# Petition — Woodson v. North Carolina

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 428 U.S. 280

## Text

RECEIVED
SEP 24 1975

CHHICE OF THE CLIK
IN THE WT CUT, Ca.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975 |

No. 75- SQ]

JAMES TYRONE WOODSON and LUBY WAXTON,
Petitioners,
? (July 9, 1974).

Jarrette v. North Carolina, No. °* !*7 (June ll, 1974).

16

17

17

21

la

lb

le

Lampkins v. North Carolina, No. 74-6673 (June 9, 1975).

Lowery v. North Carolina, No. 75-5032 (July 7, 1975)....

McLaughlin v. North Carolina, No. 75-5077 (July 1l,

Dh s6nonbOe6064000666006066600000600enee6o teCeC

Noell v. North Carolona, No. 73-6876 (June ll, 1974)....

Robbins v. North Carolina, No. 75-5426 (September 12,

PTD 606 6600666606606600600 00 66006 O06 Cb06O CSCC C CeCe

Simmons v. North Carolina, No. 75-5262 (August 12,1975).
Sparks v. North Carolina, No. 74-669 (November 29,1974).
tate v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974)......
ms Vv. Albert Carey, 285 N.C. 509, 206 S.E.2d 222(1974).

State v. Anthony Carey, 285 N.C. 497, 206 S.E.2d 213
Dit hthnn ghee benab hes haokeennsebeeeennnesnseeees
&

v. Johnnie Lee Carroll, Harnett Cty. Super. Ct.
Nos. 74-CR-4994, 4995 (Dec. 9, 6056666686066

tate v. Antonio Dorsey, Mecklenburg Cty. Super. Ct.
No. 73-CR-47181 (Sept. ll, Deven 6 eceeeecebeeeeeeee

_— v. Harold N. Givens, Mecklenburg Cty. Super. Ct.
No. 73-CR-46182 (Aug. 31, Beer coeeceesoeesscohovse

state v. James C. Mitchell, Mecklenburg Cty. Super. Ct.
No. 73-CR-61589 (Dec, 17, BECSD Cocccceoceececesooss

state v. Leonard Maurice Tucker, Harnett Cty. Super. Ct.
Nos. 74-CR-5050,5051 (Dec. 9, | es eee

State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973).....
Stegmann v. North Carolina, No. 74-6735 (June 26, 1975)..
Vick v. North Carolina, No. 75-5075 (July 11, 1975)......
Vinson v. North Carolina, No. 75-5384 (Sept. 3, 1975)....
Ward v. North Carolina, No. 74-6263 (March 28,1975)......
Woods v. North Carolina, No. 75-5091 (July 14, 1975).....

Young v. North Carolina, No. 75-5281 (Aug. 15, 1975).....

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a

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF TIL ‘'NITED STATES
October Term, 1975

No. 75-

JAMES TYRONE WOODSON and LUBY WAXTON,
Petitioness,
—%.°
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review
‘the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina
entered on June 26, 1975.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is
reported at _N.C.__, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975), and is set out in
Appendix A hereto, pp. la-15a,invr

JURISDICTIO!.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
entered on June 26, 1975, and is out in Appendix A hereto.
Jurisdiction of this Court is ianvoh.ed under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3),
petitioners having asserted hbel

abolished and death by the administration of
lethal gas substituted therefor.”

§15-188 (repl. vel. 1975):

"Manner and place of execution.--The mode of executing
a death sentence must in every case be by causing the
convict or felon to inhale lethal gas of sufficient
quantity to cause death, and the administration of
such lethal gas must be continued until such convict
or felon is dead; and when any person, convict or
felon shall be sentenced by any court of the State
having competent jurisdiction to be so executed,

such punishment shall only be inflicted within a
permanent death chamber which the superintendent

of the State penitentiary is hereby authorized

and directed to provide within the walls of the

North Carolina penitentiary at Raleigh, North
Carolina, The superintendent of the State peniten-
tiary shall also cause to be provided, in conformity
with this article and approved by the Governor and
Council of State, the necessary appliances for the
infliction of the punishment of death in accordance
with the requirements of this article.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, entered on June

26, "1975, affirming petitioners' convictions and death sentences

for first Goprep, pacer. Petitionem James Tyrone Woodson and

petitioner Luby Waxton, indigent black men, were convicted and

sentenced to death on December 9, 1974, after a joint trial in

the Harnett County Superior Court, for the murder of Mrs. Shirley

y

Whittington Butler, a white woman.

Vy

At this trial, petitioners were convicted of the armed robbery

|

of Mrs. Butler, but these judgments were arrested, since the armed»
robbery was the predicate felony of the felony murder counts.

R.

155-156. Petitioner Waxton was also convicted of the crime of

assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill for an assault
upon Mr. R. N. Stancil, during the robbery, and he was sentenced
to a term of twenty years imprisonment for this crime. R. 154.

-

—

murder and armed robbery with petitioners, but pleaded guilty to
The State's case against petitioners consisted primarily of the lesser offenses, R. 31, on December 2, 1974 (prior to petitioners’
4/

testimony of two co-defendants, Leonard Maurice Tucker and Johnnie trial), and were sentenced to terms of impris —s

Lee Carroll. Although the State introduced the testimony of twelve fucker's and Carroll's sccounts were essentially similar.
2/

other witnesses and various exhibits, no fingerprint, ballistics, Tucker testified that he and petitioner Woodson were together

or other physical evidence directly linked petitioners to the = between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on June 3, drinking wine. R. 39.

and the a other eye witness, R.N.Stancil, could not place them Woodson declared that “he did not want any part of the robbery,”

. . 5 -
on the scene. Tucker and Carroll were indicted for first degree R. 44, that they had been discussing with Carroll and petitioner

S/

Waxton for the past few days. Waxton came to Tucker's trailer

about 9:30 p.m. and asked where Woodson was. Tucker said Woodson

s “uptown,” R. 39, and Waxton told Tucker to come with him. As —
2/ Three of these witnesses were policemen who went to the Butler tea ° |

store after the robbery, R. 36-38; one was a pathologist who
testified that Mrs. Butler had been killed by a gunshot wound

in the head and that the bullet was too fragmented for ballistics
testing, R. 44-45; one was a fingerprint expert who testified
that Tucker's fingerprints were on a package of Kool cigarettes
found in the Butler store after the robbery, R. 5l; one, R.N. |
ne Sen Ce See Sees See eee eee ee "if he didn't come -- if he didn't kill him I [Tucker] would.”

the robbery; two testified as to the chain of custody of evidence,
R. 52-53, 53; two testified concerning the loan of a car to , , : :
Carroll by his brother-in-law, R. 53; one was a police officer PREG Ceeteen*e aye was Biseting ane Guetias ans be Regt Ste hese
who testified concerning his investigation of the crime, R. 53-56;
and one was a firearms expert who testified about the inconclusive
ballistics tests he hd performed. R. 56.

the two walked toward Waxton's trailer, they saw Woodson approach-
ing. Waxton hitshim in the face and told him that he was going to

go along with them. According to Tucker, Waxton told Woodson that

over it as he accompanied the two men.

3/ Stancil testified that he lived across the street from the
E-Z Shop, which was operated by Mrs. Butler, R. 52. He entered .
the shop about 10:15 p.m., June 3, 1974, to buy a Coke and noticed
that Mrs. Butler “was not in her place.” Ibid. "I met someone
coming out who seemed to be in a hurry and went on by me. I saw
something on the floor and I was going to pick it up when I heard
an explosion. The person I had just met said something like
"look out' ... . After the explosion I felt pain in my back

4A. Tucker was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on his plea of
guilty to a charge of Accessory After the Fact to Murder, State v.
Leonard Maurice Tucker, Harnett County Super. Ct. No. 74-CR-5050
|| (December 9, 1974), and to not less than twenty nor more than
thirty years imprisonment on his plea of guilty to a charge of
Armed Robbery, State v. Leonard Maurice Tucker, Harnett County
Super. Ct. No. 74-CR-5051 (December 9, 1974), the sentences to
; es : run concurrently. Carroll was sentenced to ten years imprisonment

th > one vy popes tectagg 7 ps -~ : h 7 § “? ao on his plea of guilty to a charge of Accessory After the Fact to

. nye 0 = Ick of strong will or fear
of slight or remote injury is not enou’. to excuse a criminal
act... . The defendant Woodson contends that he was coerced by
reason of all the background and circ ’~s ances of his knowledge

of Waxton, his authority over him and his power, the assault on
him this day and knowledge of other éss.ults that he had committed,

that he reasonably apprehended eminent |sic] danger of death or
great bodily harm at Waxton's hands if he did not go along and take
whatever part he took, and under those circumstances he contends
he was coerced and was not guilt: of cit!er robbery or any killins

which might have resulted fro. the ro!lecry. The defendant Woodson
contends that at most he was mere)y present. As I read to you
earlier in the law, members of t!'c ju: ", mere presence at the scene
of a crime does not constitute iin: ina .betting, and a person ra
be present even though a criminil vct is Lauking place and do nothin.
to prevent it without being guilty ot tne «ffense charged, but if
his presence under all the circunstarcts is a communication to the
other person of his readiness ind wil!:. evs to assist if needed,
under those circumstances he ma, !«e« .1 :icer and abettor."R.139-14

17/ On July 10, 1975, Chief sustree
petitioners’ death sentences in or
certiorari to be filed in thi Cou

eee BEST COPY AVAILABLE |

ilow a petition for

ie Sharp stayed execution ce:

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION WAS RAISED
AND DECIDED BELOW

Before trial, both petitioners moved to quash and dismiss

their indictments for murder “on the grounds that punishment for

the same . . . has been invalidated by the ruling FURMAN v GEORGIA,
408 US 238... [and] [t]hat GS 14-17 as presently written one §

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States in that it grants discretion to the jury with respect

to imposition of the death penalty." R. 19; see also R. 20, R. 25.)

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The motions were denied, R. 20, R. 25. These contentions were

renewed in a motion to arrest judgment after verdict, R. 151-153,
which was also denied, R. 152. Petitioner Woodson assigned these
rulings as error (Assignment of Error Nos. l, 2, 5, 7, 19 (R. 161-'
164)), as did petitioner Waxton (Assignment of Error Nos. l, 3, =
8 (R. 160-161)). The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected their

federal claims succinctly:

"In the last three years this Court has
several times rejected these contentions.
They have been thoroughly considered and
further discussion would be merely repe-
titious. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.c.431,
194 S.E.2d 19 (1973); State v. Jarrette,
284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974); State
v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974);
State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42, 203 S.E.2d 38
(1974); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 212 S.E.2d
' 142 (1975)."

State v. Woodson & Waxton, _N.C.__, 215 S.E.2d 607, 615 (1975),

App. A, infra, at 10a.

e 16 «

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO
CONSIDER WHETHER THE IMPOSITION AND
CARRYING OUT OF THE SENTENCE OF DEATH
FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER UNDER THE LAW
OF NORTH CAROLINA VIOLATES THE EIGHTH
OR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES .

Although there are now twenty-one cases pending here on

petitions for certiorari which challenge the constitutionality

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of death sentences imposed under the capital procedure mandated

by State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), this is |

the first petition involving death sentences which arise under

the post-Waddell North Carolina death penalty statute, enacted

19/ |

April 8, 1974, effective immediately. Because this statute does

18/ Henderson v. North Carolina, No. 73-6853 (filed June 8, 1974);
Dillard v. North Carolina, No. 73-6875 (June ll, 1974); Noell v.
North Carolina, No. 73-6876 (June ll, 1974); Jarrette v. North
Carolina, No. 73-6877 (June 1l, 1974); Crowder v. North Carolina,
No. 73-6878 (June 11, 1974); Fowler v. North Carolina, No. 73-7031
(certiorari granted October 29, 1974); Honeycutt v. North Carolins:,
No. 73-7032 (July 9, 1974); Sparks v. North Carolina, No. 74-669
(November 29, 1974); Ward v. North Carolina, No. 74-6263 (March 28,
1975); Lampkins v. North Carolina, No. 74-6673 (June 9, 1975);
Stegmann v. North Carolina, No. 74-6735 (June 26, 1975); Gordon v.
North Carolina, No. 74-6733 (June 26, 1975); Lowery v. North
Carolina, No. 75-5032 (July 7, 1975); Vick v. North Carolina, No.
75-5075 (July 11, 1975); Armstrong v. North Carolina, No. 75-5076
(July 11, 1975); McLaughlin v. North Carolina, No. 75-5077 (July
ll, 1975): Woods v. North Carolina, No. 75-5091 (July 14, 1975);
Simmons v. North Carolina, No. 75-5262 (August 12, 1975); Young

v. North Carolina, No. 75-5281 (August 15, 1975); Vinson v. North
Carolina, No. 75-5384 (September 3, 1975); Robbins v. North Caro-
lina, No. 75-5426 (September 12, 1975).

19/ N.C. Sess. Laws 1973 (2nd sess., 1974), c. 1201, §1, amending
N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-17 (1974 cum. supp.). There are now eighty-
nine persons under sentence of death in North Carolina. Forty-
five of these death sentences have been imposed under the State
v. Waddell procedure; forty-four have been imposed under the new
statute. See Appendix C, infra, for a complete listing of these
cases.

» 19 «

not in any way alter North Carolina's capital procedure so as
to limit or control the arbitrary and capricious infliction of
that State's nominally mandatory death penalty, petitioner in-
corporates here by reference the arguments and authorities con-

tained at pp. 26-140, Brief for Petitioner, Fowler v. North

Carolina, No. 73-7031 (attached as Appendix B, intra) concerning
(1) the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty due to prosecu-
torial charging discretion, plea bargaining, jury discretion,
and executive clemency, and (2) the excessive cruelty of the
death penalty.

This case, indeed, exemplifies the freakish administration

20/

of the death penalty in North Carolina. Four persons were

20/ The kine of arbitrary discretion in the administration of
the death penalty which is exemplified by the present consolidated
case arising under the 1974 North Carolina death penalty statute
parallels the same sort of discretion that appears in numerous
pre-statutory prosecutions under State v. Waddell.

