# Jurisdictional Statement — Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Jurisdictional Statement
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 427 U.S. 647

## Text

s wa *

IN THE ¥

5° Supreme Court of the United States

Octoper Term, 1975

LA

No. 75-1712

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-
First Series, on its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consolidated Bonds
of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly
situated,

Appellant,
Uv.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T. BYRNE, Governor of the State of
) Jersey, and WILLIAM F, HYLAND, Attorney General of the State of New
ersey,

Appellees.

DANIEL M. GABY,

Appellant,
v.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, JAMES C.
KELLOGG, III, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G. HELL-
MUTH, ANDREW C. AXTELL, WILLIAM J, RONAN, W. PAUL STILLMAN,
WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J, LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFMANN, and
JERRY FINKELSTEIN, Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority,
AUSTIN J. TOBIN, Exccutive Director of the Port of New York Authority, and
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, Governor of the State of New Jersey,

Appellees,
_ bp

UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
Intervenor.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

HOWARD STERN,
Attorney for Appellant, Daniel M. Gaby,
125 Ellison Stree
Paterson, New _ 07505.
Of Counsel:

THEODORE W. KHEEL.
Dated: May 1976

Adams Press Corp., 11 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J. 07102—(201) 623-8611

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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IN THE

Supreme Court cf the United States

Octoser Term, 1975

No.

—

“JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Opinion Below

The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court is re-
ported at 69 N.J. 253, 353 A. 24 514 and appears herein
as Appendix A. The trial court’s opinion rendered in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, is reported
at 134 N.J.Super. 124, 338 A. 2d 833 and appears herein
at Appendix B.

Jurisdiction —

These consolidated actions involve the validity of cer-
tain statutes enacted by the Legislature of the State of
New Jersey, which acts are alleged to be in violation of
the Constitution of the United States. Judgment uphold-
ing the validity of the state statutes was entered by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey on February 25, 1976. Ap-
peal is made to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).
Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, reh. den. 404 U.S. 876
(1971), Warren Trading Post Co. y. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).

Questions Presented

Whether N.J.S. 52:1-35.55, enacted in 1962, a covenant
with holders of certain bonds issued by the Port Au-
thority that the Authority was, in effect, to niake funds
unavailable for mass transit use, constitutes a violation
of U.S.Const. Art. I, See. 10, Cl. 3 in that it represents
an interstate compact not ratified by or consented to by
the Congress.

3

Statement of Facts

The litigation was commenced by the filing of a class
action complaint by the plaintiff, Daniel Gaby, on May 16,
1972. The principal relief sought was a declaratory judg-
ment that Chapter 8 of the Laws of 1962, N.J.S.A. 32:1-
35.50 (the 1962 Covenant) violated the Federal and State
Constitutions. The 1962 legislation authorized the con-
struction of the World Trade Center and the acquisition
of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroai Company by the
Port Authority and, except in certain limited circum-
stances, precluded the States of New York and New Jer-
sey from applying the Authority’s revenues and reserves
for passenger railroad purposes. It was agreed that the
United States Trust Company should be permitted to in-
tervene in the Gaby action on behalf of the bondholders.

On April 30, 1974, legislation repealing the 1962 Cov-
enant was signed into law. The United States Trust Com-
pany instituted a separate action on behalf of itself and
the bondholders naming the State of New Jersey, the
Governor, an the Attorney General as defendants. In that
action U.S. Trust sought declaratory judgment that the
repeal violated the Federal and State Constitutions.

The State of New Jersey answered the complaint of
U. S. Trust and asserted by answer and counterclaim the
validity of the repealer as well as the invalidity of the
1962 Covenant.

On December 10, 1974, the Gaby and U.S. Trust actions
were consolidated.

There was a limited trial concerned with narrow fac-
tual issues in the U. S. Trust action. All other facts in
both actions were stipulated. After oral argument ad-
dressed to all issues, the Law Division decided the mat-

4

ter by written opinion, May 14, 1975. By the terms of
that opinion and the judgment which followed, the 1974
repealer was held to be constitutional. The Court de-
clined to decide the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.
U.S. Trust appealed and its motion for direct certification
was granted. In order to preserve the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the 1962 Covenant, Gaby cross-appealed
to the N.J. Supreme Court and his cross-motion for cer-
tification was granted.

Central to the issue of the validity of the Covenant is
the question whether the mass transportation of people
within the Port District was one of the principal activi-
ties authorized by the Company (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.50 et
seq.) and whether the insulation of the Port Authority
from that activity was in such derogation of the Com-
pact as to frustrate its meaning and intent and so ma-
terial as to require Congressional approval.

The movement of persons within the Port District was
a fundamental and integral part of the plan of port de-
velopment authorized by the Congress to be undertaken
when it approved the Company. Until the enactment of
the 1962 Covenant, the Port Authority recognized that
it had a responsibility in this area albeit one which had
not been the subject of specific implementation.

A. Legislative history of Port Authority mass transit com-
mitment prior to the Covenant.

Art. XXII of the Compact defined transportation facili-
ties to

“. . . inelude railroads, steam or electric, motor

truck or other street or highway vehicles, tunnels,
bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters, tugs, float-

5

ing elevators, barges, scows or harbor craft of any
kind, aircrafts suitable for harbor service, and every
kind of transportation facility now in use or here-
after designed for use for the transportation of
carriage of persons or property.” (N.J.S.A. 32:1-
23) (emphasis supplied)

In 1922 a Comprehensive Plan setting forth a develop-
ment program for implementation by the Port Authority
was enacted in the States and approved by Congress (Stip.
at Tr. 8 et seq.). An integral part of that plan was the
existing and proposed railroad lines in the Port District
(9-10). The railroads were, of course, to be utilized both
for freight and passengers.

“In 1927 the New Jersey Legislature, stating that
it was acting ‘under and pursuant to the provisions
of the (Port Authority) company,’ ‘authorized and
directed’ the Port Authority ‘to make such plans
for the development of said district supplementary
to or amendatory of the comprehensive plan here-
tofore adopted by the Legislatures of the two States

. as will provide adequate interstate and sub-
urban transportation facilities for passengers tra-
veling to and from one State to the other within
the said district, and from one part of the said dis-
trict to another, sometimes referred to as commuter
or suburban passenger traffic, to the end that travel
between various parts of the port district may be
made more convenient, practicable and economical
for those residing in one region in the port district
and doing business in another region thereof.’”
(Stip. 75).

Governor Moore of New Jersey approved legislation
directing the Port Authority to establish commuter fa-

6

cilities. A similar bill was vetoed in the State of New
York by Governor Smith who was of the ecpinion that
the initial objection of unifying freight facilities should
first be accomplished (Stip. 76 to 78).

Governor Smith stated that:

“T am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick
to this program, and I am entirely unwilling to give
my approval to any measure which at the expense of
the solution of the great freight distribution prob-
lew will set the Port Authority off on an entirely
new line of problem connected with the solution of
the suburden passenger problem.” (Stip. 77)

The Port Authority has pointed to Governor Smith’s state-
ment as the basis for its conclusion that it does not have
responsibility for the transport of persons as distinguished
from freight. The States had the right under the Com-
pact to require the Port Authority to undertake projects
within the scope of its authority. The veto of Governor
Smith constituted nothing more than a judgment that the
problems relating to freight should take pricrity (in 1928)
over problems relating to the transportation of people.
The veto was not based upon an absence of authority on
the part of the States to require the Port Authority to
provide for the transport of persons.

In 1928 Annual Report of the Port Authority included
this comment:

“The Commissioners of the Port Authority have
found in their studies that no adequate or effective
interstate transportation development can take place
without taking full account of transportation of
passengers as well as of freight throughout the
Port District.” (Stip. 78)

ce

“Annual reports issued by the Port Authority
pursuant to the Compact. after 1923 included ma-
terial relative to the Port Authority’s efforts relat-
ing to ‘Suburban Transit.’” (Stip. 79)

In 1928 the North Jersey Transit Commission Report
stated that:

“decision (was) reached that the bi-state character
of the Port of New York authority enabled it to
function admirably as a co-ordinating agency be-
tween the: various official bodies severally engaged
in the study of the commuter problem in different
parts of the Metropolitan District of New York and
New Jersey.” (Stip. 79)

“On June 22, 1936, the Legislature of the State
of New Jersey in Joint Resolution No. 6, Laws of
New Jersey of 1936, noting that the Port Authority
had been ‘created’ for the purpose, among other
things, of ‘coordinating and developing transporta-
tion facilities within the Port of New York Dis-
trict,’ requested the Port Authority to report upon
interstate and suburban passenger transportation.”
(Stip. 83)

Pursuant to the 1936 Joint Resolution, the Port Au-
thority issued a report on suburban transit in 1937 (Stip.
84-85). In that report the Port Authority specifically
recognized that suburban rapid transit and its coordina-
tion and development were “. . . functions (which) are
within the scope of the Port of New York Authority. .. .”
(Stip. 85)

The 1938 Legislature cf New Jersey by Resolution No. 1
requested the Port Authority to continue its studies with
respect to, financing mass transit facilities (Stip. 86).

In 1949 the Coverdale report relating to mass transit
in northern New Jersey was issued and made use of
“« .. extensive plans and estimates which the Port Author-
ity had previously compiled . . .” (Stip. 89)

In 1951 Commissioner Erdman (Department of Con-
servation and Economic Development) reported to Gover-
nor Driscoll with respect to mass transit that:

“The Port of New York Authority studied the
situation in 1920, in 1930 and again in 1937. It is
the type of organization for this task. It should
be made to recognize its responsibility because it
is the human equation which makes the port im-
portant.

“Tt has recently announced its intentions to spend
some $80,000,000 for an ac litional vericular tunnel
near the Holland Tunnel. This will increase street
traffic, where there is now altogether too much of
this type of transportation. The streets have reached
the saturation point. Therefore, the need is not
for more streets, but rather for the relief of those
we have. It would seem far better if the Author-
ity has $80,000,000 to spend on a tunnel that it
should be a rapid transit tunnel and not a vehicular
one.” (Stip. 91)

In 1951 the Jenny report noted that:

“. . . the 1920 Plan of the New York-New Jersey
Port and Harbor Development Commission had
stated, ‘Our Port problem is primarily a railroad
problem ... therefore, the comprehensive plan to
evolve which this Commission was created is es-
sentially a railroad plan... A complete ceorgani:+-
tion of the railroad terminal system is the most

fundamental physical need of the Port of New York.
... The most pressing element of the entire port
problem is that of railroad service to and from
Manhattan.’ Mr. Jenny further noted that ‘al-
though 30 years have elapsed since, and our prob-
lem has grown very much worse, we still have “one
nothing to solve it.’ Noting that the Port Author-
ity’s March 1, 1937 report had stressed the desir-
ability of the development of rapid transit facili-
ties for northern New Jersey, Mr. Jenny stated:
‘This sound advice was given a decade and a half
ago, yet no one has paid any attention to it, not
even the Port Authority itself... .’” (Stip. 94)

In 1952 the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission
recommended : 10e

“ ,. the creation of a Metropolitan Rapid Transit

Authority. The Regional Planning Commission fur-
ther recommended that the Port Authority be re-
quested to provide the funds needed for further
study and such other assistance as might be re-
quested by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Author-
ity.” (Stip. 97)

Tn 1955 the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission
negotiated with the Port Authority with which it reached
a Memorandum of Understanding that the Port Authority
would finance a compresensive study of the interstate rail
problem in the Port District (Stip. 100-101).

In 1958 by Assembly Bill No. 16 a proposal was made
that the Port Authority take over, develop and improve
rail passenger facilities between New Jersey and New
York. The Port Authority expressed its active opposition
(Stip. 110 et seq.).

10

In 1959 the Metropolitan Rapid Transit District and
Port Authority issued a joint report. That joint report
first recognized that:

“There can be no question that the carrying on
of a transit function was well within the Port Au-
thority Compact terms and well within the present
powers.” (Stip. 123)

It also stated the Port Authority’s reasons for opposing
legislation which would commit it to implementing plans
for improving transit facilities (Stip. 123).

In 1959 New York and New Jersey enacted legislation
facilitating the utilization of Port Authority funds (with
State guarantees of payment) for the purchase of com-
muter railroad cars. The State of New York has made
use of the program. The State of New Jersey has not
(Stip. 129).

