# Petition — REA Express, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petition
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 426 U.S. 906

## Text

In The Suste
fil

Supreme Gourt uf the United, States 27 1976

"7

Court, U. &

ED

—_—

!
res | MICHAEL RODAK, JR. CLERK

October Term, 1975

No. 75-1238

REA EXPRESS, INC., a Bankrupt,
Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent,

AIRLINES PARTICIPATING in AIR EXPRESS SERVICE,
AIR FREIGHT FORWARDERS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN RETAIL FEDERATION, BROTHERHOOD of
RAILWAY and AIRLINE CLERKS, NATIONAL SMALL
SHIPMENTS TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, DRUG and
TOILET PREPARATION TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, and
EASTERN INDUSTRIAL TRAFFIC’ LEAGUE, PET
INDUSTRY PARTIES, EMERY AIR FREIGHT,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ARTHUR M. WISEHART
WISEHART, FRIOU & KOCH
219 East 42nd Street
Sixth Floor
New York, New York 10017
(212) 557-8800

Counsel for Petitioner

(8847)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Coplegmn BROW cc ccpccdecemcccccccccesecesessissccess 2
EE, cxcieeckenkenkedsbenessedsnssensdaneeee 2
SD POS ico cnc édcubees chase cdeudunsedescons 2
Statutory Provisions Involved .........ceceeceeeeeeeeees 3
DURAN GE GD GOD dccccccsccccccacccaccescucenessce 5
Reasons for Granting the Writ ..........cceeeseeeceeees 11

1. The decision below’ conflicts with statutory
requirements and with decisions of other courts in
failing to require findings as to the economic impact
involved in the termination of a public service. .. I]

Il. The CAB’s failure to address itself to the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act in the context of a decision to terminate Air
Express gives rise to a public policy issue of
sufficient importance to warrant review by this
Bs 6 b.00.00000050000600b08eteiSeeendeneséans 15

III. The decision below raises significant and recurring
problems concerning the relationship between the
exercise of jurisdiction by one administrative agency
in such a way as to preclude or frustrate the
jurisdiction of other administrative agencies, or the
EE GATE, occcvescescccccesescesesance 20

I ie a a al he eee ee eS a 28

ii
Contents
Page
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited:
Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 285 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ..... 12
Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) ........ 15

Atchison Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita
Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) ..... cc cece eee 11

Braniff Airways, inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C.
PME 2 8n4ud bhuese bus OUSasohncSactek dukes ie eee 15

Brotherhood v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, —— U.S. —— ..........005. 24
Carey v. CAB, 275 F.2d S18 (ist Cir. 1953) ......ccccceces 15
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .........ccceeceees 27
Harlem Valley Transportation Association v. Stafford,

Be eee SW GH Ge, COPED cc cccccccccvctoccees 16, 18, 19
Kodiak Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 447 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir.

PNG WeKEUESS Shas etucunguseaseeudebasduckescnsds 15
Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151 (1926) .............. 2
Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) .............. 12

iii

Contents
Page

Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d

286 (Sth Cir. 1962) ....cccccceccvcccvcesessceececes 12
Northeast Airlines. Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579 (Ist
Ce TEED vvcccivccesevecccceccésesesesesscessnces 15
Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S.
GOED kdnnescdesvecaccpecvccadecoedsensveveseses 13
Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926
Oe Te FE coc vcidencccccensectncivcecsessadssees
Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466
(Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ...... 15
United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964) ....... cece eeees 2
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ....... eee eee eens 27

Statutes Cited:

OSs die dil 2 sad ceeuneinniaeenies 2
insect udu enennybatewasnsinsweele 3, 25
NR 32 cs lane a eeseeskeaenekin 4,5
I 5 STs el ccc aueenneeeeinen 16

DE UD 2s id ckasbevesdeeceskvedidetuessnne 14

iv

Contents
Page
Other Authorities Cited:
Commoner, “Reporter at Large; Energy — Ill,” The New
Vorker, Feb. 06, O976, o. GO ..ccccccecsenenccesueeas 15
Congressional Record, January 23, 1976, p. H218 ......... 10
2 Davis, Administrative Law, §15.14, p. 432) 2... ccc eee eee 14
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267
(OFFS) oo vccccccccess0000eee se sh.eu naam 27
Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, §11.1 (4th ed.
i. MITTS rr 20
Study of REA Express (Staff Study, 1965) .............06. 20
Senate Committee Report %m Commerce, “Federal
Assistance For Carriers oi Express, p. 3 (S. Rep.
No. 92-1196, September 15, 1972) oc ccccnccscenceseun 2

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

@—
October Term, 1975

No.
REA Express, Inc., a Bankrupt,

Petitioner, .

