# Appendix — Silverton v. California Adult Authority

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 1976
- **Citation:** 425 U.S. 912

## Text

) Supreme Cour,

-&® FILED
| FEB @ bio
MICHAEL RODAS. JF

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1975
“No. 75-1125

RONALD R. SILVERTON, Petitioner,

vs.

CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION: FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

filed on February 9, 1976

RONALD R, SILVERTON
417 N. Harvard Blvd.
Los Angeles, Calif.
90004
Tel: (213) 663-3121
In Propria Persona

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975
“No. 75-1125

RONALD R. SILVERTON, Petitioner,
vs.

CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

APPENDIX TO

PETITION: FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

filed on February 9, 1976

RONALD R,. SILVERTON
417 N. Harvard Blvd.
Los Angeles, Calif.
90004
Tel: (213) 663-3121
In Propria Persona

APPENDIX INDEX

page

Order of Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit,

denying a certificate of

probable cause AP-1

Order rendered by the

District Court of the

Central District of

California, denying a

certificate of probable

cause AP-2

Judgment of the Federal

District Court denying

petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus AP-3

The Report and Recommen-

dation of the United

States Magistrate AP-4-a
through
AP-4-j

California Code of Civil

Procedure §170(5) AP-5-a
through
AP-5-c

California Code of
Civil Procedure §170.6 AP-6-a
and

AP-6-b

Order of Correction by the

United States Magistrate

of the Order of the Federal

District Court AP-7

SS2SEREREREREEREE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FILER

NOV 11 wrs\ °
RONALD R. SILVERTON, ) EMILE. MELE), up Wy
) J. S$. COURT oF sopcars
Petitioner-Appellant, )} _
)
) CA No. 75-8390
: ) DC # CV 74-1636 MML (T)
vs )
)
) ORDER
CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, )
)
Respondent-Appellee. )
x
__ CLERK. U. 5. Dg - 3
- - : ’ ° "ENTRAL District Or Cone. 3: : .
Rey oe . Moe my oe
a ‘ ? * = #
é UNITED STATES DISTRICT COMRT 7" ¥§-.77. "|
Ws . ¢ ~ fe. =
9° | CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ~ -_* > “: of Habeas Corpus is frivolous and without’ merit.’ - 5.
; 3
'
24 ’ Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), this Court certi- )
“23 * fies that the appeal is not taken in good faith for the . |
26 reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendation of the,
27 ‘| United States Magistrate attached hereto as Exhibit A.
28 t IT IS ORDERED chat the Application for Certificate
29 i of Probable Cause to appeal in fornia’ pdtyeris is denjed. .
30 DATED: Aueust / --~.., 1975.
31 ,
( , : »
32 | 44. fj /
AL.COLM LINC,
waa united Stare: oiseRicT subs

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, ; , 075
Z ! Iai 5, 1 1975
? h
i ae hd 6 24 » Di 7 COunt
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5 - name ez C8LITQMLA
' conta CISLaeT C: oo
6 :
7 :
a
i UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
\
° CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 i
N j RONALD R. SILVERTON, ) Case No. CV-74-1636-MML(T)
12 ; )
| Petitioner, )
- { ) JUDGMENT
i Vv. )
- t )
. # CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, )
. )
a " Respondent. )
. 4 )
1S i
17 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §€36(b), the Court has reviewed
18 the petition and the report and recommendaticn dated March 24,
19 } 1975, on file herein, ard concurs with and adopts the findings
0 | and conclusions of the United States Magistrate.
21 IT IS ADJUDGED that the petition for writ of habeas
22 | corpus is denied.
"
23 f IT IS ORDERED that che Clerk serve a copy of this
24 judgment and of the report and recommendation of the United
\
25 | States Magistrate, by United States mail, on the petitioner,
i
26 jon the Actorney General of the State of California and on the
27 Presiding Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court.

as Dated: March J5, 75 { \

2
: Wi lye tele hy hhc

PALCOLM MM. +. CAS
31 Unitea States i Judge

{ j

—— a ed

AF-%

Sass t it sss

——= aS es Se Se

FILE
MAR 2 1 19/5

CLERK. U.S OSTA CT cy
, » U.S OISTA CT Cover
ENTRAL DISTR CT CC? CALIFCRN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD R. SILVERTON, ) Case No. CV-74-1636-MML(T)
)
Petitioner, )
) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Vv. ) OF MAGISTRATE
)
CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY, )
)
Respondent. )
)

This report and recommendation is submitted to the
Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas, United States District Judge,
pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and General
Order No. 104-D of the United States District Court for the
Ceatral District of California.