In 1960 the New Jersey Senate created the Farley Com-
mittee to conduct “a full and unlimited investigation of
the Port Authority.” (Stip. 141 et seq.) Dwight R. G.
Palmer (New Jersey Highway Commissioner) testified be-
fore that Committee in 1961. With respect to commuter
railroads, he said that:

“... In other words, we became convinced that the
Port Authority’s responsibility in the rail transit
field should be concerned principally with the inter-
state aspects of the problem as the Authority is an
interstate or by-state agency. Our recommenda-

tions were consistent with that philosophy.” (Stip.
145)“

Port Authority Commissioner James C. Kellogg testi-
fied before the Farley Committee in part as follows:

ll

“At the outset, I would like to re-affirm our view
that both rail and highway transportation are es-
sential to the economic welfare of the people of
the New Jersey-New York metropolitan region. It
was for this reason that the Port Authority made
$800,000 available to the Metropolitan Rapid Trans-
it Commission to undertake a comprehensive inter-
state transit survey. We do not now, nor have
we ever regarded arterial highway or our own bus
terminal services for the accommodation of New
Jersey commuters as substitutes for a program of
maintaining and improving rail passenger facilities
between New Jersey and Manhattan and throughout
the Port District.

“For more than thirty years, the Port Authority
has been engaged in studies of all aspects of ter-
minal and transportation facilities and services with-
in the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area.
We have continuously searched for solutions to the
commuter railroad problem in the form of physical
plans which could adequately serve the commuting
public and which, at the same time, could be de-
veloped on a self-supporting basis... .” (Stip. 154-
155)

B. Enactment of the Covenant and subsequent actions.

In 1962 New York and New Jersey enacted legislation
authorizing the Port Authority to construct the World
Trade Center and to take over the Hudson and Manhattan
Railroad (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.51, et seq.). As a part of that
legislation the Covenant with bondholders (N.J.S.A. 32:1-
35.55) was also enacted.

12

The Covenant contained in N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55 is in the
following language:

“The 2 States covenant and agree with each other
and with the holders of any affected bonds, as here-
inafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds
remain outstanding and unpaid and the holders
thereof shall not have given their consent as pro-
vided in their contract with the port authority,
(a) the 2 States will not diminish or impair the
power of the port authority (or any subsidiary
corporation incorporated for any of the purposes
of this act) to establish, levy and collect rentals,
tolls, fares, fees or other charges in connection with
any facility constituting a portion of the port de-
velopment project or any other facility owned or
operated by the port authority of which the rev-
enues have been or shall be pledged in whole or
in part as security for such bonds (directly or in-
directly, or through the medium of the general re-
serve fund or otherwise), or to determine the quan-
tity, quality, frequency or nature of the service pro-
vided in connection with each such facility; and
(b) neither the States nor the port authority nor
any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of
the purposes of this act shall apply any of the
rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or re-
serves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole
or in part as security for such bonds, for any rail-
road purposes whatsoever other than permitted here-
inafter set forth.” (Stip. 204)

The Statutes continues with a definition of affected
bonds:

““Affected bonds’ as used in this section shall
mean bonds of the port authority issued or ineurred

13

by it from time to time for any of the purposes
of this act or bonds as security for which there may’
or shall be pledged, in whole or in part, the gen-
eral contract between the port authority and the
holders of such bonds, or the revenues of the world
trade center, Hudson tubes, Hudson tubes exten-
sions or any other facility owned or operated by
the port authority any surplus revenues of which
would be payable into the general reserve fund, or
bonds both so issued or incurred and so secured,”

The practical effect of the Covenant was to make Port
Authority funds unavailable for mass transport use (ex-
cept PATH) to at least the year 2007.

The Port Authority purchased and proceeded to oper.
ate PATH after certification in accordance with the pre-
existing consolidated bond resolution that the prospective
losses would not impair the sound credit rating of the
Authority (Stip. 209).

In 1970 Governors Chaill and Rockefeller enacted pro-
posed legislation to increase the role of the Port Author-
ity in mass transit, more particularly by extending PATH
to Newark Airport and building a rail link to Kennedy
Airport. Governor Cahill said that: “one purpose of the
legislation that will be introduced in both state bodies will
be to erase the authority’s impression that as long as the
PATH system is operating at a loss the authority is ab-
solved from any further responsibility for mass transit.”

(Stip. 222)

“Tn June 1971, the Legislatures of New York and
New Jersey enacted legislation authorizing the Port
Authority to extend passenger rail transportation
to Kennedy International Airport and to Newark

14

International Airport and Cranford (Chapter 245,
Laws of New Jersey of 1971). While this legisla-
tion was pending, the Port Authority obtained opin-
ion letters from the New York firms of Hawkins,
Delafield & Wood (May 3, 1971) and Davis Polk &
Wardwell (June 3, 1971), which concluded that the
proposed rail extensions were subject to the pro-
visions of the 1962 Covenant and could not be fi-
nanced out of Port Authority revenues or reserves
unless ‘self-supporting’ ...” (Stip. 233)

The Hawkins Delafield letter addressed itself to the stat-
utory device of defining the Kennedy-Newark rail links as
airport improvements:

“The terms ‘railroad’ or ‘railroad purposes’ are not
defined in the 1962 legislation. However, the term
‘railroads’ is given a broad definition in the 1921
Compact creating the Authority and reference must
be made to that definition for the purposes of giving
meaning to the term in the 1962 legislation. The
term ‘railroad’ as so defined provides no exceptions
for a railroad facility which might be incidental or
necessary to some other project or program of the
Authority. It seems clear to us that the facility
deseribed above falls within the definition of ‘rail-
roads’ in the 1921 Compact and therefore consti-
tutes a railroad within the meaning of the 1962
legislation. We may add that, in our opinion, any
attempt to limit the definition of ‘railroad’ or ‘rail-
road purposes’ prohibited or restricted by the 1962
legislation by including railroad facilities within
other definitions as suggested in the bills to amend
Ch. 802, Laws of N.Y., 1947 (A6833 and S9480) in-
troduced in the New York Legislature in April,

1970 would be ineffective for the purposes of the
statutory covenant contained in the 1962 legisla-
tion.” (Stip. 236)

The Davis Polk opinion stated that, “. . . the mere re-
definition of ‘air terminals’ by the bill would be ineffective
to remove the facilities of the Project from the ambit of
the Covenant.” (Stip. 238)

Thus, having in 1962 purported to insulate the Port
Authority from further mass transit obligations, the Legis-
latures of New York and New Jersey were effectively
frustrated in their 1971 attempt to get the Port Authority
back into mass transit by redefining railroad lines as air-
port improvements.

In December of 1971 the First Boston Corporation,
which had been commissioned by the Port Authority to
do a Passenger Rail Transportation Study, reported that,
“« .. the 1962 Covenant ‘precludes general credit financing
of any passenger transportation project, no matter how
desirable, for which projects show an operating profit be-
low debt service requirements.’ ” (Stip. 243)

In November 1972 Governors Cahill and Rockefeller and
the Commissioners of the Port Authority announced agree-
ment on a plan for rail mass transportation improvement.
The plan included the extension of P..TH to Newark and
beyond to Plainfield, as well as the creation of rail service
to Kennedy (Stip. 253).

Tn an attempt to effectuate that plan, the 1962 Covenant
was amended in New York and in New Jersey. (Chs.
207 and 208, Laws of New Jersey of 1972, Ch. 1003, Laws
of New York of 1972, Chs. 317 and 318, Laws of New
York of 1973) (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55[a]). That amendment
repealed the Covenant but prospectively only. In the light

16

of the fact that bonds already issued would not mature
until 2007, the partial repealer was ineffective in terms
of freeing Port Authority funds from the strictures of the
1962 Covenant until 2007.

The 1972 Annual Report of th® Port Authority an-
nounced the plan of the two Gevernors for the expension

of the Port Authority’s role in mass transit (Stip. 263
et seq.).

Finally, in that cireumstance in which the Port Author-
ity and the States of New York and New Jersey had
agreed upon certain mass transit projects, but neverthe-
less been frustrated by the 1962 Covenant, both States
enacted a repealer (in New Jersey Ch. 25 of the Laws
of 1974).

“This bill is designed to preclude the application
of the 1962 covenant restricting port authority par-
ticipation in mass transit projects. Chapter 208,
P.L. 1972, precluded such application to bonds new-
ly issued after the effective date of that act, but
maintained in status quo the position of holders of
bonds issued between March 27, 1962 and December
28, 1972. Since affected bonds are outstanding un-
til the year 2007, the restrictions imposed by the
covenant effectively preclude sufficient port auwuor-
ity participation in the development of a public
transportation system in the port district. In 1972
the State of New York passed legislation preclud-
ing the application of the 1962 covenant from out-
standing bonds as well as newly issued bonds. It
is the purpose of this act to accomplish effective
repeal of the covenant.” (Stip. 356)

—

17

Governor Wilson said in part that:

“Coupled with action faken by the State of New
Jersey, this bill retroactively repeals the 1962 statu-
tory covenant entered into between the States of
New York and New Jersey and prospective pur-
chasers of bonds of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. Pursuant to that covenant,
the Port Authority is prohibited from using its
revenues beyond the existing Port Authority Trans-
Hudson (PATH) System for rail mass transit fa-

cilities unless such facilities would be self-support-
ing.” (Stip. 356)

Governor Byre said that:

“The bill, A-1304, sponsored by Assemblyman Her-
bert C. Klein, D-Passaic, repeals the 1962 covenant
which has effectively precluded the port authority
from becoming involved in mass tyansit projects in
the New York metropolitan area. The covenant
restricts the authority from participation in mass
transit projects which are not self-sustaining.

“‘T hope this bill, coupled with the same legis-
lation in New York State, will clear the way once
and for all for the port authority to fulfill which I
believe was one of its original functions,’ said
Byrne. ‘The authority was created as a transpor-
tation agency and I intend to see that it lives up
to its original promise of assisting in establish-
ment of a quality public transportation system for
the metropolitan region without in any way impair-
ing its fiseal integrity.’” (Stip. 358)

The record in the proceedings below was supplemented
to reflect the fact that on the day following the issuance

18

of the Court’s Opinion (May 14, 1975), the Port Author-
ity announced substantial increases in bridge and tunnel
toll charges. The Authority further announced that the
purpose of such increases was to provide funds for mass
transit. The 1962 Covenant having been repealed, the
Authority, with appropriate financial safeguards, was now
free to respond to the legislative direction of the States
in the field of mass transit; to implement a major element
of the Compact.

The Federal Question Presented is Substantial

This appeal presents a substantial question involving
whether or not the Compact clause of the Constitution has
been violated by the enactment of the 1962 Covenant. At
the outset, it sheuld be noted that this appeal is integrally
related to the appeal to this Court in the cause with which
it has been consolidated, United States Trust Company of
New York, et al. v. The State of New Jersey, et al. hat
ease relates to an attack upon the statute repealing the
contested covenant. The repealer was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey. In the event that decision
is reversed by this Court, the validity of the 1962 Cov-
enant will be at issue. This appeal is taken, therefore,
to preserve the issue of the Covenant’s validity in the
event that the repealer is determined to be invalid.

The interpretation and construction of an interstate
compact sanctioned by Congress is a matter of federal
law. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n vy. Col-
burn, 310 U.S. 419 (1940); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Ala., State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
The 1962 Covenant constitutes a radical alteration in the

19

substance of the initial agreement between the states, and,
as such, must be approved by Congress. The consent of
Congress is a prerequisite to the validity of such agree-
ments. Howell vy. Port of New York Authority, 34 F.
Supp. 797 (D.C. N.J. 1940). The covenant, in practical
effect, materially altered tic purposes of the original
agreement.

The Covenant was a fundamental impairment of the
Compact in that it effectively made it impossible for the
States legislatively to authorize the Authority to plan,
coordinate or implement plans for mass transit. Thus
it was necessarily in derogation and not in furtherance of
the purposes of the Compact.

The bi-state structure and jurisdiction of the Port Au-
thority—an agency set up by Compact between two states,
with interstate planning, operational and economic respon-
sibilities and powers—underscores the original reason for
and need of Congressional consent.