vs.
Civil Aeronautics Board,
Respondent,

Airlines Participating in Air Express Service, Air Freight
Forwarders Association, American’ Retail Federation,
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, National Small
Shipments Traffic Conference, Drug and Toilet Preparation
Traffic Conference, and Eastern Industrial Traffic League, Pet
industry Parties, Emery Air Freight,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

The petitioner, REA Express, Inc., a bankrupt (“REA”),
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment and decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit entered on October 6, 1975.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, reported at 524 F.2d
54, and the related opinions of the Civil Aeronautics Board

(“CAB”), appear in the appendix hereto. Page references to the
appendix are cited with the suffix “a.”

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was entered on October 6, 1975. A timely
petition for rehearing was denied on December |, 1975, and this
petition for certiorari was filed within ninety days of that date.
This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
See Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151 (1926); United States
v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78 (1964).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

|. Whether the decision to terminate Air Express could be
made without a comparative hearing as to (a) the costs to be
borne by the shipping public for alternative services, or (b) a
new service proposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board but not yet
developed.

2. Whether an environmental impact statement or
evaluation was required.

RE EE TN, EO
ee

3

3. Whether a public transportation service may be
terminated without a supplemental hearing with respect to
substantial changes in circumstances including the carrier’s
efforts to reorganize as a “debtor-in-possession” pursuant to
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1302:

In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties
under this chapter, the Civil Aeronautics Board shall consider
the following, among other things, as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
necessity:

(a) The encouragement and development of an _ air-
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;

(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as
to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the
highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic
conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations
between and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;

(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or
destructive competitive practices;

4

(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;

(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and

(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of
civil aeronautics. [Emphasis added.]

Section 1002(e) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§1482(e):

In exercising and performing its powers and duties with
respect to the determination of rates for the carriage of persons
or property, the Board shall take into consideration, among
other factors —

(1) The effect of such rates upon the movement of traffic;

(2) The need in the public interest of adequate and efficient
transportation of persons and property by air carriers at the
lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service;

(3) Such standards respecting the character and quality of
service to be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or
pursuant to law;

(4) The inherent advantages of transportation by aircraft;
and

5

(5) The need of each air carrier for revenue sufficient to
enable such air carrier, under honest, economical, and efficient
management, to provide adequate and efficient air carrier
service. [Emphasis added.]

Section 1002(h) provides (49 U.S.C. §1482):

(h) Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint or
upon its own initiative, the Board is of the opinion that the
divisions of joint rates, fares, or charges for air transportation
are or will be unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly
preferential or prejudicial as between the air carriers or foreign
air carriers parties thereto, the Board shall prescribe the just,
reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof to be received by the
several air carriers. The Board may require the adjustment of
divisions between such air carriers from the date of filing the
complaint or entry of order of investigation, or such other date
subsequent thereto as the Board finds to be just, reasonable,
and equitable. [Emphasis added. ]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The transportation service known as “Air Express” was
originated by REA’s corporate predecessor in 1927, prior to the
passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. From 1927 until
1944, Air Express was the only service under which small
shipments were hauled throughout the United States by
common carriers by air. The air services were performed by the
airlines and REA provided the ground services, including
handling, transfers, routing, billing, and pickup and delivery,
pursuant to a comprehensive agreement. REA was regarded as

6

an “indirect” air carrier. Beginning in 1944, however, the airlines
began to publish their own tariffs and promote their own air
freight businesses. Air freight forwarders developed thereafter.

Despite the competition by the new services, Air Express
retained certain distinctive characteristics. It was the only
“priority” service: the shipments were boarded first after baggage
and mail, and generally on the first flight out of an airport,
regardless of airline. It covered all points in the United States,
knitting the various airlines together into an integrated service.
It specialized in shipments that were small and difficult to
handle. It utilized a single, simplified tariff for all shipments on
all airlines, and to all locations. It provided unusual services,
such as armed guard protection. And, for those small shipments
it was best equipped to handle, it charged less than competing
services.

Since 1929, REA had been owned by the railroads. In 1969,
however, the railroads sold REA in an_ undercapitalized
condition to a group put together by a new management which
the railroads’ voting trustees had recruited.