On June 12, 1974, petitioner, on parole, filed a
petition for writ of \abeas corpus. At the time of the filing
of the petition, peticioner was represented by cowsel.
Pursuant to General Order 104-D the case was referred to a
Magistrate.

A return was ordered and filed. Petitioner filed a
traverse.

On September 13, 1974, petitioner filed a substitution
of attorneys, naming himself attorney of record. A supple-
mental brief was filed on August 27, 1974. Petitioner filed

a supplemental traverse on October 24, 1974.

Af- ne

:

Pri -Sadetume
1-4-1?

ee

The Magistrate has reviewed all of the pleadincs,
return, traverse, supplemental return and traverse, pertinent
portions of the transcript as well as other exhibits eppended
to the petition, Exhibit A submitted after the filing of the
traverse, Exhibits A through I attached to the retyrn, whick

included the unpublished opinion of the California Court of

| Appeals and correspondence filed herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ISSUES PSESENTED

Petitioner seeks relief from his conviction of two
counts: conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses and to
present a fraudulent insurance claim, California Penal Code
§182.4; and soliciting another to commit or join in the
commission of grand theft, California Penal Code §653(f). This
judgment was rendered by a judge to whom the preliminary trans-
cript had been submitted.

The petition, filed prior to the amendment of Local
Rule 19(2)(1) and passage of General Order 144,presented a
problem of interpretation of grounds presented, since petitione-
enunciated no separate grounds for relief in his petition.
However, respondent interpreted the following three grounds
therefrom, which petitioner has not found objectionable in
his traverse or supplement thereto which appear to state
petitioner's claims:

1. When determining petitioner's guilt, the trial
judge considered evidence that was not presented in open court

2. Petitioner's jury waiver and his waiver of the
right of confrontation were coerced in that the triai judge
told his counsel that if he were the committing magistrate,
he would not have held petitioner to answer, and this informa-
tion was conveyed to petitioner prior to his waiver of the

above rights.

5

ARY= 6b

31
32

+ Yl -@andstone
5-1-74—100M —12073

“
"

Se

H
"

3. Petitioner was denied the right to a fair eviden-
tiary hearing in the state court for five reasons:
(a) The Court denied petitioner's introduction
of the results of a polygraph examination.
(b) The Court denied petitioner's request *° cal!
his co-conspirators of the above charges as witnesses.
(c) The prosecutor engaged in misconduct.
(d) The Court denied petitioner's request for
depositions of witnesses; and
(c) The Court should have disqualified itself

because of bias.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
I

At the onset, one must address respondent's argument
that petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies.

Petitioner raised the above-mentioned contentions:
before the California Supreme Court in his petition for heering
on his habeas corpus petition (Petition, p.9) and on his peti-
tion for hearing from the denial by the California Court of

Appeal, of his petition for coram nobis (Petition, p.11).

In both instances petitioner received “postal card denials”.

Respondent, relying upon Conway v. Wilson, 368 F.2d

485, argues that “the California Supreme Court may not have
denied the petition on the merits,” (Return, p.5) citing pro-
cedural deficiencies in petitioner's statement of grounds for
relief.

Respondent's position, and that of the Conway ruling,

has been overruled by Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124,
(9th Cir. 1974). Harris holds that when the California

Supreme Court denies a habeas corpus petition without opinion
or citation, the exhaustion requiremert is satisfied. Id.,

o %.

Fri-sandsone
$-1-74—10085—1073 |}

| at 1128-1129.

The Court stated "there is now no reason to suppose
that a postcard denial without opinion is indicative of
anything but a decision on the merits,” Id., at 1128-1129.
Therefore, respondent's arguments must fail, and it appears
that the state courts have had an opportunity to rule on peti-
tioner's contentions.

Il

Petitioner's first and second contentions, raising
issues of the trial judge's impropriety in considering facts
not presented to him in open court, and petitioner's waiver
of confrontation and jury rights based on information conveyed
by his coumsel that the judge would not have held petitioner
over to answer, may be resolved together. The merits of both
points have been raised and heard at the State's evidentiary
hearing on petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus.
(Rep.Tr. 293, 304). Indeed, this evidentiary hearing was
ordered for the very purpose of hearing the above two grounds.
(Petition, pp. 4-6). | |

Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), the written findings of the
state court are presumed correct, unless petitioner challenges
that the fact finding procedures were unfair and that the
merits of the factual dispute were not resolved.