For example, five open murder indictments, sufficient to
charge capital first degree murder, were returned against Albert
Carey, Anthony Carey, James C. Mitchell, Harold Givens, and
Antonio Dorsey for a June, 1973, killing during the course of a
service station robbery in Charlotte, North Carolina. The State's
evidence, as recounted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
State v. Anthony Carey, 285 N.C. 497, 206 S.E.2d 213, 215-217
(1974), indicated that the twCareys and Dorsey remained in a
car parked near the service station, while Mitchell and Givens |
went inside to rob it. During the course of the robbery, Mitchell |
shot and killed an attendant. Mitchell was allowed to plead guilty
to second degree murder, was sentenced to thirty years imprison-
ment, State v. James C. Mitchell, Mecklenburg County Super. Ct.
No. 73-CR-61589 (December 17, 1973), and testified against the
Careys at their respective trials for first degree murder. both
Careys were convicted and sentenced to death. A nolle prosequi
was entered against Givens, State v. Harold N. Givens, Mecklenburg
County Super. Ct. No. 73-CR-46182 (August 31, 1973), and Dorsey,
State v. Antonio Dorsey, Mecklenburg County Super. Ct. No. 73-CR-
47181 (September 11, 1973). The Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed the convictions and death sentences of the two Careys
under State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974), because)
the trial court had refused to let defense counsel inform the
respective juries that death was the punishment for first degree |
murder. v. hony Carey, supra; State v. Albert Carey, 285 |
N.C. 509, 206 S.E.2d 222 (1974). Albert Carey was retried and was |

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e Be

indicted for the capital crime of felony murder, but two (one who

went into the store where the killing took place and one who re-
mained outside as a lookout) were allowed to plead guilty to
lesser charges. All four testified at petitioners’ joint trial
and admitted their complicity in the planning and implementation
of the robbery: as the North Carolina Supreme Court noted, cnhie
the applicable legal doctrines of conspiracy and felony murder,
“since each admitted he was one of the four who conspired to

rob the shop, legally it makes no difference . . . [who] fired

the shot [that killed Mrs. Butler]." State v. Woodson & Waxton,

_N.C.__, 215 S.E.2d 607, 615 (1975); App. A, infra, at 9a. The
punishments imposed upon the four equally culpable defendants do
not, of course, square with this “legal” logic. Instead they
illustrate -- if further illustration were needed -- the extra-
legal, arbitary administration of “mandatory” capital punishment
as practiced in North Carolina and documented in the Fowler
brief. "These two death sentences are cruel and unusual in the

same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Mr. Justice Stewart,

concurring).

20/7 cont'd.

again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death,
State v. Albert Carey, Mecklenburg County Super. Ct. No. 73-CR-
46178, 61586 (December 19, 1974); his appeal is pending in the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, State v. Albert Carey, N. C.
Sup. Ct. No. 67, Mecklenburg. Anthony Carey was not retried,
however, and the State entered a nolle prosequi on December 19,
1974, State v. Anthony Carey, Mecklenburg County Super. Ct. No.
73-CR-46179.

e 19 «

ee

The North Carolina Legislature has manifestly followed the

lead of the North Carolina Supreme Court in preserving procedures

that invite juries to nullify the “mandatory” death penalty in

sympathetic cases. Codifying the rule of State v. Britt, 285 N.c.

256, 204 S.E.2da 817 (1974), it has provided that defense counsel
may inform veniremen on voir dire that a death penalty will be
imposed upon the return of a verdict of guilty to a capital
crime (N.C. Gen. Stat. §15-176.3 (repl. vol. 1975)), may request
the trial judge to instruct the jury that the death penalty will
be imposed upon the return of a verdict of guilty to a capital
crime (N. C. Gen. Stat. §15-176.4 (repl. vol. 1975)), and may in
closing argument in a capital case "indicate the consequences

of a verdict of guilty,” (N.C. Gen. Stat. §15-176.5 (repl. vol.
1975)).The clear and inevitable result of these statutory pro-
visions, as of the Britt rule, is to invoke de facto jury dis-
cretion which undercuts the imposition of North Carolina's
supposedly mandatory death penalty in a randomly and arbitrarily

selected number of cases.

@ 20 «-

- ee eee = -_—

CONCLUSION Appendix A:

Petitioners respectfully pray that the petition for a

writ of certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

“) *
- f
ae i —

Se iG . . ‘ ‘* tw,

EDWARD H. MCCORMICK
Post Office Box 38
Lillington, North Carolina 27546

W. A. JOHNSON
Post Office Box 146
Lillington, North Carolina 27546

JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
PEGGY C. DAVIS
DAVID E. KENDALL
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM
Stanford University Law School
Stanford, California 94305

ADAM STEIN

CHARLES L. BECTON
Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton
157 East Rosemary Street
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS

e 21 «

State v. Woodson & Waxton,

2715 S.L.2d0 607 (1975)

N.

Cc.

STATE v. WOODSON

N.C. 607

Che as 2155 t.24¢c07

and the Court of Appeals affirmed “a
fendant appealed to this Court on oe
ground that the case ms vived “a Sule eye
question nrising, under the nearer ye
the United State {ane} of this rowel _
§ TA-BA1). On 29 Apr it 1975 pl inti fi “
with this Court a motion to ono vc
appeal on the ground that it presented no

substantial constituls ynal Guestion
Carl F. Gaddy, Jr., Rake ih, for defendant
appellant. : |
George M. Anderson, Raleigh, for plain-
tiff appetice

PER CURIAM
i nte y this ap-

The sole question presented by this a]
peal is whether defendant 1s entitled to :
jury trial in &@ criminal contempt precece-
ing.

{1} The ‘idextical question was con-
idcred and answer J in the negative in
ay r tion v. Clothing Work-
Blue Jeans Corporatio: mage Sate
ers, Zid N.C. £95, 168 SF.24 $67. We rest-

: ’ vel
firm that well? Ree ako Codis;voti

ton by Justice Hushi: : age ae
4 418 U.S. 605, 91 S.Ct. 2057,

md and schelarly opin-

=" f
vy. Pennsyl\ ons bey
41 L.Ed 2d $12, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488, %4 S.Ct. 2697, 4] Ldi2a doe.
.
(2) GS. § TA- 303) prov! tes that there
ay be an ep) 1 of right to this Court
wating tee se of Agmeals
from decisions of the Court of Appea
ive p substantial q
which directly invelve # subeten "
? ‘ {*s tttut
tion ariming, wrest the Const 4
United States or th: Comstiiuien of tb

c o a ons interpreting
4 Wii ‘
State However, our ¢

} ?. Hant most
ew that an appellant mast
this statute require that ao ep;

nd show the existence GF a

either alleye 4

termination, and therefore plaintiff's mo-
tion to dismiss Is allowed.

Appeal dismissed.

fo Larrawccessne

STATE of North Carolina

a
James Tyrone WOODSON and
ad Luby Waxton.
No. 127.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 26. 1975.

Four defendants were indicted for
murder and other offenses i.
with the robbery of a store. The ouhenor
accepted guilty pleas from two dcfemtants
to lesser offenses in return for their eat
mony. The Superior Court, Harnett — ;
ty, Henry A. McKinnon, Bt On ager
judgment and imposed maneator)y ers
sentence and defendants appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Sharp, C. J. het ! _ o
death penalty statute 1s constitutions:!, that

: ——- *™
{ ants’ mony Was ndmssiee,
the codefendants testrmon)

4,¢ iants
and that the agreement with cuodefencant
‘ at the ay fend
; : Si) me
did not violate defendants’ constituliot

rig his

No error.

‘ .
ial ¢ Litutronal Queswon
real and substantial consti "

which has met é
conclusive judicu! cetermines

wlroady been the subje t of

Faum, J., concurred and filed opinion.

tien or suffer

dismissal, State ¥. Closon, 274 N.C. 2%,

163 S] 93 ssh, cert c nied, Ott US }0S7
g9 SC. BIC, 71 L.Ed2d 759

+ J, Criminal Law o= 1169.7

ot prejudiced by ad-
Defendants were wot prejudiced by

3 \\ 4 j ( j te ot} . a. ‘ 5 sconmsiy awit wh
} t ‘ | Oo Wisse nO. Lestink iV of ct H
| } \} ' t as t » hd ' wr Ss ho

the | of a Ms tantial const

show the exten 7
, ‘ loch ha not atreat
tulion al questron ,

‘

, ;, re
been the sulsyect of conc! ve Maal lay

pleaded guilty to lesser offenses where de-
eh os! ‘ > e - ;
fendants themscives testified to facts mar.

i ffense charyred.
ing ther gruilty of greater offense charyte

{la} ;

t
2%
i
i}
1

——
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———— 1213 At the 2 December 1974 Criminal Session,

; in exchange for their testimony as State's
Statutes providing death sentence for witnesses against Waxton and Woodson,
first-degree murder and first-degree rape the solicitor for the State dismissed the
are constitutional. GS. §§ 14-17, 14-21. armed robbery charge against Carre!) aod
the first-deyree murder charyes ara!
both Tucker and Cerro!!. Tucker was :
mitted to plead guilly to the armed rel!
firs. Butler and as an accessory . ft ;
fact to her murder. Carre! whe iso kat
brother of defendant Wexton,

4. Criminal Law ¢>302(1) '

Prosecutor's announcement before trial
that State will not seck verdict of greater
degree of offense but would ask for verdict
of lesser degree is tantamount to taking

‘nolle prosequi or acquittal on charge of

* greater depree.

5. Criminal Law 302(1)
Shortest and best mode of catrying ou

: ’ H . M
ted to plead guilty as an ccc. ots
fact to both the murder and armies roovery
of Mrs. Butler.

‘ At the trial, the State’s first witness:

: : 2 - were several police officers, whose testime
promise of immunity is for solicitor to exer- a lations:

cise right to enter nolle prosequi.

6. Constititions! Law ¢2250.2(5), 268(8)
Criminal Law ¢=273(3)

Solicitor had authority to xeree to ac- body of Mrs. Butler, an employee o
cept guilty pleas to lesser offenses in return
for testimony against other defendants and

,agreement did not deny other defcodants
due process and equal protection. Const. from the register.

1970, art. 1, §§ 19, 27; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14.

Appeal by defendants under G.S. § TA.
2i(«) from McKinnon, J., 2 December 1974
Special Session of the Superior Court of
Harnett.

At the 24 June 1974 Session, in separate
bills, defendants, James Tyrone Woodson,
aged 22, and Luby Waaton, aed 24, along
with Leonard Maurice Tucker, aged 19, and
Johnnie Lee Carroll, aged IS, were indicted
under G.S. § 15-144 for the murder of Mrs.
Shirley Whittington Butler on 3 June 1974.
At the same time they were also indicted
for the armed reltery of Mrs. Butler on 3
June 1974 and for conspiracy to commit
armed robbery. In addition, defendant
Waxton was indicted for feioniously as-

[2a]

ny tended to show:

About 10:30 pom. on 3 June 1974, # potier
officer of the City of Dunn entered the bb Z
Shop on Fairground Road and foun! the
f the
shop, lying behind the cash register. She
had been shot through the head at close
range. The cash drawer had been removed
Lying, on the counter

were a pacl: of Kool ciyurettes, a dollar bill,
a pack of matches, and a box of Cracher-
Jacks. In due course, these items were
collected and sent to the SBI, and Tuck.
er's fingerprints were found on the pack of
Kool:

Shortly after the discovery of Mes. Hut-
ler’s body pole headquarters received «
call from Mr. Stancil, who lived just wer
the street from the FZ Shop. He reported
he had been shot and requesied heip. The
detective who went to his assistance found
him bleeding badly and immediately toot:
him to the hespital.

Mr. Stancil testified that about 10:15 p
m. he went to the PZ Shop and, as he
entered, he noticed that Mrs. Butler was
not in her usual place. A person, who was
leaving: in aw hurry, said to him something
which sounded like, “look out.” Almost

' BEST COPY AVAILABLE

‘’ STATE v. WOODSON N.C. 609

Che as 21S St .20 607

simultancousty Stancil heard an explosion
and felt pain in his back. He started lo-
ward the back of the store but, ob crving
that blom! was spurting from his arm, he
went home to call for help. A bullet had
entered his back, just to the left of his
spline, and ody din bis arm. Mer. Staneil
never saw Mes. Butler, and he could not
identify the person he saw leaving the shop.

Georye Will Carroll (George Wilhe), the
brother of Jolenic Lae Carroll (Carroll) and
half-brother of Wanton, testified that about
8:30 p.m. on 3 June 1974 he lomt his car to
his brothers, that about 10:95 p. m. they
had not returned it, an’ he went to the
police station end “reported he wanted his
car located.” Later that night, George Wil-
lic, aceompenicd by Waxton, Carrotl, and
Tyrone Woodson, returned to the police sta-
tion and reported that “the boys” had
brought his car back

Detective Melee testified that at 6:09 a,
m. the weat morning, June 4th, he went to
the home of Waxton's mother and request
ed Wanton to acoompony him to the pote
atation Warten det so, and after 20 30
minute ! him te his moth-
er'’s. Immediately thereafter Wasten (so
he testifiod Mater) arrcoped with a friend te
take him and dcfendant Woodson to the

ve '

Fayettovs roart, where they enplaned
for Nu Witth, N. J There they remi wed
until Jur Mt! when Detective Mohime

returmd theta to Dan

On 16 A } “4 { : ow) V’ tt . Wo Isor

rave Detective Mo! the first stater cat
he obtained fr any of the four, In it he
bmyplicated bitmeel’, Waston, Tucker, and
Carrol! in Uhe relly ry a | On the
basis ef the formation he furnished, Care
roll avd Tuclor were arrested AU 7:30 p
m. on June Ith, Tucher syed & confession
which i plicated Veet , Wanton, and
Carrot! Ou June 27th Carroll pave the
officers & statement, bat it was not reduced
to writing: and signed

Prior to the tine “Ducker at Carrell were
called ; wit ‘ for . nh. Carroll drove the ear to Waxton
trailer. As he approached it, he saw Was
ton coming across the fickl with Woodson
and ‘Tucker walking: behind him, At the
trailer Woodson tokd him that Waaton bh v!

{4a}

+. 4. STATE ¥. WOODSON - NG GIL

Che as DISSE 24607

punched hin in the eve because he had been
drinking, an? Carroll gave him a towel to
cover the eye

.