Since the adoption of the original Compact and the
Comprehensive Plan in 1921 and 1922, respectively, the
states of New York and New Jersey have enacted numer.
ous bills “supplementary to” and “amendatory of” the
original legislation. This legislation granted the Port Au-
thority additional powers, such as the power to condemn,
to construct certain bridges, tunnels, and terminals, to
operate rairports, to pool its finances, ete., but all such
additional responsibilities and powers were consistent with
the purposes of the Compact and specifically in aid of the
Port Authority’s duty to plan and develop a coordinated
system of transportation and terminal facilities.

The covenants must fall ior they constitute agreement
between the states not approved by Congress as required
by the Constitution of the United States.

20

Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution,
provides:

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
. enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign power...” (clause

~ 8, the Compact clause).

We are concerned here with an express agreement be-
tween the states not in furtherance of the original pur-
poses of the Compact but in contravention of the Port
Authority’s mandate to plan and develop a coordinated
system of transportation. Its major obligation to plan
was not severable from any particular duty, but was the
glue which bound them together. While the Port Au-
thority increasingly ignored this statutory duty, it was
eapable until 1962 of financing and therefore formulating
and effectuating plans for the coordination and develop-
ment of all forms of transportation. This necessarily in-
cluded mass transportation. The 1962 covenants, as noted,
effectively barred use of Port Authority funds for mass
transportation beyond the Hudson Tubes.

Without the capacity to use its funds for mass trans-
portation, the Port Authority became incapable of formu-
lating and effectuating plans for the coordinated system
of all forms of transportation in the Port District con-
templated by the Compact. In this way the covenants
materially altered the Compact. They were not in “fur-
therance” of the Compact’s purposes but in defiance of
them. Moreover, to the extent that the Port Authority
is relieved of its responsibilities and obligations to mass
transportation, it is able to increase the time and money
it can devote to transportation facilities that produce rev-
enues. In this way, its powers are increased. This has
led to the Port Authority’s excessive support of facili-

21

ties for automobiles creating imbalances in all forms of
transportation—the very opposite effect ®nvisioned by the
Compact.

The Attorney General of New Jersey (F.0. 1957 No.
13) had this to say concerning non-congressional impair-
ment of Compacts:

“As Justice Jones stated in Henderson vy. Delaware
River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, 362 Pa. 475,
66 A.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1949) :

‘It is within the competency of a State, which is
a party to a compact with another State, to legis-
late in respect of matters covered by the compact
so long as such legislative action is in approbation
and not in reprobation of the compact.’ (at pp. 849,
850).

A State statute which is in conflict with an inter-
state compact approved by the Congress is an in-
valid impairment of contract in violation of the
contract clause of the United States Constitution,
Article I, Section X, par. 1; Green v. Biddle, 23
U.S. 1 (1823); Cf. Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260
(1922); P.J. McGowan & Sons, Inc. v. Van Winkle,
21 F. 2d 76 (D.C. Oreg. 1972), affirmed 277 U. S.
574 (1928). Accordingly, the general contracting
power vested in the Division of Purchase and Prop-
erty cannot constitutionally apply to the Commis-
sion.”

In the final analysis, the question comes down to this:
must a bi-state agreement relating to an agency with bil-
lions of assets, substantial regulatory powers and _ tre-
mendous impact on interstate commerce, be approved by
Congress pursuant to the Compact clause where the ef-

99

Al

fect of the agreement is to exacerbate an already de-
teriorating transportation situation, contrary to the pur
poses the Compact was intended to achieve. We submit APPENDIX A
that the answer is yes.

CONCLUSION Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
For the reasons stated, probable jurisdiction should
be noted.
Respectfully submitted,
Howarp Stern
125 Ellison Street
Pn, Eee aaneny Se ITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK. AS
. i UNITED ST: U >A? 2 cca
Attorney for Agppenant TRUSTEE FOR *HE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
Daniel M. Gaby AND NEW JERSEY CONSOLIDATED BONDS, FORTIBTIi
Dated: May 1976 AND FORTY-FIRST SERIES; ON ITS OWN BEHALF
: ; AND ON BEHALF OF ALL HOLDERS OF CONSOLIDATED
Of a . BONDS OF THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
Younsel:

AND NEW JERSEY AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SIT-
UATED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT,
vy. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; BRENDAN T. BYRNE,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; AND
WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPON-
DENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS.

Treropore W. Kueet, Esa.

DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-APPELLANT, v. THE
PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, JAMES C. KELLOGG.
Ill, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G.
HELLMUTH, ANDREW C,. AXTELL, WILLIAM J, RONAN,
W. PAUL STILLMAN, WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J.
LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFFMAN, AND JERRY FINKEL-
STEIN, COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, AUSTIN J. TOBIN, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, AND
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS,
AND UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW
YORK, ETC., INTERVENOR.

Argued October 7, 1975-—Decided February 25, 1976.

?
A2

SYNOPSIS

Class action on behalf of citizens, residents and taxpayers
srhose occupations were dependent upon the existence of mass
transportation was brought against Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey challenging constitutionality of cove-
nant between the States of New Jersey and New York on one
hand and the holders of bonds issued by the Port .\uthority
on the other hand with respect to the use to which certain
revenues were to be put. After the covenant was repealed by
New Jersey Legislature, trustee for the bonds brought action
challenging the constitutionality of the repealing statute.
The Superior Court, Law Division, 134 N. J. Super. 124,
upheld the constitutionality of the repealer and dismissed the
class action and the parties appealed. The Supreme Court
held that compact which created the Port Authority em-
powered, but did not mandate, the Author:ty to develop a
plan for a particular kind of method of transportation; and
that, since the Authority had exercised its discretion by re-
jecting a policy favoring mass transportation, mandamus did
not lie to compel the Authority to develop a plan for mass
transit even though, by virtue or repeal of the covenant, it
had the funds to do so.

Affirmed.

Pashman, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed an opinion.

A3

Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mv. Devereux Milburn, of the
New York bar, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respon-
dent-intervenor United States Trust Company (Messrs.
Meyner, Landis and Verdon, ani Messrs. Carter,
Ledyard and Milburn and Hawkins, Delafield and Wood.
of the New York bar, attorneys; Mr. Meyner, Mr. Milburn,
and Wr. Donald J. Robinson, of the New York bar. on the
brief and of counsel).

Mr, Murray J. Laulicht and Mr. Michael I. Sovern, ot the
New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney General. ar-
gued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants State of New
Jersey, Brendan T. Byrne and William F. Hyland (Mr.
William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey. at-
torney; Mr. Laulicht, Mr. Sovern and Mr. Harold Edgar,
of the New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney Gen-
eral, on the brief).

Mr. Howard Stern argued the cause for plaintiff-cross-ap-
pellant Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Shavick, Stern, Schotz,
Steiger and Croland, attorneys; Mr. Stern on the brief.
Mr. Stern and Mr. Theodore-W. Kheel of the New York
bar and Messrs. Battle, Fowler, Stokes and Kheel of the Xew
York bar, of counsel).

A4

Mr. Francis A. Mulhern argued the cause for Gross-re-
spondent The Port Authority of New York and Newtdersey,
et al. (Mr, Mulhern, attorney and on the brief; Wr. 'Patrick
J. Falvey of the New York bar, Mr. Joseph Lesser of the
New York bar, Ms. Isobel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P. Berg
of the New York bar, and Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein, of
counsel),

Per CurtAM. The judgment is affirmed, substantially for
the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Gelman, 134
N. J. Super. 124 (Law Div. 1975). The observations which
follow are occasioned by Justice Pashman’s suggested remedy
in the Gaby suit.?

Whatever persuasive force might be accorded the argument
that as a matter’of policy the Port Authority should devote
more of its energies and resources to the mass transit field,
the fact remains that the remedy fashioned by our Brother is
neither pressed for by Gaby on this appeal nor within the
powers of this Court to direct and enforce.

Gaby’s class action complaint for a declaratory judgment
that the 1962 Covenant was unconstitutional asked for “multi-
farious relief,” including a request that the Port Authority
be directed “to formulate and submit to the court a plan
for the development of mass transit facilities within the
Port District,” 134 N. J. Super. at 131. However, the trial
judge, having concluded in the United States Trust Co. suit
that “the repeal legislation was a reasonable and hence valid
exercise of the states’ police power which is not prohibited
by the Contract Clause of either the Federal or the State Con-
stitution,” td. at 197, found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of the 1962 Covenant’s asserted invalidity. He therefore dis-

——_— - te

‘Justice Pashman would order tie Port Authority to complete
pending projects and to “formulate and present plans and sugges-
tions for a regional mass transportat'on scheme to the Legislatures
of New York and New Jersey * * * ia an expeditious fashion and
within a fixed period of time.” Post at 288.

A5

missed Gaby’s complaint, id. at 198, without discussing the re-
quested relief of a direction for development of @ mass transit
plan, on which issue there was neither testimony nor argu-
ment at the trial level.

In his brief filed in the Court after direct certification of his
appeal, 68 NV. J. 175 (1975), Gaby conceded his limited pur-
pose in pursuing the appeal as being “to preserve the issue of
the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.” The point of this
in turn was, as he put it, to furnish “an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below.”* Whatever issues may have been
preserved by his appeal and whatever desire there may have
been to present “all the issues,” the fact remains that’ Gaby’s
brief raises and discusses only the validity of the Covenant in
constitutional terms. No argument is made there for any
special relief; and, understandably, the Port Authority has
likewise not briefed the question at all in this Court. At oral
argument the subject was adverted to only in a limited fash-
ion.

Ordinarily, we would have no occasion to decide an issue
which, while portentous in itself, has become so remote and
peripheral to the central thrust of this litigation. However,
inasmuch as the minority opinion raises and discusses tn ex-
tenso this question of considerable public significance, namely,
the involvement of the Port Authority in mass transit and
particularly the propriety of this Court ordering as a specific
remedy the submission of a plan for development of mass
transit facilities, we overlook whatever infirmities may exist
in the record before us, compounded by the practical disad-
vantage of not having the views of the partics, and proceed to
address the point. a

[1] The 1921 Compact between the States of New York
and New Jersey, whereby the Port Authority was created,
N. J. 8. A. 82:1-4, envisioned the adoption of a Compre-
hensive Plan for the development of the port. N. J. 9. A.

2Cross Motion for Certification of Plaintiff-Respondent, Daniel
M. Gaby.

AS

32:1-11. Direction was given to the Port Authority in the
Plan itself “to proceed with the development of the port of
New York in accordance with said comprehensive plan * * *.”
N. J. S. A. 32:1-33. That the Authority’s involvement in
transportation matters was contemplated is obvious from a
reading of this and other portions of the Comprehensive Plan
as well as of the Compact; but it requires a quantum leap
to derive therefrom a mandate (as distinguished from the
power) to develop a plan for a particular kind or method of
transportation, to wit, mass transit. It is not without sig-
nificance, for instance, that the legislature has provided that
the Authority may make recommendations for the increase
and improvement of transportation facilities, N. J. S. A.
32 :1-13, which by definition includes railroads and any fa-
cility for the “transportation or carriage of persons or prop-
erty,” N. J. 8. A. 32:1-23; but nowhere is it mandated that
such recommendations be made. A mandate such as that
contemplated by the minority opinion is not something to be
inferred by the courts but rather is a singularly appropriate
subject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent
here. Cf. Del. Riv. & Bay Auth. v. N. J. Pub. Emp. Rel.
Comm’n., 112 N. J. Super. 160, 165 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd
o. b., 58 N. J. 388 (1971).

If, then, the Authority is in the position of being em-
powered (as we acknowledge) rather than mandated to act in
the area of mass transit, its exercise of that power becomes
a matter of discretion and judgment. As is made abundantly
clear by the voluminous record in this case, the trial court’s
opinion, and the concurring and partially dissenting opinion
here, the Authority has more than once in recent years
broached the question of whether it should pursue a policy
of encouraging mass transit and has determined that it shall
not. The remedy suggested in the minority opinion is de-
signed to overrule that decision. As such it is in the nature of
the former prerogative writ of mandamus, now invocable un-
der proceedings for relief in lieu of prerogative writs, Rule
4:69.

AZ

[2,3] However, mandamus will not lie if the duty to act
‘8 a discretionary one and the discretion has been exercised.
As Justice Heher explained, in Switz v. Middletown Twp..
23 N. J. 580 (1957), mandamus is “a coercive process that
commands the performance of a specific ministerial act or
duty, or compels the exercise of a discretionary function.