The Ai Express arrangement had previously been
dependent upon agreements negotiated between REA and a
committee representing all of the airlines, subject to the approval
of the CAB. The agreements had a five year term. When REA’s
new management came into the picture in 1969, the Air Express
agreement was about to expire. The new management
discovered that, with the relative growth of the airlines’ separate
air freight businesses, it had become increasingly difficult to
negotiate a satisfactory Air Express agreement with the airlines
as a whole. The new management further discovered that the

—

;

airlines, to encourage the growth of their separate businesses,
were pricing air freight at substantially below cost.' The airlines
received about twice as much per ton mile from their share of
the Air Express divisions as they received from air freight.
Although the airlines did not receive their fully allocated costs
from either service, studies showed that they received a higher
percentage of fully allocated costs from Air Express than they
did from air freight. Finally, it appeared to REA’s new
management that the capital which the company so badly
needed to remain in business would not be forthcoming as long
as its ability to remain in Air Express was dependent upon the
good will of the airlines, who after ail were competitors, in
negotiating an agreement.

Accordingly, on April 9, 1970, REA filed a petition and
complaint with the CAB, asking that the following be
established as the major principles to govern the Air Express
arrangement:

1. The amount which REA pays the airlines
should be fairly related to what other airline
customers pay for air transportation.

2. REA should have the independent right,
subject to Board approval, to develop and revise
tariffs for Air Express service free from the

1. The substance to this contention is indicated by the subsequent finding of an
Administrative Law Judge in a separate proceeding, the Domestic Air Freight Rate
Investigation, Docket 22859. In that case, which is still pending, the Administrative Law
Judge found that, based on 1972 data, air freight rates are unreasonably low and unjustly
discriminatory, and that they should be increased on an average by 38.8%.

power of veto which the air carriers now have.
The Air Express agreement and the tariff
developed thereunder should not, as has been the
case in the past, preclude Air Express customers
from using the service for the long-haul air
market and for a broader range of shipments.

3. The agreement should be permanent and
provide for arbitration in the event that
negotiations are unable to resolve disputes.

However, the CAB dismissed REA’s petition and
complaint, and bifurcated the issues raised therein into twe
Separate proceedings: the Air Express Rates case and the Air
Express Service case. REA promptly, but to no avail, objected to
‘he severing of issues which were inextricably intertwined into
two separate proceedings. The cases were assigned to different
Administrative Law Judges who conducted separate hearings on
separate timetables. And while the Board reached a final
decision in the Air Express Service case, the Air Express Rates
case, from which REA hoped to obtain the economic
wherewithal for its survival, through the CAB’s power (and
statutory duty) to make retroactive determinations with respect
to rate “divisions,”? remains undecided, consigned to some kind
of administrative limbo called informal conferences. Meanwhile
REA, unable to weather the CAB'’s terminal edict for Air
Express, has been adjudicated a bankrupt. Thousands of
employees have been thrown out of work, the interests of
stockholders and thousands of creditors with millions of dollars
in claims wiped out, and shippers throughout the country
deprived of express services.

2. REA’s expert witness calculated that the amount of overpayment to the airlines,

based upon the yields which they were receiving from air freight, would have been in the
approximate amount of one million dollars per month, retroactive to April 9, 1970.

9

Following oral argument in the court below, in an
attempted settlement, REA and the airlines negotiated a new Air
Express agreement which they felt addressed in a constructive
way the Board's reservations about the prior arrangement. The
court remanded the matter so that the CAB could consider the

new agreement. Without further hearing or argument, however,
the Board adhered to its former conclusion, ignoring REA’s
financial plight in the groundless belief that REA’s operation as
a freight forwarder would provide the best opportunity for its
survival. By that time, REA had been compelled to petition for
reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and the
Board never stopped to inquire whether REA then had the ways
and means of transforming its Air Express business into air
freight forwarding. REA requested a hearing but in vain.

The CAB’s conclusion about the supposed desirability of
REA's becoming a freight forwarder was thrown into stark
irrationality by the Board’s decision, in yet another docket, to
require the airlines to develop another priority, interline service
for small shipments. REA contended that Air Express should be
kept in existence at least until the new service was developed so
that comparative benefits and costs could be measured, to which
the CAB responded with the contention that what it envisioned
was not a replacement for Air Express. Whether the new service
planned was or was not a replacement for Air Express — a
contention difficult if not impossible to refute because of the
impossibility of knowing precisely what the Board had in mind
— was irrelevant, of course, to the question of why Air Express
could not at-least be retained in existence until the shippers —
those who would actually use the service — could give voice to
their preferences.

10

The CAB'’s death knell decision for Air Express had a
predictable effect on REA’s business; Air Express traffic
dropped off markedly, a condition exacerbated by the decision
of affirmance below on October 6, 1975, and on November 6,
1975. REA was adjudicated a total bankrupt.