Soon thereafter Woodson took a rifle
from Tucher and pot in the front seat with
the rifle in his hand, Both Woodson and
Tucker went willingly and did whatever
they did willingly. He himself participated
in the crime on his own. Waaton did not
make him. Cuorro'l drove the car past the
E-Z Shop and stopped on a dirt road, where
Woodson jot out and fired the rifle into the
ground twice. The four then drove back to
the FZ Shop. Carroll parked the car and
Waxton told Tucker to go into the store
with him. They got out of the car leaving
Woodsen and Carroll sitting in the front
sent. Woodson was the first to see Mr,
Stancil come aeroes the street. Tle pot out
of the car with the rifle but Carrol! putied
him back and told him to put the rifle
down. Me. Stancil went into the store as
Tucher was coming out with a cash register
money tray iv his band Prior to that,
Carroll hi: ! heard om shot fired After
Yucker came out and the man went in, he
heard one more shot. By the time Tuc.er
got to the car, Wanton came out ran tage
with seme dollar bills in his hand. Me said,
“let's gro,” and Carroll drove the car back to

his mother’s house

Back at hore Carrot! took the rifle from
the car and put it in the pontry. Me and
Wee lon sotto the Lying seam v hile Tuck-
er and Wasten went mto th bathre
About tom roinutes 4 for the four went

‘downtos.n, where they met George Vill.

He antl Warton “wathed to the poh white
tion and yot at str. wht about the car”
Carrell then tec Waaton, Weetwon, and
Tucker to W, * trainer. Carrell next
aaw Viaatouw woul 4.00 a. m. on June th
when he and Weedon eome to his mother’
houre. Waster tol! Corroll to pet rid of

the cash tray, which he had put in the
pontry. at 1 Carrell burial Rh beneath bos
mother’s hou That morning be wert
with Waaten cmd We

when Jethro Wynn took them to the air

tu Vaye levine

port. Carroll reecived none of the money
from the robbery.

Carroll saw Waxton and Woodson when
they were brought hack to North Carolina
on June Mth, and he himself was arrested
on June 16th. On June 4th he had talked to
Chief Cobb and had deni that Waxton
had anything to do with this case, What he
told Chief Cobb on that date was untrue.
On June 16th he didn’t say anything. On
June 27th he made a statement to Chicf
Cobb after being advised of his constitu.
tional rigchts.

On cross-examination Carroll testified, “1
made a trade to save my own life. ] am not
trying to put anything on Luby [Waaton),
I'm just telling what happened. LT agreed to
come up here and testify in order to save
my own neck,”

Chief Cobb's textimony tended to show
that the statement which Carroll gave him
on June 27th was in substantial accord with
his testimony, that asa result of the infor-
mation Carroll gave him, he found the mon-
ey tray buried under his mother’s house
where he had said it was; that Carre! told
him all previous statemcrts were untrue;
that he had made no notes on June 2704 of
the questions he msked Carroll and the an-
swers which he gave, and Carroll signed no
statement; that he had tried unsuccessfully
tu locate the pistol which killed Mrs. Butler.

At the close of che State's evidence de-
fendants moved (1) to dismios the charyre
against them Iweanse Tucker and Carre!
had given ceriain lestimony whieh God not
appoor in the “summary of ‘Statement of
State's Witnesses’ ” which the robeitor fur-
nished counse! prior to trial; and (2) “if not
dismissed then, in mny event, a juror be
withdrawn and a pew trial ordered.” The
Court denied these motions.

On the pround that the following: Meme
were not continued in the summary defend:
ant Woodson then specifically moved to
strike the statements (1) “that Wooden
tou, the pun from Tucker” at Waaton’s
trailer, (2) “tbat Woodson pot out of the
car and test-fied the rifle by shooting: it

[5a]

»*

G12 N.C. | 2S SOUTH RAST NIN Pavone, 2d SPRIPS

twice on the ground” before the group
stopped at the B-Z% Shop; (8) “that Worst.
son had a gun before, during, at and efter
the robbery while they were in the cor";

and (4) that Woodson with the gun at
tempted to get out of the cur to stop Stan-
cil.” This motion was also denicd.

During the course of the argunient: on
these motions the solicitor told the court
“for the record that Mr. MeCormich, (Won!
son's attorney) and [he}) had had severe
pleading neyotiation sessions” ane thet it
was his innpression that Woodson woul! cue
ter a plea on Monday morning alow; with
Tucker snd Carroll, Wheres, Mr.
McCormick informed the court th th. hal
never stated to the solicitor that 1h) chert

, would plead guilty; that he tekl ics!
“would make certain recommendst) te
his client” Woodson, but he had “Seow ton
ly told the solicitor that Woodson say. test
he was not yruilty.” The solicitors re,
was thatalthough Mr. McCormicih i! on
offer him a plea but, as 2 result eof whea
discussions; it was “his impressh oo" thet
Woodson would enter pleas in his casos just

* as Tucker and Cerro!!! had dene.

At the conclusion of the forego,
‘sion, defendant Waxton, through bis atte
ney, Mr. Jolimeon, requested the coor t's je
smission to make a@ metion in «
Whereupon, in the absence of the .
in the presence of only Judge *
defendant Woodson end his att ;
MeCormich,, Mr. Gien Jehne on, t!
the court reporter, and a dey
defendant Winton tendered le U
plea of pvilly to being an ac
the fuct of murder and guilty «7
robbery, the sume crimes to wi
had pled guilty.” Mar. delnoon «
the judye and the soheitor Ghat Waxten tae
anid to him “that be thought hoo,
tled to the same treatment tht" '
recelved and he wanted to d
thing Tucker had done.” | Whe
court inquired of the solicitor, °
your position on that?” and «
-answered, “I cannot aceept t) yp:

Bach defendant testified in his own be.
half and offered no other evidence. Wax.
tor’: teotimony, summarized except when
quote t) tended to show:

Woeaton, a native of North Carolina, efter:
living nine years in Now Jersey, returned to
Dunn in November 1973. Woodsen, whom
he had known for eight years in New Jer-
s 4, came with him, and the tw lived to-
po ther ina mobile home park. Waxton met
Tucker, abo aw resident of the park, shout
twe wees prior to 3 June 1974. Maving
“tothed about it and planned it in advance,”
\Vicaton, Weodson, Carroll and Tucher had
aproad te rob the EZ Shop that might
Were on ond Carroll were unemplos oc
“Ticy said they wanted money, so they
vere geoiyge to pull a job. 1 said, ‘Why
no's"

About $:09 p.m. on June 3rd, Waxton
went loobin,: for Woodson because Woodson
“knew we woe going to rob the PZ Shop.”
Mi found hin at the trailer of his girl
friend Waelson had been drinking, but he
wa oreterank. An argument ensued, “He
said somethin, to disrepect me and TD sail
suinethins te Ch respect him; so TD hit his
Waoocn thes loft without having men.

ti aed the rebbovy to Woodsen Voodson
jot wed bela him and, when Chey got to
\. tr cer, Carrell was there in
‘ ‘') *S eur Wasxton owned a 1972
be +" N63 Volhswagen, but thes
' V'he's car in the robhory

froin another trailer ane
" as re sudy ti fii Iv

and the four bof in
ro with Cerrotl driving.
‘ \ Ro, rifle, whieh Wastes

‘it “to hill smal

They ther cios

' ‘

by the 1-2 Shop, which
: 's from Was ton's ts
' rt road where Weod
the pifl: to “mabe sure it

he had fired it twiee,
'e BZ Shop. Woedeon

to. in the eae while Waa

1 t Waited iF inte.

"BEST GOPY AVAILABLE

Waaton’s verrion of what happened in
“TL was about to ask for
but before |

dfore packaye of eta

side is at folle

a packare of Root cigarettos

ed

spobe, Pu Ler ashe

retles
he shot her
ter awl stork

and ther got

out As J ran out } wet Mer.
called Tucher @

body i conn

tance from the eat 1 heard

didn’t have
there in th

or weapon after De
When | heard the

‘

(vue ae

wy
qarre

the car We

more then five mi

From the FE

home of Warten

wei

ed the mony!

8325.00 snd |
hand dithe |
he bad off

'

moth.r ene

After she pane
D then gum
' getting

Sloe and

P EVany Ce
fee ad

(!

HPN A

yivcod at ¢

" niehely

ovel

her to beep it for hit

STATE vv. WOODSON

pletey

lateal Dornnper

to

hires the etgarettes
pod over the coun
the money out of
the cash reyrrter }yuta handful of money
afraid so J started running,
Stancil and |
nd told him, ‘let's po, some.
we’ After J got a short dis.
another shot. 1
any pun or weapen at any ime
} didn't have any pun
ane out of the store.
sccond shot Jaonore
out and we be

‘pot it the Food Store

four went to the
'e poother, where he count
There wes

Wo

N.C. G13
Chee os TIS SE 2H EN?
he “was telling something that wr not
true”; that the officers never pave him an
opportunity to make a statement before he
took the stand, that they only listened to
what Tucker, Woodson, and Carroll had to
gay. ,
Woodson's testimony, summarized except
when quoted, tended to show: He and
Warton were good friends. In November
1978 Warton had brouyht him. to North
Carolina to help him escape the drug habit
which he had sequired in New Jers y. At
first he had lived with Waxton or his nveth-
er and George Wille had gotten him a jo’.
On June 8rd Woalson was livingt with his
girl friend From time to time Waxton
; reminded Woodson of what he had done for

th rot i him

Warton had “inentionc A” the robbery to
Woodson on the morning of June 2nd, but
he “never agreed to fo along.” Woodsen
and Tucker spent most of the day on June
Grd drinking wine which had been pur:
chased with money Woodson’s girl friend
He and Tucker had spre :

roll ry.

had piven hin. : |
that they would not be in any

a . : ; - : 4
That evening whe Waaton found Woodson

Wis xlur ‘s

a" ? this , J mh qh 2 ‘ “ = " ‘ _
Later buena ul, on n nt his irl fr nd . Or tle mn axton cul (

‘ j ‘ “ 7 ed ‘ en ‘
the pun wit! him when they TeX : s. him and taki him he was Crush. When !
down. °! The asi ner wi? a , told Waxton it made he differenes Ins hy)

He they bead pre . whore. Ws ye 4
who tol! t! he ill ' : ties he was nol gong ony’ here, — we
robbery VW} thoy denied the aceusa! him iv the eye and said, "it Tdont hall you

x on . , \" the ; ¢ . ia? gin ”
he ‘ ' \ , : : ’ : ‘ wa. Vu ler will, ( ome on, Ke ’ i sad
Lol ‘ si. ; , . ; . c } i TI , Wey ~ VIS “pert ity high” b it Le Wi wt
29 ‘ ' } fevwaett Cie ‘ heii . a wee -™
lie tell au Detective Sehinet had drunk Ne knew what he was doing He
next} — rene jonk a totded tea po with Waster and followed
tathed tu | \ ' , “& sf . 6 cave. “ | om Tet . 4 , , J
r ‘ ! whi the Blase ’ bests lo hi our Phers . or og
-™ * : 7 ' ' Son ’ ton Wiatotn s 8 fle, a lle pot ii. Une oT
nit ' , } | a Thee \ ie yim r . 1} } ‘
Ulist , “ . . tig J oth ‘
Care te I , \ ton hed beer with it of bi, “own eres er ¥ he he
ATA intial ' ae _ ue 8 Wherry, ote '
i the Dunn jail for “a white,” Wanton there was going, to a a '
om ' 7 ' a i ! over at } } nw VWaaton hi { the Yer etn r NO ON
shad iat rs ; gi . ~ * call teat-
He Mian tell th. detective “who @id the forced him te £9 Ne ea is ae
. %%q' ‘ Pwith the re: ing the pun Qn the way to Us 1 ay =
Oo\! ; ' , ' ! iro “to
; ; { ie i We ' cron the bali was the first tine Warton told & ‘ a
rs } ! vd Woe who did, th watch the front door ated we t | shane my
aet : WW 1 Ty Ler | al dor in.” Ile nats 't baave yene pry Weakly Ve abe ee :
it , he had ahed hen Woalson, however,

Waaten test

Yucher shit

the

f

Pahiat he hed hee officers

joefy drat

with the towel over his
When he } ‘ ard

“was laying bac!

to’ i his ‘ eye, the rifle hy his side.

(Va) ‘

.

G14 N.C. 215 SOUTH BASTEEN
the first shot from inside the store, he
jumped vp and saw Tucler coming, out the
door and Mr. Stancil proing in, but he made
no move to stop him. Then he heard a

, second shot. Tucher was outside the build-
ing end almost immediately Woolson saw

Waxton cmerging with paper money in his
hand. ,

From the E-% Shop the four went to the
home of Waxton's mother. Waxton handed
his .22 Derringer with the nickel-plated,
pearl handle to his mother, He and Tucher
had the money. They went into the bath.
room and closed the door, but “there was no
division of the money at that
time.” After going downtown and secing
George Willie, Woodson and Waston re.
turne? to the home of Waston’s mother.
There Woodson “started to mention about
him shooting the woman,” but the woman
was the Inst word he got out of Lis mouth
before Waxton hit him in the other eye and
steprored Lim. “lie told me never in my
life to mention that woman's neme agein,
ever.”

The next morning, after Waster re.
turned? from the police station, he told
Woodson “to get a few pices” (elothes),
that they were polup to New Jersey. Jeth
ro Wynn took them to the airport and Car-
rol) went along. At the airport Waxton
gave Woolson money from the robbery
with which to buy his Uiclhet aad then balled
up the rest of the money and teld him “to
hold it.” In New Jersey, at the home of
Wexton’s nother-inlaw, he “pave bach all
the money” te Waxton, When Woo!son
was biter picket ep, Le returned to North
Carolin.

Later, in the Donn jail, Woodson herrd
Waaten “when he was hollering shout mit.
ing a confess io
Meohiser.” The detective toc him over “im
front of Waxton,” whe told Mohiver he
knew vho shot the woman and that he
would tell Lies where the pistol was if he
woukl pic Tucker up and lock bin up.
Woodsen did not make any statement at
that time because he “hod alreaty made

[his) signed statement.” Ite heard Waxton

volurteri'y,

he wanted to speck bo

[8a

© furnished them hy the solicitor are wit

REPORTED, 2d SERIES

tell Mohiser “that he did not do the shoot
ing; that it was Leonard Tucker.”