‘but does not seek to interfere with or control the mode and

manner of its exercise or te influence or direct a particular
result.” 23 N. J. at 587. As we have sought to demon-
strate, the circumstances -before us do not at all invite or
accommodate the remedy proposed. This is so because the
Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial) has in
fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass trans-
portation. Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be

‘open to dispute; but as to the propriety of this Court’s re-

fusal to intrude on the underlying policy determination.
there can be no question in the circumstances before us.
And this not as a response {o some procedural deficiency
but because of our respect for the fundamental substantive
principle embodied in mandamus.

Finally, we observe that in this particular area of bi-
state operations, there . close and continuing supervision
of the Port Authority by the other branches of government.
Hence, the proposed remedy would not only tend to usurp
the influence over the Authority vested in the Governors of
the States of New York and New Jersey, but would also in-

trude upon the functions of the legislatures of the respec-

tive States, whose task it is in the final analysis to enact
appropriate legislation and take such other action as may
be required to remedy whatever deficiencies may exist with
respect to mass transit.

Affirmed.

*

PasHMAN, J. (concurring in part and disseating is part).
, é

A8

INTRODUCTION TO GABY COMPLAINT

My Brothers today affirm a lower court decision which was
the product of two separate and distinct actions consolideted
for trial. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N. J. Super.
iz4 (Law Div. 1975). In the first action, brought by plain-
tiff United States Trust Company, the tria! court sustained
the State’s repeal of the 1962 statutory covenant (NV. J.
S. A. 32:1-35.55) between the States of New Jersey and
New York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).
That covenant was concurrently enacted by the legislatures
of New York and New Jersey at the ime of the Port Au-
thority’s acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
Company (H & M), since renamed the Port Authority
Trans-Hudson System (PATH). Intended as a means of
protecting the bondholders’ investments, the covenant pro-
hibited the states and the Port Authority from applying
“any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or
reserves, . . . for any railroad purposes whatsoever other
than permitted purposes.” V. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55. As sub-
sequently detined in the covenant, “permitted purposes”
precluded the establishment, acquisition or construction of
any railroad facility until the Port Authority could deter-
mine that the facility would be self-supporting or would not
produce deficits except within narrowly defined limits.

In dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action, the trial court
found that the 1974 “repealer,” N. J. S. A. 32:1-235.55a,
was immune from constitutionai challenge as an impai:ment
of contractual obligation, a right which is protected by
U.S. Const., Art. I, § X and N. J. Const. (1947), Art. LV,
§ VII, © 3. As a collateral finding, the court determined that
' the attractiveness of Port Authority bonds was not contingent
upon the continued protection of the 1962 covenant, but
rather upon the viability of the Port Authority itself.

AQ

The majority affirms the trial court on these bases and
to this extent, I concur fully and completely with the con-
clusions reached by Judge Gelman in his very enlightened
and comprehensive opinion. My agreement is premised on
the unduly restrictive influence which the covenant exerted
on Port Authority operations in contravention of the
statutory mandates upon which that agency was created in
1921. The paralytic effect of the covenant could be seen in
the Authority’s practical inability and aititudinal reluctance
to’ respond to the mounting needs for rapid transit in the
New York metropolitan area. In light of the limited util-
ity which it continued to serve, the 1962 covenant repre-
sented an artificial obstacle to the affirmative public action
which was necessitated as an alternative to continued and
wasteful reliance solely on the private automobile as the
primary mode of transportation. :

The second action, Gaby v. Port of New York Authority,
et al., was likewise concerned with the repeal of the 1962
covenant, Expanded into a class action on behalf of citizens,
residents and taxpayers whose occupations are dependent
upon the existence of mass transportation, plaintiff cites the
1962 covenant as.an impediment to the improvement and
expansion of these facilities. While the State of New Jersey
sought the repeal of the covenant as an ultimate end in the
(nited States Trust Co. action, plaintiff Gaby visualizes a
repeal as merely @ means to a larger end. This is because
the vindication of Gaby’s interests is only partially depen-
dent on freeing the financial resources from the restrictions
of the 1962 covenant and placing them at the Port Author-
ity’s disposal. More problematical and essential to the relief

which he desires is the necessity to overcome the adminis-
. trative inertia which has characterized the agency’s efforts

in the area of mass transportation. Consequently, Gaby re-
quested in his complaint that the trial court:

. . . {Direct and’ order the Port Authority, its Commissioners,
and its Executive Director to formulate and submit to this Court,
or a Special Master to be appointed by this Court, a plan for the

AlG

development of mass transportation facilities in the Port District.
. . . [Plaintiff Gaby’s complaint at 17)

This action was pretried on February 22, 1973 and oral
arguments were heard on September 26, 1973 on the par-
ties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Judgment
was deferred and arguments were later rescheduled to per-
mit the submission of briefs on additional issues and the
intervention of United States Trust Company as a party
defendant representing the interests of Port Authority bond-
holders. Prior to these arguments, the pendency of legisla-
tion repealing the covensnt reccmmended that the trial court
withhold further review. Accordingly, the proceedings were
stayed to permit consideration of the anticipated legislation.

The statutory repealer which was signed into law by Gov-
ernor Brendan T. Byrne on April 30, 1974 precipitated the
United States Trust Co. action, which was instituted on the
same day. On the basis of common subject matter, this later
action was consolidated on December 10, 1974 with the
previously filed Gaby case by order of the trial court. These
matters then proceeded to trial in February 1975.

The trial was iargely confined to the factual issues of
bondholder reliance on the 1962 covenant and resultént dam-
age to the secondary bond market caused by the repeal of the
covenant. The information which was thus elicited formed
the basis for the trial court’s reported opinion, 134 N. J.
Super. 124, in which the constitutionality of the 1974 re-
pealer was sustained. Although reasons upon which the
court’s decision was grounded were clearly distinguishable
from the constitutional arguments advanced by Gaby, the
court’s ultimate decision — the rejection of the 1962
covenant — coincided with Gaby’s interests. Regardless of
whether that result was achieved by sustaining the 1974 re-
pealer as the trial court did, or whether it was achieved by
tinding the 1962 covenant itself unconstitutional as sug-
gested by Gaby, the result indicated the possibility of grant-
ing the further relief sought by Gaby. A more activist role

All

for the Port Authority appeared to be a reality. Nonetheless,
the court concurrently ordered the dismissal of Gaby’s com-
plaint, thus frustrating the additional relief'which he sought.
134 N. J. Super. at 198. From this disposition, Gaby filed
a cross-motion for direct certification which was granted on
May 28, 1975. 68 N. J. 175 (1975).

Similar to his presentation before the trial court, Gaby’s
arguments are again directed towards a declaration 6f the
unconstitutionality of the 1962 covenant. This is more the
result of strategic considerations, however, than devotion to
substantive principle. Recognizing the limited nature of the
trial court’s factual findings and disposition, Gaby has
taken what appears to be a most advisable legal course. By
preserving the issue of the constitutionality of the 1962
covenant on appeal, he has simultaneously preserved one of
his major contentions should this or any other court reverse
the trial court on the constitutionality of the 1974 repealer.

Furthermore, in his Supreme Court brief, Gaby explained
that his contentions with regard to the 1962 Covenant are
inextricably tied to his request for greater involvement of
the Port Authority in mass transit projects:

The Appellant's Brief of Gaby is concerned with the validity of
the 1962 Covenant (N- J. 8S. A. 32:1-85.50 et seg.). Central to
the iasue of the validity of the Covenant is the question whether
the mass transportation of people within the Port District was one
of the principal activities aythorized by the Compact (N. J. 8. A.
32 :1-35.50 et seq.) ; whether the insulation of the Port Authority
from that activity was in such derogation of the Compact as to
frustrate its meaning and intent aud so material as to require Con-
gressional approval. [Plaintiff-Cross Appellant’s brief at 3].

The majority today chooses to overlook this relationship
in its reluctance to transcend the judgmental confines of
the trial court and in its affirmation of that court’s dis-
missal of Gaby’s complaint. This disposition, undertaken in
an unusually cavalier fashion, is not a product of some mis-
understanding as to the essential relief which Gaby requests.
On the contrary, the majority recognizes the strategic con-

Al2

siderations implicit in Gaby’s desire to preserve the issue
of the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant. 1”te (at
261). Nonetheless, in characterizing the constitutional argu-
ments raised by Gaby as exemplifying a “limited purpose
in pursuing the appeal,” the majority misconstrues and
frustrates the true interests of Gaby, and has done so in a
manner which I find most distressing.

The majority justifies its truncated consideration of Gaby’s
plea by veferring to an isolated phrase, taken out of context
from a sentence which Gaby adopted as representative of
his position in his cross-motion for certification. When more
appropriately considered within the sentence in which it
originally appeared, the phrase --- “an alternative ground
for affirming the decision below” — assumes an entirely dif-
ferent meaning from that which the majority attaches to it:

The purposes of this cross motion are identical with those stated
by the State of New Jersey in its cross motion for certification:
a . bring before the Supreme Court all of the issues submitted
to Judge Gelman and to avoid the possibility that some of the issues
submitted to Judge Gelman might have to be determined in the first
instance by the Appellate Division. Because of the urgency and
public importance of this case, it would be most unwise to require
a piecemeal, appellate process, particularly since the [first] issue
presented by this cross motion could be an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below. . . .” [Plaintiff-cross appellant's ap-
pendix at 47a-48a; empbasis supplied).

While the “first issue” refers to the constitutionality of the
1962 covenant, I believe it would be wrong to confuse Gaby’s
real interest in stimulating improvement of urban mass
transportation with his more temporal interest in having the
1962 covenant declared unconstitutional. The majority not
only fails to make this distinction, but fails to do so despite
Gabvy’s expressed desire to present “all of the issues” to this
Court.

This failure is only compounded by the majority’s persistent
willingness to ignore the Gaby complaint and the relief which
it warrants. In spite of plaintiff’s overindulgent concern for
the constitutionality issue, the statement of his case reflects

Al3

more than a limited and perfunctory reference to the subject.
During the course of oral argument, counsel for Gaby spe-
cifically stated :

Yes, as we read the compact between the states, the affirmative
obligation of the Port Authority in this area is to plan. The imme-
diate affirmative obligation . . . and indeed in these briefs and else-
where, there is a suggestion that if the Covenant is invalid or the
repenler upheld, either way, that it would be appropriate for the
Court to direct the Port Authority to study mass transit needs in
the Port Authority area and.make proper proposals. Then when
it comes to implementation, then you're talking about legislation
of the two states, but the affirmative obligation of the Port Au-
thority is to study the problem as it affects the Port area.

It should be noted in passing, that this statement not only
affirms the relief desired by plaintiff, but also embodies a re-
quest for a remedy which parallels that which I suggest be-
low, infra at 287-288.

Therefore, although my Brothers remove the constricting
fiscal shackles of the 1962 covenant, they fail to take the
additional steps which flow as natural concomitants to the
action which they affirm. This failure, as I see it, stems, in
part, from a reluctance to go farther and faster in an area
plagued by administrative inaction and intransigence. It also
constitutes an indulgence in the meaningless gesture of sus-
taining the 1974 repealer without concurrently authorizing
the relief needed to implement the initiative which the Legis-
lature sought to instill in the Port Authority by that repeal.

As I fear, the administrative foot-dragging which was im-
plicit in the 1962°covenant, may be only symptomatic of the
inertia which has characterized the Port ~Authority in the
field of mass transit operations. The majority’s decision can
only serve to perpetuate this sad state of affairs.

In light of the rapidly deteriorating condition of mas«
transit operations in the metropolitan area, this disposition
is most unfortunate. Faced with the ever-increasing deficits
which are inherent in this mode of public transportation, mass
transit operations have been repeatedly shunned by the Port

Al4

Authority in spite of its statutory mandate to the contrary.
As cutbacks in service have been experienced throughout the
Port District; the commuters’ resort to the private automobile
has produced a dysfunctional, volume of traffic congestion
and pollution. The ioll which this coagestion has exacted
has been obvious in the tunnels and on the oridges, whoxe op-
erations Qe Port Authority apparently prefers to maintain.