Petitioner has not brought his objections within the
purview of the §2254(d) subsection. The mere recapitulation
of testimony favorable to petitioner's position, and adverse
to that of the decision rendered by the Court, does not meet
the burden required by the statute.

Rather, the record reflects a full, fair, and adequate
hearing at which petitioner, an attorney of twenty years,
ably represented himself. It also shows that the determina-

tion of the Court was made on the werits after a full

npt-d

che

32

Prl-Gapdstone
$-1-74—100MI—1073

idevelopment of the material facts. The facts found by the

trial judge were those set forth in the transcript, and came

from “the testimony of witnesses," "“counsels' arguments," “the

documents, (including). . . the moving papers for writ of habeas
corpus”, and the judge's own notes. (Rep.Tr. 351-352).

In short, the record as a whoie does net rebut a pre-
sumption of correctness. The record fairly supports the deter-
mination of the trial judge. Selz v. State of California, 423
F.2d 702, 703 (9th Cir. 1970}. No further evidentiary hearing

is required under such circumstances. Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293 (1963). By federal standards, petitioner's argument
also fails.
Ill

Petitioner's enunciation of errors, allegedly denying
him a fair evidentiary hearing in state court, begins with the
Court's refusal *> permit him to introduce the polygraphic i
examination of hs leading witness. The law is clear that “mere
errors in the rejection of evidence are not subject to review ,
by writ of habeas corpus." Charlton v. Kelly, 221 U.S. 447,
457 (1913). See also, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 216,
228 (1941) and Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905). Rather

petitioner must allege an error of constitutional magnitude,
which he has not done.

Furthermore, there is law in this circuit to the effect
that there is no abuse of the trial court's discretion in
rejecting the introduction of polygraph evidence. Polakoff v.

United States, 489 F.2d 725, 727 (C.D. Cal, 1974). Rejection

of such evidence has been justified where it appeared that the
trial judge would not have believed the witmess irrespective

of the polygraph test, United States v. Bentham, 470 F.2d 1367,

1368 (9th Cir. 1972), or where "the amount of reliance upon

them would not overcome the conclusions reached upon hearing

AP-4-2 :
afin

F

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

es

32

FY! -Bamistone

+1 Te—s0CM--1973 |}
|

Esso Transport Company, Inc. v.

lconflicting evidence. '

'Terminales Maracaibo, 356 F.Supp. 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1973).

‘Finally, this jurisdiction has stated, “the error, if any, in

yrejecting the evidence would be harmless under Rule 52(g),

FRCP." United Stetes v. Bentham, supra, 1368.
|
i In sum, petitioner's allegation of a mere evidentiary

= a denialof which has consistently been treated by this

circuit as a matter within the trial court's discretion, must

_

Petitioner secondly argues that he was unconstitutionali
prohibited from producing the testimony of his two co-conspira-
tors, who would have testified to his innocence. At the evi-
dentiary hearing petitioner contended the two witnesses would

have testified to petitioner's state of mind at the time the

|
| case was submitted on the preliminary hearing transcript. (Rep.

|r. pp.93-100). The above issue had already been addressed

| in the testimony of three of petitioner's witnesses. (Rep. Tr.
17-18; 45-50; 104-106). Although petitioner denies the evidence
he sought to introduce "would be more than cumulative” (Tra-

| verse, p.14) petitioner does ncc subdstantiate this argumenc.

. ee

He articulates no new and material evidence not previously
raised, nor does he argue that he was "prejudiced by a failure

, of any particular witness to take the stand." Bryant v. Cox,

312 F.Supp. 218 (W.D. Pa. 1970).

} In short, petitioner has again raised "a question of

j the propriety of the trial judge’s action in the admission of

evidence", Lisenba v. California, supra, at 228, over which this

Court exercises no review. Petitioner makes an inadequate

| showing in constitutional dimensions as to the nature of the
"
| profered evidence. Thus, this contention also lacks merit.
f APA4YoS
-4f-

1 | Petitioner's third contention is that misconduct on

2 l che part of the deputy district attorney denied him the right
a fair evidentiary hearing.

4 The conduct to which petitioner objects concerns the

5 prosecutor asking petitioner's character witness on cross-

6 fexamination if he would have changed his opinion as to peti-

7 tioner's truth and veracity if he had known that petitioner

: was selling babies illegally (Rep.Tr. 194-195). Petitioner

4 objected, and the Court asked the prosecutor if he had any

10 basis for the question. The district attorney first expressed

11 his willingness to “bring that basis to the Court” through

12 witnesses (Rep.Tr. 195) but later decided to withdraw the

13 question “because I don't want to inconvenience people." (Rep.