As to Woolson the jury returned verdict
of “Guilty of Murder in the First Dopr.
charyred,” and “Guilty of Armed Robbery
charged.” Upon these verdicts the eh.
of felonious assault having been merged |
the charge of first-deyree murder, the eon
impored only the mandatory sentence of
death.

—

As to Wanton the verdicts were “Guilt
of Murder in the First Degree es charged,
“Guilty of Armed Roblory as charged,” and
“Guilty of Assault with a Deadly Weap»
with Intent to Kill Inflietings Serious dn)
as charged.” Upon the charye of felon.
assault the court ccjudped that Veaaten !
imprisoned for twenty years. Upon t!
murder an! roblery conviction, the 4
bery charge having Loen mered in U
charge of first-cogree murder, the cour!
imposed the mandatory sentence of deat!

Fach defendant epponted fro:a the +
tence of death dircet!y te thi, Court ur hy
GS. 6 TA-27 (4) cl, upon Water's t
we certified his app
imprecd nu

1 from the sen’
por his conviction of fle:
assault for initi.l apjpaticte review byt!
Court woder GS. & T/A 3Ns)

Rufus L. Edmicten, Atty
James FO Mepgner, Jr, Aset
Raleigh, for the State.

Gen, ant
Atty. Ger

Faward Vi. MeCormict., Lillington, fe

James Syrone Woodson, Gefcudas'
Vienst.

W. A. Joly

ton, defon amt agpelhout,

SHARD, Chict Justice.
{}) Vatently, defer fants’ riotion to «

miss the charps
cortentions thet

egieet then and (

, . .
bees ceortnin item. «f

evidence were omitted from Uhe suns.

merit and require no discus won, Mach de

fondant went upon the stand and volun

}

he him 4

STATED v. WOCDSON
Che asPtsnt 2teo7

N.C. 65

}* sthorw . . .
‘ GLa rh W ne compotent to testify is not ren

of fret i t? tC «4 ‘ A we ler
concede. the oun! ! ‘; hes coumcl dered ineompotent hy the fact that he has a
: . ys differsnee tn premise of immunity or lenience for him-
. ir testis Tr to who fired a) self.” Annet, 120 ALR. 742, 751 (Mas)
shot which | Stes Butler nw « f , LC. SRI. Ie
sapere } vy the see State v. Watson, 283 NLC. SSt, 166
‘ yt / \ vl, sinee eae) S.F 2d 232 (1974), annot., 24 LALA. (Nu)
te oe oererm '* ote ; ’
adi hes ‘ of the f who con 442 466 (1010)
aspired to pelt makes t :

; ' As Justice Barnhill (later Chief Justice)

perp ‘ it mi toy

» rob ! ‘
ny, GS ba..87F « on 4
first Gey In 4 ny
pres r 7
anil | , \ to fu
eit! } +!
ce f ; ‘
bury y bout i.
a Sucker and Carroll were competent wit
. horses and that (heir etatus as ce Cunsypyyt
é ae ” “ri es
. bp e604 or eat f. P 4 +? *s. *
or { wie DTA ‘ SF oA bore Up t
, ,
weighi and ereditutiy of their testime:
P ’ , 7) ‘ .
' and Hos uj ii econ eC)
P :@ ; 7.
‘ G.S § 14 17, % revrwku on - Ay ] “4
by the enact t of N.CS Pat ay
’ ’ |
) 4, $ ) }? ; ‘ L nuresr is hi
! "a }
Ge ypre ! { } tw, bb doath Lx
_ ‘
4 A fer ’ tvul f !, ', ‘? 1) it cA} |
’ i
] ‘ . \ ! \ of N rth ¢ ‘
Linas [we US Conet. At Vi
, ‘sy v)
‘ fit ot N.C 3
- : } » wf Ir (| ! t t! ‘4 \4 (|
thet w or : vere | my t) ‘
le ti " om t! ‘
’
, ,
sito? ; f . ' i vib Van
nerely pepe Sev & v. Wad
” ‘ ;
‘ ‘ 3 ; ’ } - i? : ; ; ,
’ ! ;
os ‘ ~ ( P ‘. : | . 2 l
‘ {, } Lula Von , of N’.( )
' c | ‘ ’ ‘
‘ : ' ( v. Croweler, ¢
Be mS SM :
() } eiute 4
Avert ]
3. ( 9 &be 6 ‘ isda
‘ ? J ‘ }
(2) All { ' bere of the Cour
, ,
‘ , oe ,
. ‘ ih j ’ ve ‘ hol

Cam. ata Voted ty pennaanl

.

GIG XC

for the imposition of a sentence of life
iinprisonment, the dissents were not based

upon the premise that the death sentence
'

constituted erucl and unusual punishment cree murder it woul
i

unfair” to permit
guilty to offen

or that there were any constitutions! in-
firmitics in capital punishment per se. On
the contrary, the thesis of the dissents was
(1) that the decision of the United States ers
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408
US. 288, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 8 LV. 346
(1972), decided 29 June 1972, had invalida-
ted the death penalty provisions of GS.

contends thet the

§ 14-17 (and alse G.S. § 14-21,G6.S.§ 14 52, power which denied him ave proce
and G.S. § 34.58), enacted in 19, and (2) the equal protection of the laws. Def
that until the statutes which made death ant Woodson, who tendered no pea
the punishinent for first-«legree murder, contended throuhert that he was
first-degree burglary, rape, and arson were — yuilty, argues thet “duc process and ¢
{ { ? | iv ly, j :
rewritten or amended by the General As- protection” require that he ree
ser..ly, this Court could not reinstate capi- greater punistiment than his secot;
tal punishment. could have giver under their p!
1074 the =e
On & April 1974 the Gen ral Assen ry “Fron th carticst times, it has
. iho > . ‘ — aos -S 47 ’
rewro.e GS. § li 7 and GS. § 1-21 to found necessary, for the detect mnect
provide the death sentenc for firsi-deyee sshment of crise, for the state tos
murder and first Geyiree rape. At the sence the criminal, t oos fur testit
time Horew rote G S. S }+ Oe mie G.S S }4 v hich to convict the es 7
f, tatee Be r His.onmMe t t yor ] . > . ’ op
§$ to provide Pfc impr — fo bert erime. While such a offers a}
yi e first deywee and arse ) :
ry in the first : gree i son AS tO in te treachery, and sometimes pet
eengees eensere 88 get gpl more guiliy to esse, tends to |
committed after £ April lo, hy its rowers a : Dy) Bae :
. : ( 00 94 thet and break up ce !
> £14 Para GS. & 2.4 the Gener- mle ; ; =
of GS. § “ one 7 7 ore , criminals sust of ©: ot
@ Aancmity eliminate’ Me Ervin oe eften beads to the pu F of |
which three members of the Court had alis- 7 -
7 ; . ‘ pers vrs . hy vf ‘ Ce mr 4
sented to the imposition of the Coath sen - a ; ae Se
{ , : ae. : Pneretore, ont pie ie Ls }’
7% wo osuch crimes comm ites prior iO ’ :
tence fe _ “7 . has bece waiforimiy hel’ Uhat {
that dete. The felony-niurder for whic! rr > eel
" : . 7 : euntrackt Wiel a © ! cM
Waxton snd Weedon have been convict . nae?
- eps from prosec:t je sl
Was committed on o June Wi—oo ces . ia
‘ ’ , ' ; fz.0v by " . 6 f\ . :
after th ] a ture rnceechiu ky yet whet) : .
P , . you eet alt ar.) « }
policy of this State with refers tr capital ag (Cit '
° - ‘ . wweu Or he Onin
punishment Until changed by the Gener! : as edd
eee ree ae gram v. Prescott, 13 , 2
Assembly, or invalidated by the Sopmens« ain ee , : :
“ - ; So. Sov Cs » hk reo ¥. SY }
Court of v! ited States, that policy pret, : geet
ta | : $15, ic? : v. . i: ), ; i f
Banc .
the history «f t nantes of
Coun ol for ¢ fondant: ? althe: ‘ h gwar tice” when ico i “tur ! ty
‘ef the Wadicll and Jarreite Geer ions, as dence,” sec United State. v. Pe
well as thy subse vucn! ules barved or thie 10), ot, , Ld! (] ): a\W! Sa
have understandably felt comstrained to re- inal Law and Procedure § 165 (15%
peat the constitutional chulhige to the CJS. Crimine! Law § 4601) (1
death penalty. R.C.1., Criminal Low § 10) QS)o),

{10}

ton, Woodson, Carrell, :

Md

215 SOUTH HASTERN REVORTER, 2d SERIES

.

conspirators, are equally guilty

two of them

bea:

soll

cept his plea was an a

the

“sf

1s

of f
fumelan
ic
capital

mh)

rbitras

‘

change for their testimony against Uh
Defendant Warton, who tender
the close of the evidence the same p’
which Tucker tendered prior to the tr

. !
ust to

+1

Defendants next contend that since Wis.

1 Yucher, the f

r

STATE v. WOODSON -
:' Cite as 215 S$ 1.20 607 ; * N.C. 617 . ,
| WAm & Eng Ann Cas. 747 (1911), M4 LR. right vested in him “when, in his judgment GIS N.C. 215 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES ro
A(NS) 459 et seq. (1910), the ease calls for it, to enter a nelly geure- _— ” =
? In many states the proses ting attorney qui and allow the prisoner's discharyc, 4 " - _ ta . . a ” 8 a gph nner greet soe
has no authority without the court's con- which practically accom lishes the same . , ym Mr. Stancil is overwhe!: nee
© extenuating circumstances grave tho so

fi

sent, to make a binding agreement with one ‘ends as [a] pardon.” The solicitor had full - In rejecting the appe lant’s contertions ,
charged with a erime that if he will te tify authority te make the ayreement which b: ; Buryer, Circuit Judge (new Chief Justice of licitor any incentive to accept the plea be
against others, he himself shall be exempt made with Tecker and Carroll, and we hold the United States Supreme Court), pre nted tendered at the close of the State's c.1-
‘ from criminal hability or be allowed to that it violated neither the Fourteenth As on Gat Os United States Attorney ts a.
plead pouty to a lesser offense. “In states Amendment rights of defendants Waxton charged ath Cs mani enceniien ot Ge

in which a prosecuting attorney may enter and Woodsen nor their rights under N.C . . laws and prosecution of offenses against

5 at neuebainan Gaia re ou, Camt, art 1 €§ 19, 27. the United States, ant, ns such, he must

court, he may grant a witue:s immunity ns eee iad a a | . have — diseretion. “To say that the
from prosecution by contract without ap s Mr. Justice White said in delivering United States Attorney must literally treat
_ every offense and every off nder alike ts to

Woodson at no time tendered to the State
a plea of any kind Throughout the trial be
contended that he was innocent because Ts
had acted under duress from Waxteon 1c:
sspvel of tha coat” 98 Am Ser 9d. Criead- the opinion of the Court in Brady v. United rn in dae Rage -iay 0N he
. States, 2397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. M63, 22 ' delegate him an impo: site tash; of courre,