Meanwhile, the Trustee, C. Orvis Sowerwine, Esq., has
maintained certain of REA’s profitable activities in operation,
and seeks means whereby the company can be rehabilitated and
restored to viability through a sale or other infusion of capital,
in the hope that the value of REA’s rights, of which he regards
Air Express as an important part, can be preserved and realized
upon as assets of the bankrupt estate. Funds potentially may be
available through the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976, which has just been enacted. That Act
defines “railroad” to include “a common carrier by railroad or
express as defined in section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce
Act,” a definition which REA, as the historica! express
company, would satisfy. Congressional Record, January 23,
1976, p. H218.

The Trustee regards the decision below as a substantial
impediment to his hopes for rehabilitation and restoration.
Accordingly, the Trustee has sought and obtained permission
from Bankruptcy Judge John J. Galgay, in S.D.N.Y., Dkt. No.
75 B 251. to cause this petition for certiorari to be filed.

The Court of Appeals has granted a stay to prevent
implementation of the CAB’s decision, denied the CAB’s request
to dissolve the stay (3a), and has stayed the mandate pending
determination and final disposition of a petition for certiorari
(Sa), on the basis of REA’s showing of irreparable injury.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision below conflicts with statutory requirements
and with decisions of other courts in failing to require findings
as to the economic impact involved in the termination of a
public service.

The Federal Aviation Act requires the CAB to consider “the
need in the public interest of adequate and efficient
transportation of ... property by air carriers at the lowest cost
consistent with the furnishing of such service.” (49 U.S.C.
§1482(e)(1) and (2).) (Emphasis added.)

Such a crucial consideration may not be ignored by the CAB
in making a determination to terminate Air Express. As stated
by this Court in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 817 (1973): “Even giving
the Commission's opinion the most sympathetic reading that we
find possible, we cannot discover in it an expressed reason for
permitting the railroads to reduce their services without showing
that the rates they propose to maintain are reasonable rates for
the service they intend to provide.”

By bifurcating the issues raised by REA'’s petition and
complaint filed in 1970, putting the issues in the Service case
ahead of the economic issues raised in the Rates case
procedurally, the Board deprived REA and the shipping public
of important statutory rights to their substantial prejudice.

The decision below is at variance with the decisions of other
circuits indicating that public interest determinations regarding

12

air services must include determination of the economic
consequences. See Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 285 F.2d 672, 674
(D.C. Cir. 1960); Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v. CAB,
298 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1962). By terminating a public
service without first making an economic determination of the
costs of the service, the CAB effectively eliminated any
possibility of meaningful public participation in what it might
have to pay for competitive services, a result out of harmony
with the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d
891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). How could the shipping public make a
choice as to which service it would prefer without knowing
ultimately what the cost would be? Nor does the decision below
offer a supportable response to that issue by referring to the
level of rates reflected in the then current tariff (19a). As Moss,
supra, shows, reference to tariff levels is not an adequate means
of discharging the CAB’s statutory economic requirements.

In the Rates case, REA contended that the amounts
received by the airlines for their Air Express divisions were
excessive by approximately one million dollars per month,
compared with their yield from air freight. Had those divisions
been adjusted as requested, REA would have been strengthened
financially and the shipping public would have been the ultimate
beneficiaries of reduced costs. The “hidden cost” of regulation,
when the regulatory agencies, as here, fail to take such
considerations into account, has been the subject of much recent
discussion.

The kind of error which results from the absence of
adequate analysis is exemplified by the general comment of the
court below with respect to recent tariffs (19a-20a). Ignored is

13

the fact that the rates for priority service by individual airlines
have been 130% of their general commodity rates for air freight,
which do not include pickup and delivery. The comment also
does not take into account the fact that in the still-pending
Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation, Docket 22859, the
CAB’s Administrative Law Judge found that air freight rates
“are unjust and unreasonable” and that the prevailing freight
rate structure is “unjustly discriminatory,” leading to the
conclusion that air freight rates should be increased by an
average of 38.8%. Thus there has been a substantial escalation in
what shippers have to pay for priority service for traffic formerly
moving by Air Express, and further escalation apparently is in
store.

The comparative cost analysis required is a responsibility
imposed upon the administrative agency, see Schaffer
Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 92 (1957), and
in this case, Air Express was terminated before that analysis ever
reached the point of administrative finality, notwithstanding a
finding by the Administrative Law Judge that “air freight
forwarder service is not endowed with the favorable economics
of a single ground agency concept, and consequently it cannot
develop a rate structure for small shipments commensurate with
air express.” (JA624(a).)

If Congress has mandated that a factor be given
consideration in the hearing process, it would make a mockery
of the will of Congress, and due process as well, to permit the
requirement to be side-stepped, as does the decision below,
by stating that there is no “assurance” that the hearing would
yield findings which would require a change in the Board's

14

decision (21a). Either the hearing process as such has integrity or
it does not, and the condition that “assurance” be shown before
even a hearing will be allowed implies a kind of a priori
reasoning which (a) is the antithesis of due process, and (b)
would effectively preclude judicial review. As stated in 2 Davis,
Administrative Law, §15.14, p. 432:

“The eardinal principle of fair hearing
is... that parties should have the opportunity to
meet in appropriate fashion all facts that
influence the disposition of the case. . . . Nothing
short of bringing the facts into the record, so that
an unabridged opportunity is allowed for cross-
examination and for presentation of rebuttal
evidence, will suffice for the disputed adjudicative
facts at the center of the controversy.”

The requirement imposed by Congress that no significant
administrative action can be taken in certain areas without
findings on the environmental impact can not be obviated in
service abandonment cases by a ritualistic recitation that there is
no “assurance” that such findings would produce a different
result, and we submit that Congress has spoken no less plainly in
requiring findings on the economic impact in cases such as the
one here involved.

Besides the overriding requirement that the CAB anchor its
action on the considerations specified by Congress, the
Administrative Procedure Act mandates findings on each of the
statutory considerations to be supported by substantial evidence
on the record, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E), and the courts in other

15

circuits have not hesitated to reverse CAB action when the
Board has failed to state separate findings on all material issues
presented. See Trailways of New England, Inc. v.CAB,412 F.2d
926, 936 (Ist Cir. 1969); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d
453, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331
F.2d 579, 588 (Ist Cir. 1964); Carey v. CAB, 275 F.2d 518, 524
(Ist Cir. 1953); Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383
F.2d 466 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).

REA also consistently has requested that it be afforded an
Ashbacker-type comparative hearing with regard to the new
priority interline service which the CAB has ordered the airlines
to develop. Only this Court can resolve the important issue of
whether such a hearing is required in the circumstances of this
case by Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), and
we respectfully request that it do so. In rejecting the applicability
of Ashbacker to this case, the court below apparently has
applied a different standard than the District of Columbia
Circuit in Kodiak Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 447 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir.
1971).

Il. The CAB’s failure to address itself to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act in the context of a decision
to terminate Air Express gives rise to a public policy issue of
sufficient importance to warrant review by this Court.

The CAB, regulating an industry with the greatest
environmental impact per ton-mile of freight moved,’ should be

3. Commoner, “Reporter at Large: Energy III.” The New Yorker, Feb. 16, 1976,
p. 64, states
(Cont'd)

16

required to explain to this Court why, six years after passage of
the National Environmental Policy Act, it seeks the destruction
of the service with the least adverse environmental impact
without attempting to address itself to the statutory
environmental requirements (42 U.S.C. §4332).

The fact that the administrative agencies have been laggards
in satisfying the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act has already provoked judicial comment with respect
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Harlem Valley
Transportation Association v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 331 (2d
Cir. 1974).

The Harlem Valley case involved local rail abandonment
proceedings; the termination of nationwide Air Express service
has a much greater environmental effect and presents an a
fortiori situation. The adverse consequences are no longer a
matter of speculation. Following the cessation of Air Express
services as a result of REA’s adjudication in bankruptcy, Federal
Express, an air taxi cargo carrier seeking exemption authority to

(Cont'd)

“Transportation dominates the energy picture. It is the largest single
end use of energy. consuming twenty-five per cent of the total
Amencan energy budget.”

“Air pollution from transportation can be judged by the amount of
fuel burned... .~ (p. 69).

“In the last few years, energy productivities have been computed for
all the major modes of intercity transportation.
Railroads... have the highest energy productivity for general
freight: 1,300 ton-miles per million B.T.U.s, compared with 360 for
intercity trucks and 20 for airlines.” (p. 68).

es eet a

ee ete.

Bette

17

use larger aircraft, filed a petition for reconsideration with the
CAB dated January 28, 1976 making the following statement:

“The gap created by the final collapse of
REA’s long-declining Air Express service has had
a particularly significant impact on Federal
Express’ traffic because so few other air freight
carriers offer a system having a geographic scope
comparable to that of REA, particularly at low
density cities.” (pp. 11-12).

The bottom line in environmental terms is the admission
that, because of the large amount added to its nightly volume by
the cessation of Air Express, Federal has had “to add needed
capacity on a grossly inefficient basis — greatly increasing its
cost, wasting scarce fuel, and jeopardizing its service reliability.”
(p. 3).

Nor does the simplistic solution proposed by Federal —
letting it use larger aircraft — address itself to the underlying
problem.