14 Tr. 196). The deputy district attorney later apologized to
petitioner, admitting he knew better than to ask questions that
he was not prepared nor willing to prove. Petitioner seemed

to accept the apology. (Rep.Tr. 201).

Respondent correctly cites Lisenba v. California, supra,

19 for the holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment leaves California
5 Szee to adopt a rule of relevance” of collateral criminal con-

| duce on the part of the accused. Lisenba, supra,at 236. Yet
22 state law also holds that

such cross-examination (impeachment
23 of character) must be conducted in good faith... ‘An

24 interrogator, in order to avoid a charge of misconduct, must

25 be prepared to follow up with proof’ questions if the existence
26 of harmful facts should be denied." People v. Perez, 58 Cal.2¢
27 229, 238-239 (1962).

28 The instant prosecutor, who admitted, "Unless I was
29 prepared to go forward at the time I asked the question, which
30 I am obviously admitting I am not inclined to do at this time,
31 I should never (have)mentioned it," (Rep.Tr. 201) manifestly

demonstrated conduct falling far short of the "good faith”

PTt-‘.ndstone | A P- ¥- ‘¢

SSZSSRRRREREREREE

32

PT! -Gandatone

jrequired of hia.

”
v

The question remains: did prosecutcrial misconduct

jdeny petitioner's due process rights? Guideline toward resoiv-
i

jing the question is set forth in

lat 236.
"
H “As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due

Lisenba vy. Lifo-nia

» Sudra,

process is the failure to observe that fundarental

fairness essential to the very concept of justice.

In order to declare a denial of it we must find

that the absence of that fairness fatally infected

the trial....”"

It camnot be said that the prosecutor's admittedly impro
per question fatally infected petitioner's trial, for the trial
judge “could be trusted to decide the guilt or innocence upon
the factual basis of the charge.” Brown v. United States,

222 F.2d 293, 298 (9th Cir. 1955). As declared in Iva Ikuko

Toguri D'Aguino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 367 (9th Cir.
p9S8)

4

“Our system of jurisprudence properly makes it
a matter primarily for the direction of the
trial court co determine whether prejudicial

misconduct has occurred. An appellate court

—=s =

will not review the exercise of the trial court's

discretion in such a matter unless the miscon-

duct and prejudice is so clear that it can be said

that the trial court judge has been guilty of

an abuse of discretion.”

Thus, although petitioner has demonstrated an instance
of prosecutorial misconduct, he has not shown that this incidenc

"facally infected" his trial so as to deny “fundamental fairness”

j Lisenba v. California, supra. Nor has he shown that the Courc

idid not judiciously ignore the question and proceed on anything

ft Pa tah

5-1-74—100m—1073 |, of.

1 but “the factual basis of the charge.” Brown v. United States,
2 » SURES. Therefore, petitioner's third contention must also fail
3
4 Petitioner's fourth contention is that the Court
5 erroneously denied his motion to take depositions of several
¢ »witnesses. The Court did so on the ground that since habeas
7 corpus is in the same nature as criminal proceedings, it did
8 not have the power to order depositions taken wless the require-
9 ments of California Penal Code §1335, et seq. were met. (Peti-
10 tion, Exhibic F, pp. 18-21).
11 Clearly, the issue presented is one of state procedure.
12 Like matters concerning the admissibility of evidence, state
13 procedures are not the subject of habeas corpus review. Incor-
14 Rinses the text and authorities of this memorandum as to
15 een first and second alleged errors at the evidentiary
16 Sl ocenten. it appears clear that petitioner has again failed to
17 pst a federal question for which habeas corpus relief may
18 issue.
-_
> Petitioner's final argument is that the state judge
21 ' who conducted the evidentiary hearing should have disqualified
22 himself because of bias. Petitioner cites no supporting facts
23 whatsoever for this legal ground.
24 As indicated, since the petition was originally filed
25 with counsel, petitioner was exempted from the requirement of
26 | using the petition form supplied by the Central District of
27 California. Petitioner was not exempted from compliance with
28 Local Rule 19. Subsection (a)(5)(b) of Rule 19 provides that
29 a petition set forth “in concise form, the grounds upon which
30 petitioner bases his allegation that he is being held in cus-
31 tody unlawfully, (and) the facts which support each of these
32 grounds. e
na hedges

3-1 -74— 00nd — 1973

l -

Petitioner's ucter failure to compl: wicn the parvicu-
jlarity required by Local Rule 19 renders his final contenrion

jwicthout merit. See 2is0, Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 *F.26¢ 1056 (9th

