taxpayer. Appellants are the United States, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and a district director and several agents of the IRS. Appel- lee G. M. Leasing Corp., is a Utah corporation alleg- edly engaged in a luxury car leasing business in Salt Lake City, Utah. A-2 The controversy centers around the income tax liability of George I. Norman, Jr. (taxpayer), a fugi- tive from justice.’ He neglected to file a 1970 or a 1971 income tax return. Subsequently, in October, 1972, IRS agent Philip Clayton was assigned to investigate taxpayers possible income tax libaility. Clayton re- ceived no information or cooperation from taxpayer and necessarily had to base any income tax deficiency upon an examination of third party records. This investigation resultgd in deficiency assessments against taxpayer and his wife on March 19, 1973, in the respective amounts of $951,409.93 and $154,138.54. Jeopardy assessments were issued the next day and IRS agents went to tax- payers residence in Salt Lake City, Utah, to collect the tax. They informed taxpayer's wife of the jeopardy assessments and made a demand for the tax due. She refused and the agents left. Federal tax liens were filed and levies were placed on taxpayer's bank account. While at taxpayer's residence the IRS agents had observed several automobiles in taxpayer's driveway. A subsequent check with the state motor vehicle depart- ment revealed that these automobiles were registered to appellee and another corporation organized and con- trolled by taxpayer, and that taxpaver owned no auto- mobiles. After further investigation it was determined that appellee was taxpayer's alter ego or transferee and that its assets should be seized to satisfy taxpayer's tax liability. 1 Taxpayer became a fugitive from justice after being convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 656 and 2. See United States v. Cooper, 464 F.2d 648 (10th C’r. 1972.) A-3 On March 21, 1973, the IRS agents went to ap- pellee‘s premises to seize assets. This was also the loca- tion of taxpayer's other offices and was owned by one of taxpayer's other corporation. Additionally, taxpayer's son, George I. Norman, III (intervenor), was using the premises as a personal residence. With the aid of locksmiths, the agents succeeded in gaining entry into the building. At this point intervenor arrived on the scene and asked what the agents were doing. They told him that they were contemplating seizing assets, and they entered the building. They left a short time later without seizing anything, being unsure as to whether the building was a personal residence or a business office. The agents returned to appellee's premises on March 23, 1973, to seize assets and documents. They again used locksmiths to gain entry. They seized, inter alia, documents and placed them in boxes, which were loaded on a moving van. It was thought that the docu- ments might be, or could indicate the location of, money and stock certificates. These documents were photo- copied and the originals were subsequently returned to appellee. The agents also seized appellee's bank account and automobiles. Subsequently, they determined that intervenor was taxpayers alter ego and seized 7,143 shares of Emdeko stock in intervenor’s name. On May 3, 1973, appellee filed suit against appel- lants in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. A second amended complaint, filed on Oc- tober 17, 1973, alleged, inter alia, that the jeopardy as- sessments were arbitrary, capricious and without found- A-4 ation; that the determination that appellee was taxpay- ers alter ego was arbitrary and capricious; that IRS agents illegally entered appellee's office, thus violating appellee's and taxpayer's constitutional right of privacy; and, that IRS agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of appellee's premises. The complaint requested, as relief, the return or destruction o! the photocopies of the documents seized ; return of the automobiles levied on and seized; suppres- sion of evidence obtained from the seized documents and an order barring appellants from ever again obtain- ing such evidence by any means; suppression of the seizure of the automobiles as evidence and an order barring appellants from ever again seizing said auto- mobiles; release of all levies filed by appellants against appellee's property; and, $525,000 damages for appel- lants’ violation of appellee's constitutional rights. Intervenors motion for intervention was granted and he filed a complaint alleging that he was the owner of the Emdeko stock seized by the IRS agents. The complaint requested a determination that intervenor was not taxpayers alter ego, return of the stock, and money damages in an undetermined amount. Appellants answered on November 1, 1973, and also counterclaimed for foreclosure of its tax liens. After a nonjury trial the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the following: appellee was not taxpayer's alter ego; the seizure of appellee's assets and documents constituted an illegal search and seizure; appellant Clayton maliciously participated in A-5 the search and seizure of appellee’s premises; the assess- ments against taxpayer and his wife for 1970 and 1971 were erroneous and they have no liability for federal income tax for those years; and intervenor was the owner of 7,000 shares of Emdeko stock but was tax- payer's alter ego with respect to 143 shares thereof. The trial court entered judgment for appellee and intervenor on May 24, 1974. The judgment (1) gave appellee and intervenor money damages in an undeter- mined amount against the individual IRS agents; (2) gave appellee and intervenor punitive damages in an undetermined amount against appellant Clayton; (3) suppressed any use of the seized documents or photo- stats thereof; (4) dismissed appellant's counterclaim with prejudice; (5) ordered the return to appellee and intervenor of all seized assets; (6) ordered the return of 7,000 shares of Emdeko stock to intervenor and the return of 143 shares of Emdeko stuck to taxpayer, his wife, “or any other rightful claimant”; (7) removed all levies and liens against said assets; and (8) gave ap- pellee an undetermined amount of money damages for assets disposed of by appellants. {1} Appellants first challenge the trial court's find- ing that appellee was not taxpayer's alter ego. This find- ing is presumptively correct and must be left undis- turbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See, e.g., Kelson v. United States, A-6 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974); Clancy v. First Nat] Bank, 408 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. den'd 396 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 430, 24 L.Ed.2d 422. We are convinced that the trial court's alter ego finding is, as appellants contend, clearly erroneous. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that appellee had no separate or independent existence and that it was tax- payer's alter ego. Appellee was one of four corporations whose existence was initiated by taxpayer. He was not an incorporator, director or officer of appellee, but served only as its general manager. He nevertheless exerted substantial, if not exclusive, control over appellee. Although appellee had three directors they were nothing more than figureheads. They made no business decisions, had no duties, attended no directors meetings, and were paid no salaries. One of the directors was tax- payer's parttime secretary. She became an incorporator- director at taxpayers request but was not told what duties and responsibilities these positions would involve and was not informed of the nature of appellee's busi- ness. She did not participate in running the affairs of appellee except to write a check when told to do so by taxpayer. She continued to work as taxpayer's secretary while serving as a director and, although she is not presently associated with appellee, never officially term- inated her position. Another incorporator-director, the attorney who prepared the legal work for appellee's incorporation, testified that appellee was merely a shell or alter ego of taxpayer and that “it had no assets or property of its own. He also testified that certain people acted as A-7 officers of appellee in connection with one or two trans- actions but that appellee actually had no officers. A third director, who also was a director of taxpayer's other corporations, testified that taxpayer controlled the affairs of the corporation “along with discussion of other people.” Taxpayer's dealings with appellee's assets is another factor indicating appellee had no separate existence. Some of appellee's assets, luxury automopiles worth thousands of dollars each, were owned by taxpayer and transferred to appellee. There is no evidence in the record that these transfers were for consideration. The record does suggest that appellee did not have sufficient, if any, funds to acquire these assets. Moreover, the rec- ord discloses that these automobiles were not transferred to appellee until several months after its incorporation. One of taxpayer's employees, whose duties included such things as taking care of these luxury automobiles for taxpayer, testified that taxpayer used the automobiles in his individual business and that they were part of his advertising campaign. The record also indicates that taxpayer purchased a new Jaquar in appellee's name and paid ivr it with a check drawn on appellee's bank account, but that tax- payer's wife used the car as her personal vehicle. And, a gas station that stored some of appellee's luxury auto- mobiles for taxpayer was paid by checks drawn on Com- mercial Properties. another of taxpayer's corporations, with only a couple of bills being paid by appellee. Other evidence indicating that appellee is taxpay- er's alter ego is the fact that appellee was supposedly A-8 engaged in the automobile leasing business but that it leased no automobiles; it had no employees, paid no wages, paid no state sales or use tax, issued no stock and had no stockholders’ meetings. Appellee contends that stock was issued but has presented no stock certificates, minutes of stockholders’ meetings or other documentary evidence to substantiate its allegations. [2] Based upon this evidence we think it is clear that appellee was taxpayer's alter ego. Accordingly, we must hold that the trial court’s finding to the contrary was error. {3} Relying on Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P.,’ appellants 2 Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P., provides:i “(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58, and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds for its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. If an opinion or mem- orandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the find- ings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b). “(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judg- ment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the questions has made in the district court an ob- jection to such findings or has made a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment.” A-9 next contend the trial court erred because it entered no independent findings of fact or conclusions of law but merely accepted those prepared by appellee. We agree. This practice of the same trial judge has been twice con- demned. See United States v. El] Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964) ; Kelson v. United States, supra. “The mechan- ical adoption of a litigant’s findings is an abandonment of the duty imposed on trial judges by Rule 52, F.R.- Civ.P., because findings so made fail to ‘reveal the dis- cerning line for decision. ...’” Kelson v. United States, supra at 1294. Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in holding that appellee's documents and automobiles were illegally seized, and in ordering the return of the automobiles and the suppression of the documents. Again, we agree. {4} Part of the basis for the trial court's ruling in this regard appears to be a finding that appellant Clay- ton’s participation in the search and seizure was of a malicious character. There is no evidence in the record to support this finding, and we must hold that it is clearly erroneous. {5} It is clear from the record that appellants con- ducted a statutorily valid seizure. A jeopardy assess- ment was made on March 19, 1973. Notice and demand for immediate payment were made the following day, A-10 as authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a).’ The refusal to pay authorized appellants to collect the tax by levy, and this included the power of “seizure by any means.” Thus appellants were acting pursuant to statute and did not commit an illegal search. The trial court's order returning the assets and suppressing the documents is improper. Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in voiding the tax assessments and in dismissing their lien foreclosure counterclaim. Appellee, on the other hand, contends the trial court's actions were proper be- cause the unrebutted evidence showed that the assess- ments were erroneous. {6, 7} When the government undertook to prove its counterclaim, it offered into evidence documents showing a presumptively correct tax assessment’ and 326 U.S.C. § 6331(a) provides in part: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax. .. . If the Secretary or his delegate makes a finding that the collection of such tax is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be made by the Secretary or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period provided in this section.” $26 U.S.C. § 6331(b) provides in part: “The term ‘levy’ used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.” *‘ These documents were Defendants Exhibit 8, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Under Internal Revenue Laws, and Defendants Ex- hibit 10, Levy. We also consider Defendants Exhibit 11, Certifi- cate of Assessments and Payments. The trial court refused to admit this document into evidence. We find no valid basis for excluding it and believe it should have been admitted. A-ll thereby established a prima facie case of liability. See, e.g., Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154 (4rd Cir. 1971); Adams v. United States, 358 F.2d 986, 175 Ct. Cl. 288 (1966); 9 Mertens L. Fed Income Tax. § 49.218 (Zimmet rev. 1971). This placed upon appellee the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden