# Amicus Brief — E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2022%3A5

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 426 U.S. 941

## Text

MOTION FIED

JUN4 1976
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OcTroBer TERM, 1975

No. 75-1602

KE. I. DuPont De Nemours & Company and PPG
Inpustries, INc., Petitioners,
Vs,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1612
ErHy.L Corporation, Petitioner,
vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

NaLco (HEMICcAL CoMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.

I;NVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1614

NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS ASSOCIATION, ASHLAND OIL, INC.,
CLARK Or & REFINING CORPORATION, KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION,
Mouawk Perro.euM Corporation, Inc., Petitioners,

Vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND
BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit

Ronaup A. ZUMBRUN,
JOHN H. FINDLEY,

Counsel, Pacific Leqal Foundation
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 465
Sacramento, Californie 95814
Telephone: (916) 444-0154

GLENN E. Davis,

Associate Counsel, Pacific Legal Foundatior
1030 - | 5th Street, N.W., Suite 342
Washinaton, D.C. 20005
Telephone: {202} 466-2686

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation.

PERNAU - WALSH PRINTING CO.- S62 MISSION STREET - SAN FRANCISCO - CA 94105

ee

Subject Index

Page

Motion for leave to file brief of amicus curiae Pacific
Legal Foundation in support of petitions for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
ee GD, oc co weccvccocecccccosecces

Brief of amicus curiae Pacifie Legal Foundation in support
of petitions for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cireuit ...

EEE ESE EEE ET EE PEEP EE PTET
Deck e ccc censcenbeeoececesece
Reasons for granting the writ ............ 0.200 ceeeeees

EE

Legislative policy questions require more rather than
less rigorous scrutiny by the courts ...............

II
The standard of review used in this case conflicts with
the standard set by this court and followed in other
En ge

Neen eT nc eeureccocseves

11
16

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.

Gp CHD |. onccodbddenccesconssdnesuennvensaddoutens 9
Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Pro, Agey., 477

i, ££ Fe Fs S|) PPP ee 14
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Ine. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

Ce GD ddenceusddedenetesesaunnsnteal 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Environmental Defense Fund, Ine. vy. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d

Oe 7,8
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Environmental Pro. Agey.,

r Be Be: By Et | error err Te 14
International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.

Gi, SGD: ccc ceccnde cepncbestescenéxécatondcusteueies 12
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) .......... 9
South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agey.,

bse £ 8b 8 err ee 12,13
State of Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency, 499 °

- & F Ff: % errr oT rere 12
Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Pro. Agey., 515 F.2d

eee Ge, ee wand eenwabeneceense cheb epecassan 12

United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, 307 U.S. 533 (1938) .. 9,10
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.

Oe GED kvkdwadecddccdsddstoneRaccednuvevesueiesis i)
Rules
Supreme Court Rules:
re MD (.‘cuscveeededhadelennes 6eendsdedencsens 6
Re re ee ree hae 2
Statutes
Be os peas asesdbedadakiesesessadddaaiied 11
USL... 6 SGT AOE A) ce ccccccdvccccccsevessss 9
Texts
M. Forkosch, Administrative Law, 103-104 (1956) ....... 10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1602

E. I. DuPont’ DE Nemours & Company and PPG
InbustriEs, INc., Petitioners,
vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1612
EtHyYL Corporation, Petitioner,
vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1613

Natco CHEMICAL Company, Petitioner,
vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1614

NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS ASSOCIATION, ASHLAND OU, INC.,
CuarK O1L & REFINING CoRPORATION, KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION,
Mouawk PETROLEUM CorporaTION, INc., Petitioners,
vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit

This motion of Pacifie Legal Foundation (PLF)
for leave to file the annexed brief amicus curiae in

2

support of petitions for writ of certiorari is respect-
fully made pursuant to Rule 42 of the Supreme Court
Rules. Consent to the filing of this brief has been ob-
tained from counsel for all parties with the exception
of the Solicitor General, counsel for respondent En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and such consents
have been lodged with the clerk of this Court.

PLF is a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation organ-
ized and existing under the laws of California for
the purpose of engaging in litigation in matters af-
fecting the public interest. Policy for PLF is set by
a Board of Trustees composed of concerned citizens.
Twelve of the seventeen-member Board are attorneys.
The Board evaluates the merits of any contemplated
legal action and authorizes such legal action only
where the Foundation’s position has broad support
within the general community. The Board has au-
thorized the filing of a brief amicus curiae in support
of petitions for writ of certiorari in these cases.

PLF considers these cases to be of special signifi-
cance in that they raise the issue of the proper scope
of review of administrative agency decisions and pro-
cedures. Particularly, the decision of the court of ap-
peals for which review is sought raises the question
whether legislative poliey decisions of an administra-
tive agency are exempt from the rigorous review to
which findings of fact hy administrative agencies are
subjected.