‘Cir. 1974).

a
From the preceding analysis of petitioner's contentions.

rit is apparent that petitioner's grounds for evidentiary hearing
for issuance of the writ are insubstantial. The state court
a of facts has reliably found the relevance faccs to be
{without error of constitutional magnitude. By federal standards
| petitioner received a fair hearing and fair trial. Further

| hearing is neither necessary nor appropriate. Petitioner has
not met the burden of showing that he is being held in viola-
‘tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The Magistrate recommends that petitioner's applica-

‘tion for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

—

DATED: March 24¥, 1975

a

APede)

-10-

27 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES See. 170

CHAPTER 2 ment of marriage, and except also appli-

POWERS AND DUTIES OF cations for confirmation of sale of real

> property in probate proceedings.
JUDGES AT CHAMBERS AND A judge may, out of court, anywhere in

ELSEWHERE the State, exercise ai! the powers and per-

Supreme court judges and judges of courts of form all the functions and duties con-

appeal. +165. ferred upon a judge as contradistin-

Superior court judges. 5166. guished from the court, or which a judge
Judges in courts having no clerk. 5167. may exercise or perform at chambers.

Ley.H. 1872, 1880 p. 41, 1929 p. $50, 1933

743, 195 . 1737.
$165. Supreme Court Judges and ch. 16, WOl ee. Ets
Judges of Courts of Appeal. $167. Enacted 1929. Repealed 1933 ch.
743.

The justices of the Supreme Court and
A new $167 follows

of the courts of appea!. ur any of them,
may, at chambers, grant al! orders and
writs which are usually granted in the 5 167. Judges in Courts Having No
first instance upon an ex parte applica- Clerk.

tion, except writs of mandamus, certi- Any act required or permitted to be per-
orari, and prohibition; and may, in their formed by the clerk of a court may be
discretion, hear applications to discharge performed by a judge thereof, and shall

such orders and writs. be performed by a judge in any court hav-
Leg.H. 1872, 1880 p. 41, 1935 ch. 74, 1967 'N& No clerk.

ch. 17. Leg.H. 1969 ch. 1610.

$166. Superior Court Judges. CHAPTER 3

The judge or judges of the superior. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
municipal and justice courts may, at

chambers, in the matters within the ju Interest, relationship, bias or prejudice.

. 170.
risdiction of their respective courts: Nuchend end wife «= *
>

| BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Sec. 170

party, or to an attorney, counsel, or agent
of either party, by consanguinity or af-
finity within the third degree computed
according to the rules of law, or when he
is indebted, through money horrowed as a
loan, to either purty, or to an attorney,
counsel or partner of either party, or
when he is su indebted to an officer of a
corporation or unincorporated associa-
tion which is a party; provided, howe er,
that if the parties appearing tn the action
and not then in default, or the petitioner
in any probate proceeding, ur the execu-
tor, or administrator of the estate, or the
guardian of the minor or incompetent
person, or the commissioner, or the ref-
eree, or the attorney for any of the above
named, or the party or his attorney in all
other or special proceedings, shall sign
and file in the action or matter, a stipula-
tion in writing waiving the disqualifica-
tion mentioned in this subdivision or in
{1} Subdivision 2 or 4 hereof, the judge or
court may proceed with the trial or hear-
ing and the performance of ail other du-
ties connected therewith with the same
legal effect as if no such disqualification
existed;

4. When, in the action or proceeding, or
in any previous action or proceeding in-
volving any of the same issues, he has
been attorney or counsel for any party; or
when he has given advice to any party
upon any matter involved in the action or
proceeding; or when he has been retained
or employed as attorney or counse! for
any party within two years prior to the
commencement of the action or proceed-
ing; eke
* “5. When it is made to appear probable
that, by reason of bias or prejudice of
*such justice or judge a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had before him.

Whenever a judge or justice shall have
knowledge of any fact or facts, which, un-
der the provisions of this section, dis-
qualify him to sit or act as such in any
action or proceeding pending before him,
it shall be his duty to declure the same in
open court and cause a memorandum
thereof to be entered in the minutes or

’ docket. It shall thereupon be the duty of
the clerk, or the judge if there be no clerk,
to transmit forthwith a copy of such

ee tore ee ones

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 28

a ane ee ee eee

aera to each party, or his attor-

ney, who shall have appeared in such uc- *

{tien er proceeding, except such party or
parties as shall be present in person or by
attorney when the declaration shail be
made.