Air Express is the least costly and most efficient method of
moving small shipments by air because of the shared use of
equipment and facilities. For the same reason, the environmental
consequences are less. As the Administrative Law Judge found,
80% of Air Express shipments were carried in the cargo space of
combination aircraft, space which in recent years, with the
advent of wide bodied aircraft, has been greatly underutilized
(JA626(a)). As these aircraft carry passengers also, they would
be operating in any event, and the environmental impact of Air

18

Express carried in that way therefore was minimal. In contrast,
only 42% of air freight forwarder traffic moves on combination
aircraft; the rest moves on specialized all-cargo aircraft, a
condition of imbalance which the ALJ found would be
exacerbated by the shift of Air Express to forwarder operations.
Noise is a further environmental factor because of the emphasis
placed by forwarders on all-cargo night operations, and the
potential effect on day/night operational patterns.

The lack of an environmental! impact statement was raised
in but ignored by the court below (REA Br. 45, fn.). The point
was not raised directly in the administrative hearing because of
the following factors: (a) REA was not seeking termination of
Air Express but its continuation, (b) testimony regarding the
greater efficiency of Air Express was introduced, (c) the
proponents of the termination of Air Express, if anyone, had the
primary responsibility for justifving the environmental
consequences of the change which they sought, (d) the Harlem
Valley and other cases make it clear that the burden of assuring
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act falls
upon the agency itself, (e) at the time of the hearing, the CAB’s
definitive environmental regulations [promuigated in September
1975] were still several years from being written, and (f) the
Administrative Law Judge held that Air Express should be
continued, in part because of its greater efficiency of operation,
so at the time of review by the CAB, REA had no basis for
objecting to the lack of an environmental assessment nor was it
aware of the substantial nature of point until later, when the
great expansion in operations by Federal Express took place.

toe

*
ee ee

es

19

When Federal Express applied for an exemption to allow it
to operate larger aircraft, REA opposed the application and
moved to have the application consolidated withthe Air Express
Service case and the CAB’s priority service docket so that a
comparative hearing could be held on environmental and other
aspects. We also pointed out that Federal’s operation was
inherently wasteful, whether it used large or small aircraft,
because of its specialized nature and the circuity involved,
causing unnecessary air and noise pollution, and that

“The increase in the use of special purpose
aircraft, while the regulated air carriers are
operating combination aircraft with only a
fraction of their belly capacity filled with cargo
would constitute a major federal action having a
substantial impact upon the environment.”
Request for Hearing and Motion, Oct. 14, 1975,
p. 9.

The CAB ignored the environmental aspect and dismissed
REA’s motion as moot on the ground that it had denied the
application for other reasons. CAB Order 75-12-38, Dec. 8,
1975. However, the environmental point was not moot; it was
intensified as a result of the cessation of Air Express and
continued operations by Federal, as demonstrated by the
statements quoted above from Federal’s_ petition for
reconsideration.

The CAB may contend that REA could raise the same issue
in the District Court by bringing an unusual action in the nature
of mandamus, as in Harlem Valley, supra. But neither REA nor

20

the judicial system has the time nor resources to afford that kind
of redundancy. The CAB’s undeniable neglect in addressing air
cargo environmental concerns generally and in the context of
this proceeding particularly, we submit is a subject well worthy
of this Court’s attention. Cf. Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice §11.1 (4th ed. 1969).

Ill. The decision below raises significant and recurring problems
concerning the relationship between the exercise of jurisdiction
by one administrative agency in such a way as to preclude or
frustrate the jurisdiction of other administrative agencies, or the
Bankruptcy Court.

Air Express accounted for approximately 30% of REA’s
total revenues. The rest was derived from surface express,
operated under certificates of public convenience and necessity
issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and various
State agencies. By placing the continuation of REA’s unique
surface express operations in extreme jeopardy, the CAB has
brought havoc to a sector of the public interest with respect to
which it has no jurisdiction.

For over one hundred years, express operations have been
cnaracterized by their inter-moda! nature. This was so significant
a factor in REA’s situation that a tripartite group with
representatives of the CAB, the Federal Maritime Commission
and the Interstate Commerce Commission worked together to
produce a comprehensive Study of REA Express (Staff Study)
in 1965. This Study pointed out that regulation of REA by the
different agencies “...is by virtue of various statutory
provisions which leave unanswered some questions of lines of
demarcation among the several agencies, and also of coverage of

Ce POA RE net a be aN

21

all REA activities,” and that “the impact of competition goes
beyond the areas in which a single agency may exercise its
authority.” (p. 3).