«J

defense in view of his testimony Uhat on th
night of the robbery he hnew what h

' -
na! Law § 153, sce also §§ $14-S1S (1965)
3 ’ eit’ Jo * “e cS) . ”» . - - ot ° ’ . . . .
4 LRAINS) 42-43 (1910), IB Am. € L.Pd.2d 747 (1970), “[ W]e cannot hold that : this concept would negate discretion. Myrt-
ae \. ete -“eveed CIOL), Am : — . ' ° ; . vat e wot ir - ra
Bae Ann Cc 28-719 (1922) - ow it is uneonstitutional for the State to ex- ad factors can center into the prosecutor's doing; that he pot inte the car o: his «
athe? : inv ded GIS), SANOL., ov , . . . . free will afte: re wm sll of
ALN 1277 0 The ¢ treat ' tend a benefit to a defendant who in turn decision. Two porsens may have committed ree will after having: known all cay
ete. Thee (ay, The courts treat such obey : : “th S poine he Lhery”
“ prom! _ t 43 Mie faitt , extends a substantial bem fit to the Stat what is preci-cly the same legal offens: but there was going te be a rewwery , U
) ry cs te . , ’ . ‘ . se aw ead al ¥ . .
‘ : o> 5*4 “ Tt) ae Oe wl Cc jainh ana - " . s . ‘ gu? 1” _ ! —_ x , .
ai aaa is a “eb ' me ee Ad. at 753, 99 S.Ct. wt M71, 25 the prosecutor is not compelled by law, Guty had not seer, Wanton during the du)
A tiete ¢ pubuc presecutor, the . , 2% oy ould have gene an f
court vil! ett 4 R f : } © LFd.2d at 759. In Lisenba v. Cuiifo: nis or tradition to treat them the same as to he could have gene anywhere if he bol
ut i SeC Lal. lemme eee ih aunt? \ sich ‘ ‘ao « ‘>* + * re : . eh «sn {iia¢
has | ' } ‘ | $14 U.S. 299, 227, €2 S.Cr. 200, 285, 86 Ld charges. On the coalvery, he is expected to desired to do so", that his stayin; t
s been pledged by hia is kept. Caimrer . ome sen a aching . ; : . ~ —— .¢
: - mi - : 166, 175 (1941), Mr. Justice Roberts noted exercise discretion and commen sense to the ar with the rifle outside the BZ?
v. State, 32 Tex Crim. 18), 22 S.W. G82, 40 ; ice hoverls moted era
” » == se > # . . -~_ . — ' «¢ if - , on: Calas ; . sat a A * * the y “w © it ’
° AmSth. 703 0 rere ome : - a . . . wi : ne TC: . ned ¢ .: . ~
~~ ( ; ted Stater v. Weody, App UAC. 266, 82 Pd ate Uses) the sul inquire into cr review bis deci vot Id. wt oe cue appraise Bae oar we ‘
2 F.2d 202 (.Mout.1925), United States v. question presented was whether it was a ; 481-482 Woodsen the full benefit of hie « ;
’ - . - ~~
’ > ,, cf _” * ‘ * 7 ~ ' ] °
Broliw, | ‘ , i (SDB 145), an denial of the apy! Nant’s comstitutronal o oe ‘ that he wert with t Pea en) tu rine Ue 2.
not e’} ' ] } 7 } soe, he +" ’ 7 . ‘ Mere oem SUI IED an ~~ * a a creak S} 4 ! ; ! f “
oe a ok UL Sey (a te) rights for the United States Aiturrey to mations Dees » ereenagy WHA CMMs, from Wat
: “ , MO COMSHLU ei! preres Oyler v. Bolesy . bs —
' . ' “fe? — . accept a purty pica fen iby az *..9.9° : a : ury were py tra. taut 3 Ve
{4} I N ri t ! is; Cc Solu or? | ' : a tenes pet by “eo sales 368 US es i P2 D1 "1 ] | Sa ’ : .
: co-defendant lesser of? ° : : Pure along and cot wheat I jor hh slop . a0 ' ; a ' ; ‘ Wii ins .
wo net § 2 We wo! of Tira! nl — seid. y Gree t . tion wae delibcrat ely f pju~t.f . = 7°
; . , n\ phe co fond: nt was alloucd to pica - y-
degre t for a verdict aa ape BON Cd UG Jetcet ‘ able sto: dird, sueh cs race, teh, or Gt Finally, we rote t \
uLiv te the mo , mee nor ‘ ee ' P ,
of socom! ror mantauurt — BE DRT ANSTS OF PLAY Sere : er stbitvary ¢! ration” Unted &
‘ ‘ ‘ j e , . . : : . Soh Vere s ; :
ana 3.2 ° oof | , ae . > . 5 @ . ‘ o> 4
tanto ® to t-.' nollie ps eal oo Dt , inact it howebrecheng, Uhe aj, y. Stecke, 261 F.2d 3345, 159 (et). Car T ly; Yuct ms! tt '
me ; ant we tr , anc 2 ' . ; t , : e ; e*? - . t 4 ‘ i
ac ie. ‘ ‘ eC { nt-<! jre ’ Pe h . " . Shs 1 Uh res . - See Cum: *, be } ry t . "\' te les z ££ -? Bi . ‘ , ‘
der. State v. 3 oP NC Ot ec og 6S He contended that the United ‘ * atory Firfereement of Must —— G1 7 wo! ’ : a,
. - - owe, 4 ™ . : _— —_ . leg in ° oe " a’ ev 4 " gf. age: i te te
c ° ‘ ‘ ’ . Sine Att rnc\ A SF ! ' 4 . . ‘ .* . ® . a
Ss} i se, ‘{] i) 7." al \ Dann rs, wi . oe A mut had advnn i ‘ , Co! LJ t% 1} . i}} * Jae \. ys vider 1. {1 »
N.C. 8 ’ | ' dus process And Oqyual protectin in that +: ’ ' :
. : both “wor " In Lists ¢ * we § ave To j tie Con errr... bool pe lur Li - Je
. 4 eyy ’ i. ‘ peo ¢ ° ° ’ . , : '
1S.G) As 4 ial » in Sate « Bas . : ana to stitution.) ecu mriy ta Uae don vssehe. @ hnowhdpe of barat '
. ' Vos. F o haat \ ae arrit one t\ ’ e . .
: . ’ j one porty an avenue Ga Cscapo Wilt . , et : . .
&) N« i ‘ } ; 2 . ‘ ’ . ’ tion, HO ah eb oet me. , aml no #fi- foriuats im Va ? G
(3 t Cand rclatiwely manor purcohonat while re fu : ‘ ‘
best mo of out bron of at ; t re trary clhosuficction, AN lecrel va be fa rie! port tes youn: bred
; . 3 cary, " he fame pe ' —_—_ ' ° . '
' . procecate te Appellant Veet .
pmri unm fi ‘ = . P : . ant ave Vio thf rere e ¢ ‘ "4 We fred we cvetes th..t t!
. ‘8 ‘ rs ied the S.athG.rra of f-. ’ ad , — ty il ' .
oeae Te berees ee we 5 ie nll ’ . ) - . ei vw" — . .
- [ili } Uh i t+! in ‘ t i | bs . Mie w j ety tee i
} - ;
, plan cot ome directed the sotliary ate thal je ie. ot ral
* . - . {12a)
*
a. a

‘ . ° ’
STATE v. WOODSON N.C. 619
Cire as 21581 24 68)

We have consitered the entire re vd in It is not an easy question for l am per-
this caec, well ac cach Ate ; at- sor ally Op yr vse ! to capital puri lire nt
sign nf of or with core ¢ ma Maminmmyp u, even for murder, is pet in
rate % th tt i t fr id 4] my) viev wis pubhe po! 5 ] do net te.
« ' i ; p4 j |
which defendants apy 3 and m ul
below we find

No Prror

EXUM, Justice (concurring)

This is the first ease, since my joining

Court, in wl we have consales

ayy. e-at . ? thy al th sente: pu

to Chepter 2%), Wes mn]

trial liewe, however, that its infliction upon on

convicted of premeditated murder or nm
der committed in the course of anot!»
. =

felony which itself as inte
to humen

rently dat rere

ife, such as we have here, contra

My belief that enpital punishment is un
i if public poticy os be

promnarity on the proposition that povern

i of the United Stntes

.
.*

620 N.C.

in degree but in kind. It is unique in its
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict
‘as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
.. renunciation of all that is embodied in
our concept of bt. nity.” (Emphasis
supplicd.)
Neither do | believe that capital punish-
_ ment, even when regularly utilized, deters
generally the commission of capita! crimes.
Practically all of the statistical data availa-
ble on the subject has been collected and
much of it thoroughly analyzed in Bowers,
Executions in America (D. C. Heath and
Company, 1974) (hereinafter, Rowers). The
author concludes: . .« + Ss
- “To assess the deterrent effects of capital
-*. punishment, investigators have conducted
* gtudies of various descriptions—examin-
ing and comparing nations and jurisdic-
~ tions within nations for the effects of

* °. gbolition and other changes in the status

. of the death penalty, Tor the effects of
fluctuations in and the cessation of exe-
~ eutions, and for the impact of the death
» .sentence and the exccution in specific
eases. Not one of these studies has
turned up evidence that the death penal-
ty is superior as a deterrent to punish-
* Ments used as alternatives. The data
presented in Chapters 5 and 6 specifically
restrict claims for the detcrrent power of
“.. the death penalty by showing that the
experimental abolition of capital punish-
ment, the ralionwide moratorium on exe-
. eutions, and the move from mandatory to
* diserctionary capital punishment, did not
~ encourage or contribute to a rise in erimi-
nal homicide.
“The failure of the death penalty to dis
. play any unique deterrent effect has been
attributed to the fact that it had come to
be imposed almost exclusively for irra-
tional actions and that even for such con-
. duct it was unlikely to be imposed. Mur-
‘der and rape are typically committed in
aware, drunkenness, and/or stupefying
passion. The offender acts in madness or
out of hatred, because of insult or betray-
_al, without expecting to Le caught, or not

[14a]

oo

215 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 24 SERIES avi

caring if he is. While the objective like!)-
hood of being put to death for his crime )
quite low, it is doubtful that the capita!
offender is subjectively aware of his
chances of escaping execution. Thus,
even under the mandatory death penalty,
which presumably contributes to the im-
pression that offenders are certain to be
executed if caught, potential offenders
appear equally oblivious to such impend-
ing doom.” Id. at 193-94.

Bowers has carefully compared homicide
rates for an equal period of time before and
after 1967 (the year of the last execution in
the United States) in death penalty and
contiguous abolition states. These cumpari-
sons make a convincing case that neither
utilization of capita! punishment mandiatori-
ly or in a discretionary way nor its de jure
nor de facto abulition has had any apprecia-
ble effect on the rate of commission of
capital crimes. See also Furman v. Geor-
gia, supra at 348-Si, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33
L.Ed.2d at 412-415 (Mr. Justice Marshal

concurring). ‘ ;

It must be conceded that the raw dzta
available has shortcomings which reduce its
probative value. “Onc is that there are no .
accurate figures for capital murders; there
are only figures on homicides and they, of
course, include non-capital killings.” Jd. «t
349-50, 92 S.Ct. at 2783, 33 L.Ed2d at
412-13 (Mr. Justice Marshall concurriny).
The main shortcoming of the statistical ir-
guments is: ,

“Capital punishment has obvious!)

failed as a deterrent when a murder is

cominitted. We can number its failures.

But we cannot number its successes. No

one can ever know how many people have

refrained from murder twceause of the
’ fear of being hanged.’ This is the nub of

the problem . . ..” Id. at 317, 92

S.Ct. at 2781, 33 LEd.2d at 41) (Mr.

Justice Marshall concurring).

Deterrence, however, is not the only pur-
pose of sanctions against criminal activity
Ketribution has long been recognized by

‘

many as another valid purpose. Chief Jus-
tice Burret pointed out im his dissent in
Furman, “The Court has con istently as-
sumed that retribution is 4 legatimate di-
mension of the pun Ament of erie 3.” 408
US. at 394, 92 S.Ct. at 2806, 93 L.Fa.2d at
439. 1, personally, do not believe that retri-
bution has an) legitimate place in our crim-
My view is that the
goals of sanctions against criminal conduct

jnal justice system.

should be general deterrence to others, spe-
cial deterrence to the offender himself, res-
titulion to the victim, and rehabilitation of
the offender. Punishment in the sense of
retribution, vengeance, OF retaliation is al-
ways in the long run self-defeating.
“But the punitive attitude persists. And
just so long: #5 the spirit of vengeance has
the slightest vestige of respectability, $0
Jong 2s it pervades the public mind and
. infuses its evil wpon the statute books of
the law, we will make no headway to
ward the contro! of erime. We cannot
assess the most appropriate and effective
‘penalty 8° long as we seck to inflict retal-
iatory pain.” Menninger, The Crime of
Punishment 918 (The Viking Press 1965).

&
Many disagree. “[it}esponsible legal think-
ers of widely varying persuasions have de-
“pated the cociolojica! and philosophical #s-
peets of the retribution question for penera-
tions, neither side being able to convince
the other.” Furman ¥. Georgia, supra at
994-95, 92 S.Ct. at 9305, 33 L.Ed at 439
(Chief Justice Buryer dissenting) While
the extent of retritulion available is ¢er-
‘tainly limited by the Crucl and Unususl
Punishment Clauses in our state and feder-
al constitutions, in the case now under con-
sideration exaction of the death penalty in

a purely retributive SENS’, while offensive
to me personally, gducs not comtravenc these

constitutional prot jbilions.

The point is that as 4 judge I cannot
gulstitute my personal will for that of the
Legisiatere merely because } disagree with

{isa}

STATE ¥. WoONSON
Cre 0s 215 S120 607

N.C. 621

its chosen policy. The utility of capital
punishment as 4 sanction against first de-
gree murder in our scheme of criminal jus-
tice is one Upon which reasonable, learned,
humane, and conscicntious persons differ.
These differences are nowhere better docu-
mented than in the nine separate opinions
filed by the Chief Justice- and Associate
Justices of the United States Supreme
Court in Furman and the various authori-
ties relied on in each of the opinions.
Whether the effects of capital punishment

in a murder case arc, indeed, brutalizing oF

_ salutary, whether the data available tend-

ing to negate the deterrent effect of capital
punishment really outweighs arguments in
its favor resting on “logical hypotheses de-
yoid of evidentiary support, but persuasive
nonetheless,” Furman Vv. Georgia, suprit at
347, 92 S.Ct. at 9781, 33 L.Ed.2d at 41) (or.
Justice Marshall coneurring), and whether
in a murder case it should be permitted for
purposes of pure retribution are questions
ypon which honest persons conscientiously
and deeply differ. This aspect of the ques-
tion strongly militates in favor of judicial
deference to the legislative will in the case
now before vs.

1 fervently hope that someday North Car-
olina will join her ten sister states who have
leristatively totali. abolished capital pun
ishment and some forty-five civilized coun-
tries throughout the world who likewise
have abolished it (except, in some instances,
in time of martial law and “for certain
extraordinary civil offenses’) Bowers at 6,
178. The Constitutions of the United
States and North Carolina in my view do
not require her to do so in cases such as this
one.

.*- oom

—-"

ee

Appendi x B:

Pp.

26-140, Bricf for pet
North Carolina, No.

itioncer,
73-7031.

Fowler v.

26

26

intractable judgment is to be made in numerous covert
ways which conceal while increasing the irregularity,
irrationality, and irresponsibility of the life-or-<death
decisions. (See Part II, pp. 26-101 infra.) Moreover, the
historical lesson learned through decades of overtly
discretionary capital sentencing -— that the death
penalty is no longer “widely accepted,’’®? but is instead
resoundingly repudiated by the institutions of criminal
justice that have actually borne the terrible respon-
sibility for choosing between life and death as the
disposition for even the most heinous of offenders (see
Part Ill, pp. 102-140 infra) — is to be ignored, as
though it never happened. With all respect, this result is
heedless of Furman, heedless of reality and history, and
forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Il.
THE ARBITRARY INFLICTION OF DEATH

Although the prevailing Furman opinions differ
somewhat in regard to the questions left unanswered by
the square holding of that case, each opinion condemns
at least any system of capital punishment in which
some persons are chosen to live and others identically
situated are consigned to die by irregular and erratic

2Tyop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality opinion of
Chief Justice Warren).

1b

27

selective processes.** Furman thus accords contem-
porary recognition to a central historic concern of the

The concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan (408 U.S. at
257-306) and Mr. Justice Marshall (408 U.S. at 314-373) shared
the view that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se
regardless of the presence or absence of selectivity in the
procedural system through which it is administered.

Mr. Justice Douglas did not reach the question “[{w]hether a
mandatory death penalty would ... be constitutional” if it were
in fact applied wholly non-selectively, 408 US. at 257, but held
the death sentences under review in Furman and companion
cases incompatible “with the idea of equal protection of the laws
that is iniplicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments,”
ibid., because they were “imposed pursuant to a procedure that
gives room for the play of ... prejudices,” 408 U.S. at 242, and
allows .the application of capital punishment “selectively to
minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society,
and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer
though it would not countenance general application of the
same penalty across the board.” 408 U.S. at 245.