In justice courts when, before the trial,
either party makes and files an affidavit
that he believes that he cannot have a
fuir and impartial trial before the judge
before which ihe action is pending, by
reason of the interest, prejudice or bias of
the judge, the court may order the trans-
fer of the action, and the provisions of
Section 398 shall apply to such transfer.

Whenever a judge of a court of record
whu shall be disqualified under the provi-
sions of this section, to sit or act as such
in any action or proceeding pending
before him, neglects or fails to declare his
disqualification in the manner herein-
before provided, any party to such action
or proceeding who has appeared therein
may present to the court and file with the
clerk a written statement objecting to the
hearing of such matter or the trial of any
issue of fact or law in such action or pro-
ceeding before such judge, and setting
forth the fact or facts constituting the
ground of the disqualification of such
judge. Copies of such written statement
shall forthwith be served by the present-
ing party on each party, or his attorney,
who has appeared in he action or pro-
ceeding and on the judge alleged in such
statement to be disqualified.

Within 10 days after the filing of any
such statement, or 10 days after the serv-
ice of such statement as above provided,
whichever is later in time, the judge al-
leged therein to be disqualified may file
with the clerk his consent in writing that
the action or proceeding be tricd before
another judge, or may file with the clerk
his written answer admitting or denying
any or all of the allegations contained in
such statement and setting forth any ad-
ditional fact or facts material or relevant
to the question of his disqualifications.
The clerk shall forthwith transmit a copy
of the judge's consent or answer to each
party or his attorney who shall have up-
peared in such action or proceeding. Ev-
ery such statement and every such an-

See. 176
—— i *

29 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
w=

7~_—_—_— | =

~. swer shall be verified by oath in the man-
ner preseribed by Section 446 for the
verification of pleadings. The statement
of a party objecting to the judge on the
ground of his disqualification, shall be
presented at the earliest practicable op-
portunity, after his appearance and dis-
covery of the facts constituting the
ground of the judge's disqualification,
and in any event before the commence
ment of the hearing of any issue of fact
in the action or proceeding before such
judge.

No judge of a court of recurd, who shall
deny his disqualification, shall hear or
pass upon the question of his own dis-
qualification; but in every such case, the
question of the judge's disqualification
shall be heard and determined by some
other judge agreed upon by the parties
who shall have appeared in the action or
proceeding, or, in the event of their fail-
ing to agree, by a judge assigned to act by
the Chuirman of the Judicial Council,
and, if the parties fail to agree upon a
judge to determine the question of the
disqualification, within five days after
the expiration of the time allowed herein
for the judge to answer, it shall be the
duty of the clerk then to notify the Chair-
man of the Judicial Council of that fact;
and it shal! be the duty of the Chairman
of the Judicial Council forthwith, upon ce-
ceipt of notice from the clerk, to assign
some other judge, not disqualified, to
hear and determine the question.

If such judge admits his disqualifica-
tion, or files his written consent that the
action or proceeding be tried before an-
other judge, or fails to file his answer
within the |2| 10 days herein allowed, or if
it shall be determined after hearing that
he is disqualified, the action or proceed-
ing shall be heard and determined by an-
other judge or justice not disqualified,
who shall be agreed upon by the parties,
or, in the event of their failing to agree,
assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial
Council; provided, however, that when
there are two or more judges of the same
court, one of whom is disqualified, the ac-
tion or proceeding may be transferred to
a judge who is not disqualified.

A judge who is disqualified may, not-

—_— eee — . -

“*
.

in his piace.

withstanding his disqualification, re-
quest another judge, who has been
agreed upon by the parties, to sit and act

—_ ee

6. In an action or proceeding brought
in any court by or against the Reci.ama-
tion Roard of the State of California, or
any irrigation, reclamation, levee,
swampland or drainage district, or trus-
tee, officer or employee thereof, affecting
vr relating to any real property. or an
easement or right-of-way, levee, embank-
ment, canal, or any work provided fur or
approved by the Reclamation Board of
the State of California, a judge of the su-
perior court of the county. or a judge of
the municipal court or justice court of the
judicial district, in which such real prop-
erty, or any part thereof. or such ease-
ment or right-of-way, levee, embank-
ment, canal or work, or any part thereof
is situated shall be disqualified to sit or
act, and such action shall be heard and
tried by some other judge assigned to sit
therein by the Chairman of the Judicial
Council, unless the parties to the action
shall sign and file in the action or pro-
ceeding a stipulation in writing, waiving
the disqualification in this subdivision of
this section provided, in which case such
judge may proceed with the trial or hear-
ing with the same legal effect as if no
such legal disqualification existed. If,
however, the parties to the action shall
sign and file a stipulation, agreeing upon
some uther judge to sit or act in place of
the judge disqualified under the provi-
sions of this subdivision, the judge
agreed upon shall be called by the judge
so disqualified to hear and try such action
or proceeding; provided, that nothing
herein contained shal! be construed as
preventing the judge of the superior
court of such county, or of the municipal
court of such judicial district, from issu-
ing a temporary injunction or restra.ning
order, which shall, if granted, remain in
force until vacated or modified by the
judge designated as herein provided.