As a public interest law foundation, PLF fre-
quently finds itself engaged in litigation with federal
administrative agencies, and particularly the Environ-

3

mental Protection Agency, in matters concerning such
policy decisions. Thus the scope of review of these
decisions is extremely important to PLF.

For this reason, Pacifie Legal Foundation requests
that this motion to file the annexed brief amicus
curiae be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
Ronaup A. ZUMBRUN,
JOHN H. FINDLey,

Counsel, Pacific Legal Foundation,
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 465,
Sacramento, California 95814,
Telephone: (916) 444-0154,

GLENN E. Davis,
Associate Counsel, Pacific Legal Foundation,
1030 - 15th Street, N.W., Suite 342.
Washington, D.C. 20005,
Telephone: (202) 466-2686,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation.
June, 1976

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBEer TERM, 1975

No. 75-1602

Kk. 1. DuPont DE Nemours & Company and PPG
INpustriEs, INc., Petitioners,

vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1612
Etrnuy. Corporation, Petitioner,
vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1613
Nauco CHEMICAL CoMPANY, Petitioner,
Vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

No. 75-1614

NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS ASSOCIATION, ASHLAND Ot, INC.,
CriarRK Or. & REFINING CORPORATION, KERR-MCGEE CORPORATION,
Mouwawk PETROLEUM Corporation, INc., Petitioners,

vs.

I.NVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit

6

INTEREST OF AMICUS
The interest of amicus is set out in the preceding
motion for leave to file this brief.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion ex banc of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of
March 19, 1976, is unofficially reported at 8 ERC
1785.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
INTRODUCTION

In this brief amicus curiae, Pacific Legal Founda-
tion (PLF) proposes to address only the issue of the
scope of review utilized below by the court of ap-
peals. Amicus believes that the concept of scope of
review of administrative decisions there adopted re-
quires review by this Court under the considerations
governing review on certiorari set forth in Supreme
Court Rule 19(b) in that:

1. Such concept is in conflict with the decision of
other courts of appeals on the same matter;

2. Scope of review is an important question of
federal law which has heen decided by the court of
appeals in a way which is in conflict with applicable
decisions of this Court; and

3. The decision of the court of appeals has so far

sanctioned a departure from the accepted and usual
course of proceedings by an administrative agency

7

as to call for the exercise of this Court’s power of
supervision.

I

LEGISLATIVE POLICY QUESTIONS REQUIRE MORE RATHER
THAN LESS RIGOROUS SCRUTINY BY THE COURTS

The majority below (Maj. Op. at 46) has in this case
adopted a special rule for review of questions believed
by the court to be matters of legislative policy. Thus,
the court found in the applicable statute “a recog-
nition by Congress that a determination of endanger-
ment to public health is necessarily a question of
policy that is to be based on an assessment of risks
and that should not be bound by either the procedural

or the substantive rigor proper for questions of fact.”
Maj. Op. at 46.

The court noted that the Administrator must be
accorded “a flexibility that recognizes the special ju-
dicial interest in favor of protection of the health and
welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does
not exist. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruck-
elshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).” Maj. Op.
at 46.

This citation is puzzling in that the referenced
case espouses a view diametrically opposed to that
of the opinion at issue. There the court spoke of a
“new era” in judicial review of agency action. Ruck-
elshaus, supra at 597. The court reasoned that since
courts were increasingly asked to review “administra-
tive action that touches on fundamental interests in
life, health and liberty” there was a dire necessity to

8

protect these interests from “administrative arbitrari-

ness.” To do this, strict judicial scrutiny must be

applied. /d. at 598. That court stated:
“For judicial review alone can correct only the
most egregious abuses. Judicial review must op-
erate to ensure that the administrative process
itself will confine and control the exercise of dis-
cretion. [Footnote omitted.] Courts should re-
quire administrative officers to articulate the
standards and principles that govern their dis-
cretionary decisions in as much detail as pos
sible. [Footnote omitted.| Rules and regulations
should be freely formulated by administrators,
and revised when necessary. [Footnote omitted. ]
Discretionary decisions should more often be sup-
ported with findings of fact and reasoned opin-
ions. [Footnote omitted.]| When administrators
provide a framework for principled decision-
making, the result will be to diminish the im-
portance of judicial review by enhancing the
integrity of the administrative process, and to im-
prove the quality of judicial review in those cases
where judicial review is sought.” Id.