Mr. Justice Stewart found it “unnecessary to reach the
ultimate question” whether “the infliction of the death penalty
is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances,” 408 US.
at 306, since he forad that the death sentences under review
were retumed “un. ~ legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be ... w..tonly and ... freakishly imposed,” 408
US. at 310, and therefore violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. “[O]f all of the people convicted of rapes and
murders ..., many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners
are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.” 408 US. at
309-310 (footnote ommitted).

Mr. Justice White declined to consider the question whether
“the death penalty is unconstitutional per se,” 408 US. at 311,
and held only that capital punishment was unconstitutional when
it “is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and ... [when] there is no meaningful basis for

distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the 927

many cases in which it is not.” 408 US. at 313.

2b

28

Eighth Amendment: “that government by the people,
instituted by the Constitution, . not imitate the
conduct of arbitrary monarchs.” Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910).

As this Court has recognized,** the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
is derived from the almost identically worded Tenth
Clause of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.°* The
preamble to the Bill of Rights declared that James Il
had endeavored to “subvert” the “laws and liberties of
this kingdom” by arbitrarily ‘assuming and exercising a
power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and
the execution of laws, without consent of parlia-

4 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).

Modern historical scholarship lends support to this con-
clusion. See SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY 41 (1971). The “Declaration of Rights,”
which William and Mary signed on February 13, 1689, before
their coronation, was reenacted with minor additions as a statute
(the “Bill of Rights”) by Parliament later that year. 1 W. & M.,
sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689), VI STAT. OF THE REALM 142-145. See
also 5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 483-490 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed.
1809); BROWNING, ENGLISH HISTORIC DOCUMENTS
1660-1714 122-128 (1953); BAXTER, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF
ENGLISH HISTORY 159 (1968). Clause 10 provides: “That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 5 PARL.
HIST. ENG. 485 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed. 1809). The Eighth
Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”

3b

29

ment.”°* The first two Clauses accordingly declared
such conduct on the part of the King and the royal

%Of particular concern to Parliament was James II’s claim
that the royal prerogative authorized him to ignore the statutes
prescribing religious qualifications for the holding of public
office, 4 THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, 1642-1801 87, 89 (1938), and to imprison subjects
when no statute or common lew principle authorized such a
punishment, 2 MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND
FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES II 515 (1850). This royal
claim was fecilitated by the 1686 decision of the King’s Bench in
Godden v. Hales, 2 Show. K.B. 475, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1!
Howell St. Tr. 1197 (Trinity Term, 2 Jac. 2) (1686), a collusive
action arranged by James II before handpicked judges to secure
judicial approval of the royal power arbitrarily to disregard the
enactments of Parliament. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITU-
TION, 1603-1688 420-426 (1966). The Court ruled: “That the
laws of England are the King’s laws, That therefore it is an
inseparable prerogative in the Kings of England to dispense with
penal laws in particular cases and upon particular reasons, That of
those reasons and those necessities the King himself is the sole
judge.” 11 Howell St. Tr. at 1199. This decision confirmed the
Parliamentary belief “that the Crown must be limited, controlled,
and [made] inferior to the laws of the land,” HUGHES &
FRIES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUDOR-—STUART
ENGLAND 291 (1959); the realization by both Whigs and Tories
“of the inadequacy of the laws of Parliament to withstand the
attacks of the King was the beginning of their rejection of James
and the real commencement of the revolution of 1688.” /d. at
294.

4b

29

30

judges illegal,?” and Clause 10 prohibited the infliction
of “cruel and unusual punishments.” The legislative
history of this provision makes clear that it was
intended to prohibit the infliction of harsh punishments

that were arbitrarily imposed.** am |
While the Bill of Rights was pending in Parliament,

an Anglican clergyman, Titus Oates, appealed his 1685
perjury conviction to the House of Lords. Oates had

37 These two Clauses flatly overruled Godden v. Hales, supra
note 36, declaring:
“1. That the pretended power of suspending of laws, or the
execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of
parliament, is illegal. 2. That the pretended power of
dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal
authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is
illegal.”
5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 485 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed. 1809). A
significant new phrase was also added to the Coronation Oath:
henceforth, the ascending monarch was to ree to em
rding to “the statutes in Parliament agreed upon, an
ioe a customs of the same.” WILLIAMS, THE EIGHT-
EENTH—CENTURY CONSTITUTION, 1688-1815: DOCU-
MENTS AND COMMENTARY 3, 37 (1960). “The oath in its
previous form had pledged the King to ‘grant and keep’ the laws
and customs ‘granted’ by his predecessor. If the laws were merely
the King’s grants, then it might be contended that he could
revoke them. Henceforth, it was plain that he was bound by the
laws.” 4 THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, 1642-1801 176-177 (1938).

38 Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:”

The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 859 (1969);
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838,

844 (1972).

30

5b

31

been convicted in the King’s Bench of giving false
testimony during the “Popish Plot” trials of 1678-1679,
and had been sentenced to be defrocked, to serve a
term of life imprisonment, to pay a large fine, to be
twice severely whipped, and to be pilloried four times a
year.*® This punishment was harsh.‘ discriminatory and
arbitrary in the extreme — a manifest attempt to avenge
Oates’ anti-Catholic intrigues against James II (who had
then been Duke of York) by the imposition of
punishments that were both unauthorized by statute
and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.*!

For discussions of this phase of the Oates case, see CLARK,
THE LATER STUARTS, 1660-1714 88-92 (1934); BROWNING,
ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1660-1714 12-15
(1953); 4 THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND, 1642-1801 61-65 (1938); LANDON, THE TRI-
UMPH OF THE LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN ENGLISH
POLITICS, 1678-1689 181-183 (1969).

“The lengthy flogging prescribed for Oates was apparently
intended to be fatal: “the court, having no power to hang him,
plainly intended that he should be flogged to death.” 4
THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
1642-1801 142 (1938). This was the contemporary under-
standing of the court's intent. In 1689, the House of Commons
resolved “[t] hat it was illegal, cruel, and of dangerous example
that a freeman [Oates] should be whipped in such a barbarous
manner, as, in all probability, would determine in death.” 5
PARL. HIST. ENG. 387 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed. 1809).

“"Imprisonment for life could not at that time be imposed for
perjury (a misdemeanor), 4 THOMSON, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1660-1801 142 (1938); and “fo] nly
a spiritual court could degrade a priest,” ibid. According to
Macaulay, “that the sentence [imposed on Oates] was illegal was
a proposition that admitted of no dispute.” 3 MACAULAY, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES
Il 308 (1850).

6b

31

32

Oates’ conviction and sentence were affirmed in the
House of Lords, with thirteen of the Members
dissenting strongly on the grounds that these punish-
ments were “cruel, barbarous, and illegal’ and “‘con-
trary to the Declaration [of Rights] of the 12th of
Feb. last... whereby it doth appear, that excessive Bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed,
nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.’’*? Oates

425 PARL. HIST. ENG. 291-292 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed.
1809). This dissent declared:

“1. ‘For that the King’s-bench, being a temporal court,
made it part of the Judgment, That Titus Oates, being a
clerk, should, for his perjuries, be divested of his canonical
and priestly habit, and to continue divested all his life:
which is a matter wholly out of their power, belonging to
the ecclesiastical courts only. 2. For that the said
Judgments are barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian. And
there is no precedents [sic] to warrant the punishments of
whipping, and committing to prison for life, for the crime
of perjury; which yet were but part of the punishments
inflicted upon him . 4. For that this will be an
encouragement, and an allowance, for giving the like cruel,
barbarous, and illegal Judgments hereafter, unless this
Judgment be reversed. 5. Because sir John Holt, sir Henry
Pollexfen, the two Chief Justices, and sir Robert Atkins
chief baron, with six Judges more (being all that were then
present), for these and many other Reasons, did, before us,
solemnly deliver their Opinions; and unanimously declare,
That the said Judgments were contrary to law, and ancient
practice; and therefore erroneous, and ought to be reversed.
6. Because it was contrary to the Declaration of the 12th
of Feb. last, which was ordered by the lords spiritual and
temporal, and commons, then assembled; and by their
Declaration ingrossed in parchment, and inrolled among the
Records of parliament, and recorded in Chancery; whereby
it doth appear, that excessive Bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive Fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.’ ”

7b

33

then sought relief in the House of Commons, where his
cause was strongly taken up by militant Protestants,
who secured passage of a resolution “That Bills be
brought in to reverse the Judgments against Mr.
Oates... as cruel and illegal."*? Sir William Williams
declared during the debate on this bill: “let any man
give us a precedent to square with that Judgment. It
makes the Judges arbitrary, and hereafter the Judges
may. be most injurious in punishing.”“* When a
deadlock occurred with the House of Lords over a
collateral matter,** one of the floor managers from the
Lords (whose bill gave Oates more limited relief than
the Commons bill) admitted that the Oates judgment
was illegal but declared that Oates deserved punishment
for his libels. A Member of Commons responded:

** *Be it so. This bill gives him no indemnity. We
are quite willing that, if he is guilty, he shall be
punished. But for him, and for all Englishmen, we
demand that punishments shall be regulated by

a3
5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 296 (1688-1704\Cobbett ed. 1809).
“Id. at 294.
“The Commons had also declared that the perjury judgements
against Oates were “corrupt.” 5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 392

(1688-1704) (Cobbett ed. 1809), and it was this j
q \ allegati
the Lords would not agree to. /d. at 394. —

8b

34

law, and not by the arbitrary discretion of any
tribunal.’ ***

By the time of the framing of the American Bill of
Rights, eight States had adopted prohibitions of “cruel
and unusual punishments” that were modeled upon

43 MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM
THE ACCESSION OF JAMES II 310 (1850). The floor managers
of the Commons bill reported back to the House of Commons
on their difficulties in securing an acceptable compromise bill
from the House of Lords:

“the commons had hoped, that, after the Declaration [of
Rights] presented to their majesties upon their accepting
the crown (wherein their lordships had joined with the
commons in complaining of the crue! and illegal punish-
ments of the last reign; and in asserting it to be the ancient
right of the people of England, that they should not be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishments; and that no
judgments to the prejudice of the people in that kind
ought in any-wise to be drawn into consequence, or
example); and after this Declaration had been so lately
renewed in that part of the Bill of Rights which the lords
had agreed to; they should not have seen Judgments of this
nature affirmed, and been put under a necessity of sencing
up a Bill for reversing them, since those Declarations will
not only be useless, but of pernicious consequence to the
people, if, so soon after, such Judgments as these stand
affirmed, and be not taken to be cruel and illegal within
the meaning of those Declarations—That the commons had
a particular regard to these Judgments, amongst others,
when that Declaration was first made; and must insist upon
it, that they are erroneous, cruel, illegal, and of ill example
to future ages.... That it was surely of ill example for a
temporal court to give judgment, ‘That a clerk be divested
of his canonical habits; and continue so divested during his
life.” That it was of ill example, and illegal, that a
Judgment of perpetual imprisonment should be given in a
case, where there is no express law to warrant ty

5 PARL. HIST. ENG. 386-387 (1688-1704) (Cobbett ed. 1809).
Oates was pardoned by King William before the differences

34 between Commons and Lords were finally resolved. /d. at 399.

gb

35

Clause 10 of the English Bill of Rights,*” and the
federal government had inserted a similar provision into
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.4 Because earl

American legal history is so obscure, it is not saesitie
to know exactly what the draftsmen of these provisions
intended.*® However, whatever else such clauses were

47u7:..:_:
ny! amine of 1776, Declaration of Rights, §9 (7
pe - ae AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3813
ame rod a hy page THE BIRTH . OF THE BILL OF
inte of Fen. 6 y i —— ); Delaware Declaration of
Carolina Constitution of 1776, §10 (s ee. : ae
Maryland Constitution of 1776, § 22 (3 THORPE ee aan
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. 26 (3 THORPE os =
:. Bann Ne’ Hampshire Constitution of 1784, $33 (4
. a “dom «t 2457); Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, art.
I -.+ Mor cruel punishments inflicted”) (5 THORPE

spre, at 3101); South Carolina Constitution of 1790, art. 9 84
: ae 4 on punishments inflicted”) (6 THORPE, supra, at
— ' : oe Constitution of 1777, ch. 2, §35 (6 THORPE

print 1): To deter more effectually from the
pear : crimes, by continued visible punishment of long
: » and to make sanguinary punishments less necessary ;

Ouses ought to be provided for punishing, by hard labor, th
who shall be convicted of crimes ....” wiliain

48 .

, sp nee of 1 787, The Northwest Territorial Government
* . Il (Confederation Congress, July 13, 1787): “All fines shall
' moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be
inflicted.” See 1 U.S.C. xxxvii-xxxviii (1964).

“Legal development is probabl

' elopr y the least known aspect of
pone ed colonial history. Judicial opinions were not eto in
a es, no year books were issued, and the printed materials
or legal and judicial history have been so scanty as to preclude
the more cautious historians from dealing with this important
side of colonial life.” MORISON (ed.), RECORDS OF THE

SUFFOLK COUNTY ,
(1933). COURT, 1671-1680 unpaginated preface

10b

35

36

36

intended to prohibit, it is unlikely that they were not
intended to guard against the arbitrary infliction of
harsh punishments. For there is evidence that the
colonists were concerned with this issue. In 1635,
Governor John Winthrop described the attempts of the
Massachusetts Bay Colonists to draft a comprehensive
criminal code in order to limit the discretion of the
magistrates: “The deputies having conceived great
danger to our state in regard that our magistrates, for
want of positive laws, in many cases, might proceed
according to their discretions, it was agreed, that some
men should be appointed to frame a body of grounds
of laws, in resemblance to a Magna Charta, which being
allowed by some of the ministers and the general court,
should be received for fundamental laws.”*® The
writings of Blackstone, whose influence on the
development of colonial American law was enormous,*'
had echoed the 1689 Parliamentary debates concerning
the Oates case by stressing the fact that English law did
not allow the arbitrary infliction of punishment:

“it is moreover one of the glories of our English
law, that the nature, though not always the quality
or degree, of punishment is ascertained for every
offence: and that it is not left in the breast of any
judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment,

S WHITMORE, COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS

1630-1686 5 (1889).