Unlike today’s majority, I am unwilling to assign plaintiff
Gaby’s case to death or to a peaceful somnambulism. This is
particularly so where within the historical and evidential ma-
terials presented to the trial court reside the seeds for a more
sweeping and effective disposition. I cannot sanction the mere
repeal of the 1962 covenant without a concurrent assurance
that the Port Authority will assume those responsibilities for
which it was created and, which to this point, it has effectively
avoided. The recalcitrance of the Port Authority has not been
‘altered by the trial court’s disposition and will not be altered
by merely affirming that decision. A more effective disposition
is needed.

If
HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE PORT

AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE MASS TRANSIT
FACILITIES

In its opinion, the majority grudgingly acknowledges the
Port Authority’s obligation to become involved in mass trans-
portation. After a perfunctory reading of the statutory frame-
work of the Port Authority, the majority concludes that the
existence of such a mandate is “a singularly appropriate sub-
ject for specific legislative Gnatine, conspicuously absent
here.” (At 258).

While specific statutory directives hove served as vehicles
for recent Port Authority projects, N. /. S. A. 32:1-35.20
(authorization for the Port Authority to undertake mass
transportation projects to link the various airports in the
Port District), N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.21 -tanthorization to

Al5

build railroad lines to and facilities at the various airports in
the Port District), its employment is in its infancy and
affords no insight as to the previously reluctant forays which
the Port Authority has made into the field of mass trans-
portation. A full consideration of the statutory basis of the
Port Authority and the history of its implementation reveals
that the majority’s interpretation of the Authority’s powers
and obligations is both short-sighted and erroneous. For
instance, the statutory creation of the Port Authority evinces
a clear legislative intent to have the Authority become in-
volved in development of mass transportation. The majority
position misconceives the role of the Authority to be a drone-
like entity ultimately dependent upon enabling legislation, ra-
ther than a separate bi-state agency. Similarly, the majority
fails to recogni: ‘he inherent limitations on the knowledge,
information and expertise which are at the disposal of the
New Jersey and New York Legislatures on the subject of mass
transit operations. In light of this fact, the wisdom of relying
upon legislative directives to address the panoply of needs
within the field of mass transportation becomes problematical.
The failure of the majority to account for these factors casts
a large shadow upon the validity of its construction of the
Port Authority’s powers. These inadequacies within the ma-
jority position become apparent upon thorough consideration
of the statutory origins of the Port Authority and the man-
date which was encompassed in its original Compact and Com-
prehensive Plan.

| A. Origins and Early Development ;
Compact and Comprehensive Plan

The Port Authority is a statutory product of a compact
which was entered into by the States of New Jersey and New
York in 1921.’ Modeled efter the recommendations of a joint

1New Jersey approved the compact by L. 1921, c. 151, now con-
tained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg. The comparable New York

Ai6

commission,” the Port Authority represented a response to, the
dysfunctional competition end commercial! disputes which his-
toricaily had plagued the two siates.* As such, it was intended
to meet the needs and interests which the two states shared
with respect to the Port of New York. This was expressly
recognized in the preamble to the 1921 Compact, which stated :

The future development of such terminal, transportation and other
facilities of commerce will require the expenditure of large sume

legislation was adopted in Laws of Vew York 1921, c. 154, now con-
tained in N. Y. Unconsol. Laws, § 6401 et seg. (McKinney 1961).
Congressional consent to the compact was granted by Pub. Rea.
No. 17, 8. J. Res. 88, c. 77, 42 Stat. 174.

At the time of creation, the agency was designated “The Port
of New York Authority.” N. J. 8. A. 32:14. This was amended by
L. 1972, c. 69, §§ 1, 2, contained in N. J. S. A. 32:1-4 and 32:1-4.1,
to the more ecumenical “The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey.” For the purposes of this opinion, the agency sha!!
be referred to as the Port Authority or just Authority.

2The New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Com-
mission was a body whose representative membership were created
by independent, though concurrently enacted bills which were passed
by the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York in 1917. Composed
of three commissioners from each state, the commission issued a
preliminary report in 1918, New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor
Development Comm'n, Preliminary Joint Report, Transmitted to the
Legislature, February 18, 1918 (1918). This was followed by a prog-
ress report in 1919, and a comprehensive report in 1920, in which
the commission proposed the establishment of a permanent body
with interstate jurisdiction. Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan
and Recommendations (1920). It subsequently submitted the ten-
tative draft of the proposed compact. See Bard, “he Port of New
York Authority, 24-34 (1942).

3The enmity between the two states traces its roots as far back
as the semina! case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. 8S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8
L. Ed. 2% (1824). Although it has from time to time received ex-
haustive consideration in the case law, New Jersey v. New York, 28
U. 8. (3 Pet.) 461, 7 L. Ed. 741 (1880); 30 U. 8. (5 Pet.) 284,
8 L. Ed. 127 (1831); 31 U. 8. (6 Pet.) 323, 8 DL. Bd. 414 (1832);
In the Matter of Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. S. 401, 406-10, 2 8. C+.
804, 27 L. Ed. 764 (1883) j- State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L. 29 (Sup.
Ct. 1862); Central RR. of N. J. v. Jersey City, 70 N. J. L. &
(1903), a concise presentation of its history may be found in
Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 5-24. z

Al7

of money, and the cordial co-operation of the states of New York
and New Jersey in the encouragement of the investment of capital,
and in the formulation and execution of the necessary physical
plans... . (N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-1]

While the Compact delineated the framework for the Port
Authority and its operations, the necessity for a more specific
implementation was recognized in Article X, which directed
the state legislatures to adopt “a plan or plans for the compre-
hensive development of the port of New York” “fas soon as
may be practicable.” N. J. 8. A. 32:1-11. The formulation
of this plan was undertaken by the Authority’s initial board
of commissioners, whose Report with Plan for the Comprehen-
sive Development of the Port of New York, December 21.
1921 (1921) was eventually enacted as the Comprehensive
Plan mandated by the Compact.*

This plan envisioned an active and affirmative role for the
Port Authority in the development of the Port District.® Sec-
tion 8 of the Comprehensive Plan provided:

-

The Port of New York Authority is hereby authorized and directed
to proceed with the development of the port of New York in accord-
ance with said comprehensive plan as rapidly as may be economically
practicable and is hereby vested with all necessary and appropriate
powers not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States
or of either state, to effectuate the same, except the power to levy
taxes or assesaments. [N. J. 8. A. 32:1-33; emphasis supplied)

That fultiilment of this statutory mandate contemplated the
involvement of the Port Authority in transportation matters
of the Port District is undeniable. This responsibility, for

«The Comprehensive Plan was enacted in L. 1922, c. 9, now con-
tained in N. J. S. A. 32:1-25 et seg. New York approved the Com-
prehensive Plan in Laws of New York 1922, c. 43, now found in
N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6451-68 (McKinney (1961)). Congressional
consent was secured in S. /. Res. of July 1, 1922, c. 277, 42 Stat.
822.

3The metes and bounds of the Port District are defined in NW. J.
8. A. 32:1-3.

Als

exampie, was explicitly mentioned in that portion of the pre-
amble of the Compact cited above. Article XXII of the Com-
pact further clarifies this respoasibility by defining “trans-
portation facility” as including:

. railroads, steam or electric, motor truck or other street or
highway vehicles, tunne!s, bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters,
tugs, floating elevators, barges, s¢cows or aarbor craft of any kind,
aircraft suitable for harbor service, and every kind of transportation
facility uow in use or hereafter designed for use for the transporta-
tion or carriage of persons or property. [N. J. S. A. 32:1-23; em-
phasis supplied]

The centrality of the railroads to the organizational and co-
ordination schemes of the Port Authority was highlighted by
the separate definition of “railroads.” This was a reflection of
the final report by the New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, which in 1920 had recom-
mended the establishment of a bi-state agency with appropri-
ate jurisdiction. See footnote 2, supra. The report, whose
factual findings served as the basis for the Compact and the
Comprehensive Plan, found the commercial inadequacies
of the metropolitan area to be “primarily a railroad problem.”
The absence of railroad coordination and accessibility at many
places within the district consequently required “essentially
a railroad plan.” The Commission summarized its suggestions
in a proposal which entailed the establishment of railroad belt-
line systems between New Jersey and New York, and con-
cluded :

This remodeled terminal railroad system, bringing every railroad
of the Port to every part of the Port, and thus giving every part cf
the Port opportunity to develop and to have the eccnomical trans-

6N. J. & A. 32:1-23 provides:

“Railroads” shall include railways, extensions thereof, tunnels,
subways, bridges, elevated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits,
powerhouses, substations, lines for the transmission of power, car
barns, shops, yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-
proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.

A19

portation service needed for its commercial and industrial growth
and expansion, c nstitutes the comprehensive plan of the Commis-
sion — the plan which the Commission recommends for formal
udoption by the two states. [New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, Joint Report, supra footnote 2, at 3]

This statutory responsibility to develop the transportation
facilities of the Port District, and particularly facilities re-
lating to railroad operations, contained an implicit obligation
to foster passenger transportation service. Although the
Port and Development Comimission report concentrated on
the freight shipment needs of the area, it did not preclude a
comparable role for the Port Authority in passenger service.
With one notable exception, the Port Authority’s role in
passenger service is confirmed by the early history of the
agency. In this regard, however, even that exception, the
1928 veto message of Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York
which rejected a New Jersey proposal for the development
of a rapid transit system between the states, may be no
more than a personal predilection. 7 See 134 N. J. Super. at
149. Noting that the Port Authority should “stick to this
program . . .[for] the solution of the great freight distribu-
tion problem,” Governor Smith at no time denied the agency’s
power to deal with passenger service, and only suggested a
reordering of its priorities. More importantly, the position
which he advocated was expressly repudiated by the Port
Authority that same year. In a June 11, 1928 resolution
supporting the continuation of a Suburban Transit Engi-

7Governor Smith, in what remains the only major statement ques-
tioning a Port Authority role in passenger traffic, remarked:

I am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick to this pro-
gram, and I am entirely unwilling to give my approval to any
measure which at the expense of the solution of the great freight
distribution problem will set the Port Authority off on an entirely
new line of problem connected with the solution of the suburban
passenger problem.

Veto Message, Public Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith of 1928,
187-88 (1938).

A20

neering Board,*® the Port Authority recognized that it had
a responsibility to the metropolitan commuter, based on its
broader cuty to develop transportation in the Port District:

The Commissioners of the Port Authority have found in their
studies that no adequate or effective interstate transportation de-
velopment can take place without taking full account of tranmepor-
tation of passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port Dis-
trict. [Emphasis supplied]

B. Port Authority Involvement im the
Area of Mass Transit ;
Reports, Studies and Legislation
Concermng Mass Transit

The continuance of its role in mass transportation has
been reaffirmed by the Port Authority from time to time.
The obligation to provide for passenger service within the

8The Suburban Transit Engineering Board had been created in
response to a Port Authority suggestion in its 1927 Annual Report.
As that report stated:
It is our opinion that, in the long run, the greatest progress will
be attained by having this Engineering Board undertake the re-
sponsibility for the preparation of the engineering section of a
comprehensive suburban transit plan for the entire port district.
The Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1927, 56
(Jan. 20, 1928). :
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this body was the intended
recipient of the funds which Governor Smith vetoed. The Port of
New York Authority, Annual Report for 1928, 683 (Dec. 31, 1928).

SA4nnual Report for 1928, supra footnote 8, at 64
t] . ! r Tes 91 “the W Jerse y Legisiature, i,
Tfhe Sena; / j ‘-PnPral Af 7" TI RSLA) Join 7 “his pol lation
i ;
fy) WIP ULHICALIGANS ( gen j ( { Mis’ ce .LSN¢ molly f on
(ta / Phi gb PS, LF } ] wt 197 4? {) Té iT yf 17 r \ Tile renor?t
The legstation passed by New Jersey during the iast four yeurs
efleets the dererrmination on the part of its officials to direct
wrt Authority towards making a greater financial commitment
iss transit ty rder ‘o letermine whether New Jersey has

wel teented by the Vorr Authority iu a fair and impartial manner
the Committee has investigated the degree of Port Authority re-

opsiveness te meeting the mass transportation needs of the State.