7. When, as a judge of a court of record,
by reason of permanent or temporary
physical impairment, he is unable to
properly perceive the evidence or prop-
erly conduct the proceedings.

———- «> =f

Sec. 170a

* 8. Notwithstanding anything con-
tained in subdivision 6 of this section, u
judge of the superior court or a judge of
the municipal court or justice court of the
judicial district, in which any real prop-
erty is located, shall not be disqualified to
hear or determine any matter in which
the upposing party shall have failed to
appear within the time allowed by law, or
as to such of the opposing parties who
shall have failed to appear within the
time allowed by law, and as to which mat-
ter or parties the same shal! constitute
purely a default hearing; provided, that
nothing in this section contained shall be
construed as preventing the judge of the
superior court of such county, or of the
municipal court of such judicial district,
from issuing an order for immediate pos-
session in proceedings in eminent do-
main.

Nothing in this section contained shal!
affect a party's right to a change of the
place of trial in the cases provided for in
Title 4 (commencing with Section 392) of
Part 2 of this code.

Leg.H. 1872, 1880 p. 42, 1895 p. 234, 1897
p. 287, 1905 p. 467, 1915 p. 550, 1921 p. 150.
1925 p. 18, 1927 p. 1403, 1y2y p. 958, 1935
ch. 743, 1937 ch. 156, 1939 ch. 1047, 1941 eh
70, 1951 ch. 1737, 1957 ch. 1545, 1959 ch.
744, 1965 ch. 1260, 1969 ch. 446, 1971 ch.
807.

8170.
five

sullivisions 2

1971 Deletes. |

$170a. Disqualified on Appeal When
Participating in Trial.

No justice or judge, before whom a
cause or question may have been tried or
heard, shall sit or act, in an appellate
tribunal, on the trial or hearing of such
cause or question.

Leg.H. 1919 p. 454, 1951 ch. 1737.

§170b. Enacted 1921. Repealed 1933 ch.
743.

§170.1. Husband and Wife—One
Degree of Affinity.

For the purpose of computing the de-
grees of affinity within the meaning of

. ‘ ad —_

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ~~

Section 170, 4here is one degree of af-
finity between husband and wife.

Leg.H. 1945 ch. 960.
$170.5.
lotr,
crieniseiaiaiietinececmaiieseei
$170.6. Prejudice Against Party or
Attorney.

(1) Neo judge or court commissioner of
any superior, municipal or justice court
of the State of California shall try any
eivil or criminal action or special proceed-
ing of any kind or character nor hear any
matter therein which involves a con-
tested issue of law or fact when it shall be
established as hervinafter provided that
such judge or court commissioner is pre-
judiced against any party or attorney or
the interest of any party or attorney ap
pearing in such action or proceeding.

Enacted 1937. Repealed 1959 ch.

(2) Any party to or any attorney ap-
pearing in any such action or proceeding
may establish such prejudice by an oral
or written motion without notice sup-
ported by affidavit or declaration under
penalty of perjury or any oral statement
under oath that the Judge or court com-
missioner before whom such action or
proceeding is pending or to whom it is as-
signed is prejudiced against any such
party or attorney or the interest of such
party or attorney so that such party or
attorney cannot or believes that he can-
not have a fair and impartial trial or
hearing before such judge or court com-
missioner. Where the judge or court com-
missioner assigned to or who ts scheduled
to try the cause or hear the matter is
known at least 10 days before the date set
for trial or hearing, the motion shal! be
made at least five days before that date.
If directed to the trial of a cause where
there is a master calendar, the motion
shall be made to the judge supervising
the master calendar not later than the
time the cause is assigned fur trial. In no
event shall any judge or court commis-
sioner entertain such motion if it be made
after the drawing of the name of the first
juror, or if there be no jury, after the
making of an opening statement by coun-
sel for plainuff, or if there be no such
statement. then after swearing in the
first witness or the giving of any evi-

ee
= ee

ry

31 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES See. 170.7

-_— on,

j

dence or after trial of the cause has oth-
erwise commenced. If the motiun is di-
rected to a hearing (other than the trial of
a cause), the mution must be made not
later than the commencement of the
hearing. In the case of trials or hearings
not herein specifically provided for, the
procedure herein specified shal! be ful-
lowed as nearly as may be. The fact that
a judge or court commissioner has pre-
sided at or acted in connection with a pre-
trial conference or other hearing. pro-
ceeding or motion prior to trial and not
involving a determination of contested
fact issues relating to the merits shall not
preclude the later making of the motion
provided for herein at the time and in the
manner hereinbefore provided.