S'\Granucci, “Nor -Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:”’

The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 862 (1969).
Edmund Burke announced to Parliament in 1775 that almost as
many copies of Blackstone’s Commentaries had been sold in the
American colonies as in Great Britain. SUTHERLAND, THE
LAW AT HARVARD 25 (1967).

1lb

37

which the law has beforehand ordained

subject alike, without respect of aang Fong |
judgments were to be the private opinions of the
judge, men would then be slave to their
magistrates; and would live in society, without
knowing exactly the conditions and obligations
which it lays them under....[{W]here an estab-
lished penalty is annexed to crimes, the criminal
may read their certain consequence in that law
which Ought to be the unvaried rule, as it is the
inflexible judge of his actions.’’S?

Finally, the American statesmen who framed the state
and federal prohibitions on cruel and unusual punish-
ments in the late Eighteenth Century typically believed
that their rebellion against Britain had been justified in
order to preserve their inherited English civil rights and
political freedoms:** “from a purely legal interpreta-
tion, the American Revolution itself, as the Americans
saw it, was largely the result of England’s disregard of
the common-law rights of the Colonists.” It therefore
appears unlikely that they would consciously have

,

“See BAILYN. THE IDEOLOGICAL
, ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1-54 (1967).

wa ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 337

12b

37

38

38

rejected or limited any of their traditional liberties,**
including the right against arbitrary infliction of harsh
punishments. George Mason, the author of both the
Virginia Declaration of Rights and the amendments
proposed to Congress by the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion.®® stressed the necessity of limiting all forms of
American governmental authority by such guarantees of
individual liberty:

“In the declaration of rights which that country
{Great Britain] has established, the truth is, they

SSThe legislative history of adoption of the Eighth Amend-
ment is sparse and not particularly illuminating as to the
purposes of the Framers. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 111 (2d
ed. 1863); 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 447-448, 451, 452 (2d ed.
1863); 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (Ist Cong., Ist Sess.
1789). There is evidence, however, that in certain ratifying
conventions, opponents of the Constitution feared that, without
a Bill of Rights, Congress would be free to devise whatever
criminal punishments it wished and that tortures might be
instituted. Patrick Henry, for example, declared to the Virginia
Convention: “when we come to punishments, no latitude ought
to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives
[in Congress] .... Are you not, therefore, now calling on those
gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials and
define punishments without this control [a constitutional
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments”’]?. . . . You let
them loose; you do more — you depart from the genius of your
country.” 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 447-448 (2d ed. 1863). There
is thus some evidence that the Framers were concerned to limit
the discretion of Jegislators to devise punishments, and there is
no indication whatsoever in any of the debates that they would
have approved an arbitrary freedom on the part of magistrates to
impose criminal punishments.

S6See | ROWLAND, LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 234-250
(1892).

13b

39

have gone no farther than to raise a barrier against
the power of the Crown; the power of the
legislature is left altogether indefinite... .

But although ...it may not be thought necessary
to provide limits for the legislative power in that
country, yet a different opinion prevails in the
United States. The people of many states have
thought it necessary to raise barriers against power
in all forms and departments of Government... .”

1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 436 (Ist Cong., Ist Sess.

1789).

The arbitrary infliction of death which this Court
condemned in Furman and companion cases arose, of
course, from various procedures*’ whereby juries (or
judges) were given the option to sentence convicted
capital offenders to life (or term) imprisonment or
death.** But — particularly in the light of McGautha vy.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) — it is impossible to
read Furman as prohibiting only the explicit statutory
annunciation of jury discretion to impose alternative
sentences of imprisonment or capital punishment.
Surely Furman and the Eighth Amendment forbid any
arbitrarily selective imposition of the “unique penalty”
of death,*® whatever the source or mechanism of the
arbitrariness. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 1973

‘’For a description of some of these variations, see State v.
Rhodes, Mont. _.__, 524 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1974).

58See McGautha v. California, 402 US. 183, 197-203 (1971).

59Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 US. at 310 (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart).

l4b

39

40

40

Mass. Adv. Sh. 1199, 300 N.E.2d 434 (1973).%° The
particular method of selecting some men to die while
others in like cases live with “no meaningful basis for
distinguishing” among them*' cannot be thought
constitutionally decisive. For the Federal Constitution is
not ordinarily concerned with the forms of state
procedure, but with their result. See, e.g., Chambers vy.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-303 (1973); Mempa vy.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-137 (1967); Jackson Y.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 n.19 (1964), It “‘nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes” of
producing unconstitutional consequences. Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). Federal constitutional
guarantees cannot — as Justice Holmes wrote in another
context — “be evaded by attempting a distinction” of
form without a difference in substance. Davis Y.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).

1, Commonwalth v. A Juvenile, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held a “mandatory” death penalty statute
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment where death was
the “mandatory” punishment for a specified crime but
discretionary mechanisms existed by which a trial court could
avoid subjecting a particular defendant to that “mandatory”
sentence. The case involved a juvenile who had been condemned
under a statute which made death the “mandatory” punishment
for rape-murder. The Court held that when a juvenile could be
adjudicated either as an adult for rape-murder (in which case, the
death sentence was mandatory, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c.
265 §2) or as a juvenile (in which case no death sentence could
be imposed), a death sentence imposed pursuant to the adult
“mandatory” statute could not be affirmed, since Furman
invalidated “discretionary imposition of the death sentence.” 300
N.E.2d at 442 (emphasis in original).

61Furman y. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 313 (concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice White).

156

4]

To be sure, Waddeil’s annulment of the North
Carolina “recommendation” statute ostensibly made
death the exclusive punishment for first degree murder,
rape, first degree burglary and arson. But the
implementation of the death sentence for this broad
range of offenses inevitably required the exercise of vast
and uncontrolled selective discretion by district attor-
neys, trial judges, juries and the Governor in choosing
which defendants would live and which would die in
cases where the death penalty was potentially applicable
after Waddell. Language requires that the several
practices through which unrestrained and arbitrary
discretion infects the administration of the death
penalty under Waddell be described separately, as we
shall do in the following subsections of this brief. But
the practices plainly operate cumulatively to produce
the kind of extreme uncertainty and unpredictability in
the infliction of the death penalty that violates
Furman’s ban.

“There is... danger in treating any one stage [of
the criminal justice process] as if it were a
self-contained system rather than merely one
decision in an ongoing process of interrelated
decisions and consequences of decisions. An
assumption, explicit or implied, that adjudication
is in fact a quasi-automatic, nondiscretionary
process, turning solely on matters of sufficient
evidence, is a gross oversimplification ... .”

NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 150
(1966). Thus as demonstrated by Professor Charles

82See also Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in
Criminal Justice, 46 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 12, 14-15 (1972).

16b

41

42

42

Black in his recent trenchant analysis,®? the result of

63BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY
OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974). Professor ®lack points
out the numerous discretionary decisions made at every stage of
the criminal justice process, with life and death consequences,

and emphasizes:

“Regarding each of these choices, through all the range,
one of two things, or perhaps both, may be true.

First, the choice made may be a mistaken one. The
defendant may not have committed the act of which he is
found guilty; the factors which ought properly to induce a
prosecutor to accept a plea to a lesser offense may have
been present, though he refused to do so, the defendant
may have been ‘insane’ in the way the law requires for
exculpation, though the jury found that he was not. And
so on.

Secondly, there may either be no legal standards governing
the making of the choice, or the standards verbally set up
by the legal system for the making of the choice may be so
vague, at least in part of their range, as to be only apparent
standards, in truth furnishing no direction and leaving the
actual choice quite arbitrary.

These two possibilities have an interesting (and, in the
circumstances, tragic) relationship. The concept of mistake
fades out as the standard grows more and more vague and
unintelligible. There is no vagueness problem about the
question ‘Did Y hit Z on the head with a piece of pipe?’ It
is, for just that reason, easily possible to conceive of what
it means to be ‘mistaken’ in answering this question; one is
‘mistaken’ if one answers it ‘yes’ when in fact Y did not
hit Z with the pipe. It is even fairly clear what it means to
be ‘mistaken’ in answering the question ‘Did Y intend to
kill Z?’ Conscious intents are facts; the difference here
really is that, for obvious reasons, mistake is more likely in
the second case than in the first, for it is hard or
impossible to be confident of coming down on the right
side of a question about past psychological fact.

(continued)

17b

43

numerous interrelated arbitrary processes in the admin-
istration of the death penalty in North Carolina is
exactly the result condemned by Furman: death
sentences which are “wantonly and... freakishly im-
posed.” Furman vy. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 310
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart).

And this means not merely that a few men die for
ties nO more atrocious than the crimes of many who
are spared. It means also that society’s most extreme
and irremediable punishment is likely to be practiced
principally upon the outcast of society. Discrimination
is inseparable from arbitrariness wherever social atti-

(footnote continued from proceeding page)

It is very different when one comes to the question, ‘Was
the action of which the defendant was found guilty
performed in such a manner as to evidence an ‘abandoned
and malignant heart’?” (This phrase figures importantly in
homicide law.) This question has the same grammatical
form as a clearcut factual question; actually, through a
considerable part of its range, it is not at all clear what it
means. It sets up, in this range, not a standard but a
pseudo-standard. One cannot, strictly speaking, be mistaken
in answering it, at least within a considerable range
because to be mistaken is to be on the wrong side of a
line, and there is no real line here. But that, in tum, means
that the ‘test’ may often be no test at all, but merely an
invitation to arbitrariness and passion, or even to the
influence of dark unconscious factors.

‘Mistake’ and ‘arbitrariness’ therefore are reciprocally
related.”

Id. at 19-21 (emphasis in original).

“See, e.g, LAWES, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING
SING 302, 307-310 (1932); DUFFY & HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN
AND 2 WOMEN 254-255 (1962); De Ment, A Plea for the
Condemned, 29 ALA. LAWYER 440, 440-441 n.2 (1968)

(quoting Commissioner A. Frank Lee, of the Alabama Board of
Corrections).

18b

43

44

tudes make men or groups unequal or unpopular. That
had not ceased to be the case in England three
centuries after Titus Oates,°* and it assuredly has not
ceased in this country where “(t]hroughout our history
differences in race and color have defined easily
indentifiable groups which have at times required the
aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the
laws.” “It is the poor, the illiterate, the underpriv-
ileged, the member of the minority group — is
usually sacrificed by society’s lack of concern. To
believe that this discrimination can be ended or
controlled by the annulment of forthright jury
discretion in capital sentencing in North Carolina blinks
reality. For,

“discretion in the imposition of the death penalty
will continue to be exercised in the prosecuting
attorney’s decision concerning the wording of the
charge; the grand jury’s decision concerning the

6SPIERREPOINT, EXECUTIONER: PIERREPOINT 2i!
(1974):

“As long as reprieves for the death sentence existed, the
reason for a reprieve was always fundamentally political: an
execution here would incite too much sympathy for the
victim and must be respited; an execution there will show
that the Home Secretary means business. The public were
allowed to blow like the wind for one popular reprieve of a
favourite from Hampstead, and stay dead calm about an
unattractive strangling in Ashton-under-Lyne precisely
because the same basic inconsistency was being operated
for the policy reprieves. The trouble with the death
sentence has always been that nobody wanted it for
everybody, but everybody differed about who should get
off.”

6 prernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).

67D iSalle, Trends in the Abolition of Capital Punishment, 1 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1969). See also text and notes at
44 notes 226-227, infra.

19b

45

allegations of the indictment; the jury’s findings
concerning the existence of defenses, [and]
elements of the crime...; and the governor’s
decision whether to commute the death sentence if
one results. Since discretion will not be substan-
tially restricted under the new [procedure] ...,
but merely shifted to other parts of the criminal
justice process, there is little reason to expect thai
disproportionate application to minorities and poor
people will not continue.’’®*

A. Prosecutorial Charging Discretion

As long ago as 1931, the Wickersham Commission
reported that “[t]}he Prosecutor [is] the real arbiter of
what laws shall be enforced and against whom... .’’®

Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuating a
Costly Myth, 9 GONZAGA L. REV. 651, 661-662 (1974). See
also Note, Mandatory Death: State v. Waddell, 4 N.C. CENT. L.
J. 292, 298 (1974).

**NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 19
(1931). See also DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-214 (1971); authorities collected

in note 74 infra. Cf. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION vii (1929):

“... | have attempted to indicate the very great
importance of the public prosecutor, a fact which is
particularly American. The sheriff and the coroner, the
grand jury, and finally the petit jury, products of a long
historical evolution, have quite faded into insignificance.
Likewise, both the examining magistrate and the trial judge
in state courts, partially through their own lack of
capacity, partly through legal limitations upon their
powers, and largely because they have no means for
knowing what they should know about the cases before
them, perform no dominant role. In the midst of the decay
and impotence of his official associates, the prosecutor rises
to a definite mastery. To a considerable extent, he is
police, prosecutor, magistrate, grand jury, petit jury, and
judge in one.”

20b

45

46

In North Carolina, the prosecuting attorney (called the
Solicitor) is charged with the duty to “prepare the trial
dockets, [and] prosecute in the name of the State all
criminal actions requiring prosecution in the superior
and district courts of his district,” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§7A-61 (1973 cum. supp.) (emphasis added). He is
thereby given broad and _ essentially antennas
authority to initiate and terminate prosecutions, State

be eath penalty case, where the conviction and
.” yn ec ge new trial ordered because of
procedural error, illustrates the Solicitor’s charging discretion
under Waddell. In State v. Spicer, 285 N.C. 274, 204 S.E.2d 641
(1974), two persons were tried and convicted for murder during
the course of an armed robbery. A third person, one Brailford,
had helped to plan the robbery and was to share in its proceeds,
but he was not charged in the murder although his testimony
“permitted the jury to make a finding that he was an accomplice
either in the robbery or the murder, or both. 204 S.E.2d at
647. The Court described Brailford’s criminal role in the
following fashion:
“the State’s witness Brailford made the admission to the
officers, ‘I stated that I initiated the proposition concerning
the hit of Christian Brothers Poultry. It was my idea.” He
again stated he expected his cut. ...
The evidence discloses that the witness Brailford originated
the plan to rob his employer and explained the setup at
the plant.”
Ibid. The other two persons involved in the robbery, Spicer and
one Isaac Monk, were convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to die. Spicer’s conviction has been, as indicated,
reversed on grounds permitting a retrial and a new death
sentence, while Monk’s conviction and death sentence are now
pending on appeal in the North Carolina Supreme Court. State v.
Monk. No. 13, New Hanover County, Fall Term, 1974.