The Committee ~ eooelasion Was suceinet as i Was untorty

hue Committee recognizes that the Dort Authority has aequired
a reputetion for its engineering, planning and management skills
It is the conclusion of the Committee, however, that in the area
of mass transportation the Port Authority's perfomance has not
heen satisfactory. "/d. at 17]

The Committee’s conclusions were premised upon the same
type of factors which I have considered above. While the Com-
mittee wes hopeful that the Port Authority would take its
mass transportation responsibilities “more seriously” in the
future, it nonetheless pledged “its vigilance to see that the

A34

Port Authority completes the mass transportation projects

: ’. 9? + + Bs)
it has promised to complete.” /d. at 18, 19.

The senritivity of the stete goverament to the urgent need
for more modern means of public transportation has noi been
confined to the legislative branch. In his recent “State of the
State” address, Governor Byrne not only recognized this prob-

lem, but concurrently cited the Port Anthority’s responsibility
for its solution. Perhaps ever more important, the Governor
indicated hia willingness to impose an afirmative sanction on
the Port Authority should ihe desired action in the area of
mass transit not be forthcoming:

How do we keep the railroads running at a time when the staie
subsidy program costs over $100 mil'ion a year and has been grow-
ing by more than 35 per cent a year? Should there be an overall
operating agency for these lines? What about the communities and
industries served by lines soon to be abandoned? Where can we
find the $255 million required to match federal funding for the

45While the history of the Port Authority’s involvement in mas
transportation has been discouraging, the prospects for renewed ef-
forts by the agency in this area of endeavor are hopeful. In the
above cited report by the Legislature’s Joint Transportation and
Communications Committee, the development of a mages transporta-
tion plan by the Port Authority was noted, Report of the Senate
and General Assembly Joint Transportation and Communications
Committce (Pursuant to Assembly Concurrent Res. No. 211 of 1974,
16-17 (Octcber 4, 1975)). This plen committed the Port Authority
to the provision of additional direct rail service to Penn Station in
New York City for New Jersey commuters, the expansion of the
Midtown Bus Terminal, the construction of a rail link to Kennedy
Airport ard the extension of the PATH system from Newark to
Plainfield. Although the Urban Mass Transportetion Administration
on December 19, 1975 rejected New Jersey’s request for $27%-
million to construct the PATH extension, the State’s expressed in-
tention to reapply for such funds will create the possibility of » con-
tinued role for the Port Authority in mass transportation. The
Sunday Star-Ledger, December 21, 1975, at 1, 8; The New York
Times, December 22, 1975, at ——; The New York Times, January
4, 1976, at 34. This persistence has apparently been successful as
federal approval of a $400-million block grant for the PATH ex-
tension to Plainfield and other mass trans't projects is anticipated.
The Star-Ledger, February 10, 1976, at 1.

:
|

A35

modernization of two major commutes. lines and the extension of
PATH to Plainfield?

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey must increare
it» commitment to these efforts. If it is unwilling to do so, we will
insist that it rescind the toll increases instituted last year for the
specific purpose of funding improvements in the public transporta-
tion system. [Annual Message of Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Jan.
13, 1976, at 19]

I, too, would similarly take this opportunity to demonstrate
the vigilance which has motivated the Joint Committee and
the Governor. The Port Authority has too long neglected the
responsibility with which it was statutorily charged in i921.
In So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67
N. J. 151, 189 (1975), we recognized the significance of
transportation to the overall development of an urban area.
T would today reaffirm this significance.

IV
CONCLUSION

The relief which I recommend today is intended as an
answer to # problem which has assumed crisis proportions.
The Port Authority is the producer, the director and the
main character of the play known as “The Disease of Mass
Transportation.” This malady has suffered too long from
the benign neglect of public agencies such as the Port Au-
thority, and such neglect has permitted the disease to spread
unattended. The resulting state of affairs may most accurately
he described as one of emergency. While the appellation
“emergency” was at one time reserved for calamitous and
natural occurrences, the inadequate and deteriorating quality
of mass transit in the metropolitan area has had an eroding
effect on the urban environment in which it operates. This
effect has been measurable not only in terms of the unending
lines of commuters who have been inconvenienced by in-
efficient service, but also in terms of traffic congestion with
its attendant pollution as well. The courts of this country
have long recognized that such emergent circumstances may

A36

serve as a mandate to administrative action. “While emer
gency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power.” Home Building & Loun
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26. 54 8. Ct. 231. 235,
78 L. Bd. 413, 422 (1934); Hourigan v. North Bergen Tp.,
113 N. J. L. 148, 148 (EB. & A. 1934).

For an Authority that is long on cash and short on
dreams,’® it is time to respond for those who have long suf-
fered the inconvenience and expense which have resulted from
the Port Authority’s inaction.

I would order the Port Authority, its Commissioners and
its Executive Director to not only complete those projects to
which it is already committed, but io formulate and present
plans and suggestions for a regional mass transportation
scheme to the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey.
Implicit in this would be the requirement that such efforts be
completed in an expeditious fashion and within a fixed period
of time. This injunction is necessary to bring home the im-
portance of Authority action in the face of the current trans-
portation crisis.

In proposing this relief, I should not be understood as ad-
vocating usurpation of the functions of either the executive
or legislative branches of government. The majority’s charac-
terization of my position is in error. (At 259). My dis-
position does not contemplate ordering either the Governors
or the Legislatures of the States of New Jersey and New York
to undertake any particular course or courses cf action. I
would he loathe to intrude upon the relationships which have
developed between these other branches of state government
and the Port Authority. Nonetheless, I am all too aware of
the fact that expertise in the field of mass transit operations
resides in the body which was originally vested with both
power and jurisdiction in that area, namely the Port Au-
thority. By according the Authority a statutory mandate to

16Caro, supra, footnote 10 at 922.

A37

undertake mass transportation projects, it was anticipated
hy both States that the Port Authority would actively re-
search, promote and recommend projects to be authorized and
implemented by the State Legislatures. It is precisely the
Port Authority’s reluctance to utilize its expertise that has
frustrated this basic first step towards the development of a
much-needed integrated mass transportation system in the
metropolitan area. Therefore, I would order the Port Au-
thority to proceed with this initial planning stage. while, at
the same time, acknowledging that ultimate adoption and im-
plementation of the resultant plans remain a legislative and
executive prerogative. The declared willingness of those
branches of government to adopt appropriate measures leaves
me confident that only timely suggestions by the Port Au-
thority are needed to point the direction towards improved
mass transit operations.

Although I am unsure whether it is the perception of my
suggested order as a usurpation of executive and legislative
function which underlies the majority's disagreement with
such relief, I am, nonetheless, clear in my opposition to the
lesson in civil procedure which the majority would impose
on this case. T find that the majority’s exercise of power un-
der a writ of mandamus would ill-befit a remedy with such a
Marshallian association. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. 8. (1
Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). This is a direct result of not
only the restrictive but the erroneous construction which the
majority gives to the powers implicit in a mandamus. The
writ of mandamus is a remedial process whose essential func-
tion is to compel the performance of a ministerial action or the
ecercise of a discretionary function. Roberts v. Holsworth,
10 N. J. 1. 5% (Sup. Ct. 1828); Switz v. Middietown Twp.,
23 N. J. 580 (1957). This mode of relief is particularly ap-
propriate with regard to recalcitrance by public officials or
authorities. Bd. of Taration v. Belleville, 92 N. J. Super.
338, 340-41 (Law Div. 1966). While the court has the power
under a mandamus to compel action, it does not similarly
have the power to control discretion in the performance of

A38

the designated action. Such discretion properly resides in
the functioning authority.

By its construction of the mandamus, the majority would
not only accord the authority discretion in the manner of
performing the compelled action, but would permit the au-
thority discretion as to whether the ordered. action should
be performed at all. Although the majority has recognized
that the Port Authority has resisted efforts to promote its
involvement in mass transportation, it would consider this
to be an exercise of discretion which would preclude a
mandamus or an order similar to the one which I have sug-
gested :

As we have svught to demonstrate, the circumstances before us
de not at all invite or accommodate the remedy proposed. This is
xo because the Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial)
has in fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass transportation.
Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be open to dispute;
hut as to the propriety of this Court’s refusal to intrude on the
underlying policy determination, there can be no question in the
circumstances before us [At 259].

| cannot subscribe to such reasoning, whose circular nature
would undercut the relief which the majority otherwise feels
warranted under the circumstances and which would effec-
tively emasculate the mandamus, or any similar relief, as
a remedy.

I reject the majority’s approach to the problem of this
case within a procedural contexi. We have been taught that
there are no rights without remedies. By stripping us of
our remedies, the majority is most assuredly divesting us
of our rights. Marbury v. Madison, supra, 5 U. 8. (1
(‘ranch) at 163, 2 L. Ed. at 69. Furthermore, we have long
passed the days wherein cases were decided on the niceties
of procedural technicalities. Hodgson v. Applegate, 31 N. J.
29, 43 (1959) ; Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N. J. Super.
368, 385 (App. Div. 1958). There is no need to resurrect
in this case another of these manifestations of by-gone days.

A39

Even if I were to acknowledge the necessity of specifically
resorting to a mandamus or its equivalent, I could not
justify withholding such relief in this case; nor can I pres-
ently understand the distinction which the majority draws
between the mandamus which they recommend and the order
which I propose. Granting that mandamus is an “extraor-
dinary remedial process,” Beronio v. Pension Comm'n of
Hoboken, 130 N. J. L. 620, 623 (E. .& A. 1943), aff’g 129
N. J. L. 557% (Sup. Ct. 1943), I cannot see the unfortunate
plight of the more than 30 million commuters who are de-
pendent upon the Port Authority’s transportation services
annually, nor the Authority’s benign neglect of their plight,
as being anything less than extraordinary. This is particu-
larly so where to adopt the majority’s approach would per-
mit the Port Authority to ignore the statutory responsi-
bilities with which it was charged in 1921.

The majority in Gaby v. Port of New York Authority has
been unwilling to take the action which I regard as impera-
tive. From its disposition I must, therefore, respectfully
dissent.

For affirmadnce—Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CLIF-
FORD and Judges ConFrorpD, CARTON and HaLPpERN—6.

Concurring in part and disser‘ing in part—Justice PasH-
MAN—1.

APPENDIX B

A40

Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ETC.,

PLAINTIFF, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, &£T AL.,
DEFENDANTS .

DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF, v. THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey
Law Division

Argued April 8, 9, 1975—Decided May 14, 1975.

SYNOPSIS

Consolidated actions were brought concerning constitu-
tional validity of legislation creating, and later repealing,
a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York
and holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority cf New
‘ York and New Jersey. Defendants filed counterclaim for
declaration of validity of repealing legislation. The Su-
perior Court, Law Division, Gelman, J. S. C., held thac
legislative enactments, such as the 1962 covenant whereby
the States and Authority were precluded from applying Au-
thority revenues and reserves for passenger railroad pur-
poses unless permitted by criteria set forth in the covenant,
can constitute a contract within meaning of the contract
clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, that not
every impairment of a contract obligation or security for its
performance runs afoul of the contract clause, that a State’s
inherent power to protect the public welfare may be validly
exercised under the contract ciause even if it impairs a con-
tractual obligation so long as it does not destroy it, and
that in view of emergent problems of air pollution, crises
in mass transit and energy problems repeal legislation was a
reasonable and valid exercise of the State’s police power
and was not prohibited by the contract clause of either the
Federal or State Constitution.

Complaints dismissed; judgment for defendants on coun-
terclaim.

ee

A4l1

Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn (of
the New York Bar) for plaintiff United States Trust Com-
pany (Messrs. Meyner, Lardis & Verdon, attorneys; and
Messrs. Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, attorneys; and Mr.
Donald J. Robinson (of the New York Bar) Messrs. Haw-
kins, Delafield & Wood, attorneys).

Mr. Michacl I. Sovern (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Murray J. Laulicht, special counsel for defendants (Mr.
William F’. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, attor-
ney; Mr. Harold 8. H. Edgar (of the New York Bar) on
the brief).

Mr. Theodore W. Kheel (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Howard Stern for plaintiff Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Battle,
Fowler, Stokes & Kieel, attorneys, and Messrs. Shavick,
Stern, Schotz, Steiger & Croland, attorneys).