(3) If such motion is duly presented
and such affidavit or declaration under
penalty of perjury is duly filed or such
oral statement under oath is duly made,
thereupon and without any further act or
proof, the judge supervising the master
calendar, if any, shali assign some other
judge or court commissioner to try the
cause or hear the matter. In other cases.
the trial of the cause or the hearing of the
matter shall be assigned or transferred
to another judge or court commissioner
of the court in which the trial or matter
is pending or, if there is no other judge or
court commissioner of the court in which
the trial or matter is pending, the Chair
man of the Judicial Council shall assign
some other judge or court commissioner
to try such cause or hear such matter as
promptly as possible. Under no circum-
stances shall a party or attorney be per-
mitted to make more than one such mo-
tion in any one action or special proceed-
ing pursuant to this section; and in ac-
tions or special proceedings where there
may be mor * than one plaintiff or similar
party or more than one defendant or simi-
lar party appearing in the action or spe-
clal proceeding, only one motion for each
side may be made in any one action or
special proceeding

(4) Unless required for the conven-
ience of the court or unless guod cause is
shown. a continuance of the trial or hear-
ing shall not be granted by reason of the
making of a motion under this section. if

a continuance is granted, the cause or

ao -
.
-

—— = ©

matter shall be continued from day to day
or for other limited periods upun the trial
or other calendar and shail be reassigned
or transferred for trial or hearing as
promptly as possible.

% Anv affidavit filed pursuant to this
ewetion shall be in substantially the fol-
lowing fornu

bhere set forth court ame cause
State of Caliternia

tounty of

.s

bemw tirst dulv swer

ch proses cnn says Th ! su jar’ or
attorney fer a party tothe within aetim
or stn ial poten veel ne TI it
the Jiheige er court comitniisstonet hefore
whom the teml of tl or a heormig im
thes aforesaid aetied ospeetal pre

! pemeling or te whom if is as
sie s presudieed agamest the party
ms ofterhnes or The thiferest t the
preety rr hs otlorners ser Tht fiant
itttecet r le ves that he eunnet hav el
farce onpartial trial or hearwig before

stil bige or comet eomunisstets

Subseribed and sworn te before ne thos
(Clerk or Notary Public or of!

ftiecr acdmiuiist ring oat!

(6) Any oral statement under oath or
declaration under penalty of perjury
made pursuant to this section shal! in-
clude substantially the same contents as
the affidavit above.

(7) Nothing in this section shall affect
or limit the provisions of Section 170 and
Title 4, Part 2, of this code and this sec-
tion shall be construed as cumulative
thereto.

(8) If any provision of this section or
the application to any person or circum-
stance 1s held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or appli-
cations of the section which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or ap-
plication and to this end the provisions of
this section are declared tu be severable.

Leg.H. 1957 ch. 1055, 1959 ch. 640, 1961
ch. 526. 1965 ch. 1442. 1967 ch. 1602.

—- — *

$170.7. Appellate Department of

Superior Court Exempt From (170.6.
Section 170.6 does not apply to a judge

~

~.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR:
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA °

CIVIL MINUTES — GENFRAL

Case No. __CY_ 74-1636 MML (T)
Title RONALD R. SILVERTON -Vs-

Date 8-26-75 __

CALIFORNIA ADULT AUTHORITY

DOCKET ENTRY

PRESENT:
HON. VENETTA S. TASSOPULOS §RSOX
— ee OTY_ MOOT OS
Deputy Clerk Coart Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
RANERAXRXXSXIVEXKXaEKX . None

EXSXESX NONE

PROCEEDINGS: “In Chambers"

e “tae The Magistrate having been advised of an error and omission
in the Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause,
it is ordered that the words “in forma pauperis" shall be deemed
deleted from line 29 thereof.

It is further ordered that the Report and Recommendation of
the Magistrate referred to therein be attached to the crder denying
application for Certificate of Probable Cause, and be mailed to
all parties of record.

ears MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk pm

Aft.*

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385003_1693%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.