16

2lb

47

v. Loesch, 237 N.C. 611, 75 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1953),”!
including not only absolute discretion whether and
what to charge,” but also absolute discretion to bring
an indicted defendant to trial upon lesser charges than
those set forth in the indictment even if the evidence

"The Court also ruled in State v. Loesch, that the Attorney
General had no supervisory jurisdiction over the several Solicitors
of the State, whose offices were established by Article III,
Section 18 of the State Constitution. “(T]he duty of the
Attorney General in so far as it extends to the solicitors of the
State is purely advisory. The Attorney General has no
constitutional authority to issue a directive to any other
constitutional officer concerning his legal duties.” 75 S.E.2d at
656.

"The grand jury provides no significant check upon
prosecutorial discretion since — except in a few extraordinary
cases — it is heavily dominated by the prosecuting attorney.
See, eg, Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1171
(1960), and authorities cited; Shannon, The Grand Jury, True
Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of the
Prosecutor? 2 NEW MEXICO L. REV. 141, 170 (1972); Note,
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwar-
ranted Inaction, 65 YALE L. J. 209, 212-213 (1955). Indeed, it
is dubious that even the most conscientious grand juror, zealous
to perform the grand jury’s function of providing “‘a fair
method for instituting criminal! proceedings against persons
believed to have committed crimes,’ Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (as quoted in Russell v. United States,
369 US. 749, 761 (1962) ); accord: State v. Greer, 238 N.C.
325, 77 S.E.2d 917, 918-919 (1953), by inquiring “into the
existence of possible criminal conduct and [returning] ... only
well-founded indictments,” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
688 (1972); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 US. 338.
343 (1974), would suppose that this function called upon him to
return an indictment upon charges greater than those sought by
the prosecutor. And, as we shall shortly see under North Carolina
law, if a grand jury did return such an indictment, the prosecutor
could elect not to prosecute the offense charged, but only a
lesser included offense. See text and note at note 73 infra.

22b

47

48

48

shows that 2 greater crime has been committed, State v.
Allen, 279 N.C. 115, 181 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1971);”
and see State v. Roy, 233 N.C. 558, 64 S.E.2d 840,
841 (1951).”

™31n State v. Allen, the Court affirmed a second degree
burglary conviction in a case where the sole question presented
on appeal was “ ‘Did the trial court commit error by placing the
defendant on trial for burglary in the second degree when all the
evidence tended to show burglary in the first degree?’” 181
S.E.2d at 455. The appellant was charged by indictment with
first degree burglary, but at trial the solicitor announced he
would seek no verdict greater than burglary in the second degree.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina -ruled that “the solicitor
has the authority to elect not to try the defendant on the
maximum degree of the offense charged but to put him on trial
for the lesser degree thereof and lesser offenses included
therein.... The effect of such election by the solicitor,
announced as in this instance, is that of a verdict of not guilty
upon the maximum degree of the offense charged, leaving for
trial the lesser degree and the lesser included offenses.” /bid.

Cf Note, Prosecutorial Discretion, 21 DePAUL L. REV.
485, 486 (1971-1972):

“(t]he limitations of a prosecutor's discretion are some-
what nebulous, and, in general, undefined. He has the
authority by law to enforce certain laws by prosecuting
offenders. Whom he chooses to prosecute, what he charges
them with, whether he charges them at all, whether he
later drops the charges or recommends a lower sentence at
the time of trial are all within the prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion.”

See also MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 154-172, 293-350
(1969); 2 PLOSCOWE (ed), MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS 315-320 (1956); Baker & DeLong, The Prose-
cuting Attorney, 24 5. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 1025 (1934),
Ferguson, Formulation of Enforcement Policy: An Anatomy of
the Prosecutor’s Discretion Prior to Accusation, 11 RUTGERS L.
REV. 507 (1957); Mills, The Prosecutor: Charging and
“Bargaining,” 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 511; Note, Prosecutor's
Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955); Note, Private
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted
Inaction, 65 YALE L. J. 209, 209-215 (1955).

23b

49

The North Carolina courts steadfastly refuse to
review prosecutorial decisions. The leading case is State
v. Casey, 159 N.C. 472, 74 S.E. 625 (1912), where an
appellant, prosecuted and convicted for second degree
murder by poisoning, argued that there was no evidence
of this crime; that she was either guilty of first degree
murder or not guilty of any offense. The North
Carolina Supreme Court rejected this contention,
commenting that the appellant had no “privilege to be
tried for the capital felony” and concluding that “if the
solicitor erred, it is an error in favor of the prisoner, of
which she cannot justly complain.” 74 S.E. at 625. And
following Waddell, the court in State v. Jarrette, 284
N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721, 742 (1974), flatly rejected
the contention that the Eighth and the Fourteenth
Amendments required any circumscription of the
discretion of the Solicitor in capital cases:

“the Constitution of the United States does not
require a state, in the enforcement of its criminal
laws, so to hedge its prosecuting attorney about
with ‘guidelines’ that he becomes a mere auto-
maton, acting on the impulse of a computer and
treating all persons accused of criminal conduct
exactly alike.”

The consequence of this unfettered prosecutorial
discretion is, of course, that different Solicitors may
utilize different standards in deciding whether to
initiate capital or noncapital prosecutions. Without any
guidance whatsoever,”* a Solicitor is free to make the

SCf. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1952):

“{a] society that holds, as we do, to belief in law cannot
regard with unconcern the fact that prosecuting agencies
can exercise so large an influence on dispositions that
involve the penal sanction, without reference to any norms
but those that they may create for themselves.”

24b

49

50

decision whether an indictment will be sought for first
or second degree murder or manslaughter,” for rape or
assault with intent to rape, for first or second degree
burglary. He may thus “without violating [his] .. . trust
or any statutory policy...refuse to [seek] ...the
death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the
crime.” Furman vy. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 314
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White). This
unconstrained discretion doubtless accounts in consider-
able part for the striking fact that there have been only
three convictions’’ of first degree burglary during a full
year of Waddell’s implementation in a State where there
were about forty convictions annually for this crime in

7*As we demonstrate at pp. 65-76 infra, the distinctions
among these offenses as they may apply to particular factual
Situations are largely intangible and judgmental.

State v. Poole, rev'd for insufficient evidence, 285 N.C. 108,
203 S.E.2d 786 (1974); State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203
S.E.2d10(1974), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Henderson y.
North Carolina, U.S.S.C. No. 73-6853 (June 8, 1974); State v.
Boyd, N.C. Sup. Ct. No. 7, Spring Term 1974, (pending on
appeal). In State v. Henderson, supra, the defendant was also
convicted of and sentenced to die for rape; and in State v. Boyd,
supra, the jury was unable to agree on a homicide verdict after it
was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of second
degree murder.

25b

$1

the recent past, and where 39,210 “burglaries and
housebreakings” were reported in 1972.7? The conclu-
sion is inescapable that Solicitors have simply not
regarded first degree burglary as a crime deserving
death, and have not initiated first degree burglary

™In 1955, the North Carolina Department of Justice ceased
to report separate statistics for persons convicted of first degree
burglary and of second degree burglary. In 1952, there were 47
convictions for first degree burglary in Superior Court (with 15
“Other dispositions”) and 5 convictions in “inferior court” (with
64 “Other dispositions” there). 32 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAR.
OLINA 1952-1954 515, 521 (1954). In 1953, there were 33
convictions for first degree burglary in Superior Court (with 10
“Other dispositions”) and 4 convictions in “inferior court” (with
49 “Other dispositions” there). /bid. In 1954, there were 35
convictions for first degree burglary in Superior Court (with 26
“Other dispositions”) and 9 convictions in “inferior court” (with
61 “Other dispositions” there). 33 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAR.
OLINA 1954-1956 377, 379 (1956). “Other dispositions” is
nowhere defined; since the total of convictions and “Other
dispositions” represents “cases disposed of in the Superior and
inferior courts of the State,” 32 BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAR.
OLINA 1952-1954 510 (1954), “Other dispositions” apparently
includes acquittals and nol pros’s.

” UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1972 74 (Aug. 1973). The Uniform Crime Reports, of
course, reflect reported crimes, not convictions; and the reported
“purglaries and housebreakings” doubtless exceed the total
number of statutory first degree burglaries which occurred in the
State during 1972. Nevertheless, it cannot rationally be imagined
that only three first degree burglars were apprehended in North
Carolina during a twelve month period.

26b

51

52

prosecutions in cases where they might have obtained
convictions for this crime.

The inconsequential number of first degree burglary
convictions under the Waddell regime is _hasdly
surprising, since the ‘ercise of prosecutorial discretion
to blunt the impact of “mandatory” penalties in
sympathetic cases has been one of the most significant
phenomena observed in the enforcement of such
statutes: “‘[a] charge may be reduced to avoid infliction
of punishment harm that administrative officials regard
as too severe in relation to the suspect’s conduct.
Usually, a less serious offense is charged because
conviction of the maximum offense carries a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence.”’®®

As with the death-penalty statutes struck down in
Furman, it is not necessary to conclude that North
Carolina’s capital laws are being intentionally adminis-
tered “‘with an evil eye and an unequal hand,” Yick Wo

® MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE
A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 207 (1969). Cf Rosett, Discretion,
Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 SO. CALIF. L.

REV. 12, 49 (1972):

“lo] fficials tend to respond to the undue harshness of
punishments provided by the law by seeking discretion to
avoid the imposition of that harshness in most cases. Yet,
ironically, it is when the system is particularly severe that
discretion may be most abusive and the temptation to act
unjustly becomes greater. When the system is severe,
discretionary decision-making becomes unacceptable be-
cause it reposes excessive authority in the hands of an
often unsupervised individual official. In such a situation,
the advantages of legal rules and process become
exaggerated.”

52

27b

53

v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886). The point
rather is that their implementation is necessarily and
unavoidably arbitrary. Since no standards exist to
regularize the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, there
is nothing to guarantee that some defendants, like
petitioner, will not be capitally charged while other
defendants, probably guilty of similar conduct, are
prosecuted for second degree murder or manslaughter.
Although the choice of charge is quite literally the
difference between life and death, that choice is a
completely uncontrolled, discretionary decision of the
Solicitor.

B. Plea Bargaining

Another point of entrance for arbitrariness in the
administration of capital punishment in North Carolina
under the Waddell procedures is the unfettered power
of the Solicitor to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser or
other non-capital offense from a capitally charged
defendant, and/or to nol pros a capital indictment.
Exercise of this discretionary power undercuts the
“mandatory” nature of the death penalty for first
degree murder as effectively as the practice of
selectively charging homicide defendants with second
degree murder or manslaughter at the outset. The
guilty-plea process is unregulated by law, and the
discretion of a Solicitor to accept a plea to a lesser
offense in a capital case is therefore quite as
untrammelled as the freedom of a jury to recommend
mercy in a pre-Waddell capital prosecution.

28b

54

Plea bargaining is pervasive in the criminal justice
system; guilty pleas are said to account for up to ninety
per cent of all criminal convictions.*’ Indeed, in view of

the judicial resources available, the systematic and

54

extensive practice of plea bargaining appears inevitable:

“fi]f all the defendants should combine to refuse
to plead guilty, and should dare to hold out, they
could break down the administration of criminal
justice in any state in the Union. But they dare
not hold out, for such as were tried and convicted

8!PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW. ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967). See also Coon, The
Indictment Process and Reduced Charges, 40 N.Y. ST. BAR J.
434 (1968). A study of the indictments for first and second
degree murder in Massachusetts between 1956 and 1965 which
received a final disposition in terms of guilt or innocence
revealed that 221 out of 326 defendants (67.8%) entered a guilty
plea and that 93.2% of these guilty pleas were to a lesser charge.
Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in
Massachusetts, 3 SUFF. L. REV. 292, 299 (1969). The study
concluded that:
“there is a wide disparity among the courts in terms of the
proportion of guilty pleas in murder cases. This finding
indicates that the practice of plea bargaining is far from
uniform. It also underscores the potential risk inherent in
such an informal and invisible process as plea bargaining.
For example, a defendant indicted for first degree murder
in one court may have a very good chance of negotiating a
plea of guilty to second degree murder, while in another
court such a possibility may be minimal. The implications
of this are serious, since conviction for first degree murder
may well result in a sentence of death.... Therefore, it
seems crucial that the practice of plea bargaining be
governed by specific and explicit guidelines that could be
systematically and consistently applied from court to
court.”

Id. at 307.

29b

55

could hope for no leniency. The prosecutor is like
a man armed with a revolver who is cornered by a
mob. A_ concerted rush would overwhelm
him.... The truth is that a criminal court can
operate only by inducing the great mass of
actually guilty defendants to plead guilty.’’*?

Because homicide cases are likely to take up a great
deal of time in preparation and trial, they are
particularly likely to be settled by plea bargaining.**
And the fact that the harshness of a death sentence
creates a relatively great risk that a conviction will be
reversed on appeal for procedural error provides an
additional incentive for plea bargaining in capital cases:

“ee

[s]ince time immemorial... [prosecutors] will
prefer to get a definite conviction, without the
tremendous expense that goes with a murder trial,
the taking of a chance that a jury may not
convict, or that some technical error will be made
in the heat of trial which will result in a reversal
by an Appellate Court.’ "™

521 UMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 46 (1937).
In the words of one prosecutor:

“*A murder case ties up a courtroom for a week, or at
least for three days. We are naturally more anxious to
bargain for guilty pleas in murder cases than we are in
cases that might take fifteen minutes at trial.’ ”

Pittsburgh First Assistant District Attorney James G. Dunn,

quoted in Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 55 (1966).

“Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 30 (1963) (quoting opinion of Judge C.
Conrad Schneider, State v. Faison, No. 5-550-57, Bergen Cty.
Ct., Nov. 21, 1958).

30

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2059%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