Mr. Joseph Lesser (of the New York Bar) for defendant
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Mr. Francis
A. Mulhern, attorney); and Mr- Patrick J. Falvey (of the
New York Bar). Vs. /subel BE. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P.
Berg (of the New York Bar), (Wr. Vigdor D. Bernstein,
of counsel).

GELMAN, J. S. ©. These are consolidated actions which
have as their common subject matter the constitutional va-
lidity of legislation of this State creating, and later repeal-
ing, a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New
York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).' The

—

1Under the terms of the Compact of 1921 creating the Port Author-
ity, N. /. 8S. A. 32:1-1 et seg., legislative action taken by one state

134 N.J.Super.—9

A42

first legislative act in question, chapter 8 of the Laws of
1962, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 (the 1962 covenant), autbor-
ized the Port Authority to construct the World Trade Cen-
ter and to acquire and operate the Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad Company. As part of the 1962 legislation the two
States enacted a statutory covenant with each other and
with the holders of certain Port Authority bonds whereby
the States and the Port Authority were precluded from ap-
plying the Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger
railroad purposes unless permitted by the criteria set forth
in the statute. N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55.

The 1962 covenant was repealed by chapter 25 of the
Laws of 1974.2 The complaint filed by the United States
Trust Company challenges the coustitutionality of the re-
peal act of 1974, and the Gaby complaint attacks the va-
lidity of the 1962 covenant. We turn, then, to the proce-
dural history of these actions and the issues projected by
the respective pleadings.

Procedural History

1. The Gaby Action

On May 16, 1972 plaintiff Daniel Gaby filed a class
action complaint for a declaratory judgment that the 1962
covenant violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The
complaint named as defendants the Port Authority, its com-
missioners and executive director, and the then Governor of
New Jersey, William T. Cahill. On October 25, 1972, on

affecting the powers and duties of the Port Authority is not effective
until concurred in by the legislature of the other. V. J. S. A. 32:1-8.
Statutory citations in this opinion will be limited to the applicable
New Jersey statutes unless the context otherwise requires.

2In 1972 the Legislature had repealed the 1962 covenant as to all
bonds of the Authority issued after the effective date of the act.
L. 1972, c. 208; N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55a. The act became effective
upon the adoption of concurrent legislation by the State of New
York on May 10, 1973. Laws of N. Y. 1973, oc. 318. The validity
of this legislation is not in issue in these proceedings.

. A43

the motion of the Attorney General of New Jersey, the
complaint was dismissed as to former Governor Cahill. The
Attorney General also moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to name as an indispensable party the Port Author-
ity’s bondholders. No disposition appears to have been made
of the motion at that time.

The Gaby complaint alleges, among other things, that
the residents of the State of New Jersey are dependent
upon mass transit facilities and are adversely affected by
the deterioration of such facilities within the District ser-
viced by the Port Authority (the Port District). It is al-
leged that the Port Authority was created by the Compact
of 1921 and consented to by the United States Congress®
to assure “cooperation of the two states in the future develop-
ment” of transportation facilities within the Port District,
and that by virtue of the 1962 covenant, restricting the
Port Authority’s power to acquire or operate passenger rail
transit facilities, the two states entered into a new “Com-
pact” without the consent of Congress and in violation of
U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 10. The complaint further alleges:
that the 1962 covenant constitutes an unconstitutional sur-
render by the State of its sovereign powers “to protect the
health, general welfare and safety of the people,” and that
it has impaired and obstructed existing facilities for the
transportation of goods in interstate commerce, in viola-
tion of U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.

Gaby asks for multifarious relief. Aside from seeking a
declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the 1962 cov-
enant, he asks the court to declare the covenant to be sub-
ject to repeal, and to direct the Port Authority to formu-
late and submit to the court a plan for the development of
mass transit facilities within the Port District.

The Gaby action was pretried on February 22, 1973, at
which time it was stipulated that the action could proceed

8Pub. Res. No. 17, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (42 Stat. 174).

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Fe aa: ee ee

A44
as a class action without formal notice to the class repre-
sented by plaintiff. Thereafter both sides moved for sum-
mary judgment, and oral argument on the motions was
heard on September 26, 1973. At the conclusion of the ar-
gument the court directed the parties to submit further
briefs on the constitutional issues and on the question
whether the bondholders were necessary parties to the Gaby
action. Following conferences between counsel and the
court, it was agreed the United States Trust Company
should be permitted to intervene in the Gaby action as a
party defendant to represent the interests of the bondholders
in that action. -n order to such effect was entered on De-
cember 18, 1973, and arguments were rescheduled on the
motions for summary judgment.

Prior to the date fixed for the argument the prospects
for the adoption of the repeal act became apparent, and
further action in the Gaby case was stayed pending future
legislative developments.

2, The United States Trust Company Action

The New Jersey Legislature completed action on the
repeal act on April 22, 1974, and Governor Brendan T.
Byrne signed the bill into law on April 30, 1974. On the
same day United States Trust Company (U. S. Trust)
filed its complaint on behalf of itself as the holder of Port
Authority bonds, as trustee for certain designated issues of
Port Authority bonds, and on behalf of all holders of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authority. The com-
plaint names as defendants the State of New Jersey, Gov-
ernor Byrne and the Attorney General of New Jersey, and
seeks a declaratory judgment that the repeal act violated
the Federal and State Constitutions.

U. S. Trust alleges that it is the holder (for its own ac-
count and in a fiduciary capacity) of $96,000,000 of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authority; that the
Port Authority was intended, under the terms of the Com-
pact approved by Congress, to be a self-supporting public

~ nee nD

A45

agency whose obligations were to be and are payable from
its net revenues and certain reserve funds; that the 1962
covenant was enacted to protect the Port Authority’s ex-
isting and future bondholders from the diversion of pledged
revenues and reserves to finance deficit mass transit facili-
ties and further to preserve the Port Authority’s credit
standing; that the Port Authority notified prospective pur-
chasers of its bonds of the existence of the 1962 covenant
and purchasers relied on the covenant in purchasing bonds
issued by the Port Authority, and that the secondary mar-
ket for the Port Authority consolidated bonds has been ad-
versely affected by the repeal act.

The complaint alleges, that the repeal act violates the
“impairment” and “taking” provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10 aud Amends. V and
XIV, and the equivalent provicisus of the New Jersey Con-
stitution, N. J. Const. (1947), Art. TV, § VIT, par. 3;
Art. I, pars. 1 and 20.

The answer filed by defendants asserts several defenses
among which the following may be briefly noted: (1) the
repeal act constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police
power hy the State; (2) the 1962 covenant itself violated
the Federal Constitution because of lack of congressional
consent; (3) the repeal act does not constitute an “im-
pairment” of the contract since the obligation of the Port
Authority to pay its bondholders remains intact; (4) the
hondhoiders were on notices of the reserved powers of the
State to repeal the 1962 covenant, and (5) the repeal act
was adopted as a police power measure to meet a transpor-
tation crisis affecting the health, safety and welfare of per-
sons residing within the District. Finally, the answer as-
serts a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the
repeal act is constitutional.

A consent order was entered pursuant to R. 4:32-1 in
the U. S. Trust action directing that the action be main-
tained and defended as a class action by U. S. Trust on

A46

behalf of all holders of consolidated bonds of the Port Au-
thority, and that notice to the class be deemed to have been
given by means of the media publicity which was dis-
seminated when the action was instituted. 9n December 10,
1974 the Gaby and U. S. Trust actions were consolidated
by order of the court.

The parties to the U. S. Trust action have filed a 366-
page stipulation of facts, accompanied by exhibits covering
all phases of the case with the exception of two issues: (1)
whether the purchasers of consolidated bonds issued by the
Port Authority after the adoption of the 1962 covenant re-
lied in fact upon the existence of the covenant, and (2)
whether the repeal of the 1962 covenant adversely affected
the secondary market for Port Authority bonds. These is-
sues were the subject of a trial on February 4, 5, 6, 7 and
11, 1975, and the court’s findings on the issues will be set
forth infra.

The Formation, Facilities and Financial Structure
of the Port Authority.

1. Formation and Facilities.

In 1917 the States of New Jersey and New York estab-
lished the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor De-
velopment Commission (the Commission) to study the fa-
cilities and problems of the Port of New York and to rec-
ommend a plan for the future development of the Port.*
The Commission filed its Report’ on December 16, 1920

—

4The enabling legislation directed the commissioners to negotiate
and agree upon a joint report recommending a policy for the states
“to the end that said port shall be efficiently and constructively
organized and furnished with modern methods of piers, rail and water
and freight facilities * * *.” The Commission was to work out “a
comprehensive and adequate interstate and Federal port policy, to
meet commercial needs in times of peace and the protection of the
harbor and adjacent localities in times of war.” L. 1917, ¢. 120.

5Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations,
New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission,
1920 (hereafter cited as the Report).

. r os .

In addition to the General Reserve Fund, various special reserve
funds have been created as a result of contractual commitments
with bondholders in support of the various issues of Port Authority
bon’s. As in the case of the General Reserve Fund, the Authority
may apply moneys in the Special Reserve Funds for purposes relat-
ing only to those of its bonds secured by a pledge of the General
Reserve Fund, including purposes relating to facilities financed by
such General Reserve Fund Bonds.

All Port Authority revenues not applied to operation and main-
tenance and debt service must be paid into one or another of these
reserve funds. There are no excess revenues which are free of this
contractual commitment to bondholders.24 [Emphasis supplied]

In its statement to the 1958 Legislature the Authority
suggested that even if it were possible to ignore legal re-
strictions on the use of Authority net revenues to finance
commuter rail deficits, such a course of action would im-
pair the Authority’s credit standing and adversely affect
the ability of the Authority to carry out its then existing
programs. To reinforce this view the Authority solicited
and included in its statement similar expressions of opin-
ion from members of the investment banking community.

In January 1959 a joint report was issued on Assembly
Bill No. 16 by the New Jersey Assembly Committees on

24In view of recent developments it should be noted that in its
statement the Authority also opposed an increase in tolls for the
Hudson River crossing since this would constitute an “unfair tax”
upon motorists to subsidize rail transit.

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Highways, Transportation and Public Utilities, and on Fed-
eral and Interstate Transportation. This report concluded
that the Port Authority could not be called upon to under-
take the entire rail passenger transit obligation because (1)
no one could estimate the size of the deficit operation the
Authority would be undertaking, and (2) while the Au-
thority could absorb some deficit, its operations, taken as
a whole, must be self-supporting.

Pressures for financial aid to and Port Authority in-
volvement in commuter transit continued to mount, and in
1960 the New Jersey Senate created a committee (known
as the Farley Committee) to study the Snancial structure
and operations of the Authority. One of the principal sub-
jects investigated by the Farley Committee was the Au-
thority’s role in commuter transit. At the time the Com-
mittee’s hearings commenced its immediate concern was to
find a means to continue the operations of the bankrupt
Hudson & Manhattan Railroad (H & M). The bankruptcy
reorganization proceedings involving the H & M had reached
the point where, in 1959, the District Court had left the
H & M with sufficient cash for operations to continue for
cnly two years. See In re Hudson & Manhattan Ratlroad
Co., 174 F. Supp. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F. 2d 402 (2 Cir. 19€0). The
Authority’s Executive Director, Austin Tobin, testified be-
fore the committee concerning his discussions with New Jer-
sey Highway Commissioner Dwight Palmer to have the
Port Authority acquire and operate the H & M. Tobin
testified in September 1960:

Faced with these legal and contractual commitments [to the
Autherity’s bondholders], which are the whole basis of the Author-
ity’s credit, Commissioner Palmer and the Port Authority have been
examining, beginning with our initial exploration of the possibility
on last February 15, whether bi-state legislation could be fashioned
under which the Authority might even acquire and finance the bank-
rupt and deficit-ridden Hudson & Manhattan properties and finance
its modernization by the Port Authority as a new Port Authority
facility.

A66

In other words, could any legal and financial plan be worked
out that would meet the foregoing contracts with investors and, from
the standpoint of maintaining the Port Authority’s credit, guarantee
that the Authority would not thereupon become generally or further
involved in the deficits of the commuter railroads, both in New York
and in New Jersey? Obviously, unless such a covenant could be es-
tablished no Port Authority bonds could be sold either for the
acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan properties or for any other
Purt Authority purpose.