In the instant case, the court disregards this admon-
ition and finds that “if the statute accords the regu-
lator flexibility to assess risks and make essentially
legislative policy judgments, as we believe it does,
preventive regulation based on conflicting and incon-
clusive evidence may he sustained.” Maj. Op. at 51.
The majority found therefore that “[w]here a statute
is precautionary in nature [footnote omitted], the
evidence is difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflict-
ing because it is on the frontiers of scientifie knowl-

)

edge, the regulations designed to protect. the public
health, and the decision that of an expert administra-
tor, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof
of cause and effect.” Maj. Op. at 53-54.

This new doctrine is at odds not only with the
mandate of Citizous to Preserve Overion Park, Ine. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), to engage in a “search-
ing and substantial inquiry.” Jd. at 415. It is also
glaringly inconsistent with this Court’s decisions con-
cerning delegation of legislative policy making fune-
tions to administrative agencies.

Legislative policy making is a Congressionai func-
tion. Article I, Section 1, of the United States Con-
stitution provides that “[a]// legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.” (Emphasis added.) Because of the language
of this section, it has been the traditional rule
in federal law that Congress cannot delegate its law-
making power to any other authority or body. United
States v. Shreveport Gram & Elevator Co., 287 U.S.
77 (1932); A.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

The Clean Air Act authorizes the Administrator to
prohibit, control, or regulate a fuel or fuel additive if
“the omission products will endanger the public
health or welfare... .” 42 U.S.C. § 1857F-6C(¢) (1)
(A).

Since United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, 307
U.S. 533 (1938), the federal rule on delegation of
powers has been that:

10

“each enactment must be considered to deter-
mine whether it states the purpose which the
Congress seeks to accomplish and the standards
by which that purpose is to be worked out with
sufficient exactness to enable those affected to un-
derstand these limits... .” 307 U.S. at 574.

As one authority has restated the rule:

“In other words, the delegator cannot just del-
egate and let the delegatee go off on a legal and
political bender; the delegatee must be curbed,
else his power would be unlimited. This curb is a
requirement of the Constitution, as judicially in-
terpreted in each case, so that every delegation
must contain standards as limitations. ‘These
standards are for the purpose, as Chief Justice
Warren has stated in another connection, of
having the force of law, not the law of foree,
apply.” M. Forkosch, Administrative Law, 103-
104 (1956).

It is clear that the decisions of this Court require
that in any delegation of any legislative power—and
certainly in the area of legislative policy making—
the courts must give such delegation the strictest of
scrutiny. Thus, the court of appeals’ ruling that pre-
ventive regulation based on conflicting and inconelu-
sive evidence may he sustained if a statute may be
interpreted as according the regulator flexibility to
assess risks and make essentially legislative policy

judgments (Maj. Op. at 51) without being subjected
to either the procedural or substantive rigor proper
for questions of fact (Maj. Op. at 46) is in conflict
with the applicable decisions of this Court concerning

11

review of delegated powers and should therefore be
reviewed by this Court.

Il

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW USED IN THIS CASE CONFLICTS
WITH THE STANDARD SET BY THIS COURT AND FOL-
LOWED IN OTHER CIRCUITS

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415-416 (1971), prescribes the standard
of review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
There this Court noted that 5 U.S.C. § 706 dictates
a “substantial inquiry,” a “thorough, probing, in-
depth review.” The court must first decide whether
the Administrator acted within the scope of his au-
thority. Then the court must go on to determine

?

whether the choice made was “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” To do this the court must “consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment.” The reviewing court is
specifically instructed to make an “inquiry into the
facts.” Id.

While the opinion of the court of appeals accepts
these requirements in theory (Maj. Op. at 69-71), it
does not follow them in practice in holding that the
standard of review is narrower in eases of legislative
policy making than it would be in others. Maj. Op.
at 4.

The coneurring opinion of Judges Bazelon and Me-
Gowan, whose votes are necessary to the majority, says

12

explicitly what the court seems to accept implicitly.
This opinion is based on the premise that courts
should not inquire into the technical details of admin-
istrative decisions. (Bazelon at 1.) This was not the
approach of the District of Columbia Cireuit in Inter-
national Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). It has also been explicitly rejected by the
First Cireuit in South Terminal Corp. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agey., 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).

The Eighth Cirenit in Union Electric Co. v. En-
vironmental Pro. Agey., 515 F.2d 206, 214 (8th Cir.
1975), appeal pending, states that the one principle
upon which Clean Air Act cases are in agreement is
that the standard for review of agency decisions is
the arbitrary and capricious standard.

The Fifth Cireuit in State of Texas v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1974), appeal pending, heard a state challenge to
the Environmental Protection Ageney’s (EPA) re-
jection of its plan. It held the standard of review was
that announced in Overton Park, supra, and went
on (oO say:

“In applying this standard, our review must be
hased not only upon the agency’s explanation of
‘its course of inquiry, its analysis and reasoning,’
feitation omitted] but also upon the full record
hefore the agency |citation omitted]. Only by
our own study of the record can we resolve the
factual disputes between the parties, much less
hope to ‘engage im a substantial inquiry’ into
the agencv’s action.” Jd. at 297.