In its annual report for fiscal year 1974. the ICC expressed
concern about the effect of the CAB'’s ruiing regarding Air
Express (p. 54): “A December [1973] ruling by the Civil
Aeronautics Board affecting the operational status of REA
Express, Inc. (REA) may have serious bearing on the company’s
capability to maintain a financially viable posture.” It adds (p.
55): “Whether REA has the capability to continue as a viable
transporation entity im ight of the CAB order remains to be
seen.” In addition, the ICC’s annual report states (ibid. ):

‘In light of these circumstances and the special
status which REA enjoys under the Interstate
Commerce Act in the conduct of its express
service, a joint hearing of the Senate
Subcommittees on Air and Surface
Transportation was held in executive session on
June 10, 1974, to investigate the situation
involving REA. The Commission presented
testimony at these hearings concerning the
current operations of REA. The conclusions of
the hearing have not as yet been made public.”

And the Senate Committee on Commerce in its Report
entitled “Federal Assistance For Carriers of Express” (S. Rep.
No. 92-1158, September 15, 1972) stated (p. 3):

22

“REA has long provided service for such unique
and sometimes undesirable and troublesome
items as corpses, blood, valuables, live animals,
ornamental crops, fresh fruits and vegetables,
shoes, drugs, medicines, coffee, typewriters,
furniture, flagpoles and the occasional household
items, steamer truck or camp baggage. Generally
speaking, REA is a carrier of small shipments.
Reportedly half its shipments weigh less than 50
pounds, almost three of every four are under 100
pounds and only 1/20 of REA’s traffic 1s
shipments weighing 1,000 pounds or more.
Currently the company employs some 16,000
employees.”

“The Committee is concerned about the possible
loss of REA’ Express service which the
Committee deems to be important even though
other companies in some instances may provide
similar service. The need for small shipments
service is of such that the loss of a significant
competitor for small shipments traffic could
conceivably reduce substantially the quality of
service for small parcels. Indicative of potential
difficulties are the problems which reportedly
face the pet industry, many breeders and dealers
(of dogs and birds especially). Some are
considering institution of proprietary service, and
others the formation of a shipper’s association.

;
;

ee

23

Many others, however, are too smail to engage in
such operations. Their potential problems are
most serious.”

As noted in the Statement of the Case, supra, Congress has
just enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, containing provisions for financial assistance for
express companies like REA. The trustee is very desirous of
finding a successor who will rehabilitate the Express Company.
Thus the CAB’s decision to terminate Air Express places a
serious obstacle in the path of rehabilitation, and raises
important public policy considerations which do not lie within

the jurisdiction of the CAB exclusively.

Approximately two-thirds of REA’s revenues derive from
surface express operations regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the regulatory agencies of the various states
throughout the United States. To permit an agency which has an
impact upon substantially less than half of the total of the
operation conducted in the public interest to have a veto power
over the possibility of rehabilitating the Express Company
would be to undercut the regulatory authorities and
responsibilities of the other agencies affected in a way which
Congress could not have intended.

The court below said it saw no “need” for the CAB to
postpone its decision until it has finally determined the issues in
the Rates case or put into effect a new high-priority service (20a-
21a). We suggest that the burden should be just the opposite: in

view of the important public policy considerations pointed out
above, what was the Board’s “need” to implement its decision

24

before those additional events take place? A good and faithful
servant of almost fifty years standing is entitled to no less

consideration.

Further, there is a substantial question whether REA was
accorded procedural and substantive due process by the C AB as
it struggled for survival. On February 18, 1975, REA was forced
to seek reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.
This presented an opportunity to submit new operational plans
which would reduce costs and give the company an opportunity
to straighten out its financial affairs. The creditors were
cooperative. However, the existing labor agreements constituted
a serious impediment to success, and REA succeeded in an
action to have them rejected as onerous and burdensome by the
Bankruptcy Court. In Brotherhood v. REA Express, Inc., 523
F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 1975), cert. denied, — U.S.

, the court said:

“When REA, after going into Chapter Xl
proceedings, was authorized to operate as a
debtor-in-possession, it acted as a newjuridical
entity.”

It was treated as a “new employer” which, the court
emphasized, “. . .must be granted certain prerogatives at the outset
in making changes in the method of operation, business
structure and labor arrangements of a venture. Otherwise, the
free flow of capital and efforts to revive or expand a weak
enterprise might be frustrated.” (/bid.)

25

No single factor led to a greater degree of frustration of the
efforts to revive or expand REA as a Chapter XI debtor-in-
possession than the CAB’s inflexibility. When so extreme an
action as the rejection of collective bargaining agreements as
onerous and burdensome may be justified to satisfy the
objectives of the Bankruptcy Act, do not those same objectives
require the CAB at least to consider the possibility of some
accommodation? The Federal Aviation Act itself specifies that
the CAB shall consider “The regulation of air transportation in
such a manner as to... foster sound economic conditions in,
such transportation ... .” (49 U.S.C. §1302(b).)

Despite the extremity of REA’s situation, and its status as a
new “juridicalentity,” the CAB was unwilling even to accede *o
its request for a hearing following the filing of its petition for
reorganization under Chapter XI. In its request for such a
hearing, REA stated that, “Fairness alone would dictate that, if
the Board is unwilling to approve the new Air Express
agreement in its present form, it should indicate what terms and
conditions it would approve so the continuity of employment
could be assured.” Hence, REA’s request was that the CAB
should “either approve the new Air Express agreement or order
a hearing in which an evidentiary record is made concerning the
new circumstances involving REA and Air Express.”4

At that stage of its existence REA had long passed the point
of ideology regarding Air Express, and was simply and humbly
seeking the opportunity to survive. The CAB turned a deaf ear,

4. Petition for Reconsideration, April 29, 1975, pp. 13-14. The Board denied this
request in its order dated May 23, 1975. REA did not file a separate petition to review as
the Second Circuit had retained jurisdiction over the matter.

26

denied a hearing on what the possibilities might be, and the
court below converted CAB’s non-consideration of the subject
into what is merely a speculation, unsupported by record
evidence, namely that “... the Board, apparently recognizing
employee welfare as a factor to be considered in deciding what
course would be in the public interest... granted air freight
forwarder authority to REA specifically on the ground that its
operation as a freight forwarder would provide the best
opportunity to benefit its employees.” (2la-22a).

We respectfully disagree with that conclusion even based
upon the record as it was presented in a hearing which ended in
1971.5 But as applied to a situation which existed in 1975,
following substantial and profound changes of circumstances,
not made the subject of a hearing before the Board, we submit
that the application of a false premise, namely that air freight
forwarding will be of benefit, when in fact the effect of such a
decision would be to wipe out the company, its jobs, and the
public services it performs, represents a denial of due process in
a very basic way. REA, its management, its employees, its
creditors, and its customers, all of whom had the greatest and
most direct interest in the survival of the company and its
services, and with no motive whatsoever for seeing the wrong
choice made, all believed that the forced conversion of the
company into air freight forwarding would be not “REA’s best
opportunity,” but a disaster:

As shown in an affidavit submitted by REA, such a
conversion would involve substantial changes in operations, in

5. The decision below errs in indicating that dual authority to provide both Air
Express and air freight forwarding service was a primary objective of REA. Dual

authority was requested only as an alternative position if other improvements in Air

Express — primarily reduction of costs and rates — were not made.

|

27

facilities, in marketing approach, in customers, in employee
practices and training requirements, which REA was unable to
make. Thus, in the changed circumstances, the decision to
terminate Air Express became a corporate death sentence.

Lad

. . some kind of hearing is required at some time before a
person is finally deprived of his property interests.” Wolff v.
McDonneil, 418 U.S. 539, 557-8 (1974). We submit that such a
“hearing” must take place with respect to the factual situation as
it eXists in some proximate time relationship to the period in
which the deprival of property interests occurs. In the
approximately four vears following the hearing in the Air
Express Service Investigation, there have been significant
developments involving REA, other carriers, and in the industry
itself. There is a fundamental question of how “stale” a record
may be and still justify “substantial evidence” reliance thereon
within the context of the constitutional guarantee of due
process.

Even the termination of welfare benefits without a hearing
has been held to infringe upon due process, see Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and the termination of a pioneering
public service should be given no less consideration. In a
constitutional scale of values, “there is a human difference
between losing what one has and not getting what one wants,” a
distinction which “is valid in economic regulation,” also, because
“capital has been expended, investor expectations have been
aroused, and people have been employed.” See Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975), and
discussion therein.

7 Finally, “The required degree of procedural safeguards
varies directly with the importance of the private interest

28

affected .. .” \article cited supra, at 1278), and the importance
and magnitude of the public and private interests affected in this
litigation are substantially greater than those in many of the
cases in which this Court has taken for review to consider the
applicability of the due process requirements. (/bid.)

CONCLUSION

So that the decision below will not constitute a further
obstacle to hopes and efforts for the rehabilitation and
restoration of express services for the shipping public, a writ of
certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Arthur M. Wisehart
WISEHART, FRIOU & KOCH
219 E. 42nd Street

Sixth Floor

New York, New York 10017
Counsel for Petitioner

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1791%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.