Thus the core of the problem is whether or not the two States
could, to use a phrase about it, ‘build a statutory fence around’ the
Hudson & Manhattan by guaranteeing to investors that the Author-
ity would not and could not become involved in the large and in-
creasing deficits of the New York and New Jersey commuter rail-
roads, which with the New York subways total a deficit of some-
thing like $150,000,000 a year.

In January 1961 Commissioner Palmer appeared before
the Farley Committee and expressed his conclusion that the
Port Authority should purchase and operate the H & M
provided limitations were placed upon the Authority’s role
in mass transit. On this subject he testified:

The Port Authority in my opinion must make money and accumu-
late reserves for the rainy day if it is to be equipped to meet the
needs of our two states of New York and New Jersey. It does not
have general taxing powers. Its only taxes are the tolls it collects
from the users of its facilities. Its shareholders are the public, you
and I, and the institutions that buy the bonds. Since the cost of
financing often determines the feasibility of a project it stands
to reason that you and I get more for our toll dollar in the way
of modern and safe facilities if we make certain that the credit rat-
ing of the Authority remains intact.

Now most of us realize that the matter of credit is not an exact
science. The credit of an organization depends or quite a few fac-
tors; past performance, efficient management and calibre of personnel
and markets for the product the institution has to sell; and last
but not least — what investors think of the operation as a financial
risk. It is, in the final analysis, the practical aseessment of being
repaid money that they lend to it.

Relating specifically to what ultimately became the 1962
covenant, Senator Wayne Dumont questioned Commissioner
Palmer as follows:

A67

Q. Commissioner, when the Port Authority made its proposal in
September, at our hearings then, to take over the Hudson & Man-
hattan Tube, they surrounded their proposa’ with certain restric-
tions which, sc far as I could tell were designed to eliminate any
real obligation on the part of the Port Authority beyond taking over
the Hudson & Manhatten Tubes, at least so far as the railroad field
was concerned. Do you consider those restrictions that they sur-
rounded this proposal with as reasonable ones? A. Yes, I do. And
I have so stated in my proposal and I do it purely on the basis of
what experience I may have had in the field of finance and industry,
and of what we are hoping to obtain and acquire in the future in
the expansion of facilities that the Port can supply.

e * * . , . . * «

And it seems impossible, from all of my direct — and not through
any other channels — direct contacts, to observe that money could
be loaned for even the acquisition of the H&M in the event there was
not some assurance that this just wasn't one bite of the cherry and
that further transportation business was all to be pulled together.
I think it’s simply a question of whether the investor says yes or
no, and at the present time my observation is the investor says no
unless he has that limitation.

The following day the Port Authority’s Vice-Chairman,
James C. Kellogg, III, testified concerning the Authority’s
H & M plans. He emphasized that only by adopting what
became the 1962 covenant could the Port Authority acquire
and rehabilitate the H & M.

There is, of course, no possibility whatsoever that either the Port
Authority or any one else could operate the H&M on a self-support-
ing basis. The bankrupt H&M has not paid a dividend since 1932;
it has not been able to meet the interest on its bonded indebtedness
and has been in receivership since 1954.

e & .

e s . s °

On this estimate of the H&M losses [$5 million annually], and
if we are able to satisfy prospective investors by statutory assurances
that this proposa) will not involve the Authority’s General Reserve
Fund ia any other or further commuter deficit operations, we be-
lieve we can conscientiously certify, as we must under our indentures,
that this financing will not impair the Port Authority’s credit. On
the other hand, if we are not in a position to cite such statutory
assurances to those from whem we will have to borrow the money,
and therefore, we are not in a position to make such a certification,
we obviously would not be in a position to borrow money for the
acquisition, let alone the improvement, of the H&M.

i 2 & _ 6 @ eo e

All Port Authority revenues not applied to operation and mainte-
nance and debt service must be paid into one or another of these

A68

reserve funds. There are no excess revenues which are free from
this contractual commitment to bondholders,

The most important pledges that the Port Authority bas made to
its bondholders are those relating to the issuance of bonds for new
projects. These pledges were necessary since otherwise the security
could be diluted, not only through the raiding of revenues and re-
serves, but just as disastrously by the unlimited issuance of bonds
which have such revenues and reserves as their primary source of
repayment.

It is because of this that the Port Authority had to covenant with
its bondholders not to issue Consolidated Bonds supported by the
General Reserve Fund for any new facility unless it can be demon-
strated that, including the new facility, net revenues will be suf-
ficient to cover by at least 1.3 times the maximum interest and prin-
cipal payments due in any future year. Furthermore, bonds for a
new faciilty cannot be issued with a pledge of the General Reserve
Fund unless the Port Authority Commissioners certify that the issu-
anee of the new bonds will not materially impair the sound credit
standing of the Authority, the investment status of the Authority's
bonds, or the ability of the Authority to fulfill its commitments and
undertakings. Such protections for investors under open-end revenue
bond issues are not uncommon,

Applied to the H&M proposal, I would like to make it clear that
the question of whether or not we can borrow the $83,500,000 which
is required, is not simply a question of whether or not we would
have to pay a higher rate of interest on these funds, We can only
submit to you the unanimous view of the Commissioners of the Port
Authority that there is no possibility whatsoever of borrowing the
money at all without a statutory assurance to investors that any
future Port Authority responsibilities in the field of commuter rail
transport over and above the present and existing interstate Hudson
and Manhattan railroad system wili not involve a pledge of the Port
Authority's General Reserve Fund.

I say to you as a New Jersey Commissicner, and with al) the
sincerity that I can command, that there is nothing arbitrary or
doctrinaire about this conclusion. It simply represents the Port
Authority's credit. My business is investment financing and I say
to you gentlemen that I could not sell a single Port Authority bond
without such an assurance. If my responsibility were on the other
side of the table, I would not buy a Port Authority bond that did
not contain such an assurance, [Emphasis supplied]

Following Kellogg’s prepared statement he was questioned
by Senators Farley and Cowgill as to the binding effect

A69

which the proposed covenant legislation could have on a sub-
sequent legislature. The questioning proceeded as follows:
BY SENATOR FARLEY:

Q. Mr. Kellogg, I noticed in the latter part of your statement,
you said you must be given assurance by the Legislature that if
they directed the Port to proceed to purchase this property, they
must make a pledge to the bondholders there be no further projects
involving rail. Now I appreciate that if the Legislature directs you
to enter into a contract involving the issuance of bonds, there will
be no impairment of obligations of contract, but I must call to your
attention and the members of yoor Commission that one Legislature
cannot bind a subsequent Legislature involving policy. If, perchance,
may I illustrate — ten, fifteen, twenty years from now the respective
legislatures of New York and New Jersey importune your Port
Authority Commission to do something in addition involving public
service, one legislature cannot bind another involving policy. Do
you follow me? A. I do.

Q. I appreciate the legal end of it involving obligation of con-
tract, but in your statement that you be given assurance that no
further services should be required of you involving rail forever here-
after — and how this legislature could bind a subsequent legislature
I do not know. A. We'd have to say that to the bondholders, the
ones that were going to purchase the new bonds, that we as Com-

missioners believe that this would not endanger the 1.8 ratio.
a . > * . . . °

BY SENATOR COWGILL:

‘

Q. I want to clear one thing up. I got a little confused there for
a minute on that policy business — in the event that the H&M were
acquired on the basis of statutes passed by New Jersey and New
York, they would not be called upon, that is, the Port Authority
would not be called upon, to go into any further commuter problems
of other roads. If bonds were issued under such legislation, you
would not be able to issue any further bonds for anything else unless
you were willing to certify that it would not — A. That's correct.
It wouldn't say that the bonds couldn't be issued with a estate guar-
antee later on for something else or something of that type, freight or
anything else.

Q. It seems to we on that basis, that you enter a contract on the
basis of legislation passed, thet contract is going to stand and some
later legislature is not going to be able to change it. A. That's right.

SENATOR FARLEY:

My question, Senator, was —- and I appreciate we cannot impair
obligations: In effect, would any commitment with the present legis-

A70

lature estop or attempt to estop any legislation involving public
needs in the future? [No answer was given at this point].

Commissioner Clancy of the Port Authority followed Com-
missioner Kellogg to the stand and the following colloquy
took place directed to the same point:

SENATOR FARLEY:

I say to you as a commissioner representing New Jersey we too
have a responsibility of making sure that this is done thoroughly,
intelligently and in a way that would be feasible and practical, It
was testified today by Mr. Kellogg that the Port should, not be bound
by any other demand from the State Legislature relative to rail
service. I pointed out to him — and may I say to you as a lawyer

— we well appreciate that any direction we give you by enacting -

legislation, we could not impair any obligation such as contracts of
bond issues. Likewise, you as a lawyer know that one legislature
cannot bind the other involving policy five, ten, or twenty years
hence. A. I appreciate that.

Q. So that when this Committee makes its report, we are not
exonerating the Port from any responsibility for any demand for
future public service by either the New York or New Jersey legis-
lature. I want you to appreciate that fact. A, I appreciate that
fully and I am aware of the fact if a situation such as that would
arise in the future, that would be a matter that we would have to
discuss on its own merits with a future Governor and future legis-
lature.

Q. That's right.

a . .

MR. TOBIN:
May I say something?

SENATOR FARLEY:

I want to call you, Mr. Tobin, relative to this situation. If you
want to interject something at this time, we will be very happy to
have you do so,

MR. TOBIN:

You might want to know that this legislative assurance, as Com-
missioner Kellogg pointed out, would only apply to future commuter

ATi

operations and only limits the use of the pledge of the general re-
serve fund, It only limits the pledge of the general reserve fund,
nothing else. It would not typically bar Port Authority participation
where some other scheme of guarantee of the bonds or something like
that —

SENATOR FARLEY:

That would have to depend on its own merit or demerit and then
be considered. But I call to your attention as a Commissioner the
problem of the Legislature.

I am aware of the problem, but, of course, the action that is taken
now with reference to the Hudson and Manhattan would not neces-
sarily of itself bar future participation in the problem generally. It
would, however, not be possible if that future participation involved
any impairment of this reserve fund.

While the Farley Committee hearings were in progress the
New York Legislature adopted legislation directing the Port
Authority to acquire and operate the H&M, Laws of N. ¥.
1961, c. 312, without any covenant against or limitation upon
future Authority involvement in passenger rail transit. This
legislation was not acceptable to the New Jersey Legislature
because “the absence ~f such a covenant * * * endangered the
future utility of the Port Authority to the two States.” Re-
port of Senate Investigation Committee Under Senate Resolu-
tion Number 7 of the Year 1961, at 23. The Committee’s
report, which was issued in 1963, notes that it sponsored the
1962 covenant legislation so as to limit

* © © by a constitutionally-protected statutory covenant with Port
Authority bondholders the extent to which the Port Authority reve-
nues and reserves pledged to such bondholders can 'n the future be
applied to the deficits of possible future Port Authority passenger
railroad facilities beyond the original Hudson & Manbattan Railroad
system. (Jd. at 24)

The 1962 covenant legislation was passed unanimously by
both houses of the New Jersey Legislature on February 13,
1962 and Governor Hughes signed the bill on the same day.
Tie New York Legislature followed suit on March 7, 1962,
Laws of N. Y. 1962, c. 209, and the covenant legislation be-

AT72

came effective upon Governor Rockefeller’s signature on
March 27, 1962.

L. 1962, ¢. 8, authorized the Port Authority to proceed
with the acquisition, construction and operation of a port
development project which would include the World Trade
Center and the H&M. N. J. S. A. 32:1-35,52. For this pur-
pose the Authority was authorized to issue bonds for the
project secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund,
N. J. 8. A. 32:1-85.53. The preamble of the act reflects
the following legislative findings relevant to the H&M ae-
quisition :

The States of New York and New Jersey hereby find and determine:

(1) that the transportation of persons to, from and within the
Port of New York and the flow of foreign and domestic cargoes to,
from and through the Port of New York are vital and essential to
the preservation of the economic well-being of the northern New
Jersey-New York metropolitan area ;

(2) that in order to preserve the northern New Jersey-New York
metropolitan area from economic deterioration, adequate facilities for
the transporiation of persons must be provided, preserved and main-
tained and that rail services are and will remain of extreme im-
portance to such transportation of persons;

(3) that the interurban electric railway now or heretofore oper-
ated by

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2039%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