In South Terminal Corp., sv pra, the First Cireuit
Court of Appeals reviewed an EPA regional air qual-

13

ity control plan made in place of a state plan. Again,
the court applied Overton Park standards. The court
emphasized the “clear error of judgment” language
and stressed the need for a “searching and careful”
review to assure it “that the Ageney’s technical
conclusions no less than others are founded on
supportable data and methodology and meet mini-
mal standards of rationality.” /d. at 655. Emphasis
added.

The court also upheld the arbitrary and capricious
standard for review of the controls selected by EPA,
but said it must bear in mind that Congress has
given EPA, not the courts, the discretion to choose
among alternative strategies. This may be similar to
the type of “policy” decision discussed by the ma-
jority here. But in South Terminal the court in-
sisted that the technical determination upon which
the policy is based be strictly reviewed and explained.
That court did not accept some of EPA’s technical
determinations in that case, but went on to review
the implementation plan controls. In reviewing a
regulation putting a freeze on new parking spaces, the
court indicated :

“We cannot say that such a freeze is arbitrary
and capricious assuming EPA is able to support
bu credible data its position as to the magnitude

of the need for carbon monoxide emission redue-
tions ....” Id. at 671. Emphasis added.

The majority in the case at bar appeared reluctant
to question whether there is credible data to support

14

the decision. While the court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Agency, the reviewing court
must require the Agency to demonstrate to the court
that its decision is based on credible data. Overton
Park, supra at 416.

In Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Pro.
Agey., 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973), petitioners
sought review of EPA approval of a state plan for im-
plementation of federal ambient air quality standards.
The Administrator arsued that the scope of review
should be limited solely to questioning whether a state
hearing was held and whether the mathematical de-
termination that the rational standards will be
achieved under the state plans were arbitrary and
capricious. He contended these were the only things
which he considered in his action. The court did not
accept this argument and reasoned that the Admini-
strator had considered much more than these factors
and that it needed to engage in a “substantial inquiry”
into all of his considerations to assure itself that all
relevant factors had been considered by the Ageney.
The court therefore demanded the “full record” be-
fore the Administrator when he made his decision. The
emphasis of the “full record” in that case and others
indieates that the court must examine all the bases for
the ageney decisions whether termed technical or
policy.

In Friends of the Farth v. U.S. Environmental
Pro. Aqey., 499 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second
Cireuit Court of Appeals reviewed EPA’s approval
of certain aspects of New York’s clean air implemen-

15

tation plan. The court was primarily concerned with
whether the Administrator was correct in his factual
determinations. Again that court reiterated the Over-
ton Park standard that an inquiry into the facts
should be “seaiching and careful.” It indicated that
if the record does not reveal the basis of his determi-
nation, the court can ask the Administrator for a fur-
ther explanation and if the findings are not sustained
by the record the court can vacate the decision. Id.
at 1123. While this inquiry of the court was limited
to a factual inquiry, it emphasizes that the Admini-
strator must present a full factual basis for his deci-
sion. Again, in this case the court recognizes that
while it cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the Administrator, it must ask whether or not he had a
basis for the decision he made.

The “arbitrary and capricious” standard is the one
which other courts of appeals have stressed. All these
eases require a full record indicating all factors con-
sidered and a thorough explanation of why the deci-
sion was made. These courts also stress that all
relevant factors be considered in the decision. This in-
dicates that even if a decision is termed one of “pol-
icy” it must be supported by facts which the court can
review to ascertain if they were properly considered
or determined. While a court cannot substitute its
decision for the Agency’s, it can require the Agency to
substantiate its decision at every step. The scope of
review in these courts, then, substantially conflicts
with the scope of review espoused by the majority

here.

16

CONCLUSION

Scope of review of administrative agency decisions
and procedures is an important question of federal law.
Because the standard adopted by the majority in the
ease at bar conflicts with the standard specified by chis
Court and implemented by other courts of appeals,
Pacific Legal Foundation, as amicus curiae, urges
that the petitions for certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
Ronacp A. ZUMBRUN,
JOHN H. FINDLEY,

Counsel, Pacific Legal Foundation,
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 465,
Sacramento, California 9581/4,
Telephone: (916) 444-0154.

GLENN E. Davis,
Associate Counsel, Pacific Legal Foundation,

1030 - 15th Street, N.W., Suite 342,

Washington, D.C. 20005,

Telephone: (202) 466-2686,

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation.
June, 1976

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_2022%3A5. Public record. Not legal advice.
